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2015 Seeing the Unseeable: The Philosophical and Rhetorical Concept of Enargeia at Work in Latin Robert E. (Robert Edward) Hedrick

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COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

SEEING THE UNSEEABLE:

THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND RHETORICAL CONCEPT OF ENARGEIA

AT WORK IN LATIN POETRY

By

ROBERT E. HEDRICK, III

A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Classics in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of

Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2015 Robert Hedrick defended this dissertation on March 16, 2015. The members of the supervisory committee were:

Timothy Stover Professor Co-Directing Dissertation

Svetla Slaveva-Griffin Professor Co-Directing Dissertation

John Roberts University Representative

Nathaniel Stein Committee Member

Francis Cairns Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and certifies that the dissertation has been approved in accordance with university requirements.

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This manuscript is dedicated to two people who have deeply influenced me and who, in fact, share my name: my grandfather, Robert E. Hedrick (1920-1997), and my father, Robert Hedrick, Jr.

My grandfather was a truly great person. He served his country as a captain in the U.S. Army during World War II and saw combat throughout Europe. After returning home, he went on to become the first “Doctor” in the family and was the director of the Orlando location of Florida Southern College. him, I would not be the man I am today.

Throughout my life, my father has been the greatest influence on me both intellectually and ethically. He is also a truly great person and I have strived to emulate him in many ways. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from Duke University (the same college where I received my B.A.). As a high school teacher, he is on the front lines of the Classics discipline. I had the distinct of taking his classes throughout my high school years. Our countless conversations helped me to grow and develop my own critical thought and to become a person guided by the goals of altruism and generosity. He is also responsible for kindling my love of classical languages and literature. I can honestly say that none of this would have been possible without his help, encouragement, and love all along the way. It is with a great deal of love that I dedicate this manuscript to him.

iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project was only made possible thanks to the help and guidance of many people and organizations throughout the last few years. I owe special thanks to my dissertation committee.

In particular, Svetla Slaveva-Griffin and Tim Stover, as the co-chairs, read multiple drafts of each chapter and provided constructive criticism and encouragment throughout this process. I cannot thank you both enough. I would also like to thank the other members of the committee,

Francis Cairns, Nathaniel Stein, and John Roberts, for their kindly advice, assistance, and feedback. Thanks also go out to Laurel Fulkerson for helping me learn the publishing process during my two years as her editorial assistant for The Classical Journal. I also wish to thank Jeff

Bray and Patrick Burns for their help with paper work and for clearing up logistical problems along the way. In addition to them, the FSU Classics department has been a source of tremendous support throughout these years of graduate study. In particular, they provided me with sufficient funding throughout my graduate career and awarded me with the M. Lynnette

Thompson Fellowship for the 2014-2015 school year. Without this support, this dissertation would surely not have been finished this year. I have also benefited from funding from the Duke

Alumni Scholarship (2002-2005) and from the Semple Award from CAMWS to attend the

American School in during the summer of 2011.

This dissertation had a very long gestation period. I was first exposed to the concept of enargeia in my first semester of graduate school, while working on a paper for John Marincola’s class on Xenophon’s Cyropaedia. In other courses, I often found myself returning to this topic and pursuing the study of ancient theories of vision and visualization. Chapter three developed from a paper that I wrote for Dr. Slaveva-Griffin’s class on Platonic . Chapter four is largely based on a paper that I wrote for Dr. Stover’s seminar on . The sections on

iv , Lucretius, and include portions of papers deliverd at recent CAMWS conferences and at the SCS conference this year. I owe thanks for the many comments and questions from the members of these panels and especially to the presiders and , with special thanks to

David Armstrong, Sergio Yona, Wilson Shearin, and Ben Hicks. I also thank the anonymous referees at Philologus for feedback on the Lucretius chapter.

On a more personal note, I wish to thank family and friends who have offered me much needed support throughout this process. My mother and father have steadfastly supported my studies and have always been there for me lending me love and encouragement. I owe special thanks to my brother, Stevie, and sister, Molly, and to their wonderful families for all the love and support along the way. I also would like to thank my grandparents, my Uncle Jim and Aunt

Carol (now deceased), and especially to Topper for all your thoughtful encouragement. Thanks also go out to my in-, the Geer family, for welcoming me into their family and for their great love and generosity. To my closest friends throughout graduate school—Kyle, Shawn, Kristen,

Charlie, Jordan, Sara, Deb, Kevin, Giulio, Ricardo, Ben, and Stephen—I owe many thanks as well. Over these years, you all have been there for me at various points along the way and you have often provided the necessary encouragement, studying assistance, as well as diversions that kept me going.

Lastly and most importantly, I offer humble thanks to my wife, Ashley, who has patiently listened for countless hours as I waxed poetic on the subject of enargeia and who has even read numerous drafts of papers and chapters throughout this process. It is only with your generous and caring support that I was able to bring this project to fruition. This project has, I’ll admit, been daunting—both mentally and physically draining—but you have been there for me every step of the way and I cannot thank you enough. You are my best friend and my true love. I will forever

v be thankful to you for helping to make this possible and, most of all, for your compassion and love every day of our lives together. Thank you, sweet girl.

vi TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... viii CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ...... 1 CHAPTER TWO: PERSPICUITAS: ENARGĒS AND THE HISTORY OF MEANING FROM TO PLATO ...... 15 CHAPTER THREE: EVIDENTIA: ENARGĒS AND ENARGEIA IN PLATO AND ...... 28 CHAPTER FOUR: SCIENTIA: SELF-EVIDENCE AND THE CRITERIA OF IN HELLENISTIC ...... 69 CHAPTER FIVE: ANTE OCULOS: ENARGEIA AS “PLACING BEFORE THE EYES” IN , , AND PEDAGOGY ...... 126 CHAPTER SIX: SPECIES RATIOQUE: ENARGEIA IN THE PHILOSOPHY AND POETRY OF LUCRETIUS ...... 174 CHAPTER SEVEN: PROLĒPSEIS: CONCLUSION WITH ANTICIPATIONS ...... 201 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 226 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 254

vii ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the Hellenistic concept of enargeia (self-evidence/vividness) in both its philosophical and literary dimensions and then applies this concept to close readings of Lucretius’ and Virgil’s Aeneid. I argue that the theory of enargeia provides an important model for understanding the epistemological themes of these poems. My study offers a history of the concept from its origins in Homeric poetry through its development as a philosophical term in Plato and Aristotle, before turning to examine the theory of enargeia in epistemology, rhetoric, and literary theory in the . Based on the foundation of these Hellenistic theories, I turn to a discussion of the stylistic effect of enargeia and the link between seeing and knowing in Lucretius. I illustrate how vivid often serves to inspire knowledge in both the reader and the didactic addressee, Memmius. According to Epicurean

(and Stoic philosophy), vision and sense-perception of self-evident facts ultimately provide the basis for knowledge. I maintain that we can see this same framework underpin Lucretius’ rhetorical strategies, his descriptions, and the way that he guides us as readers to imagine the poetic subjects before our ’s eye.

By noticing how enargeia plays a role in Lucretius’ philosophy and , we can better understand the way Hellenistic thought continued to influence Latin literature. Through the lens of rhetorical and philosophical theory, I draw important conclusions about the epistemological themes in the poem and how they influence the reader’s response. This lens seems entirely appropriate, as Lucretius would have been thoroughly familiar with enargeia through his study of philosophy, rhetoric, and literature. An especially helpful result of my study is that it offers a way to integrate various dimensions of ancient thought—philosophical, rhetorical, literary, and historical—with one another. I show that these aspects are not separate

viii from each other, but rather they allow us to glimpse how various fields of thought interacted and continued to be appropriated and applied in the creation of poetry in the late into the imperial age and throughout the Western tradition. This interdisciplinary approach helps us to draw conclusions about the intellectual background of Lucretius, however my findings and methodology can also be understood to apply for other Latin writers, most importantly Virgil, as

I illustrate through a brief study of the end of the Aeneid in my closing chapter.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

From the Hellenistic period on, ἐνάργεια/enargeia, which is defined by LSJ as

“clearness, distinctness, vividness”,1 plays an important role as a philosophical, rhetorical, and literary concept. These three aspects often blend with one another and overlap in their uses, as the term refers to: 1) clarity [perspicuitas] of physical sensation as well as verbal expression, which is sufficiently lifelike so as to render the subject “before the eyes” of the reader/listener; 2)

(self-) evidence [evidentia] of truth both direct to the senses and indirect through signs, reports, and reasoning; and 3) the epistemological basis for knowledge itself [scientia]. This three- pronged application of the concept provides the framework for this dissertation. In the next four chapters, I lay out the development of enargeia from its more general meaning of clarity through its transformation in the Hellenistic period into a technical concept in philosophy and rhetoric.

These chapters lay the foundation for the close readings of Lucretius in chapter six. I argue that he blends the rhetorical and epistemological aspects of enargeia through his of “viewing and understanding nature” (naturae species ratioque). Because it has several distinct and yet interrelated applications, scholars have mostly concentrated their efforts on individual uses of enargeia—for instance in poetry or in Hellenistic philosophy2—but have largely glossed over the complex inter-connections between philosophy and poetry. My study remedies this oversight by focusing on how the Hellenistic concept allows us an inroad for recognizing and explicating rhetorical, philosophical, and poetic techniques of Roman writers, as illustrated in Lucretius and

Virgil, in particular.

1 Liddell and Scott, revised by Jones (1996) 556 (hereafter abbreviated LSJ). As my study will show, the basic from traditional dictionaries are often far too reductive, ignoring the term’s epistemological and rhetorical nuances. 2 For poetry, see Zanker (1981). For , see especially Ierodiakonou (2011).

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In order to bring out all of these aspects, this dissertation is divided into five thematically consecutive chapters (not counting this introduction), along with a final chapter that offers some concluding remarks and anticipations for further avenues of study. Chapter two, perspicuitas, examines the earliest uses of the adjective enargēs from Homer through the classical period.

Chapter three, evidentia, surveys the development of the abstract noun enargeia in philosophy through the works of Plato and Aristotle. Chapter four, scientia, describes the emergence of a technical concept of enargeia in the of and the Stoics during the

Hellenistic period. Chapter five, ante oculos, looks back to consider appeals to clear evidence in classical orators, before turning to an analysis of how enargeia developed into a literary device in ancient rhetorical and literary theory. In these spheres it comes to refer to realistic imagery, in which verbal descriptions make subjects visible before one’s eyes through the imagination and transform readers/listeners into viewers. Chapter six, species ratioque, illustrates the programmatic use of the concept in the De rerum natura. In it, I argue that enargeia is at the heart of Lucretius’ poem and philosophy. Through enargeia, he makes the invisible subjects of his poem’s physics visible to his readers rhetorically, through vivid descriptions, and cognitively, through appeals to sensory evidence. The concluding chapter of this study points to additional areas of research and applies the theory of enargeia to a second case study, the end of Virgil’s

Aeneid.

On the level of physical sensation, enargeia ( translates the term into Latin as both perspicuitas and evidentia) refers primarily to clarity, usually of vision, arising from sense perception.3 It is only in the Hellenistic period that the term comes to refer to self-evidence, i.e. the direct perception of a fact such that it is clear, obvious, and could not conceivably be

3 Cic. Acad. 2.17.

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otherwise.4 According to the Epicurean and Stoic schools, enargeia is a necessary feature of any criterion of truth or kanôn (measuring stick).5 Only on the basis of direct evidence from the senses, which is clear and convincing (i.e. enargēs), can the mind employ its reasoning to achieve a sure understanding of the world and even draw conclusions about unclear or unobservable phenomena. This lucid type of perception achieves comprehensible knowledge and a surety that this knowledge is correct; it guarantees that one’s experience of the outside world is clear, true, and knowable.6 For Epicurus, enargeia is the link between cognition and the senses.

By reasoning from the certain, clear evidence of the senses, the mind magnifies and distinguishes parts of the universe that are unclear or impossible to see, including the roots of Epicurean physics—atoms and void. The Stoics also based their theories on what they deem to be self- evident (enargēs) and therefore provide the foundations for rational inferences.7 For both

Epicurus and the Stoics, all conclusions about the natural world must be based on clear evidence

4 See Long and Sedley (1987) 491, hereafter L&S, which translates enargeia as “self-evidence… self-evident = enargēs”. 5 For Epicurus, see his Letter to Herodotus 82: “So we should pay heed to those feelings which are present in us, and to our sensations—universal sensations for universal matters, particular ones for particular matters—and to all self-evidence which is present by of each of the discriminatory faculties (καὶ πάσῃ τῇ παρούσῃ καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν κριτερίων ἐναργείᾳ)”. The translation and Greek text is from L&S 17D. See also Ierodiakonou (2011), Striker (1996b, c, and d), Taylor (1980), DeWitt (1943). For the Stoics, see Cicero’s summary based on the Stoic Antipater of cognitive impression (phantasia katalēptikē) as a criterion of truth: “They [the Stoics] also said it was not necessary to define the nature of knowledge or cognition or “grasp” (if we want a word-for-word translation of the Stoic term katalēpsis), and that those who wanted to urge that there is something that can be grasped and cognized were acting unscientifically, because there was nothing clearer than self-evidence (quod nihil esset clarius ἐναργείᾳ) …and they held that things with this degree of clarity did not require definition (nec ea quae tam clara essent definienda censebant)…”. The translation and Latin text are from L&S 68U. See also Hankinson (2003), Frede, M. (1999), Sandbach (1971a) and L&S 40B, K. Epicurus uses the term kanôn (measuring stick) interchangeably with kriteriôn (discriminating faculty), while the Stoics prefer the latter. 6 See, for example, Ierodiakonou (2011), Striker (1996b, c, and d), L&S (1987) and chapter four of this study. 7 See Sandbach (1971a) 19, which summarizes the value of the Stoic criterion of truth, the phantasia kataleptike: “There must be a point to call a halt. There must be some presentations that are immediately acceptable, and are self-evidently true. That is what constitutes a cognitive presentation”. The italics are my own.

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(enargeia), in contrast to “dim”, “hazy”, or “unclear” views of the world, which do not provide sound groundings for knowledge.8

Clarity of expression (Greek saphēneia, Latin perspicuitas) is also linked to the rhetorical and literary usage of enargeia. In the Hellenistic period the latter comes to refer to vivid description (its Latin equivalents include illustratio, repraesentatio, and descriptio).9 Through description, writers of both prose and poetry craft visual imagery for their listeners/readers— even of objects or events that are impossible to see with the naked eye—which possesses a powerful realism (another synonymous Latin expression for enargeia is sub oculos subiectio, literally “casting beneath the eyes”).10 In speech and literature, enargeia thus becomes a valuable device through which verbal expression becomes compelling and almost seeable, and even indicative of truth. By the late and into the Imperial period, can be seen adapting this rhetorical form of enargeia to suit their own doctrines. Thus, (an

Epicurean) and (a Stoic) encourage their students, as well as themselves, to visualize truth and by seeing its self-evidence to apply proper reasoning and render appropriate judgments.

Enargeia, therefore, furnishes us with a critical lens through which we can better understand the interaction between philosophy, rhetoric, and literature in antiquity. Through an examination of the term’s history and its multifaceted applications, I shed light on an important instance in which Hellenistic epistemological theory influenced subsequent Roman literature and the rest of the Western tradition. Furthermore, I argue that Latin writers drew on the concept’s

8 Cf. ’ description of the Stoic view (L&S 40K): “So too, whenever someone is keen to grasp something precisely, he is seen to chase after such an impression of his own accord, as when, in the case of visible things, he gets a dim impression (ἀμυδρὰν…φαντασίαν) of the object. He strains his sight and goes close to the visible object so as not to go wrong at all; he rubs his eyes and does just everything until he takes in a clear and striking impression (τρανὴν καὶ πλεηκτικὴν… φαντασίαν) of what he is judging, as though he thought the reliability of the cognition rested on this”. 9 Zanker (1981) 298. In Greek, a (later) term that is often synonymous with enargeia is ekphrasis, a subject that has received far more scholarly attention in recent years than enargeia; see, for example, Webb (2009), Putnam (1998), and Thomas (1983). 10 See Plett (2012), Otto (2009), Scholz (1999), Zanker (1981) and chapter five.

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triple nature and employed enargeia in crafting literary and rhetorical passages where vision inspires knowledge of truth. In this way, I demonstrate how understanding enargeia allows us to distinguish the rhetorical and philosophical armory of ancient writers, as well as the responses of ancient (and modern) readers. Indeed, I show that enargeia, in all of its aspects, is at the heart not only of Epicurus’ philosophy, but also of Lucretius’ poetic achievement, as in his didactic he brings a universe consisting of invisible atoms in an infinite void before the eyes of his listeners/readers through description and imagery.

1. Methodology: How to study enargeia?

In order to observe how enargeia plays a role in Roman literature—philosophically, rhetorically, and poetically—it is helpful to start at the beginning by considering the origin of the word. Ἐναργεία comes from ἐναργής, an adjective that is derived from the Indo-European root, “ar(e)-ĝ- (arĝ-?), rgi-”, meaning “shining, whitish”.11 In Greek, ἐναργής,-ές was formed from the simplex adjective ἀργής,-ῆτος (Attic ἀργός,-ή,-όν), meaning “shining, glistening; white; bright”, which Cunliffe notes is intensified by the prefix -ἐν. 12 More specifically,

Strömberg argues that whereas ἀργής is often applied to brightness particularly of “vivid lightning”, the likeliest explanation for the origin of ἐναργής is that it is “a possessive compound ...meaning that ‘in which light is’”.13 This observation helps to account for the earliest uses of the adjective in Homer, where it is employed in sublime contexts, applied especially to divinities when appearing in dreams or epiphanies.14 The word ἐναργεία was coined later (likely

11 Pokorny (1959) 64. Pokorny defines these Indo-European roots as “glänzend, weißlich” and also notes that the word is etymologically linked to Greek ἄργυρος (silver) and Latin argentum (gold). The English translations are my own. Cf. Chantraine (1999) 345 and Beekes (2011) 430. 12 Cunliffe (1963) 556. Chantraine (1999) 345, in agreement with Strömberg (1946), notes that the form is “[c]omposé possessif avec le préverbe ἐν- du type ἐντελής d’un thème en s *ἀργός”. 13 Strömberg (1946) 119. 14 For discussion of these, see chapter two.

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by Plato) as an abstract noun. In Latin, a variety of expressions convey the same concept, including “demonstratio, evidentia, illustratio, repraesentatio, and sub oculos subiectio”.15 What is common to all of these terms—from their earliest origin to the later specialized instances—is a stress on brightness or clarity in relation to the sensation of vision.

In chapter two, I begin by establishing how the adjective enargēs was first employed, eventually leading to the abstraction enargeia entering Greek in Plato’s dialogues. The diachronic examples provide a historical survey of the concept from Homer through the Classical period. This evidence shows that the adjective had a broad meaning, simply referring to brilliant appearance or obviousness, but also that it was confined principally to sublime contexts, either in dreams or epiphanic settings. In chapter three, we see the term beginning to shift to take on a more esoteric meaning in philosophical circles and the first examples of the noun, enargeia. In

Plato and Aristotle, enargēs and enargeia are located epistemological contexts where clarity is associated with true knowledge. Additionally, in Aristotle we see the emergence of a literary and rhetorical theory of “placing before the eyes”. This theory influenced the rhetorical schools of the Hellenistic period, which employed enargeia as a conceptual term to refer to highly realistic descriptions. Ultimately, I show that in the fourth century, the term undergoes a transition only to emerge finally in the Hellenistic period as a much discussed concept in philosophical, rhetorical, and literary circles, albeit with different nuances in each field of use.

What started as an unmarked term for “brilliance”, mainly referring to divine subjects, shifted its usage throughout the Classical period, eventually a technical concept of Hellenistic jargon—one which would have a profound impact on Hellenistic and Roman thought.

15 Zanker (1981) 298.

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In chapter four I move on to discuss enargeia’s specialized uses in Hellenistic epistemology. This chapter offers a synoptic examination of the theories of knowledge of the new schools of the period—in particular, Epicurean and Stoic—focusing on the debate over how to determine truth from falsity and whether this is even possible. Having arrived in Athens by

306 BCE, Epicurus’ theory appears to be the earliest, and the Stoics seem to have modified or rejected much of his theory. At the same time, they accepted and adapted certain of his verbal expressions, most notably his insistence upon clear-evidence (enargeia) from sense-perception, and presented their own critical tools for determining truth, called kritēria.

Chapter five supplements the preceding discussion by broadening the scope to include rhetorical and literary theories of the Hellenistic period. After a brief survey of earlier rhetorical uses of the terms enargēs and enargeia, I examine the rhetorical theories of the Hellenistic and

Roman periods, in which enargeia refers to a literary device in which realistic descriptions place a subject “before one’s eyes” (ante oculos). This chapter also includes a brief examination of the

Epicurean , poet, and literary theorist, Philodemus, who lived in Italy during the first century BCE. His surviving writings provide important comparanda for Lucretius, as he was a contemporary of Philodemus and also an Epicurean. While we cannot say whether the two had any association with one another, in Philodemus we can recognize theoretical discussions of visualization and Epicurean therapeutic techniques. Futhermore, like Lucretius, Philodemus was was also very influential upon the next generation of poets including Virgil and . In chapter six, I argue that his procedures of visualization also are at work in Lucretius’ poem.

Although individual sides of the Hellenistic concept have been studied in isolation—including its

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usage in history, in philosophy, in poetry, in rhetoric, and in literary theory16—the advantage of chapters four and five of this study is that they account for all of these various uses. Indeed, by distinguishing and synthesizing these applications, I show show that a complete understanding of the concept is possible only through a complete reconstruction of all its aspects. Thus, we see how enargeia emerges not only as an important concept in Hellenistic philosophy and literary theory, but also how it plays a vital role in Roman literature, especially in Latin poetry.17 These chapters, therefore, lay the methodological foundation for the rest of my inquiry.

Chapter six offers a case study in which I apply the tools laid out in chapters four and five. Through close readings of Lucretius, I demonstrate how enargeia can be fruitfully utilized to elucidate Latin literature. While virtually any author of the Roman period could benefit from examinations of enargeia, I restrict my focus to Lucretius for reasons of both space and relevance to the topic. As a case study, Lucretius is helpful because he is directly and obviously influenced by Hellenistic philosophy—his subject matter is, after all, Epicurean physics—and because his poetic aim is to make invisible and abstract concepts like atoms and void visible and knowable to his readers. Indeed, his influence from and knowledge of Hellenistic literature and philosophy is indisputable. As Lucretius gives us the first fully extant Latin epic and also the one most steeped in Hellenistic thought, it is the primary and most appropriate place to look for evidence of enargeia, both as a rhetorical and philosophical concept. Thus, it offers important evidence of the cross-cultural transmission of the concept of enargeia from to .

Enargeia proves to be a valuable tool for understanding the formative influence of Hellenistic thought on Latin literature of the late Republic, early Empire, and on the later European tradition.

16 See especially Plett (2012), Ierodiakonou (2011), Otto (2009), Parondo (2005), Scholz (1999), Walker (1993), Mueller (1993), and Zanker (1981). Similar to this study, Mueller (1993) argues for a close connection between the philosophical and literary applications of the term, but confines its focus to . 17 Zanker (1981) offers a sort of clarion call for utilizing enargeia in the study of poetry.

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While the code models of the De Rerum Natura in the genre of didactic poetry are

Hesiod’s Works and Days and, more importantly, ’ Peri Phuseos,18 works of the archaic and classical periods, respectively, the literary tools and philosophical armory of the poem are nonetheless steeped in Hellenistic theory and practice.19 By studying how Lucretius employs enargeia, I show how he reveals his influences from Greek Hellenistic trends and how these more recent developments an important role in the poem’s themes, arguments, descriptions, and didaxis.20 I argue that he draws on epistemological and rhetorical enargeia in molding his poetics. In particular, he stresses the power of vision throughout his poem and crafts his imagery to be vivid (enargēs) as an application of Epicurus’ philosophical principles.

Moreover, by making his poetry seeable “before the eyes” of his readers, Lucretius also applies

Epicurean therapeutic techniques, illustrated in Philodemus as well as later Epicurean sources such as of Oinoanda. Vividness of poetic argument and description thus becomes a key component of poetic form and pedagogy. He forces the reader to confront the realities of the world directly through his/her own vision of the world and through the mind’s eye; by seeing, he compels him/her to know the truth of Epicurean physics. The study of Lucretian enargeia reveals

18 I borrow the term “code model” from Conte (1986) 31, who argues that poets, in particular Virgil, employ different types of models in the composition of their poetry and especially in their use of allusion and intertextuality. He defines these models as “exemplary models” and “code models”, noting: “Homer is often, indeed nearly always, Virgil’s “exemplary model” (together with Apollonius of Rhodes, Naevius, Ennius, the Greek and Roman tragedians, and several other authors), but he is also constantly the “code model.” That is, he is present as the model divided into a series of individual sedimented units, but he is also the representative of the epic institution that guarantees the ideological and literary functions of poetry itself—functions that Virgil uses for their exemplary value and restores by direct, unmediated contact. …The essential question is obviously whether he was trying to reproduce single loci or to assimilate rules and codifications. The double vision of a literary model suggests that both interpretations apply.” 19 For Hesiod and Lucretius, cf. Gale (2009) or note Kenney’s comment (1970) 369: “Lucretius… must have been aware that he was writing in a tradition that went back to Hesiod and had passed through various phases since”. Classen (1968) 94 calls Empedocles the “πρῶτος εὑρετής of Lucretius’ type of poetry and, indeed, his only predecessor”. For the importance of Empedocles’ poem as a model for Lucretius’, see especially Sedley (1998). 20 For instance, critics have in recent years chiefly focused on the influence of Hellenistic poetry on both Lucretius, but far less on how Hellenistic rhetoric and therapeutic techniques figure in the poem and his poetic methods; see especially Kenney (1970).

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many visual nuances throughout the poem. In this way, we may better understand not only narratological issues, such as questions of focalization, raised by scholars such as Fowler and

Reed,21 but also the ideological and philosophical significance of imagery. Using enargeia as a literary device, he creates realistic descriptions that invite the reader not simply to listen to the epic, but rather to see it. His descriptions do not simply represent his poetic subjects, but instead enact them, compelling the listener to view the verbal images as if directly present before his/her eyes (ante oculos)22. As the poem would often have been read aloud, the oratorical aspects of enargeia would, moreover, have been far more obvious to Lucretius’ audience than to modern readers. Unlike ekphrasis or “[s]et-piece description”, which Fowler notes “is regularly seen by narratologists as the paradigm example of pause”, 23 enargeia plays a vital role throughout the entire work. It is present in the appeals to the reader and in philosophical arguments, as well as in extended passages of description.

Therefore, I conclude by arguing that in Lucretius and other poets as well, especially

Virgil, who followed his lead, enargeia transforms the listener/reader into a student, who views the complex and sometimes even invisible activities of the universe. These subjects become apparent and self-evident through life-like descriptions, and the audience must then conclude that they are true. Poetic vividness proves to be a central feature of rhetoric and literature, helping to achieve a narrative and didactic telos. By examining Lucretian enargeia, I also draw further conclusions about the reactions of his contemporary readers, readers who would have recognized the authors’ subtle manipulations of vision and knowledge. Ultimately, I show that for Lucretius

21 See Fowler 2000a and 2000b, and Reed (2007). 22 Recall that another synonym for enargeia in Latin is sub oculos subiectio. The ability to create images before the eyes (ante oculos) of the reader/listener is the defining feature of poetic/rhetorical enargeia. Cf. Zanker (1981) 298-9, particularly in reference to Ad Heren. 4.55.68 (Demonstratio [i.e. enargeia] est cum ita uerbis res exprimitur ut geri negotium et res ante oculos esse uideatur) and Cicero, Part. Or. 6.20 (Est enim haec pars orationis, quae rem constituat paene ante oculos; is enim maxime sensus attingitur, sed et ceteri tamen et maxime mens ipsa moueri potest). 23 Fowler (2000b) 66.

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imagery is intimately linked with philosophy, as well as with the rhetorical and literary penchants of the day.

2. Status Quaestionis

Since the pioneering work of Bailey on Lucretius, the visual imagery of the poet has often earned special attention.24 For instance, he goes so far as to argue that “[t]he key to the understanding of Lucretius' mind seems to me to be that it was visual rather than logical”.25

While he is right to acknowledge the importance of vision to Lucretius’ poetic project, he overstates the poet’s lack of logic. In fact, as I show in chapter six, the poem’s visual language, , similes, and descriptions are all predicated on a sensory-based philosophy, i.e. the kanôn, that Epicurus himself laid down as the basis for knowledge. Similarly, West, while offering sensitive readings of the imagery in the De rerum natura, admits in laying out his methodology that “the philosophy I have taken as it comes, subordinating it to the elucidation of the poetry in a way that would have exasperated Lucretius”.26 More recently, Sedley has compellingly argued that the De rerum natura is a versification of Epicurus’ On Nature.27 While

I find Sedley’s arguments generally convincing, he does not relate Lucretius’ poetry to Epicurus’ insistence upon enargeia or to Epicurean therapeutic techniques of “placing before the eyes”. My own methodology, which accounts for the relationship between Epicurean enargeia and

Lucretius’ own poetics, offers a helpful advantage in showing that his writing techniques, aside from their Epicurean subject, are themselves derived from Epicurus’ philosophical and rhetorical views. Indeed, as I argue from complementary evidence in Philodemus’ works, his poetic and

24 From Bailey, see (1926), (1928), (1931), and (1947). 25 Bailey (1940) 280. Also, in his Prolegomena to his commentary on the DRN, Bailey argues (1947) 17, “His mind is visual, not logical, he sees a picture and the picture for him takes the place of syllogistic argument”. 26 West (1969) vii. 27 Sedley (1998).

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didactic procedures cohere with the Epicurean procedures of his close contemporary.

Nevertheless, Lucretius’ project is more ambitious and even more Epicurean, especially in comparison to Philodemus’ more occasional and slight poetry.28 In his poem, philosophy is not subordinated to imagery, nor is imagery to philosophy, but rather they are intertwined in a distinctly Epicurean manner.

In an especially effective statement about Lucretius’ style, Gale argues:

The ‘clarity’ of [Lucretius’] poetry results from its ability to concretize abstract ideas, by the use of imagery, personification and figurative language in general, and thus enable the reader to grasp them with his mind. This is itself consistent with Epicurean principles: the primacy of sensory evidence, and the method of analogical reasoning from the visible to the invisible.29

Her monograph analyzes Lucretius’ use of and touches on many of the visual features of his poetics. For instance, she is right to note in passing the importance of clarity of expression

(saphēneia) to Lucretius’ poetry;30 however, her study does not address the central significance of enargeia, i.e. epistemic self-evidence, to both Epicurus’ philosophy and Lucretius’ poetics.

My study, thus, lends support to Gale’s argument, which links the Epicurean subject of the poem with its poetic techniques. I argue that it is ultimately enargeia, both in the rhetorical nature of the poem and in its analogies from the visible realm of the senses to the invisible world of atoms and void, which provides the “clear view” and the evidence for knowledge of the world.31 By concentrating my reading of the De rerum natura on Epicurean enargeia, I show that Lucretius’ poetry is grounded firmly on Epicurus’ epistemology. The poet, then, is putting his Epicurean

28 See Sider (1997). 29 Gale (1994) 144-5. 30 For saphēneia in Lucretian poetics, cf. also Asmis (1995) and Milanese (1989). 31 Zanker (1981) 309 employs the term “clear view” to describe the effect of ἐνάργεια and shows that the terms ἐνάργεια and ἐναργής were vital to Epicurus’ philosophy, arguing that in his writings ἐνάργεια: “[was] raised to the status of a specific technical term... to denote ‘the clear view’, which is a product of immediate empirical apprehension and which is the indispensable condition for those sense impressions (φαντασίαι) which can be trusted as evidence for the external properties of objects; all true opinion must be based upon it”. Furthermore, one of Cicero’s renderings of ἐνάργεια into Latin is evidentia (cf. Acad. 2.17), a translation that stresses the (self-) evident knowledge achieved through vision according to Epicurus’ epistemology.

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beliefs into practice by performing his own didactic enargeia, based on the rhetorical and analogical techniques of the master himself. 32

3. Telos

Over the course of this study, I demonstrate how Hellenistic theories of enargeia— rhetorical, literary, and philosophical—remain relevant to understanding Roman literature and ultimately to understanding the foundation of literary imagery throughout the western tradition.

Lucretius’ didactic epic serves as my principal case study and allows for a close examination of the ways in which Hellenistic and philosophical theory entered Roman literary practice. Indeed, in his poetry enargeia is employed in all of its various shades in order to convey the didactic subject. While the links between enargeia as a principle in epistemology–in philosophy–and a descriptive device–in rhetoric and –have been recognized before,33 far too often modern scholars have restricted their discussions to only one of its modes

(or have brushed it aside completely, ignoring it as a superficial ornamentation without offering any close analysis of their own).34 By reviewing the history of the term, its emergence as a specialized concept in Hellenistic thought, and its important role in Roman literature of the late

Republic, I provide a synoptic view of this concept, which allows for a more nuanced and thorough understanding of the themes and poetic practices of Lucretius, as well as poets who

32 For Lucretius’ employment of (Hellenistic) rhetorical techniques over Epicurus’ objections to rhetoric (or rather, along his lines), see especially Marković (2008) and Asmis (1983). The debate over internal contradictions in the poem and of a possible disparity between Lucretius’ Epicurean philosophy and his actual poetics goes back to Patin’s “L’Anti-Lucrèce chez Lucrèce” (1868). Like Gale, I argue, contra Patin, that Lucretius’ poetics are intimately linked with and not contradictory to his Epicurean philosophy, in particular the master’s stress on vividness (enargeia). 33 In particular, see Zanker (1981), Otto (2009), Feldherr (1998) especially pp. 4-19, and Vasaly (1993). 34 The phrase “mere enargeia” arises very often in commentaries to both poetry and prose with little to no discussion of the importance of this tool. As an example of how sensitive philologists often find themselves arguing for the importance of enargeia over the predominant bias toward ignoring it as a simple ornamental feature, note Kenney’s comments on a passage in Lucretius (1972) 17: “the vividness is not mere rhetorical enargeia for its own sake; this is not decorative writing but functional writing”. I would argue that Kenney is right not only in his nuanced reading of Lucretius and about his use of enargeia, but also that for Lucretius, no instance of enargeia should ever be dismissed as “mere” anything.

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were influenced by him.35 Indeed, this Hellenistic lens seems entirely appropriate for Lucretius as he would surely have been aware of enargeia as both a philosophical concept and a literary/rhetorical effect, not only through his study of , but also from an awareness of other contemporary schools of rhetoric and philosophy, especially the Stoics.36 Ultimately, I offer new insights into the influences on early Roman epic poetry. Lucretius, as well as later generations of poets including Virgil, employed imagery with complex philosophical and literary aims. By understanding enargeia as a concept with a range of uses, both epistemological and literary, we can better interpret the applications of imagery in poetry as well as prose in antiquity.

Despite my focus on Lucretius, my method and findings would also be applicable to to other poets including Virgil (as I demonstrate in my concluding chapter), as well as Ovid, Lucan,

Statius, and writers of both prose and poetry throughout the Roman Empire or even in the

Medieval and Renaissance periods.37 In this way, enargeia equips us to understand better the influence of Hellenistic thought on later philosophers and/or philosophical poets (indeed

Lucretius combines both).

35 As a point of comparison, Otto’s study (2009) on enargeia only focuses on Greek works (mainly Hellenistic, but also their archaic and classical models). Furthermore, Prauscello (2010) 381, in a review of Otto’s monograph criticizes the author, specifically noting: “[d]espite O.’s claims, philosophical reflection and literary practice are nowhere treated co-extensively and as genuinely engaging with one another”. My thesis aims to alleviate this precise shortcoming, arguing for an integral link between the philosophical and rhetorical uses of enargeia in Lucretius. 36 For general background on the education of Roman poets and their readers, see Fantham (1996). 37 In fact, medieval and renaissance studies on enargeia have already shed much light on the persistent influence of the technique in poetry after antiquity; see, for instance, Plett (2012) and Wells (2002).

14 CHAPTER TWO

PERSPICUITAS: ENARGĒS AND THE HISTORY OF MEANING FROM HOMER TO PLATO

1. Archaic Poetry

As I have laid out the technical uses of the word enargeia in its literary, rhetorical, and philosophical contexts in my introduction, it is worth looking back at the history of the term to see how it developed, ultimately shifting its meaning and becoming an important concept in

Hellenistic discourse. The earliest attested usage of the adjective ἐναργής/enargēs goes back to

Homer’s Iliad and . Cunliffe defines his use of the word as: “(1) In visible presence... (2)

Clear or plain to the mind’s eye”.38 We can see from this definition that already in Homer, the term has a literal and a metaphorical meaning, i.e. a link between sensory and mental vision. It can describe something physically present to one’s sight or something so vivid in the mind that it is as if it were visible. The later is a kind of mental vision, a seeing with the mind. Both meanings, as we shall see, leave a lasting impact on the concept of enargeia in its various applications. In its earliest examples, enargēs has a primary meaning referring to a brilliant appearance, but even at this early stage, it could also be extended to brilliance of thought.

Its usage, however, is more restricted than these initial definitions imply. Looking at the

Homeric examples, we note that the adjective is mainly confined to epiphanic descriptions of gods when they come to mortals, manifest in their divine visage.39 In the first attestation of the

38 Cunliffe (1963) 129, entry for ἐναργής. LSJ 556 defines ἐναργής, ές as “visible, palpable” and, “especially [in contexts] of the gods appearing in their own forms” it means “in bodily shape”. 39 Forms of the adjective are used in the Iliad at 20.131 (discussed above), and in the Odyssey at 3.420 (of ’s appearing to Nestor), Od. 4.806-7 (discussed below), 7.201 (of gods’ appearing to Alcinous and the people of Phaeacia), and at 16.161 (as Athena appears to , but goes unseen by and Eumaeus, the poet notes that gods do not themselves vividly (ἐναργεῖς) to everybody).

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word from the Iliad,40 remarks that Achilles “will be struck with fear if ever a god meets him face to face in the midst of battle. For gods are hard to bear when they appear in their true form [ἐναργεῖς]” (20.130-1).41 Here, the word emphasizes the visual dynamism of the passage, as the poet first stresses the effect of a god’s epiphany directly (ἐναντίβιον) in the presence of a mere mortal. This culminates in the sententious final phrase (χαλεποὶ δὲ θεοὶ φαίνεσθαι

ἐναργεῖς), which ends on the adjective ἐναργεῖς as the last word of Hera’s speech. While only appearing here in the entirety of the Iliad, it is given a prominent position, at line end, as the last word of a direct speech. The line serves as a gnomic statement, which forcefully conveys the awe-inspiring presence of the gods—a radiance that is unbearable to mere human sensation.

Moreover, this emphatic use of the adjective within the epiphanic context leaves a legacy throughout the . It remains a common term in sublime or divine contexts (as will become clear from other examples, but especially from Plato’s sublime moments in the discussed in the next chapter). Indeed, the Homeric precedent also helps explain why in later philosophy and rhetorical discussions enargeia is noted for having an immediate and distinct effect on human senses, more powerful and more distinct than ordinary visual sensation.

The only Homeric occurrence of enargēs outside of this most basic definition comes in the Odyssey, as is consoled by the phantom of Iphthime, sent by Athena.42 The dream figure offers Penelope words of comfort and promises her that her son will return home, although falling short of explicitly telling her news of her long-lost husband, Odysseus.43 As the shadowy image (4.835: εἴδωλον ἀμαυρόν) flies away, Penelope takes solace in the dream, particularly

40 LSJ 556. 41 Il. 20.130-1: δείσετ’ ἔπειθ’, ὅτε κέν τις ἐναντίβιον θεὸς ἔλθῃ / ἐν πολέμῳ· χαλεποὶ δὲ θεοὶ φαίνεσθαι ἐναργεῖς. The translation is my own; Greek text comes from Allen (1931). 42 Cf. Cunliff (1963) 129. 43 Od. 4.806-7.

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because it came to her so clearly (841: ἐναργές)44. While the dream preserves the epiphanic framework of other Homeric instances of the adjective (as the vision is sent to Penelope by

Athena, herself), it nevertheless reveals a different dimension for the term, as the dream—a medium which is inherently unclear and enigmatic—is described as distinct or vivid. Moreover, the advice from the dream image is actually less than fully clear, as she does not directly hear any news of Odysseus, yet it still manages to soothe her worried mind. The line also seems to hint at the paradoxical nature of the circumstance, as the poet notes that the dream was ἐναργές, i.e. bright, clear, vivid, while appearing in the gloom of the night (νυκτὸς ἀμολγῷ). This early use of the adjective hints at aspects which philosophers later draw on in their applications of the abstract noun enargeia, which refers precisely to a vividness of vision that offers comfort and understanding once it has been glimpsed. Just as Penelope reaches a point of understanding because of the vividness of her dream (a dream which is so real and lifelike that she believes in its truth), so too can our knowledge according to later Hellenistic philosophers be assured if confronted with evidence (i.e. enargeia or its Latin form evidentia) from the world which compels our assent to its truth and acceptance of reality by virtue of its vividness. In Homer and on throughout the classical period, as we will see in the rest of this chapter, enargēs refers to vivid clarity (i.e. perspicuitas), without possessing the kind of guarantee of truth argued for by

Hellenistic philosophers.

2. Classical and Poetry

In tragedy, the adjective enargēs continues to appear occasionally throughout Archaic and Classical Greek texts. Aeschylus, for instance, employs the word several times, however he mainly restricts its usage to Homer’s. Let us look closely at a few instances in order to see how

44 Od. 3.842: ὥς οἱ ἐναργὲς ὄνειρον ἐπέσσυτο νυκτὸς ἀμολγῷ.

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his usage reflects and builds upon the Homeric application. First, he uses it in the Persians to describe Atossa’s dream. Like Penelope, Atossa mentions how realistic and vivid her dream was, stating: “nor have I ever seen any such like” (ἀλλ’ οὔτι πω τοιόνδ’ ἐναργὲς εἰδόμην; l.179).45

Furthermore, her dream, like Penelope’s, is predicative of the future (and ultimately proves to be true). In her case, however, the dream brings foreboding, not comfort, as it hints at disaster for her son, Xerxes.

Like Homer, Aeschylus also uses the term in an epiphanic context, as the chorus of

Theban women in the Seven Against prays to for divine intervention, saying (135-

6): “You too, Ares—pity us!—guard the city named for Cadmus and make evident (ἐναργῶς) your closeness to us.”46 They beseech the god to show his concern for them directly or vividly

(ἐναργῶς), i.e. they pray for an epiphany. Similar to the Odyssey passage discussed above, the author of Bound has Io describe her distorted and confusing omens (αἰολοστόμους

/ χρησμούς, ἀσήμους δυσκρίτως τ’ εἰρημένους, 661-2), which ultimately are clarified only by a final, distinct oracular utterance (ἐναργὴς βάξις, 663). The vividness of this oracle compels

Inachus to expel Io, his own daughter, from his home. The veracity of this final prophecy goes unquestioned, precisely because it is clear and compelling, i.e. enargēs. It is this quality that subsequent philosophers and rhetoricians term enargeia, as that which possesses this feature must be accepted at face value by virtue of the obviousness of its reality, i.e. its truth is impossible to contest. Like in Homer, the term has a sense of clarity, but it does not yet assure one of epistemic truth.

45 All texts for Aeschylus from Page (1972). 46 Sept. 135-6: σύ τ’ Ἄρης φεῦ φεῦ πόλιν ἐπώνυμον / Κάδμου φύλαξον κήδεσαί τ’ ἐναργῶς.

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Sophocles also utilizes enargēs in his plays (seven times in those that are extant and once in a fragment).47 A particularly interesting example comes in Oedipus Tyrannus, when Oedipus meets with Kreon and (wrongly) accuses him of trying to steal his throne by arranging for a false oracle. In this case, Oedipus incorrectly assumes that Kreon is obviously the real murderer and a would-be usurper to his throne (ἵκου, φονεὺς ὢν τοῦδε τἀνδρὸς ἐμφανῶς / λῃστής τ’

ἐναργὴς τῆς ἐμῆς τυραννίδος (534-5)).48 What is especially ironic about this use of enargēs

(along with the preceding adverb emphanōs) is that the very thing that he claims is clear and compelling (i.e. enargēs) is manifestly not. Oedipus himself is, of course, the true killer, and it is not at all apparent that Kreon has any desire for the throne.49 In the later, technical usage of enargēs and enargeia of the Hellenistic age, that which is enargēs, by definition is irrefutable and truthful. What Oedipus thinks is obviously compelling and true, is actually wrongheaded and false, therefore it can never be enargēs.

In Antigone, Sophocles employs the word enargēs in order to stress the power of direct sensory evidence, a use that prefigures its more restricted meaning in the Hellenistic period.50 In the ode to , the chorus states (795-9): “radiant desire is the victor, shining in the eyes of the bride who graces the marriage bed”.51 Commenting on this passage, Jebb is right to note:

“ἐναργής, ‘clearly seen’ or ‘present to the lover’s sight’ marks the vivid appeal to the senses, in

47 OC 910 (by Theseus, demanding Oedipus’ daughters be brought to him); Trach. 11 (of the river god ’ appearing in visible form as a bull), 224 (of in an epiphanic description from the Chorus); OT 535 (see above); Ant. 263 (the guard says that while accusations flew, it was not clear (κοὐδεὶς ἐναργής) who had covered the body of Polyneices), 795 (see above); El. 878 (Chrysothemis promises that Orestes is immediately present for ), and Fragment 314.116 (cf. TLG). 48 All Greek text of Sophocles from Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990). Note also how in Jebb’s commentary on the line (1893) 80, any mention of enargeia (which the passage practically cries out for) is completely passed over, instead commenting only on the grammar: “τῆς ἐμῆς closely follows τοῦδε τἀνδρὸς, as OC 1329: so Ai. 865 μυθήσομαι immediately follows Αἴας θροεῖ. If a Greek speaker rhetorically refers to himself in the third person, he usu. reverts as soon as possible to the first”. 49 For a conflicting view on Oedipus’ guilt, see Ahl (1991). 50 See chapter four. 51 Ant. 795-9: νικᾷ δ’ ἐναργὴς βλεφάρων ἵμερος εὐλέκτρου / νύμφας, τῶν μεγάλων πάρεδρος ἐν ἀρχαῖς / θεσμῶν. Translation by Blondell (2004).

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contrast with the invisible and spiritual majesty of the θεσμοί which Love overrides. For

ἐναργής as = ‘before our eyes,’ ‘in bodily presence,’ cp. O.C. 910; Tr. 11, 224”.52 Jebb’s footnote gets to the heart of Sophocles’ clever use of the term, as prior to him the word had solely been employed when referring to what one could see clearly through the sense of vision.

Nevertheless, in this passage where “desire” is the feature that is clear, distinct, and obvious from the lover’s eyes (βλεφάρων), the playwright is employing a traditional vocabulary in a slightly new way. Desire is an abstraction, which cannot be viewed directly or physically with the senses to which the adjective enargēs, strictly speaking, applies. Just as Sophocles subtly elides the difference between physical and metaphorical uses of enargēs, so too, later philosophers will articulate features of the world that are clear and distinct (enargēs), yet which are not accessible through the senses alone.53

While the word was fairly common in Aeschylus and Sophocles, Euripides makes no mention of the adjective enargēs in any of our extant texts. In other poetic genres outside of tragedy and philosophy, the term does not appear to have been very common, although the loss of much of this material makes it impossible to say with any certainty how often the word was used. Whatever the case, it is not found in the writings of Solon, Theognis, Mimnermus, or

Archilochus. It is also not in the lyrics of Alcaeus or Sappho.54 Pindar, however, does employ the word in Olympian Ode 7.42, calling for a “visible” (ἐναργέα) altar.55 In this instance, the vividness of the altar is not simply a divine manifestation (as in Homer’s usage), but is rather an

52 Jebb (1900) 147. 53 I am thinking here of Epicurus, in particular, although it is also a feature of Stoic expression. For instance, according to Epicurus, enargeia is a feature of things that are seen with vision, but it can also be a feature of invisible realities such as atoms and void, which nonetheless possess a vivid veracity that, according to him, compels belief. For more on this, see chapter four. 54 Cf. TLG. 55 Ol. 7.39-43: τότε καὶ φαυσίμβροτος δαίμων Ὑπεριονίδας / μέλλον ἔντειλεν φυλάξασθαι χρέος / παισὶν φίλοις, / ὡς ἂν θεᾷ πρῶτοι κτίσαιεν / βωμὸν ἐναργέα, καὶ σεμνὰν θυσίαν θέμενοι / πατρί τε θυμὸν ἰάναιεν κόρᾳ τ’ ἐγχειβρόμῳ. He also employs it in Fragment 75.13 (ἐναργέα τ’ ἔμ’ ὥτε μάντιν οὐ λανθάνει.); cf. TLG, the Greek text comes from Maehler (post Snell) (1975).

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obvious and distinct public tribute to the goddess for all to see.56 It is a much more literal and less marked use of the term than the tragic applications of his contemporary Aeschylus or, later,

Sophocles.

About a half-century after Pindar, Aristophanes employs forms of enargēs twice in his comedies, once in the adverbial form (ἐναργῶς) at Knights (1173) and once as an adjective at

Wasps (50).57 The latter instance shares a similar, albeit travestied, context with the Homeric usage of the adjective in Penelope’s dream. In Aristophanes’ scene, the slaves Xanthias and

Sosias compare and interpret one another’s dreams. While asleep, Xanthias sees the Athenian assembly not filled with people, but rather with animals (sheep (32), a whale (35)) and theriomorphic politicians, especially Theorus “who had the head of a crow” (43)). This prompts

Xanthias to offer the “obvious” (enargēs, 50) interpretation that the dream portends that Theorus is doomed, i.e. that he will “go to the crows” (51). Xanthias remarks (49-51): “Once a man, he then suddenly became a crow [i.e. in his dream]! And isn’t it obvious [ἐναργὲς] what this means? He’ll rise up from us and go to the crows!”.58 Although Aristophanes caricatures dream interpreters and parodies the “obviousness” of the implications they draw from dreams, the speech of the two slaves, nevertheless, provides a rare piece of evidence in the comic genre of how the word was employed in the late fifth century.59 Indeed, Aristophanes seems to be

56 Note that Svarlien (1990) translates the line: “that they should be the first to build for the goddess an altar visible to all men…”. Translation from the Project online. 57 The sausage-seller claims that “clearly, the goddess watches over you” (ὦ Δῆμ’, ἐναργῶς ἡ θεός σ’ ἐπισκοπεῖ). In this instance, like the example in the Wasps discussed in more depth below, the claims a fact is obvious (ἐναργῶς), however this claim is not substantiated by the direct evidence of the senses. Here, the character instead assumes that Demos is protected by Athene because he is achieving some success. In Aristophanes, clear or obvious evidence, i.e. enargēs, is anything but. It is instead quite ambiguous, despite the fact that it is claimed as self-evident. All Greek text for Aristophanes from Wilson (2007). 58Vesp. 49-51: ἄνθρωπος ὢν εἶτ’ ἐγένετ’ ἐξαίφνης κόραξ· / οὔκουν ἐναργὲς τοῦτο συμβαλεῖν, ὅτι / ἀρθεὶς ἀφ’ ἡμῶν ἐς κόρακας οἰχήσεται. The translation is my own. In his Loeb volumes of Aristophanes (1998), Henderson understands the adjective in its two occurrences as denoting clear, obvious evidence, as in his translation of Wasps 50-1: “[I]sn’t it plain as day that Theorus is up and leaving us and going to the vultures?” (my italics). 59 The play was performed at the Lenaea festival in 422 BCE (Dover’s entry in Horblower and Spawforth, ed. (2012) Oxford Classical Dictionary 164, henceforth OCD).

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parodying contemporary usage of the word enargēs. Xanthias’ interpretation of the dream is not at all “obvious” or “clear”, yet the surety of his claim is brought out by the adjective, enargēs. In his commentary, MacDowell translates the passage, “Well then, isn’t this the obvious conclusion…” and notes further, “ἐναργὲς of logical plainness is rare; I know of no exact parallel. The infinitive is epexegetic: ‘the obvious thing to conclude’.”60 He is right to note the oddness of the phrase, particularly in light of the earlier examples of the word discussed above which do not denote a logical conclusion. Nevertheless, the dream context also explain the use of the adjective as in both Homer and in tragedy the adjective was used in similar contexts where a dreamer made an assumption (of comfort or ill-foreboding) because of a nocturnal vision. While

Sommerstein explicates the passage, noting, “traditional dream-lore …interpreted “seeing yourself with a bird’s head” as signifying that “you will not remain in your own country”,61 he too admits that “[i]n the Greek…there seems to be no clear prediction of Theorus’ death but only of his departure from Athens.”62 Unlike later uses of the term, the examples in Aristophanes show that in the classical period the adjective can both indicate truth or an obvious piece of evidence, but also can be (mis?)applied to unclear evidence—i.e. someone claims that something is vivid or obvious, when it is not. Sommerstein’s comments confirm the ambiguity of the phrase despite Xanthias’ claim of the “obviousness” of his conclusion. This ambiguous usage—as an indicator of truth, but one that can be mistaken—is radically different from the strict use the word comes to have in Hellenistic epistemological contexts, particularly for the Epicureans and

Stoics. In Aristophanes, claims of obvious truth often prove false or at the very least non-

60 MacDowell (1971) 134. The bold text is MacDowell’s. 61 Sommerstein (1983) 156. Sommerstein cites Artemidorus, Onirocritica 1.37 and D. Del Corno, BICS 29 [1982] 58 for this claim about “traditional” dream interpretation. 62 Ibid.

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verifiable. Even in this earlier passage from Aristophanes, the ambiguous nature of claims of

“obvious” truth, show themselves to be problematic and open for debate.

3. Classical Historiography

In prose of fifth century, only Herodotus uses the word enargēs with any regularity (four times in his history).63 These instances too have contexts that are very similar to those in the

Homeric texts where the term was first used. In fact, of the four occasions where Herodotus employs the adjective, two are related to dreams portending the future (of (5.55) and of Artabanus (7.47)) and the other two occur in a passage describing oracles (8.77). In the first instance, Hipparchus ignores an especially vivid (ἐναργεστάτην) vision that came to him in a dream (ἰδόντα ὄψιν ἐνυπνίου τῷ ἑωυτοῦ πάθεϊ ἐναργεστάτην (5.55)), defies its threatening content, and attends the Panathenaea where he is ultimately killed by Harmodius and Aristogiton

(5.56). Whereas characters in Homer and Aeschylus change their actions because of the vividness of their dreams, Herodotus portrays the opposite: Hipparchus denies an evident truth revealed to him in a dream to his own detriment.

In the case of the dream of Artabanus, however, its evidence is ultimately belied by the destruction of Xerxes’ forces. Both Artabanus and Xerxes share a similar vision in which a man appears to them and urges them to stick to their original intentions of marching against Greece, despite certain misgivings both men feel (7.10 ff.). While they originally receive encouragement from the vision,64 Artabanus eventually confesses to Xerxes his continued feelings of trepidation

63 See Powell (1966). The adjective does not occur in the texts of Thucydides, nor in the fourth century in the writings of Xenophon. It occurs only once in Lysias at In Andocidem 3. This usage is similar to Homer’s, particularly as it refers to divinities in an epiphanic context as Lysias notes that (6.3): “the two goddesses vividly exact vengeance upon evildoers” (ὅτι ἐναργῶς τὼ θεὼ τούτω τιμωρεῖτον τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας); the Greek text is from Carey (2007). While people cannot necessarily witness gods’ punishing mankind, Lysias plays on this commonplace sentiment by stressing the obviousness of this claim. 64 Hdt. 7.18.19-20: ἐνθαῦτα ἐπαρθέντες τῇ ὄψι.

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regarding the expedition, especially due to the vastness of the land and the difficulty of harborage (7.49ff.).65 It is precisely here, in acknowledging the compelling evidence of the dream that Herodotus shows the variability of even vivid visions: they too can prove to be false.66

Indeed, it is only the vivid, or as Waterfield translates “unambiguous”,67 nature of the dreams that makes Artabanus support Xerxes’ plans for the Greek invasion, a plan that soon proves disastrous. Herodotus’ phrasing in this instance shows that in classical Greek the adjective enargēs, although used to describe a compelling vision that spurs human , does not entail an assurance of truth. Ierodiakanou is thus right to acknowledge, based on this evidence that, “it seems that the common use of the term enargeia is broad enough to suggest truth, but not necessarily to guarantee truth.”68 Nevertheless, it would be helpful to distinguish a bit more clearly than she does that it is not enargeia that suggests truth, but rather the adjective enargēs.

While they are obviously very closely linked to one another, the former term represents a later development and a specialization of the adjectival form, one which conflicts with Herodotus’ usage. Indeed, in his history self-evident (i.e. enargēs) visions can prove to be false—a conception that later Epicurean and Stoic philosophers would deny as a contradictory expression as, according to their epistemology, that which is enargēs and thereby possesses enargeia, by definition is clear, compelling, and—most importantly—true.

In the last example, Herodotus twice stresses the veracity of oracles (in particular, of

Bacis) when they speak vividly (ἐναργέως λέγοντας (8.77.2), οὕτω ἐναργέως λέγοντι Βάκιδι

65 Hdt. 7.47.9-10: ἐγὼ δ’ ἔτι καὶ ἐς τόδε δείματός εἰμι ὑπόπλεος. 66 Xerxes asks Artabanus (Hdt. 7.47.4-7): “If your dream hadn’t been so unambiguous (ἐναργὴς), would you have kept to your original point of view and been reluctant for me to march on Greece, or would you have changed your mind?” (εἴ τοι ἡ ὄψις τοῦ ἐνυπνίου μὴ ἐναργὴς οὕτω ἐφάνη, εἶχες ἂν τὴν ἀρχαίην γνώμην, οὐκ ἐῶν με στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἢ μετέστης ἄν;). The translation is from Waterfield (1998), Greek text is from Hude (1927). 67 Waterfield (1998) 424. 68 Ierodiakonou (2011) 61.

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(8.77.12)). While Ierodiakonou identifies these oracles as “unequivocal”,69 their meaning is far from clear or “obvious” as she translates the term in this early usage. Furthermore, How and

Wells comment on the passage that, “This is perhaps the strongest profession of faith in oracles to be found in H., often as he delights to notice the fulfillment of prophecy (cf. chapts. 20.1 n.,

96; ix. 43). His faith is in marked contrast with the scepticism of Thucydides (ii.17, 54; v.26)”.70

Bowie actually brackets the passage as being problematic and spurious, while noting that, “[t]his is the only place where H. explicitly emphasizes the importance of clarity in oracles”.71

Furthermore, Bowie also sums up Asheri’s argument, “that H. is not claiming belief in all oracles indiscriminately, but only in those that are clear and shown to be true by events”, although he objects that “even if this were a good example of a clear oracle, the argument would be more persuasive if τοὺς ἐναργέως λέγοντας were written”.72 While the passage again presents a strong connection between the adjective enargēs and the truthfulness of the oracle, the ambiguous nature of oracles shows that even evident signs cannot always be understood until after the facts play out. While Herodotus later claims that (8.96), “every prediction about the

[sea] battle came true—not only the ones made by Bacis and Musaeus, but also the statement made in an oracle many years previously…”,73 he, nevertheless, concedes that these enigmatic statements often escape human recognition.74 While perhaps proving to be true, these omens lack the kind of clear and compelling evidence of the power of enargeia as articulated by Hellenistic

69 Ibid. 70 How’s and Wells’ (1928) commentary on Herodotus accessed through gutenberg.org online on Oct. 19, 2013. They make no comments specifically on uses of enargēs. 71 Bowie (2007) 167. For support, Bowie cites Asheri, D. (1993) “Erodoto e Bacide: consideratzioni sulla fede di Erodoto negli oracoli (Hdt. VII 77)” in M. Sordi (ed.), La prefezia nel mondo antico, Milan: 63-76 and Harrison, T. (2000) Divinity and History: The Religion of Herodotus, 130-2. 72 Ibid. 73 Hdt. 8.96: …ὥστε ἀποπεπλῆσθαι τὸν χρησμὸν τόν τε ἄλλον πάντα τὸν περὶ τῆς ναυμαχίης ταύτης εἰρημένον Βάκιδι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ δὴ καὶ κατὰ τὰ ναυήγια τὰ ταύτῃ ἐξενειχθέντα τὸ εἰρημένον πολλοῖσι ἔτεσι πρότερον τούτων ἐν χρησμῷ Λυσιστράτῳ Ἀθηναίῳ ἀνδρὶ χρησμολόγῳ, τὸ ἐλελήθεε πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας· Translation by Waterfield (1998) 520. 74 Note especially the verb ἐλελήθεε in the last clause above.

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philosophers, although especially in the instance of the oracles of Bacis, we can see the seeds of this usage already being sown. What the Epicureans and Stoics require for evidence to possess enargeia is not simply that a sign proves to be true in hindsight (as Herodotus seems to have it), but rather that it guarantees knowledge and truth both now and in the future.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have surveyed the uses of the adjective enargēs and related terms from the earliest examples in Homer through the Classical period of drama, poetry, and history. From this evidence, we note that even in this early phase the term, usually translated “vivid”, possessed a rich set of nuances, associating it not just with clarity, but also with the sublime and with visual perception. Scholars have noted that the meaning of the word enargēs shifts from its earliest uses through the Hellenistic period, however the exact nature of this change has often been misunderstood or oversimplified. For instance, Strömberg correctly notes that, “In Homer this adjective is used of the gods, on appearing to men in their own forms …[o]r it is employed of dreams, which are specially clear in impression”.75 Nevertheless, as we have seen from the evidence of this chapter, he surely oversimplifies the usage of the term when he writes: “After

Homer, too, the word stands in a fixed relation to dreams and visions …This stylistic nuance, however, is gradually lost, so that the word is in course of time used in the general sense of

‘clear’, ‘distinct’, ‘evident’, ‘obvious’”.76 Over the centuries the term developed a different, but not necessarily more ‘general’ meaning; indeed, it has a very specific usage in the spheres of

Hellenistic philosophy. While the adjective implies truth in Sophocles, Aristophanes, and

Herodotus, we can nevertheless notice that this feature of clarity or perspicuitas can also beguile

75 Strömberg (1946) 118. He cites Il. XX 131; Od. VII 201, XVI 161, and III 420 for the first usage, and Od. IV 841 for the latter. 76 Strömberg (1946) 118. He cites for examples Herodotus V55; VII 47; Corp. Hipp. Προρρητικός I 5 (V 512, I L.); Aeschylus, Πέρσαι etc.

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one’s interpretation and mislead. In the next chapter, we will see how in the fourth century BCE, the term develops important epistemological nuances, which stress the power of sense perception, especially vision. Indeed, in the works of Plato and Aristotle the adjective and the associated term enargeia are explicitly linked with knowledge. Yet as we have seen from the archaic and classical evidence, Plato and Aristotle did not simply invent new metaphorical uses for these terms; rather, they had precedent going back to Homer. Furthermore like Homer, Plato also preserves the adjective’s sublime aspect, a key distinction that will also leave an impact on the Hellenistic notion of enargeia.

27 CHAPTER THREE

EVIDENTIA: ENARGĒS AND ENARGEIA IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

1. Plato and the emergence of philosophical enargeia

While the adjective enargēs continued to be used throughout the classical period with its traditional (non-technical) meaning of “obvious”, “vivid”, or “clear”,77 interestingly the term is not attested in any of the fragments of Presocratic philosophers.78 It seems then that at least through Plato and even Aristotle, as we shall soon see, the word had no technical or philosophically restricted usage. While this claim is admittedly an argument e silentio, the fact that the term remains a non-technical, general adjective for “clarity” even through Plato (and later Aristotle) shows that, at least for these philosophers, the term lacked the specificity that it came to possess in the Hellenistic period.79 Nevertheless, as we shall see, both Plato and Aristotle sow the seeds for the subsequent technical applications of the term as an epistemological concept, which referred to clear evidence of truth, and as a literary or rhetorical , which referred to vivid and realistic descriptions.

To begin, it is vital to quote the following rather lengthy excerpt from an article by

Ierodiakonou in order to establish how modern critics have typically commented on the epistemologies of Plato and Aristotle, and especially how they have emphatically disregarded their uses of the adjective enargēs and its noun form enargeia. Ierodiakonou writes:

77 Cf. Ierodiakonou (2011) 61. 78 Cf. the indices of Graham (2010), Diels, Hermann, and Kranz (1954) (henceforth D-K), and Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983). Using the search features of the online Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (henceforth TLG), I found that while the term does appear in some of the passages, all uses of the term are from testimonia or commentaries in writers from a much later date (e.g. D-K 68 A71 (Simplicius’ discussing a passage from Aristotle’s Physics (8.251B) on ); and Graham 7.5 (Elias discussing Zeno the Elean and his defense of ). In these instances, the applications draw from the usage established by Hellenistic philosophers, not the Presocratics. See also Furley (1987). 79 Cf. Ierodiakonou (2011) and Strömberg (1946) 118. The discussion of Plato and Aristotle below complicates this view considerably, however neither of these philosophers employs the terms enargeia or enargēs in a fully technical manner as philosophers and rhetorical theorists do in the Hellenistic period.

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The same applies [i.e. that “the term enargeia suggests truth, but [does] not necessarily [guarantee] truth”] in the use of the term in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Both of them use it not in a particularly technical way, and even when they use it in an epistemological context it does not necessarily seem to be a warrant of truth (for example, Theaet. 179c6; 206b7; A. Pr. 68b36). It is plausible to suggest that Plato and Aristotle simply followed the ordinary use of the term enargeia, because they did not focus on the question of the possibility of knowledge; for they took it for granted that knowledge is possible, and did not argue about the credibility of what they took to be its foundations. They both were primarily concerned with the question of the general conditions under which we know something, rather than whether these conditions are ever unquestionably satisfied and how we can tell in a particular case that they are satisfied. That is to say, they were interested mainly in showing what knowledge is, and not that it is possible.80

Although the generalization that Plato and Aristotle “took it for granted that knowledge is possible, and did not argue about the credibility of what they took to be its foundations” seems, for the most part, to be correct, I must challenge the way in which Ierodiakonou dispenses with these philosopher’s references to enargeia, particularly in epistemological contexts. In the ensuing pages, I argue that both Plato and Aristotle show an increasingly technical application of the adjective and noun, enargēs/enargeia, and in fact provide the bridge between the traditional and Hellenistic uses of the terms. Indeed, the notion of an “ordinary use of the term enargeia” prior to Plato is belied by the fact that he seems to have coined the term himself. Moreover, the technical significance, which the term comes to have in the Hellenistic period, also has its foundations in Platonic usage of the noun and adjective, as exemplified particularly in the

Statesman and the Phaedrus, respectively, as well as in Aristotle.

While the second chapter laid out the common uses of the adjective enargēs through the fifth century BCE, we can see in Plato’s writings of the fourth century a substantial shift to a new application for both the adjective and its derived noun form, “enargeia”. Like his predecessors, he closely links the terms with the sublime, but he also, for the first time, stresses a connection between clear vision (i.e. enargeia) and access to firm knowledge of truth. Although it is perhaps

80 Ierodiakanou (2011) 61.

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an overstatement to speak in terms of a clear , he, nonetheless, establishes much of the terminology and poses important questions concerning the nature of knowledge, which occupy the Hellenistic period. Particularly, in dialogues such as the Theatetus, the

Republic, and the Phaedrus, the characters raise the issues of the possibility of knowledge, the basis for knowledge, the objects of knowledge, etc. Indeed, (the figure of) both anticipates skeptical philosophers with his famous disavowal of knowledge and claim to ignorance in the (21d),81 while also prefiguring tenets of and other dogmatic with his positive arguments in the middle and late dialogues. As Taylor acknowledges, despite Socrates’ assertions, he nevertheless at other times, even within the

Apology itself, makes claims to certain kinds of knowledge, e.g. knowing that “carrying out his mission is fine and good”.82 Moreover, as Lee notes, “before the Hellenistic era, worries about whether knowledge is really possible seem curiously absent”.83 Indeed, both Plato and later

Aristotle accept that knowledge is possible. What knowledge constitutes, however—the ability to provide a proof, a grasp of Being, a vision of the forms,84 understanding this world of coming to be and passing away, technical know-how, justified true belief, etc.—is often under contention.85

Despite his lack of concern with a criterion for knowledge, Plato nevertheless supplies the philosophical community with the necessary technical vocabulary—including enargeia—and frames many of the central issues for epistemological debate in the centuries to come. He thus becomes the transitional figure in epistemology and in the study of enargeia, bridging the classical usage of enargēs and the Hellenistic theories of enargeia in philosophy and rhetoric.

81 On misinterpretations of the passage, see Taylor (2008) 165 ff. 82 Taylor (2008) 165. 83 Lee (2005) 1. 84 While commenting on Cicero, Long’s (2006h) 296 notes that, ““Looking at” a Form is standard Platonic language, and Plato also standardly says that the Forms are “capable of being seen by the intellect’”. See also Frede, D. (1999). 85 Cf. especially Taylor (2008), Brisson (1998), Woodruff (1990), and Fine (1990).

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a. Epistemic Enargeia in the

The earliest attested usage of the abstract noun “enargeia” comes from Plato’s Statesman

(277b-c):

…we have made our (ἀπόδειξιν) longer, and have in every way failed to apply a finish to our story (τῷ μύθῳ), and our account (ὁ λόγος), just like a portrait, seems adequate in its superficial outline [τὴν ἔξωθεν …περιγραφὴν], but not yet to have received its proper clarity (ἐνάργειαν), as it were with paints and the mixing together of colors. But it is not painting or any other sort of manual craft, but speech and discourse (λέξει καὶ λόγῳ), that constitute the more fitting medium for exhibiting all living things, for those who are able to follow; for the rest, it will be through manual crafts.86

As the Platonic passage evidences, even in its earliest usage, enargeia is tied to both seeing—in this case, like seeing a (not quite finished) work of art—and knowledge through discourse (i.e. ). In the excerpt, the stranger from Elea argues that a philosopher can achieve to a higher degree with argument (logos) that which a painter seems to achieve through his art: namely, a clear and distinct encapsulation of his subject, i.e. enargeia. Enargeia is here opposed to a bare outline [τὴν ἔξωθεν …περιγραφὴν] and represents a special kind of realism, which is well- defined, clear, and highly detailed. It describes something that is “in living color”, so to speak.87

According to the reasoning of the dialogue as well as Plato’s use of logos in other dialogues especially the and the Republic, the ability to provide a logos or explanation on a subject is the defining feature separating knowledge or wisdom (phronēsis or noēsis) from

86 Pl. Plt. 277b-c: μακροτέραν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν πεποιήκαμεν καὶ πάντως τῷ μύθῳ τέλος οὐκ ἐπέθεμεν, ἀλλ’ ἀτεχνῶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ζῷον τὴν ἔξωθεν μὲν περιγραφὴν ἔοικεν ἱκανῶς ἔχειν, τὴν δὲ οἷον τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τῇ συγκράσει τῶν χρωμάτων ἐνάργειαν οὐκ ἀπειληφέναι πω. γραφῆς δὲ καὶ συμπάσης χειρουργίας λέξει καὶ λόγῳ δηλοῦν πᾶν ζῷον μᾶλλον πρέπει τοῖς δυναμένοις ἕπεσθαι· τοῖς δ’ ἄλλοις διὰ χειρουργιῶν. Greek text is from Burnet (1967 [=1900]); translation by Rowe in Cooper (1997) 319. 87 I owe this expression to Francis Cairns. As a point of comparison, Nünlist (2009) 195 notes a scholia to the Iliad that, “Homer’s description of Ajax’ physical symptoms (shortness of breath, sweat) when the Trojan pressure becomes too strong even for him is praised for being ‘more graphic even than painting’ (καὶ ζωγραφίας ἐναργέστερον, school. T Il. 16.107-11 ex)”. In both Plato and the scholiast, the graphic arts are denigrated at the expense of vivid linguistic expression.

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belief (doxa).88 For instance, in differentiating opinion from knowledge, Fine stresses that, “Plato believes that in addition to true belief, knowledge requires an account or logos ( 98s;

Phaedo 76d, Republic 531e, 534b).”89 She also notes that knowledge not only requires a logos

(which she abbreviates KL), but knowledge must also be “based on knowledge” (abbreviated

KBK), summing up this view with the illustration: “I know a thing or proposition only if I can provide an account of it which I also know. Stating an account of something is not sufficient for knowing it; in addition, I must know the account.”90 The Statesman too offers a vivid display of

Platonic logos and reveals an epistemology, which closely alignes knowledge with logos. Here,

Plato puts forward examples of two methods for arriving at truth through explanation: a logos (it offers the clearest illustration of Plato’s practice of division) and mythos, as the stranger and his interlocutors (mainly Socrates the younger) distinguish the nature of the statesman. In this way,

Plato presents a dramatic example of the philosopher doing the work of philosophy, making arguments and distinctions about the nature of his subject matter (in this case, what makes a

88 For example, in Timaeus, Plato (through the voice of Timaeus) most fully expresses the distinctions between logos and mythos. The former is defined as the tool of the world of Being (τὸ ὄν) which is “grasped by understanding along with reason” (νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν), while mythos is a tool of the world of Becoming (τὸ γιγνόμενον) which is grasped by “opinion coupled with non-rational perception” (δόξῃ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου (my translation)) (Tim. 27e-28a). Watson (1988b) 1-13, 89 shows that the phrase doxa met’ aistheseos is, at other points in Plato’s works (Theatetus 152c, 161e; 260c, e, 263d, 264a, Republic 382e), equivalent to the noun phantasia (he calls it “the formula for phantasia” at p.8), although the term does not appear in the Timaeus. Watson (1988a, b) explains the Platonic origin of the term phantasia as well as its later Aristotelian and Hellenistic applications, which has important links to the concept of enargeia in the Hellenistic period and later (on Aristotle, see §2 chapter three; for the Hellenistic applications, see chapter four). Furthermore, according to Plato, the world of Becoming is only a likeness (εἰκόνα) of the world of Being and therefore the tools of this realm must only be a likeness to the true reality of Being (Tim. 29b). The myths, while ultimately only capable of producing opinion, nonetheless can express true opinions. Yet these are non- verifiable and are themselves only likenesses. Indeed, myth, as Socrates also confirms with the verb ἐοικέτω at Phaedrus 246a, is ultimately a just a simile, a likeness to the true realities of Being. See Brisson (1998) for more on the distinction between logos and non-verifiable mythos. 89 Fine (1990) 106. 90 Fine (1990) 107 cites the Theatetus and Republic 533c for this view.

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good politician), and even relying upon myth to illustrate his dense philosophical subjects (e.g. the myth of the succession of Kronos to , 269e ff.).91

Commenting on the dialogue, Lane argues that the stranger’s story coupled with his follow up criticism of the myth, “make it a fulcrum of the dialogue… It serves not only to show the errors in what has gone before…, but also to introduce two points of method which together make possible the completion of the inquiry.”92 Moreover, his discussion of this passage stresses one of the key epistemological concerns of the dialogue and especially of philosophers after

Plato. Lane argues: “The searching criticism of the story, then raises for the reader the question of how to measure: how to judge the grandeur, greatness, suitability and length of the story which has just been presented.”93 Hellenistic philosophers respond to this challenge with their own epistemological theories. In these, they focus on the types of questions raised by Plato and argue that the way one can measure accurately is by having a standard (Epicurus calls it a kanon, a measuring stick) as a “criterion of truth” upon which we can base our judgments. Lane fails to mention the central importance of enargeia—used in this very passage for the first time—as the defining feature of a criterion of truth. What the stranger complains the story is lacking— vividness or clarity—is the principal characteristic of verifiable evidence and the basis for knowledge itself according to Hellenistic theory. The dialogue, along with its companion pieces

Theatetus, Sophist, and Parmenides, was highly influential on the development of later epistemological theory. Here we can see the term enargeia already possessing a meaning rich in signification, one that combines vividness of vision and of description, which later philosophers

91 For Plato’s method of creating philosophical myths as examples, companion pieces, and illustrations of his logoi, see especially Brisson (1998) and Slaveva-Griffin (2003). 92 Lane (1998) 100-1. 93 Lane (1998) 126.

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could (and did) exploit. Thanks to Plato the word enargeia passed into the epistemological vocabulary of Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics.

b. Enargeia and the Sublime in the Phaedrus

In addition to the Statesmen, Plato repeatedly uses the adjective enargēs in the

Phaedrus,94 particularly in the myth of the charioteer, again linking the term with achieving knowledge and in a sublime context. 95 These instances provide another glimpse into the developing technical usage of the adjective. The link between seeing and knowing often becomes problematic for Plato as physical sensation is distinguished from and relegated to an inferior position to reason. This distinction is at the core of his and epistemology,96 as he contrasts the sensible world (τὸ γιγνόμενον or τὸ ὁρατόν)—i.e. the world of things that are seen and therefore come into and pass out of it, and which can be perceived (not known) through the senses (αἴσθησις)—and the world of the Being (τὸ ὄν or τὸ νοητόν)—i.e. the world of the unseeable and eternal forms, which can be grasped only through reason

(φρόνησις or νόησις).97 Nevertheless, Plato’s language, even when describing the invisible forms and Being, is often marked by highly sensual language, especially related to sight, a paradox of sorts. This link is also articulated in the charioteer myth through a recurrent stress on the clarity of vision. In this context he employs several forms of the adjective enargēs. While for

Plato, absolute, true wisdom (φρόνησις) ultimately rests on a reasoned account or λόγος, he nevertheless, contra the orthodox view of him as a strict rationalist,98 recognizes the importance

94 The adjective is used four times in the work at §§250d2, d3, d5, and 278 d4. The three reiterated uses of the adjective in §250d are an especially emphatic instance of the adjective and form the main examples in this analysis. 95 For this myth, see especially Rowe (2009). 96 These ontological and epistemological distinctions are most fully articulated at Republic 509ff. and Timaeus 28ff. 97 Cf. Tim. 28a ff. 98 For a basic summary of the traditional or orthodox view of Plato’s philosophy (or epistemology), one can consult the entries for “Plato” in the OCD written by Dover (1999) 1190-3 or in The Cambridge Dictionary of

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of the senses, particularly vision, as a stepping-stone to grasping eternal truths and especially for expressing these truths in this world. In fact, as the language of the senses becomes fully integrated into the mythos, the bare proof, i.e. logos, of the soul’s immortality at §245c5-246a2 comes to life through the myth and thereby provides the reader (or, rather, the listener Phaedrus) with a synoptic, collective view of the soul’s full interactions between the world of Becoming and the world of Being. The combination of these two philosophical explanations—proof (logos) and myth (mythos)—provide the clarity (enargeia) necessary for the reader to understand and even to envision the soul itself, a moment of poetic sublimity that encapsulates Plato’s .

In the Phaedrus, the pinnacle of the soul’s progression (like in the cave analogy in the

Republic) is not just seeing, but entering (albeit only for a brief moment) the realm of Being.99

The soul is dramatically personified as peaking its head out (ἀνακύψασα) into that which really exists (εἰς τὸ ὂν ὄντως). In this instance, perceptual vision is still secondary to the state of knowledge (συνιέναι) and true understanding. At the same time it is essential to the soul’s understanding of true reality (as it has already seen the true realm whence it came and which it recollects) and for its inevitable journey back down into this realm and its behavior here. In this way ontology, epistemology, and are all intertwined. Furthermore, the objects of the soul’s

Philosophy (1995) 619-2 by Kraut. Traditionally, Plato’s philosophy has been understood to stress the value of complete rationalism and a rejection of empirical knowledge based on the senses. I argue that the conception of vision in the Phaedrus complicates this orthodox view. 99 For the cave analogy, see Rep. 514a ff. Cf. also Rep. 537d: ἐπειδὰν τὰ τριάκοντα ἔτη ἐκβαίνωσιν, ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων προκρινάμενον εἰς μείζους τε τιμὰς καθιστάναι καὶ σκοπεῖν, τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει βασανίζοντα τίς ὀμμάτων καὶ τῆς ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως δυνατὸς μεθιέμενος ἐπ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν μετ’ ἀληθείας ἰέναι. Wood (1987) 509 describes the escape from the cave: “One who follows [Socrates] out of the cave understands first what it is to be chained inside the cave, looking at shadows. But he understands the shadows to be shadows, whereas those chained take them as realities”. Ultimately then, the philosopher is able to understand the shadows, i.e. the sensible realm, as well as the world of Being, a point that agrees with the myth in the Phaedrus. Indeed in Rep. 523b, as well as in the cave (514a ff.), the divided line analogy (509d ff.), and the description of the training of the philosopher at 537d, the admittance of sense perception as a factor along the way to knowledge is retained. While the goal of Plato’s philosophy is a rationalism that goes beyond sense perception, the achievement of this goal only comes about by means of passing through and out of this domain.

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vision are not anything like the material world, but rather truth itself (τὴν ἀλήθειαν) and the forms (κατ’ εἶδος); paradoxically, it sees invisible objects.100 Indeed, the goal of the soul’s journey is a vision [ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν], but one which is accompanied by an understanding (συνιέναι) of true realities, i.e. εἶδος. This knowledge is achieved through a progression, proceeding from sense-perceptions [ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων],101 especially sight, upward, i.e. an for , and ultimately arriving at a unified, true knowledge of Being itself [εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον]. Here, Plato describes a synoptic view, which becomes synonymous with his philosophical mode of collection, whereby the philosopher (or his soul) integrates what he has seen into a full understanding and arrives at knowledge itself. Like the philosopher’s gaze after escaping the cave in the Republic, the myth of the Phaedrus, following as it does upon the logical proof for the soul’s immortality,102 provides both a sort of ascent into the world of Being and then a descent back into the world of Becoming. Only by returning to myth and images, i.e. the objects of this world, can full wisdom be achieved in light of the glimpse of Truth that has preceded it. Thanks to the brilliant clarity brought about by knowledge and rational discussion of the forms—mythically likened to a vision of the invisible, but sublimely beautiful, forms themselves—the philosopher knows and understands the truths of this world of Becoming and can remember the true reality of the world of Being.

100 Strictly speaking the soul, as it is incorporeal, has no eyes or body, however in the realm of myth, which is a likeness (eikon) to the world of Being, Plato often uses imagery that anthropomorphizes the soul and its behavior. Indeed in the Republic, he speaks specifically of the “soul’s eye” (or the mind’s eye), τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα (Rep. 533d), which as in the Phaedrus, is able to see the unseeable forms. In the Phaedrus as well, he expresses the impossibility of humans’ seeing the forms, in particular wisdom (250d: ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ᾗ φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται), in all of their glory. Nevertheless in the myth, the soul, through its clearer sort of vision and entrance into the upper world, is granted access to these immortal sights. 101 On sense-perception (αἰσθήσις) in Plato, see especially Frede, M. (1987b). 102 Rep. 245c5-246a2.

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The wisdom provided by that super-heavenly vision is also linked to Plato’s conception of knowledge as anamimnēsis (249c),103 whereby the soul recalls the things, i.e. the forms, which it once saw (ἅ ποτ’ εἶδεν), prior to its entry into body. Yunis notes: “In the Phaedrus the theory

[of recollection] is neither explained nor justified by argument; rather, it is dramatized in the soul’s prenatal journey upward to glimpse the super-heavenly realm of the Forms.”104 This notion of “dramatiz[ing]... the soul’s... journey” is especially apropos, as the entire myth provides a vivid narrative for the soul’s behavior, but one which is separate from the logical discourse of the proof which precedes it. The vision, which the soul had, is purely metaphorical and even paradoxical, as the objects of its vision are impossible to see.105 Yet, the soul’s, in particular that of a philosopher, wisdom or understanding (ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια) depends upon what it had access to through a non-sensory of vision—a perception which leads to knowledge.

Memory, knowledge, and vision are all intertwined and even come to life through the imagery of

Plato’s mythical descriptions.

Especially noteworthy, yet largely overlooked, is the thrice-repeated word, enargēs.106 It is worthwhile therefore to examine the section closely in order to note how the adjective

(particularly its superlative forms) and synonymous words are utilized by Plato. In this way, we are able to see how this passage lays the groundwork for Hellenistic philosophers who employed the same terminology within their own epistemological and physical theories. He writes (Phdr.

250c6-d7):

103 Phdr. 249c: τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἅ ποτ’ εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὂν ὄντως. The Greek text for the Phaedrus is from Burnet (1967 [=1901]). 104 Yunis (2011) 146. 105 While Plato’s language and writing are certainly less ambiguous and enigmatic, the reoccurring paradoxes of seeing the unseen hearken back to Presocratics such as Parmenides, , and especially , all of whom relied to a great degree on paradoxical language to express their own philosophical truths. 106 Note for instance, Yunis’ commentary (2011) on the passage, which several times translates enargēs as vivid, yet makes no mention of the importance of the word in epistemological or sublime passages of this sort.

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Well, all that was for love of a memory that made me stretch out my speech in longing for the past. Now beauty, as I said, was radiant among the other objects; and now that we have come down here we grasp it sparkling most vividly [ἐναργέστατα] through the clearest [ἐναργεστάτης] of our senses. Vision, of course, is the sharpest [ὀξυτάτη] of our bodily senses, although it does not see wisdom. It would awaken a terribly powerful love if such a vivid image [ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον] of wisdom came through our sight, and the same goes for the other objects of inspired love. But now beauty alone has this privilege, to be the most clearly visible [ἐκφανέστατον] and the most loved [ἐρασμιώτατον].107

As Plato continues the comparison, likening the one who has seen the form of beauty and remembers it to an initiate in the mysteries, the imagery comes to encapsulate his own epistemology.108 The soul’s initial experience of the forms―a vision of them―accounts for its knowledge of true existence, one which cannot be explained rationally; instead, it is presented as a kind of (ἐνθουσιάζων). It therefore requires mythical representation as logical discourse fails to articulate emotional moments of inspiration and sublimity.109 The mystical description is especially fitting for the soul’s activity in the realm of being as in mystery religions, particularly those of Eleusis to which Plato alludes, the culmination of the rituals involved the unveiling of sacred objects, which were seen and thereby understood.110 Indeed the

107 Phdr. 250c6-d7: Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μνήμῃ κεχαρίσθω, δι’ ἣν πόθῳ τῶν τότε νῦν μακρότερα εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ κάλλους, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, μετ’ ἐκείνων τε ἔλαμπεν ὄν, δεῦρό τ’ ἐλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν ἡμετέρων στίλβον ἐναργέστατα. ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ᾗ φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται—δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑαυτῆς ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον παρείχετο εἰς ὄψιν ἰόν—καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἐραστά· νῦν δὲ κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν, ὥστ’ ἐκφανέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον. All translations of Phaedrus are by A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff in Cooper (1997), although at times I have adapted them slightly to illustrate the terms under discussion. 108 Phdr. 249c-d: τελέους ἀεὶ τελετὰς τελούμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται· ἐξιστάμενος δὲ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων σπουδασμάτων καὶ πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενος, νουθετεῖται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρακινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ λέληθεν τοὺς πολλούς. 109 Brisson (1998) 10 notices the importance of myth for emotional moments and links these instances to magic and incantation, writing: “It follows then, that myth is addressed not to the intellect but to the emotions and that it plays especially on the sensations of pleasure and that humans share with other animals. Myth aims to modify human behavior not through education strictly speaking but through imitation, which makes it akin to magic and incantation”. I would add that it is not just magic and incantation, but also mystical moments of inspiration which myths articulate, as in this instance it is not magic strictly speaking that is mythically represented, but rather mystical possession. 110 Burkert (1987) 92-3 describes the Phaedrus as “[b]y far the most influential text about the experience of mysteries”. He also notes, “The revelation of true Being brought about by Eros had already been described in the language of mysteries in the [208e f.], where the distinction between “preliminary initiation” (myein) and “perfect and epoptic mysteries” clearly refers to Eleusis”.

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very name for the highest level of initiates, epoptai, meaning “watcher[s]”,111 testifies to the importance of vision. Like with his terms for the forms, idea/eidē,112 Plato is playing on etymological links between verbs of knowing (oida) and seeing (horao). Burkert argues:

The terms mystai and epoptai are unequivocal; the dancing “chorus” celebrating the orgia and the sacred views113 that convey unforgettable bliss..., while the “sacred sounds are omitted because Plato is concentrating on eide.114

He is surely right to notice the connection between the the stress on eidē and vision. Indeed, the entire analogy to the mysteries is emblematic of the stress on vision throughout the Phaedrus and the epistemology it presents. Thus in Plato’s expression, the anthropomorphized soul―it possesses eyes, while in fact souls are incorporeal―sees the forms, i.e. it views them like epoptai view the sacred mystical objects, and seeing these, it gains knowledge of the greatest mystery of the universe, Truth itself.

It is precisely the soul’s ability to see the forms―a vision that brings knowledge with it―that allows Plato to admit to the importance and power of vision. Socrates states: “Vision comes to us as the sharpest of the body’s senses”.115 Here, Plato adamantly stresses the value of sight and its primacy among our senses; it is the sharpest and the most clear (ἐναργέστατα) of them, particularly as it has the closest kinship to the form of Beauty.116 Nevertheless, vision and the senses have a limit, which true knowledge and wisdom (φρόνησις) do not, for wisdom is not perceptible (φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται). While vision is an important tool along the path to wisdom,

111 Burkert (1987) 172. 112 Plato’s forms (ἰδέα), which are invisible, nevertheless have a name that is closely tied to the world of perceptions, as the word is etymologically derived from ὁράω, cf. Beekes (2011) 577. 113 Italics are mine for this word alone as the stress on vision comes to the fore. All the other italics (as the words are transliterated from Greek) are Burkert’s. 114 Burkert (1987) 92. 115 Phdr. 250d: ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ᾗ φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται—δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑαυτῆς ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον παρείχετο εἰς ὄψιν ἰόν— καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἐραστά· 116 Phdr. 250c-d: περὶ δὲ κάλλους, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, μετ’ ἐκείνων τε ἔλαμπεν ὄν, δεῦρό τ’ ἐλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν ἡμετέρων στίλβον ἐναργέστατα.

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the soul’s true vision of the forms is ultimately not through the senses, as indeed it lacks all corporeal existence including eyes, except metaphorically. Rather, its power is the ability to understand and recall through anamimnēsis the truly existent realm, to which it ultimately belongs. The souls of gods (and of true philosophers) have access to the “view” of the realm of being, which is gazed upon only with the mind (θεατὴ νῷ),117 i.e. by means of noēsis. This viewing with the mind, which Plato describes with various verbs of seeing including forms of

ὁράω (καθοράω,118 ὑπεροράω119), βλέπω,120, θεάομαι,121 and θεωρέω,122 has truth as its object, τἀληθῆ. Indeed, this kind of contemplative or divine vision is the instrument of Plato’s rational mode and the foundation of his epistemology.123

The repeated emphasis on the adjective enargēs—used twice in its superlative form and once coupled with the noun εἴδωλον—shows the term to be vital to understanding this passage in particular and indeed to understanding the dialogue in toto. Moreover, it was, I contend, this passage that subsquently helped to shape the Hellenistic concept of enargeia. Here, Plato names

117 Phdr. 247c-d: ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφὴς οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα, ψυχῆς κυβερνήτῃ μόνῳ θεατὴ νῷ, περὶ ἣν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης γένος, τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον. 118 E.g. Phdr. 248c. 119 E.g. Phdr. 249c. 120 E.g. Phdr. 249d 121 E.g. Phdr. 249e, 250b, 250e. 122 Plato employs the term, θεωρία 46 times in his works, four in the Phaedrus itself (247c, 247d, 276b, 276d. At times, as in 247c-d, it represent the culmination of the soul’s divine vision of truth, however it is often synonymous with various forms of ὁράω, as at 276b where it refers to a farmer gazing upon his plants as they grow. Both θεωρία and forms of ὁράω, when applied to the soul, represent the activities of a rational mind (νοῦς). For more on θεωρία and its connection to the seeable and the unseeable, particularly as related to νοῦς, see Festugière (1950) 105: “Qui dit θεωρία dit vue. Cette vue a pour objet l’Intelligible, le νοητóν. Elle exige donc un organe approprié qui appréhende cet objet. L’idée même de contemplation inclut en son un œil spirituel, un νοῦς. La distinction de deux organes, l’un ordonné au visible, l’autre à l’invisible, correspond exactement à la distinction des deux mondes, l’ὁρατόν et l’ἀειδές”. 123 Phdr. 247 d-e: ἅτ’ οὖν θεοῦ διάνοια νῷ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀκηράτῳ τρεφομένη, καὶ ἁπάσης ψυχῆς ὅσῃ ἂν μέλῃ τὸ προσῆκον δέξασθαι, ἰδοῦσα διὰ χρόνου τὸ ὂν ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ θεωροῦσα τἀληθῆ τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ, ἕως ἂν κύκλῳ ἡ περιφορὰ εἰς ταὐτὸν περιενέγκῃ. ἐν δὲ τῇ περιόδῳ καθορᾷ μὲν αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην, καθορᾷ δὲ σωφροσύνην, καθορᾷ δὲ ἐπιστήμην, οὐχ ᾗ γένεσις πρόσεστιν, οὐδ’ ἥ ἐστίν που ἑτέρα ἐν ἑτέρῳ οὖσα ὧν ἡμεῖς νῦν ὄντων καλοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστιν ὂν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν· καὶ τἆλλα ὡσαύτως τὰ ὄντα ὄντως θεασαμένη καὶ ἑστιαθεῖσα, δῦσα πάλιν εἰς τὸ εἴσω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἴκαδε ἦλθεν. ἐλθούσης δὲ αὐτῆς ὁ ἡνίοχος πρὸς τὴν φάτνην τοὺς ἵππους στήσας παρέβαλεν ἀμβροσίαν τε καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῇ νέκταρ ἐπότισεν.

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vision as the sharpest (ὀξυτάτη) and most vivid (διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως) of the body’s senses (τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος… αἰσθήσεων), the ways in which

Hellenistic philosophers, especially Epicurus, despite his overt disagreement with Plato’s physics and philosophy, discuss the criterion of truth.124 Frede aptly discusses the use of the verb aisthenesthai and concludes that, “Plato narrows down [the] common use so that it does come to have the meaning “to perceive by the senses”, as opposed to simply “to perceive”, “to hear”, “to realize”, “to notice”, or “to become aware of” (a meaning which would also include grasping through mental cognition). 125 While his article focuses on Plato’s use of the verb in the

Theatetus, the passage from the Phaedrus also supports his thesis, as here too Plato distinguishes vision as the best and sharpest bodily sense, but contrasts it with mental knowledge (phronēsis).

Additionally, the passage links the adjective enargēs with Empedocles’ physical theory regarding the sense of sight—a theory which remained the predominant scientific explanation for vision at the time of Plato and later formed the basis for Hellenistic models (especially

Epicurus’).126 The vocabulary of the passage is rife with scientific jargon and references, which

Plato intends the reader to understand based on the background of Empedocles.127 This becomes most notable in the discussion of effluences (tiny particles that everything perpetually releases),

124 Later eclectic and dogmatic Platonist philosophers (as opposed to the skeptical New Academy), who accepted the principle of a “criterion of truth” and enargeia, often tried to (re-)interpret passages such as this retrospectively as supporting the theory of a criterion of truth. For instance, Brunschwig (1994b) 228 comments on Sextus Empiricus’ discussion of the criteria that, “It goes without saying that this notion is supremely important in Sextus’ inquiry, as it is central in the philosophical tenets of the Hellenistic period. When Sextus comes to grips with it, it already has a very long history; and this history has been further extended, in its earlier part, by the fact that earlier philosophical doctrines (of the classical and even the archaic period) have been reinterpreted by the Sceptics [and I would add the Stoics, Epicureans, Platonists, and Peripatetics] and retrospectively construed as so many answers to the κριτήριον question”. This passage surely lent itself to the same sorts of (re-)interpretations of the theory of enargeia in the Hellenistic period and, I claim, would have encouraged the introduction of the term as a technical concept in epistemology. 125 Frede, M. (1987b) 3. 126 For discussion of Empedocles’ theory of perception, see especially Ierodiakonou (2005) and Long (1966). Text, English translations, and commentary for Empedocles are available in Graham (2010), in Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983), and in Wright (1981), the last of which is of great assistance as it provides an exhaustive index verborum. 127 Empedocles dates to circa 492-432 BCE (OCD 503).

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which the eye physically admits through its pores and which thereby provide a material basis for the sensation of sight. Of the lover (erastes) beholding his beloved (eromenos), Plato writes

(Phdr. 251 b-c):

Once he has looked at him, his chill gives way to sweating and a high fever, because the stream (ἀπορροὴν) of beauty that pours into him through his eyes (διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων) warms him up and waters the growth of his [i.e. his soul’s] wings. …when it looks (βλέπουσα) upon the beauty of the boy and takes in the stream of particles (μέρη ἐπιόντα) flowing into it from his beauty (that is why it is called ‘desire’ (ἵμερος), when it is watered and warmed by this, then all its pain subsides and is replaced by joy.128

Yunis notices the Empedoclean connections and he comments, “The stream of beauty that comes through the eyes is a borrowing from Empedocles’ theory of perception, whereby we see things by virtue of effluences (ἀπορροαί, Meno 76c) that come forth from things and go into pores in our eyes (Empedocles DK 31 A86.7, 87, B89, 109a).”129 These effluences are the physical basis for vision; material films are said to shed off of objects perpetually and to come into direct contact with bodily organs (in this case the eye) and cause vision to occur. Indeed, in one fragment of Empedocles preserved in Plutarch, he explicitly states, “of all things that have come to be there are effluences [ἀπορροαί].” 130 In the passage from the Phaedrus, this theory is taken for granted and the beloved’s beautiful effluences (ἀπορροαί, 251b2), as Plato employs

Empedocles’ key term, inspire the lover to think of Beauty itself.

While the Platonic passage owes much to Empedoclean physics, it nevertheless also employs key words, which are not present in Empedocles, but rather are central to the theories of

128 Phdr. 251b-c: δεξάμενος γὰρ τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀπορροὴν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ἐθερμάνθη ᾗ ἡ τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις ἄρδεται, θερμανθέντος δὲ ἐτάκη τὰ περὶ τὴν ἔκφυσιν, ἃ πάλαι ὑπὸ σκληρότητος συμμεμυκότα εἶργε μὴ βλαστάνειν, ἐπιρρυείσης δὲ τῆς τροφῆς ᾤδησέ τε καὶ ὥρμησε φύεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς ῥίζης ὁ τοῦ πτεροῦ καυλὸς ὑπὸ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος· πᾶσα γὰρ ἦν τὸ πάλαι πτερωτή. (c) ζεῖ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ὅλη καὶ ἀνακηκίει, καὶ ὅπερ τὸ τῶν ὀδοντοφυούντων πάθος περὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας γίγνεται ὅταν ἄρτι φύωσιν, κνῆσίς τε καὶ ἀγανάκτησις περὶ τὰ οὖλα, ταὐτὸν δὴ πέπονθεν ἡ τοῦ πτεροφυεῖν ἀρχομένου ψυχή· ζεῖ τε καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ γαργαλίζεται φύουσα τὰ πτερά. ὅταν μὲν οὖν βλέπουσα πρὸς τὸ τοῦ παιδὸς κάλλος, ἐκεῖθεν μέρη ἐπιόντα καὶ ῥέοντ’—ἃ δὴ διὰ ταῦτα ἵμερος καλεῖται—δεχομένη [τὸν ἵμερον] ἄρδηταί τε καὶ θερμαίνηται, λωφᾷ τε τῆς ὀδύνης καὶ γέγηθεν· 129 Yunis (2011) 153. 130 From Plutarch’s Natural Questions 916d: “πάντων εἰσὶν ἀπορροαί, ὅσσ’ ἐγένοντο” (numbered in Graham 153 [F107], and DK 31 B89). Translation from Graham (2010) 396-7.

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Democritus. 131 In fact, in commenting on the same passage from Plutarch describing

Empedocles’ effluences, Long writes:

These ἀπορροαί, like everything else, are material and presumably, though we have no evidence on this point, analogous to the εἴδωλα of Democritus. We may infer that they are qualitatively identical with the body which produces them, for one of the conditions of perception is the reception of ἀπορροαί by the sense-organs.132

This is especially noteworthy as Long appropriately links Empedocles’ effluences (ἀπορροαί) to Democritus’ images (εἴδωλα), although he neglects to mention this section of the Phaedrus for support. Indeed, this passage provides the very sort of evidence which he laments is lacking, as it shows that in Plato’s mind, at the very least, the two terms are analogous. Moreover, this also provides an important link between Empedocles, Democritus, and the Hellenistic philosophers, as it is Democritus’ physics and terminology, not Empedocles’, which later provides Epicurus with the central concepts and vocabulary for his physics.

In the Phaedrus, Plato employs Democritus’ key word for the material image, εἴδωλον

(250d6), which, according to his theory, passes from objects to the eye, instead of restricting himself to Empedocles’ term, effluences (ἀπορροαί), although used as a synonym at 251b2.133

131 Democritus’ dates are notoriously difficult to pin down (cf. the commentary of Taylor (1999) 157 ff.), but he was likely born in the mid-5th century BCE (the OCD gives the dates 460-57) and died some time in the early to mid-4th C., making him slightly older than Plato, but nonetheless a close contemporary. According to the Life of Democritus by Diogenes Laertius (9.40), “Plato, who mentions practically all the early philosophers, never mentions Democritus at all, even in places where he ought to reply to him. He plainly realized that he would be disputing with the best of the philosophers”; the translation is by Taylor (1999) 57. While Diogenes is right to recognize that Plato does not mention Democritus by name (although Diogenes also notes that in the Pseudo-Platonic text the Rivals of Love, “Democritus may be the unnamed participant… who talks to Socrates about philosophy” (ibid)), the Phaedrus excerpt provides valuable evidence for Plato’s engagement in a sort of philosophical dialogue with Democritus. He draws on his contemporary’s terminology in articulating his own conception of vision and alluding to the similar physical system of Empedocles. Ferwerda (1972) 351 shows that ancient doxographers and philosophers also often linked Plato and Democritus with one another, even at times quoting them “in support of the same theory”. Ferewerda shows that these references misunderstand their philosophies (treating similar vocabulary in their works as though the two had views which complemented one another). He concludes that, “[t]here is no reason to conclude from these texts that ancient authors believed in a deep hostility between them”. 132 Long (1966) 260. 133 Plato again uses εἴδωλον in a similar context at Phdr. 255d7. In the Meno, he explicitly discusses Empedocles’ ἀπορροαί (at 76c7, c9, c10, and d4), but only in the Phaedrus does he connect the term with its Democritean name εἴδωλον; cf. also Ferwerda (1972) 346 ff.

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Describing the lover’s vision of Beauty, he writes, “It would awaken a terribly powerful love if so vivid an image (ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον) of wisdom were to come through our sight as beauty”

(250d5-6).134 While we cannot definitively be sure that he drew the term εἴδωλον directly from

Democritus (or Democritus from Plato for that matter) as the two were close contemporaries and

Democritus’ dates are uncertain,135 it is apparent from the Phaedrus passage that by the early to mid-fourth century the two terms could be used as virtual synonyms, with εἴδωλα standing in for

Empedocles’ ἀπορροαί (just as Long points out above). The term εἴδωλον is the principle term in Democritus’ explanation of sight and, furthermore, supplies the means by which he (and later

Epicurus) explains dreams. 136 For instance, Stobaeus summarizes the views of ,

Democritus, and Epicurus on perception, stating: “Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus say that perception and thought occur when eidōla come from outside; neither of these happens to anyone without the impact of an eidōlon”.137 The eidōla are thus in both the Platonic passage and in the works of these other physicists a material body which impinges on our eyes and causes us to sense objects while both awake and asleep, comparable to Empedocles’ effluences. The very term eidōlon in Plato seems to allude to and imply Democritus’ theory of sensation. Indeed, it seems most likely from the passage that Plato is drawing on the terminology of Democritean

134 I will say more about Plato’s use of the adjective enargēs below, but for now the focus will be on the term eidōlon. Translation adapted from Nehamas’ and Woodruff’s text in Cooper (1997) 528. 135 The quote from Diogenes above (n.90) shows that later philosophers clearly assumed that Plato had direct knowledge of Democritus’ theories (and not the other way around), but that he chose to pass over them for the most part in silence. If this is the case, a fortiori this passage from the Phaedrus offers suggestive evidence of Plato in dialogue with his slightly earlier contemporary, drawing on his terminology and expecting his audience to recognize the allusions without naming Democritus explicitly. In a similar way, Plato invokes Empedocles’ effluences in the same context without a clear reference to Empedocles by name (unlike in the Meno passages mentioned above). 136 Plut. Quaestiones convivales 735a: ὅ φησιν Δημόκριτος ἐγκαταβυσσοῦσθαι τὰ εἴδωλα διὰ τῶν πόρων εἰς τὰ σώματα καὶ ποιεῖν τὰς κατὰ τὸν ὕπνον ὄψεις ἐπαναφερόμενα· Greek text by Hubert (1971 [=1938]). 137 Stobaeus, I.50.12: Λεύκιππος, Δημόκριτος, Ἐπίκουρος τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν νόησιν γίνεσθαι εἰδώλων ἔξωθεν προσιόντων· μηδενὶ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδετέραν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος. The Greek text is by Hense and Wachsmuth (1958); translation from Taylor (1999) 119.

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physics, as he also employs Empedocles’ (neither of whom are named), in describing the means by which vision occurs (i.e. the physical impact of films or images on the eye).

In contrast to the entry in LSJ, Plato’s usage is actually the first attested example of the noun eidōlon referring to something physical, i.e. a film (the equivalent of aporroai), a definition later employed by Epicurus. While the earliest uses of eidōlon in Homer, Herodotus, and the tragedians refer to a “phantom” or “any substantial form”,138 the word comes to have a far more specific and technical meaning in Epicurus’ philosophy. LSJ recognizes this change in meaning, defining the word: “in the system of Epicurus, film given off by any object and conveying an impression to the eye”.139 I would argue, however, that the term surely had this same technical meaning in the mostly lost works of Democritus, particularly in light of the quotation from

Stobaeus. Plato seems to be fully aware of the similar meaning of the terms εἴδωλον and

ἀπορροαί, which is why he employs them -by-side (within a few sentences of one another140). It is precisely Empedocles’ effluences and Democritus’ films that he is describing as entering through pores into the eye in both sentences. Indeed, in this instance we can even witness how later philosophers like Epicurus would have grasped upon a term which had already become part of the technical vocabulary of Democritus and Plato when describing his own physics—a system which similarly claims that all things give off films (εἴδωλα) that are then perceived through material impressions on the human eye.141

In addition to Plato’s technical usage of εἴδωλον based on Democritus’ usage, he also subtly manages to include an intertextual reference to the earliest uses of both enargēs and

138 LSJ (p.483) entry for εἴδωλον. 139 LSJ cites as examples of this usage “Epicur. Ep.I p.1- U., Nat. 2.1,al., Cic. Fam.15.16.I, etc.” 140 εἴδωλον at 250d6, ἀπορροαί at 251b2. 141 For the similarity of Empedocles’ and Epicurus’ theories of vision and knowledge (and Lucretius’ recognition of the “common ground between [them]”, see Gale (1994) 61ff.

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eidōlon in Homer’s Odyssey.142 To recall, in the passage Athena creates an eidōlon (i.e. a phantom) fashioned to look like Iphtheme to comfort Penelope. Stanford comments on the phrase “εἴδωλον ποίησε” (4.796): “note that dreams were thought to be objective bodies, not figments of the sleeper’s brain”.143 Plato maintains the physicality of the Homeric term eidōlon in the Phaedrus passage; however, in this instance the term also has a technical aspect which it has gained thanks to the vocabulary of Democritus’ physics. The intertextuality becomes especially apparent when we notice the adjectives attached to the term in both Homer and Plato, as they are antonyms of one another. The eidōlon, which Homer describes as “dim” or “hazy” (εἴδωλον

ἀμαυρόν, 4.824, 835), is called “clear” or “distinct” (ἐναργὲς) by Plato (ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον,

Phdr. 250d5-6). Furthermore, the same Homeric passage also includes an especially noteworthy instance of the adjective enargēs, already discussed above. The very word that Homer had applied to Penelope’s dream (ἐναργὲς ὄνειρον, 4.841) is applied by Plato to the physical image

(εἴδωλον) itself. Here, we can see Plato as an intermediary, re-contextualizing a Homeric phrase to align with contemporary physics, both his own as described in the philosophical myth of the

Phaedrus and Democritus’. At the same time, his more technical usage of the terms enargēs and eidōlon also paves the way for these terms in the Hellenistic period.

As a final word on Plato’s Phaedrus and its influence on Hellenistic philosophy, it is important to examine further the emphatic use of the adjective enargēs at 250d5. Not only does he employ the Democritean noun εἴδωλον, but he also couples it with the adjective ἐναργὲς,144 both a reference to Homer as shown above and the key word of the Phaedrus passage as it is repeated three times in four lines (250d2, d3, and d5). In its final instance, it is dramatically used

142 Indeed, this precise passage was the subject of my comments in chapter two, §1. 143 Stanford (1996) 290. 144 The adjective ἐναργές does not appear in any of the extent fragments of Leucippus or Democritus (nor in Empedocles for that matter); cf. Taylor (1999) and Bailey (1928).

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in combination with eidōlon—a combination that Plato is the first philosopher to enunciate. As the use occurs within the myth of the soul imagined as a charioteer, it is full of imagery and vivid language, but this language also highlights a mystical sort of sight, which provides a likeness to knowledge itself.145 Indeed, at this particular moment, the philosopher imagines a hypothetical vision of an unseeable form of wisdom (φρόνησις), which he recognizes is impossible, but which nonetheless through imagery conveys the brilliant, ineffable nature of wisdom.146 While later philosophers like Epicurus surely disagreed with Plato on many subjects (the notion of the forms being one of the most divisive issues), the concept of a vivid image or film, i.e. an

ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον, which provides the basis for perception and leads to knowledge, marks an important area of agreement. While so often Plato’s epistemology and uses of the terms enargēs/enargeia have been swept aside as more of the ordinary (see, for instance,

Ierodiakonou’s quote at the beginning of this section), his vocabulary contains the kernels from which Hellenistic physical and epistemological theories grow and develop.

2. Aristotelian Vision and the Transition to Hellenistic Enargeia

Like Plato, Aristotle too reveals a transitional stage in the development of the concept of enargeia. He moves from a non-marked usage of the term—meaning obvious or clear—to a more technical application as a feature of truth and meaning self-evident. In particular, he employs the adjective (and the noun once) in ways that display the triple nature of the concept— philosophical, rhetorical, and literary—all of which become vital to understanding it in the

Hellenistic period and thereafter. As with my discussion of Plato, I demonstrate that Aristotle’s

145 Cf. Baltzly (1996). 146 250d4-5: φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται. φρόνησις is also the antecedent for ἑαυτῆς in the following sentence, where Plato employs a present contra-factual condition to stress the impossibility of seeing this form, i.e. “it would cause such terrible lusts if any such clear image/film of it [i.e. wisdom] passed into our sight” [understand, but no such clear vision could do so because wisdom is invisible] (δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑαυτῆς ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον παρείχετο εἰς ὄψιν ἰόν). The translation is my own.

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uses of the term have been unjustly ignored by scholars. Again, note for instance Ierodiakonou’s assessment that he uses the term “not in a particularly technical way”, but instead largely restricts it to its “ordinary Greek” meaning of “obvious”.147 In fact, the evidence from Aristotle shows the term already shifting its sense. In his works, it is employed in explanations of knowledge and it seems to be morphing into a term referring to evidence and as an indication of truth. Moreover, he also for the first time explicitly utilizes the adjective enargēs in connection with appearances

(phantasia, phainomena, phantasmata), an epistemological issue that both Epicurus and the

Stoics confront, with both sides arguing views that are opposed to his. At the same time,

Aristotle’s rhetorical and poetic theory, particularly his notion of “placing before the eyes”, also lays the foundation for the theories of vivid description, which influence the rhetorical concept of enargeia in the Hellenistic period and on into the Roman empire.

a. Enargeia and Evidence (Evidentia)

In de Anima, Aristotle utilizes the adjective enargēs twice in addition to the sole use of the noun enargeia in his extant works (at 403a19 and 428a14, and 418b24, respectively). Unlike earlier archaic and classical usage, he employs the adjective in a far less sublime manner, stripping it of its divine associations and instead limiting its meaning to refer to clarity, particularly of an evidential sort. While this usage is less technical,148 it, nevertheless, leaves a lasting imprint on Hellenistic and Roman thought, particularly as it applies to mental inferences drawn from the sense of sight. For instance, it is clear that Cicero is thinking along similar lines to Aristotle when he translates enargeia as evidentia (which passes into English as the word

147 Ierodiakonou (2011) 61. 148 This would seem to be in agreement with Ierodiakonou’s (2011) 61 of Aristotle’s usage as “ordinary Greek”, however, I will also show that Aristotle also reveals a more evidentiary basis for the adjective and noun, which influences Hellenistic and Roman philosophy and rhetoric.

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“evidence”),149 and which is etymologically derived from videre, to see.150 While in Hellenistic sources that which is vivid (enargēs) compels a viewer to accept its reality and truth, Aristotle’s usage contradicts this Hellenistic application; for him, something (e.g. “a strong or vivid effect”)151 can be enargēs (i.e. clear and compelling) to the human mind or soul, but not necessarily force the perceiver to accept it as real or verifiable.

In discussing how the human soul is affected by emotions and the senses at De Anima

403a, Aristotle argues (DA 403a16-24):

It therefore seems that all the affections of soul involve a body—passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body. In support of this we may point to the fact that, while sometimes on the occasion of violent and striking occurrences (ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων) there is no excitement or fear felt, ...[h]ere is still a clearer case: in the absence of any external cause of terror we find ourselves experiencing the feelings of a man in terror. From all this it is obvious that the affections of soul are enmattered formulable essences.152

While even rival schools of the Hellenistic age like the Epicureans and Stoics might have agreed with Aristotle’s stress on the physical connections between the soul and body expressed in this passage,153 they would have strongly argued against his notion that a “vivid effect” might somehow be mistaken. For Epicurus as well as the Stoics, the adjective is not simply a signifier

149 Cic. Luc. 17: nihil est clarius ἐναργείᾳ, perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos, si placet, nominemus. The Latin text is from Plasberg (1922). I will say more about this passage in chapter five, §2. 150 See Oxford Latin Dictionary (henceforth OLD). 151 DA 403a19-20: ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων...; All Greek text for De Anima is from Ross (1961). The translation here is my own. 152 DA 403a16-24: ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα. μηνύει δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δ’ ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζηται. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦτο φανερόν· μηθενὸς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμβαίνοντος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου. εἰ δ’ οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἰσιν· All translations of De Anima are by Smith, in Ross (1952), unless otherwise noted. 153 These rival schools, especially the Epicureans, would disagree with Aristotle’s stress on the formal and material causes of the emotions. As Frede, M. (1992) 103-4 argues concerning this passage, for Aristotle: “All these so-called affections of the soul have two sides, a material and a formal. And a full physical account or definition of them would have to specify both (403a8-12)… They are physical or natural the way he understands ‘physical’: they have a material side to be described in terms of the material constituents of the organism and their features, and a formal side to be specified in terms of the natural capacities of the organism. It is this formal side which makes them the natural processes which they are”.

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of a feeling, which can be ignored or rejected according to the Aristotelian passage, but rather it is a clear indication of truth and reality, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Aristotle’s sole usage of the noun enargeia also comes from the De Anima, in a passage that is striking for its references to evidence both from speech acts and from the senses.

Sheppard, in her discussion of the literary uses of enargeia, claims that the noun “enargeia or vividness… is not found in Aristotle, [but rather] he uses the related adjective, and he gives clear expression to the underlying idea.”154 Perhaps it is due to her reliance upon the Poetics, but whatever the case, she fails to notice the one instance where Aristotle does use this term. Otto, however, notices this passage, commenting: “According to the current communis opinio,

Aristotle only employed the noun ἐνάργεια in a single instance in the De anima, while in the

Rhetorik, for substantive reasons the reading ἐνέργεια is preferable at places which are textually problematic”.155 The concept of enargeia arises then, not in a discussion of poetry or literature, but rather in a more scientific passage, where he articulates his theory of sight and contrasts his views with those of other philosophers. Aristotle writes (DA 418b20-26):

Empedocles (and with him all others who used the same forms of expression) was wrong in speaking of light as ‘travelling’ or being at a given moment between the earth and its envelope, its movement being unobservable by us; that view is contrary both to the clear evidence of argument and to the observed facts (παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐνάργειαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα); if the distance traversed were short, the movement might have been unobservable, but where the distance is from extreme East to extreme West, the draught upon our powers of belief is too great.156

154 Sheppard (1991) 36. She quotes Poetics 1455a22-6: “In composing plots and working them out so far as verbal expression goes, the poet should, more than anything else, put things before his eyes as he then sees the events most vividly as if he were actually present, and can therefore find what is appropriate and be aware of the opposite”. I will discuss this particular passage and enargeia in the Poetics below. 155 Otto (2009) 71: “Der heutigen communis opinio zufolge verwendet Aristoteles das Substantiv ἐνάργεια nur an einer einzigen Stelle in De anima, an den textkritisch problematischen Stellen der Rhetorik ist aus inhaltlichen Gründen die Lesart ἐνέργεια vorzuziehen”. The English translation is my own. I will say more about the connections between ἐνάργεια /ἐνέργεια below. 156 DA 418b20-26: καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, οὐδ’ εἴ τις ἄλλος οὕτως εἴρηκεν, ὡς φερομένου τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ γιγνομένου ποτὲ μεταξὺ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος, ἡμᾶς δὲ λανθάνοντος· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐνάργειαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα· ἐν μικρῷ μὲν γὰρ διαστήματι λάθοι ἄν, ἀπ’ ἀνατολῆς δ’ ἐπὶ δυσμὰς τὸ λανθάνειν μέγα λίαν τὸ αἴτημα.

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This excerpt comes from a long explanation of sight (DA 418a26ff.), neatly summarized by

Tuominen, who notes: “Aristotle does not accept the atomist analysis according to which some effluences or material particles should arrive at our organs from the objects. He criticizes the atomists for making seeing perfectly analogous to touch. Rather, he claims that the visible object must change the illuminated air or water adjacent to it and the air or water transmits the effects to our eyes.” 157 Indeed, in this passage, Aristotle specifically argues against Empedocles’ effluences, mentioning him by name.158

What is especially interesting is how Aristotle appeals to both reason and to the body’s senses as evidence for the wrong-headedness of the atomists’ views. The clear evidence

(enargeia) that Aristotle notes is not sensory, however, but rather from reason or speech

(logos)—τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐνάργειαν (DA 418b24). Indeed, he even diametrically opposes this evidence of language with the evidence of the senses or appearances, τὰ φαινόμενα (DA

418b24). He uses the adjective enargēs in a similar way in the Nicomachean Ethics, writing (NE

1097b22-4): “Presumably, however, to say that is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired [literally, ‘for it to be told more vividly’

(ἐναργέστερον… ἔτι λεχθῆναι)]”. 159 Later Hellenistic philosophers and literary theorists employ the term enargeia in both of these senses, i.e. for clear evidence from verbal expression and from the senses, uses that Aristotle seems to lay the groundwork for here. As we have already seen Plato bridging Classical and Hellenistic terminology, here we likewise witness

157 Tuominen (2007) 165. 158 In the same context, Aristotle also argues against the visual theories of Democritus and likewise names him directly (DA 419a15ff.). For more on these theories, see the previous section on Plato. 159 Translation by Ross in Ross (1952) 343. Ἀλλ’ ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ’ ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. Greek text for Nichomachean Ethics from Bywater (1962 [=1894]). Nussbaum (1986a) 62 sums up Aristotle’s requirement for clear logoi that, “The task demanded of logoi, being one of clarification and articulation, requires clarity and articulation in the logoi themselves: ‘We will have spoken sufficiently if we make things clear as far as the subject matter permits’ (diasaphētheiē, 1094 b11-12, cf. diasaphēsai, 1097 a24, dioristhōsi, 1098 b6, enargesteron, 1097 b23)”.

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Aristotle’s transforming the word’s meaning. In utilizing enargeia in a manner that stresses the clarity or vividness of verbal expression or thought, he thus paves the way for its Hellenistic usage in rhetorical and literary circles.

As noted above, an important development in Aristotelian applications of the noun enargeia and the adjective enargēs is their close connection to appearances and the imagination

(phainomena and phantasia, respectively). Aristotle employs the adjective in the De Anima in a context that specifically associates it with φαντασία (as well as in other contexts with forms of the verb φαίνω or adjectives like φανερός,-ά,-όν—all of which are etymologically related).160

The concept of φαντασία (translated in English by such widely varying terms as appearance, presentation, impression, and imagination) is a major concern for Hellenistic philosophers as well as literary critics.161 For Aristotle, unlike for Epicurus who uses the term to refer to the impressions brought about by very fine material images impinging upon our eyes,162 impressions or appearances () are separate from matter. In her discussion of Aristotelian phantasiai, Frede comments that they “can and do exist by themselves” and defines them as

160 Cf. παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐνάργειαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα (DA 418a23-24) discussed above. For the link between the adjective and the noun, note the entry in LSJ (p.1915): “φᾰνερός, ά, όν, but ός, όν,… (lyr.): (φαίνω):—visible, manifest. Cf. Strömberg (1946) 119, where he discusses the derivation of ἐμφανής from ἐμφαίνειν (and compares this with the etymology of ἐναργής). See also Schofield (1992) 256ff. on “Phantasia and Phaenetai”. 161 Silverman (1991) 133 discusses earlier uses of the noun in Plato, arguing that he: “posits the faculty of phantasia to fill [the] gap [between perception and knowledge]. Phantasia's role is to link the limited irrational findings of αἴσθησις to the conceptual faculty of belief”. Lycos (1964) 497 translates Aristotle’s usage of phantasia hyper-literally as “the state or capacity of being appeared to”. Commenting on its use in the Hellenistic period, Lesses (1998) 490 notes, that it “is often translated as “appearance," [however] the term refers to a basic, representational mental state, which includes much more than visual appearance” and therefore employs the translation “impression”. Cf. also L&S (1987), who translate phantasia as “impression”. I will say more on its Hellenistic uses in chapters four and five. 162 Cf. L&S (1987) 15A8: καὶ ἣν ἂν λάβωμεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις εἴτε μορφῆς εἴτε συμβεβηκότων, μορφή ἐστιν αὕτη τοῦ στερεμνίου, γινομένη κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς πύκνωμα ἢ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ εἰδώλου. Epicurus’ disciple, Lucretius, translates phantasia into Latin as visum (literally, that which is seen), again referring to the material films which flow from all material objects and which are received and perceived by the eye. DRN 4.499: proinde quod in quoquest his visum tempore, verumst; cf. also L&S (1987) 16A and the commentary.

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“motions in the soul caused by sense-perceptions”. 163 Indeed, these “violent and striking occurrences [literally, effects]”, noted above, are directly related to phantasia (DA 403a8ff). For

Aristotle, the imagination (phantasia) is based on the way things appear (phainomena) in the world, which can be “both clear or confused, simple or complex, true or false”.164 In DA 403a19-

20 where he describes the effects (παθημάτων) of phantasiai as clear or vivid (ἰσχυρῶν καὶ

ἐναργῶν), they are caused by that are unfounded—the fears that the human mind feels lack a real world cause. For Hellenistic philosophers like Epicurus, phantasiai are material—they always have a direct, real, and true cause; for Aristotle, however, these phantasiai actually can be clear to the mind but lack a real world cause, thus remaining unsubstantiated and false. While this is a contradiction of language according to Hellenistic jargon, we can already see the roots of this debate here. Moreover, the connection between phantasiai and clarity (enargēs/enargeia) remains a central concern of later epistemology.

In his discussion of phantasiai Aristotle distinguishes the imagination (φαντασία) from judgment (ὑπόληψις) at DA 427b27ff.165 He inquires whether imagination is “a single faculty

(δύναμις) or disposition (ἕξις), relative to images, in virtue of which we judge (κρίνομεν) what is true from what is false” (DA 428a3-4).166 He rejects the former while going on to discuss

163 Frede, D. (1992) 294. 164 Frede, D. (1992) 295. Also of value for understanding Aristotle’s usage of phantasia—what it is and how it functions in relation to sense perception (aesthesis) and the intellect (nous)—see Watson (1998b), Sorabji (1992), Schofield (1992), Silverman (1991), and Lycos (1964). 165 Cf. also Schofield’s (1992) 273 discussion of the passage just preceding this one, DA 427b14-17: φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας, αὕτη τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις. ὅτι δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις, φανερόν. He argues that, “The passage makes it plain that not merely the hupolēpsis which results from thinking, but the process of thinking itself is distinct from phantasia, which it nevertheless requires. Aristotle, exploiting a point made by Plato in the Republic (510D-511A), recognizes that what one engages in thinking about and what one imagines in so thinking may be distinct in the sense he hints at”. 166 DA 428a1-5: εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ’ ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἴ τι κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν, <ἆρα> μία τις ἔστι τούτων δύναμις ἢ ἕξις καθ’ ἃς κρίνομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα; τοιαῦται δ’ εἰσὶν αἴσθησις, δόξα, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς. Aristotle phrases this argument as a question, not a statement, however he goes on to prove in the following sections (DA 428a4ff.) that this articulation is correct. The translation has been adapted from Smith (1952).

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vision and arguing that while “sight or seeing” (ὄψις καὶ ὅρασις) are an “ability or an activity”

(δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια), imagination takes place even when “neither of them are present, e.g. in dreams”.167 Here, as Zanker (1981) has noted, for Aristotle, ἐνέργεια has a technical meaning, which he is utilizing to refer to “the representation of things in a state of actuality … and …in opposition to δύναμις, potential latent existence or capacity for action”. 168 Furthermore,

Aristotle argues that whereas the senses are always true,169 imaginings (phantasiai) are mostly false.170 The former statement is one that Epicurus would have accepted (indeed, his statement

“all sensations are true” has earned him considerable derision and has been the cause of much debate, both ancient and modern).171 Aristotle concludes that phantasia is neither a “power”

(δύναμις) nor a “disposition” (ἕξις), but rather a “movement (κίνησίς) that does not occur without sensation”.172 Summing up its nature, he writes: “this movement must be (1) necessarily

(a) incapable of existing apart from sensation, (b) incapable of existing except when we perceive,

(2) such that in virtue of its possession that in which it is found may present various phenomena both active and passive, and (3) such that it may be either true or false”.173 These claims are not in line with the subsequent views of Epicurus (or the Stoics). Instead, Aristotle describes phantasia in his own terms and concludes that it is a movement (κίνησίς), i.e an active principle

(ἐνέργεια, note not “vividness” ἐνάργεια), which has a material basis, but is not itself

167 DA 428a5-8: ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις, δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε. αἴσθησις μὲν γὰρ ἤτοι δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὄψις καὶ ὅρασις, φαίνεται δέ τι καὶ μηδετέρου ὑπάρχοντος τούτων, οἷον τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις. 168 Zanker (1981) 307. 169 Aristotle states (DA 428a11-12), εἶτα αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς ἀεί, where the antecedent for αἱ is αἴσθησις (the plural is implied by the plural form of phantasiai compared to it in the de clause [αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι]). 170 DA 428a11-12: εἶτα αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς ἀεί, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται αἱ πλείους ψευδεῖς. 171 Cf. DeWitt (1943) and Taylor (1980). 172 My translations. DA 428b11-13: ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίνεσθαι ἀλλ’ αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἴσθησις ἔστιν… 173 DA 428b: καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. The translation is from Smith (1952).

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enmattered (contrary to Epicurus), and which is something in between opinion and sensation.174

While for him phantasia draws on sensation, it nevertheless is often at variance with it (he gives the example: “we imagine a sun to be a foot in diameter though we are convinced that it is larger than the inhabited part of the earth”).175

In the same passage Aristotle also explicitly denies vividness (enargēs) to appearances or the imagination (phantasia), a point against which Epicurus and the Stoics later argue. In a manner that conflicts with Hellenistic usage, Aristotle employs the adverbial form of enargēs as he distinguishes appearance (he uses the verb φαίνεται) from clear sense perceptions—arguing that “we do not, when sense functions precisely with regard to its object, say that we imagine it to be a man, but rather when there is some failure of accuracy in its exercise”.176 Schofield notes:

Aristotle is surely pointing out that if we clearly see a man, we do not say: ‘It looks like a man’, since the caution, doubt, or non-committal implied by that form of words is out of place. It is when our eyes let us down that phainetai becomes an appropriate location; and the judgement we make by employing it is not straightforwardly a report of what we perceive, but a more guarded statement of how what we perceive looks to us, how we interpret it.177

For Aristotle, appearances or imaginings, whether articulated with the verb phaino or the noun phantasia, fill in the gaps between sense perception—particularly when it is unclear (μὴ

ἐναργῶς αἰσθανώμεθα)—and knowledge, so they can be either true or false.178 For Hellenistic philosophers like Epicurus, enargēs has a narrower meaning referring to a guarantor of truth and

174 Cf. Schofield (1992) 256, where he notes that “Professor Nussbaum suggests that, “Aristotle may put such stress on phantasia partly because it (unlike thinking) has a material basis which renders it an appropriate component in a physiological account of movement””. 175 DA 428b2-4: φαίνεται δέ γε καὶ ψευδῆ, περὶ ὧν ἅμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, οἷον φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πιστεύεται δ’ εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης· 176 DA 428a12-15: ἔπειτα οὐδὲ λέγομεν, ὅταν ἐνεργῶμεν ἀκριβῶς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὅτι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν μὴ ἐναργῶς αἰσθανώμεθα πότερον ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής. 177 Schofield (1992) 258 ff. (see especially 260 on the first phrase). 178 Note, for Aristotle, phantasia is also not a mixture of opinion and perception (as Silverman argues, based on Republic 602c-603a and Sophist 263d it is for Plato). Aristotle makes this point explicitly at DA 428a24-8: φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα μετ’ αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ δι’ αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, φαντασία ἂν εἴη, διά τε ταῦτα καὶ διότι οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἔσται ἡ δόξα, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνου, εἴπερ ἔστιν, οὗ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις·

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reality. In fact, it can even be applied to objects of phantasia, but if so they must be real and must not with the senses.179

While the nature of phantasia is different according to Aristotle and the Hellenistic philosophers, the passage nevertheless already articulates a key epistemological concern, one that would become an important topic in Hellenistic philosophy: how to judge truth from falsehood. While Aristotle never addresses the notion of a “criterion of truth”, as do the

Hellenistic schools,180 he clearly recognizes the need for foundational principles upon which we can rest our judgments (he uses the verb κρίνομεν for “judging” or “distinguishing” at DA

428a3, etymologically related to the Hellenistic κριτερίον, i.e. a discrimitating faculty).181 In the generation after Aristotle, both Epicurus and the Stoics responded to this question with theories of their own, ultimately accepting clear perception and vivid mental impressions (phantasia) as criteria of truth.182 Aristotle, however, asserts no such thing and instead recognizes the problems with using phantasia as a critical device, as it can be both true and false (and in his mind, it is usually the latter).183 Polanski sums up Aristotle’s views:

Were phantasia to discriminate things and to put us in truth or falsity (καθ’ ἣν κρίνομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα), it would have to be sense (αἴσθησις), opinion (δόξα), intuition (νοῦς), or knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, 428a3-5). Aristotle argues that phantasia is none of these alternatives, that is, it is not sense or ὑπόληψις, hence it cannot be a power of discrimination, but it is a power of representation giving rise to perceptionlike appearances.184

179 More will be said about Epicurus’ views (as well as the Stoics) in chapter four. 180 Cf. especially Striker (1996b) for discussion of the background to the Hellenistic notion of the “criterion of truth” and to the Hellenistic debates concerning this concept. 181 Cf. Chantraine (1999) 584-5 entry for κρίνω and LSJ 997 entry for κριτήριον, τό. 182 For Epicureans, the “impacts of mental impressions” are (τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας) are explicitly acknowledged as a criterion of truth—a means of distinguishing truth from falsehood—and likewise for Stoics, the criterion of truth is the grasping impression (καταλεπτική φαντασία). See L&S 17A and L&S 40C, respectively. More on this in chapter four. 183 DA 428a12, discussed above. 184 Polanski (2007) 415-16. Note, Polanski utilizes Jannone (1966) for his text instead of Ross (1961), which I have cited for De Anima. Because of this, Polanski’s text has a few variations from the text quoted earlier (καθ’ ἣν for καθ’ ἃς) and a switch in the order of νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη. While the former does not cause much trouble, Polanski argues for a progression hinted at by the word order of his text, noting (p.415 n.24): “In the order given here we perhaps have the suggestion that sense may give rise to opinion and intellectual grasp of principles may give

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These appearances, while important for explaining how our mind understands the world and imagines it to be, do not allow us to make sure judgments about reality for they lack a sound material basis or a foundation for rational judgment. Ultimately, as I show in chapter four,

Epicurus and the Stoics respond to Aristotle’s dissusions about judgment and discriminating faculties by explicitly admitting phantasia among their criteria, over Aristotle’s objections. One of the ways in which Epicurus and the Stoics make this case (contra Aristotle) is to link phantasia with clear perception, i.e. enargeia, a leap that Aristotle does not make in either his use of the adjective or noun.

To conclude our discussion of Aristotelian physical theory, let us return to his use of the adjective enargēs. While the association with phantasia in De Anima reveals an original application for the term—which leaves a mark in Hellenistic discussions—in other cases, he utilizes the adjective in a manner that seems to draw on Platonic usage. For instance in De sensu et sensibilibus, Aristotle, like in the passage of Plato’s Statesman discussed above, applies the adjective enargēs to a painter creating art. While offering several conjectures about the nature of color, he writes (Sens. 440a6-12):

This [that the black and white are “juxtaposed” according to ratios which create colors185] then is one conceivable hypothesis to explain the genesis of immediate colours. Another is that the Black and White appear the one through the medium of the other, giving an effect like that sometimes produced by painters overlaying a less vivid upon a more vivid colour [ἑτέραν χρόαν ἐφ’ ἑτέραν ἐναργεστέραν ἐπαλείφοντες], as when they desire to represent an object appearing under water or enveloped in a haze, and like that produced by the sun, which in itself appears white, but takes a crimson hue when beheld through a fog or a cloud of smoke.186

rise to scientific knowledge”. Cf. also Watson (1988b) 23ff. where he argues based on DA 428a3-5, similarly, that phantasia is, “not identical with any of these [i.e. ‘among the potentialities or dispositions in virtue of which we are enabled to judge and arrive at truth or falsity, among which we also count capacities like perception belief, knowledge and intuitive apphrehension’]. 185 For his conjectures about the nature of color, see De sensu et sensilibus 439a20ff. and Beare (1952) 677-8. For how black and white interact to form color according to Aristotle, see Broakes (1999) 98ff. and Johansen (1997). 186 My italics. Sens. 440a6-12: εἷς μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν χρωμάτων οὗτος, εἷς δὲ τὸ φαίνεσθαι δι’ ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἐνίοτε οἱ γραφεῖς ποιοῦσιν, ἑτέραν χρόαν ἐφ’ ἑτέραν ἐναργεστέραν ἐπαλείφοντες, ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐν ὕδατί τι ἢ ἐν ἀέρι βούλωνται ποιῆσαι φαινόμενον, καὶ οἷον ὁ ἥλιος καθ’ αὑτὸν μὲν λευκὸς

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Whereas in the Statesman, Plato had employed the noun enargeia for the first time to stress the vividness of speech in a comparison to painting, here Aristotle applies the comparative adjective

ἐναργεστέραν to a bright or vibrant color of paint. The more vivid the color, he argues, the more clearly the object represented comes into focus, instead of appearing dim in a sort of

“haze”. In all of these uses, however, enargēs (or its noun form enargeia) refers to an unimpeded, distinct view—one that includes all of the fine details of the object. On the one hand,

Plato’s painter fails to capture his subject with the proper realistic detail and clarity (ἐνάργεια,

Pol. 277c3), which a philosopher’s speech (λόγος, 277c1) achieves, instead accomplishing only a bare outline (τὴν ἔξωθεν… περιγραφὴν, 277c1). Aristotle’s artist, on the other hand, adds paint layer by layer, making his composition more and more realistic by the use of increasingly vivid colors. In this way the colors succeed in conveying a realism, which makes the painting distinct and lifelike to the viewer, even when the subject is meant to be “in water or in air” (ἐν

ὕδατί τι ἢ ἐν ἀέρι, Sens. 440a9-10).

b. Enargeia and Aristotle’s Theory of “Placing before the Eyes”

While so far we have concentrated on epistemological passages that helped to pave the way for the usage of enargēs/enargeia in Hellenistic philosophy, it is also important to note how

Aristotle’s rhetorical and literary theories also were precursors to Hellenistic enargeia in its other applications. While not specifically utilizing the term enargeia in his Rhetoric or Poetics,187 he nonetheless has much to say about the rhetorical practice of “bringing a subject before the eyes” of a listener—a practice which the Hellenistic schools called enargeia. In fact, the expression

Aristotle uses to define his concept of “pro omattōn poiein”, as Newman notes, is the nearly

φαίνεται, διὰ δ’ ἀχλύος καὶ καπνοῦ φοινικοῦς. The Greek text is from Louis (1956); translation by Beare in Ross (1952) 677. 187 Otto (2009) 72. See also Plett (2012), Webb (2009), Otto (2009), Scholz (1999), Lausberg (1998), Walker (1993), Woodman (1988), and Kennedy (1972).

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homophonous energeia.188 This term refers to actualization, an Aristotelian concept that often seems to blend into enargeia in the Hellenistic period and in rhetorical studies thereafter. As

Keuls notes, “[t]he two terms energeia and enargeia are not related etymologically. The former comes from the root –erg-, “work”, and has given us the derivative “energy”. The latter [as I have already established in chapter one] is derived from the adjective argos, “clear,” and means brightness, lucidity and, by extension, visual vividness”.189 She defines the Aristotelian term energeia as, “in a rhetorical context meaning approximately ‘forceful description of an action’, while also noting that he defines it in two different ways as both “the placing of things before the eyes” (at 1411b23) and as “movement” (ἡ δ’ ἐνέργεια κίνησις at 1412a10).190 Otto too recognizes the problem, noting:

The confusion in the manuscripts is not surprising. In places that are vulnerable to the reading ἐνάργεια, Aristotle also employs the formula πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν in contexts featuring ἐνέ/άργεια. This formula is used in a similar way in the normal, later definition of ἐνάργεια and likewise stimulated the Latin translation of ἐνάργεια as subiectio sub oculos.191

Aristotle links this ability to bring a subject before the eyes to metaphor, “because it allows rhetors to actualize actions immediately before and, through this actualization, lead those audiences to insight”.192 For him, an effective orator or poet is one who not only turns his listeners into eyewitnesses, activating their emotions by placing the subject before their mind’s eye, but also one who keeps his subject before his own eyes while composing. Likewise, in

188 Cf. Newman (2002) 3ff. in which she draws upon and paraphrases the views of Kirby (1997), Moran (1996), Kennedy (1991), and Stanford (1936). 189 Keuls (1978) 124. 190 Keuls (1978) 124. Keuls cites Rhetoric 3,11,2 and 3,11,4 respectively, but to maintain consistency in citation formatting, I have cited the Bekker numbers. On energeia vs. kinesis, see Nussbaum (1986b) 324-7. 191 Otto (2009) 72: “Gleichwohl kommt die Konfusion in den Handschriften nicht von ungefähr: An den für die Lesart ἐνάργεια anfälligen Stellen bedient sich Aristoteles im Zusammenhang mit der ἐνέ/άργεια nämlich auch der Formulierun πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, welche ähnlich in der später üblichen Definition der ἐνάργεια auftaucht und auch die Übersetzung ins Lateinische von ἐνάργεια mit subiecto [sic] sub oculos angeregt hat”. The translation is my own. 192 Newman (2002) 3. Newman also draws upon Moran (1996) 392, where he states that, “it is no exaggeration to say that the primary virtue of metaphor is for Aristotle the ability to set something vividly before the eyes of the audience (pro omattōn poiein) (1410b34)”.

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Hellenistic rhetoric and literary theory, enargeia is associated with making a subject appear as if before the eyes of the audience, a conception which Aristotle’s vocabulary already hints at.

Furthermore, just as Hellenistic theorists draw on the terminology of philosophy including phantasia and enargeia in order to address literary and rhetorical issues, so too does Aristotle employ philosophical language in articulating the power of rhetoric and poetry.193

For example in the Rhetoric, Aristotle employs the phrase πρὸ ὀμμάτων twelve times and “uses bringing-before-the-eyes as a technical term” in his discussion of style (lexis).194 He defines the expression at 1411b23-7: “By ‘making them see things’ I mean using expressions that represent things as in a state of activity [ἐνεργοῦντα].”195 His terminology conforms with his philosophical distinction between passive potentiality (δύναμις) and activity (ἐνέργεια),196 although in this case he applies this vocabulary to rhetorical tools. He does not stress the vividness (ἐνάργεια) of expression, as do Hellenistic critics, but rather praises the orator who portrays his subject dynamically. He supports the claim that good oratory “mak[es] the lifeless living through the metaphor [τὸ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔμψυχα ποιεῖν]” with evidence of dynamic passages in Isocrates, Euripides, and Homer such as “Then to the plain rolled the ruthless stone”.197 While he focuses on how activity (energeia) lends verisimilitude to oratory, the theory that a good

193 It has often been noted how Aristotle uses a similar vocabulary in his aesthetic, scientific, and ethical works. Halliwell (1986) 3, for instance, in his discussion of the Poetics acknowledges “the occurrence of terminology which Aristotle expects to be identified and comprehended within the framework of his own philosophy”. While Halliwell’s footnote (3) mentions terms such as “, …various senses of ‘nature’, …wholeness and unity, … and eutuchia,… and ‘universals’”, I would add phantasia, energeia, dynamis, the adjective enargēs, and pro omattōn poiein. 194 Kennedy (2007) 219n.103. Examples of πρὸ ὀμμάτων are Rhet. 1386a34, 1405b12, 1410b34, 1411a26, 1411a28, 1411a35, 1411b4, 1411b6, 1411b9, 1411b23, 1411b24, and 1411b25. 195 Rh. 1411b23-7: λεκτέον δὲ τί λέγομεν πρὸ ὀμμάτων, καὶ τί ποιοῦσι γίγνεται τοῦτο. λέγω δὴ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει, οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον μεταφορά, (ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεια), ἀλλ’ οὐ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν· All Greek text for Aristotle’s Rhetoric is from Ross (1959); translations from Kennedy (2007), unless otherwise noted. 196 Cf. above and Zanker (1981) 307. 197 Rh.1411b31-4: καὶ ὡς κέχρηται πολλαχοῦ Ὅμηρος, τὸ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔμψυχα ποιεῖν διὰ τῆς μεταφορᾶς. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν εὐδοκιμεῖ, οἷον ἐν τοῖσδε, “αὖτις ἐπὶ δάπεδόνδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής…” Kennedy (2007) 222. Kennedy notes the passage is a quote from Odyssey 9.598.

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writer or speaker can “place a subject before the eyes” of his listeners continues to influence philosophers and rhetorical writers of the following period.198 In a way that is very similar to

Aristotle, the rhetorical theories of enargeia in the Hellenistic period focus on its power to present a clear view of reality before one’s eyes.

In the Poetics, we can also see the seeds of the literary and rhetorical theories of how to transform a listener into a viewer—what would later be referred to by the terms enargeia or phantasia. Aristotle writes: “In constructing the and working it out with the proper , the poet should place the scene, as far as possible, before his eyes. In this way, seeing everything with the utmost vividness, as if he were a spectator of the action, he will discover what is in keeping with it, and be most unlikely to overlook inconsistencies”.199 The writer must constantly keep an “eye” on his subject, “viewing” it to see whether it is realistic and possesses verisimilitude both for himself and in the eyes of his audience. “Longinus”, or whoever the later

(imperial) writer of On the Sublime is, makes the same point as he describes phantasia or

“image-production [εἰδωλοποιία]”.200 He argues that phantasia takes place “in cases where, carried away by enthusiasm and passion, you think you see what you describe, and you place it before the eyes of your hearers”.201 Webb helpfully comments that this definition describes “a two-fold process whereby the orator himself visualizes his subject-matter and thereby makes his

198 Webb (2009) 51 makes this case explicitly in her discussion of ekphrasis, noting that, “the idea of ‘placing before the eyes’ goes back in rhetorical theory to Aristotle who discusses the power of metaphor to place its subject pro ommatōn, and the definition makes ekphrasis synonymous with other rhetorical terms for vivid description, such as enargeia, diatupōsis, diagraphe (‘descriptio’, or ‘explicatio’ in Latin, or simply ‘sub oculos subiectio’, ‘placing before the eyes’)”. 199 Poetics 1455a22-6: Δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐναργέστατα [ὁ] ὁρῶν ὥσπερ παρ’ αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις εὑρίσκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν λανθάνοι [τὸ] τὰ ὑπεναντία. The Greek text for Poetics is that of Kassel (1965). The English translations are those of Butcher (1951), unless otherwise noted. On the precise wording of this passage, see Sifakis (2009). 200 On the Sublime 15.2. 201 On the Sublime 15.1. The translation is from Roberts (1907).

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audience see it through his words”.202 Indeed, the articulation is reminiscent of the Aristotelian passage of the Poetics; however in On the Sublime, the technique is linked directly to enargeia, the Hellenistic concept that followed in the wake of Aristotle’s theorizing.203

While Aristotle does not discuss or even utilize the term enargeia in the Poetics or

Rhetoric, he nevertheless has much to say about the related subject of clarity in writing or speaking (σαφήνεια). By the Hellenistic period, clarity (saphēneia) and vividness (enargeia) are often linked with one another and are even employed as virtual synonyms. For Aristotle, clarity falls under the discussion of style (lexis) and refers to using words according to their principle meanings. He writes (Poetics 1458a1-21): “The perfection of style is to be clear without being mean. The clearest style is that which uses only current or proper words.”204 Epicurus would nearly agree with Aristotle’s statement here, however for him proper expression involves not a mid-point between what is lowly and what is obscure, but rather employs only the common uses of words. For instance, in discussing time he argues (Ep. Hdt. 72): “we should neither adopt alternative terminology for it as being better—we should use that which is current—nor predicate anything else of it as having the same essence as this particular thing”.205 Gale also notes that,

“Epicurus’ sole stylistic canon was clarity (σαφήνεια)”.206 Aristotle, on the other hand (as he also does in his ethical works), stresses the need for finding a mean—between a “base”

(ταπεινόν) expression and one which employs “strange or rare words” (γλώτταις καὶ τοῖς

ἄλλοις εἴδεσι χρώμενος ἀπρεπῶς, 1458b13-14) to the point of becoming jargon

202 Webb (1997a) 117. 203 More on this in chapter five, §2. 204 Poet. 1458a1-21: Λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι. σαφεστάτη μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐκ τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ ταπεινή· παράδειγμα δὲ ἡ Κλεοφῶντος ποίησις καὶ ἡ Σθενέλου. 205 Ep. Hdt. 72: οὔτε ἄλλο τι κατ’ αὐτοῦ κατηγορητέον, ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἔχοντος τῷ ἰδιώματι τούτῳ—καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ποιοῦσί τινες—ἀλλὰ μόνον ᾧ συμπλέκομεν τὸ ἴδιον τοῦτο καὶ παραμετροῦμεν, μάλιστα ἐπιλογιστέον. The Greek text is from Arrighetti (1973); translation from L&S 7B. 206 Gale (1994) 150. See also Gale (1994) 138 ff. and the passage in Diogenes Laertius from which she draws this conclusion (DL 10.13): σαφὴς δ’ ἦν οὕτως, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἀξιοῖ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ σαφήνειαν ἀπαιτεῖν.

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(βαρβαρισμός, 1458a31),207 enigmatic (αἰνίγματός, 1548a26), or even laughable (γελοῖον,

1458b12). He thus provides the noun saphēneia with a technical usage, one which strongly influences Hellenistic philosophy and rhetoric even as soon as Epicurus. In turn, the concept of saphēneia also became closely associated with the vividness of language, termed enargeia, a relationship that will become clearer in chapter five.

Importantly, the text of the Poetics utilizes the superlative form of the adjective enargēs

(ἐναργέστατα, 1455a24) to describe the clarity of the vision.208 This passage is not without controversy, however, and Otto questions this generally accepted reading and instead prefers the disregarded (vernachlässigte) reading, ἐνεργέστατα for ἐναργέστατα, because of the similarities between this passage and that in the Rhetoric (discussed above).209 According to this reading, the poet should see the objects of his poetry not most vividly, but rather as if actualized

(ἐνεργέστατα). While her reasoning aligns closely with Aristotle’s phrasing elsewhere and with his ontology, it obscures the distinct possibility that it is precisely this passage and others like it

(already discussed), which help to establish the more technical usage of “vividness” (enargēs/ enargeia) and bridge the terms’ Classical and Hellenistic uses. While it is understandable that later scribes could have drawn on current rhetorical jargon and therefore transformed an epsilon to an alpha, it is also likely that even in Aristotle, the term was already taking on a more technical application, a likelihood underscored from the evidence that I have examined above.

207 Butcher’s (1951) translation for βαρβαρισμός. 208 Similarly, Aristotle employs the superlative ἐναργέστατα along with articular form τὸ ἐναργὲς at 1462a17. Both of these uses of the superlative have often been the subject of contention over whether Aristotle wrote ἐναργέστατα or ἐνεργέστατα. Nevertheless, the recent edition of Aristotle’s Poetics by Tarán and Gutas (2012) 218 (who draw on the whole manuscript tradition of the text in Greek, Latin, Arabic, and Syriac for their text) prints ἐναργέστατα at 1455a24, and ἐναργέστατα and τὸ ἐναργὲς at 1462a17. Moreover, they comment on the latter reading (p.467, n.62a17), “It is not clear whether in both cases Σ had ἐναρ- rather than ἐνεργ-, but it is clear that the Syriac translator so read it, as reflected in the Arabic”. Sifakis (2009) discusses Poetics 17, 1455a29-34 and convincingly argues for certain minor emendations, but maintains ἐναργέστατα as the proper reading. 209 Otto (2011) 76n.257: Diese Lesart wird geboten vom Parisinus und der Translatio latina, deren Übereinstimmung Kassel mit dem Buchstaben Π bezeichnet. Dagegen steht nur der Riccardianus, dem Kassel folgt. Das adverb fehlt in der Translatio arabica.

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By this reading, he claims that by seeing one’s subject with maximum lucidity, a poet can figure out what is fitting (πρέπον) and remove unrealistic details, thus making the audience trust that the poetry is true to life. Indeed, as Butcher argues, for Aristotle ‘probability’ (εἰκός) (he adds

‘necessity’, and later also that which is convincing (τὸ πιθανόν))—and I would include fitting

(πρέπον), the adjective Aristotle employs here)—“refers rather to the internal structure of a poem; it is the inner law which secures cohesion of the parts”.210 Moreover, I argue, by sticking to what is probable, convincing, and fitting, the poet creates a poem that possesses a distinct realism, i.e. it is both active (energes) and clear (enargēs), before his own eyes and before the eyes of his listeners/readers—who in turn can see the described subjects before their mind’s eye.

To bring this analysis of Aristotle full circle, let us conclude by returning to Aristotle’s discussions of judgment, but here through an examination of what he says about it in relation to ethics and the good life. In particular, we must note how the terms he uses explicitly recall the literary discussions of the Rhetoric and Poetics. For Aristotle, as indeed for most (if not all) ancient philosophers, 211 the goal or aim of philosophy is a good life and happiness

(eudaimonia).212 Indeed, he states as much in the Nichomachean Ethics (1095a14-20):

…all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy…213

210 Butcher (1951) 166. See also 163ff. 211 See especially Hadot (2002) and (1995). 212 Nussbaum (1986a) 61 comments on Aristotle’s metaphor from archery of searching for a target: “In the EN, he uses an image from archery to illustrate the practical contribution of his arguments… Ethical inquiry is presumably not supplying a target where one was previously altogether absent. The use of the same language in Book VI (1144a7) suggests that adults trained in the are already aimed at some target (1214b7ff.); what is, it seems, lacking is a clear view of the target, an articulation of eudaimonia, our shared end, into its component parts. Aristotle’s claim is that a philosophical treatise can help us to see more clearly what our ends are and how they relate to one another. This will improve practice in the way that a clear view of a target makes it easier to hit: we become more discriminating, more confident, more reliably accurate in choice”. The stress she lays upon vision and seeing is entirely appropriate, as it also relates to the procedure of pro ommattōn poiein and hints at the visual reference in Aristotle’s concept of theōria. 213 NE 1095a14-20: Λέγωμεν δ’ ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς

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Famously for Aristotle, this happiness involves a contemplative life, the life of theōria.214

Furthermore, this notion is at the center not only Aristotle’s ethical, but also his literary theories.

For example, commenting on the concept of mimēsis in Aristotle’s Poetics,215 Butcher notes, “‘Imitation’, in the sense in which Aristotle applies the word to poetry, is …seen to be equivalent to ‘producing’ or ‘creating according to a true idea,’ which forms part of the definition of art in general”.216 This “true reasoning” (λόγος ἀληθής) has ethical and artistic implications. For instance, the vocabulary directly links artistic creation to philosophical contemplation, as he writes (NE 1140a10-14): “All art is concerned with coming into being, i.e. with contriving and considering (θεωρεῖν) how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made”.217 Hadot explicates the Aristotelian concept of theōria: “Rather than referring to the life of a scholar, …we should speak of ‘life exercising itself for wisdom’ or the ‘philo-sophical’ life, since for Aristotle, wisdom represents the perfection of theōria.”218 Hadot further argues:

“Aristotle’s praise of life of the mind is simultaneously the description of a way of life actually practiced by Aristotle and the members of his school, and an ideal program or project: that is, an

ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ’ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν· Translations for Nichomachean Ethics are by Ross from Ross (1952), unless otherwise noted. 214 Cf. EN 1170a2ff. Watson (1988b) 28 comments on the link between phantasia and theōria in the de Anima: “That phantasia is necessary, though not itself sufficient, for the conversion of perceptions into thoughts is confirmed by one final passage in the De Anima… Aristotle says (432a4-14) that the objects of thought are to be found among the forms which are the objects of perception, and that for this reason someone who did not perceive anything would not learn or understand anything, and when one contemplates, θεωρῇ, one must do so comtemplating a phantasma. For ...phantasmata are like sense-perceptions except that they are without matter” and later, “For the perception to become the phantasma it is necessary for the phantasia to act, for this has been stated to be something between perception and thinking, and in virtue of which a phantasma occurs to us”. 215 Note that Sheppard (1991) 136 links the Hellenistic concept of enargeia explicitly to mimēsis, arguing that it “was associated with successful realistic representation or ”. 216 Butcher (1951) 153. He quotes EN 1140a10 “ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική”, for Aristotle’s definition of art. On mimēsis in Aristotle, see Woodruff (1992). 217 NE 1140a10-14: ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ θεωρεῖν ὅπως ἂν γένηταί τι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ· 218 Hadot (2002) 86. For discussion of theōria in Plato, see Festugiere (1950).

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invitation to rise up by degrees towards wisdom”.219 What is also essential to this conception of the good, philosophical life in a state of happiness (and to Hadot’s analysis of it), is the notion of actualization (energeia), the same principle that played such an important role in Aristotle’s discussion of pro omattōn poiein. He forcefully states (NE 1169b28-30), “For we have said at the outset [of the NE] that happiness is an activity [energeia]; and activity plainly comes into being and is not present at the start like a piece of property.”220 Thus, for him, eudaimonia is an active principal, which requires the constant effort and awareness of a person to achieve and to maintain actively; it is an exercise (ἄσκησίς).221

It is ultimately the constant effort that is required to achieve excellence (arête)—whether in ethics or in rhetoric—that makes the practice of pro omattōn poiein so important. By constantly keeping one’s subject or one’s goals before one’s eyes, an orator can bring about its actualization (its energeia). In a similar way, a philosopher can achieve happiness through active engagement in theōria, contemplating or even seeing with the mind.222 By the Hellenistic period, however, this same sort of viewing with the mind is called not energeia, but rather enargeia.

According to these later theories, it is enargeia that allows us to see objects clearly, both through verbal expression and through direct physical sensation. Impressions (phantasia), which

Epicureans and Stoics argue are verifiable because of sensation and reason, are thus able to provide us with a sound basis for knowledge. Ultimately then, Aristotle’s theories—while often

219 Hadot (2002) 86. See also Hadot (1995) 266 ff. 220 NE 1169b28-30: ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐνέργειά τις ἐστίν, ἡ δ’ ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι γίνεται καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὥσπερ κτῆμά τι. 221 Aristotle uses this word meaning “training” or “practice” only two times in his works, at Politics 1288b13 and EN 1170a11. The later instance stresses the effort required to achieve excellence (ἀρετῆς) and the need for training from “company of the good” (EN 1170a11-12: γίνοιτο δ’ ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς). For more on the spiritual exercise (meletē or askēsis) and practice of , see Hadot (2002) and (1995), especially the chapters “Spiritual Exercises”, “The View from Above”, and “Philosophy as a Way of Life”. 222 For the etymology of theōria and its relation to the Greek verb for seeing (ὁράω), see especially Chantraine (1999) 433-4.

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disregarded or disparaged by these later schools—provided much of the technical support for their vocabulary and encouraged later writers on philosophy and rhetoric either to account for his conceptions of vision and visual imagery or to incorporate his terminology within their own theories.

3. Conclusion

Like Homer, Plato preserves the association of the adjective enargēs with divinity and sublimity, as demonstrated in the Phaedrus where he describes the extreme clarity of the soul’s vision of Beauty. He was also the first philosopher to employ the abstract noun enargeia in a passage, which I have showed, laid the groundwork for later Hellenistic applications of the term.

Furthermore, while Zanker is largely correct to argue that “Neither Aristotle nor Theophrastus,

…appears to have known ἐνάργεια as a technical term in rhetoric, and the same seems to be true of the other schools of rhetoric in the fourth century”,223 I hope that through my survey of

Aristotle’s uses of the adjective, noun, and related concepts, it has become clear how his vocabulary and theory provided an important bridge to the concept of enargeia in the Hellenistic period.224 Aristotle’s usage of enargēs links the adjective with vision—both through physical

223 Zanker (1981) 308. Zanker convincingly shows that although Sextus Empiricus “tells us that Theophrastus considered τὸ ἐναργές common to the twofold criterion of truth, sense of things visible (αἰσθητά) and intellectual perception of things intelligible (νοητά) [M. 7.218]”, nevertheless, “its application seems to have been very broad, especially if it can refer to νόησις τῶν νοητῶν”. Similarly, Watson (1998b) 36 remarks on the same passage in Sextus, “The emphasis in Theophrastus on the importance of sense perception and on starting from it as a basis would also have been welcome to the Stoics (see fr. 18 Wi.; and cf. Theophrastus’ 8b12ff. and 9b8-9). Sextus Empiricus reports (Adv. Math. VII 217) that Aristotle and Theophrastus had two criteria, aisthēsis for the objects of sense perception and noēsis for the object of thought, but that Theophrastus said that what was common to both was clarity (to enargēs)”. On aisthēsis in Aristotle, see Solmsen (1961). 224 Regarding Theophrastus, who has not figured into the discussion so far, I would note that I have examined the four instances of forms of enargēs (he does not employ the noun enargeia) in his surviving works (Historia plantarum 3.6.4.6, de Pietate 18.3, frag. 6.10.2, frag. 27.1.7) with the help of TLG. None of these seems to me particularly remarkable, although it is worth mentioning that fragment 6 links the adjective in its superlative form to evidence from signs; frag. 6.10.1-3): Ὕδατος μὲν οὖν σημεῖα τὰ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖ εἶναι.Ἐναργέστατον μὲν οὖν τὸ ἑωθινὸν ὅταν πρὸ ἡλίου ἀνατολῆς φαίνηται ἐπιφοινίσσον σημεῖον· The connection between semiotics and enargeia becomes far more pronounced in the Hellenistic period (particularly in the theories of Epicurus and his followers); see Allen (2001) and Sedley (1982), as well as my discussion in chapter four.

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sensations and through the notion of the mind’s eye or the imagination (phantasia). This link between vividness and phantasia becomes especially important in the philosophies of the

Epicureans and the Stoics, although their notion of phantasia is often quite different from his.

Moreover, Aristotle is the first philosopher or rhetorical/literary theorist to articulate a theory of visual imagery, which he terms pro omattōn poiein—placing before the eyes. Sheppard is thus right to acknowledge how Aristotle gives clear expression to the underlying idea of enargeia: "In composing plots and working them out so far as verbal expression goes, the poet should, more than anything else, put things before his eyes as he then sees the events most vividly as if he were actually present, and can therefore find what is appropriate and be aware of the opposite."225

Although these remarks are based on the Poetics, they apply equally to the Rhetoric and indeed the fullest discussion of pro omattōn poiein in Aristotle comes from the latter. The goal of this rhetorical or literary practice is actualization (energeia) in which the writer can see his subject before his mind’s eye and the reader/listener can as well. This notion of “placing before the eyes” is the same as the Hellenistic rhetorical concept of enargeia, a notion to which we will return in chapter five.

225 Sheppard (1991) 36.

68 CHAPTER FOUR

SCIENTIA: SELF-EVIDENCE AND THE CRITERIA OF TRUTH IN HELLENISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY

While our examinations of the archaic and classical applications of enargeia and enargēs have helped us to understand why and how later philosophers and critics chose this terminology, we must now turn to examine how enargeia emerged as a technical concept in the Hellenistic period: first in philosophy (in this chapter) and then in rhetorical theory and literary criticism (in the next).

Beginning with Epicurus, enargeia and enargēs come to have a strong epistemological signification with a formal meaning that denotes self-evidence as the source for knowledge

(epistemē/scientia). Indeed, for both Epicureans and Stoics enargeia, as self-evidence, is the principle feature of every criterion of truth—the means for discriminating truth from falsity. This language informs much of the discussion of sensory perception and knowledge in both schools as each of them appeal to empirical evidence as proof for their philosophical views. In this chapter,

I show that much of the focus of Hellenistic philosophy was on epistemological questions—how can we know something?; what is knowledge?; how is this knowledge verifiable?—and I argue that the concept of enargeia is crucial for understanding the theories offered by the leading dogmatic schools of the period—the Epicureans and the Stoics.226 Ultimately, this technical usage of the term was to remain primary throughout the rest of antiquity. As we will see in the next chapter, it also directly influenced the rhetorical theories of enargeia that developed during the Hellenistic period. Indeed, as I will demonstrate, eventually the philosophical concept of enargeia was to play an important role in the poetics of Lucretius, analyzed in chapter six, and

226 Brunschwig (1999) 229 characterizes the change in focus between the Classical and Hellenistic periods as “The epistemological turn”.

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was also to leave a lasting mark on other writers of the Roman period in both prose and poetry, particularly Virgil.

1. Epicurus, Enargeia, and Sure Knowledge of Truth a. Matter, the Senses, and Perception

Epicurus is the first philosopher to enunciate a technical use for the abstract noun, enargeia. He applies this term to refer to the “clear view” or “self-evidence” of sensory

(particularly visual) data.227 According to him, sense perceptions provide us with a critical means

(κριτήριον) or yardstick (κανών) against which we can measure and even verify our knowledge of the world.228 Epicurus’ metaphor to a ruler or yardstick (kanōn) speaks to the value of a criterion of truth: it allows us to distinguish truth from falsity (as a yardstick determines straightness or crookedness by virtue of its being straight) and is itself a means for distinguishing measurement (as a yardstick is by virtue of its being marked with measuring units).229 According to several ancient sources, he even went so far as to declare that, “all sense impressions are true”,230 a claim which often earned him the ridicule of other schools. As DeWitt and others have

227 For enargeia as a “clear view”, see Zanker (1981) 308 and Long (1971a) 117ff. For enargeia as “self- evidence” or “what is evident”, see the index of L&S, as well as Tuominen (2007) 238ff., and Striker (1996b) 42 and (1996c) 82ff., et al. 228 DL 10.31 (L&S 17A). See also commentary in L&S 88-90 on “The criteria of truth”. 229 See Asmis (1999) 261ff. and Striker (1996b) 31ff., who provides lucid discussion of Epicurus’ criterion of truth along with much helpful commentary on the metaphor to a ruler/yardstick. Lucretius translates kanōn as regula (ruler) at DRN 4.513, see chapter six. For the importance of epistemology in this book, see especially Císař (2001). 230 See Sextus Empiricus, M 8.63.1-6: “Epicurus used to say that all sensibles are true, and that every impression is the product of something existent and like the things which moves the sense; and that those who say that some impressions are true but others false are wrong, because they cannot distinguish opinion from self-evidence” (Ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγε μὲν πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ἀληθῆ, καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος εἶναι, καὶ τοιαύτην ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ κινοῦν τὴν αἴσθησιν, πλανᾶσθαι δὲ τοὺς τινὰς μὲν τῶν φαντασιῶν λέγοντας ἀληθεῖς, τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς παρὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι χωρίζειν δόξαν ἀπὸ ἐναργείας). The translation is from L&S 16F; all Greek text for Adversos Mathematicos is from Mau and Mutschmann (1914). I would note in particular how in this passage Epicurus is said to have appealed to self-evidence, i.e. enargeia, as the basis for empirical judgment. See also Epicurus, KD 23 (L&S 16D): “If you fight against all sensations, you will not have a standard against which to judge even those of them you say are mistaken” (Εἰ μαχῇ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οὐχ ἕξεις οὐδ’ ἃς ἂν φῇς αὐτῶν διεψεῦσθαι πρὸς τί ποιούμενος τὴν ἀγωγὴν κρίνῃς). Cicero, de Fin. 1.20.64 “qui (sensus) si omnes veri erunt, ut Epicuri ratio docet, tum denique poterit aliquid cognosci et percipi” (Quoted in DeWitt (1943)). DeWitt 28 comments on the last passage, “In this text "verus" stands for ἀληθής in the Greek testimonia and it is

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shown, the scorn was unmerited as rival philosophers often exaggerated or misunderstood his epistemological theory.231 Despite the jabs, however, Epicureans persisted in asserting that there were four yardsticks (kanōna) or criteria of truth available to us: 1) sensations (αἰσθήσεις); 2) preconceptions (προλήψεις); 3) feelings (πάθη); and 4) “focusing of thought into an impression” (τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας).232 They argued that these were the sole means of achieving knowledge and assessing its contents. They are, as the derivation of the term criteria shows (κριτήριον from κρίνω, “to separate, …distinguish, …choose, …judge”), tools for discriminating and judging what is real and what is true or false.233

The reason these critical faculties provide a sure foundation for knowledge is that they are based on self-evidence (enargeia).234 Accordingly, they supply a direct and objective means

not found there to be replaced by more specific terms such as ἀψευδής. This leaves room for ambiguity in all versions: the meaning may be "true" in the sense of "reliable" and its synonyms, or it may be "real" in the sense of independently existing”. The precise wording of Epicurus’ dictum is much debated, particularly whether he said that “all sense- impressions (phantasiai) are true” or “all sensations (aisthēsis) are true”. See Striker (1996c), which argues, I think convincingly, that the former reading is preferable, but that they ultimately amount to the same thing. For more discussion of Epicurus’ dictum, see especially DeWitt (1943), Taylor (1980), Everson (1990b), Annas (1992) 162ff., and Ierodiakonou (2011) 65ff. See also Fine (2011). 231 DeWitt (1943). See also O’Keefe (2010) 97ff., Asmis (2009) 94ff., Striker (1996b) 34ff., L&S 78-90, Taylor (1980), and Rist (1972) 14-40. 232 Diogenes Laertius claims that (DL 10.31 (L&S 17A): “Epicurus, in the Kanōn (‘Yardstick’), says that sensations, preconceptions and feelings are the criteria of truth. The Epicureans add the ‘focusings of thought into an impression’”. As criteria, all of these are not only checks on reasoning and judgments about right and wrong, but they are also themselves true and self-evident. For example, as Scott notes (1989) 362 drawing on S.E., M. 7.203, Sextus begins his explanation of “the Epicurean thesis ‘all perceptions are true …by taking the truth of all feelings as the paradigm for perceptions to follow”. For aisthēsis in Epicurus, see Solmsen (1961). O’Keefe (2010) 85 names only the first three criteria in his discussion of Epicurean epistemology. Nevertheless, as Strozier (1985) 64 and 68, respectively, notes, the epibolē tēs dianoias “is clearly claimed as a criterion in the letters”, for which he cites DL 10.38, 50, 52, 62, 63, and 68. Long (1986) 25 translates the phrase as “apprehension by intellect”, while Rist (1972) 32ff. translates epibolē tēs dianoias as “image-making contact of the mind”. Striker (1996b) 36 and 37 comments on the controversial phrase φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας, explicating that it is “an act of focusing the mind on an object or state of affairs which leads to a sense-impression” and further notes that “it would seem to be the Epicurean counterpart to the καταλεπτικὴ φαντασία of the Stoics”. For more on Epicurus’ canonic, especially ἐπιβολαὶ τῆς διανοίας, see Asmis (2009), Rist (1972) 14-40, and DeWitt (1939). 233 LSJ 996. For the derivation of κριτήριον, see entry for κρίνω in Chantraine (1999) 584-5 and entry for κριτ-ήριον, τό in LSJ 997. For the background to the term κριτήριον and its Hellenistic use for “criteria of truth”, see Striker (1996b) and the commentary in L&S 88-90. 234 Long (1986) 26 sums up how all sense impressions as well as judgments about them must be checked against clear impressions (i.e. enargeia): “In order to use the evidence of the senses as material for establishing true propositions about the world, Epicurus assumed the validity of certain axioms. …[1]: ‘Sense-impressions which are

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of convicting falsehood and confirming truth. Indeed, the procedure of canonics, the Epicurean method of reasoned argument and verification, always returns to certain foundational, self- evident truths based on empirical perceptions and/or preconceptions of the world.235 All analysis or claims about the world—even those made about invisible atoms or void—must concur with this primary evidence (enargeia) if it is to be accepted as true. Summarizing this view, Diogenes quotes Epicurus: “Every sensation, he says, is devoid of reason and incapable of memory …Nor is there anything which can refute sensations or convict them of error …nor again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on sensation …Hence it is from plain facts [ἀπὸ τῶν

φαινομένων] that we must start when we draw inferences about the unclear [περὶ τῶν

ἀδήλων]”.236 Epicurus asserts that all judgments and inferences (σημειοῦσθαι), particularly those concerning unobservable aspects of the world (περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων), must be referred back to and checked against “plain facts” (ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων), the later phrase used by him as a synonym for enargeia.237 In making inferences, however, the procedure remains empirical, as all claims must comply with the data of sense evidence.

“clear” provide accurate information about the external appearance and properties of objects.’ …[2] ‘Judgments about non-evident objects are true if they are consistent with clear sense-impressions.’” 235 I say “reasoned argument and verification” instead of logic, because Epicurus rejects the traditional forms of logic such as dialectic; see DL 10.31 and Clay (1983) 66-72 who describes Epicurean kanonics as (p.66), a “logic …concerned with criteria for judgment and fundamental principles or simply as stoicheiotikon ([DL]] 10.30)”. 236 DL 10.31-2: πᾶσα γάρ,” φησίν, “αἴσθησις ἄλογός ἐστι καὶ μνήμης οὐδεμιᾶς δεκτική· οὔτε γὰρ ὑφ’ αὑτῆς κινεῖται οὔτε ὑφ’ ἑτέρου κινηθεῖσα δύναταί τι προσθεῖναι ἢ ἀφελεῖν· οὐδὲ ἔστι τὸ δυνάμενον αὐτὰς διελέγξαι. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ὁμογένεια αἴσθησις τὴν ὁμογενῆ διὰ τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν, οὔθ’ ἡ ἀνομογένεια τὴν ἀνομογένειαν, οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰσι κριτικαί· οὔτε μὴν λόγος, πᾶς γὰρ λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἤρτηται. οὔθ’ ἡ ἑτέρα τὴν ἑτέραν, πάσαις γὰρ προσέχομεν. καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐπαισθήματα δ’ ὑφεστάναι πιστοῦται τὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀλήθειαν. ὑφέστηκε δὲ τό τε ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀκούειν ὥσπερ τὸ ἀλγεῖν· ὅθεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων χρὴ σημειοῦσθαι. All translations from Diogenes Laertius are from Hicks (1925), although I have adapted them at times. All Greek for Diogenes’ Life of Epicurus (Book 10), except for Epicurus’ letters and Kyriai Doxai, comes from Long (1964). I have also checked these translations against Dorandi (2013). 237 Ep. Hdt. (DL 10.52): “And to this view we must closely adhere, if we are not to repudiate the criteria founded on the clear evidence of the sense (κατὰ τὰς ἐναργείας), nor again to throw all these things into confusion by maintaining falsehood as if it were truth” (καὶ ταύτην οὖν σφόδρα γε δεῖ τὴν δόξαν κατέχειν, ἵνα μήτε τὰ κριτήρια ἀναιρῆται τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐναργείας μήτε τὸ διημαρτημένον ὁμοίως βεβαιούμενον πάντα συνταράττῃ). Note how he appeals explicitly to enargeia in this passage. The translation is from Hicks (1925); all Greek text for the letters of Epicurus and the Kyriai Doxai are from Arrighetti (1973).

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According to Epicurus, if something is not wholly determinable as true or false, it must, at the very least, not contradict or contest the evidence of the senses.238 Therefore, if one holds an opinion that is contrary to the evidence of the senses, then this must be rejected as false. It is our own evaluations—what he calls epilogismos—or opinion (doxa) that are to blame for errors, not our senses or the other criteria of truth, which are infallible.239 But how then are we to check our reasoning if our senses sometimes seem to mislead us?240 Ierodiakonou sums up Epicurus’ empirical procedure by explaining that: “…it is in virtue of the fact that our impressions are evident that they constitute witnesses who attest or contest, to follow the forensic analogy of

Epicurus’ terminology (epimartyrȇsis, antimartyrȇsis), the truth or falsehood of our beliefs.”241

Here Ierodiakonou notes how Epicurus establishes two modes of reasoning that provide checks upon our senses and our mental inferences, which he calls attestation (epimartyrȇsis) and contestation (antimartyrȇsis).242 If we utilize these techniques, he avers, we can make correct inferences and judgments based on the signs perceived by the senses.243 He unequivocally states the power of these modes (Ep. Hdt. 51): “If it is not attested (μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ) or is contested

(ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ) [i.e. by enargeia], it is false. On the other hand, if it is attested

238 See DeWitt (1943) 23. 239 See Scott (1989) 364. On Epicurean epilogismos, see DL 10.73, as well as Erler (2003) and Schofield (1996). 240 For instance, we cannot see the atoms at all and sometimes, like an oar appearing bent in water, our senses seem to mislead us (in this case, into believing that the oar is really bent). 241 For this conclusion, Ierodiakonou (2011) 68 cites “Sextus Empiricus, M. 7.211-16; 8.324; Diogenes Laertius, 10.34; 48-51”. 242 The terms epimartyrȇsis and antimartyrȇsis are translated in various ways (confirmation, witnessing, counter-witnessing, etc.), but this seems to me the most straightforward. See Tuominen (2007) 255ff., Allen (2001) 199, Sedley (1982), and Dumont (1982). 243 Epicurus and his followers, as Sedley (1982) 240 has shown, explicitly regarded his tools of attestation, contestation, as well as “similarity”, as procedures of “sign-inference (sēmeiōsis), that is, the discovery of non- evident truths by means of evident signs”. While this article focuses chiefly on de Signis by the Epicuruean Philodemus, its conclusions also apply to Epicurus and to Lucretius. See, for instance, the passage Ep. Hdt. 38: Ἔτι τε κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν καὶ ἁπλῶς τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ’ ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη, ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα.

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(ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ) or else not contested (μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ), it is true”.244 The requirement of being ‘not uncontested’ (in the form of the litotes, οὐκ or μὴ with the verb ἀντιμαρτυρέω) grants Epicurus and his followers the ability to make claims and judgments about unclear and invisible realities (ἄδηλα, ἀφανῆ, ἀόρατα). These include the basic components of Epicurean physics: the atoms, void, and the swerve. As these are unseeable and unclear, any discussion of them must be expressed through analogies to the clear, seeable, vivid (δῆλα, φανερά, ὁρατά,

ἐναργής) realm of the perceptions. So long as one’s conclusions from analogy and rational inferences do not introduce added opinion and are not in conflict with the empirical evidence of the senses, then the conclusion must be true. It is only what is patently obvious, i.e self-evidence

(enargeia), which can render a judgment false.245 Empirical, sensory evidence always takes precedent. If something is obvious and self-evident, then the senses, because they are purely passive and do not include reason or opinion (they are alogos), reveal it to be true and our mind must accept it.

To explain how we grasp evidence directly from the outside world, Epicurus draws on

Democritus, arguing in his Letter to Herodotus that our sense organs, particularly our eyes, are imprinted by effluent atoms (which he calls εἴδωλα). These film-like images are constantly emitted by all physical objects; by receiving these images, the eye perceives the impression

244 DL 10.51: …ἐὰν μὲν μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ ψεῦδος γίνεται· ἐὰν δὲ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ ἀληθές. The translation is my own. Sedley (1982) 268ff. comments that, “Epicurus tells us …that error arises not through the mental or sensory apprehension of impressions, but through a distinct but related process, apparently one involving judgement about those impressions”. 245 Note, for instance, Epicurus’ line of reasoning about the minimum parts of the atom (something unseen) by analogy to the perceptible minimum (Ep. Hdt., DL 10.59): “We must recognize that this analogy also holds of the minimum in the atom; it is only in minuteness that it differs from that which is observed by sense, but it follows the same analogy. On the analogy of things within our experience we have declared that the atom has magnitude; and this, small as it is, we have merely reproduced on a larger scale” (μικρότητι γὰρ ἐκεῖνο δῆλον ὡς διαφέρει τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν θεωρουμένου, ἀναλογίᾳ δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κέχρηται. ἐπεὶ περ καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ἡ ἄτομος, κατὰ τὴν ἐνταῦθα ἀναλογίαν κατηγορήσαμεν, μικρόν τι μόνον μακρὰν ἐκβαλόντες.). For analysis of this passage, see Furley (1967) 22ff. For his appeal to analogy checked against clear evidence in support of his theory of minimal parts, see Long (1986) 28ff.

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(phantasia) of the object.246 The complete image, perceived by vision or other senses, is called a phantasia (variously translated as “presentation”, “impression”, or “appearance”).247 DeWitt argues that this term, “denotes a true presentation of a single, existent object, though reduced to scale, as it registers itself upon the vision and mind of a sane, sober and waking person, and stands in contrast to φαντάσματα or φαντασμοί, which denote hybrid, distorted or indistinct presentations”.248 As the theory of phantasiai establishes a direct link between original object and the sense-organs, it becomes the mechanism by which Epicurus can explain both perception and cognition. This also connects phantasiai to the critical faculties for determining truth. Asmis recognizes this link and notes that according to Sextus Empiricus, Epicurus’ criterion of truth,

“consists in “presentation” (φαντασία); and he adds that Epicurus also used the term ἐνάργεια,

“evidence,” for φαντασία”.249 The important point is that for Sextus, as well as for Epicurus, enargeia and phantasia amount to the same thing—direct evidence from the outside world which provides a basis for empirical inferences, as well as reasoning and judgment.

Epicurus’ theory of vision is more fully formed than those for the other senses. It is also involved, as we will see, in the proper exercising of the complete set of his criteria of truth. But how exactly does vision take place? Following Democritus, Epicurus’ materialist physics allows for only two natures, body (i.e. the atoms) and void. But Epicurus is also committed to

246 On eidōla and the precedent for the term in Democritus, see chapter three, §1. 247 Ep. Hdt. (DL 10.50, L&S 15.A): καὶ ἣν ἂν λάβωμεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις εἴτε μορφῆς εἴτε συμβεβηκότων, μορφή ἐστιν αὕτη τοῦ στερεμνίου, γινομένη κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς πύκνωμα ἢ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ εἰδώλου. In his list of Epicurus’ works, Diogenes (10.28) names the now lost Περὶ φαντασίας. Lucretius translates Epicurus’ term phantasia into Latin as visum, literally “a thing seen”. See DRN 4.499 (L&S 16.A): proinde quod in quoquest his visum temorpore, verumst. All Latin text for Lucretius is from the Loeb edition of Rouse, rev. by Smith (1992). More will be said about Lucretius’ translations and expression of Epicurus’ theories in chapter six. 248 DeWitt (1939) 414. 249 Asmis (1984) 95. For these claims, she cites Adv. math. 7.203 (Ἐπίκουρος δὲ δυεῖν ὄντων τῶν συζυγούντων ἀλλήλοις πραγμάτων, φαντασίας καὶ [τῆς] δόξης, τούτων τὴν φαντασίαν, ἣν καὶ ἐνάργειαν καλεῖ, διὰ παντὸς ἀληθῆ φησιν ὑπάρχειν) and 7.216.

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empiricism, so he needs a mechanism to explain the physics of sensation and cognition. The process is two-fold, involving the emission of atoms by objects (on one end) and the receiving of these emitions (on the other). The effluences or images (εἴδωλα), which vision grasps, constantly stream off of everything in the universe in thin, film-like bodies.250 When the emitted atoms make contact with a sense organ (the eyes for color and shape, the ears for sound, the skin for touch, the nose for smell, and the tongue for taste), they stamp themselves into the organ without any loss of character.251 He states this clearly: “whatever impression [φαντασία] we get by focusing our thought or senses [ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις], whether of shape or of properties, that is the shape of the solid body, produced through the image’s

250 Even in the cases of mad or sick people, the mind takes in eidōla or a complete phantasia, however it is the mind’s added opinion which is responsible for error by judging these distorted eidōla to represent an accurate, external state. It is the same in the case of dreams, as we do not employ the modes of attestation or contestation to check our experiences. Regarding hallucinatory or dream ‘images’, Long (1986) 24 stresses how it is vital that we not add false opinion to our sensations, particularly as they can consist of “real effluences which are compounded and then produce images of Centaurs and monsters (Ep. Hdt. 48; Lucret. iv 130-42)”. While real (i.e. material) and true (because they are made by atomic impacts on the mind), we err if we infer that these images represent the objects of this world accurately. We must be very careful to test these images against all our senses and reason, i.e. against the criteria of truth, in order to make sure that they are attested or at least not contested by clear evidence. 251 Although Epicurus’ physics is almost identical to Democritus’ and draws explicitly upon his views (see L&S 5), his epistemology, ethics, and (lack of) teleology are, nevertheless, drastically different from Democritus’ (cf. the discussion of free will in the inscription of Diogenes of 32.1.14-3.14 (L&S 20G)). On this difference, note how Zeller (1870) 482-3 argues that, “even when the two philosophers agree in individual statements, the meaning which they attach to these assertions, and the whole spirit of their systems, is widely divergent. Democritus aimed at explaining natural phenomena by natural causes. He wished, in short, for a science of nature purely for its own sake. Epicurus wished for a view of nature able to avert disturbing influences from man’s inner life. Natural science stands with him entirely in the service of ethics”. See also Modrak (1993) 102 and O’Keefe (1997). Epicurus employs the term τύπος to refer to the stamp of “impressions” made by the solid bodies received in the senses from emanating objects, an expression which explicitly recalls the imprint of a signet ring; cf. LSJ 1835 entry for τύπ-ος, ὁ. The analogy to stamping, Iopollo notes, is likely in response to Plato’s “model of opinion illustrated in the (191cff.) as the linking of a present image to the imprint of a past image on the soul, which is itself compared to a wax tablet”, see Ioppollo (1990) 438. While Ioppolo’s comments address the Stoic application of the term τύπωσις, they apply equally well to the use of τύπος by Epicurus. I will say more about the term τύπος and the related διατύπ-ωσις (a term nearly synonymous with enargeia in Hellenistic rhetoric) in chapter five and in relation to Stoic epistemology at the end of this chapter. See also Asmis (1999) 272ff. According to Epicurus, errors are due entirely to opinion added to the sensation (i.e. it is our fault for attributing something to the sensory input which was not there); see Ep. Hdt., DL 10.50 (L&S 15.A.10): Τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ διημαρτημένον ἐν τῷ προσδοξαζομένῳ ἀεί ἐστιν… While our senses have thresholds below or above which we cannot sense, if something is sensed it must necessarily exist—even images in sleep. For checking the truth or falsehood of our opinions we must utilize Epicurus’ modes of attestation and contestation; see below.

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[εἰδώλον] concentrated succession or after-effect”. 252 Thus the eidōla and phantasia are trustworthy as they grant us direct, unimpeded access to the outside world; to know truth, however, we must be careful to make sure that our rational inferences are in keeping with these true realities.253

b. Preconceptions, Reasoning and the Mind (psychē/animus)

While remaining staunchly empirical in his stress on sense perceptions as the basis for knowledge, Epicurus also accepts the need for inference and for the mind’s ability to reason, particularly from things seen to things unseen. By accepting the importance of the mind—three of the four criteria of truth named by Diogenes are really mental, not physical—he, therefore, has a solid foundation for accepting the procedures of analogy (also called similarity) and contestation (antimartyrȇsis) as means for visualizing (and thereby understanding and knowing) the un-seeable, unclear realm of atoms and void (to which the eidōla also belong).254 This unperceivable world, which lies beneath the threshold of the senses, is available to us by focusing our thoughts on real evidence and by making comparisons with other evidence from our experience. It is a kind of seeing with the mind, but one that is founded on the prolēpseis or preconceptions we have of things. 255 These are arrived at empirically through repeated sensory

252 My italics. DL 10.50 (L&S 15.A.9): καὶ ἣν ἂν λάβωμεν φαντασίαν ἐπιβλητικῶς τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις εἴτε μορφῆς εἴτε συμβεβηκότων, μορφή ἐστιν αὕτη τοῦ στερεμνίου, γινομένη κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς πύκνωμα ἢ ἐγκατάλειμμα τοῦ εἰδώλου. One of Epicurus’ lost works named by Diogenes (10.28) was Περὶ εἰδώλων. 253 Furley (1993) 84 contrasts Epicurus’ views on sense perception to Democritus’, noting that the textual evidence, “[is] suffiecient to show that the Epicureans parted company from Democritus in allowing that perceptible qualities are properties of external objects, not merely pathē of the senses. And this is plainly an important difference”. 254 For an example of how Epicurus utilizes analogy to make distinctions between the objects of perception and unclear objects like atoms and void, which are beneath our powers to perceive, see the chapter “Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus §§56.5-59” in Furley (1967) 7-27. 255 DL 10.31. Cicero defines prolēpsis as, “a delineation of a thing, preconceived by the mind, without which understanding, inquiry and discussion are impossible” and credits Epicurus with the coining of this term. His Epicurean speaker in de Natura Deorum articulates the prolēpsis of the gods as (L&S 23E), “preconception (anticipationem), or prenotion (praenotionem), of the gods (for new things require new names, just as Epicurus

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inputs.256 While located within the rational mind, they too, ultimately, have a material and sensory basis. Furthermore, the mind can also focus upon its mental impressions (phantasiai), which have entered it through the physical eidōla/phantasia given off by all material entities, including, for Epicurus, the gods. These are stored up in the mind’s memory, which is imprinted by the material effluences.257 Through his ability to reason, a philosopher can achieve a “clear view” (enargeia) of even the unseeable aspects of the world. As it is clear and vivid (enargēs), it too is real, verifiable, and true. Unlike Plato or other rationalists, the central tenet of Epicurus’ epistemology, however, is that all knowledge and judgment must be consistent with empirical evidence (enargeia) from the real world—evidence, which, as its name still implies (from Latin videre), is distinct, vivid, and most importantly visible.258

But how can the mind’s preconceptions and memories serve as criteria of truth? Diogenes helps explain this area of Epicurus’ canonic by defining a preconception (πρόληψις) as, “a sort of apprehension (κατάληψις) or a right opinion (δόξα ὀρθή) or notion (ἔννοια), or universal idea (καθολικὴ νόησις) stored in the mind; that is, a recollection (μνήμη) of an external object

himself gave prolēpsis its name, a name which no one had previously applied to it) is such that we think the gods blessed and immortal”. ND 1.43-5: …quam appellat πρόλημψιν Epicurus id est anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest. …hanc nos habere sive anticipationem, ut ante dixi, sive praenotionem deorum (sunt enim rebus novis nova ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse πρόληψιν appellavit, quam antea nemo eo verbo nominarat)—hanc igitur habemus, ut deos beatos et inmortales putemus. The translations are from L&S, while the Latin text is that of Plasberg (1917). Asmis (2009) 93-4 explicates the link between focusing the mind (epibolē) and appearances (phantasiai), noting that, “[t]he term ‘presentational’ [i.e. φανταστικὰς] signifies that the mind attends to an appearance (‘presentation’, phantasia) from outside. 256 See Long (1971a) 11ff. In a similar way, Lucretius, links vision with the power of thought in the repeated phrase, “naturae species ratioque”, which I discuss in chapter six. 257 As Long notes (1986) 24, “Epicurus… supposed that there are ‘images’ [i.e. eidōla or in the Latin translation of Lucretius simulacra] which somehow bypass the sense organs and penetrate directly to the mind.” Nevertheless, these are still material—very thin, but still material; they are in Long’s words “atomic clusters”—and as they are matter they are “explicable by the mind’s contact with atoms that enter it from outside”. See also Konstan (2011). 258 DeLacy (1939) 86 acknowledges how Epicurus’ line of reasoning from the seen to the unseen is also tied to the Epicurean views on language, noting: “Language has cognitive value only to the extent that it may be referred back to objects of experience by a process of empirical verification. Language of this kind is alone philosophical; for it alone provides an adequate medium for the communication of philosophical observation and inference. The correct use of language is inseparable from the investigation of truth, for language and truth rest on the same empirical standards”. On Epicurus’ theory of language, see especially Dalzell (1987) 25ff.

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(ἔξωθεν φανέντος) often presented”.259 Because of repeated material impacts on the sense organs, the mind builds up a memory base of notions (i.e. preconceptions or anticipations) of what things in this world are (Diogenes gives as his first example “man”).260 One preserves phantasia, impressions in the mind, which can be mentally (re-)activated by focusing our thoughts (epibolē). While false opinion is responsible for errors,261 prolēpsis—i.e. in Diogenes’ phrasing “correct opinion” or the storage of a “universal idea” in the mind’s memory—cannot be.262 Tuominen sums up prolēpsis in this way: “the truth of the preconceptions entails two things: (i) the attributes assigned to the things in the preconception really belong to those things;

(ii) the things the preconception refers to exist, i.e. the preconceptions are not vacuous”.263 In the final phrase of this quote, we can recognize how preconceptions are also derived from ontologically existent sense-impressions. The preconceptions are themselves self-evident, because in the mind they consist of atomic imprints from real objects, and they remain there through memory, with which we can reactivate them through our mental focus. The mind processes all sensations through a process of material input from outside; however, Epicurus

259 DL 10.33: Τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἱονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τουτέστι μνήμην τοῦ πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος… DeWitt (1954) 144 calls this passage of Diogenes “a hodgepodge of Epicurean and Stoic terminology and doctrine”. Certainly by defining prolēpsis as a katalēpsis, Diogenes is drawing upon Stoic terminology, as their criterion of truth is the grasping impression (καταλεπτική φαντασία). Nevertheless, DeWitt overstates the absurdity of Diogenes’ placing “general concepts” [i.e. prolēpsis] of such brute things as horses and oxen …in the same logical category with that of justice”. For Epicurus, these things are in many ways on the same level, as knowledge of the concept of a horse or an ox comes from seeing a horse or an ox. Similarly, the prolēpsis of justice also comes from repeated atomic impacts on the senses (e.g. seeing people acting justly and participating in mutually beneficial social relationships), and in this way it is empirical and self-evident (see Epicurus’ KD 37, 38). On the abstract prolēpsis of justice, for instance, Asmis (2009) 88 notes that, “The preconception of ‘justice’, for example, is ‘what is beneficial in communal dealings with one another; and this is an evaluative judgment involving at least the preconceptions of benefit and community”. For Epicurus, all of these preconceptions ultimately arise through the senses; cf. Morel (2008) 29ff. 260 DL 10.33: …οἷον τὸ Τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι ἄνθρωπος εὐθὺς κατὰ πρόληψιν καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ νοεῖται προηγουμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων. 261 See Ep. Hdt. 50 (L&S 15A10): Τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ διημαρτημένον ἐν τῷ προσδοξαζομένῳ ἀεί ἐστιν… cited above. Note also Lucretius’ emphatic statement on the infallibility of sense-perception and the errors of the mind at DRN 4.386: “Do not blame the mind’s error on the eyes” (proinde animi vitium hoc oculis adfingere noli); my translation. See also the discussion of false opinion in Philodemus in chapter five and Scott (1989) 365ff. for discussion of this passage from Lucretius and on the errors caused by opinion added to sense perception. 262 See Strozier (1985) 73ff. 263 Tuominen (2007) 224.

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particularly stresses the sense of sight (as does his later follower Lucretius). On this basis, he argues that everyone who possesses their senses, with vision as the sensation par excellence, does in due course arrive at accurate, clear, and true preconceptions (prolēpseis).

For Epicurus, a prolēpsis amounts to what we would normally call a word’s definition, however it is slightly different in that it does not (necessarily) need to be described in words, but rather it must be seen to be understood. Indeed, Epicurean philosophy does not require strict definitions; rather, words or names (because they are based on prolēpseis) must refer to things that are so patently clear so as to be self-evident, i.e. enargēs.264 Diogenes conveys this point by arguing that, “preconceptions are self-evident (ἐναργεῖς)” while “opinion (δόξα)… is either true or false”.265 Commenting on this passage, Konstan notes that, “as far as I can judge, the

Epicureans reserved the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ for what they called δόξα and ὑπόληψις, which we may render as ‘belief’ and ‘supposition’, two psychic processes that surely involve the rational part of the soul”.266 Error for Epicurus always resides in our own added (false) opinion, not from the sensation; so preconceptions, which are derived from sense-experience and have no added opinion, are surely true. While sensations (aisthēseis), are devoid of memory (DL 10.31

μνήμης οὐδεμιᾶς δεκτική), preconceptions require it for they are caused by repeated, atomic impressions. Moreover, as Morel argues, prolēpsis is, “a certain kind of doxa—a correct one—,

264 Long (1971a) 127 points out the shortcomings of Epicurus’ theory, noting that, “Epicurus’ linguistic theory is severely limited in its scope. He had nothing, apparently, to say about grammar and syntax. Like many other imagist or conceptualist accounts of meaning his treatment of semantics …is vitiated by its attempt to reduce the sense of all or most words to clear and distinct ideas. The concept of πρόληψις is ill suited to explain the usage of pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions and a vast number of nouns and verbs, not to mention the meaning of whole sentences”. Long is surely right about the errors that Epicurus’ linguistic theories allows, but for the purpose of this study, the real world applications of the theory do not really matter. I am simply laying out the theory and establishing how Epicurus related sensation and mental activity through the concept of enargeia. This will especially be vital to understanding how Epicurus’ followers and readers (such as Lucretius), who knew and even believed his theories (despite their shortcomings), applied them to their own literary works. 265 DL 10.33-4: ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσιν αἱ προλήψεις· καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἤρτηται, ἐφ’ ὃ ἀναφέροντες λέγομεν, οἷον Πόθεν ἴσμεν εἰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; τὴν δὲ δόξαν καὶ ὑπόληψιν λέγουσιν, ἀληθῆ τέ φασι καὶ ψευδῆ· 266 Konstan (2011) 62.

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and …accordingly it has ‘a propositional structure of the type ‘such a thing is a man’ or ‘the gods are happy and indestructible creatures.’ …[And it] seems to constitute a kind of representation, that is a mental image that is simulataneously distinct both from its original source and from the object to which it can be applied”.267 Indeed, a preconception is precisely a “mental image”, which is patently obvious and can even be seen.268 By visualizing or seeing a word or a concept in one’s mind, one knows certain clear facts.269

Epicurus’ theory of preconceptions also coheres with his theory of language. He writes

(Ep. Hdt. 10.37-8):

…you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning. For the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen (βλέπεσθαι) and to need no proving (μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι).270

He does not establish his own logic, but rather employs what Bailey calls a “rules of procedure”,271 which progresses from physical sensations to the mind through clear, self-evident inferences.272 Konstan assesses the procedure concluding that, “in this process ‘the senses

267 Morel (2008) 33. 268 Tarrant (1981) 93 shows how mental enargeia was applied by Epicureans and non-Epicureans to their theories of prolēpseis and common notions. He argues, “The obvious candidate for identification with the intelligible self-evident would be the natural/common notions which were appropriated by the Academics of the first century B.C. from the Stoics. Mutilated passages in Antipater and Philodemus suggest that ἐνάργεια was thought by other schools to belong to our προλήψεις or ἐννοιαί of the Gods”. For these conclusions, Tarrant (93ns.70, 71) draws upon Cic. TD 1.57 where it “is used to explain Platonic ‘recollection’”, Plut. Mor. 10511ef…which “shows Antipater to have used the term to refer to a clear πρόληψις” and Philodemus Sign. fr. 8 where he “may possibly have used κατενάργημα for such a πρόληψις". 269 For insance, one knows, from seeing the gods in one’s mind via a preconception, that they are blessed (KD 1). 270 Ep. Hdt. 37-8: Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις, ὦ Ἡρόδοτε, δεῖ εἰληφέναι, ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα ἔχωμεν εἰς ταῦτα ἀναγαγόντες ἐπικρίνειν, καὶ μὴ ἄκριτα πάντα ἡμῖν ᾖ εἰς ἄπειρον ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἢ κενοὺς φθόγγους ἔχωμεν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ’ ἕκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξεως προσδεῖσθαι, εἴπερ ἕξομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ’ ὃ ἀνάξομεν. Ἔτι τε κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν καὶ ἁπλῶς τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ’ ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πάθη, ὅπως ἂν καὶ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἔχωμεν οἷς σημειωσόμεθα. See Clay (1983) 66ff. on the connection between Epicurus’ kanōn and his approach to words or first concepts. 271 Bailey (1926) 176. 272 Asmis (2009) 90 sums this up best: “There is an act of inference [i.e. in grasping a preconception]; but it consists of simply recognizing connections that are given [i.e. that are enargēs]”.

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lead’”.273 Thus, even when dealing with matters of language or any matter of truth and falsehood, we must always base our judgments on enargeia. Bailey comments on the same passage, “in

Epicurus’ idea all thought proceeds by means of visualization, or more exactly, the προλήψεις come before the mind: an ἐννόημα then is a ‘mental image’, and Epicurus therefore uses the verb βλέπεσθαι”.274 This is the very point that comes in for criticism from Cicero who claims that Epicurus “abolishes definitions”. 275 Yet as Diogenes notes, for Epicurus, “the object primarily denoted by every term (ὀνόμα, i.e. word) is …self-evident (ἐναργές)”.276 Thus, he does not go so far as Cicero claims as to get rid of all definitions.277 Instead, he argues that when referring to objects of the senses—man, horse, ox, etc.—and even to general concepts—good, bad, justice, the gods, pleasure, pain, etc.—the term itself should be sufficient to provide a clear and vivid understanding of the notion of the thing signified; one must be able to see it.

In her discussion of the same passage, Tuominen notes that, it “is a kind of regress argument …(i) if all our knowledge is based on proof, an infinite regress follows”.278 More importantly, she reads the passage in a second way, arguing:

According to the second reading the argument is: (ii) if our understanding of all the words should be based on knowing an account or a definition, this would entail that all the words making up the account should also be thus understood, and hence an infinite

273 Konstan (2011) 62. 274 Bailey (1926) 176-7. 275 Cicero, de Fin. 1.22: “Of the whole armour of Logic your founder [i.e. Epicurus], as it seems to me, is absolutely destitute. He does away with Definition; he has no doctrine of Division or Partition; he gives no rules for Deduction or Syllogistic Inference, and imparts no method for resolving Dilemmas or for detecting Fallacies of Equivocation. The Criteria of reality he places in sensation; once let the senses accept as true something that is false, and every possible criterion of truth and falsehood seems to him to be immediately destroyed…” (iste vester plane, ut mihi quidem videtur, inermis ac nudus est. Tollit definitiones; nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet; non quomodo efficiatur concludaturque ratio tradit; non qua via captiosa solvantur, ambigua distinguantur ostendit; iudicia rerum in sensibus point, quibuis si semel aliquid falsi pro vero probatum sit, sublatum esse omne iudicium veri et falsi putat…). The translation and Latin text are from Rackham (2006 [=21931]). Here, Cicero translates the Greek for criteria of truth (κριτήρια τῆς αληθείας) as “iudicium rerum” and “iudicium veri”. For more on this passage, see especially Rist (1972) 14ff. 276 DL 10.33: παντὶ οὖν ὀνόματι τὸ πρώτως ὑποτεταγμένον ἐναργές ἐστι· For the definitions of ὀνόμα, τό, see OLD 1232. 277 Long (1986) 30 rightly argues that Cicero’s statements are “grossly misleading”. 278 Tuominen (2007) 239.

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regress would follow. Therefore our understanding of some basic words must be based on our having some natural concepts which we ‘see’ (βλέπεσθαι) and of which we do not need an account.279

Like Bailey, Tuominen emphasizes the importance of the verb βλέπεσθαι, which incorporates both sensation and mental visualization. Similarly, Asmis comments on this passage and provides an explanation for the Epicurean theory of prolēpsis, noting that:

As his first rule, Epicurus demands standards by which we judge our beliefs and enquiries. This standard is the ‘first concept’ corresponding to an utterance, and it is something that is ‘seen’. The technical term for this type of concept is prolēpsis, ‘preconception’ …signif[ying] that the concept has been ‘grasped prior’ to the pursuit of an inquiry. Without such a grasp, we would either keep demonstrating to infinity or have empty utterances.280

Prolēpesis must, therefore, precede every act of reasoning. One cannot reason as a child; the preconceptions must be built up from sensations over the course of one’s development. The store of preconceptions that one amasses in one’s memory can be accessed through the mind’s focus or vision and employed in reasoning. This is why for Epicurus, even concepts can be viewed

(βλέπεσθαι), albeit through the impressions (φαντασίαι) in the mind. As these are based on direct physical contact with the outside world, they too are evident (ἐναργές).281

Furthermore, Epicurus’ explanation for how words inspire impressions in the mind also suits his statements about rhetoric and poetry. Diogenes tells us that he argued that one should only utilize the “standard expression when referring to things” (λέξει κυρίᾳ κατὰ τῶν

πραγμάτων)”.282 In his book on the Epicurean rhetoric of Lucretius, Marcovic links this view to

279 Ibid. 280 Asmis (2009) 86. See also Morel (2008). 281 See Morel (2008) 31, who argues, “preconceptions are not radically distinct from sensations …even though they constitute a distinct class among the several criteria, preconceptions are closely tied up with sensations”. 282 DL 10.13: Κέχρηται δὲ λέξει κυρίᾳ κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἣν ὅτι ἰδιωτάτη ἐστίν, Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικὸς (fg. vii Nauck) αἰτιᾶται. The translation is my own. Note that the adjective κύριος -α, -ον (particularly in its superlative form) is a common term in Epicurus’ epistemological jargon (e.g. Ep. Herod. 35, KD 9, 12, 16, et al.). I owe the examples to Bailey’s (1926) 429 “Index of the Principal Terms”. Immediately following this passage, Diogenes nevertheless admits that, “Aristophanes the grammarian credits him with a very characteristic (ἰδιοτάτη) style”. I would take Aristophanes’ comment as a slight criticism, perhaps even translating ἰδιοτάτη as “very peculiar” to get across this point. Epicurus’ style has often struck readers as

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peripatetic theories, noting that, “Aristotle said that the quality of clarity [σαφήνεια] the only requirement of style Epicurus endorsed, is most easily achieved through the use of terms in their standard [κύρια] meaning”.283 This agrees with Diogenes’ continued comments as he states that,

“[Epicurus] was so lucid a writer that in the work On Rhetoric he makes clearness (saphēneia) the sole requisite”.284 As we have already seen (and will see more fully in the next chapter), saphēneia is often a synonym for or used in close conjunction with the term enargeia.285 Like

Aristotle, Epicurus believed that words can conjure up mental images in listeners/readers. The former articulated this ability by stressing the concepts of ἐνέργεια (actualization) and πρὸ

ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν (placing before the eyes).286 While Epicurus’ works on rhetoric and poetry are lost, we can still surmise from the statements in Diogenes how his views on language were consistent with his criteria of truth. As the theory goes, we do, in fact, see both concepts and physical images (phantasia/eidōla) before our mind’s eye when we apply our reasoning. This is

rather difficult. Clay (1983) 60-1, for instance, notes that Cicero calls Epicurus’ writings a “thicket” (ND 1.24.68) and Pythocles complains that it is hard to remember (δυσμνημόνευτα). Nevertheless, Epicurus does seem to strive for carefulness and clarity of expression, often through compounded terms (e.g. προ-λήψις, ἐπι-βολή, ὑπο-τάσσω, etc.) used in technical jargon. He also at some point crafted condensed epitomes, as well as the letters and the Kyriai doxai, which are far more accessible. See Clay (1983) 60ff. and DeWitt (1954) 25ff. on the “bald style” of Epicurus. 283 Markovic (2008) 94 cites Aristotle’s phrase “τῶν δ’ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια” at Rh. 3.2, 1404b. Too (1998) 139 comments on the phrase, that he used terms which indicate his discussion of literary style is decidedly political. ‘Speaking Greek’ (to hellēnizein) is the ‘beginning’ or ‘rule of style’ (archē tēs lexeōs) (1407a19-20), and the discussion goes on to stress the importance of using what are literally ‘authorized’ (ta kuria) nouns and verbs (1404b5-6)”. Too’s translation of kyria as ‘authorized’ would also be appropriate to Epicurus’ use, particularly in regards to his Kyriai Doxai, i.e. his Authorized Opinions. 284 DL 10.13. Epicurus’ work On Rhetoric is now lost except for a few fragments collected in Usener (1966) 109-14. 285 The terms enargeia and saphēneia remain an oft-employed combination in rhetorical and literary critical contexts through the second Sophistic. Cf. Squire (2009) 244, who cites Hermogenes’ discussion of an ecphrastic description in his Progymnasmata (10.49): “Through the vividness (enargeia) and clarity (saphēneia) of an ecphrastic description, …the reader might hope to perceive the same phantasia that had been experienced by the artistic creator and viewing subject…”. See also Theon, Progymnasmata 119, “ἀρεταὶ δὲ ἐκφράσεως αἵδε· σαφήνεια μὲν μάλιστα καὶ ἐνάργεια τοῦ σχεδὸν ὁρᾶσθαι τὰ ἀπαγγελλόμενα” discussed in Webb (2009) 52. I will say more about this combination in the next chapter. For modern discussion of the two, see especially Nünlist (2009) 197. 286 See Rhetoric 1410b33-6: ἔτι εἰ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖ· ὁρᾶν γὰρ δεῖ [τὰ] πραττόμενα μᾶλλον ἢ μέλλοντα. δεῖ ἄρα τούτων στοχάζεσθαι τριῶν, μεταφορᾶς ἀντιθέσεως ἐνεργείας. Note also the discussion of the frequent linking and even mixing of the terms enargeia and energeia in chapter three and see Webb (2009) 26 and Montefusco (2005).

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because both mental and physical vision requires images (phantasia).287 What is important to

Epicurus is that we must be careful to concentrate our on sense evidence, i.e. “focusing of thought into an impression” (τὰς φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοία). This ensures that our reasoning is correct, because it is based on the criteria of truth. If one reasons from these, as they are clear and self-evident, then one’s mind, like the senses, can achieve a kind of mental vision and even gain clear knowledge of unclear, invisible realms. Indeed, one’s conclusions will be clear and self-evident, if one clings to the self-evident criteria for one’s inferences.

c. How to make the invisible visible?

Unlike the earlier philosophical uses of enargeia Plato and Aristotle, Epicurus transformes the noun into a fully technical concept, one that refers to the vividness or clarity of both the senses and, as we have seen, the mind.288 Asmis clearly recognizes the importance of the concept and its central place in exercising reason, as she notes:

Amid the plethora of terms, two demand special attention: ἐπιβολή (‘application’, ‘act of attending’) and ἐνάργεια (‘evidence’). This pair of terms is especially prominent in Epicurean epistemology and may be said to characterize it. Ἐπιβολή is not found as a technical epistemological term before Epicurus; and ἐνάργεια receives a new sense and importance.289

287 Thanks to Epicurus’ theories on vision, the link between phantasia and enargeia remains a commonplace in philosophical, rhetorical, and literary discussions throughout antiquity. It passed first into Stoic circles where it was adapted to fit their own theories of physics as well as language, and then made its way into literary criticism and rhetorical theory. See the next chapter. 288 Similarly, Epicurus adapts other terms from Plato and Aristotle to fit his own epistemological theories. For instance, Lee (1977) 46 captures Epicurus’ adaptation of the concept of phantasia: “For Aristotle, phantasia was a faculty entirely distinct from perception (de Anima III.3). That position of Aristotle’s had been an integral part of his opposition to Plato, for whom phantasia had been nothing less than the master-concept for our entire perceptual relation with the physical world. That view had of course marched hand in hand with Plato’s metaphysical derogation of phenomenal reality as the imaging in space of separate Forms, but Aristotle totally rejected that metaphysical assessment. He sought accordingly to displace phantasia from its position of Platonic preeminence, taking aisthēsis instead as the normal and fundamental form of our relation to nature, and segregating phantasia from aisthēsis in such a way as to establish a version of direct realism. Epicurus’ led him to reject any such direct realism and so to reinstate phantasia within his analysis of perception. Nonetheless, his account does share with Aristotle’s view …a focal commitment to an anti-representationalist realism for which the proper object of perceptual awareness is the external physical object itself. His theory thus steers between (and borrows from both) the Aristotelian and Platonic views—a self-conscious strategy…”. 289 Asmis (1999) 264.

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From the history of the term in the last chapter as well as the evidence from Epicurus, we can see that Asmis is surely correct to note the “new sense and importance” of ἐνάργεια in Epicurean philosophy. Indeed, it was precisely this concept that allows Epicurus to have a sure foundation for his criteria of truth. The senses are the basis for his epistemology, yet he also admits to the

‘self-evidence’ of rational inferences and analogies. Long comments:

He accepted a principle of empirical inference concerning unseen phenomena, and he also held that certain things which are by nature unseeable, most notably atoms, can be inferred from what is visible by the application of ‘analogy’. On the basis of these mental processes, combined with what he called ‘the clear view’ [i.e. enargeia], Epicurus claimed to provide an analysis of phenomena which was objectively valid.290

Both Asmis and Long stress the link between clear sense evidence and the rational leaps made by

Epicurus in his conjectures about the unseen realm of atoms and void. Enargeia provides the mechanism that makes the invisible seen. But how can this be if the invisible cannot be sensed?

For Epicurus, all reasoning must be based on and checked by the criteria of truth, or we might also say by enargeia, as it is by virtue of this feature that the criteria preserve their accuracy. It is meant to be, as Long conveys, an objective form of evaluating truth and falsehood.

Thus, the critical devices (kanōna) for determining self-evidence are themselves self-evident.

Indeed, truth and self-evidence are, for Epicurus, one and the same thing.291 But what of the unseeable aspects of the world? For these, we must first make conjectures, then look in the self- evident realm of the senses for evidence that can refute them. Only then, if no refutational

290 Long (1971a) 114 and the endnotes on 129. Asmis (1999) 261 comments: “Epicurus plotted the ascent from sensory experience to knowledge of the hidden structure of the world by distinguishing …between what is ‘evident’ (ἐναργές) and what is ‘nonevident’ (ἄδηλον). The evident is known immediately by sense perception and by preconceptions based on sense perception; the ‘nonevident’ must be inferred”. 291 Cf. Striker (1996b) 42: “Epicurus uses the expression ἐνάργεια to describe the self-evident truth of the criterion. However, ἐνάργεια or ἐνάργημα (D.L. X 72) do not denote the self-evident nature of these truths, as one might at first suppose, but rather the self-evident truths themselves. This is probably the import of Sextus’ remark (M VII 203) that Epicurus also spoke of φαντασία as ἐνάργεια. The word ἐνάργεια can also appear as a synonym for αἰσθήσις or κριτήριον (cf. Κ.Δ. XXII and XXIII), since presumably all and only those truths which serve as criteria would be considered self-evident.”

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evidence is found, can we accept our conjecture as true. Epicurus lays out this procedure best

(KD 24):

If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate with respect to that which awaits confirmation (τὸ προσμένον) between matter of opinion and that which is already present (τὸ παρὸν ἤδη), whether in sensation (αἴσθησιν) or in feelings (πάθη) or in any presentative perception of the mind (πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας), you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief and so you will be rejecting the standard of truth (τὸ κριτήριον) altogether.292

Provided that one clings to the phenomena established by clear sense-perception (i.e. κριτήρια or ἐνάργεια), one can make true, rational inferences about unclear aspects of the world, even those which lie beneath the minimal threshold of our senses.

Epicurus does, however, admit certain limits to human sensation and reason, as well as the difficulty of achieving knowledge. He thus distinguishes between what is known, what can be known (either now or in the future), and what cannot ever be known. We see these distinctions in Sextus’ discussion of Epicurean epistemology, where, as Tuominen notes, he distinguishes between that which is “naturally non-evident [adēlon]… for instance the number of stars”, which can never be known, from that which is “homonymously non-evident” [τὰ δ’

ὁμωνύμως τῷ γένει λεγόμενα ἄδηλα, M. 8.317], which “is not altogether unknowable; it is hidden but can be made known to us”.293 She continues, noting how Diogenes “adds to the picture the class of what is expected to be evident (τὸ προσμένον, e.g. a tower as seen from afar)… [These] will be evident when perceived”.294 The cause of error in these instances is

292 KD 24: Εἰ τιν’ ἐκβαλεῖς ἁπλῶς αἴσθησιν καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον καὶ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς· The translation is from Hicks (1925). Asmis (2009) 95 comments on the passage: “The key to escaping the dilemma is to distinguish between a present object of awareness and an added opinion, so as to accept every sensory presentation as free from error and test every opinion by reference to this standard”. 293 Tuominen (2007) 256. Cf. also Everson (1990b). 294 Ibid. Long (1978) 35 also notes the importance of τὸ προσμένον to Epicureans. He argues that, “They [Epicureans and Stoics] did not maintain that every sense experience accurately reveals the nature of external objects. But in cases where this is so, the reliability of the evidence is supposedly recognized, in part at least, as a feature of

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opinion. Sensation is always accurate, but a person admits false opinion by making a supposition

(hypolēpsis) about the contents of a sensation which is not self-evident.295 One might make a false judgment because of a lack of clarity for the senses (e.g. identifying a horse as a cow at a distance)296; one could also err in terminology (e.g. identifying a horse as a cow because one misunderstands what a horse is qua horse).297 Even delusions, such as Orestes’ seeing the Furies, are not an error of sensation, but rather of “flawed judgment”, i.e. false opinion.298

To clear up errors, one must check one’s perceptions against clear sensations. This is not always easy, a point which Striker acknowledges, noting:

…although the basic truths are contrasted with conjectural or derivative ones as being clear or evident (enargē, dēla) as opposed to obscure or non-evident (adēla), it is not the case that they are easily recognisable. Epicurus does not hold that the truths that serve as criteria must be grasped without the intermediary of proof or argument, but membership in the class of basic truths may not always be easy to establish. The thesis that there are criteria of truth is meant to secure the possibility of knowledge; it does not promise a simple way of distinguishing between truth and falsity.299

While not a simple thing, Epicurus, nevertheless, asserts that his criteria and rational modes are capable, if used properly, of assuring us of the correctness of our conclusions. He steadfastly clings to empirical evidence and signs from the senses as the basis for knowledge, even when discussing matters that they themselves cannot perceive. But if one reasons about unclear the experience itself—…for the Epicureans “the near” or “clear” view”. He unpacks the final terms (p.47n.6), “τὸ παρὸν ἤδη as distinct from τὸ προσμένον, or ἐνάργεια”. 295 Scott notes (1989) 365, drawing on Ep. Hdt. 48, 52, and 82, that, “Epicurus commonly called his criteria, including perception ‘clear’. This does not mean however that the criterion is clear to us, and clear as a criterion as opposed to a mere opinion; it only means that perception gives a perfectly clear or accurate picture of the images”. 296 E.g. the (in-)famous example of thinking a square tower is round at a distance falls under this sort of error. In this case, the eidōla do report a round tower because the image has been worn away at the edges by the distance they have traveled, however a closer inspection gives a clear perception of the tower as square. Cf. Everson (1990b) 178 ff. and Scott (1989) 363ff. 297 Konstan (2011) 62. See also Striker (1996b) 35ff. For how Epicurus blames opinion, not sensations (aisthēsis) or preconceptions (prolēpsis), see Konstan (2011) 62ff. 298 Modrak (1993) 104. Cf. S.E. M. 8.63: “At any rate, in the case of Orestes, when he seemed to see the Furies, his sensation, being moved by the images, was true, in that the images objectively existed; but his mind, in thinking that the Furies were solid bodies, held a false opinion” (L&S 16F). Long and Sedley (1987) 86, drawing on Lucretius 4.722-822 and the passage from Sextus, comment that, “Presumably [Orestes] encountered some freak images of this kind, produced by the chance cohesion of separate images from women and snakes…, and in his disturbed condition failed to recognize them as mere fleeting impressions without a solid body for their source”. 299 Striker (1996d) 157.

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phenomena, beneath or beyond sense perception, one must check one’s judgments against the evidence of the senses by utilizing his rational modes of attestation (epimartyrȇsis) and contestation (antimartyrȇsis). These are the crucial checks on opinion. We can, therefore, see that Epicurus’ theory clearly distinguishes how knowledge is achieved and tested: the means for achieving it are the criteria of truth; attestation and contestation supply the modes for building upon and checking knowledge. He also distinguishes between the forms of knowledge (i.e. those that are possible and those that are not).300 Ultimately, he concludes that knowledge must always be based on self-evidence (enargeia) and, moreover, that this self-evidence can and should be used to decipher and understand non-evident truths.

But how exactly do we check our knowledge or utilize the modes of attestation and contestation to discover non-apparent truths? Striker unpacks these concepts noting that, “Sextus speaks of confirmation [i.e. ἐπιμαρτύρησις] and non-confirmation [οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις] in the case of opinions concerning observable states of affairs, of refutation [ἀντιμαρτύρησις] and non-refutation [οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις] in the case of opinions concerning unobservable states of affairs”.301 It seems that Sextus is worth believing in this instance, as this same vocabulary occurs in the works of Epicurus and, as we will see in the sixth chapter, in the writings of his disciple

Philodemus. As an illustration of how we can judge about sensations through the mode of confirmation or non-confirmation, let us consider the statement “that is Plato”. If we walk close and have a clear view, then our original opinion (δόξα), supposition (ὑπόληψις) or thought

(ἐννόημα)—which was awaiting confirmation (προσμένον)—is either confirmed by evidence

(ἐνάργεια), in which case it is true (it is Plato), or else it is not confirmed, in which case it is

300 Cf. Asmis (2009) 93, who writes, “There are two kinds of signs: perceptions, consisting of acts of attention by either the mind or the five senses; and feelings [i.e. pathē]. There are two kinds of inferences: inferences about what is ‘waiting’ to be observed (to prosmenon), and inferences about what cannot be observed (what is ‘non- apparent’, to adēlon)”. 301 Striker (1996b) 43. See Ep. Hhow dt. 10.51 and DL 10.34. See also Allen (2001) 196ff. and Dumont (1982).

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false (it is not Plato). Here, as with all cases for Epicurus, clear evidence from sensation is the final arbiter of truth.302

Likewise, for judgments about things beneath our sensory threshold, we must test our suppositions against the clear evidence of our senses. In this case, however, we must utilize the mode of refutation [ἀντιμαρτύρησις] and non-refutation [οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις]. For example, if we conjecture ‘there must be void’, then we can test this hypothesis against the observable fact that ‘there is movement’. This does not refute the hypothesis that there is void. Indeed, nothing in our sensation contests this claim.303 We must, therefore, accept it to be true. While this can sometimes lead to multiple explanations (e.g. for lightning, for magnets),304 this is not a problem in Epicurus’ view, as he admits that these are not only possible explanations, but rather are all true, because they are not refuted by clear evidence.305

Along with the modes of confirmation and contestation, Epicurus also accepts the need for analogy. Asmis describes the procedure as, “consist[ing] of examining many perceptible instances and concluding, on the basis of regularly observed similarities and differences, that

302 Clay (1983) 68-9 emphasizes sense perception as a check on reason, writing, “Sensation is …the ultimate court of appeal for the constructs of reasoning, which they can either “corroborate,” testify against, or be neutral to”. 303 Note how Epicurus argues for the distinction between body and void drawing on the tools of confirmation and non-refutation at Ep. Hdt 39-40: “For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested (μαρτυρεῖ) by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely (τεκμαίρεσθαι) when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known. And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move (καθάπερ φαίνεται κινούμενα). Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist…” (σώματα μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔστιν, αὐτὴ ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπὶ πάντων μαρτυρεῖ, καθ’ ἥν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἄδηλον τῷ λογι-σμῷ τεκμαίρεσθαι, ὥσπερ προεῖπον τὸ πρόσθεν. εἰ <δὲ> μὴ ἦν ὃ κενὸν καὶ χώραν καὶ ἀναφῆ φύσιν ὀνομάζομεν, οὐκ ἂν εἶχε τὰ σώματα ὅπου ἦν οὐδὲ δι’ οὗ ἐκινεῖτο, καθάπερ φαίνεται κινούμενα· παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐθὲν οὐδ’ ἐπινοηθῆναι δύναται οὔτε περιληπτῶς οὐτ’ ἀναλόγως τοῖς περιληπτοῖς, ὡς καθ’ ὅλας φύσεις λαμβανόμενα καὶ μὴ ὡς τὰ τούτων συμπτώματα ἢ συμβεβηκότα λεγόμενα.). Body (which can be sensed) in this instance is testified to or attested by clear evidence (phainomena). Void is proven, i.e. not refuted, because motion is clear and obvious (φαίνεται) and a plenum (or lack of void) would refute this clear evidence. 304 See Lucretius’ explanations for these at DRN 6.160-422 and 6.906-1089, respectively. For multiple explanations, see also Allen (2001) 197, Strozier (1985) 76ff., and Sedley (1982) 267-8. 305 Multiple explanation receives further support from Epicurus’ theory (which again is not refuted by the senses) of an infinite universe, i.e. if one cannot be sure which explanation applies to a particular instance, it surely applies at some instance in the infinite cosmos, cf. Ep. Pyth. 89.

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certain conjunctions hold by necessity. In making this examination, we use epilogismos,

‘calculation’ that is directed at the phenomena [i.e. enargeia]”.306 As with all judgments, this too appeals to empirical evidence. Just as we observe how things act in the world, so we can infer that they act similar everywhere.307 With analogy, however, we also recognize the need for visualization as a tool for discovering truth. Indeed, Epicurus employs the phrase “πρὸ

ὀμμάτων”—already examined in chapter two for its role in Aristotle’s discussions of rhetorical energeia (actualization) and the key phrase in later Hellenistic definitions of enargeia—in a single (fragmentary) instance in a context which seems to associate it with analogy.308 As it stands, the text reads (frag. 28): “and because of this, on all sides visualizing the round shape before your eyes on the grounds that it is analogical evidence of the same thing”.309 While the passage is scanty, it preserves a strong connection between analogy (the adjective ἀ[ναλο]γι[σ-

]τικὰ) and one’s inner, mental vision through the process of “placing before one’s eyes” (πρὸ

ὀμμ[ά]των τιθέμενοι). By this mental exercise, we can both see clear evidence, and from it, draw inferences about the world that are consistent with it. For instance, we can surmise that just as all humans in one’s sensory experience are mortal, so too they must be mortal everywhere.

Thus, Epicurus lays out principles of his epistemology; he accepts analogy, along with

306 Asmis (2009) 88. 307 DeWitt (1954) 277 defines Epicurus’ method as “analogy and transition or progression from similars to similars”. Cicero, quoted in DeWitt (1954) 272, links the similarity method to Epicurus’ theory of ἰσονομία, declaring: “The nature of the universe must be such that all similars correspond to all similars”. Cic. ND 1.19.50: umma vero vis infinitatis et magna ac diligenti contemplatione dignissima est. in qua intellegi necesse est eam esse naturam ut omnia omnibus paribus paria respondeant; hanc ἰσονομίαν appellat Epicurus id est aequabilem tributionem. ex hac igitur illud efficitur, si mortalium tanta multitudo sit, esse inmortalium non minorem, et si quae interimant innumerabilia sint, etiam ea quae conservent infinita esse debere. 308 For Aristotle, see chapter three, and for rhetorical/literary enargeia, see chapter five. 309 Frag. 28: καὶ διὰ τοῦτ[ο πα]νταχόθεν πρὸ ὀμμ[ά]των τιθέμενοι τὰς περιφερείας ὡς τοῦ α[ὐτ]οῦ πράγματο[ς] ἀ[ναλο]γι[σ-]τικὰ [τεκμήρ]ι[α]. The (rough) translation is my own; Greek text from Arrighetti (1973).

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contestation and refutation to be critical devices, which allow us to arrive at true, self-evident knowledge because all of them are founded on self-evidence.310

d. Memory and Visualization in Epicurus

As a final point on Epicurus’ link between sensation and reason, it is important to consider the role of memory for its role in concept formation (i.e. prolēpsis) and for how it functions in what we might call visualization or imagination (which he calls, phantastikas epibolas tēs dianoias). As already shown, according to Epicurus memory is built up from atomic impacts: first, on the sense-organs and then directly on the atoms in the mind, a material explanation that suits his empiricism and physics.311 There are thus two parts to memory, a non- cognitive part and a cognitive part. The non-cognitive part is taken up by sensation (aisthēsis), which Epicurus describes as “devoid of reason and incapable of memory”.312 Scott argues, “The point about denying memory to perception is that …perception can only consider what is before it, it cannot recall past perceptions and use them to interpret present ones”.313 On the other hand, there is a cognitive element as in the memory it builds up a store of preconceptions, caused by repeated atomic impacts; memory is, therefore, vital to the working of the mind and to its preconceptions. While the body receives impacts from external stimuli as infallible impressions

(phantasiai), the mind, in turn, applies reasoning in order to account for these perceptions and to discriminate them from one another. It is at this level that the mind must be careful to avoid introducing false opinion and with it faulty reasoning. Based on the account of Diogenes

310 Asmis (2009) 89-90 makes a similar point, noting that, “the conception of a human being as a rational living being is an empirical judgement, consisting of a memory of many living whose behavior is observably rational, by contrast with the behaviour of other living beings. In the case of the gods, the preconception involves a comparison with human beings, but this can be explained similarly as the result of a sorting process by which certain observed features are grouped together in contrast with the observed behaviour of human beings”. 311 For the material composition of the mind, see especially Lucretius, DRN 3.94-416. 312 DL 10.31-2. “πᾶσα γάρ,” φησίν, “αἴσθησις ἄλογός ἐστι καὶ μνήμης οὐδεμιᾶς δεκτική·…” 313 Scott (1989) 364n.13.

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Laertius, Rist argues, “for Epicureans general concepts [his translation of prolēpseis] arise only from the registration of sense-experiences as memories”.314 Moreover, memory is also central to the practice of focusing the mind, as it concentrates on the material images that it has stored up

(this is why, the mental focus is based in phantasia [φανταστικὰς]; this mental concentration is the basis for our acts of reasoning, as well as our ethical decisions.

Although the Epicurean universe contains the random movements of the swerve, we nevertheless have it in our power to achieve peace of mind, what Epicurus calls , by focusing on true facts.315 We can achieve this state only by accepting or even looking squarely at the truth, which on every occasion is based on self-evidence. We must accept that death and chance are part of the fabric of the universe, but not things to be feared.316 Proper reasoning from self-evidence instills peace of mind and removes fear of the traditional gods and of death.

Ultimately, for Epicurus, practicing philosophy requires us to train ourselves to keep our minds directed only to clear reality (i.e. enargeia) and to the concepts that naturally arise from it. The

“practical wisdom” (phronēsis) that comes by maintaining this sort of mental awareness is, in

Long’s words, “the fundamental requirement for living the pleasurable life”. 317 Epicurus describes the need for conscientous effort: “So we must exercise (μελετᾶν οὖν χρὴ) ourselves in the things (ποιοῦντα) which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and,

314 Rist (1972) 27-8. He continues, bases his judgment on , Stromates 2.4 (Us. 255): “The general concept [prolēpsis] is a concept arising directly from sense-perception and the memory of sense-perception with no intrusion of false ‘opinion’. Thus with false opinion excluded it can be thought of as a concept which is, as the Epicureans put it, self-evident (ἐναργής); hence the general concept can be spoken of as a criterion.” Not only are one’s own prolēpseis valid criteria, so too are general conceptions built up in the collective memory. Like Aristotle (and the orators, who are discussed in the next chapter), Epicurus recognizes the principle of the consensus omnium, as a valid tool for inferences, provided that it is checked against the criteria of the senses. Long (1986) 45 notes, for instance, that Epicurus “use[s it] to establish the properties of the gods”. 315 For more on the swerve, see chapter six. See also Long (2006d) especially 160ff. He argues (p. 161) that by the terms “random and chance” Epicurus means, “contingency as distinct from causal continuity”. 316 See chapter six and Lucretius’ description of Epicurus lifting his eyes against the monstrous Religio (DRN 1.62ff.). For Epicurean views on death, see especially Henry (2009) and Segal (1990). 317 Long (2006d) 161.

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if that be absent, all our actions are directed toward attaining it”.318 Bailey notes that this practice is a form of meditation, commenting, “μελετᾶν: probably ‘meditate on’, not ‘practise’: so at the end of the letter §135.5”.319 The exercise, as Bailey grasps, is one that requires keen mental awareness and preserving Epicurus’ teachings at the forefront of one’s thoughts, like a meditation; it is also a form of visualization or imagination, as one focuses on the phantasia which are present in memory.

To assist students in learning and retaining the important facts of his philosophy,

Epicurus condensed his doctrines from the massive length of his On Nature (Περὶ Φύσεως, thirty-seven books in total) and his other technical treatises listed by Diogenes Laertius (10.27-

28) into epitomes, summarizing letters, and highly refined maxims.320 Clay argues that he saw the need “to present his teachings in a new and memorable form”.321 He adds, “The three letters preserved by Diogenes Laertius, the condensation of thought which is set out in the epitomes, and the Kyriai doxai all witness a stage of development initiated with Epicurus’ realization that a new form of writing was necessary to make his teaching accessible and permanently useful to those who were willing to master it”.322 What Clay effectively highlights is Epicurus’ goal in condensing these writings: to make his teachings memorable and useful.323 The most extreme

318 Ep. Men. 122.8-10. μελετᾶν οὖν χρὴ τὰ ποιοῦντα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εἴ περ παρούσης μὲν αὐτῆς πάντα ἔχομεν, ἀπούσης δὲ πάντα πράττομεν εἰς τὸ ταύτην ἔχειν. The translations for the letters are from Hicks (1925), slightly adapted. Here, Epicurus refers to the goal in life as happiness (eudaimonia), which amounts to the same thing as ataraxia. 319 Bailey (1926) 328. Epicurus’ philosophical exercise or meditation is comparable to what Aristotle would call contemplation (theōria) or imagining/presenting before the eyes (pro omattōn poiein). 320 DeWitt (1954) 25 comments on Epicurus’ style and the importance of memory: “Along with the adoption of the bald style and the textbook form was taken over the demand for memorization”. 321 Clay (1983) 60. 322 Ibid. See also Strozier (1985) 90. 323 On the importance of memorization of Epicurean teachings, see also Nussbaum (1986a) 48.

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form of compression of thought is found in the Kyriai Doxa, pithy maxims designed to be memorized and constantly accessed (and reaccessed) by the mind.324

Epicurus himself states why he chooses to simplify his philosophy in this manner: it is meant to be an aid to memory. In the opening words of his Letter to Herodotus (DL 10.35), he writes:

For those who are unable to study carefully all my physical writings or to go into the longer treatises at all, I have myself prepared an epitome of the whole system, Herodotus, to preserve in the memory enough of the principal doctrines (τὸ κατασχεῖν τῶν ὁλοσχερωτάτων δοξῶν τὴν μνήμην ἱκανῶς), to the end that on every occasion they may be able to aid themselves on the most important (κυριωτάτοις) points, so far as they take up the study (θεωρίας) of physics. Those who have made some advance in the survey (ἐπιβλέψει) of the entire system ought to fix (μνημονεύειν [i.e. memorize]) in their minds under the principal headings an elementary outline (τύπος) of the whole treatment of the subject. For a comprehensive view (ἐπιβολῆς) is often required, the details but seldom.325

In the passage, Epicurus appeals to his reader(s) to preserve his teachings in memory, particularly the most important (κυριωτάτοις) points, and to access them “on every occasion” where they are needed, for they are vital for properly understanding or even viewing his physics

(he uses the words θεωρία and ἐπιβολή).326 The point of condensing his teachings is to make

324 Translated variously as Sovran Maxims (Hicks (1925) 663), Principle Doctrines (Bailey (1926) 94ff.), Authoritative Opinions (Asmis (1984) 15), Key Doctrines (L&S (1987) 87), et al. The most important example of the summarizing of Epicurus’ teachings for the sake of memorization is the (the fourfold remedy): “God is not to be troubled, death not to be feared, and the Good easy to acquire, evil easy to endure.” Kleve (1997) 65 calls this “the shortest possible epitoma of the system, the epitoma epitomarum so to say, coined by Epicurus himself”. The translations and quotes are from Kleve. 325 DL 10.35: Τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις, ὦ Ἡρόδοτε, ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἀναγεγραμμένων ἡμῖν ἐξακριβοῦν μηδὲ τὰς μείζους τῶν συντεταγμένων βίβλους διαθρεῖν, ἐπιτομὴν τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας εἰς τὸ κατασχεῖν τῶν ὁλοσχερωτάτων δοξῶν τὴν μνήμην ἱκανῶς αὐτοῖς παρεσκεύασα, ἵνα παρ’ ἑκάστους τῶν καιρῶν ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις βοηθεῖν αὑτοῖς δύνωνται, καθ’ ὅσον ἂν ἐφάπτωνται τῆς περὶ φύσεως θεωρίας. καὶ τοὺς προβεβηκότας δὲ ἱκανῶς ἐν τῇ τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβλέψει τὸν τύπον τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας τὸν κατεστοιχειωμένον δεῖ μνημονεύειν· τῆς γὰρ ἀθρόας ἐπιβολῆς πυκνὸν δεόμεθα, τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος οὐχ ὁμοίως. The translation is from Hicks (1925). Italics are mine. On the technical term τύπος, see n.251 in this chapter. 326 Note that the title of his Principle Doctrines, Κύριαι Δόξαι, employs this same word.

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them easy to remember and useful; they are to be memorized, then recalled and (re-)employed on every occasion for one’s reasoning.327

In the same letter, Epicurus directly addresses the value of memorization and constant referral back to his doctrines, stating: “To the former, then—the main heads [i.e. the most important points]—we must continually (συνεχῶς) return, and must memorize them (τῇ μνήμῃ) so far as to get a valid conception of the facts (κυριωτάτη ἐπιβολὴ ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα)…”.328

Hicks’ translation of ἐπιβολὴ as “conception” is on the right track; Epicurus is employing the same terminology from his epistemology (as in the phrase “focusing of the mind” (ἐπιβολή τῆς

διανοίας), as he also did in the opening of the letter discussed above (10.35.8: ἐπιβλέψει). By focusing our minds constantly on his teachings—like mantras in a sort of philosophical meditation—we remind ourselves of the clear, self-evident conclusions he achieved.329 Hadot argues that these brief statements of “permit the disciple to grasp in a kind of single intuition the essentials of the doctrine in order to have it more easily at hand”.330 He is surely right to emphasize the power of Epicurus’ maxims and letters for fascilitating learning and for recalling his physics, epistemology, and ethics. Moreover, the maxims are also memorable because they are transformed into viewable concepts, constantly visualized before the mind’s

327 As we will see in chapter six in our close reading of Lucretius, by clothing Epicurean philosophy in the garb of poetry, he too makes his writings memorable and more useful; cf. Kilpatrick (1996) 88, who describes Lucretius as “dedicated to the principle of the utile of poetry, for which the dulce (voluptas) is end and means”. 328 Ep. Hdt. 36 (DL 10.36): βαδιστέον μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα συνεχῶς, ἐν <δὲ> τῇ μνήμῃ τὸ τοσοῦτο ποιητέον, ἀφ’ οὗ ἥ τε κυριωτάτη ἐπιβολὴ ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα ἔσται καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀκρίβωμα πᾶν ἐξευρήσεται, τῶν ὁλοσχερωτάτων τύπων εὖ περιειλημμένων καὶ μνημονευομένων· 329 For living and practicing one’s Epicureanism at all times, cf. Epicurus, VS 41: “We must laugh and philosophize at the same time and do our household duties and employ our other faculties, and never cease proclaiming the sayings of the true philosophy” (Γελᾶν ἅμα δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οἰκονομεῖν καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς οἰκειώμασι χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδαμῇ λήγειν τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀρθῆς φιλοσοφίας φωνὰς ἀφιέντας). The translation comes from Bailey (1926) 113, Greek text from Arrighetti (1973). On this passage and Epicurean “therapeutic arguments”, see Nussbaum (1986a) 44 and passim. 330 Hadot (1995) 60.

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eye.331 For Epicurus, however, we must also be keenly aware that the mental impressions that reside in one’s mind are not invented, but rather they are built up from repeated sensory-imputs from atoms on our sense-organs and on our mind. Thus, according to his physics visualization requires images in the mind (phantasia), which are preserved from their intial sense-impressions and then reawakened through the focusing of our thoughts (φανταστικὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς

διανοίας).

By again and again referring back to Epicurus’ teachings, made accessible through epistolary summaries and maxims, the philosopher or student participates in a philosophical exercise, i.e. ἄσκησίς or μελέτη.332 One holds these teachings foremost in one’s memory and applies the doctrine to whatever problems or questions one has. In this way, the practice of

Epicurean philosophy resembles the Aristotelian practice of pro omattōn poiein, “placing before the eyes”, which, to recall from chapter three, he describes as a form of actualization (energeia).

Aristotle argued that it was necessary for an orator or poet to keep one’s subject constantly before his/her eyes as if it were present and active so as to render it actualized for himself and for his audience.333 While Epicurus’ epistemology is very different from Aristotle’s, he nonetheless retains a stress on vision and visualization through his theory of epibolē.334 By focusing the mind

331 Recall that prolēpseis too were articulated by Epicurus as being seen (βλέπεσθαι). It is, therefore, not stretching the point to say that the maxims were also to be seen or visualized by Epicureans. On seeing concepts, see above and cf. Ep. Hdt. 10.38: “the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen (βλέπεσθαι)”. Cf. also Erler (1997) 86, who notes that for Epicureans, “Discussions should begin not with definitions but with an outline account based on empiricism.” 332 Clay (1983) 61, commenting on the Letter to Herodotus, draws the distinction that, “Epicurus’ elementary presentation of his physiology is useful for two very different groups of readers: the beginners with no deep familiarity with Epicurus’ thought and the experts, who, in their involvement with detail, must keep the theoretical armature of his philosophy constantly in mind”. On visualization or meditation, see Hadot (2002) 113ff. and (1995), especially the chapters “Spiritual Exercises”, “The View from Above”, and “Philosophy as a Way of Life”. 333 See Rhet. 1411b23-7: “By ‘making them see things’ (πρὸ ὀμμάτων), I mean using expressions that represent things as in a state of activity [ἐνεργοῦντα]”; (λεκτέον δὲ τί λέγομεν πρὸ ὀμμάτων, καὶ τί ποιοῦσι γίγνεται τοῦτο. λέγω δὴ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει, οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον μεταφορά, (ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεια), ἀλλ’ οὐ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν·). 334 Note how Epicurus’ draws upon the Aristotelian term theōria in the opening of the Letter to Herodotus: “For those who are unable to study carefully all my physical writings or to go into the longer treatises at all, I have myself

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on clear, true evidence, whether stored within it (in the form of memories or prolēpseis) or external to it in the form of sense-evidence, one can accurately look upon and understand the universe and accept nature for what it is without being troubled.335 This requires the continual application of Epicurus’ principles at every moment of living; one must make sure that all actions and opinions comport with the evidence of the world. As Scott concludes, “[Epicurus’] essential task is to bring the person to see the apertum [i.e. a Lucretian translation of enargeia], the clear evidence of the criterion separating it out from any superadded opinions”.336 By keeping this evidence before the mind’s eye and by verifying all sensations and feelings against them, one can avoid the addition of spurious opinion. To put it another way, all behavior and knowledge must be based on enargeia.

prepared an epitome of the whole system, Herodotus, to preserve in the memory (τὸ κατασχεῖν… τὴν μνήμην) enough of the principal doctrines, to the end that on every occasion they may be able to aid themselves on the most important points, so far as they take up the study (θεωρίας) of physics.” (Τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις, ὦ Ἡρόδοτε, ἕκαστα τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἀναγεγραμμένων ἡμῖν ἐξακριβοῦν μηδὲ τὰς μείζους τῶν συντεταγμένων βίβλους διαθρεῖν, ἐπιτομὴν τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας εἰς τὸ κατασχεῖν τῶν ὁλοσχερωτάτων δοξῶν τὴν μνήμην ἱκανῶς αὐτοῖς παρεσκεύασα, ἵνα παρ’ ἑκάστους τῶν καιρῶν ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις βοηθεῖν αὑτοῖς δύνωνται, καθ’ ὅσον ἂν ἐφάπτωνται τῆς περὶ φύσεως θεωρίας.). Note also that Long (1986) 30 recognizes how Epicurus draws upon and re-contextualizes Aristotle’s jargon, noting about a passage in the twenty-eighth book of on nature, “a glimpse of Epicurus when he is not merely summarizing or exhorting. In this work Epicurus discussed induction, using Aristotle’s technical term epagôgê...”. See also Nussbaum (1986a) 65, who notes that “In recent years it has become increasingly evident through scholarly work [particularly by Merlan, Rist, and Furley] that Epicurus was thoroughly familiar with the EN and had it in view in many parts of his writing”. Asmis (1990) 2380 argues that, “Although Epicurus recognized induction as an important component in scientific inference, Zeno [the Epicurean teacher of Philodemus] appears to have been the first to reduce all scientific inference to induction”. While it is likely that she is right, it is also clear that the basis for Zeno’s scientific method had already been firmly established and that the theory of enargeia is central to this theory. 335 Philodemus may offer additional evidence of the influence of Aristotle on Epicurus, even on the concept of enargeia. For example, Nussbaum (1986a) 66 notes that, “Philodemus …refers to related aspects of Aristotle’s view of ethical inquiry: for example, the idea that it speaks of what is non-evident using the evident as evidence (1104a12). But Philodemus’ work in this area seems to be heavily derivative from Epicurus, and to have as its aim the description of Epicurean practice”. 336 Scott (1989) 373-4.

98 2. Stoic Enargeia: Epistemology, Ethics, and Visualization

Like Epicureanism, Stoicism shows a strong inclination toward epistemology.337 To articulate their position, the Stoics drew upon terminology popularized by other philosophers including Epicurus, as in their usage of enargeia, while offering their own proposals for what constituted a criterion of truth. While Epicureans first sparked the debate concerning the need for criteria to account for fixed knowledge, the Stoics accepted this premise, but named other faculties, different from those of Epicurus, as fulfilling this role. As in the system of Epicurus,

Stoicism argued for a materialist universe, however, theirs was teleological, founded upon the providence of a good, rational, and material creator deity (identified variously as Zeus, reason, nature, soul, , etc.). This cosmological structure stands in stark contrast to the random atomic comings-together and separations at the core of Epicurean physics. Also similar to the

Epicurean account, Stoics explained the process of vision through material causes: they conceived of the mind as being imprinted by impressions (phantasiai) from outside. As Long argues:

Phantasia is the most basic faculty of the Stoic soul. In its simplest form it is the way the soul is imprinted by the information it receives via the five senses. Without phantasia, animals would have no cognitive access to their environment or the conditions of their bodies. What distinguishes the class of human beings is the rationality of their phantasiai.338

This theory of phantasia thus provides the necessary material foundation for sensation; from sensation arise thoughts and knowledge. While the process shares many characteristics and vocabulary with Epicurean theory, the Stoics differ in several important respects. By examining

337 Much of this section has been influenced by Sharples (1996), Sandbach (1975), Long (1971b), and Rist (1969). 338 Long (2006f) 242.

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their theory of enargeia, we will thus see how the Stoics adapted Epicurean terminology and offered their own, unique explanations for knowledge and for how we arrive at it.339

Regarding enargeia, Sandbach comments that the earliest Stoic writers do not seem to have used the term at all and it “does not occur in any fragment of any Stoic earlier than

Antipater”.340 He concludes:

…at some time or another the Stoics did adopt the word just as they had adopted prolēpsis; uses the adjective enarges (apud Galen De plac. p. 400, Müller), and in Plutarch Comm. not. 1083c the Stoics appear as ‘these champions of enargeia’. It was easy enough for the Stoics to adopt the word, because by enargeia Epicurus meant to denote just that quality of a phantasia which Zeno denoted by the word kataleptikē, that quality which makes a man feel certain of its truth. Epicurus expressed this actively, making the presentation real enough to command belief; Zeno passively, making it real enough to be capable of being firmly grasped by the mind.341

With the fragmentary nature of our sources, we cannot be sure whether the earliest Stoics ever employed the adjective or noun, let alone whether they employed it as a technical concept.

Nevertheless, it is clear that by the first century BCE, enargeia had been fully absorbed into the vocabulary and philosophy of the Stoics. Later philosophers interpreted the writings of the early

Stoics to be fully in line with the theory of self-evidence. Therefore in the discussion of Stoic epistemology that follows, we are on firm ground in referring to enargeia as a Stoic principle

339 One caveat must be admitted: one of the chief problems for discussing Stoicism is the fragmentary nature of the sources. The lack of any complete Stoic text prior to the Imperial period makes reconstruction of their philosophical views difficult. Moreover, we can also see, in contrast to the more dogmatic Epicureans, a tendency to adapt and alter their views over time in order to better account for scientific discoveries or to answer objections raised by the other schools, particularly the Skeptics of the middle Academy. Even in the earliest period of the Stoa (represented by their first three leaders: Zeno, the founder of the school, followed by , and ) Stoic philosophers reveal an ability to respond and even change their doctrines in response to protests. Later Stoics such as , Posidonius, , and others seem to have modified Stoic doctrine even to the point of rejecting earlier Stoic teachings or admitting Academic views into their own discipline. The result of this syncretism and fragmentary evidence is that it is hard to present a diachronic view of Stoic epistemology, in particular their theories concerning the criterion of truth, that holds true for the school at all times. Therefore, the interpretation that I offer is a kind of palimpsest in which we can tease out the more orthodox stance concerning enargeia and the criteria. Nevertheless, the diverse nature of the sources written over many centuries (from its Hellenistic origin around the year 300 BCE and on into the Imperial Roman Empire) requires that we sift through later Stoic views in order to reconstruct those of Zeno or Chrysippus. More challengingly, we must also account for presentations of Stoic dogma in non-Stoic sources, which reveal biases against Stoicism (e.g. Cicero, Sextus Empiricus). 340 Sandbach (1971b) 32. L&S 501 date Antipater as “Head of the Stoic school from c. 152 to c. 129” BCE. 341 Ibid.

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and we can be certain that the concept of enargeia was considered by Stoics and non-Stoics alike to be a central component of their theory of knowledge.

a. Sensation and Evidence: the Cognitive Impression (Kateleptic Phantasia)

As Epicurus was the first philosopher to address the need for a standard (kanōn) or discriminating tool (kritērion) in order to test and gauge truth, the Stoics felt a need to confront his challenge and to explain sure knowledge. They accepted his contention that one needs a criterion upon which to found true knowledge, but argued that different criteria reached this bar.

As his newly coined terms had already become standard, the Stoics incorporated and adapted

Epicurus’ jargon to suit their own theories: they too searched for a kritērion or kanōn.342 As criteria, they are reported to have named various mental and physical processes including sensation (aisthēsis), preconception (prolēpsis), common notions (koinai ennoiai), inclination

(orexis), and knowledge (epistēme).343 In opposition to Epicurus’ thesis that “all sensations or impressions are true”,344 the Stoics accepted that not all, but only certain sense impressions (those that are kataleptic, i.e. “grasping” or “cognitive”) were accurate and true (i.e. enargēs), while acknowledging that others lacked certainty or an assurance of truth (those that are akataleptic).

In a further contrast with the Epicureans, the Stoics clearly distinguished the impression

(phantasia), which impacts the soul and is the basis for knowledge from the imagination, which is not a criterion of truth. Aetius, for instance, notes (4.12.1-5; SVF 2.54):

342 Epictetus, a late Stoic source (first to second century CE), provides evidence of the continued focus on a critical factulty called a kritērion (e.g. Disc. 1.11.9: Ἀλλ’ εἰ ἐζητοῦμεν, ἔφη, περὶ λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων, ποῖον ἂν κριτήριον παρεκαλοῦμεν πρὸς διάγνωσιν αὐτῶν; Τὴν ὅρασιν, ἔφη.) or a kanōn (e.g. Disc. 2.11.15-16: Οὐκ ἄρα ἀρκεῖ τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπὶ βαρῶν ἢ μέτρων ψιλῇ τῇ ἐμφάσει ἀρκούμεθα, ἀλλὰ κανόνα τινὰ ἐφ’ ἑκάστου εὕρομεν. ἐνταῦθ’ οὖν οὐδεὶς κανὼν ἀνωτέρω τοῦ δοκεῖν;). The Greek text for Epictetus is from Schenkl (1916). 343 See κριτήριον in the index to von Arnim (1905-1927) Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (henceforth SVF) vol. 4, 88 and L&S 40. 344 Cf. ns.236 and 237 above.

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Chrysippus says that these four [i.e. impression (phantasia), impressor (phantaston), imagination (phantastikon), figment (phantasma)] are all different. An impression is an affection [] occurring in the soul, which reveals itself [endeiknumenon hauto] and its cause [to pepoiȇkos]... The cause of an impression is an impressor: e.g., something white or cold or everything capable of activating the soul. Imagination is an empty attraction, an affection in the soul which arises from no impressor, as when someone shadow-boxes and strikes his hands against thin air; for an impression has some impressor as its object, but imagination has none. A figment is that to which we are attracted in the empty attraction of imagination; it occurs in people who are melancholic and mad.345

The description of an impression (phantasia) above as that which “reveals itself”

[endeiknumenon hauto] is virtually synonymous with the concept of enargeia. As my translations have shown, if something is described as enargēs or possessing enargeia, it is self- evident.

Finding common ground with the Epicureans, the Stoics maintained that the mechanism for revealing truth about the outside world was an impression, phantasia. Sextus describes

Cleanthes’ comparison of phantasia to “the imprint made in wax by signet-rings”.346 The materialism of helps to explain this comparison: for them the soul consists of matter called pneuma so it can be altered physically.347 As Annas explains (based on DL 7.52),

“The workings of the senses have a uniform explanation in terms of pneuma: the way in which

“body affects body” in the case of the soul has to be by pneumatic tension”.348 Pneuma then, according to Zeno and Cleanthes, is imprinted by physical images like wax. Chrysippus,

345 L&S 39B. Cf. also DL 7.49-51 (L&S 39A). On this passage, see Sheppard (2014) 12ff. 346 S.E. M. 7.228: φαντασία οὖν ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ. περὶ ἧς εὐθὺς καὶ διέστησαν· Κλεάνθης μὲν γὰρ ἤκουσε τὴν τύπωσιν κατὰ εἰσοχήν τε καὶ ἐξοχήν, ὥσπερ καὶ <τὴν> διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων γινομένην τοῦ κηροῦ τύπωσιν… All translations of Sextus Empiricus are from Bury (1961), unless otherwise noted. Watson (1988b) 30, discussing a similar analogy in Aristotle’s comparison of memory to “an impression on wax” (in On Memory 450a29-30, and recurring in DA 424a17f. and 435a9), notes that, it is a “borrowing from Plato (Theat. 191c-e)… which we can trace back to Democritus”. On Stoic memory, see also Webb (2009) 119ff. 347 Sandbach (1971a) 10 calls the impression a “mental event” and notes that, “For the Stoics… the psyche is material, and any mental event is a physical event. So presentation is a physical change in the psyche”. 348 Annas (1992) 72. Watson (1966) 16 distinguishes how the pneūma applies to the different components of the world, noting that, “The pneūma as responsible for the highest form of unity of inorganic matter was called by them hexis. …In similar fashion pneūma is responsible for the higher levels of being, for soul and organic life. …In Stoic terminology, then, hexis is the structure of inorganic matter, physis of organic being (SVF II 708-13), and psyche of the animal and human world”.

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however, quarreled over this metaphor. He argued that it misses the mark because imprinting would not allow the mind to retain several images at once and would ultimately blot out memory altogether, as other phantasiai would impress themselves into (and erase the old images in) the wax of the mind. 349 Therefore, he preferred to understand Zeno’s (and Cleanthes’) term impression (typōsis) as “alteration” (heteroiōsis), which would allow “many presentations [to] co-exist in us at the same moment”.350 Thus, according to the predominant form of Stoicism, represented by Chrysippus, perception and ultimately knowledge are based on data passively received from the senses through phantasia,351 which pass on information as an impression on the mind, i.e. the soul.352 It is their material conception of sensation and cognition that accounts for the perfect transfer of information and thereby provides a guarantee of truth from kataleptic impressions. Striker distinguishes the difference between the criteria of the Epicureans and the

Stoics, noting: “while criteria in the Epicurean sense serve to assess beliefs about non-evident

349 See Sedley (1993) 329ff. Arthur (1983) 70 argues that, “Chrysippus’ theory is rather more sophisticated, being much more accommodating to a multiplicity of simultaneous impressions. Even so it might have its difficulties with colours and smells. In any case, the basic idea is the same. A φαντασία acts as a replica of, or at least an analogue to, an external object of perception, enabling the mind to »become aware of« its nature”. 350 S.E. M. 7.229-30. Χρύσιππος δὲ ἄτοπον ἡγεῖτο τὸ τοιοῦτον. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, φησί, δεήσει τῆς διανοίας ὑφ’ ἕν ποτε τρίγωνόν τι καὶ τετράγωνον φαντασιουμένης τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον διαφέροντα ἔχειν περὶ αὑτῷ σχήματα ἅμα τε τρίγωνον καὶ τετράγωνον γίνεσθαι ἢ καὶ περιφερές, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον· εἶτα, πολλῶν ἅμα φαντασιῶν ὑφισταμένων ἐν ἡμῖν, παμπληθεῖς καὶ τοὺς σχηματισμοὺς ἕξειν τὴν ψυχήν, ὃ τοῦ προτέρου χεῖρόν ἐστιν. αὐτὸς οὖν τὴν τύπωσιν εἰρῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὑπενόει ἀντὶ τῆς ἑτεροιώσεως, ὥστ’ εἶναι τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον “φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ψυχῆς”, μηκέτι ἀτόπου ὄντος <τοῦ> τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα, ὑφ’ ἓν [κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον] πολλῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς συνισταμένων φαντασιῶν, παμπληθεῖς ἀναδέχεσθαι ἑτεροιώσεις· Lesses (1998) 5ff. offers a helpful discussion of this passage in Sextus and the role of phantasia as an “imprint”. See also Zeller (1870) 77ff. 351 See Aetius 4.12.1-3: “Impression …is an experience (pathos) which occurs in the soul and which, in [the pathos] itself, also indicates that which caused it” and SE M. 7.161: “this pathos must be indicative both of itself and of the phenomenon which produced it, which pathos is not other than the impression. Hence, we say that an impression is a pathos of an animal capable of presenting both itself and the other thing [i.e., its cause]”; both quotes are from Lesses (1998) 17. Sextus’ vocabulary offers an explicit appeal to self-evidence (i.e. enargeia) as he states (M. 161.2-4), “the criterion must be sought in the affection of the soul caused by the sensible evidence” (ἐν ἄρα τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας πάθει τῆς ψυχῆς ζητητέον ἐστὶ τὸ κριτήριον). Cf. also Modrak (1993) 99, “Perception is, for the Stoics, the reception of information”. 352 To be precise, it is the commanding faculty (to hegemonikon) of the soul that receives the imprints from the senses. Lesses (1998) 4 lays out the mental activities of this part of the soul as “thinking, believing, perceiving, and so forth”. Cf. also Ioppolo (1990) 434, who argues (based on Cleanthes’ metaphor) that, “This leaves no room for doubt regarding the physical contact which establishes itself between the external object and the commanding- faculty through the mediation of the senses. Presentation for Zeno is, in fact, almost a blow from the outside”.

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things, the Stoic criterion is a means of discovering what is evident”.353 For the Stoics, kataleptic impressions become a criterion of truth because they provide a critical tool for judging our sensations about the outside world, i.e. what is evident.354 Like Epicureanism then, Stoicism at its basis is an empirical philosophy.355 Only through repeated sensations from without can we come to have inner concepts, which then allow for logical deductions and ethical judgments.356 More importantly, the Stoics, like the Epicureans, achieve through this explanation a guarantee of truth; by means of the kataleptic impression one comes to know—for certain—the true evidence of the world, i.e. enargeia.

While the Stoics also distinguish unclear principles through their refined procedures of logic based on preconceptions (prolēpseis) and notions (ennoiai) in the mind, the kataleptic impression accounts for self-evident knowledge from the senses (i.e. enargeia).357 Nevertheless, as Ioppolo notes, “Zeno set out from common sense, and from the conviction that the senses, if they are whole and intact, lead to absolutely certain knowledge of the outside world.”358 This procedure is very similar to Epicurus’. Both philosophers acknowledged the value of common sense or notions (koinai ennoiai) and argued positively for the value of sense-impressions over the objections of Skeptics.359 Boeri lays out the Stoic theory of knowledge acquisition:

353 Striker (1996d) 158. This first part of this claim is a bit overstated; for Epicurus the criteria allow us to assess beliefs about both non-evident things (through antimartyrȇsis), as well as evident things (through epimartyrȇsis). 354 Cf. Michael Frede’s summation (1999) 319: “Perception will give us knowledge of particular observable facts. To gain the truly general knowledge which constitutes wisdom we will have to rely on more than perception. To this purpose the Stoics, following the Epicureans, introduce the notion of anticipations [i.e. prolēpseis]”. 355 Annas (1992) 86 calls the Stoics “thoroughgoing empiricists”. Conversely, Modrak (1993) 100 argues, “there is also a tension between [Stoic empiricism and “their account of thinking”]. The more thoroughgoing their empiricism is, the less able the Stoics will be to explain the complexity and plasticity of thought”. 356 For Stoic ethics, see especially Schofield (2003). 357 See Sandbach (1971b). 358 Ioppolo (1990) 433. 359 Watson (1966) 24 argues, “Since we have them [i.e. the emphutoi prolēpseis] by nature and they do not depend on our own particular environment or education (δι’ ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας SVF II 83), they are common to all men and so they are also called the κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι”. Similarly, Tarrant (1981) 75 notes that Plutarch, a Middle Platonist, but influenced by the vocabulary of Hellenistic Stoics and Epicureans, links enargeia with common notions (koinai ennoiai) arguing, “Together the three passages [De Communibus Notitiis 1074b,

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For the human being the first contact with the world is through the senses; they offer the material aspect of knowledge. Although the soul (or rather "the commanding part of the soul"; τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) is like a sheet of paper ready for writing upon, there are "ingrained or implanted preconceptions" (προλήψεις ἔμφυτοι) as well, which are natural rational components whose function is to determine and to help interpret the stuff provided by the senses. According to Diogenes Laertius' report [DL 7.54], for the Stoics a preconception is a "natural conception of the universal things" (or simply "universals"; ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου). The function of preconceptions in the Stoic theory of knowledge seems to have been searching for and finding out a new knowledge.360

The last statement in this description sums up the value of these rational principles.

Preconception (prolēpsis) provides the basis for Stoic reason and logic, i.e. “searching for and finding out a new knowledge”. Sensation, on the other hand, is the foundation for preconceptions and underlies all mental notions. Thus, sensory impressions (φαντασίαι) and the mind’s rational principles (προλήψις and ἔννοια) together allow us to make sound judgments about the world.361 The kataleptic impression accounts for clear sensory data, while the human mind’s ability to reason explains our capacities for language and rational inference.362 Both, however, arise from clear evidence, as the material mind/soul is altered by phantasia.

Unlike Epicureans, however, Stoics argued that not every datum from the senses was assuredly true. Only those that are evident (enargēs), striking (plēktikos), clear (tranēs), and/or distinct (ektypos) (and therefore provide a guarantee of their own truthfulness) are necessarily

1079a, and 1084b] clearly show the interrelation between the three concepts: self-evident, common notion, and accustomed usage”. 360 Boeri (2001) 743. The tabula rasa analogy comes from Plutarch, On Stoic Self-contradictions 1041E (SVF 3.69). See also Watson (1988b) 45. 361 While everyone has kataleptic impressions, according to the Stoics only the can achieve true knowledge, while the rest of humanity has access only to true beliefs. Striker (1996d) 161 comments: “Neither Epicurus nor the Stoics pretended to offer an easy test for truth. Epicureans must watch out for distortions of sense-impressions; the Stoics actually denied that anyone except the sage could achieve knowledge—fools, that is, ordinary people, would indeed have cognitions, but those would at best be only true beliefs that might be shaken by argument, never knowledge”. Similarly, Watson (1966) 6 argues, “in the Stoic view the philosopher or λογικός, like the artist, cannot be content with general, abstract principles: his skill must be tested by its application to details: he is to see clearly and be concerned with one particular thing at each time: he must know each thing in its uniqueness”. On the Stoic view of knowledge vs. opinion, see Cicero, Ac. 1.41-2 and SE M. 7.151-7 (L&S 41B and C, respectively). 362 Cf. Zeller (1870) 75ff.

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true—a requirement met only by the kataleptic impression.363 Ierodiakonou stresses this same point, as she argues, “the Stoics insist that an impression, in order to be evident and to serve as a criterion, not only has to be true, but has to be guaranteed to be true”.364 This is, in fact, the same view as the Epicureans in their theory of enargeia. Nevertheless, for Stoics, only kataleptic impressions fulfill this qualification of guaranteeing truthfulness. Diogenes Laertius quotes

Zeno’s description of the different sorts of impressions (DL 7.46):

Of impressions (φαντασία), one kind is cognitive [καταλεπτική], the other incognitive [ἀκατάληπτον].365 The cognitive, which [the Stoics] say is the criterion [κριτήριον] of things, is that which arises from what is and is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance with what is. The non-cognitive is either that which does not arise from what is, or from that which is but not exactly in accordance with what is: one which is not clear [τρανῆ] or distinct [ἔκτυπον].366

While Zeno applies the adjectives clear [τρανῆ] and distinct [ἔκτυπον] to the kataleptic impression—perhaps even purposely avoiding the Epicurean technical term for self-evident clarity, enargēs—later Stoics accepted the adjective and noun enargeia as the distinguishing feature of kataleptic impressions. The expression “from what is” (hyparchon) has been the subject of much scholarly debate, however Frede makes a convincing case that what Zeno means

363 Skeptics, like the Academic Carneades, objected to Stoic theory of the kataleptic impression, precisely because it was said to guarantee truth. For instance, Sandbach (1971a) 9 sums up the skeptical objection: “That there is truth, that there are objective facts or real things (pragmata) Carneades did not deny; he denied that any statements about those facts could be known to be true. Although most presentations, he said, probably correspond to the facts, there are none of such a kind that they can be recognised with certainty as corresponding. If there are no such presentations, knowledge cannot be possible”. See also Frede, M. (1999) 312-13 and (1983). 364 Ierodiakonou (2011) 70. 365 Sandbach (1971a) 14 expresses how the Stoics employed the terms kataleptic and akataleptic, noting: “If katalēpsis, apprehension, is a grasp primarily of the presentation, but secondarily of the external object, it is easier to understand the phrase katalēptike phantasia and its opposite akatalēptos phantasia. The first adjective belongs to a type that is usually, but by no means always, active in sense, and the second to a type that is even more predominantly passive. This distinction fits. The akatalēptos is a presentation that cannot be grasped… The katalēptike, on the other hand, is so called in deliberate ambiguity. It is one which when grasped entails grasp of the object. Although strictly speaking the presentation is not itself the agent that grasps the object but the medium through which the mind grasps it, the adjective can be understood in an active sense, ‘the presentation associated with the process of grasping’”. 366 L&S 40C (translation slightly adapted) (DL 7.46): τῆς δὲ φαντασίας τὴν μὲν καταληπτικήν, τὴν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον· καταληπτικὴν μέν, ἣν κριτήριον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων φασί, τὴν γινομένην ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπεσφραγισμένην καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην· ἀκατάληπτον δὲ ἢ τὴν μὴ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μέν, μὴ κατ’ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· τὴν μὴ τρανῆ μηδὲ ἔκτυπον. Cf. also SE M.7.247-52, the commentary for L&S 40, Ierodiakonou (2011) 69-71, Watson (1988b) 46ff., and Sandbach (1971a).

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by this is, “not that a cognitive impression has its origin in a real object, but in a fact. For the impression that A is F to be cognitive it must have its origin in the fact that A is F”.367 The Stoics even went so far as to deny that any two objects, no matter how similar, could have the same impression.368 A true cognitive (i.e. kateleptic) impression would be able to distinguish between two different impressions, as each one is unique.369 In cases where one cannot tell between two similar impressions, the impression is not cognitive.370 Frede further unpacks the Stoic kataleptic impression:

What seems to be demanded is this: the relevant features of the object which a cognitive impression represents are represented in such a way that this representation could not be the representation of some other features, and they jointly constitute a distinctive representation of the object, that is, a representation which captures a set of jointly distinctive features of the object, for instance its distinctive look.371

Therefore, the kateleptic impression cannot be wrong because it preserves the impression of the impressor in exact accordance with its features. As Sandbach notes, “Such a presentation [i.e. the kataleptic impression] was declared, at least by Chrysippus and his followers, to be a test of truth, and probably the basic test, on which the validity of any other tests depends”.372 Thus, they achieve their goal of establishing a kanōn or criterion of truth; they claim that the kateleptic impression is a truthful standard against which we can measure and check other impressions for

367 Frede, M. (1999) 302. 368 Skeptics particularly from the Academy (such as ) criticized this point, offering objections such as the similarity of twins or two eggs, and the “indiscernibility with respect to stamp and impression” (see Sextus Empiricus, M. 7.408 (L&S 40E)). Cf. also Frede, M. (1999) 309ff. 369 Long (1986) 128 notes that, “Later Stoics, faced with such objections [from the Skeptics], conceded that even a cognitive impression might be misinterpreted owing to external circumstances; and they added to their specification of this criterion, ‘provided that it has no obstacle’ (Sextus, Adv. math. vii 253)”. One of the examples of this sort of “obstacle” is Menelaus’ failure to recognize his wife Helen from Euripides’ Helen, see SE M. 7.254ff. and Long (1986) 128ff. 370 Zeller (1870) 86-7 writes, “If the question is raised, How are true perceptions to be distinguished from false ones? the immediate reply given by the Stoics is, that a true perception is one which represents a real object as it really is.” Furthermore, “Some of our perceptions …are of such a kind that they oblige us to bestow on them our assent, and compel us not only to regard them as probable, but also to regard them as true, and corresponding to the actual nature of things”. The perceptions, which “oblige us to bestow on them our assent”, are the cognitive or kataleptic impressions. Cf. also Sharples (1996) 22ff. 371 Frede, M. (1999) 312. 372 Sandbach (1971a) 9.

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truth and falsehood. Because an impression of this sort is self-evident (enargēs) or clear (tranēs), it must be true.

Moreover, according to the Stoics one can also have a kateleptic impression from mental reasoning. For instance, Bevan argues, “A katalēptikē phantasia …need not necessarily be a sense-impression; it may also be the apprehension of a truth logically deduced from indubitable premises. In either case, such a phantasia is true to objective fact and possessed of convincing force”.373 This “convincing force” is the same kind of self-evidence (enargeia), which the

Epicureans accepted for judgments and reasoning as well. Similarly, Long comments:

To the ‘cognitive impression …the Stoics seem to have traced back any true statement (Cic. Acad. i 42). Most of our evidence places the cognitive impression in a treatment of perceptual judgments, and …it is perception which provides the foundation of all concepts. But the Stoics also recognized a class of non-sensible impressions to which no physical object or single physical object would correspond. The impression that ‘man is a rational animal’ or ‘fifty is five times ten’ falls under the category of rational or non- sensible impressions.374

These sorts of mental certainties correspond to what Epicurus had referred to as prolēpseis, preconceptions. What is essential for something to be true is that the impression be self-evident

(enargēs). It is for this reason that Sextus says (M. 9.393), “In general everything which is conceived is conceived either through presentation of things evident (κατ’ ἐμπέλασιν τῶν

ἐναργῶν) to the senses or through transition of things evident (κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν

μετάβασιν)”.375 If Sextus is to be believed, in the cases of clear sensory perceptions and

373 Bevan (1913) 36. He adds, “The ideal Wise Man is characterized on the intellectual side by the sureness with which he distinguishes ‘grasping impressions’ from ambiguous ones. He is not omniscient, but he is incapable of making a mistake”. 374 Long (1986) 130-1. 375 SE M. 9.393: Καθόλου τε τὸ ἐπινοούμενον πᾶν ἤτοι κατ’ ἐμπέλασιν τῶν ἐναργῶν νοεῖται ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν, καὶ τοῦτο ποικίλως, ὁτὲ μὲν κατὰ ὁμοιότητα, ὁτὲ δὲ κατὰ ἐπισύνθεσιν, ὁτὲ δὲ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, καὶ ταύτην δὲ ἤτοι αὐξητικὴν ἢ μειωτικήν. The translation is slightly adapted from Watson (1988b) 51. As Watson shows, the former presentations are those that are perceivable by the senses (aisthētikai), while the latter are those that are grasped only by the mind (i.e. ouk aisthētikai). He argues regarding the latter, “…it is less likely that they can be indicated deictically. They are less likely to be present: one must make a transition to them. All the phantasiai ouk aisthētikai fall under the general heading of transition”. For aisthēsis in Stoicism, see Rubarth (2004).

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logically valid statements, the bar of self-evidence is met; therefore, the impression is assuredely a kataleptic one and must be true.376

b. Stoic Cognition, Reactions to Enargeia, and Knowledge (Scientia)

Having outlined the kataleptic impression above, we can move on to look at the human response to such an impression. The Stoics argued that one’s reaction to impressions (phantasia) comes in the forms of “assent” (synkatathesis) or “cognition” (katalēpsis), only the latter of which is sure and true. Our assent is liable to make errors because of distance or a lack of clarity

(enargeia) in our sensastion. Cicero reports a vivid analogy Zeno used to illustrate assent to impressions (Acad. 2.145, SVF 1.66):

He would spread out the fingers of one hand and display its open palm, saying ‘An impression [visum, Cicero’s translation of phantasia] is like this.’ Next he clenched his fingers a little and said, ‘Assent [adsensus, for synkatathesis] is like this.’ Then, pressing his fingers quite together, he made a fist, and said that this was cognition [comprehensionem] (and from this illustration he gave that mental state the name of katalēpsis, which it had not had before). Then he brought his left hand against his right fist and gripped it tightly and forcefully, and said that scientific knowledge [scientiam, for epistēme] was like this and possessed by none except the wise man.377

As Zeno’s analogy illustrates, assent to an impression is different from cognition, as cognition is stronger and assuredly true, while assent can be either right or wrong. Doty argues that Zeno’s demonstration does not show “the order, temporal or logical, of the process of acquiring knowledge” (i.e. phantasia—synkatathesis—katalēpsis—epistēme), but rather the “relative

376 See Tarrant (1981) 80, where he comments on a passage from Sextus Empiricus (M. 227-60) that, “The final section on the Stoics centres chiefly on their difficulties (227-260), but ends on a note which reveals strikingly the source’s liking for ἐνάργεια (257) as embodied in the later Stoic theory of the καταληπτικὴ φαντασία”. He goes on to note that the source for this section was Antiochus of Aschalon (p.84), “who saw a consensus of opinion among Old Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics; it was he who saw all the chief post-Socratic schools agreeing on the importance of the self-evident (Math. 8.143-4, 160-3, 200, 216, 218-9, 257).” He goes on to assert that, “the view of the self-evident which Antiochus later employs is probably Stoic rather than Academic…”. 377 Cic. Acad. 2.145: et hoc quidem Zeno gestu conficiebat: nam cum extensis digitis adversam manum ostenderat, ‘visum’ inquiebat ‘huius modi est’; dein cum paulum digitos contraxerat, ‘adsensus huius modi’; tum cum plane compresserat pugnumque fecerat, comprensionem illam esse dicebat (qua ex similitudine etiam nomen ei rei, quod ante non fuerat, κατάληψιν imposuit); cum autem laevam manum admoverat et illum pugnum arte vehementerque compresserat, scientiam talem esse dicebat, cuius compote nisi sapientem esse neminem. The Latin text is from Rackham (1951), translation from L&S 41A. See Sandbach (1971a) 11ff.

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degree of certainty attaching to each stage”.378 We are to understand that assent happens simultaneously with the impression, not subsequently. Arthur goes so far as to suggest that,

“assent is a generic term, referring to the mind’s acceptance of any presentation regardless of its epistemological worth. Catalepsis, on the other hand, arises only when the mind assents to a cataleptic presentation”.379 This interpretation, in my view, best fits the Stoic distinction between opinion (doxa), as either true or false, and knowledge (epistēme), always true and steadfast.380

Although only the wise man can possess sure knowledge, kataleptic impressions are available to all and so too is cognition (katalēpsis), the mind’s response to self-evident impressions. Even the fool has certain sensations that are clear and compelling (enargeis)—e.g. “I see a house”—which immediately inspire firm and true comprehension. He or she is not so easily dissuaded of these

“truest beliefs”, or rather, firm cognitions.381 Indeed, if one claims to “see a house” and one really is “seeing a house”—clearly, directly, and with a sound mind—it would be virtually impossible for one to abandon this firm sensation and cognition. While the fool would not be in possession of “truth” itself, i.e. the state of knowledge (scientia/epistēme), which is the psychological (and physical) state of the wise man, he or she, nevertheless, is in possession of “the true”.382 Even a fool’s katalēpsis is firm and true, as Zeno’s comparison of it to a fist shows.

378 Doty (1992) 15. He adds, “if assent were to precede κατάληψις, certainty regarding the trustworthiness of a presentation would be an impossibility until after assent is given, in a haphazard way with no indication of its truth or falsity. Thus κατάληψις would be removed from its office as an indicator of truth. Furthermore, taking assent as prior to κατάληψις would mean that the wise man, no less than anyone else, will hold opinions with no firm basis and will consequently err, a conclusion that would be anathema to the Stoics”. Cf. Arthur (1983) 75ff. 379 Arthur (1983) 69. 380 Cf. Arther (1983) 76 who argues, based on passages from Galen (SVF III 256) and Stobaeus (SVF III 548), that, “Just as the wise man is possessed of ἐπιστήμη, so the fool is possessed of ἄγνοια. …Stobaeus tells us that ἄγνοια is for the Stoics a μεταπτωτικὴ συγκατάθεσις καὶ ἀσθενής [i.e. a changeable and weak assent]. Like ἐπιστήμη, ἄγνοια is both a system of beliefs (in its case an unsound system) and a species of assent”. 381 Thus, Arthur (1983) 77 goes too far in asserting that, “a fool can always be made to change his mind, to abandon even his truest beliefs. In brief the position of the fool is that when he assents to a non-cataleptic presentation, his assent is an act of δόξα and an act of ἄγνοια. When he assents to a cataleptic presentation, he performs an act of catalepsis and again an act of ἄγνοια”. 382 The Stoics distinguished between truth as a body (soma) and “the true” as a lekton. See Boeri (2009) 735-6. and Long (1986).

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The mind’s response to clear and compelling impressions—a phrase that amounts to the same thing as enargeia (i.e. self-evidence)—is to give its assent (synkatathesis) and concurrently to achieve cognition (katalēpsis) of the external object that is presented to it. Indeed, the term kataleptic hints at this compulsion, as it stresses the “grasping” of the mind as it receives impressions and assents to their being factual and true.383 There is, however, extensive debate surrounding whether or not the impressions have propositional content. 384 For example,

Sandbach confronts the problem by arguing that, “Assent is assent to a presentation. But if a presentation is nothing but a physical change in the psyche, a typōsis, how can one assent to it?

Assent should be to a proposition; it is that which is true or false”.385 Whichever side one takes in this debate, it is clear that the impression is imprinted on a rational (human) mind with an informational content and it is by accepting this content that we give our assent.386 It seems likely, in accordance with Stoic language theory, that this informative content is language based.387 As rational animals, it is through language (λόγος) that we first process presentations

(phantasia) and later articulate them; reason and language are both forms of λόγος.388

383 This analysis concurs with Zeno’s fist analogy. On the term katelēptikē, see especially Sandbach (1971a) 10, who notes that, “the adjective kataleptike is ambiguous. It is formed from the verb katalambanein, which means ‘grasp’, ‘apprehend’, and may have an active or a passive sense”. Also, see Doty (1992) 22ff. on the debate about the active and passive senses of katalēptikon. 384 Lesses (1998) 6, to my mind, offers the best path for making sense of the Stoic theory, arguing that, “the impression conveys information. Whether what is conveyed requires propositional content is less clear”. He continues, noting that (p.23n.67), “Roughly, beliefs involves [sic] assent to an impression which contains what are termed "sayables" (lekta). Sayables are rather similar to statements… [and] impressions containing sayables are equivalent to thoughts and occur only in rational beings”. For various views on this topic, see Lesses (1998), Annas (1992), Sorabji (1990), Long and Sedley (1986) 239-241, Frede, M. (1983), and Long (1971c). 385 Sandbach (1971a) 12. 386 Watson (1988b) 46 describes the process: “The grounds for such acceptance on assent, synkatathesis, may be strong or weak, and as a result the phantasiai now accepted may be described as persuasive or unpersuasive, pithanoi or apithanoi (Sextus A.M. VII 242ff.). Even persuasive views may be false, as we well know. Phantasiai are said to be true when it is possible to make a true affirmation about them (ἀληθῆ κατηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι) …It is only when certainty has been attained that we can talk of or the grasping or apprehension of something, and this must be thought of as a reaffirmation or second assent after examination (which, again, may be practically instantaneous”. 387 Long (2006f) 242 argues that, “Speech… appears to be the manifestation of what is rational about rational impressions. Or, to put it another way, rationality, as it pertains to human beings, is manifested in language”. 388 Watson (1988b) 44-5 distinguishes human phantasia from those of animals.

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In an especially evocative analogy preserved by Sextus, the vivid clarity, i.e. self- evidence (enargeia), of kataleptic impressions is described as, “all but seize[ing] us by the hair… and pull[ing] us to assent (sunkatathesis), needing nothing else to achieve this effect or to establish its difference from other impressions”.389 In this metaphor, the kataleptic impression compells us by dragging us not only to assent, but also leads us to a firm mental grasp of the underlying facts of what has produced the impression; this understanding is what the Stoics term cognition, katalēpsis. Lesses captures how a clear impression reveals its cause:

[Sextus] speaks explicitly of the subject also having the capacity to be aware of or grasp "the clear thing which is indicative of what produced it" (heautēn te emphanizein opheilei kai tou poiēsantos autēn enargous endeiktikē kathestanai).390 This description of what an impression reveals about its cause entails that more is revealed than just some quality, which, as it happens, causes the impression. The content of the impression clearly points to what produced it. In other words, something is revealed as the cause of the impression. The content of such an impression explicitly contains causal relations of which a perceiver can be aware.391

389 L&S 40K (SE, M. 7.255). Iopollo (1990) 435n.14 comments that although “[t]he passage refers to the younger Stoics”, nevertheless, “since the definition of the cognitive presentation given at [SE M.] 247 is that of Zeno and at 253 it is said that older Stoics (ἀρχαιότεροι) invoked it as criterion of truth, we could reasonably assume that all the Stoics shared, on this subject, Zeno's view”. Likewise, Bevan (1913) 35 argues that the hair-pulling analogy “assuredly goes back to Zeno himself”. 390 The passage under discussion is SE M. 7.161-3: “And this pathos must be indicative both of itself and of the phenomenon which produced it, which pathos is not other than the impression. Hence, we say that an impression is a pathos of an animal capable of presenting both itself and the other thing [i.e., its cause]. For example, Antiochus says, when we look at something we are put into a certain condition with respect to sight and we do not have our sight in the same condition as before we looked. In this sort of alteration, we take hold of (antilambanometha) two things, one, the alteration itself, which is the impression, and, the second, that which produced the alteration, which is the visible thing. And similarly in the case of the other senses. So, just as light (phōs) reveals both itself and everything in it, in this way the impression too, which is the beginning of the animal's cognitive functions, like light, must make apparent both itself and the clear thing which is indicative of what produced it” (τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πάθος αὑτοῦ <τε> ἐνδεικτικὸν ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν καὶ τοῦ ἐμποιήσαντος αὐτὸ φαινομένου, ὅπερ πάθος ἐστὶν οὐχ ἕτερον τῆς φαντασίας. ὅθεν καὶ φαντασίαν ῥητέον εἶναι πάθος τι περὶ τὸ ζῷον ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου παραστατικόν. οἷον προσβλέψαντές τινι, φησὶν ὁ Ἀντίοχος, διατιθέμεθά πως τὴν ὄψιν, καὶ οὐχ οὕτως αὐτὴν διακειμένην ἴσχομεν ὡς πρὶν τοῦ βλέψαι διακειμένην εἴχομεν· κατὰ μέντοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀλλοίωσιν δυεῖν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἑνὸς μὲν αὐτῆς τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως, τουτέστι τῆς φαντασίας, δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν ἐμποιήσαντος, τουτέστι τοῦ ὁρατοῦ. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τὸ παραπλήσιον. ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ φῶς ἑαυτό τε δείκνυσι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φαντασία, ἀρχηγὸς οὖσα τῆς περὶ τὸ ζῷον εἰδήσεως, φωτὸς δίκην ἑαυτήν τε ἐμφανίζειν ὀφείλει καὶ τοῦ ποιήσαντος αὐτὴν ἐναργοῦς ἐνδεικτικὴ καθεστάναι.). The translation is adapted by Lesses from Inwood and Gerson (1988). In the revised second edition of Inwood and Gerson (1998), the passage is numbered III-18 (p. 276). 391 Lesses (1998) 21.

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The passage from Sextus, which Lesses comments on here, explicitly addresses the importance of clear, self-evidence (enargeia) in the Stoic theory of perception and cognition. Yet Lesses does not go far enough and link enargeia with the criterion of truth, as Sextus assuredly does.

This is apparent in his statement: “One must seek the criterion [τὸ κριτήριον, i.e. of truth] in the affect on the soul from that which is evident (ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας)”.392 As this illustrates, if

Sextus is to be believed, enargeia is vital to the Stoic theory of perception and ultimately provides its end; it is what makes a criterion evaluative of truth.

As for the Epicureans, the feature of self-evidence allows the Stoics to attain a telos to their empirical procedure of acquiring knowledge and to avoid circularity. Sandbach draws attention to self-evidence as an end to a potential “regress, as is pointed out by Sextus Adv. math.

VII 428-9. There must be a point to call a halt. There must be some presentations that are immediately acceptable, that are self-evidently true. That is what constitutes a cognitive presentation”.393 Enargeia provides an intuitive end-point for sense perception and for mental reasoning. For a Stoic, then, their evidence will guarantee their truth”.394 It is not just evidence that guarantees the truth, but rather self-evidence. If it is self-evident—either to the senses or to the mind—one’s judgment is assuredly true and indeed it compels the mind to assent to its veracity.395 Only by appealing to self-evidence do the Stoics, as well as the Epicureans, achieve a

392 SE M. 7.161: ἐν ἄρα τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας πάθει τῆς ψυχῆς ζητητέον ἐστὶ τὸ κριτήριον. Inwood and Gerson (1998) 276 translate the passage, “Therefore, the criterion should be sought for in the experience [or state] of the soul arising from a clear [perception]”. Bracketing for this passage is by Inwood and Gerson. 393 Sandbach (1971a) 19. Cf. also Frede, M. (1999) 313 and Bevan (1913) 35ff. 394 Frede, M. (1999) 313. Similarly, Bevan writes (1913) 35: “We have impressions, as a matter of fact, of whose truth we are quite sure. There are things which come home to us with such distinctness (ἐνάργεια) that to doubt is a physical impossibility” and later (pp.37-8), “The Wise Man’s assent (συγκατάθεσις) would never be given to anything but a katalēptikē phantasia. Only in order that an impression might be katalēptikē it must be clear and complete enough to exclude all interpretations but one; only one theory as to its origin must be logically possible”. 395 See Ioppolo (1990) 436, who sums up the Stoic view: “When the soul recognizes a presentation as true by giving its assent to it, we have cognition or κατάληψις. All men are able to recognize the outside world 'for nature has given the sensory faculty and the presentation which arises thereby as our light, as it were, for the recognition of truth' [SE M. 7.239]. It is for this reason that cognition, which is assent to a cognitive presentation, is common to all

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basis for all rational inferences from (external) sense impressions to the (internal) cognitive power of the mind.

While assent consists of an instantaneous acceptance of an external stimulus as true, as rational beings we possess the ability either to give our assent to true facts or to withhold assent if the stimulus is unclear or non-evident (i.e. lacks enargeia). Lesses articulates the role of personal will in one’s assent to impressions, noting: “For perception to occur, an agent must not only be presented with an impression, he or she also must assent to it”, a move which he further stresses is “a voluntary act”.396 This ultimately aligns Stoic epistemology and ethics with one another, for it is human volition that is accountable for correct or incorrect assents. Yet, there is something paradoxical about their view. Recall that kataleptic impression was said to “drag us by the hair” to assent; this certainly implies that we have very little choice about whether or not we assent to an impression as it compels us to accept it as true. Likewise, Hippolytus preserves an analogy about fate from Zeno and Chrysippus: “When a dog is tied to a cart, if it wants to follow it is pulled and follows, making its spontaneous act coincide with necessity, but if it does not want to follow it will be compelled in any case. So it is with men too: even if they do not want to, they will be compelled in any case to follow what is destined”.397 Sandbach recognizes the paradox, arguing: “No weight can be put on their insistence that assent was something for men and is a criterion of truth: it is founded on the truthfulness of the cognitive presentation, which faithfully reproduces all the characteristics of the existing object. …The assent given to the cognitive presentation is firm as well, because it is founded on presentations of simple sensory objects, which are at the basis of all conceptions, notions and prenotions. Indeed the origin of our knowledge, even our intellectual knowledge, lies in the senses”. 396 Lesses (1998) 6. For this assertion, he cites DL 7.49, Cic. Ac. 1.40, 2.145. Cf. also Long (2006f) 240. 397 L&S 62A (SVF 2.975). Στωϊκοὶ καὶ αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ συλλογιστικώτερον τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ηὔξησαν καὶ σχεδὸν ὅροις περιέλαβον, ὁμόδοξοι γενόμενοι ὅ τε Χρύσιππος καὶ <ὁ> Ζήνων. οἳ ὑπέθεντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀρχὴν μὲν τῶν πάντων θεόν, σῶμα ὄντα τὸ καθαρώτατον, διὰ πάντων δὲ διήκειν τὴν πρόνοιαν αὐτοῦ. καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ τὸ καθ’ εἱμαρμένην εἶναι πάντα διεβεβαιώσαντο, παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιούτῳ· ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀχήματος ἐὰν ᾖ ἐξηρτημένος κύων, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται ἕπεσθαι, καὶ ἕλκεται καὶ ἕπεται, ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης [οἷον τῆς εἱμαρμένης]· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ βούληται ἕπεσθαι, πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται. τὸ αὐτὸ δήπου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν (Hippolytus, Refutation of all heresies 1.21.1-2). Greek text is from Marcovich (1986).

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which we are responsible; the phrase used, ἐφ’ ἡμῖν [i.e. in our power/up to us], does not imply that it is possible that we should do the opposite of what we in fact do. Whether assent necessarily follows on a cognitive presentation or not, we are still responsible for giving or withholding it”.398 The phrase ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, “up to us”, is invoked by the Stoics to escape from a purely (hard) deterministic view of the universe and allow room for free will.399 We are in their view assuredly at the mercy of fate (also referred to as God, Zeus, Necessity, et al.); we are, however, also responsible for our own judgments and opinions—i.e for our assents—because we are rational creatures.400 Even though our fate is beyond our control, our judgments (i.e. our acts of assent) remain under our authority. Enargeia points the way, but we must accept it and assent to it if our reasoning and judgments are to be accurate and morally correct.

c. Enargeia and Stoic Ethics

As we have seen, the Stoics made the kataleptic impression not only the basis of judgments about sensory experience, but also made it the basis of ethical decision-making. If we stay focused solely on kataleptic impressions, which are true and self-evident, then our acts of assent will be correct both epistemically and ethically (i.e. in accordance with nature). Therefore, by basing all of our and veridical judgments on self-evidence (enargeia), we fulfill our

398 Sandbach (1971a) 15. For ethics, see also Long (2006b and c). 399 In contrast, Epicurus used the phrase παρὰ ἡμῖν, “dependent on us”. Annas (1993) 64, commenting on the fragmentary Book 25 from Epicurus’ On Nature, argues that, “…Epicurus says that things depend on us (para) rather than that they are up to us (epi); as agents we make choices, but there are always constraints on those choices given that our bodily nature already determines that we want certain kinds of things, and that our bodies work in certain kinds of way and not others”. Hankinson (1999b) 529, drawing upon Cicero’s de Fato 40, claims that the Stoics espoused a “soft determinism”, rather than a “hard determinism”, which would entail that because “all things occur by fate”, “there is no justice in either praise or blame, honours or punishments”. Their appeal to the importance of personal assent and that which is in our own power (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν), seems to bear out Hankinson’s view rather than Cicero’s polemical one. 400 Doty (1992) 13-14 comments, “The voluntary character of assent is important to the Stoic theory because it places the responsibility for error squarely on the shoulders of the individual percipient; we can err by giving assent to a presentation which does not impress us with a feeling of certainty, but we can equally withhold our assent. Error is therefore voluntary, and not part of some vast, cosmic plot against us”.

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proper function, what the Stoics termed kathēkon (Cicero translates the term as officium).401

Thus, cognitive or kataleptic impressions and enargeia are at the basis of both knowledge and ethics.402 Kataleptic impressions provide a secure grounding for knowledge as they allow or, rather, compel the mind to assent to self-evident truth. Likewise, they provide a firm basis for our ethical choices as our responses and attitudes to impressions are either innate or based on natural processes. This security is not guaranteed by other impressions (i.e. those that are akataleptic), which are not self-evident for reasons of distance or which are impeded by outside circumstances. 403 Prominent examples of the latter type include Alcestis’ reuniting with

Admetus, or Menelaus’ with Helen mentioned by Sextus (M. 254ff.).404 It is human error that is at fault in attributing false causes to the impression, particularly when the impressions are unclear (akataleptic). In these instances, it is the person’s assent that contains the element of error—one which we are responsible for.405 In these cases we mistake a non-cumpolsory

401 See DL 7.107 (L&S 59C, SVF 3.493): “Proper function (sc. τὸ καθηκον) is an activity (ἐνέργημα) appropriate (οἰκεῖον) to constitutions that accord with nature”; and Cicero, de Finibus 3.17.20 (L&S 59D): “With the principles thus established that those things which are in accordance with nature are to be taken for their own sake, and that their opposites similarly are to be rejected, the first ‘proper function’ [officium] (this is my term for kathēkon) is to preserve oneself in one’s natural constitution; the second is to seize hold of the things that accord with nature and to banish their opposites”. 402 The Stoics attribute knowledge of good and evil to two forces: there are “innate preconceptions”, which are themselves cognitive/kataleptic (L&S 60B), or concepts that are acquired naturally, i.e. through kataleptic impressions (L&S 60C). L&S 60B (SVF 3.69): “He says that the theory of good and bad things introduced and approved by himself is most in harmony with life and connects best with the innate preconceptions [μάλιστα τῶν ἐμφύτων ἅπτεσθαι προλήψεων]”. L&S 60C (DL 7.53): “The idea of something just and good is acquired naturally” [φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται]. Cf. the discussion of koinai ennoiai above. 403 For the distinction between types of akataleptic impressions, see Arthur (1983) 72, who cites Alexander of (SVF II 70), “stat[ing] that of non-cataleptic presentations some are false while some are true but unclear/incomplete (amudros)”. 404 The difficulty (or impossibility) of distinguishing kataleptic impressions from other non-kataleptic impressions was a subject of much debate between Stoics, on the one hand, and Hellenistic Academics and Skeptics, on the other, the latter of whom denied the ability of any impression to guarantee its trustworthiness. In their attempts to disprove the kataleptic impression, the Academics and Skeptics identified various circumstances (e.g. the madness of Herakles (L&S 40H, Sextus, M.7.403), cases of twins (L&S 40H, Sextus, M.7.410), and other visual tricks (as in a case of two nearly identical pomegranates (L&S 40F, DL.7.177)) where no guarantee of truth could be arrived at despite the sense impression. The Stoics argued in these circumstances, the sage would withhold assent (see Cicero, Ac. 2.57) or else would assent only to there being a reasonable impression, not necessarily a kataleptic one (as in the case of and the pomegranates, DL 7.177). Cf. Sharples (1996) 22ff. 405 Striker (1996d) 159n.14 comments on the case of Menelaus and Helen that, “the example would only show that false beliefs may sometimes prevent us from having cognitive impressions, not that we may not assent when we

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impression (akataleptic) with a cumpolsory one (kataleptic). According to Stoics (similar to the

Epicurean view), we must take care to assent only to impressions that are self-evident (enargeis); only these truly compel our assent, thus definitively providing a criterion of truth and through this a firm foundation for knowledge and ethics.406

Hadot describes the Stoic view of judgment, noting that, “our inner discourse enunciates and describes their [i.e. the kataleptic impressions’] content, and we either give or withhold our consent from this enunciation.”407 His stress on how interior reasoning or ‘discourse’ is involved in acts of assent to an impression is well attuned to the issues involved in the Stoic theories of knowledge and ethics. Only by assenting to self-evident impressions can we be sure that our knowledge is sure and that our personal actions (beginning with our own assent which leads to an impulse (horme) for action) are right as well. Epictetus, a Stoic philosopher of the high imperial period, lectures on assent (3.22.42-4):408

…who can compel you to assent to what appears false? No one. Or who, not to assent to what appears true? No one. Here, then, you see that there is something in you naturally free. But which of you can desire or shun, or use his active powers of pursuit or avoidance, or prepare or plan anything, unless he has been impressed by an appearance of its being for his advantage or his duty? No one. You have, then, in these too something unrestrained and free. Cultivate this, unfortunates; take care of this; seek for good here.409

have one. That their admission [that it was in fact a cognitive impression] was embarrassing for the ‘younger Stoics’ is shown, I think, by the haste with which they added that in the absence of obstacles cognitive impressions ‘virtually grab us by the hair and drag us to assent,’ thus reasserting their ‘striking and evident’ character”. 406 Cf. Ioppolo (1990) 437: “The self-evidence and effectiveness of the cognitive presentation prompt assent, a kind of approval or yielding. It is possible to say that assent is voluntary and at the same time inevitable. The soul yields to an evident and striking presentation just as a scale necessarily goes down when weights are laid on it. Zeno, therefore, conceives assent as a necessary concomitant of cognitive presentation, because in a healthy commanding-faculty it is natural to yield to those presentations 'which have the peculiar power of revealing their objects'. A presentation is not an interpretation of reality, but rather a faithful translation of it”. 407 Hadot (2002) 131. He cites (SVF II, 98 (SE M. 2.397) and also links the practice with the reasoning of , on which see Hadot (1998) 106ff. 408 The OCD 512-13 gives his dates as “mid-1st to 2nd cent. AD”. 409 3.22.42-4: ‘καὶ τίς ὑμᾶς ἀναγκάσαι δύναται συγκαταθέσθαι τῷ ψευδεῖ φαινομένῳ;’ ‘οὐδείς.’ ‘τίς δὲ μὴ συγκαταθέσθαι τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀληθεῖ;’ ‘οὐδείς.’ ‘ἐνθάδ’ οὖν ὁρᾶτε, ὅτι ἔστι τι ἐν ὑμῖν ἐλεύθερον φύσει. ὀρέγεσθαι δ’ ἢ ἐκκλίνειν ἢ ὁρμᾶν ἢ ἀφορμᾶν ἢ παρασκευάζεσθαι ἢ προτίθεσθαι τίς ὑμῶν δύναται μὴ λαβὼν φαντασίαν λυσιτελοῦς ἢ μὴ καθήκοντος’; ‘οὐδείς.’ ‘ἔχετε οὖν καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀκώλυτον καὶ ἐλεύθερον. ταλαίπωροι, τοῦτο ἐξεργάζεσθε, τούτου ἐπιμέλεσθε, ἐνταῦθα ζητεῖτε τὸ ἀγαθόν.’ All Greek text for Epictetus is that of Shenkl (1916); translation by Higginson (1944) 225.

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As he emphasizes, one must constantly “cultivate this” attitude and train oneself through practice to assent only to true appearances (i.e. those that are kataleptic) and to withhold assent from those that are false or unclear (i.e. those that are akataleptic).410 In a similar fashion, the Stoic emperor Marcus Aurelius enjoins himself to take care, “so that nothing nonobjective may infiltrate its way in” [Hadot’s rendering of akataleptic] (7.54), to “give[] … consent neither to what is false, nor to what is obscure” (8.7), and to cling to what is “objective” [i.e. kataleptic] for

“value-judgment[s]” (9.6).411 Both Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius charge themselves and their students to make the constant mental effort to assure that their judgments are based on solid, sure evidence (enargeia). By heeding only kataleptic impressions, one’s judgment has a sure foundation, built upon self-evident truth, enargeia. This alone guarantess correct inferences, achieves truth, and is, therefore, an appropriate basis for rational judgments about truth and falsity, as well as right and wrong.

d. Keeping Truth Before Our Eyes

To assist people on the path toward happiness (εὐδαιμονία), the telos of a proper life, the Stoics, like Epicureans, condensed their doctrines into epitomes and concise maxims.412

These were meant to be memorized or regularly referred back to in order to help one act on each and every occasion with virtue (ἀρητή). Virtue, as the Stoics explicitly state, was something that could be learned.413 Like Aristotle as well as the Epicureans, the Stoics enjoin themselves and

410 See Long (2006i). 411 Hadot (1998) 44. 412 See Stobaeus 2.77 (L&S 63A, SVF 3.16): “They [the Stoics] say that being happy (εὐδαμονεῖν) is the end (τέλος), for the sake of which everything is done, but which is not itself done for the sake of anything. This consists in living accordance with virtue (ἐν τῷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν), in living in agreement (ἐν τῷ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν), or, what is the same, in living in accordance with nature (ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν).” 413 Cf. DL 7.91 (L&S 61K, SVF 3.233): “Virtue is teachable …as is evident from the fact that inferior men become good”. In their comments, Long and Sedley (1986) vol. 2, 379 note that this sentence “is ascribed to Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Posidonius and Hecato”.

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others to keep what is good and proper constantly “before one’s eyes” (πρὸ ὀμμάτων).414 This is precisely the sort of visualization that would have been regarded as enargeia in the Hellenistic schools of rhetoric—the placing of an imagined scene or fact before one’s eyes.415 Aphoristic statements are useful because both students and experts can easily hold them in mind; by recalling them, one reinforces proper conduct as well as appropriate reasoning practices.416 Along with constantly repeated praecepta came exempla, visualized evidence, which testified to the correctness of the paedagogical instructions. Seneca, a Stoic from the first century CE, argues for this combination, as he writes that, “people trust their eyes more than their ears… [and] the journey [to wisdom] is long through praecepta, but short and effective through exempla.”417 By visualizing the evidence, the Stoics argued, one could maintain proper behavior as well as reasoning. Indeed, through a sort of meditative enargeia, one keeps one’s actions and judgments attuned to the proper evidence of the world, i.e. epistemic enargeia.

In the , we can see how Marcus Aurelius practices this kind of visualization or rhetorical enargeia as a personal didaxis. He constantly chides himself to imagine

(φαντάζου, 10.28), to ponder continuously (συνεχῶς ἐπινοεῖν, 10.27), and to place before his eyes (πρὸ ὀμμάτων τίθεσθαι, 10.27) the past, present, and future of the world. He writes

(10.27):

Bear in mind (ἐπινοεῖν) continuously how all such things as now exist existed also before our day, and be assured, will exist after us. Set before thine eyes (πρὸ ὀμμάτων

414 Cf. Bartsch (2007) 94: “The Stoics were credited in antiquity with believing in the persuasive and pedagogoic power of visualization, and learning to employ this technique appropriately provided part of the training, or askêsis, that a budding Stoic was encouraged to undertake—perhaps ironically, in order to vitiate the effects of the visual.” See also Mowbray (2012) 396ff. 415 On the rhetorical theory, much more will be said in chapter five. 416 Cf. Mitsis (1993b) 296, arguing based on Ep. Mor. 94 and 95, “[Seneca] maintains…that even someone acquainted with the fundamental principles of morality (decreta) needs the help of praecepta… Without developing this kind of moral awareness, agents will not be able to act in ways appropriate to particular circumstances”. 417 Mowbray (2012) 396. Sen. Ep. 6.5: in rem praesentem venias oportet, primum quia homines amplius oculis quam auribus credunt, deinde quia longum iter est per praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla. The Latin text is from Reynolds (1977).

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τίθεσθαι) whole and their stagings, one like another, all that thine own experience has shown you or you have learned from past history, for instance the entire court of Hadrian, the entire court of Antoninus, the entire court of Philip, of Alexander, of Croesus. For all those scenes were such as we see now, only the performers being different.418

This is the same kind of mental activity that Aristotle encouraged poets and orators to engage in as they write and which was subsumed under the umbrella of enargeia in Hellenistic rhetoric.

Here Marcus does not imagine these scenes in order to compose a drama but rather as paradigms for his own behavior. Indeed, writing and rewriting the Stoic principles as diary-like entries becomes a rehearsal for his own future, what Hadot calls a “spiritual exercise”.419 The historical exempla, piled one upon another, alert him to the repetitions of history and remind him of the

Stoics’ cyclical view of time.420 What Marcus has under his own control is not past or future circumstances, but rather his own response to whatever occasion arises. He can act in accordance with nature and with reason at every moment, particularly if he prepares in advance for all contingencies and keeps virtue constantly in mind. By seeing these examples—clear evidence placed before his eyes—he can behave (and reason) appropriately.

418 M. Aur. Med. 10.27: Συνεχῶς ἐπινοεῖν πῶς πάντα τοιαῦτα, ὁποῖα νῦν γίνεται, καὶ πρόσθεν ἐγίνετο, καὶ ἐπινοεῖν γενησόμενα· καὶ ὅλα δράματα καὶ σκηνὰς ὁμοειδεῖς, ὅσα ἐκ πείρας τῆς σῆς ἢ τῆς πρεσβυτέρας ἱστορίας ἔγνως, πρὸ ὀμμάτων τίθεσθαι, οἷον αὐλὴν ὅλην Ἁδριανοῦ καὶ αὐλὴν ὅλην Ἀντωνίνου καὶ αὐλὴν ὅλην Φιλίππου, Ἀλεξάνδρου, Κροίσου· πάντα γὰρ ἐκεῖνα τοιαῦτα ἦν, μόνον δι’ ἑτέρων. All Greek text for Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations is that of Farquharson (1968). The English translation is by Haines (1930), slightly adapted. 419 Hadot (1998) 48ff. 420 Cf. Long (2006g) and (1986), in the later of which he notes that (p.138), “It was a Stoic doctrine that ‘only the present is real’ but the present is said to consist of past and future (SVF ii. 509, 517). This is a way of saying that time is continuous, and can only be broken up into different relations by means of language. Time like lekta has no independent existence but is rather something which rational beings make use of in order to explain the movements of bodies”. Rist (1969) 273 argues that Marcus Aurelius’ views on time are at points quite removed from those of the earlier Stoics, however he admits, “There is not very much in what Marcus says about the nature of time which might not have been said by Chrysippus, but the context in which he situates his theories removes him a considerable distance from any of the early members of his school”. He claims that Platonic theories regarding time intrude on the Stoic views of Marcus, and that his view is that (p.287), “Time, the ever-changing flux, is itself a moral problem. How is it possible to live a good life at all, so long as one has the sense that all actions are turned by time into triviality? The fact that, despite having to overcome his own about time and actions, Marcus nevertheless persisted to the end in his struggle to live an upright life according to Stoic theory as he understood it, is an indication of no small importance of the strength of his will and of his sense of duty. At times it seems as though it is a sense of duty, a sense not rationalized philosophically as a categorical imperative, but accepted instinctively, which carries him through”.

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In one instance, Marcus actually refers to this procedure of visualization with the very term we have been discussing. To prod himself to apply his Stoic principles to his life, he writes:

“Let it always be self-evident” (Ἐναργὲς ἔστω, 10.23), i.e kept before his eyes.421 He is performing a philosophical form of enargeia on himself, keeping before his mind’s eye the central tenets of Stoicism, i.e. the self-evident facts of the world (enargeia). Hadot explicates the procedure: “, as Marcus says (VII, 2), run the risk of dying out, if one does not constantly reignite those inner images, or phantasiai, which make them present to us”.422 He goes on to note, “We must, then, not only act in conformity with the theorems of the art of living and the fundamental dogmas, but also keep present to our consciousness the theoretical foundations which justify them”.423 Nevertheless, Hadot does not link Marcus’ practice with the literary concept of enargeia. It is really one and the same, only its aim is not literary creation—as it would be for a writer of tragedy, poetry, or history—but rather personal meditation. By mentally preserving his philosophical principles through pithy maxims and sententious phrases, he can constantly refer back to these truths when faced with every impression (phantasia) that he encounters in the world. The philosophical synopses then drive home the full weight of his

Stoicism, which he already embraces, and allow him to visualize them before his eyes,

421 The translation is my own. Haines translates’ the passage (Med. 10.23): “Never lose sight of the fact that a man’s ‘freehold’ is such as I told thee, and how all the conditions are the same here as on the top of a mountain or on the sea-shore or wherever thou pleases. Quite apposite shalt thou find to be the words of Plato: Compassed about (by the city wall as) by a sheep-fold on the mountain, and the milking flocks”. Ἐναργὲς ἔστω ἀεὶ τὸ ὅτι τοιοῦτο ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἀγρός ἐστι καὶ πῶς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐνθάδε τοῖς ἐν ἄκρῳ τῷ ὄρει ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ ἢ ὅπου θέλεις. ἄντικρυς γὰρ εὑρήσεις τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος· “σηκὸν ἐν ὄρει, φησί, περιβαλλόμενος καὶ βδάλλων βληχήματα.” 422 Hadot (1998) 37. Elsewhere, Hadot writes (p.50), “These formulas, which are repeated throughout the Meditations, never set forth a doctrine. Rather, they serve only as a catalyst which, by means of the association of ideas, reactivates a series of representations and practices, about which Marcus—since he is writing only for himself—has no need to go into detail. Marcus writes only in order to have the dogmas and rules of life always present in his mind. He is thus following the advice of Epictetus…”. 423 Hadot (1998) 42, commenting on Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations 10.9.

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reminding him to take care to apply correct reasoning and to act virtuously. The clear evidence

(evidentia/enargeia) is always readily available to him through his mind’s phantasia.

To conclude this investigation of Stoic epistemology and ethics, let us survey the roles we have seen enargeia take on. On the one hand, epistemically it has the power of distinguishing truth from falsehood, as it is the defining feature of the criterion of truth, the kateleptic impression. For Stoics, vividness and clarity (i.e. enargeia) is an objective characteristic of physical objects which is available to our sense perception and which brings with it complete assurance that something is true. Furthermore, it is also a feature that is grasped in our minds.

Because our minds are rational, enargeia is also available to us by means of clear inferences based on valid logic. As we achieve a clear view and cognition (whether because of mental or physical self-evidence), we are obliged to assent to the veracity of the impression and to act accordingly through our impulses. These logical moves, like physical sensation, bring about phantasia, and if these are the katelptic variety—i.e. they are clear and self-evident—then the truth of an induction is assured.

The Stoic (and Epicurean) theory of enargeia was also assimilated to Hellenistic literary and rhetorical theories. From later uses of terms such as enargeia and phantasia in Epictetus and

Marcus Aurelius, it is apparent that the Stoics were encouraged (and encouraged themselves) to keep their doctrines constantly at the front of their minds, a meditative form of enargeia. By reference to these tenets, the Stoic, whether expert or student, could check every datum of sense experience and/or act of reasoning against self-evident truths, which s/he already accepted. Thus the Stoic theory of enargeia also is closely akin to the Hellenistic literary and rhetorical theories of “imagination” (phantasia) and “placing before the eyes” (pro omattōn poiein), which will be examined in the next chapter. Indeed, rhetoric and literary criticism of the age drew directly on

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Stoic and Epicurean terminologies. Therefore, by understanding the role of enargeia in Stoic theory, we have at our disposal not only a better tool for understanding philosophy, but also for analyzing and interpreting literature. Literature and historical writings provide us, as well as later

Stoic readers, with the very sorts of exempla mentioned by Seneca, which can be seen and then imitated or criticized. By “placing before our eyes” the self-evident principles of Stoic philosophy, we can adapt our reasoning and ethical behavior so that it is consistent with enargeia.

3. Conclusion

The concept of enargeia, which had initially been a term coined by Plato broadly referring to “clarity” or “clear definition”, became a crucial point of contention throughout the

Hellenistic period. It was Epicurus who first employed the term in a fully technical way, referring primarily to the self-evidence of the senses. From this evidence, he argued, we can achieve sure knowledge (epistemē/scientia). He also applied this term more broadly than to just sense-perceptions by employing it to refer to mental judgments and concepts; these too, however, were clear or self-evident if and only if they were consistent with and ultimately based on empirical evidence. The Stoics too made the concept a key feature of their epistemologies and the definining feature of their criteria of truth; indeed, both schools made it the very means of achieving any fixed knowledge of the world.424 The connection between sensory and mental enargeia was to remain a mainstay in philosophical debate. The fact that Sextus, writing in the second century CE, was still engaged in Hellenistic epistemological debates about enargeia testifies to the long-lasting importance of the concept in philosophical discourse. Similarly, the evidence from Cicero shows that anyone who studied philosophy—whether within the Stoic,

424 Tarrant (1981) 80 is thus off track in arguing based on SE M.203-216, “that the details of Epicurean theory, as set out here, do not seem to warrant such great emphasis being placed on ἐνάργεια”.

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Epicurean, Academic, or Peripatetic schools—during the Hellenistic Age and on into the Roman

Empire, would surely have dealt with the question of a criterion of truth and with enargeia. All schools addressed the need for a vivid and clear foundation upon which to rest knowledge. Both the Epicureans and Stoics dogmatically proposed certain criteria, which they claimed had this quality of self-evidence, including sense perception (aisthēsis), cognition (katalēpsis), preconceptions (prolēpseis), et al. The skeptical traditions offered no criterion of truth of their own, instead arguing negatively against the possibility of self-evidence (enargeia) except, in certain instances, for making plausible decisions, not assuredly true judgments.425 The syncretism of the time encouraged philosophical schools to look for areas of commonality and to implement the jargon of other schools within their own philosophies, although they often subtly adapted and altered the meanings of other school’s vocabulary to suit their own views.

Moreover, we have also seen in both Epicurean and Stoic texts a stress on the power of memory and mental focus. By emphasizing memory and the need for constant effort to maintain correct reasoning and to abide by true principles, Epicurus and the Stoics can be seen as important sources for the development of the theory of the imagination.426 Their procedures of visualization and meditation also seem to have influenced theories of visualization and imagery in Hellenistic rhetoric and literary criticism to which we turn in the next chapter. While Epicurus himself did not refer to this process as enargeia, but rather called it practice (μελέτη), focus

(ἐπιβολή) or on one occasion visualization (πρὸ ὀμμ[ά]των τιθέμενοι), it was, nevertheless, his term for self-evidence—enargeia—which would be further developed by later philosophers, rhetoricians, and literary critics and remain an important concept in all of these different spheres.

In this way, as we shall see, enargeia would leave a lasting impression on the themes and writing

425 See Niiniluoto (2000) and Frede, M. (1983). 426 On constant practice and repetition in Epicurus, see Nussbaum (1986a) 48ff.

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practices of later periods. Indeed, writers of the Hellenistic and Roman periods would likely have been exposed to the concept of enargeia first in their rhetorical training and only later in the study of philosophy. It was, nevertheless, as a philosophical concept that enargeia initially emerged as a serious concern and with a technical meaning. Indeed, the primary philosophical meaning was never entirely lost when it was adapted secondarily by rhetorical theorists and literary critics. Therefore, it is vital that we keep the Stoic and Epicurean views on enargeia

“before our eyes”, so to speak, as we turn to other applications of the concept in the next chapter.

We will also see complementary applications of self-evident knowledge and visualization in our analysis of Philodemus, Lucretius, and Virgil in chapters five, six, and seven, respectively, all of whom had close ties to the Epicurean schools in Italy. Their texts illustrate how visualization, together with self-evidence from the senses, continued to play an important role in

Epicurean pedagogy and argument, and in the literature that was influenced by these schools.

Indeed, I will argue that the philosophical side of enargeia is central to analyzing the rhetorical uses of enargeia in Lucretius’ De rerum natura in chapter six, as well as the ending of the

Aeneid in chapter seven.

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CHAPTER FIVE

ANTE OCULOS: ENARGEIA AS “PLACING BEFORE THE EYES” IN RHETORIC, LITERARY THEORY, AND PEDAGOGY

In this chapter, I examine the place of enargeia in the fields of ancient rhetorical and literary theory, along with closely associated concepts like phantasia, visualization (pro ommatōn poiein, Latin sub oculos subiectio), description (hypotypōsis/diatypōsis, Latin descriptio/illustratio), and ekphrasis. In particular, I show that in these spheres enargeia comes to refer to a stylistic effect in which an audience or reader is encouraged to imagine a described subject before his/her mind’s eye. As a literary device, this procedure holds great importance in

Hellenistic literary criticism, for instance in the scholia on Homer, in Dionysius of

Halicarnassus, and in On the Sublime. Moreover, it was also taught as a rhetorical exercise, evidence of which is preserved in rhetorical discussions of the Hellenistic and Imperial periods, including the Rhetorica ad Herennium, Cicero, and Quintilian, among others. Writers attempted to create vividness, i.e. enargeia, through highly realistic descriptions as well as through emphatic, emotional appeals to their audience’s senses, especially vision. While this effect was brought about purely through verbal communication, the theorists of rhetoric and literature also seem to acknowledge a physical effect on the listener/reader—enargeia actualizes mental phantasia, indeed the two terms are for the most part synonymous.

I show that the rhetorical form of mentally “placing before the eyes” also plays a vital role in the therapeutic techniques of both Philodemus, on whom this chapter ends, and Lucretius, whom the next chapter takes up. For Philodemus, as well as his close contemporary Lucretius, visualization has an important function in Epicurean pedagogy, allowing a teacher to utilize description along with frank criticism in order to propel his/her pupil to stay on a proper ethical

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course and to modify his/her behavior in order to align it with an imagined ideal. As we saw in chapter four, according to Epicurus, if we concentrate on and preserve true facts before our eyes, then our actions and inferences from the world will be accurate and true. For Philodemus and

Lucretius, as well as other writers such as Virgil, influenced by Epicureanism as well as by similar theories in Stoicism and other philosophical schools, enargeia thus continued to possess an important epistemic quality, linking vision—even mental vision—to sure knowledge.

After first surveying the history of its rhetorical applications in section one, I turn in the next section to a close consideration of enargeia in its rhetorical and literary uses. By understanding the ancient methods to achieve vividness, we will ultimately be able to apply these principles to a close reading of the De rerum natura in chapter six. After examining its role in rhetoric and literary theory, this chapter ends with a discussion of the philosopher/poet

Philodemus, whose surviving works provide programmatic evidence of the link between evidence (enargeia/evidentia) and visualization (pro ommatōn/ante oculos) in Epicurean pedagogy.

Last, but not least, this chapter looks forward to the next chapter on Lucretius and to the final chapter’s analysis of the Aeneid. Like Lucretius, Philodemus was an Epicurean living in

Italy in the first century BCE; indeed, he was the leader of a school centered in Naples and was closely associated with Virgil, even dedicating one of his works to him. While I make no claims about any direct connections between Philodemus and Lucretius, I will argue in the following chapter that Philodemus’ Epicurean form of visualization is very similar to Lucretius’ method and that his theoretical discussions can help inform our readings of the De rerum natura and the

Aeneid.

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1. Proof and Evidence in Rhetoric of the Fourth Century BCE

While our inquiries into Plato and Aristotle showed that their applications of enargēs/ enargeia provided a bridge to later Hellenistic usage particularly in philosophical contexts, the orators of the fourth century also show a remarkable surge in uses of the terms and increasingly technical applications for them, which influenced Hellenistic rhetorical and literary theory. This is especially apparent in how the terms come to mean not just “clear” (i.e. possessing perspicuitas/saphēneia), but rather “convincing” and “self-evident”, when referring to evidence or proof. In particular, this usage is often seen in contexts in which orators appeal to the consensus omnium, general common knowledge which is patently obvious to all. These applications help account for the technical theory of enargeia in Hellenistic aesthetics, which remains a stylistic effect throughout the Roman period, seen in Cicero’s translation of enargeia as evidentia and in the rhetorical theories of ante oculos subiectio/ponere/videre, in the Rhetorica ad Herennium and in Quintilian.

Whereas the adjective enargēs was shown in the second chapter to be relatively rare in the fifth century, in the following period, Plato’s contemporary Isocrates employs it five times in his extant works, Aeschines three, and Demosthenes a substantial eleven times. While most of these instances conform to what Ierodiakonou calls “the ordinary Greek” usage of the term

(meaning “obvious”),427 comparable to the usage discussed in the second chapter which I referred to as perspicuitas, these writers also show an increasing stress on the ability of these “obvious” facts to provide persuasive evidence, evidentia. This evidence then compells the audience to consent to the speaker’s claims, a usage which leaves a lasting legacy on how the adjective and noun are employed by Epicurus, the Stoics, and rhetorical and literary critics.

427 Ierodiakonou (2011) 61.

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Of these orators, Isocrates, the earliest of the three, uses the adjective enargēs with its most traditional usage meaning “obvious”, which as Ierodiakonou notes is “broad enough to suggest truth, but not necessarily to guarantee truth”.428 For instance, in his Encomium of Helen, as he comments on the excellence of Helen (including her beauty which brought her divinity), he singles out how she used her divine status to raise her brothers, the Dioscuri, to be equal to the gods as well.429 To prove (πιστὴν ποιῆσαι) their apotheosis, moreover, Isocrates notes that, “she gave to them honors so manifest (ἐναργεῖς) that they have power to save when they are seen by sailors in peril on the sea, if they but piously invoke them”.430 In this instance Isocrates argues, the vivid sign of St. Elmo’s fire acts as compelling proof to mortals that Castor and Polydeuces have been divinized. As in Homer and its earlier uses, the adjective is associated with the sensation of vision, for humans can see the proofs of the brother’s honors in the heavens when viewing the electrical conditions associated with St. Elmo’s fire.

In the Antidosis as well, Isocrates employs the adjective in this same manner—i.e. as implying certainty, but not guaranteeing it. Nearing the end of this oratorical defense of his life,

Isocrates states (15. 243-4):

A little while ago I said that many good men had been misled about philosophy, and are consequently harshly disposed toward it. Now, however, I have assumed that the arguments which I have presented are so plain (ἐναργεῖς) and evident (φανεροὺς) to all that no one, it seems to me, can misapprehend its power or accuse me of corrupting my disciples or have any such feeling as I imputed to them a little while ago.431

428 Ierodiakonoun (2011) 61. 429 Isocrates, Helenae encomium, 10.61. 430 Isoc. 10.61: βουλομένη δὲ πιστὴν ποιῆσαι τὴν μεταβολὴν οὕτως αὐτοῖς τὰς τιμὰς ἐναργεῖς ἔδωκεν ὥσθ’ ὁρωμένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ κινδυνευόντων σῴζειν, οἵτινες ἂν αὐτοὺς εὐσεβῶς κατακαλέσωνται. The Greek text comes from Brémond and Mathieu (1963 [=1929]); translation from Norlin (1980). 431 Isoc. Antid. 15.243-4: νῦν δ’ οὕτως ἐναργεῖς ὑπείληφα τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς εἰρημένους καὶ πᾶσι φανεροὺς ὥστ’ οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖν μοι δοκεῖ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς οὐδὲ καταγιγνώσκειν ἡμῶν ὡς διαφθείρομεν τοὺς μαθητὰς, οὐδὲ πεπονθέναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν οἷον αὐτοὺς ὀλίγῳ πρότερον ᾐτιώμην· ἀλλ’ εἰ δεῖ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ μοι παρεστηκὸς, ἡγοῦμαι πάντας τοὺς φιλοτίμως διακειμένους, ἐπιθυμητικῶς ἔχοντας τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ καὶ λέγειν…; The Greek text is from Mathieu (1966); translation from Norlin (1980).

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While he admits that he thinks that the evidence he has offered is clear (ἐναργεῖς) and apparent

(φανεροὺς) to all, he phrases this as an assumption (with the verb ὑπείληφα), implying that this is only his opinion and it is possible that he could be wrong. His other instances (at de 8.73,

Panathenaicus 12.238, and Busiris 11.37) fall in line with these same uses.432 For Isocrates, as for archaic and classical writers of Greek, the adjective enargēs implies “obviousness” and

“clarity”, but it does not necessitate truth. Even when utilizing the term to refer to inferences from signs or clear evidence, as he does in the passage from the Encomium of Helen (and in a similar instance at de Pace 8.73),433 the adjective never comes with an epistemological force, referring to evidence that brings with it compelling, verifiable truth. It rather speaks to a general notion of accepted belief, something that all take for granted.

Nevertheless, Isocrates’ speeches offer dynamic examples of speech as display

(apodeixis), a genre that stresses persuasion more than speech for the sake of truth. The surety of his claims and his emotional evidence must also be understood in light of its generic character.

Indeed, while in antiquity St. Elmo’s fire was attributed to the Dioscuri in their divine roles as protector deities, the association lacks the kind of certainty that guarantees truth. This religious belief is not verifiable by empirical observation. Although Isocrates’ evidence is powerful and conveyed with language that is passionate and exciting, it nonetheless cannot be proven to be certain—belief or opinion, i.e. doxa, is still necessary. If we recall from chapter two, this usage is ultimately far closer to that in Homer’s poems and in tragedy, where enargēs was shown to refer to something that was obvious or clear (perspicuitas), but not necessarily assuredly true.

Isocrates’ texts show that the usage contemporary with Plato continued to possess a less marked meaning, lacking the epistemological nuances of the term’s later development. Therefore, Plato

432 Isocrates’ various uses of the adjective enargēs were collated by means of the search features of TLG. 433 Isoc. de Pace 8.73: καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν μάλιστα τὸν ἐναργέστατα δυνάμενον δηλῶσαι τὰς πονηρίας τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὰς συμφορὰς τὰς ἐπ’ αὐτῶν γιγνομένας·

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is truly an anomaly in his employment of enargēs and enargeia in the early fourth century BCE, as shown in the chapter three.

While Isocrates preserves the traditional meaning of enargēs/enargeia in his speeches,

Demosthenes and Aeschines, writing in the mid to late fourth century, reveal increasingly technical applications for the terms. Their usage paves the way for later Hellenistic usage in rhetorical works, referring to evidence that is “apparent” and therefore compels the listener’s/reader’s consent to a speaker’s claims to truth. While Demosthenes does not employ

Plato’s abstract noun enargeia in any of his speeches, he nonetheless uses the adjective eleven times in his extant works. In all of these instances, the context suggests that the audience should draw an inference from evidence that is clear (saphēs), obvious (phaneros), or evident (enargēs).

Demosthenes, of course, has his own motives for making such assertions and they could certainly be disputed, yet his rhetoric and the adjectives bolster the emotional resonance of his claims; the proof, he avers, is indisputable because it is apparent to all. The audience is put in a position where they must either acquiesce to the speaker’s evaluation or else declare him a liar, as he confirms that the facts themselves are certain and unambiguous. Furthermore, at times he distinguishes what is clear (saphēs) and evident (enargēs) from what is controversial and unclear

(adēlos). Interestingly, the adjective dēlos, which we might expect to be contrasted to its alpha- privative form adēlos, is ultimately far less nuanced and more general in its usage, simply denoting a generally accepted fact (e.g. 1.5: dēlon gar esti…)434. Enargēs, saphēs, or phaneros, are the preferred antonyms for adēlos, when it refers to ambiguity. In this way, Demosthenes shows that these adjectives already possess nuanced or even technical meanings; if something is

434 Cf. Dem. Olynthiac 1.5: δῆλον γάρ ἐστι τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις ὅτι νῦν οὐ περὶ δόξης οὐδ’ ὑπὲρ μέρους χώρας πολεμοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀναστάσεως καὶ ἀνδραποδισμοῦ τῆς πατρίδος, καὶ ἴσασιν ἅ τ’ Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ἐποίησε τοὺς παραδόντας αὐτῷ τὴν πόλιν καὶ Πυδναίων τοὺς ὑποδεξαμένους· The Greek text is from Butcher (1966 [=1903]).

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described as enargēs, then it implies that it must be generally accepted as true and undeniable, while that which is unclear (adēlos) is still subject to doubt.

Demosthenes’ speech, On the Symmories, provides us with an example of just such a distinction of obvious and (self-)evident facts from unclear conjectures or hazy hypotheticals. He writes (14.4):

For I believe, Athenians, that if there were clear and unmistakable signs (ἐναργὲς [τι] γένοιτο καὶ σαφὲς) of the King's hostile intentions, the other Greeks would join with us, and would be deeply grateful to those who would stand up for them and with them against his attacks; but if we force on a war, while his aims are still obscure (ἔτ’ ἀδήλου τούτου καθεστηκότος), I am afraid, men of Athens, that we shall be obliged to encounter, not only the King, but also those whom we are minded to protect.435

Here, the orator specifically laments the lack of concrete evidence, which would necessitate

Athenian intervention, admitting instead that the current situation remains unclear (ἔτ’ ἀδήλου).

He even employs a future less vivid conditional construction, “if there were some direct and clear evidence” (ἐναργὲς [τι]… καὶ σαφὲς) [understand, ‘but this is highly unlikely’],436 which stresses the vital link between the adjective enargēs and certain knowledge. The phrase rhetorically compels the listener to concede the impossibility of certainty on this subject because of its obscure (ἀδήλου) nature. For Demosthenes, as for later Hellenistic rhetoricians and philosophers, if something is enargēs or saphēs, then it is grasped by the senses and thereby is accepted as true. The opposite likewise holds true for him—but importantly not for all later philosophers—that if something is unclear, then it must also be uncertain.

In this vein Demosthenes employs the adjective enargēs in his Second Philippic to emphasize that proof of his claims is patently clear to all and, therefore, his assertions ought to

435 Dem. 14.4: ἡγοῦμαι γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς Ἕλληνας, εἰ μὲν ἐναργὲς [τι] γένοιτο καὶ σαφὲς ὡς βασιλεὺς αὐτοῖς ἐπιχειρεῖ, κἂν συμμαχῆσαι καὶ χάριν μεγάλην ἔχειν τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ μετ’ αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνον ἀμυνομένοις· εἰ δ’ ἔτ’ ἀδήλου τούτου καθεστηκότος προαπεχθησόμεθ’ ἡμεῖς, δέδι’, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ τούτοις μετ’ ἐκείνου πολεμεῖν ἀναγκασθῶμεν, ὑπὲρ ὧν προνοούμεθα. Translation and Greek text are from Butcher (1966 [=1903]). 436 My translation.

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be trusted. There he argues, “To those who have sense, even just a little, the evidence is plain to see”.437 According to the logic of the passage, the obviousness of his evidence—visible (ἰδεῖν) and clear (ἐναργῆ)—proves that his facts are unambiguous and that he is telling the truth.438

Moreover, the evidence is drawn from examples, paradeigma. Recall from the last chapter how

Seneca argued that, “people trust their eyes more than their ears… [and] the journey [to wisdom] is long through praecepta, but short and effective through exempla”.439 Demosthenes expresses this same sort of rhetorical argument in this case, however he does so about four hundred years prior to Seneca. By seeing clear evidence from his examples, he assumes that the audience will conclude that he is right. While he also reveals his own personal bias and even pejoratively insinuates that one would have to be devoid of common sense not to see the situation for what it is, his rhetoric reinforces his point by stressing the accurate evidence of the senses. For him, the clearest and most trustworthy proof comes from direct sensory perception. Only by clearly seeing the situation—that Philip’s forces are mounting against Athens—can rational Athenians make properly considered decisions and choose to follow Demosthenes’ advice.

As a final example of Demosthenic usage, let us look at a short passage from his masterpiece On the Crown. The adjective is used only one time in the speech, but once again, the orator employs it in a context that stresses firm knowledge based on proof from direct, visual evidence. He poses the question to his audience, “Have I any proofs (ἀποδείξεις) of my claim?” only to answer himself immediately, “Yes, proofs definite (ἐναργεῖς) and manifest (φανεραί). I

437 My translation. καίτοι σωφρονοῦσί γε καὶ μετρίως ἐναργῆ παραδείγματ’ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν…; Greek text comes from Butcher (1966 [=1903]). This use of the adjective is similar to that at 21.72: τὸ δεινὸν παραστῆσαι τοῖς ἀκούουσιν οὕτως ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τοῦ πράγματος τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ τοῖς ὁρῶσιν ἐναργὴς ἡ ὕβρις φαίνεται. Meijering (1987) 29-30 recognizes the latter as, “[a]n important passage in Demosthenes [where he] applies it to visualization by means of rhetorical style”. 438 On visualization in Andocides, Lysias, Aeschines, and Demosthenes, see also Sheppard (2014) 25. 439 Sen. Ep. 6.5.

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ask you all to consider them (σκοπεῖτε)” (18.300). 440 Yunis comments on Demosthenes’

“didactic expressions” like these, which “slow the pace down and invite the audience to pay close attention”.441 Surely he is right to notice the didactic quality of these instances, particularly as they engage the audience in probing the factual basis of his claims and encourage them to draw their own conclusions (like a teacher with students). Nevertheless, what is missing from these comments is any reference to enargeia, particularly in its rhetorical function in which the reader/listener is invited to see verbally described conditions as if before his eyes.442 It is exactly in situations like this where an orator can be seen employing enargeia as a rhetorical device.

Here, the point is driven home by the adjectives ἐναργεῖς and φανεραί, as well as the verb

σκοπεῖτε. This vocabulary encourages the audience to imagine the situation before their eyes— an application of enargeia. While the term likely did not have a fully technical meaning at the time when he was writing, his speeches, as well as excerpts from Homer, Thucydides, and many others, were later culled for illustrative examples of enargeia. These passages were ultimately gathered together in rhetorical handbooks (or Progymnasmata) and teachers employed them as paradigms for their pupils to follow and imitate.443 Here, we can see a prime instance of how

Demosthenes’ vocabulary and method served as a basis for Hellenistic theorizing. Indeed, as his words imply, if something is evident and apparent (i.e. ἐναργεῖς and φανεραί), then one can see it clearly and ought to accept it as true. This link between appearance and truth becomes the

440 Dem. 18.300: τίνες αἱ τούτων ἀποδείξεις; ἐναργεῖς καὶ φανεραί. σκοπεῖτε δέ…; The translation and Greek text are from Butcher (1966 [=1903]). 441 Yunis (2001) 124. The comment comes in a footnote to §26, however the note on §300 refers back to this section, so it is pertinent. 442 Cf. Dionysius’ comments on a speech of Lysias which define enargeia as “the stylistic effect in which appeal is made to the senses of the listener and attendant circumstances are described in such a way that the listener will be turned into an eyewitness (ὁρᾶν)”; Lys. 7; I.14,17 Us.-Rad. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐνάργειαν πολλὴν ἡ Λυσίου λέξις. αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶ δύναμίς τις ὑπὸ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἄγουσα τὰ λεγόμενα, γίγνεται δ’ ἐκ τῆς τῶν παρακολουθούντων λήψεως. ὁ δὴ προσέχων τὴν διάνοιαν τοῖς Λυσίου λόγοις οὐχ οὕτως ἔσται σκαιὸς ἢ δυσάρεστος ἢ βραδὺς τὸν νοῦν, ὃς οὐχ ὑπολήψεται γινόμενα τὰ δηλούμενα ὁρᾶν καὶ ὥσπερ παροῦσιν οἷς ἂν ὁ ῥήτωρ εἰσάγῃ προσώποις ὁμιλεῖν. The Greek text and translation are from Zanker (1981) 297. 443 See Webb (2009) passim and Henderson (1991).

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central feature of the subsequent Hellenistic definition of the term, but, as we see, it is already present in Demosthenes’ usage.

In the same contemporary as Demosthenes, Aeschines also uses the adjective three times in his speeches. Like his rival, the adjective ἐναργές and its adverbial form ἐναργῶς imply that a fact is clear and evident, and ought, therefore, to be accepted as true. For instance, in

Against , Aeschines introduces Hegesandrus into the speech with an acknowledgement that the facts that he intends to mention are enargēs, i.e. clear, general knowledge. He states (1.55), “I know you are surprised that I have not mentioned him long before this, so notorious is what I am going to relate.”444 The word that Adams translates as

“notorious” is actually ἐναργές, in this case referring to the obvious details surrounding

Hegesandrus and his lifestyle—details that are already known to the Athenian audience.

Although this is the first mention of Hegesandrus in the speech, the use of enargēs intimates that what he is about to say about him is based on apparent facts which are known by all and generally accepted as true.

Indeed, Aeschines goes on in the speech to describe him as living immorally and committing acts (including prostitution) just like the alleged crimes with which Timarchus is charged. Later in the speech, he argues (1.70): “Don’t you suppose that Hegesandrus, in his desire to wipe out his own notorious [περιβοήτους] practices with Leodamas, which are known to all of you [ἃς ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες σύνιστε], made extravagant demands on the defendant, hoping to make Timarchus’ conduct so exceedingly bad that his own earlier behavior would seem to have been modest indeed?” As in the previous instance, Aeschines stresses how Hegesandrus’ crimes are general knowledge. In both of these cases, the orator inspires his audience to accept

444 Aeschin. In Tim. 1.70: καταπλεῖ δεῦρο ἐξ Ἑλλησπόντου Ἡγήσανδρος, περὶ οὗ πάλαι εὖ οἶδ’ ὅτι θαυμάζετε διότι οὐ μέμνημαι· οὕτως ἐναργές ἐστιν ὃ ἐρῶ; All Greek text for Against Timarchus comes from de Budé and Martin (1962 [=1927]); all translations for Aeschines are from Adams (1919).

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his line of reasoning and his claims about Timarchus because, he asserts, they are based on clear

(ἐναργές, 1.55) and well-known facts [ἃς ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες σύνιστε, 1.70]. He accepts and appeals to the consensus omnium as the basis of his arguments, a strong tactic in a forensic speech where the jury of Athenian citizens must decide the case based on their own experience as well as the arguments presented.

These examples demonstrate how fourth century orators appeal to clear evidence by utilizing the adjective enargēs. This usage stresses the unambiguous nature of their claims, either because of the audience’s personal experiences or general knowledge. This use leaves a legacy on the applications of enargēs/enargeia to evidence (and ultimately it helps explain Cicero’s translation of enargeia as evidentia).445 Unlike Demosthenes’ applications of the adjective

ἐναργές, which link it with direct visible perception of evidence, Aeschines insists that the broadly accepted beliefs of his audience also show the clear, obvious nature of his facts. Indeed, he connects the adjective explicitly to public sentiment. He writes (1.127-8):

But in the case of the life and conduct of men, a common report [φήμη] which is unerring [ἀψευδής] does of itself spread abroad throughout the city; it causes the private deed to become matter of public knowledge, and many a time it even prophesies what is about to be. So manifest [ἐναργές] and so far from being fabricated [οὐ πεπλασμένον] is this statement of mine, that you will find that both our city and our forefathers dedicated an altar to Common Report [φήμης], as one of the greatest gods; and you will find that Homer again and again in the Iliad says, of a thing that has not yet come to pass, “Common Report [φήμη] came to the host…446

In the Hellenistic period too, philosophers, especially Epicurus, link the adjective enargēs with common notions of truth, that is, the consensus omnium and not simply to direct empirical

445 Cic. Luc. 17. 446 Aesch. In Tim. 1.127-8: περὶ δὲ τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀψευδής τις ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου πλανᾶται φήμη κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ διαγγέλλει τοῖς πολλοῖς τὰς ἰδίας πράξεις, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ μαντεύεται περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι. Καὶ οὕτως ἐναργές ἐστι καὶ οὐ πεπλασμένον ὃ λέγω ὥσθ’ εὑρήσετε καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν καὶ τοὺς προγόνους φήμης ὡς θεοῦ μεγίστης βωμὸν ἱδρυμένους, καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον πολλάκις ἐν τῇ Ἰλιάδι λέγοντα πρὸ τοῦ τι τῶν μελλόντων γενέσθαι· «φήμη δ’ εἰς στρατὸν ἦλθε».

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knowledge.447 Already, in Aeschines’ speeches the foundation for this later application of the term can be detected. Like him, Epicurus, as discussed in the previous chapter, accepts both direct perceptions from the senses as valid criteria for knowledge,448 as well as common sense and generally recognized truths—which he calls preconceptions (προλήψεις). While Aeschines was no philosopher and gave no explanations for why public feelings and beliefs amounted to a clear basis for knowledge, his expression shows that these sentiments were very much part of the discourse in the mid-fourth century BCE—the very Zeitgeist that Epicurus found when he came to Athens by 307/6 BCE.449 In addition, theorists in rhetorical and literary circles seize upon the notion of enargēs and enargeia as a kind of mental vision, a seeing with the mind. According to this view, it is an effect of style and expression, which makes one’s claims clear and persuasive to an audience. It is to this use of enargeia that we now turn our gaze.

2. Enargeia in Ancient Literary Criticism

In the Hellenistic and Roman periods, literary criticism and rhetorical theory are virtually interchangeable; this is especially the case with the concept of enargeia.450 Therefore, the discussion of enargeia in this section is equally applicable to analysis of oratory and literature.

Indeed, we will apply such anaysis in the next chapters to close readings of the De rerum natura and the Aeneid. Both Lucretius and Virgil would have been exposed to these Hellenistic theories and they would then have implemented these procedures in their poems. While theorists of this period, no doubt, remained heavily influenced by Aristotle’s poetical and rhetorical works, as well as those of his student Theophrastus, it was the technical terminologies of the Stoics and

447 See discussion in chapter four. 448 Cf. Long (1986) 45. 449 See Dorandi (1999a) 43. 450 See, for instance, Woodman (1988) 84ff. in which he offers persuasive comments about the close link between rhetoric and literature in ancient thought (particularly in historiography).

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Epicureans that were seized upon by critics and transformed from epistemological criteria into literary figures. For instance, Hellenistic critics referred to Aristotle’s “placing before the eyes”

(pro ommattōn poiein) not only through the translation sub oculos subiectio, but also by the terms enargeia and phantasia.451 Atkins notes that Theophrastus “is quoted by both Dionysius of

Halicarnassus and Demetrius” as having stated “his definition of verbal beauty as that ‘which gives pleasure to the ear or the eye or has noble associations of its own’”.452 This notion of verbally “giv[ing] pleasure to the ear or the eye” was to pass into the literary discussions of the

Hellenistic and Imperial periods as a feature of vivid style and as a associated with enargeia. With this in mind, the literary concept of enargeia and ancient procedures for visualization will provide a framework for the close readings in the final two chapters.

We have already seen in the previous chapter how by the fourth century BCE enargēs, an adjective that had originally been a non-marked term referring to clarity or distinctness

(perspicuitas), became transformed into the concept enargeia, a technical and abstract notion in philosophy referring to the quality of self-evidence achieved through direct and incontrovertible sense perception (evidentia). It provided the basis for the criteria of truth proposed by Epicureans and Stoics and the foundation for all knowledge (epistēme/scientia). In these schools, the concept was also closely aligned with the theory of phantasia (Latin simulacra/visiones), which entailed that images or appearances were physically received by our eyes and retained as impressions in

451 e.g. Rhet. 1411b23 and 1412a10 (ἡ δ’ ἐνέργεια κίνησις), and Poetics 1455a22-6: Δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐναργέστατα [ὁ] ὁρῶν ὥσπερ παρ’ αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις εὑρίσκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν λανθάνοι [τὸ] τὰ ὑπεναντία. Note how Aristotle uses the superlative ἐναργέστατα in the excerpt from the Poetics, paving the way for the rhetorical theory of enargeia. For enargeia as sub oculos subiectio, see e.g. Cic. de Orat. 3.202 and Quint. Inst. 9.2.40ff.; cf. Otto (2009) 72, Lausberg (1998 [=21973]) §§319, 559, 680, and 810-13, and Zanker (1981) 298. See also Williams (1968) 634-81. 452 Atkins (1934) vol.1, 157.

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our minds (psychē in Greek or animus/anima in Latin).453 Material images, thus, form the basis of any claim to truth for both Epicureans and Stoics, as they offer a direct link between the outside world and the mind, one which both sides argue (albeit in different ways) is verifiable and produces true knowledge. Sheppard stresses how in ancient theories of the imagination, images are retained in the mind, not projected or created by it, arguing that, “ancient writers treat mental images as pictures in the mind, the mind reflecting images either from the word of sense- perception or, sometimes, from a higher, intelligible world”.454 The former theory clearly refers to the empirical approach of the Epicureans and Stoics, while the latter is that of middle- and neo-Platonists.455 Alongside these philosophical applications, however, we must also address how phantasia and enargeia emerge as technical terms in Hellenistic rhetorical and literary theory. In these fields the words denote life-like descriptions, which realistically present details of a scene or action to a reader/listener and which encourage him/her to imagine the verbalized subject as if “before the eyes” (ante oculos). While in philosophical theory, the concepts of enargeia and phantasia provide a material basis for knowledge, in rhetorical and literary circles, they come to have a figurative meaning, referring not to direct sense perception, but rather to visualization, a kind of seeing with the mind.

The close connection between rhetoric and philosophy goes back at least to the fifth century with the , the pre-Socratics, and Socrates, himself. This debate is mainly preserved for us in the dialogues of Plato.456 His Phaedrus argues in favor of a new kind of

453 For the animus/anima complex in Epicureanism, see Lucretius’ DRN books 3-4. The translation of phantasia as simulacra is also based on Lucretius, see chapter 6, while the translation as visiones comes from Quintilian, which is discussed below. 454 Sheppard (2014) 2. She compares this to a “refection in a mirror”, rather than “project[ing] its images outward onto the world, functioning like a lamp”, which is how she characterizes the theory of the imagination in Romantics like Wordsworth. 455 I restrict this study to the Stoics and Epicurean views, but for later Platonist views on phantasia and enargeia, see Sheppard (2014) and Mueller (1993). 456 In addition to the Phaedrus, see his Sophist, Parmenides, and .

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rhetoric, i.e. one that is not sophistical, but rather philosophical and that can grasp truth itself, not simply a likeness of truth.457 Aristotle goes even further in advocating the study of rhetoric (as well as poetry) as a technē, a skill that could be practiced and learned. In the Hellenistic period, as we saw in the previous chapter, Epicurus also wrote a work On Rhetoric, in which he named saphēneia as the sole requirement for proper expression.458 The Stoics too were active in the debates concerning literature and rhetoric, and wrote numerous works in these spheres. For instance, among the works of Zeno listed by Diogenes are the titles, On Style (Περὶ λέξεως), On the Reading of Poetry (Περὶ ποιητικῆς ἀκροάσεως), and five books on Homeric Problems

(Προβλημάτων Ὁμηρικῶν πέντε).459 All of this debate within philosophy and rhetoric would have encouraged a great deal of syncretism in the vocabulary of the different schools of thought, as each put forward their own theories concerning proper (and improper) language and expression.

One of the central concerns was the role of communicative clarity (saphēneia/ perspicuitas), a subject that was discussed in both philosophical and rhetorical contexts, as we have seen throughout this study. Nünlist distinguishes clarity (saphēneia) from graphic quality

(enargeia) based on the use of the terms in the Homeric scholia, showing that in these cases saphēneia implies functionality, while enargeia implies the use of subtle details and visuality.460

Cicero preserves testimony of the contentious arguments about style in the Hellenistic age and he

457 See Ferrari (1987) and Burger (1980). 458 DL 10.13. 459 DL 8.4. Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus are also noted by Diogenes for having written numerous tracts on logic in addition to works On Art, On Homer, On Education, among many others (DL 8.174-5, 189-202). It is very likely that many of these writings addressed the rhetorical and literary debates of the period and would also likely have made much of the terminology—e.g. phantasia, enargeia, etc.—part of the rhetorical/literary jargon. 460 Nünlist (2009) 197. He gives as his example the scholiasts comment on a line in the Iliad (school. bT Il. 415 ex.): “Take away the line, and you will not destroy its clarity, but you will take away its graphic quality [i.e. enargeia]…” This clarification is helpful to keep in mind.

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weighs in on these debates, himself.461 For him, the goal of all speech is persuasion (persuadere).

He argues that one can achieve this by means of three different strategies: by moving the audience (movere), by entertaining them (delectare), and by instructing them (docere).462 While

Cicero goes further than Epicurus in laying out the proper virtues of style by including not just clarity, but also propriety (decorum) and Latinitas, nevertheless these virtues are remarkably close to Epicurus’ stress on saphēneia. Indeed, Leeman notes that, “It is clear at once that the

Epicurean style was in fact up to the standard of these requirements. Cicero’s harsh judgment of its lack of delectatio and ornatus proves to be biassed [sic]”.463 In philosophy, he argues for a of “quiet indoor-conversation, sermo”, less emotional than the rhetoric of the forum, but also inspiring more delight than bare, philosophical treatises.464 While Epicurus’ writings— especially the fragments of On Nature preserved from Herculanean papyri—show that his predominant style was austere and difficult, we also see a clearer style in his letters, more rhetorical and easier to understand (and remember). It seems that this is closer to Cicero’s prescription for proper writing, that it be both clear and engaging. Nevertheless, he does acknowledge that Epicureans have, albeit rarely, achieved an appropriate style and he calls , in particular, the teacher of Philodemus, very sharp (acutissimus) and admits that he spoke “clearly, weightily, ornately”.465 From the evidence of Epicurus and from the titles of Stoic works, as well as the better preserved discussions of Plato and Aristotle before them, we can see how proper form and were an important area of debate within both philosophical

461 See, for instance, Orator 62-4, discussed in Leeman (1963) 203. 462 Leeman (1963) 203. We will see in the next chapter how Lucretius instructs his reader/student in the poem’s didaxis, however we will also note how he moves their emotions (i.e. movere) and engages their interest (delectare). 463 Ibid. 464 Ibid. As Cicero aligned himself with the , this seems perfectly in keeping with Plato’s preferred form of the philosophical dialogue, rather than the lecture-note treatises like Aristotle or the dense, esoteric writings of Epicurus and the Stoa. 465 Cic. ND 1.59: distincte, graviter, ornate. Cicero calls Philodemus acutissimus at TD 3.38. The reference and translation comes from Asmis (1992) 396. See also Asmis (1990) 2371.

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and rhetorical circles. By rendering enargeia into Latin as perspicuitas, Cicero is, thus, engaging in this debate and showing himself to be fully aware of the controversies.466 He gives his own opinion on the matter; while including clarity as a necessary virtue of style, he accepts the need for an orator to achieve an emotional impact on an audience through a more passionate style. To reach this goal, as we will see, it was important to make one’s presentation vivid, i.e. to render all details with precision so that the audience could imagine that they were seeing them directly.

Another ancient critic who preserves evidence of the literary concept of enargeia is

Dionysius of Halicarnassus. In his commentary on a speech of Lysias, he, in fact, provides the best definition for the term, defining it as, “an effect [δύναμίς] that conveys to one’s senses

[ὑπὸ τὰς αἰσθήσεις] the things described in words” and describing it as having the ability to make one “see [ὁρᾶν] the things that are clarified [τὰ δηλούμενα]”.467 Zanker defines it as, “the stylistic effect in which appeal is made to the senses of the listener and attendant circumstances are described in such a way that the listener will be turned into an eyewitness”.468 Other terms that are either synonymous or very closely associated with this effect include eidōlopoia

(literally, crafting images), hypotypōsis or diatypōsis (imprinting or stamping), and ekphrasis (in

Latin, it is translated as descriptio, evidentia, illustratio, repraesentatio, and sub oculos

466 Acad. 2.17. ...[some philosophers] maintained that those who tried to prove that there is something that can be grasped and perceived were acting unscientifically, because there was nothing clearer than enargeia (as the Greeks call it: let us term it perspicuity or evidence, if you will, and let us manufacture terms if necessary... eosque qui persuadere vellent esse aliquid quod conprehendi et percipi posset inscienter facere dicebant, propterea quod nihil esset clarius ἐναργείᾳ―ut Graeci, perspicuitatem aut evidentiam nos si placet nominemus fabricemurque si opus erit verba... The text and translation, slightly adapted, are from Rackham (1951). 467 Lys. 7; I.14,17 Us.-Rad.: ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐνάργειαν πολλὴν ἡ Λυσίου λέξις. αὕτη δ’ ἐστὶ δύναμίς τις ὑπὸ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἄγουσα τὰ λεγόμενα, γίγνεται δ’ ἐκ τῆς τῶν παρακολουθούντων λήψεως. ὁ δὴ προσέχων τὴν διάνοιαν τοῖς Λυσίου λόγοις οὐχ οὕτως ἔσται σκαιὸς ἢ δυσάρεστος ἢ βραδὺς τὸν νοῦν, ὃς οὐχ ὑπολήψεται γινόμενα τὰ δηλούμενα ὁρᾶν καὶ ὥσπερ παροῦσιν οἷς ἂν ὁ ῥήτωρ εἰσάγῃ προσώποις ὁμιλεῖν. 468 Zanker (1981) 297. Although the context for the definition comes from Dionysius’ comments on Lysias 7, enargeia, is nonetheless equally applicable to poetry, as Zanker argues and as chapter six of this study shows.

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subiectio).469 Reed notes how enargeia, “is closely related to ecphrasis and is often treated along with it or as a subspecies of it”.470 More in keeping with the ancient theories, however, would be to treat ekphrasis as a subspecies of enargeia, not the other way around (as is usually done).

Therefore, that is the way I discuss the two concepts below. By practicing this technique, rhetorical and literary critics argued that writers and readers could be transformed into viewers of images or phantasia.471 Enargeia, thus, became a vital tool for imagery in both descriptive and narrative passages, as writers crafted life-like scenes before the reader’s eyes, a technique that could be utilized in all genres of oratory and literature.472

As the treatise Ad Herrenium attests, this stylistic feature allows one to “express a subject in words to the point that the matters seem to be present before one’s eyes”.473 Thus the use of enargeia here achieves the same effect as Aristotle’s energeia, actualization, which he had treated under the heading of pro ommatōn poiein. It is a feature of several of the “virtues

(ἀρεταί) of style”, discussed by Aristotle, Theophrastus, the author of the Rhetorica ad

469 For this list, see Zanker (1981) 298. While these terms are often used synonymously with enargeia, this term actually predates them (sometimes by several centuries), so in many ways it is a more accurate label for the literary effect than later concepts like ekphrasis. See Zanker (2004) 172, which characterizes enargeia as being a “far more flexible” concept than ekphrasis and goes on to argue that, “As a term and concept to start from, ekphrasis …narrows the inquiry undesireably.” Atkins (1934) 265 and Webb (2009) 94 note illuminatio as an additional synonym for enargeia, for which Quintilian 8.2.31-2 (where he cites Cicero for this usage) supplies the evidence. Rowe (1997) 143 adds depictio and imaginatio. See also Lausberg (1998 [=21973]) §§810ff. For Cicero, see Innocenti (1994) and Vasaly (1993) passim. 470 Reed (2007) 30. 471 Zanker (1981) 305 argues that “φαντασία in its literary meaning of ‘visualization’ had come into vogue only in Ps.-Longinus’ day which appears to be at least later than the first century B.C.”. For phantasia, see especially Sheppard (2014 and 1991), Schofield (1992), Frede (1992), Silverman (1991), Feeney (1991) 51-2, and Watson (1988a, b). 472 Webb (1997b) 344 notes how “Homer and Virgil were cited alongside the historians as models”, for which she cites Theon, Progymnasmata, pp. 118-19” and “Quint. Inst. 8:3:63 [which] cites Virgil as a model of enargeia.” For discussion of enargeia/evidentia in historiography, see Woodman (1988) passim, Walker (1993), and Kraus (2010). For evidentia in the narrative of panegyric oratory, see Rees (2010) 108-15. For enargeia and rhetorical description in poetry, see Zanker (1981), Dubois (1982), and Reed (2007) especially 30-1. 473 Ad Herenn. 4.55.68: Demonstratio [i.e. enargeia] est cum ita verbis res exprimitur ut geri negotium et res ante oculos esse videatur. Id fieri poterit si quae ante et post et in ipsa re facta erunt conprehendemus, aut a rebus consequentibus aut circum instantibus non recedemus... See also Ad Herennium 4.51: Descriptio [i.e. enargeia] nominator quae rerum consequentium continent perspicuam et dilucidam cum gravitate expositionem… The Latin text for Ad Herenn. comes from Caplan (1954); the translation is my own. On the role of enargeia in both demonstratio and descriptio, see Zanker (1981) 298f., Montefusco (2005), and Berardi (2007).

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Herennium, and other critics. In particular, it is associated with “purity of language (to write

Greek, as Aristotle called it, which the Romans translated latinitas)”, as well as with

“ornamentation”, and especially with Aristotle’s (and Epicurus’) sine qua non of style, lucidity

(σαφήνεια, perspicuitas).474 Leeman recognizes the connection between enargeia, as a figure of thought (exornatio sententiarum), and clarity, a virtue of style. He argues based on the Rhetorica ad Herennium: “Clarity is an indispensable virtus dicendi in the orator, but it may also be heightened to ocular demonstration, demonstratio (sub oculos subiectio, ἐνάργεια), which is an exornatio”.475 This sort of vividness is more than a clear style in which logical order, proper syntax, and an understandable vocabulary are effectively employed; it also entails the creation of realistic descriptions, which appeal to the eyes, hence Leeman’s translation as “ocular demonstration”.476 Through enargeia, then, an audience’s visual sensation can be actualized in the mind through the descriptive power of words. Through this mental vision, the audience is transformed into an eyewitness, as though seeing the scenes or events described directly through autopsy.477 Rhetorical enargeia also appeals to evidence accessible by clear autopsy, but in these cases one accesses it not through vision, but through verbal descriptions. Like light illuminating obscure objects in the realm of the senses, words make clear what one cannot actually see.478

474 Grube (1965) 107. See also his discussion of Aristotle at 95ff. and of the virtues of style from 106-8. Note how Cicero praised the ornate writing of Zeno of Sidon, discussed above. 475 Leeman (1963) 39. Demonstratio strikes me as an odd way to translate enargeia, as it would more naturally correspond to Greek proofs, called apodeixeis. Nevertheless, the mental clarity offered by a proof would represent the same sort of vividness or self-evidence, which we discussed in the last chapter as evidentia, which the logical arguments of the Stoics and the empirical procedures of the Epicureans strived to achieve. 476 Cf. Squire (2009) 143 and Nünlist (2009) 197. 477 Webb (2009) 90, drawing upon the conclusions of Desbordes (1990), contends that “enargeia attempts to achieve the unattainable ideal of a judge who has witnessed the crime and thus can reach a decision that is certain and not subject to the vagaries of interpretation and probability”. 478 The light/dark imagery is often utilized by Lucretius as he seeks to make clear obscure things (DRN 1.136-7: obscura reperta …inlustrare) and “to display clear lights before your mind, whereby you may see into the heart of things hidden” (1.145-6: clara tuae possim praepandere lumina menti / res quibus occultas penitus convisere possis).

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But how exactly does one achieve this effect? For one, a writer can be extremely detailed in his descriptions of places, persons, and emotions, rendering them lifelike because of the specificity of the expression.479 The descriptive procedure of enargeia closely aligns it with the concept of ekphrasis, a term which, while popular in many recent studies, is actually not attested until Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the Imperial period.480 This effect also accounts for its Latin renderings as descriptio (description), illustratio (illustration), and repraesentatio

(representation).481 Ekphrastic descriptions often break away from a longer narrative either in epic or in prose (most famously, in Homer’s description of Achilles’ shield and Virgil’s description of Aeneas’). In other instances, an ekphrasis can even be turned into a poem in its own right (for example, Catullus 64 or Keats’ “Ode on a Grecian Urn”), in which a scene or object is described in lifelike detail. In the educational curriculum, students would have been taught these and would have practiced crafting vivid scenes as pedagogical exercises. Many of these are preserved in progymnasmata, “the ‘preliminary exercises’ which made up the elementary stage of instruction in schools of rhetoric”.482 While these only survive from the later Imperial period, they nevertheless illustrate how composing elaborate and realistic

479 See Lausberg (1998 [=21973]) 359ff. He decribes evidentia, i.e. enargeia, as “the vividly detailed depiction of a broadly conceived whole object …through the enumeration of (real or invented) observable details”. Cf. Nünlist (2009) 195-6. 480 LSJ 526, entry for ἔκφρασις. Note the synonymous meaning of the terms ekphrasis and enargeia in the definition for ἔκφρασις in LSJ as “description”. For studies of ἔκφρασις as an extended description of a piece of art in literature, see Webb (2009), Goldhill (2007), Putnam (1998), and Fowler (2000b). As an obvious example of the focus of modern critics on ekphrasis at the expense of enargeia, note that the former has an entry in the OCD (p. 495), while enargeia does not. The same applies to Hornblower and Spawforth (2004) The Oxford Companion to Classical Civilization (p. 253). 481 For instance, Webb (2009) 193 writes that, “The key to the nature and function of ekphrasis is its defining quality of enargeia, the vividness that makes absent things seems [sic] present by its appeal to the imagination. Though enargeia is used frequently in genres such as historiography and poetry, its effects can also be thoroughly rhetorical, helping the orator to involve his audience (and himself) emotionally and imaginatively in the subject of the speech and thus to promote their acceptance of the ideas he is putting forward.” 482 See OCD 1216. For dating of progymnasmata, see OCD entry. For ekphrasis in the progymnasmata, see Webb (2009).

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descriptions had become a vital piece of the curriculum in rhetorical schools by the first century

CE, a practice which likely was passed down from Hellenistic pedagogy.

Even in its rhetorical or literary mode, enargeia is a broader concept than realistic description or ekphrasis. Indeed, by extending one’s awareness of vividness to include not only the descriptions of objects or places, to which studies of ekphrasis usually restrict their focus, but also vivid phrases or visual vocabulary, which are included under the umbrella of enargeia, one can get a far better understanding of Hellenistic literary theory and its applications for reading subsequent Roman literature. While enargeia certainly can be seen in ekphrastic passages, such as the Cybele episode at DRN 2.598-660 or the Aeneid’s shield description in Book 8, it also embraces more subtle verbal manipulations that help the reader visualize whatever subject arises.483 For instance, one way to achieve vividness is through second person verbs, which dramatically engage the reader and force them to pay close attention.484 Similarly, a sudden shift in tense—e.g. from past to present—is also said to arouse the reader/listener, making it feel like one is “involved in the struggle”.485 Ps.-Demetrios 211ff., stresses how enargeia can be achieved through repetition, which “appeal[s] to the emotions rather than to the senses”.486 Visual words, even seemingly innocuous ones like Latin videtur (usually translated as “seem”, but also the passive or middle form of videre, “to see”), appeal to the readers’ sense of sight, often in very

483 On the Cybele passage, see Schrijvers (1970) 50ff., Ernout (1962 [=1925]) 294ff., and Bailey (1947) vol.2, 898ff., particularly his assessment on p.899 of how Lucretius “[d]etail by detail… works out his allegorical interpretation of the conception of Cybele and her worship”. On ekphrasis in the Aeneid, see Fowler (2000b [=1991]), Putnam (1998), Barchiesi (1997), Boyd (1995), and West (1975-1976). 484 See, for instance, [Longinus] Subl. 26.2. Note also Lausberg’s comment (1998 [=21973]) 241 that, perspicuitas, i.e. enargeia, “is …useful in cases where the auditor is not entirely attentus”. Atkins (1934) vol.2, 269 also recognizes the importance of enargeia for “compell[ing] attention by its vivid pictures”. See also Sheppard (2014) 34ff. 485 See [Longinus] Subl. 25. and Quint. 9.2.40-3, discussed by Sheppard (2014) 34 as “[t]echniques and effects of realism”. For the theory of enargeia in Quintilian (and Longinus), see Dross (2004) and Cockcraft (1998). 486 Zanker (1981) 298. I will discuss the importance of repetition for creating enargeia in my close reading of the DRN in the next chapter.

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subtle ways.487 Similarly, we read that the auditory impact of words can also help to achieve enargeia, as Ps.-Demetrius argues: “Harsh collocations of sound also contribute to vividness,

…For every imitation (of sound) is vivid to some extent.”488 In these cases, the translation as

‘description’ fails to capture the nuances of the practice of enargeia according to these ancient theories; the dynamism and emotional resonance of this technique is often lacking from the kind of passages that we label as ekphrasis. By paying attention to these subtleties, in addition to descriptive realism, we can be on much firmer ground in our evaluations of the practices of ancient writers and the interpretations of their readers.

As we saw from our discussion of the Poetics in chapter three, we could already see in

Aristotle the seeds of literary and rhetorical theories of how to transform a listener into a viewer—what would later be assigned the technical names of enargeia or phantasia. He writes:

In constructing the plot and working it out with the proper diction, the poet should place the scene, as far as possible, before his eyes [πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον]. In this way, seeing everything with the utmost vividness [οὕτω …ἐναργέστατα], as if he were a spectator [ὁρῶν] of the action, he will discover what is in keeping with it, and be most unlikely to overlook inconsistencies.489

The writer must constantly keep an “eye” on his subject, “viewing” it to see whether it is realistic and possesses verisimilitude both for himself and for his audience. In On the Sublime attributed to Longinus, the procedure, however, is called phantasia or enargeia, terms which were not employed by Aristotle in this manner, but which the rhetorical schools had adapted from the

487 We will see in the next chapter how Lucretius capitalizes on the visual vividness of videtur. 488 Demetr. Eloc. 219. Κακοφωνία δὲ πολλάκις, ὡς τὸ κόπτ’, ἐκ δ’ ἐγκέφαλος, καὶ πολλὰ δ’ ἄναντα, κάταντα· μεμίμηται γὰρ τῇ κακοφωνίᾳ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν· πᾶσα δὲ μίμησις ἐναργές τι ἔχει. The Greek text for Ps.-Demetrius On Style comes from Rademacher (1901); translation from Grube (1961) 110. On the use of sound (and silence) in Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum as an example of rhetorical enargeia, see Kraus (2010). 489 Poet. 1455a22-6: Δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐναργέστατα [ὁ] ὁρῶν ὥσπερ παρ’ αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις εὑρίσκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα ἂν λανθάνοι [τὸ] τὰ ὑπεναντία. Greek text for Poetics is that of Kassel (1965). The English translations are those of Butcher (1951), unless otherwise noted. On the precise wording of this passage, see Sifakis (2009).

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vocabulary of Hellenistic philosophers.490 This work argues that phantasia takes place, “in cases where, carried away by enthusiasm and passion, you think you see what you describe, and you place it before the eyes of your hearers”.491 Webb comments that this definition describes, “a two-fold process whereby the orator himself visualizes his subject-matter and thereby makes his audience see it through his words”.492 Arieti and Crossett comment that, “Longinus carefully follows Aristotle here (Poetics 1455a22)”, who also has a two-fold process for composer and audience.493 It is the same process of visualization for both reader and writer, a theory which

Hermogenes’ Progymnasmata also preserves. Squires sums up this view:

For Hermogenes, the two chief ‘virtues’ (aretai) of an ecphrasis were the vividness (enargeia) and clarity (saphēneia) of the description: it was through these elements, it seems, that a reader could be expected to arrive at the same inner vision—the same phantasia—that the scene or object had originally brought to the mind’s eye of the speaker.494

Just as the writer must view an imagined scene before his/her mind’s eye, so too through realistic description, i.e. phantasia or enargeia, he can he bring before a reader’s/listener’s eyes the same

490 Cf. Kennedy’s (1966) 355 assessment of On the Sublime as a “work of Greek criticism, with a remarkably philosophical breadth of vision”. See also Dross (2004). 491 Subl. 15.1. The translation is from Roberts (1907). The dating for Ps.-Longinus’ treatise is notoriously difficult, however it is usually dated to the first century CE, see OCD 858, Obbink (2002) 102-3, Arietti and Crossett (1985) ix-xi, Russell and Winterbottom (1972) 461, and Roberts (1907) 1-23. Whatever the case, the work assuredly preserves terminology and theory from the Hellenistic period. 492 Webb (1997) 117. Cf. also Webb (2009) 94-6 and Sheppard (2014) 19: “Phantasia …is connected explicitly with visualization by the writer and the recreation of such visualization in the audience”. 493 Arieti and Crossett (1985) 87. For more on this passage in Aristotle, see my discussion in §2, chapter three. In addition, the Homeric scholia preserve evidence of this same theory of visualization, called phantasia, which Schlunk (1974) 41-2 notes “occurs frequently in the scholia”. Moreover, he argues that the purpose of this procedure “is …to stimulate the “inner vision” and so to create as vivid and as striking an effect as possible upon the reader”. 494 Squires (2009) 143. Hermog. Prog. 10.23-8: Ἀρεταὶ δὲ ἐκφράσεως μάλιστα μὲν σαφήνεια καὶ ἐνάργεια· δεῖ γὰρ τὴν ἑρμηνείαν διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς σχεδὸν τὴν ὄψιν μηχανᾶσθαι. ἔτι μέντοι συνεξομοιοῦσθαι τὰ τῆς φράσεως ὀφείλει τοῖς πράγμασιν· ἂν ἀνθηρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἔστω καὶ ἡ λέξις τοιαύτη, ἂν αὐχμηρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἔστω καὶ ἡ λέξις παραπλησία. The Greek text is from Rabe (1913). Cf. Webb (2009) 96: “Both Quintilian and ps.-Longinus write as if vivid language can actually give access to the mind which gave rise to it. That is, if enargeia arises from mental images, it must be possible to work back up the chain and to reconstruct the creative process, or rather the original mental image which gave rise to the words that prompt the reader’s own mental image” [my italics]. Both Webb and Schlunk fall short of linking this conception to Epicurean and Stoic theories of self-evidence (enargeia), as I do below.

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imagined scene.495 Writer and audience thereby engage in a sort of participatory act of viewing and even emotion—a sympathy—in which they also experience the same sense-impressions as one another.496

The stress on how enargeia or phantasia excites mental images in both the reader and writer also ties this ancient theory to more modern visual theories, particularly that of focalization.497 Reed emphasizes this link in arguing that:

The alternative to focalization-as-solution …is to remember the status of focalization as a trope of enargeia and accept that the explicit viewer shares a gaze with an implied viewer… Focalization should be understood not as identity between the narrative attitude and the focalizing character, but as a more indirect relationship: in a word, rhetorically.498

This argument is well attuned to the issues involved in visualization, for reader, writer, and inscribed characters.499 Enargeia allows readers to see a scene as if before his/her eyes; it allows them to sympathize by viewing what the narrated characters see; finally, it also allows them to see what the writer saw and visualized during the composition of the text. Thus, this rhetorical trope draws the reader into a participatory engagement with the text, making one stand ‘in the shoes’ of the character(s), so to speak, and to see through another’s eyes.500 In the next chapter, I

495 See Webb (2009) 114, who stresses how through enargeia, “language serves as the medium by which phantasiai are communicated from the speaker’s mind to that of the listener”. Nevertheless, for philosophical comparanda, Webb only addresses the views of the Stoics on this topic, neglecting the Epicurean concept of enargeia, which will play an important role in our reading of Lucretius and Vigil in the next chapters. 496 On sympathy between writer and audience, see especially Conte (2007), which treats Virgil’s style and argues that (p. 61), “every single means of communication bears impressed upon it the constant participation of the poet’s I in the narrative of the facts: a mental and emotional presence which is always alert, an active sympatheia which the author imposes upon himself and demands in response from his reader.” While Conte’s analysis is specific to Virgil, it is also applicable to the use of enargeia in activating phantasia and pathē in writer and audience. 497 On focalization, see especially Fowler (2000a) and Reed (2007) passim. 498 Reed (2007) 31. Reed’s comments are specifically addressed to the Aeneid, but like Conte’s they can be applied equally well to the role of enargeia in other rhetorical and literary contexts. 499 Cf. Webb (2009) 97, who does not address the issue of focalization, specifically, but argues that in Quintilian and Ps.-Longinus, “the evocation of a character’s perceptions… plays a vital role.” 500 Zanker (2004) 9 speaks of “audience participation” as being “vital to any attempt to reconstruct Hellenistic approaches to the acts of viewing and imaging in both poetry and art”.

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will argue that in Lucretius it also allows both reader and writer to participate in a visual pedagogy, seeing what the other sees and viewing the same images before their eyes.

Along with focalization, enargeia can also be utilized to go beyond mere description and vision—reifying intangible or even invisible realities.501 For instance, Ps.-Longinus’ treatise, On the Sublime, explicitly links phantasia, enargeia, and visualization with sublimity (ὕψος), a sense of majesty that is ultimately beyond one’s expression or even total comprehension.502

Conte argues that in Ps.-Longinus, “The sublime, so far from being an ineffable quality, is entrusted to expressive techniques and becomes visible by means of them.”503 It is precisely this visibility that enargeia helps to achieve. From our survey of the history of the terms enargēs and enargeia in the archaic and classical periods, we have already seen how vividness often can convey things divine, which surpass sense perception. Recall, for instance, from the first section of chapter two, the dream of Penelope which brought her comfort, while at the same time did not reveal to her the entire fate of her husband. She experiences a divine intervention, yet she does not fully grasp its ramifications; yet at the same time, she takes solace in the advice and the experience. Similarly, in the Platonic passage from the Phaedrus discussed in chapter four, vividness was linked with a vision of the form of Beauty. This is not simply human vision, but rather a divine sort of gaze that can see even abstract concepts like truth (τὴν ἀλήθειαν) and the forms (κατ’ εἶδος) directly. It is a similar sort of sublimity, which has passed on into the rhetorical concept of enargeia in the Hellenistic period and is preserved by Ps.-Longinus. By practicing enargeia and “placing before one’s eyes”, writers can make people see events that

501 Cf. Zanker (2004) 9, which notes, drawing on the assessment of Fritz Graf (1995) “Ekphrasis: Die Entstehung der Gattung in der Antike”, that, “Dio Chrysostom (12.55-83) prized ἐναργεία ...as a means whereby poetry could outstrip art, since it allows the mind to tolerate an unreal subject like the figure of described by Homer at Iliad 4.442-43, in a way in which an artist could never hope to succeed.” 502 Sheppard (2014) 94, quoting Warnock’s (1976) description of the sublime, argues that through phantasia, “imaginatively we are ‘reaching out towards what imagination cannot comprehend’”. 503 Conte (2007) 67.

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they were not or could not be present at—e.g. in oratory or historiography, the past, present, and future all become viewable 504 —and even can transform them into viewers of invisible substances—e.g. for Lucretius, of atoms and void—which would not be accessible solely through the sense organs.505 It is not surprising, then, that writers who present impossible-to-see events and subjects like Lucretius and, subsequently, Virgil, would utilize this practice to engage the reader and to make him/her see the scenes for themselves.

The precise goal(s), the telos, of this procedure is articulated in different ways in the various sources, including the ancient scholia, rhetorical handbooks, and commentaries.506 The writer of On the Sublime argues that the aim of phantasia or “image-production [εἰδωλοποιία]” is “astonishment (ἔκπληξις) for poetry and vividness (ἐναργεία) for oratory”.507 By seeing with the mind, one’s emotions and enthusiasm become aroused (Subl. 15.1: ὑπ’ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ

πάθους), just as if one were actually present and witnessing the scene directly with one’s sensory capacities.508 The effect of visualization on the emotions (πάθη) is stressed by the ancient critics, who describe why writers craft realistic imagery.509 The evidence for how this procedure was applied survives mainly from writings that post-date the Hellenistic period; yet these texts were assuredly influenced by Hellenistic theory, which they also preserve some of the

504 Cf. the meditative practice of Marcus Aurelius discussed in §2, chapter four. 505 Cf. Webb (2009) 100ff., who notes the passage in Quint. 9.2.41, in which he describes the ability of vividness “to make an audience feel present at past and future events, this effect is called ‘translatio temporum, or, in Greek, matastasis or metathesis (a ‘transference [of time]’). See also Leigh (2004). 506 It is called a τέλος at Subl. 15.2. 507 Subl. 15.2. ὡς δ’ ἕτερόν τι ἡ ῥητορικὴ φαντασία βούλεται καὶ ἕτερον ἡ παρὰ ποιηταῖς οὐκ ἂν λάθοι σε, οὐδ’ ὅτι τῆς μὲν ἐν ποιήσει τέλος ἐστὶν ἔκπληξις, τῆς δ’ ἐν λόγοις ἐνάργεια, ἀμφότεραι δ’ ὅμως τό τε <παθητικὸν> ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ τὸ συγκεκινημένον. On this passage, see Webb (1997a) 117ff. and (1997b) 344. For discussion of ekplēxis, the ‘thrill of shock’, see also Feeney (1991) 28, 52. All Greek text for [Longinus] On the Sublime is from Russell (1964). 508 For the link between phantasia and enthusiastic inspiration, see especially Sheppard (2014) 82ff., which mainly focuses on the interaction between these concepts in Neoplatonist sources, but also provides discussion on the development of this link. 509 For the passions, see especially Subl. 8. The view that poetry and art stir up an audience’s emotions goes back, at least, to Plato. Cf. Sheppard (2014) 6: “Plato always stresses that the artist does not have knowledge, even when he allows that artistic success may be due to inspiration; it follows that art deals in images and appearances and appeals not to any rational part of the soul but to the emotions”.

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best evidence for. For instance, while Quintilian is obviously later than the Hellenistic age, he encourages orators and students of rhetoric to craft vivid descriptions, which will excite an audience’s emotions, arguing that (6.2.29):

The person who will show the greatest power in the expression of emotions [in adfectibus] will be the person who has properly formed what the Greeks call phantasiai (let us call them “visions” [visiones]), by which the images of absent things are presented (repraesentantur) to the mind in such a way that we seem actually to see them with our eyes [cernere oculis] and have them physically present to us [praesentes habere].510

Sheppard notes that in this passage, “Quintilian …uses the term phantasia not of the ability to visualize but of the images called up by such an ability, declaring that the orator who is most effective in moving his audience will be the one who has a good stock of what the Greeks call phantasiai and the Romans call visiones”.511 Quintilian concludes (6.2.32): “The result [of this procedure] will be enargeia, …a quality which makes us seem not so much to be talking about something as exhibiting it. Emotions will ensue just as if we were present at the event itself”.512

Thus, enargeia is, for him, the telos of any description, as the vividness renders the audience a viewer of or even a participant in a described scene. The reader/listener shares the emotions of characters in the described scene or . Indeed, they also share in the images of the writer who places the same images before his/her eyes during the writing process. Meijering argues that, “In principle the stirring of emotions is not the primary object of a proper historian, but in practice he will inevitably have to take account of the πάθη that accompanied the events he is describing. It is his duty besides factual history also to convey the emotional aspect of the

510 Inst. 6.2.29: Quas φαντασίας Graeci vocant (nos sane visiones appelemus), per quas imagines rerum absentium ita repraesentantur animo ut eas cernere oculis ac praesentes habere videamur, has quisquis bene ceperit is erit in adfectibus potentissimus. The texts and translation for Quintilian are from Russell (2001). 511 Sheppard (2014) 27. See also Webb (2010) 88ff. for “Enargeia in Quintilian”. 512 Inst. 6.2.32: Insequitur ἐνάργεια, quae a Cicerone inlustratio et evidentia nominator, quae non tam dicere videtur quam ostendere, et adfectus non aliter quam si rebus ipsis intersimus. Cf. Webb (1997) 114, which argues that, “For Quintilian, the power of language to arouse pathos is vital to [the] immediate, even intimate, communication between speaker and listener.” See also Atkins (1934) Vol. 2, 264ff.

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past.”513 This applies equally well to poetry.514 By making not only the bare facts of a description life-like, but also the emotions, a writer engages the reader in the work. One can then do more than just see that the evidence is true, but also feel it.

On the Sublime also preserves testimony about the importance of visualization for creating “grandeur, magnificence and urgency”, all of which contribute to the emotional effect of sublimity.515 The word used in the treatise for visualization is phantasia, which the writer also notes is “what some people call image-production [εἰδωλοποιία]”. 516 Like Ps.-Longinus,

Plutarch explicitly compares the emotional charge of vivid writing, in particular in historiography, to the effect of painters, arguing (de Gloria Atheniensium 346f4-47a5):

Simonides …calls painting inarticulate poetry and poetry articulate painting: for the actions which painters portray as taking place at the moment literature narrates and records after they have taken place. …[T]he underlying end and aim [τέλος] of both is one and the same; the most effective historian is he who, by a vivid representation of emotions and characters, makes his narration like a painting.517

Like Ps.-Longinus, Plutarch also calls the technique eidōlopoia, what we might translate simply as ‘creating imagery’. He goes on to comment on its effect of bringing about enargeia, which he notes Thucydides is particularly adept at causing in his readers.518 As in rhetorical circles, this literary effect of enargeia refers to highly realistic descriptions, which play on the audience’s

513 Meijering (1987) 31. 514 Note that Meijering’s monograph (1987) addresses poetry, not historiography, as its subject. Nünlist (2009) 194-8 also addresses the use of the concept in the Homeric scholia. 515 [Longinus] Subl. 15.1. All translations for On the Sublime come from Russell and Winterbottom (1972). 516 Subl. 15.1-3. Ὄγκου καὶ μεγαληγορίας καὶ ἀγῶνος ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ νεανία, καὶ αἱ φαντασίαι παρασκευαστικώταται· οὕτω γοῦν <ἡμεῖς>, εἰδωλοποιίας <δ’> αὐτὰς ἔνιοι λέγουσι· 517 Plut. De glor. Ath. 346e4-47a5: Πλὴν ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν μὲν ζωγραφίαν ποίησιν σιωπῶσαν προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ ποίησιν ζωγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν. ἃς γὰρ οἱ ζωγράφοι πράξεις ὡς γινομένας δεικνύουσι, ταύτας οἱ λόγοι γεγενημένας διηγοῦνται καὶ συγγράφουσιν. | εἰ δ’ οἱ μὲν χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασιν οἱ δ’ ὀνόμασι καὶ λέξεσι ταὐτὰ δηλοῦσιν, ὕλῃ καὶ τρόποις μιμήσεως διαφέρουσι, τέλος δ’ ἀμφοτέροις ἓν ὑπόκειται, καὶ τῶν ἱστορικῶν κράτιστος ὁ τὴν διήγησιν ὥσπερ γραφὴν πάθεσι καὶ προσώποις εἰδωλοποιήσας. On this passage, see Sheppard (2014) 29ff. The Greek text is that of Nachstädt (1971 [=1935]), translation by Babbitt (1936), quoted in Sheppard (2014) 29-30. 518 Plut. De glor. Ath. 347a5-9:ὁ γοῦν Θουκυδίδης ἀεὶ τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς ταύτην ἁμιλλᾶται τὴν ἐνάργειαν, οἷον θεατὴν ποιῆσαι τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ γινόμενα περὶ τοὺς ὁρῶντας ἐκπληκτικὰ καὶ ταρακτικὰ πάθη τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν ἐνεργάσασθαι λιχνευόμενος. For more on imagery, see Squire (2009), Zanker (1990), West (1969), Pöschl (1962), and Pope (1949).

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emotions as they visualize the scene in their minds. But Plutarch is also a Platonist philosopher, so the value of enargeia also has an evidential aspect, as it also does for the Stoics and

Epicureans.519

It is important to recognize precisely where these rhetorical or literary discussions are taking their vocabulary—i.e. from philosophy, particularly that of the Hellenistic period. While

Sheppard notes that it is Plato who first used the term phantasia, it became more formalized in the writings of Aristotle and eventually emerged as a fully technical concept in Stoicism and

Epicureanism.520 The use of phantasiai, which Quintilian calls visiones, as a mental stock of images, is derived from Epicurean and Stoic jargon, not from Plato or Aristotle.521 In these schools, phantasia refers to a material image or impression.522 These impressions can be both exterior, received through the senses, or interior, located within the mind. In On the Sublime, the writer provides an analysis of the rhetorical usage of the word which draws upon these philosophical notions, stating:

In a general way the name of image or imagination [φαντασία] is applied to every idea [ἐννόημα] of the mind, in whatever form it presents itself, which gives birth to speech. But at the present day the word is predominantly used in cases where, carried away by enthusiasm and passion, you think you see [βλέπειν] what you describe, and you place it before the eyes [ὑπ’ ὄψιν] of your hearers.523

Russell comments that the first part of this sentence is “[a] Stoic definition” of phantasia, but from the evidence we have discussed, it is also clear that the Epicurean view of impressions and the Aristotelian practice of “placing before the eyes” has also left an impact on the term’s

519 See Mueller (1993) and Zanker (1981) 311. 520 Sheppard (2014) 2. 521 See chapter four. 522 On Stoic phantasia, see especially L&S 39B and 39A, and for discussion, Frede, M. (1983) and Sandbach (1971a). 523 [Longinus] Subl. 15.1: καλεῖται μὲν γὰρ κοινῶς φαντασία πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν ἐννόημα γεννητικὸν λόγου παριστάμενον· ἤδη δ’ ἐπὶ τούτων κεκράτηκε τοὔνομα ὅταν ἃ λέγεις ὑπ’ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ καὶ πάθους βλέπειν δοκῇς καὶ ὑπ’ ὄψιν τιθῇς τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. The translation is from Roberts (1907); the italics are my own.

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meaning. 524 Rhetorical theorists, therefore, can be recognized for having appropriated the vocabulary, including phantasia, from Stoics and Epicureans, utilizing it to refer to the

“conjuring up of images”—the origin of the English ‘’.525 Enargeia was similarly re- contextualized and came to be defined, as we have seen, as the stylistic effect of visualization, i.e. a lifelike view of a scene as if before one’s eyes, achieved through a highly realistic description. Thus, both enargeia and phantasia remain closely connected with one another, even being used interchangeably, but are adapted to fit a new context separate from epistemology. In these fields, they represent an effect of style [Greek, lexis], used to achieve literary or rhetorical realism and verisimilitude along with powerful emotional effects.

As we saw in chapter four, Epicurus names perceptions, αἰσθήσεις, and feelings/ emotions, πάθη, as two of his criteria of truth, the foundations for all judgment and inferences.

These were said to be critical tools, because they grasped clear evidence (enargeia) directly from atomic contacts with the sense organs and because they, themselves, were self-evident. On the other hand, the Stoics too asserted phantasia to be central to the mechanism by which the soul becomes imprinted or modified from the outside world and through which it can achieve a firm grasp of reality.526 Indeed, Long states, “Phantasia is the most basic faculty of the Stoic soul. In its simplest form it is the way the soul is imprinted by the information it receives via the five senses.”527 Recall also Aetius’ Stoic definition of phantasia as “an affection [pathos] occurring in the soul, which reveals itself [endeiknumenon hauto] and its cause [to pepoiȇkos]”.528 From our discussion of the rhetorical uses of these words, we can note how these concepts have

524 Russell and Winterbottom (1972) 477. For the link with Aristotle, cf. the analysis in Arieti and Crossett (1985) 87. 525 On how phantasia became fantasy, see Watson (1988a). 526 Recall from chapter four that both Stoics and Epicureans speak of impressions being stamped in the soul like a signet ring, calling it a τύπος. Similar to enargeia and phantasia, the term typos, was also introduced into rhetorical theory, as a term for descriptions (e.g. hypotypōsis/diatypōsis). 527 Long (2006f) 242. 528 L&S 39B.

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transformed to become far more figurative in their denotations. Instead of Epicurean atomic collisions, which arouse sensations and feelings, or Stoic phantasia, which reveal themselves and their cause, the literary concepts of phantasia and enargeia describe the arousing of purely mental, not physical, images. In the end, however, these theories are very close to one another.

Images, i.e. phantasiai, if aroused in the mind of the writer—whether mental or from direct autopsy—are the same as those in the reader, provided that the description is clear and accurate, i.e. if it achieves the effect of enargeia.529 Like the physical mechanisms of the philosophers, these too have an impact on the mind and can influence the emotions of the audience. While literary critics and rhetorical theorists avoid pursuing the physical ramifications of these theories any further, we can see that the concepts have only slightly shifted—from something sensory and/or mental in the Epicurean and Stoic treatments, to something entirely mental in the rhetorical/literary theory. Whereas both philosophies addressed the importance of direct empirical sensation for knowing truth, the literary theorists speak of the ability of words to make one seem to be examining something directly, even if one is really only reading or listening to its description.

Ultimately, the difference between philosophical and rhetorical enargeia is the absence or presence of illusion, respectively. Webb argues, “whether in poetry, rhetoric or historiography, whether it represents credible or incredible things, verbally produced enargeia is always a matter of illusion.”530 Rhetorical enargeia creates the illusion of being present or ‘as if’ seeing, while one is truly only hearing or reading words. She sums this up by asserting, “ekphrasis and enargeia are concerned with verisimilitude, not truth.”531 While this assessment is quite right about rhetorical enargeia, certainly from a modern perspective, it nevertheless falls short of

529 See Squire (2009) 143. 530 Webb (2009) 103. 531 Webb (2009) 117 n.35.

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capturing the power of enargeia from an ancient philosophical standpoint and slightly misrepresents the literary theorists’ views—particularly as both reader and writer see the same images as one another. In both Epicureanism and Stoicism, whatever is self-evident or vivid— enargēs—is also assuredly true. Both schools addressed the nature of truth through their various criteria and strongly asserted the ability of humans to know truth. Of central importance for knowing truth was enargeia and the physical impact of images, phantasia. And indeed, they also addressed the ability of humans to learn what is true and to keep it before one’s eyes through constant reference to the self-evident. Through rhetorical exercises, which become a kind of therapy, we can constantly keep what is true “before our eyes”. It is this view of enargeia—one that combines philosophy and rhetoric—that paves the way for the interplay between vivid description in writers like Lucretius and the evidence they appeal to. As we will see in the next chapter, by rhetorically employing enargeia, Lucretius encourages his readers to examine their own sensations and to see proof, i.e. self-evidence, all around them for the truth of Epicurean philosophy. In this case, there is no illusion involved. The rhetoric and the epistemic qualities of enargeia become (re-)integrated with one another. We can also see complementary evidence of this procedure in the therapeutic practice of “placing before the eyes” found in Philodemus to which we now turn.

3. Philodemus, Epicurean Pedagogy, and the Therapy of “Placing before the Eyes”

So far, we have seen how enargeia becomes an important term in both rhetorical and literary circles by the first century BCE in addition to its already vital role in Hellenistic epistemology. Philodemus offers us another piece of instructive evidence, contemporaraneous

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with Lucretius, for the role of visualization in Epicurean rhetoric and didactic.532 It is also certain that he had a personal relationship with Virgil, even making him a dedicatee of his On Vices and

Virtues.533 Therefore, when we notice rhetorical procedures that are implemented or encouraged by Philodemus, we are also on solid ground in looking for Virgilian intertexts and similar literary practices in his works. While Philodemus, in many ways, modernizes Epicureanism and engages in debates with other schools (especially the Stoics) as well as within his own school, he nonetheless remains committed to the teachings of Epicurus and the other founders of the

Epicurean kepos (Metrodorus, , and Polyaenus).534 His fragmentary treatises often exhibit the procedure of “placing before the eyes” (what we would call visualization). This practice becomes a form of Epicurean therapy and pedagogy. Through it, we can remove improper reasoning and learn to behave ethically and reason appropriately. 535 In order to illustrate this technique, I examine how Philodemus calls for teachers to utilize candid speech didactically in order to place before a student’s eyes right and wrong behavior in his On Frank

Criticism and how he encourages one to visualize the outcomes of one’s behavior as a piece of

Epicurean therapy in his On Anger. While he does not specifically call these procedures enargeia

(or phantasia) in the manner of the rhetorical and literary critics discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, it will become clear that his process of visualization is very similar to

532 For helpful discussion of Philodemus’ life, works, and philosophy, see Gaines (2005), the introduction to Sider (1997) and Asmis (1990). 533 For Virgil as an addressee of this work, see Janko (2000) 6 and Gigante (1995) 44-7, 64. For Virgil and Philodemus, see Tait (1941), Cairns (1989), Galinsky (1988, 1994, 1997), Erler (1992), Obbink, ed. (1995), Fowler (1997b), and Armstrong, Fish, Skinner and Johnston, eds. (2004). In my concluding chapter where I explore further avenues of study for enargeia, I will comment on Epicurean visualization in the end of the Aeneid. 534 On Philodemus as a modernizer of Epicurean thought, see Erler (1992b). On the founders and organization of Epicurean schools, see DeWitt (1954) 70-120. Asmis (1990) 2378 argues that, “Throughout his writings, Philodemus depicts Epicurus and his closest associates, particularly Metrodorus, Hermarchus and Polyaenus, as leaders (καθηγεμόνες, καθηγηταί) whose lives and doctrines provide a standard from which their followers should not deviate. Although Philodemus feels free to add new considerations and explore new areas, he is severe against those Epicureans whom he perceives to be misinterpreting Epicurus and abandoning his teachings.” 535 For the procedures of Epicurean therapy, see Nussbaum (1986a) and Armstrong (1993) 193ff.

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and, indeed, directly influenced by these rhetorical and literary theories. Furthermore, his method of visualization, like Lucretius’, is also consistent with Epicurus’ teachings.536

On Frank Criticism serves as a manual, of a kind, for proper Epicurean pedagogy. While the text is fragmentary, we can nevertheless glean from it Philodemus’ engagement with the rhetorical debates of the period and display of his own practical procedures for educational instruction. Recall from the previous section how ocular demonstration (pro ommatōn poiein, demonstratio, sub oculos subiectio) and clarity (saphēneia) had become important concepts in

Hellenistic rhetorical theory, and, moreover, had been incorporated into the practice of enargeia, vividness. This sort of vividness, in which one imagines or visualizes an action or a subject as if it were present, emerged as a vital component of rhetoric and literature, and it was often remarked upon by the theorists and critics of the age. Philodemus also engages with this topic, however he stresses the importance of visualization not for its own sake—as in the procedure of ekphrasis—nor for the sake of emotional resonance—as discussed in Ps.-Longinus and

Quintilian—but rather for the sake of education. By placing before a student’s eyes proper or improper behavior (or reasoning), Philodemus claims, a teacher can check a student’s behavior and keep them on a proper course. Like the rhetorical and literary theorists, he links visualization with the emotions (pathē), but in his technique, visualization does not arouse emotions, but instead it helps to alter them and to keep them within proper boundaries.537

While Epicureans, unlike the Stoics, accept certain feelings, most importantly pleasure, to be proper and “natural”, they also argue that excessive emotions should be checked and limited because they involve improper reasoning (e.g. according to them, excessive anger or fear are

536 For these, see chapter four. 537 On pathē in Philodemus, see Konstan (2006) 203-5.

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wrong because they show that one values honor or life more than they deserve).538 Armstrong defines Philodemus’ use of natural as meaning, “worthy of acceptance by a human being” and as being “produced by a correct understanding that some state of affairs is true; they are not mere first reactions as with the Stoics.”539 This is especially important as it means that emotions like anger have a direct relationship with the world and they are based on self-evident truths, i.e. on

(empirical) enargeia. Therefore, in contrast to the Stoics, the Epicureans accept emotions such as anger to be both necessary and natural.

Socrates’ famous dictum ‘no one does wrong willingly’ (Grg. 59e5-6, μηδένα

βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν) resonates with an idealistic strain in the Epicurean view, in which they accept the principle that if one should know that a particular action were wrong, one would never do it.540 For Epicurus, people’s wrong behavior is the result of improper reasoning and false beliefs; by learning how to reason properly—basing one’s evaluations only on the clear evidence of the senses, i.e. enargeia, and on the telos of human happiness, pleasure (hedonē/voluptas)— one’s behavior and judgments will also be right.541 For him, emotions (pathē) involve both cognitive (i.e. judgment) and non-cognitive components (sense-perception, pleasure/pain).542 By keeping one’s evaluative procedures (one’s epilogismos) attuned to the criteria of truth, one’s

538 For Stoic rejection of emotions and therapies to remedy them, see especially Krentz (2008), Knuutilla (2004) 47-80. For the acceptance of anger as a “natural” emotion in Epicureanism, see Tsouna (2007 and 2011), Asmis (2011), Armstrong (2008), Knututilla (2004) 80-7, Fowler (1997b), Procopé (1993), and Galinsky (1988, 1994, 1997). Konstan (2006) argues for a distinction between katastemic feelings (pathē) like pain/pleasure, which are non-cognitive, and emotions like anger and fear, which involve a rational distinction and opinion. 539 Armstrong (2008) 83. 540 Pl. Grg. 509e: τί οὐκ αὐτό γέ μοι τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, πότερόν σοι δοκοῦμεν ὀρθῶς ἀναγκασθῆναι ὁμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ Πῶλος ἢ οὔ, ἡνίκα ὡμολογήσαμεν μηδένα βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἄκοντας τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πάντας ἀδικεῖν. The Greek text is from Burnett (1968 [=1903]). For Socrates’ dictum, see Gulley (1965). For Epicurus’ “diagnosis” of “empty desires” and “false beliefs” as the problems faced by humanity and the therapeutic techniques to fix these, see Nussbaum (1986a) 32ff. 541 Cf. Konstan (2006) 204-5. On Epicurean pleasure and virtues, see Long (2006e). 542 Cf. Tsouna (2007) 187, who argues that, “emotions are complex conditions or events associated primarily with the rational part of the soul. They are cognitive in the sense that they involve beliefs and judgments”.

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judgments and one’s emotions will also be in line with Epicurus’ teaching.543 Whereas the Stoics argued for the extirpation of all passions,544 emotions—even one’s that ‘bite’ or cause pain like anger—do not need to be eradicated according to Epicureans; those that are “natural” and consistent with clear evidence (enargeia) are necessary and proper.545 Moreover, one cannot eliminate all pain, so sometimes it is advisable to experience some pain either for a friend’s sake or for one’s own in order to experience the more long-lasting katastemic pleasure, i.e. pleasure in rest not in movement (kinetic).546 The wise man, thus, experiences anger (and other emotions) because it is in accordance with clear evidence, while the non-wise person who is disposed to anger (or to other emotions) does so because he is irascible and/or because he judges based on false opinion.547 Emotions that result from the former are natural (φυσικήν) or reasonable

(εὔλογος), while from the latter are empty (κενή) because they are based on false reasoning.

In order to keep one’s judgments consistent with proper Epicurean values and with empirical data, Philodemus makes visualization, for which he uses the phrase tithenai pro ommatōn, a central part of his pedagogy.548 By ‘placing before the eyes’ a student’s right or wrong actions, he argues, a teacher can make the student understand what is right or wrong about his/her reasoning and judgments.549 This does not mean that it is always comfortable to use frank

543 On epilogismos, see Schofield (1996). 544 See L&S 65. 545 On Epicurean ‘bites’, see Armstrong (2008) and Tsouna (2007) 32-51, 188ff. 546 Cf. Ep. Ep.Men. 128: “…we do not choose every pleasure, but often pass over many a pleasure because more trouble than pleasure results to us from them; and [we] consider many painful things [algēdonas] more valuable than pleasure, since greater pleasure follows for us when we have finished enduring the for however long a time”. The translation is from Armstrong (2008) 89-90. 547 On the importance of one’s disposition (διάθεσις), see Tsouna (2007) 189ff., Procopé (1993) 375-7, and Galinsky (1988) 335ff. 548 On Philodemean “placing before the eyes”, see Tsouna (2011, 2007, and, especially, 2003). 549 He also uses this language in his On Anger (col. I.23 and especially IV.16). Armstrong (2008) 101 notes that this work, “is …an extension of On Frank Criticism, and it takes On Frank Criticism “as read,” mentioning it by title (col. XXXVI.22-6). In the passage of On Anger col. IV.16, visualization is likened to a medical procedure. Alexander (2008) 196-7 recognizes the importance of the latter passage, in particular, its “comparison with doctors who describe the dangers and of a particular disease to their patients (“setting [them] before their eyes”) in order to make them amenable to the cure.”

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speech and to display a student’s errors before his/her eyes or even before a group of students.550

Armstrong argues: “Parrhēsia, frank criticism, sometimes may be quite painful both to the student and the teacher of philosophy because it involves shaming for the teacher and being shamed for the student, but is nonetheless both necessary and beneficial”.551 The important thing is that frank speech can goad a student to reform; the long-term benefit outweighs the short-term pain for both teacher and student. The teacher redirects the pupil to exercise the proper calculus—pleasure—and to utilize the proper criteria—sensations, preconceptions, and feelings.

Visualization, thus, is transformed by Philodemus from a rhetorical concept into an instructional technique.

Philodemus writes that it is important to “set before our eyes (τιθῶμεν δὲ πρὸ

ὀμμάτων)… the difference that exists between a caring admonishment and an that pleases but pretty much stings everyone”.552 The modern commentators remark, “Just as the students are to visualize their errors ([Phld. Lib.] frs. 42, 77 [=78N]), so too the teachers are to form an image of which method may be most effective”.553 This procedure concurs with Aristotle’s procedure of

“placing before the eyes” (pro ommatōn poiein) and with the practice of visualization described in Ps.-Longinus under the heading of phantasia or eidōlopoia, in which both author and reader visualize the same images as one another. This process is also at work when Philodemus

550 It is not anachronistic to speak of his/her eyes because women were included in the Epicurean schools of philosophy and Philodemus’ On Frank Criticism (Col. XXIb-XXIIb) even offers specific advice for employing candidness with women; see Konstan, et al. (1998) 13. For women in the Epicurean garden, see Dorandi (1999b) 58, and more broadly, see Trapp (2007) 205-7. 551 Armstrong (2008) 82, see also 97-100. 552 Phld. Lib. Fr. 26, 4-10: τιθῶμεν δὲ πρὸ ὀμμάτων καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἣν ἔχει κηδεμονικὴ νουθέτησις [ἀρ] ἀρεσ-κούση]ς μέν, ἐπιει[κ]ῶς δὲ δ]ιακνούσης ἅπαντας <ε>ἰρωνείας. Cf. also Lib. Col. XVIIa. On “placing before the eyes”, see also Schroeder (2004) 140. 553 Konstan, et al. (1998) 15. On p.17, note also the similar comments about other fragments, which offer a complimentary view on the importance of visualization: “If fr. 76 has the teachers in view, it presents intriguing evidence for mutual psychagogy. The teachers hold up before the eyes of the students both their own errors and those of others. The practice is that of visualizing errors, of “putting mistakes in front of the eyes” of those at fault in order to facilitate their improvement (cf. frs. 26, 42)”.

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encourages instructors to (Fr. 76): “set forth [sc. before the eyes of their students] their own errors with frankness, and …those [of others] as well”.554 Here, both student and teacher are encouraged to visualize and display their own as well as others’ shortcomings as a kind of confession;555 wrong actions are thereby “viewed” and therefore visually enacted, in the hopes that they may not be repeated in the future. While frankness might at times sting, it also invites openness of communication and ultimately leads to proper behavior and reasoning, and to lasting friendship as one does not keep secrets from friends.556 This practice is also consistent with

Epicurean empiricism as it is only by seeing right or wrong behavior that one can correct it.

Closely associated with visualization—both in Philodemus’ method and in rhetorical theory—is candidness of speech, παρρησία (in Latin, licentia). For instance, Leeman notes among the “figures of presentation” listed in the Rhetorica ad Herennium, “Frankness of speech, licentia (παρρησία), [which] may be either real and pungent, or pretended and flattering”.557

Rowe includes frankness as a “thought figure” in his discussion of style noting that, “Parrhesia is claiming to use candor, which by appearing to risk the good will of the audience instead is intended to strengthen it due to the speaker’s courage in speaking the truth.”558 Philodemus seizes upon this rhetorical trope and transforms it through visualization into a piece of Epicurean pedagogy. He argues that teachers must practice frankness of speech with their students in order to correct their errors and to modify their behavior. Like a medical doctor who frankly tells us

554 Phld. Lib. 76.7-11: οἷς ἐκθήσουσιν οἱ κατας[κευα̣ζομενοι⟦ς⟧ μετὰ παρρη̣[σί]ας τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἁμαρτή[μα- τα καὶ [ἄλλω]ν δ’ ὑπο[θή]σονται… All Greek text for On Frank Speech and translations come from Konstan, et al. (1998). The bracketed “before the eyes of their students” is my own. 555 On confession in Epicurean therapy, see Knuutilla (2004) 85-7. Cf. also Nussbaum (1986a) 46-7 and DeWitt (1952) 99, who describes the student-teacher relationship, thusly: “disciples should look to their head as a father- confessor; to him their mistakes and shortcomings should be frankly disclosed in confidence; they were to regard him as their savior”. 556 On biting arguments or criticism, see Tsouna (2011) 91-118, Armstrong (2008), and Nussbaum (1986a) 41ff. On Epicurean friendship and the need for frank criticism from true friends, see Armstrong (2011), Porter (2003), and Konstan (1997) 108-13. 557 Leeman (1963) 39. 558 Rowe (1997) 139.

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our diagnosis and then provides a course of treatment, so too frankness of speech has a jarring effect.559 It becomes a kind of therapy in which one can see one’s errors and learn how to improve. While teachers must be careful to adapt their speech to appeal to each student as an individual, their practice of placing a subject ‘before the eyes’ is central to their ability to persuade, inform, and ultimately reform the student.560 Also like visualization, frank speech goes both ways, from teacher to student and from student to teacher. Tsouna notes that, “frank speech is both a method of pedagogy and a way of speaking which forges bonds of benefits and gratitude among the members of Epicurean communities and is essential to the development of genuine friendships.”561 Through this device, teachers alert us to our failures and encourage us to adapt our actions to what is appropriate. This didactic exercise, thus, keep students’ judgments in line with proper Epicurean reasoning based on the criteria of truth—sensations (αἰσθήσεις), preconceptions (προλήψεις), and feelings (πάθη).

Philodemus also employs visualization in his On Anger in which it acts as a therapeutic or corrective procedure to compel a student to follow the teacher’s directions. He likens the process to a medical doctor explaining a patient’s diagnosis and treatment, explaining (Ir. col.

IV.4-19):

[While some] of the doctors [reason or talk about] the magnitude of the disease and the passionate feelings that occur because of it and its other inconveniences and sometimes also the dangers, (these things) escape the patient’s notice, some entirely ([κα]θόλου]), others as they are appraised (ἐπιλογιστικῶς), whence they become more careless about avoiding them as if moderate (evils) were happening to them; but when they are put before the eyes, they make patients eager to be treated.562

559 For the medical analogy, see Nussbaum (1986a) 36ff. We will see in the next chapter that Lucretius’ description of his poetry as the “honey” for the draught of worm-wood also draws on this medical comparison. 560 On the potential for students to react differently to criticism and the teacher’s need to adapt one’s admonishments to suit individuals, see Tsouna (2007) 106ff. 561 Tsouna (2005) 91. 562 Phld. Ir. IV.4-19: ΕΝΟΙΣ τ[ῶν ἰα]τρῶν τό τε μέγεθος [τῆς] νόσου καὶ τὰ γει[νόμεν]α δι’ αὐτὴν πάθη καὶ [τὰς] ἄλλας δυσ[χ]ρηστίας, ἐ[νί]οτε [δ]ὲ καὶ [τ]οὺς κινδύ[ν]ους, λ̣α̣νθά[ν]ει τὰ μὲν [κα]θόλου τοὺς κάμνοντ[ας], τὰ δ’ ἐπιλογιστικῶς, ὅ[θ]εν ἀμελέστεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀποφυ[γ]ὴν ὡς μετρίων ἐνεστηκότων καθίστανται, τεθ̣έ̣ντα δὲ π̣ρὸ ὀμμάτων [ἐ]πιστρ[αφ]ε̣ὶς πρὸς τὴν [θ]εραπεία̣ν παρασκευάζει. The Greek text is

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Philodemus not only preaches this procedure, but he also practices it. He includes a long diatribe

(col. VII.16-XXXI.23), comparable to those in Chrysippus and Bion.563 This descriptive passage, in Annas’ words, presents a “parade of characters furious, spluttering, and generally out-of- control” in order “to bring the evil vividly before our eyes”.564 The similarity to Chryssipus— indeed Wilke argues that his Therapeutikos Logos was Philodemus’ main source—also shows that the procedure of “placing-before-the-eyes” was not unique to the Epicureans.565 Rather, it was a common piece of philosophical and therapeutic procedure throughout the Hellenistic period. It is likely that these sorts of vivid descriptions in philosophy also encouraged the development of the theory of vividness, enargeia, in the rhetorical and literary critics, a syncretism that we have already remarked upon. These are precisely the sorts of descriptive passages that would be classified as enargeia in rhetorical circles as they are lifelike and compel the reader to imagine the described characters. Here, however, this procedure not only has the pedagogic function of bringing the emotion of anger vividly before the listener’s eyes, but it also has a therapeutic one. Armstrong recognizes this value, arguing that in Philodemus’ view,

“although it was wrong solely to inveigh against the angry and do nothing more, it had a genuine therapeutic and even medical value to put the horrors of rage pro ommatōn –vividly, before their eyes”.566 By visualizing the horrible effect of excessive anger, the student learns to recognize the

from Indelli (1988), the translation is from Tsouna (2007) 205. Cf. also Phld. Ir. col. I.23. On the medical value of visualization, see Alexander (2008) 196-7 and Armstrong (2008) 103. 563 Armstrong (2008) 101, Tsouna (2007) 190, and Procopé (1993) 380-81 make comparisons to Chrysippus and/or Bion. Tsouna (2007) 195-238 and (2003) discusses the ethical issues involved, while highlighting the importance of ‘set[ting]-before-the-eyes’ in Philodemus. 564 Annas (1989) 145-6. 565 Wilke (1914) xxx-liv. See also Armstrong (2008) 102-5, in which he discusses this possibility, ultimately concluding that, “It may well be that we can recover some of the tone of the more vivid “before the eyes” presentations in Chrysippus, of which a sample very much like Philodemus’s ranting is found in SVF 3.478 (see Tieleman 2003: 178-81)”. 566 Armstrong (2008) 103. See also Sheppard (2012) 11 and Tsouna (2007) 204ff.

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harm it poses and can then modify his/her behavior, particularly by remembering vivid examples.

Vision and visualization are also central for properly evaluating the world and to exercising proper judgment based on our sensory data. Philodemus comments (Ir. 37.16):

…(some) understanding it (anger) to be a blessed (μακάριον) thing (the Peripatos), others an evil, fastening on its sting (τὸ δακνηρόν) (the Stoics). But we (Epicureans), because there is a kind of false reasoning induced by the word (sc. orgê), do not make any unitary pronouncement. Instead, we teach that the emotion, taken in isolation and per se, is an evil, since it is painful or resembles what is painful, but taken in conjunction with one’s character (διάθεσις) as a whole, it is something that can even be called a good, as we think. For it results (when good) from seeing what the nature of states of affairs really is (ἀπὸ τοῦ βλέπειν ὡς ἡ φυσις ἔχει τῶν πραγμάτων), and from not having any false beliefs (μηδὲν ψευδοδοξεῖν) in our comparative estimations of the losses suffered and in our chastisements of those who harm us (ἐν ταῖς συμμετρήσεσι τῶν ἐλαττωμένων καί ταῖς κολάσεσι τῶν βλαπτόντων).567

As a good Epicurean, he stresses the importance of seeing (βλέπειν) clear evidence, i.e. “what the nature of states of affairs really is”, a periphrasis which really amounts to the same thing as

Epicurus’ term, enargeia. One accomplishes this through the senses, most importantly sight.

Sheppard links Epicurean mental vision with atomic theory, stating, “for an Epicurean even quite complex mental pictures that result from our combining of images ultimately have their origin in the action of material atoms on the atoms which constitute our minds and sense-organs.”568 She is right that this practice is consistent with atomism; moreover, it is also consistent with Epicurus’

567 Phld. Ir. 37.16: αὐ[τὸ μ]ακά[ρ]ιον [ὑπο]λαμ⎜βά[ν]τες, οἱ δὲ κακόν, ⎜ τῶ[ι] δακνηρῶι προσπί⎜πτ`οντ´ες αὐτῆς. ἡμεῖς δὲ τῶι ⎜ καὶ κατὰ φωνήν τινα πα⎜ραλογισμὸν ἐντρέχειν ⎜ οὐχ ἁπλῆν ποιούμεθα ⎜ τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ⎜ μὲν πάθος αὐτὸ κατὰ δι⎜άληψιν ἀποφαινόμε⎜θα κακόν, ἐπειδὴ λυπη⎜ρόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀνάλογον ⎜ λυπηρῶι, κατὰ δέ τὴν ⎜ συνπλοκήν τῆι διαθέσει ⎜ κἂν ἀγαθὸν ῥηθήσεσθαι ⎜ νομίζομεν· συνίσταται ⎜ γὰρ ἀπὸ το[ῦ] βλέπειν, ὡς ἡ ⎜ φύσις ἔχει τῶν πραγμά⎜των, καὶ μηδὲν ψευδο⎜δοξεῖν ἐν ταῖς σ[υ]μμε⎜τρήσεσι τῶν ἐλα[ττ]ω⎜μάτων καὶ ταῖς κολάσε⎜σι τῶν βλαπτόντων. The Greek text is from Indelli (1988); the translation is by Armstrong per litteras. On this passage, see Galinsky (1994) 197 and Asmis (1989) 157. 568 Sheppard (2014) 11. She adds, however, “That may be why Epicurean thinkers show little interest in the mental processes of the artist and why Epicureanism had little influence on the use of the word phantasia in aesthetic contexts”. From our study, it has become clear that Epicureanism did influence the use of phantasia as well as enargeia in aesthetic contexts. Moreover, it will also become clear that Philodemus and Lucretius were also acutely interested in mental processes and practiced poetry in a manner that was consistent with their Epicurean philosophy.

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procedure of attestation, epimartyrȇsis, his mode for checking sensory data.569 Anger arises from both a non-cognitive sensation (vision, i.e. from atomic eidōla) and a cognitive element, including memory and a reasoned judgment based on observable evidence. So long as one’s judgment is confirmed by self-evidence (enargeia) and does not introduce false opinion

(pseudodoxa) into the evaluation of the sensation, then the judgment must be correct according to Epicurean reasoning. The anger which then results from this sensation and knowledge is, in

Philodemus’ terminology, “natural” (φυσικήν) or reasonable (εὔλογος), as opposed to “empty”

(κ̣[ενήν).570 Tsouna comments: “Philodemus suggests that emotions such as anger and the fear of death are in many cases empty emotions precisely because they often involve empty (i.e., both false and harmful) beliefs about their objects.”571 Armstrong goes further in his analysis by linking proper emotions to judgments from clear evidence. He argues, “The “goodness” of

[Philodemus’] “natural” emotions results not from meditations and the good, but from his continual and unremitting attention to something very different: actual facts, ta pragmata, and what is in accordance with them, to pragmatikon—a meditation quite different from that of the Stoic sage.”572 What Armstrong calls “meditation” is really a form of rhetorical enargeia, i.e. visualization; but this visualization is designed to induce one to comply with proper Epicurean reasoning based strictly on clear evidence, i.e. epistemological enargeia. This is an empirical approach, perfectly consistent with Epicurus’ teachings; however, it also requires constant effort if one is to persist in drawing correct conclusions. By keeping a clear view ever present before our mind’s eye of what anger is—its motivations, the involvement of evaluation and judgment of

569 On this procedure, see the discussion in §1 of chapter four as well as Dumont (1982). 570 For anger as natural, see Phld. Ir. col. XXXVI.20, XXXVIII.6, 36, XXXIX.26, 30. For anger as reasonable, see Phld. Ir. col. XX.24-5. For empty anger, see Phld. Ir. col. XXXVIII.1 and XXXIX.8. See also Armstrong (2008) 100-5. 571 Tsouna (2011) 187. 572 Armstrong (2008) 102. Cf. also Procopé (1993) 381, who argues that, “the therapy for anger like other emotional ailments would be to shape the mind, by exercises like that of learning whole texts of EPICURUS by heart, to the point where it would automatically “think nothing external to be of importance (ira XLVII 39-41).”

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wrongdoing, and especially the ramifications of it—we can make sure that our inferences are in line with the criteria of truth and with the hedonic calculus.573 Furthermore, we can be sure that our judgments—about the world or about the emotional demands of a situation—are also accurate if and only if they are based upon and consistent with clear, empirical evidence

(enargeia/evidentia).

In this way, Philodemus transforms the rhetorical practice of visualization into an epistemological and ethical one. It is the need for autopsy that links these two processes, either by seeing through the sense of vision or by seeing in the mind.574 Nussbaum argues that the important features of Epicurean therapeutic practices included, “memorization, confession, [and] informing”.575 This is surely consistent with the evidence from Epicurus, discussed in the previous chapter, as well as Philodemus. Through a form of philosophical meditation, i.e. by memorizing and constantly repeating to oneself Epicurus’ teachings (particularly his Kuriai

Doxai), one can constantly keep the mind alert to proper reasoning based on sense evidence and can recognize when errors might crop up from the addition of false opinion. By confessing one’s behavior and judgments and by placing them before the eyes of fellow Epicureans, one gets helpful feedback and can check his/her decisions to make sure that they are consistent with clear, empirical evidence. In the same way, by informing one’s students and using argumentative strategies to analyze the evidence from the world and to draw inferences from it, one also follows Epicurus’ empirical procedure. Even Philodemus’ notion of “chastising (kolasis) those

573 On the hedonic calculus, see DeWitt (1952) 216-48. For Epicureans, the meditiation is predominantly on the bad results of anger, as opposed to the Stoics like Chrysippus whom Procopé (1993) 380 characterizes as “dwell[ing] on the odiousness, the folly and turpitude, of passions like anger.” 574 Cf. Zanker (1981) 309-10, where he argues that, “the Hellenistic literary term shares with Epicurean ἐναργεία special relevance to the sense of sight”. 575 Nussbaum (1986a) 48.

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who harm us” is in line with the need to modify one’s behavior through visualization.576

Armstrong has alerted me to the dichotomy that, “Throughout On Anger τιμωρία, τιμωρέω,

“vengeance, avenge” are used pejoratively and κόλασις, κολάζω “chastisement/retaliation, chastise/retaliate” are their positive counterpart”.577 Philodemus accepts anger and punishment provided that they are natural and coupled with frank speech. A teacher or chastiser, thus, brings before the eyes of the person being punished what he/she has done wrong by clearly and frankly declaring the wrong.578 Just as a parent might explain to a child how he or she has erred before delivering a punishment—say, a spanking—Philodemus accepts the need for one to chastise a wrongdoer for his/her actions when exercising anger by bringing it before his/her eyes and then exacting retribution.

As a final note on Philodemus, it is also necessary to consider very briefly his aesthetic applications of the terms enargēs and enargeia, which arise on a few occasions in his discussions of poetry. It is often difficult to surmise his personal views because his general method is to describe the theories of others and then to challenge them in a negative fashion, often without expressing his own theory.579 His analysis, nonetheless, is particularly important, as his are the only pieces of literary criticism and rhetorical theory to survive antiquity from an Epicurean perspective. Indeed, as Zanker has recognized, Philodemus actually preserves the earliest evidence of the technical concept of enargeia in rhetoric and literary criticism.580 Moreover, as

Philodemus’ treatise On Poetry collects the teachings of his teacher, Zeno, it also testifies that

576 On Epicurean chastisement (kolasis), see Armstrong (2008) 89ff. and Sorabji (2000) 201-3. 577 Per litteras. 578 This practice of chastisement will play a role in my interpretation of the end of the Aeneid in the concluding chapter. 579 On this procedure, see the introductions to Janko and Mangoni (2011), Janko (2001), Asmis (1992), Greenberg (1990), and Tate (1941) 88-107. See also Kleve (1997) 55-8, who sums up Philodemus’ method (p. 57): “It is difficult to obtain a clear understanding of Philodemus as we only know it from his criticism of others.” 580 Zanker (1981) 307.

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this usage goes back at least one generation prior to him and was likely also prevalent in

Hellenistic works which are now lost.581

In book five of On Poems, Philodemus dissects various theories of poetry put forward by

Epicureans and non-Epicureans alike. These include arguments about the utility of poetry and its virtues. Central to his discussion are the figures of enargeia, “vividness”, and emphasis,

“suggestiveness”.582 Asmis defines these: “ἐνάργεια... is to state things in such a way as to put them before our eyes or our senses; it is said to exceed ‘clarity’, σαφήνεια. ἔμφασις …[refers to] leav[ing] more to be understood than is put down in words”; it is implying or suggesting something, without saying it outright.583 As with the varied uses of enargeia already discussed, emphasis is used by Philodemus in both epistemological and rhetorical contexts. For instance,

Armstrong comments on On Anger that:

Throughout the final section on Epicurean beliefs about anger, to which it is the sole surviving witness (XXXIV.16-L. 7) it is assumed that “good” or “natural” anger is based on a correct apprehension or at least a solid impression of damage done intentionally to oneself (or one's friends, XLI.18-20), ἔμφασις βλάβης ἑκουσίας, XL 33-38, cf. XLVII 33, XLIX 31.584

In this application, emphasis refers to the sensory impression of harm, i.e. it is a synonym for

Epicurus’ phantasia. In literary discussions, these same epistemic terms—enargeia and emphasis—appear and receive approval from the philosopher/poet. For Philodemus, these are

581 Cf. Zanker (1981) 307: “Ἐνάργεια can therefore safely be said to have been current as a technical term in the criticism of poetry in the second century B.C. just as its use in historiography is attested for that century in Polybius and Agatharchides”. While for reasons of space I have not been able to discuss the use of the term by Hellenistic historians (as opposed to by their critics), Zanker is persuasive in his assessment that they “seem to use ἐνάργεια in its strict philosophical sense; for instance, Polybius talks of the value of ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν πίστις, making specific reference to autopsy (20.12.8)”. For the philosophical sense, meaning self-evidence (evidentia), see chapter four. 582 These translations are drawn from Asmis (1992) 402ff.. 583 Asmis (1992) 402. For Epicurean views of poetry, see especially Asmis (1993) and (1991). On clarity in Philodemus’ On Rhetoric, see also Tate (1941) 96ff. This use of enargeia by Philodemus is perfectly consistent with that described in §2 in rhetorical theory and literary criticism. For Philodemus’ On Rhetoric, see especially Gaines (2001) and Chandler (2006). 584 Armstrong (2014) per litteras. This analysis formed part of a talk that Armstrong delivered in Geneva.

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necessary components of a good poem; they are not, however, criteria for determining whether a poem is good or not.585

As a poet himself, Philodemus has a very practical way—formed by experience—of viewing and judging poetry; poems can be good on any subject, whether noble or not (unlike for

Plato), provided that they are consistent with the “common notion of a good poem”.586 This is a very Epicurean way of thinking about poetry as it appeals to the consensus omnium as its basis for goodness.587 This would qualify in Epicurus’ terminology as a prolēpsis, a preconception, which, to recall from the previous chapter, is self-evident and is one of the criteria of truth. For determining the goodness or badness of a poem, he singles out the success or failure of its thought, διάνοια. He rejects critics who argue that sound is the most important quality of a poem

(the euphonists).588 Similarly, he discards those who stress only morally useful teaching, as well as “imitation” and “suitability”.589 Asmis comments, “Unlike the pleasure of music [which, she argues, only has the utility of pleasure], the pleasure of poetry is primarily intellectual, and this pleasure would seem to be more valuable than a purely sensory pleasure”.590 So, if Philodemus

585 Asmis (1992) 404: “Philodemus, it seems, is prepared to revise traditional views by accepting vividness [enargeia] and suggestiveness (emphasis) as necessary virtues of poetry; but he extends these virtues to prose”. Over the course of this study, we have already seen that vividness was often extended to prose and suggestiveness is also named as a virtue of expression by rhetorical theorists, so it also seems to have been present in prose criticism. Nevertheless, Asmis’ claim is certainly true for Philodemus as he does claim both of these figures as appropriate to both prose and poetry. Tate (1941) 106-7 argues that Philodemus also engages with Alexandrian theories of art and with the debate between Asianists and Atticists in the first century BCE in his poetic theories by “stress[ing] simple, unaffaffected style …parallel to the studied simplicity pursued by the neoterics and the Atticists”. While I will avoid discussing the Asianist/Atticist debate in this study, it is clear that Philodemus’ stress on simplicity and clarity would be consistent with Epicurus’ on saphēneia. 586 Asmis (1992) 415. 587 See Phld. Poem. 5. 36.6 (Mangoni’s numbering), where he argues that beauty is patently obvious to anyone who is educated: μόνοι γὰρ ⎜[οἱ] πεπα[ι]δευ[μέ]νοι σ[υν]ιᾶσι, τὸ δὲ δὴ καλὸν ⎜καὶ παντελῶς. The Greek text is from Mangoni (1993) 162. On this interpretation, cf. Asmis (1992) 412-13. 588 On Poems 5. col.18.15-17: 589 For his dismissal of these as criteria for poetry, see On Poems 5. 20, 33.11, 38.10, respectively, and see Mangoni (1992) and Asmis (1992). Note also Greenberg’s (1990) 24 assessment that, “Philodemus felt that the poet is not concerned, as such, with the dissemination of knowledge, and that if a poem is instructive, that is not a virtue of the poem as such.” 590 Asmis (1991) 15. On the Epicurean views of Horace regarding the utility of poetry, see Armstrong (1993).

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demands that the thought of the poem be the sole criteria for judging its goodness, where does this leave vividness? Unlike the other criteria put forward by various critics that he attacks,

Philodemus does not dismiss enargeia as a necessary feature of good poetry. Because it is also a feature of both poetry and prose, however, it cannot be the sole distinction between success or failure of poetry; it is simply a necessary component of it.

4. Conclusion: ante oculos

From this survey of the rhetorical, literary, and didactic applications of enargeia, it has become clear that the philosophical concept in Epicureanism and Stoicism surely influenced the extended application of the term in the Hellenistic period to vivid descriptions, in which a subject was said to be placed “before the eyes” of the reader/listener (pro ommatōn/ante oculos). Asmis criticizes Zanker’s suggestion that “the term was borrowed by critics from contemporary philosophy, in particular Epicureanism”, instead arguing that “[t]here are certainly links (which are worth exploring further) between the literary and philosophical uses of both ἐνάργεια and

ἔμφασις; but ἐνάργεια has a development in literary theory that is largely independent of philosophical theory.”591 My study, which has, as she recommends, further explored these links, actually reveals the connections to be much stronger than she asserts. Hellenistic literary and rhetorical critics were deeply influenced by philosophical arguments and language, and they adapted their technical terminology to suit their own theories. This process was syncretic, however, and we can see Philodemus (and Lucretius) synthesizing the different applications of enargeia and visualization to make them consistent with one another. While the term enargeia is, obviously, the central example of this dissertation, the same process is at work with other terms from philosophy such as emphasis, as we can see from Philodemus. Enargeia, which originally

591 Asmis (1992) 405 n.57. Zanker (1981) makes this claim on page 309.

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had a strictly epistemological application referring to self-evidence, emerges in these new contexts with a figurative meaning, denoting descriptions that are so life-like that they are tantamount to visual evidence. Webb argues that, “If we believe the rhetoricians, the impact of enargeia is immediate, leaving any intellectual judgment of the credibility of the images to a later moment.”592 This assessment is equally appropriate to enargeia in all of its roles; it conveys to the senses and to the mind self-evidence. For Epicureans, that which is self-evident is assuredly true, whether physical sensation, mental preconception, or interior feeling (of pleasure or pain). Similarly, for the Stoics, impressions that are self-evident compel one to assent to their truth. As the links between enargeia in philosophy, rhetoric, and literature, in particular poetry, have emerged throughout the course of this study, we are now ready to apply these principles to a close reading of a poem that combines all of these features, Lucretius’ De rerum natura.

592 Webb (2009) 122.

173 CHAPTER SIX

SPECIES RATIOQUE: ENARGEIA IN THE PHILOSOPHY AND POETRY OF LUCRETIUS

“Let be be finale of seem.” – from Wallace Stevens’ “The Emperor of Ice Cream”593

In this chapter, I turn to a single case study of enargeia in all of its aspects— philosophical, rhetorical, and poetic—in Lucretius’ didactic epic, the De rerum natura. It would be possible and indeed worthwhile to apply the same type of scrutiny to virtually any philosophically minded writer of the Roman period (e.g. Virgil, Horace, Ovid, Seneca, Lucan,

Tacitus), and thereafter.594 Nevertheless, the DRN is an especially good source for this line of inquiry as it has a special place at the nexus of Latin literature and Hellenistic thought. In it,

Lucretius presents the teachings of Epicurus, taking his subject matter, as Sedley has shown, directly from the master’s enormous treatise On Nature (Περὶ φύσεως).595 While the poem’s subject matter is Epicurean physics, the presentation is steeped in the rhetorical and literary practices of the Hellenistic period, which had become commonplace in late Republican Italy.596

Moreover, the DRN is also a translation or, better yet, a transformation of “obscure” Greek concepts (1.136: obscura reperta), originally written in prose, into Latin poetry and addressed to a Roman reader (Memmius);597 it is a feat which the poet acknowledges to be difficult to achieve in a clear fashion (1.137: inlustrare), particularly due to the “poverty of the language and the

593 Stevens (1990) 64. 594 I will offer a brief example of the merits of similar inquiry in my concluding chapter through a close reading of the end of Virgil’s Aeneid and comment on potential avenues for future research. 595 This is the thesis of Sedley (1997 and 1998), which seems to me very persuasive. For an alternate view of Lucretius’ method, which argues that he drew on Epicurus’ Greater Epitome (now lost) and his letters, which are preserved in Diogenes Laertius, see Clay (1983). Whatever side in this debate one is on, it is clear that Lucretius drew his subject matter directly from Epicurus. See also Bailey (1947) 22-37. 596 See, for instance, Kenney (2007b [=1970]), Brown (2007 [=1982]) and Donahue (1993). 597 On the identity of the didactic addressee, see Smith’s introduction to Rouse, rev. Smith (1992) xvi-xviii, Roller (1970), Bailey (1947) 5-8, Allen (1938), and Munro (1866) 340-3.

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novelty of the subjects”.598 In the panegyric opening to Book 3, Lucretius credits Epicurus with revealing and clarifying the secrets of the world, praising him for “illuminating the blessings of life” (3.2: inlustrans commoda vitae).599 Lucretius praises Epicurus’ ability to bring the world out of darkness into the light―an ability that is also linked to his power of sight. The light/dark runs throughout the poem, as the master brings light (extollere lumen, inlustrans) to mortals who are in a state of ignorance, one which is often likened to blindness (caecus) and darkness (tenebris tantis).600 Epicurus becomes a sort of Prometheus figure, bringing light to mankind and granting it the ability to see and know the universe’s truths, including the power of the gods (3.18: apparet divum numen). He offers mankind the only chance of ridding themselves of fear and for obtaining peace of mind (ataraxia in Greek, for Lucretius animi pacem at 3.24).

The poet wishes to achieve a similar goal by transforming the master’s words into a didactic form that is suitable for his Roman readers.601

The recognition of the interdependence of philosophy, rhetoric, and poetry throughout the

De rerum natura corrects a common misconception about it: that its poetry and philosophy are

598 DRN 1.136-139: Nec me animi fallit Graiorum obscura reperta / diccifile inlustrare Latinis versibus esse, / multa novis verbis praesertim cum sit agendum / propter egestatem linguae et rerum novitatem… (It has not slipped my mind that it is difficult to make clear the obscure discoveries of the Greeks in Latin poetry, particularly because of the poverty of the language and the novelty of the subjects). All Latin text for Lucretius is from Rouse, rev. Smith (1992); the translation here is predominantly my own, although I also rely on Rouse/Smith (1992). 599 The same verb is used in both instances (at DRN 1.136 and 3.2). Lucretius, as poet, seeks to bring revelation (inlustrare) to Roman readers just as Epicures has revealed (inlustrans) the world to all mankind. Recall from the last chapter that one of Cicero’s translations for enargeia was illustratio; the term, even for Lucretius, seems to have been borrowed from contemporary literary criticism and rhetoric. Furthermore, he was not alone in translating Epicureanism into Latin; other than Cicero, also translated Epicurean works into Latin in prose; see Kilpatrick (1996) 88 and Howe (1951). It seems likely, then, that the term illustratio as a translation for enargeia was prevalent in the Zeitgeist of late Republican Italy. 600 DRN 3.1-3: O tenebris tantis tam clarum extollere lumen / qui primus potuisti inlustrans commoda vitae, / te sequor, o Graiae gentis decus... For light/dark imagery, cf. also DRN 3.87-8: nam veluti pueri trepidant atque omnia caecis / in tenebris metuunt... 601 For Lucretius’ goals, see Kilpatrick on the opening of Book 4 (1996) 75: “Inspiration from the , the joys of poetic originality and fame merge with the challenge of liberating Romans through his epic verse”.

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somehow separate from or even at war with one another.602 Bailey, for instance, goes so far as to argue that, “[t]he key to the understanding of Lucretius’ mind seems to me to be that it was visual rather than logical”.603 Contra Bailey, however, Gale has proposed that “mental processes are directly linked with visualization by Epicurus and his followers, so that Lucretius has everything to gain from presenting his arguments in strongly visual form”.604 With Gale (albeit through a different lens), I argue that in his poetics visual description is consistent with and built upon the foundational principles of Epicurean philosophy—the kritēria of truth. Furthermore, while critics have frequently noted Lucretius’ flare for visual imagery, they have often restricted themselves either to discussing his Epicurean philosophy or his poetics. For instance, West describes his own methodology, “the philosophy I have taken as it comes, subordinating it to the elucidation of the poetry in a way that would have exasperated Lucretius”.605 While in recent years scholars have made strides in linking the poetics of the De rerum natura to its philosophy, there is still much work to be done.606 In particular, the close connection between enargeia as both a rhetorical figure central to the poem’s imagery and as the epistemic foundation of

Epicurean philosophy has largely been overlooked.607 Lucretian enargeia is both evidentiary, i.e. epistemological, and descriptive, i.e. rhetorical. Through visualization readers can see and thereby grasp the clear evidence for Epicurus’ physics. The concept of enargeia allows the poet

602 Cf. Gale (1994) and DeLacy (1957) 114ff., the latter of whom offers a defense of Lucretius against critics who have argued for “some inner conflict between ‘Lucretius the philosopher’ and ‘Lucretius the poet’ or ‘Lucretius the intermittent psychotic”. The most (in-)famous example of this sort of criticism is Patin’s “L’Anti-Lucrèce chez Lucrèce” (1868). On Patin’s influence, see Gale (2007b) 2ff. 603 Bailey (1940) 280. 604 Gale (1994) 84. Dalzell (1996) 59 too recognizes the centrality of vision in Lucretius’ didaxis and argues that, “Lucretius had one advantage in formulating the argument of his poem. Epicureanism stressed the central importance of the evidence of the senses. The unseen can be known only through analogy with the seen. So illustration from the visible world is not just a poetic embellishment, but art of the fabric of the philosophical argument.” 605 West (1969) viii. 606 See, for instance, the studies collected in Gale (2007a), which offer a more well-rounded view of Lucretius’ poetics and philosophy, as well as Gale’s monograph (1994), Clay (1983), and Schrijvers (1970). 607 For just a few (among many) discussions of the imagery in Lucretius, see West (1969), Townend (1965), DeLacy (1964), and Pope (1949).

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to express clearly his decidedly unclear philosophy; it enables him to convey an abstruse physics and its invisible components, atoms and void, by bringing them before the listener’s/reader’s eyes through analogy and imagery.608 For this reason, the poet closely links vision with true knowledge throughout the epic.609

Lucretius takes on a missionary role, as he strives to convert readers to accepting

Epicureanism for themselves. To achieve this aim, he must employ every sort of reasoning and rhetoric at his disposal.610 In particular, he relies on rhetorical enargeia for descriptions which place the subjects “before the eyes” of the reader; he utilizes therapeutic enargeia through repetitions, which make the teachings memorable for the reader; 611 his poetry becomes a rhetorical device, as it serves as the honey-on-the-cup, making the difficult teachings more palatable and easier to recall;612 finally, he appeals to sensory evidence, i.e. epistemological enargeia, for proof of his conclusions. Therefore, by utilizing a powerful stylistic effect, which brings his writing to life as if before the eyes of his readers, and by grounding his arguments and analogies in empirical evidence, Lucretius verbally manages to create visual images—enacting the poem before his audience’s gaze. This practice is both didactically effective and, more

608 See n.598 above. Lucretius also refers to his project as “adapting everything with the Muses’ charm” (DRN 4.9: …musaeo contingens cuncta lepore). On this line, Keen (1985) 7-8 comments: “To make a bitter medicine sweet is not to remove the healing effect of the potion, but to alter its composition in such a way that the formula works within the patient in a different way. In this case the sweetened medicine of the poem alleviates or removes the symptoms of the audience’s disorder, but the complete cure for it belongs to those who have achieved a full philosophical understanding of Epicurean philosophy”. 609 Most emphatically, Lucretius, punning on the similar sound of the terms visum and verum, states (DRN 4.499): “on each and every occasion, whatever is seen, that is the truth” (proinde quod in quoquest his visum tempore, verumst). The translation is my own. 610 For the use of rhetorical tools by Lucretius (over Epicurus’ objections), see Marković (2008), Kenney (2007a), Schrijvers (2007), Schiesaro (2007) 79ff., Classen (1968), and Savage (1952). 611 For the importance of repetition as a form of meditation in philosophy, see Erler (1997) 79, who argues that, “To make philosophical instruction practicable at any time and in any situation, it has to become a part of a person. It has to be dyed, as it were, by repetition…”. On Epicurean memorization, see Clay (1983) 176-85. 612 The comparison to honey-on-the cup is from DRN 1.936-50, repeated almost word-for-word at 4.1-25. On this passage and the medical imagery in the poem, see especially Kilpatrick (1996). This article also sums up the therapeutic technique of Lucretius, arguing that (p.89), “The patient-friend must be purged by both rote and reason of stressful hopes, fears, and false beliefs.” It does not, however, mention the role of enargeia as both a rhetorical and therapeutic technique in the poet’s Epicurean quiver. On the passage, see also Mitsis (1993a) and Classen (1968), who offer different takes on the honey-on-the-cup simile.

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importantly, perfectly consistent with Epicurean philosophy. What I ultimately demonstrate is that the various aspects of enargeia—rhetorical, literary, and philosophical—are all relevant for understanding Lucretius’ poetic method and subject, as both are founded upon Epicurus’ doctrines. I maintain that in the poem, philosophy is not subordinated to imagery, nor is imagery to philosophy, but rather they are intertwined in a distinctly Epicurean manner.

1. Species Ratioque

Let us look, then, at how Lucretius employs enargeia didactically as a literary device for crafting vivid imagery and analogies, and how his claims rest upon knowledge that is self- evident. To achieve his poetic and didactic goals, he relies upon the reader’s ability to visualize his descriptions as a form of psychagogy, pedagogy, and meditation.613 He invites his readers to imagine Epicurean physics as if before their eyes; by seeing these processes, he persuades the reader to accept the Epicurean view of the world, founded upon sensual, particularly visual, experience.614 Like Philodemus, whose pedagogical and therapeutic techniques were discussed in the previous chapter, Lucretius appeals to his audience’s sense of sight, encouraging them to

613 On meditative procedures in the DRN, see Erler (1997). Like Erler, I seek “to emphasize the functional aspect of certain passages for the reader” and to show how “the content goes together with the formal exercise” (p.81). In general, however, he resorts to the meditative practices in Stoics like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius for comparanda (he does make some mention of Philodemus, but not for this practice). From our analysis of Stoic procedures of enargeia in chapter four, I would agree with Erler that in both Epicurean and Stoic texts “the methodical parallels are remarkable indeed” (p.87). My argument differs from his, however, in that I demonstrate that literary and philosophical enargeia, which he does not mention, were commonplace Epicurean practices from the evidence we have already examined in both Epicurus and Philodemus, and that this sort of self-evidence is at the heart of Lucretius’ project. Moreover, the passages that I discuss are not examined closely in his article (he provides close-readings of the DRN’s opening hymn to Venus, the passage on love in Book 4, and the plague passage at the end of Book 6). For meditation and/or visualization procedures in Lucretius, see also Schrijvers (1969) 87-147 and (2007), and Clay (1983) 176ff. 614 Smith (1992) xlv argues that the subject for the poem suited Lucretius’ observant nature, noting: “Here was ample scope for Lucretius’ extraordinary powers of observation, imagination, and description, especially as the imperceptibility of the atoms necessitated the employment of numerous analogies from the perceptible world to prove their existence and illustrate their nature and movement”. While I do not dispute that the poet’s natural gifts were suited to his task, I would also add that Epicurean philosophy, as we have already seen, privileged the same “powers of observation, imagination, and description”, along with analogies from the visible world to the invisible.

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visualize his described subjects.615 At the same time, he draws from his own repository of empirical data, visualizes it, and then describes it in detail in order to render the invisible realities of Epicurus’ physics visible. By bringing all of the facets of enargeia into our analysis, we can see how an Epicurean poet applies Epicurus’ teaching and reasoning practices through a

Hellenistic effect of style.

In the programmatic statement that gives this chapter its title (species ratioque), Lucretius links vision with knowledge, stating the need for ratio (reckoning, philosophy, understanding, doctrine, order), coupled with species (appearance, sight, image, vision).616 This combination is repeated four times throughout the poem in the phrase naturae species ratioque (at DRN 1.148;

2.61; 3.93; and 6.41). Seeing and knowing are entwined with one another and it is only through the knowledge that comes from this “clear view” or enargeia that the base superstitions of mankind can be purged. Lucretius confirms this point, stating (1.146-8): “This terror of mind therefore and this gloom must be dispelled, not by the sun’s rays or the bright shafts of day, but by the viewing (species) and understanding (ratio) of nature”.617 Through vision (species), the organization (ratio) of the universe can be understood and by the light of true philosophy the

615 For psychagogy in Lucretius and Philodemus, see Chandler (2006) 147-67. Kleve (1997) and Schroeder (2004) see direct influence on Lucretius from Philodemus. Schroeder, for instance, argues that (p.141), “the dependence of Lucretius on Philodemus is found, not in his scientific arguments, but in his use of Epicurean therapy.” While Schroeder offers helpful discussion, he goes, I think, too far in seeing direct Philodemean influence on Lucretius; rather, I argue, the best course of action is to look for similar procedures in both writers and to view these as Epicurean practices in general that likely go back to Epicurus himself, but which were also influenced by Hellenistic rhetoric as well as therapeutic techniques in rival schools like the Stoics. Thus, we do not need to see a direct dependence of Lucretius on Philodemus (or the other way around); instead they are understood to be Epicureans practicing Epicureanism in their arguments and visual procedures. For more discussion of connections between Philodemus and Lucretius in their contemporary milieu, see Dorandi (1999a and b) and (1997), and the introduction to Leonard and Smith (1942) especially 32ff. 616 Four times, he employs the combination naturae species ratioque (at DRN 1.148; 2.61; 3.93; and 6.41). Thury (1987) 270 argues that, “by this he means that he wants to represent and explain the workings of the universe through poetic imagery”. She is quite right, however, I would add that it is not just imagery that achieves this aim, but also arguments based on the evidence of the senses and Epicurean procedures of visualization, both of which fall under the category of enargeia. 617 DRN 1.146-8: Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque neccessest / non radii solis neque lucida tela diei / discutiant, se naturae species ratioque.

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darkness of ignorance can be relieved. By seeing clear evidence, he seems to think (as Epicurus also does), conversion to Epicureanism is a fait-accompli; he will thus achieve his didactic telos of transforming his reader into a fellow Epicurean and friend (1.41: suavis amicitiae).618 We will see this same method and theme at work in the close readings that follow.

2. How to See Like Epicurus

As a rhetorical and pedagogic technique, Lucretius engages the reader in his topic by constantly stressing visual sensation, as well as utilizing repeated first- and second-person verb forms. In the didactic mold, the poet himself takes on the role of teacher, engaging the reader/ student in participatory acts of seeing and reasoning.619 He is taught and, better yet, shown how to view the world correctly and how to understand it for what it truly is.620 The poet invites his reader to place the subject of the text before his mind’s eye (i.e. ante oculos) through poetic imagery, even when the subject is impossible to see (for instance atoms or the swerve). At the same time, he prods the reader to look for proof of his claims in the evidence from their own sensations and what they know to be the case. He makes a direct appeal to both reader and to the evidence of the senses as he argues (4.478-81): “You will find (invenies) that it is from the senses in the first instance that the concept [notitiem = Greek prolēpsis] of truth has come, and that the senses cannot be refuted. For some standard must be found of greater credit, able of itself

618 On Lucretius’ missionary zeal, see Smith (1992) xlv: “the poet is inspired with a deep sense of missionary purpose and puts all his heart and soul, as well as all his intellectual power, into his writing, and that is largely why his work still grips our attention, still throbs with life and excitement”. 619 Lucretius uses the verb “docere” fourty-seven times throughout the poem, explicitly acknowledging his role as teacher while the reader, ostensibly Memmius but also anyone who reads the poem, becomes the pupil. Gale (2004) offers much helpful discussion on Lucretius’ role as a teacher (praeceptor) and the reader as pupil. On Lucretius’ dual roles as student of Epicurus and as teacher of Memmius, see Schiesaro (2007) 64-71. 620 As was the case for Philodemus, this involves visualization (ante oculos) and frank, sometimes even harsh, speech. On the harshness of Lucretius’ language, see Armstrong (2008) 114-15 and Fish (1998). In using the male pronouns, I am acknowledging Lucretius’ dedicatee, Memmius, as the poet’s model reader. Of course anyone, male or female, could read the poem. On Memmius as the “mock reader” or “didactic addressee” of the poem, see especially Mitsis (1993a) 122ff. and Clay (1983) 212ff.

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to refute false things by true”.621 Here, the poet states the Epicurean tenet that truth, as a concept, is derived from the senses, as all preconceptions are according to Epicurus. Indeed, all of his criteria are directed towards clear sense-evidence (i.e. epistemic enargeia) and are, themselves, derived from the senses. The “standard” to which Lucretius refers is Epicurus’ “yardstick”

(kanōn), which he had employed as a synonym (and metaphor) for the criteria of truth (kritēria), and which Lucretius translates as regula (4.513).622 In his arguments, the poet thus applies the master’s standard by utilizing his empirical methods and by checking all rational inferences against the clear evidence of sensation (Greek αἴσθησις/aisthēsis, Latin sensus).623

To achieve his didactic telos of converting his reader to Epicureanism, Lucretius employs a vocabulary of vision throughout the epic. Repeatedly, he uses words that depend on the reader’s sense of sight and that activate his ability to imagine the scenes described. Verbs

(videre, cernere, spectare, tueri, etc.) and nouns (oculus, species, acies, etc.) that refer to seeing pervade the poem.624 For example, the poet employs the phrase ante oculos, which, as we saw in

621 DRN 4.478-81: Invenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam / notitiem veri neque sensus posse refelli. / nam maiore fide debet reperirier illud, / sponte sua veris quod possit vincere falsa. 622 DRN 4.513: Denique ut in fabrica, si pravast regula prima, / normaque si fallax rectis regionibus exit, / et labella aliqua si ex parti claudicate hilum, / omnia mendose fieri atque obstipa necesse est / iprava cubantia prona supine atque absona tecta, / iam ruere ut quaedam videantur velle, ruantque, / prodita iudiciis fallacibus omnia primis, / sic iditur ratio tibi rerum prava necessest / falsaque sit, falsis quaecumque ab sensibus ortast. While this passage describes the problems that arise from having a faulty measuring unit, it can also be interpreted to stress the need for an accurate standard. If a proper standard were utilized, then the house would not fall and if applied to reasoning, then our reasoning would be accurate and firm knowledge would result. Recall from chapter four that the comparison to a yardstick (kanōn) or ruler (regula) was made by Epicurus, because a device such as this provides an accurate means for distinguishing correctness (in the case of a ruler, the fact that it is straight distinguishes straightness) and is itself a measuring unit (as rulers have marked units for distinguishing length). Epicurus also referred to his epistemology as kanonics. 623 On Lucretius’ use of sensus and his theories of sense perception, see Glidden (1979). For tactus, see Schoenheim (1966). 624 Through a search of these words on the Perseus Project website, videre (in inflected forms) was found more than 400 times in the poem, cernere 70, spectare 6, tueri 31. For nouns, oculus (inflected) occurs 56 times, species 13, acies 8. Deutsch (1939) 116 notes that, “Probably the single word which appears more than any other at the end of the line is a form of videre, usually in the passive voice. More than 210 verses in the poem end this way. Some fifty of these repetitions, or about one fourth of the total number, are in the fourth book, which is expected since the book is devoted to a discussion of images [i.e. simulacra, Epicurus’ εἴδωλα]”. The use of videtur is very pointed, stressing the power of vision; this is in contrast to the way that Roller (1970) 247 describes his use of Memmius’ name at line ending (in vocative as Memmi), arguing, “It would seem that Lucretius used the word Memmi

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chapter five, is the hallmark of the rhetorical construct of enargeia, twenty-seven times throughout the text.625 Indeed, the Rhetorica Ad Herennium specifically argues that enargeia is achieved by making it seem that a subject is present before the audience’s eyes (ante oculos).626

This is precisely what Lucretius hopes to achieve.

One of the most frequent and emphatic appeals to visualization, i.e. to enargeia, arises in the repeated second-person address to the reader with the verb “vides”, employed twenty-seven times in the text―thirteen coupled with “nonne”. The second-person verb cajoles the reader to envision the poem before his mind’s eye. Sheppard notes that in Ps.-Longinus’ On the Sublime, one of the “source[s] of sublimity” includes “the use of the second person, addressing the reader directly”.627 The formation “nonne vides” creates a negative question, which encourages the reader to answer tacitly “yes”, participating in the Epicurean didaxis.628 Keen argues that,

“reading a philosophical text in the way in which the author intended it to be read and understood is mental activity [and therefore evidence of it], and that the reader’s agreement with the text represents an intellectual conversion to the philosopher’s system”.629 Each and every concession made by the reader amounts to a step on the path towards Epicureanism. Thus,

Lucretius subtly wins his audience’s trust and gains their allegiance to Epicurean doctrines while at the same time disarming him to the counter-intuitive or even objectionable (from an outsider’s

whenever he was temporarily at a loss about how to finish a line, and that he had no special thought of appropriateness to the context.” 625 For comparison, Ovid, whom Hardie (2002a) 6 describes as “an obsessive visualiser” and whose works far outnumber Lucretius’ (six Loeb volumes to one), employs “the phrase ante oculos ...thirty-six times in his works”, a much smaller frequency. 626 Ad Herenn. 4.55.68: Demonstratio [i.e. enargeia] est cum ita verbis res exprimitur ut geri negotium et res ante oculos esse videatur. See chapter five and its discussion of this passage in §2. 627 Sheppard (2014) 34. 628 On Lucretius’ use of the phrase, nonne vides, its epic (and tragic) heritage, and ultimately its consignment to didactic, see Schiesaro (1984). In Lucretius, Schiesaro argues, the expression alerts the reader to “a transition to descriptive illustration” (p.145: “un preciso segnale che indica al lettore il passaggio ad una illustrazione esemplificativa.”). While he does (p.154) briefly link nonne vides to Epicurean epistemology, he does not connect it to either Epicurus’ stress on enargeia or to the rhetorical/therapeutic techniques of “bringing before the eyes”. 629 Keen (1985) 1. This article offers much helpful discussion of second-person verb forms throughout the poem.

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point of view) deductions in the argument. The vocabulary, filled with visual terms, encourages the reader to imagine and even to see the natural world, both the visible and the invisible, as if before the eyes (ante oculos).630

In descriptions of the natural world, Lucretius includes fine details, which stimulate the reader to visualize the scene and even to look around at his contemporary settings in order to see proof of his claims. This is especially clear in his description of fire’s effect on metal as he writes

(5.1252-57): “flaming heat with appalling din had devoured the forests deep down to the roots and parched up the earth with fire, through the hot veins into hollow places of the earth would ooze and collect a stream of silver and gold, of copper also and lead”.631 Kenney is one of the few commentators to recognize the value of enargeia in the epic and he singles out this passage for explicit praise, commenting: “[t]he description is vivid, in Lucretius’ best manner; but the vividness is not mere rhetorical enargeia for its own sake; this is not decorative writing but functional writing”.632 The observation aptly stress the dynamism of the poetic description, particularly exemplified through the life-like details (e.g. the listing of metals (1256-7) or the awful sound as trees fall due to the effects of fire (1252-4)) and continued with the visual

630 In fact the concept of “seeing in the mind” occurs throughout the text as in the description of the early history of mankind, where Lucretius remarks, “quippe etenim iam tum divom mortalia saecla / egregias animo facies vigilante videbant... (5.1169-70). In this instance, Lucretius stresses the ability to see with the mind (literally a waking mind [animo ...vigilante]). The reader, like the people Lucretius is describing, becomes an active participant and viewer as he is involved in visualizing the scenes described. Seeing is intricately linked with knowing in this instance as the image is more than merely a reference to vision, but rather to a sense of sight that is linked with the mind and knowledge. This too ties in to the themes of species and ratio. 631 DRN 5.1252-61: quidquid id est, quacumque e causa flammeus ardor / horribili sonitu siluas exederat altis / ab radicibus et terram percoxerat igni, / manabat uenis feruentibus in loca terrae / concaua conueniens argenti riuus et auri, / aeris item et plumbi. quae cum concreta uidebant / posterius claro in terra splendere colore, / tollebant nitido capti leuique lepore, / et simili formata uidebant esse figura / atque lacunarum fuerant uestigia cuique. However that may be, whatever the cause by which flaming heat with appalling din had devoured the forests deep down to the roots and parched up the earth with fire, through the hot veins into hollow places of the earth would ooze and collect a stream of silver and gold, of copper also and lead; and when afterwards they saw these congealed together and gleaming upon the earth with bright colour, they would pick them up captivated by the sleek smooth grace and would see that they were each moulded into a shape like the hollows in which they had left their mark. Translation from Rouse and Smith (1992). 632 Kenney (1972) 17.

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vocabulary of the twice-repeated videbant in lines 1257 and 1260. Nevertheless, Kenney does not see this individual occurrence of enargeia as a sort of microcosm of the poet’s technique, comparable to many other instances in the epic. He is right that it is “functional writing”, not

“decorative”, but I would argue that for Lucretius, no instance of enargeia should ever be characterized as “mere”. While stylistic enargeia was an important ornamental feature of

Hellenistic literature, more important to Lucretius was philosophical enargeia as the basis for

Epicurus’ empirical reasoning and rhetorical enargeia applied as a pedagocial procedure to bring true reality before the student-reader’s eyes. For the poet, then, enargeia is always more than a piece of ornamentation and is, instead, a vital means of both presenting and understanding

Epicurean philosophy. His realistic descriptions allow his readers to see Epicurean physics before their eyes and by seeing to know its truth.

While the atoms are ultimately too small to be seen with the naked eye, they can nonetheless be visualized through analogy. For example, we can recognize the need for visualization in the famous comparison of the arrangement of atoms to the letters in the poem itself (1.823-4): “...all through these very lines of mine you see (vides) many elements common to many words”.633 In this instance, the poem testifies to the truth of Epicurus’ physics.

Lucretius’ direct address of the reader with the second-person verb, vides, actively engages him in the learning process and encourages him to see visible evidence in the letters and words on the page. It is made all the more emphatic because contemporary, unlike modern, readers of the DRN

633 DRN 1.823-4: etiam passim nostris in versibus ipsis / multa elementa vides multis communia verbis. On the comparison of letters to atoms in this passage and throughout the DRN (the argument is repeated several times), see the contrasting discussions of Dalzell (1987) and Friedlander (1941). Note, especially, Friedlander’s comment (p.17): “The “letters”—this name covering at the same time what we call letters and sounds—are the elements of language, a limited number producing the abundance of words and verses. Thus they are an image of the atoms producing the world”. The italics are my own.

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would likely have listened to the poem, not read it with their eyes.634 Webb, for instance, comments on Quintilian that, “The common practice of reading aloud would, in itself, have helped to preserve the oral nature of the text for the reader”.635 Lucretius’ readers would likely not have seen letters on a roll of papyrus, but rather would have had to imagine them. Moreover, the un-seeable atoms, which might be difficult to conceive of, become reified through the homespun analogy.636 Enargeia—both rhetorical (through the descriptive analogy) and epistemic

(through the appeal to visual evidence)—has brought them before the reader’s eyes.637 Instead of remaining obscure and invisible, the reader can visualize these microscopic entities as being no different than alphabetic letters; the truth becomes self-evident.

Also rich in enargeia is the first description of Epicurus in the poem (1.62-7):

Humana ante oculos foede cum vita iaceret in terris oppressa gravi sub religione, quae caput a caeli regionibus ostendebat horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans, primum Graus homo mortalis tollere contra est oculos ausus primusque obsistere contra...

When humanity’s life lay for all to see (ante oculos) foully groveling upon the ground, crushed beneath the weight of Superstition, which displayed her head from the regions of heaven, lowering over mortals with horrible aspect, a man of Greece was the first who dared to uplift mortal eyes against her, the first to make stand against her...638

634 Fantham (1996) 38 concludes that, “we should imagine the cultured book-lover listening to more often than perusing his texts”. 635 Webb (1997) 113-14. 636 Recall also from chapters four and five that analogy was also a procedure allowed by Epicurus and utilized by Philodemus, respectively. Epicurus even uses an analogy to convey the power of his criteria of truth by likening them to yardsticks (kanōna). 637 While he makes no mention of Epicurean enargeia or self-evidence from empirical sensation, Keen’s (1985) assessment compliments my own. He argues (p.3), “Lucretius method of instructing his reader continues to operate at an overwhelmingly empirical level. If his reader is converted to atomism by the end of the poem and believes that he understands the world in a new and valid way, it is not because he has though[t] it out but because he[ ]perceives and observes the world in this new way” [I have corrected a few typos in Keen’s text]. This procedure is thoroughly in keeping with Epicurean stress on self-evident conclusions based on the senses. 638 Translation and text (slightly adapted) come from Rouse and Smith (1992).

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In the passage, Lucretius invites the reader to imagine mankind in a state of despair, dramatically employing the phrase “ante oculos” to encourage the reader to visualize this awful sight.639

Kenney is right in arguing that, “ante oculos is not a semi-formulaic filler, but represents the usual Epicurean appeal to the evidence of the senses”.640 Yet, he does not go far enough. The references to vision highlight the aim of Epicurus’ empiricism: a progression from the senses to rational understanding. The personification of religio with its horrible face (horribili ... aspectu), looming over humanity (super ...mortalibus instans) is especially evocative, as the poet brings an abstract concept to life, representing it as a monster that threatens mankind’s very existence.

Through imagery, the abstraction suddenly becomes a physical entity and is even seeable as the term “aspectu” adds to the stress on vision. Its threat, however, is not one of physical violence, but rather of ignorance, which can be relieved by proper reasoning. Epicurus takes on the role of martial hero and slayer of beasts; however, it is not through warfare that he defeats the enemy, but rather through vision and reason, emphasized by the description of how he “dared to uplift mortal eyes against her”.641

As in the cases of vides and nonne vides discussed above, Lucretius engages the reader through repetition as part of his didaxis. He repeats oculos in lines 62 and 67, primum and primus in lines 66, 67 and 71, and contra at the end of lines 66 and 67.642 Zanker addresses the importance of repetition for enargeia, again drawing on Dionysius, as he notes: “Another

639 The reader may not have had to use too much imagination amidst the turmoil of the mid-1st century BCE. One could simply look around and see visible evidence of Roman hardship. On this, see especially Keen (1985) 5. 640 Also drawing attention to Lucretius’ visual emphasis, Kenney (1974) 20 comments on the passage that, “The imagery is, as usual with Lucretius, consistently vivid and physical. The life of man - meaning all humanity - lay crushed under the weight of superstition for all to see: ante oculos is not a semi-formulaic filler, but represents the usual Epicurean appeal to the evidence of the senses; when Epicurus exposed religio for what it was he was able to do so precisely because he used his eyes on the visible universe. tendere contra est oculos ausus, that is, connotes not only defiance but observation.” 641 For discussion of Epicurus’ role as a conqueror in Lucretius’ poem and comparanda from the Aeneid, see Hardie (1986) 193-200. 642 DRN 1.71: naturae primus portarum claustra cupiret.

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method for producing ἐνάργεια ...is repetition, διλογία, which will ...appeal to the emotions rather than to the senses”.643 While critics have often noted the repetition of whole passages throughout the poem,644 we can also recognize how the power of repetition in a single passage leads to emotional reactions and increased attention in the reader.645 The repeated words jar the readers and force them to re-view the scene in their minds and to comprehend its horror.

In addition to repetition, the spondaic rhythms of lines 62-3 and alliteration in line 64

(quae caput a caeli...) also contribute to Lucretius’ weighty emotional appeal.646 The frightening imagery of the passage constantly appeals to the sense of vision, particularly through references to the eyes (the repeated oculos, 62 and 67) and appearance (aspectu, 65). While not commenting specifically on these lines, Townend’s description of “the essence of [Lucretius’] poetic treatment” which “has the power of conveying to us his vision or his feelings or both at once, the former of these with particular vividness” is apropos to this passage as well as many other descriptions in the DRN.647 Here, the reader is invited to imagine and see Epicurus as a triumphant general or a culture hero, ridding the world of the monster religio. Furthermore, as

Lucretius emphasizes, his achievement is far greater than a military leader or beast slayer because he accomplishes his feats not by martial force, but rather through the “vivid” or “living power of his mind” (1.72: vivida vis animi pervicet).648

643 Zanker (1981) 298. The argument is based on Dionysius 211ff. On repetition, see §2 of chapter 5, Lausberg (1998) §§434, 608-64 and Sheppard (2014) 34. For repetition in Lucretius, see especially Deutsch (1939), Ingalls (1971), West (1975), Thury (1987), Erler (1997), and Marcovic (2008) passim. 644 I would see most of these instances as memory aids, which illustrate Lucretius’ pedadogical method. On Lucretius’ mixture of realism and emotionalism, see especially Williams (1968) 671. 645 See, for example, Erler (1997) 85, in which he links repetition to meditation, arguing, “The repetitions in the text… may be viewed in this way [i.e. as meditative aspects], the demand to memorize certain truths (II.581-85), or the suggestion to use patterns of argument for personal exercitium…”. 646 For the importance of sound for creating enargeia, see §2, chapter five. 647 Townend (1965) 103-4. Townend’s chapter has numerous examples of Lucretian imagery with discussions of their vividness. Nevertheless, he neglects to link the vividness of the DRN to Epicurus’ stress on enargeia. 648 Similarly, Gale (1994) 122 recognizes “Lucretius’ praise of his mentor, who has conquered not only the world, but the entire cosmos, dictis non armis”. While Gale is right to note the power of Epicurus’ words, I would also stress that Epicurus’ weapon against the monstrous religio is not solely words, but also visual sense perception.

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Vision’s ability to attain sure knowledge and to dispel the evils of the world is also explicitly evoked in Lucretius’ encomium of Epicurus at the opening of Book 3. Here, he argues that Epicurus’ reasoning (3.14: ratio tua) has revealed the world so that (3.25-7), “the underworld regions are nowhere apparent, nor does earth stand in the way of seeing down into everything, whatsoever goes on below under our feet throughout the void”.649 In these lines, the poet succinctly banishes any thought of an or an underworld from his mind because they are not apparent (3.25: nusquam apparent Acherusia temple). He is applying Epicurus’ method of contestation (antimartyrȇsis); an afterlife does not exist, because this would conflict with the evidence of the senses and with atomic theory, which has already been proven to exist and to be self-evident (by non-contestation, ouk antimartyrȇsis).650 Furthermore, he articulates the power of Epicureanism in specifically visual terms: vision, or rather a heightened form of vision, allows one to understand the universe as one can look beneath (despicere) solid ground and recognize invisible void. The image is similar to ’s description of “the ideal dispassionate historian”, whom “he endows ...with a superhuman gaze, and likens ...to the Homeric Zeus, ‘who looks one moment at the land of the horse-tending , and the next moment at Mysi,’ and who

‘reports [events] as [they] appear to him from his lofty look-out’”.651 Like Lucian’s historian,

Epicurus has a god-like ability to see and understand all that occurs in the universe; no obstruction can stand in his way. Moreover, by accepting Epicurean philosophy, Lucretius too has gained the ability to see as the master did, an ability he also wishes his readers to develop through full conversion to his own true philosophy. He writes, “For once your [i.e. Epicurus’]

649 DRN 3:25-7: at contra nusquam apparent Acherusia templa, / nec tellus obstat quin omnia dispiciantur, / sub pedibus quaecumque infra per inane geruntur. 650 On the procedure of antimartyrȇsis, see §1, chapter four and below. 651 Walker (1993) 373. Walker relies on Russell’s translation of Hist. conscr. 49 for the quoted lines from Lucian. While Walker’s article is specifically on the use of enargeia for history and in particular its use by Thucydides, Dionysius, and Polybius, the use of enargeia by historians is very similar to that in Lucretius. Furthermore, Lucretius was clearly influenced by Thucydides as his plague description at the end of Book Six is heavily indebted to Thucydides’ plague in Book 2 of his history.

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reasoning started to enunciate the nature of things revealed by your divine mind, away flee the mind’s terrors, the walls of the world open out, I see [video] what goes on throughout the whole void” (3.14-17).652 The verbs (the alliterative diffugiunt and discedunt, and the dramatic video) vividly engage the reader as the didactic poet describes his own acceptance of

Epicureanism and the and heightened awareness that have come with it. Fear is personified and forced to run for its life (diffugiunt) because of the discoveries of

Epicurus―discoveries achieved by vision and mind. Like Epicurus, Lucretius has attained the ability to see (video) the true rerum natura and by seeing, he understands the nature of the universe and, therefore, has no fear.

3. Seeing the Unseeable

For Lucretius, the fundamental value of enargeia is its ability to relate to his reader and bring before his eyes concepts that are beneath the powers of the human senses to perceive. For instance, in his description of mirrors, enargeia is achieved both stylistically—through the vocabulary of vision—and thematically—through the appeal to the senses as the poet makes apparent the evidence for unclear aspects of the world, what Epicurus would call ἄδηλα. Let us look closely at this passage to see how this is done (4.269-274):

Nunc age, cur ultra speculum videatur imago percipe; nam certe penitus remmota videtur. quod genus illa foris quae vere transpiciuntur, ianua cum per se transpectum praebet apertum, multa facitque foris ex aedibus ut videatur; is quoque enim dublici geminoque fit aere visus…

Now perceive (percipe) as I tell you why an image (imago) is seen (videatur) beyond the mirror (speculum); for certainly it appears (videtur) to be far withdrawn. It is the same as with those objects which are seen (transpiciuntur) in their reality through the doors outside, when the doorway provides an open view (transpectum ...apertum) through it

652 DRN 3.14-17: nam simul ac ratio tua coepit vociferari / naturam rerum, divina mente coortam, / diffigunt animi terrores, moenia mundi / discedunt, totum video per inane geri res. Translations are adapted from Rouse and Smith (1992).

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and allows us to see (videantur) from the house many things outside. For this vision (visus) also is brought about by two distinct stretches of air...653

In a scant six lines, Lucretius utilizes ten words that appeal to the reader’s sense of vision. All three passive forms of videre (videatur at 269, videtur 270, and videantur 273) occur at the end of lines and are far more evocative than the usual English translation of videtur (or other passive forms of videre) as “seems”.654 In Lucretius, “is seen” or even “one sees” are often better ways to interpret videtur than “seems”, as the passive form relates explicitly to sight (unlike the Greek word δοκεῖ to which it often corresponds in Latin). Indeed, seeing for both Epicurus and

Lucretius is the basis of knowing (epistemē/scientia). It, therefore, has both an epistemic and ontological force. We can recall the epigram from the beginning of this chapter by the modernist poet, Wallace Stevens: “Let be be finale of seem”. Lucretius, as well as Epicurus, share this sentiment—i.e. existence is the supreme consummation of seeming (or being seen). The former, thus, conveys this epistemic force though his applications of videtur/videntur.

Townend argues that “it is of the greatest importance for the reader to remain constantly awake to the slightest example of imagery in the use of words, if he is not to miss something of this urgency”, an appeal which seems especially apropos to Lucretius’ use of “videre”.655 Volk claims, however, that Lucretius’ changing of referents in his words is “thoroughly un-

Epicurean”.656 This charge seems to be supported by Diogenes Laertius, who refers to Epicurus’ making “clearness [σαφήνεια/ saphēneia] the sole requisite” of rhetoric and notes that he made

653 See n.668 below for Diogenes of Oinoanda’s comparable discussion of mirrors. 654 Recall from n.624 how Deutsch (1939) 116 noted that, “Probably the single word which appears more than any other at the end of the line is a form of videre, usually in the passive voice”. Line 274 ends with visus used as a noun with an active meaning (seeing/sight). This illustrates the more evocative use of the verb “videre” as visus can also be the passive form of videre. 655 Townend (1965) 112. 656 Volk (2002) 117. Volk acknowledges that Epicurus encouraged a philosophy in which the careful use of words was required in which each word had a single, precise meaning, a position that is in marked contrast to Lucretius’ strategy in which he frequently alters the meaning of words depending on the context (e.g. res, ratio, videre, summa, etc.).

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a point of using the “standard expression when referring to things” (λέξει κυρίᾳ κατὰ τῶν

πραγμάτων).657 Lucretius’ alterations from the most straightforward meaning of words would seem to be at odds with Epicurus’ teachings regarding saphēneia, “clarity of expression”. But is his form of expression really unclear? His uses of the verb videre surely possess nuanced meanings, more diverse than the “standard expression”; however, the clarity of his thought is never really in doubt.658 The language is, as the practice of saphēneia requires, functional.659

Moreover, the poetry is also vivid and graphic, appealing directly to the evidence of the senses, particularly vision. Likewise the analogies bring the sensory data of the world before the eyes of the listeners/readers, a procedure that is in harmony with Epicurus’ epistemology and its foundation of “self-evident clarity”, enargeia. What seems at first to be “un-Epicurean” and a sign of obscurity in Lucretius’ terminology is, in fact, a rhetorical procedure that is consistent with the master’s teachings.

An especially dramatic example of the manipulations of videre comes in the middle of

Book Four, as Lucretius changes subjects from sight to sound, yet he seems to get his senses confused. The speaker claims (4.598-600): “we often see [videmus] a conversation going on behind closed doors, of course because the voice can pass unimpaired through tortuous passages in a substance, while images [simulacra, i.e. Epicurus’ εἴδωλα/eidōla] refuse”.660 The mingling of sight and sound may catch the reader by surprise. Indeed, Bailey comments that, “videmus is awkward with colloquium,” albeit acknowledging that there are other passages [from Plautus,

Virgil, Horace, and another from Lucretius] where “videre is used for perception by senses other

657 On this passage and saphēneia (in both Epicurus and in rhetoric), see §1, chapter four and §2, chapter five. 658 On Lucretius’ avoidance of a technical vocabulary and, instead, reliance upon common words with shifting meanings, in particular “sensus and sentire”, see Glidden (1979). 659 Nünlist (2009) 197. For more on saphēneia vs. enargeia, see the discussion in §2, chapter five. 660 DRN 4.598-600: conloquium clausis foribus quoque saepe videmus, / nimirum quia vox per flexa foramina rerum / incolumis transire potest, simulacra renutant. On the Epicurean theory of eidōla, see §1, chapter four and n.667, below.

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than sight”.661 Ultimately, he offers the solution that “here it means rather ‘we see a conversation taking place’”.662 While Bailey is right to notice the discontinuity between the verb of seeing and the auditory perception of a conversation, his answer is, I think, off track. Even if one were to accept his claim that Lucretius refers to how people can “see a conversation taking place”, surely one would have to admit that we cannot see a conversation taking place behind closed doors

(4.598: clausis foribus). Kenney is closer to the answer as he sees this as an instance of

“Lucretius’ use of synaesthetic metaphor to convey the materiality of ...phenomena”.663 It is indeed synaesthetic as the poet combines seeing and listening; this is due, however, to Epicurus’ stress on vision and visualization, not the writer’s carelessness.664 Seeing and hearing become entwined in the visual description of an auditory process. Lucretius thus subsumes all sensation, in this instance hearing, beneath the umbrella of vision. The verb videmus acts as a cue to enargeia, as the poet engages the reader in the practice of visualization and forces him to imagine the Epicurean account for sound passing through doors. Because the correct explanation for sound and vision are ultimately the same—atoms moving through void and making contact with sense organs—it is perfectly appropriate for the poet to switch the senses of perception in this way. Thus, Lucretius encourages the reader to visualize the process of hearing. The didactic procedure is, moreover, based on proper Epicurean reasoning in which inferences about invisible matters must be checked against clear evidence of the senses, i.e. non-confirmation (ouk antimartyrȇsis). To recall, non-contestation is the practice whereby we can check hypotheses about unclear realms, which are beneath our sensory threshold, against self-evidence (i.e.

661 Bailey (1947) 1252. 662 Ibid. 663 Kenney (2007a) 107, n.61. The quotation offers a brief summary of Catrein’s helpful and fuller discussion of synesthesia in Lucretius; see Catrein (2003) 180-3. 664 Note that even the comparison of the atoms to the letters on the page discussed above was to some degree synaesthetic as well, as the contemporary ‘reader’ of Lucretius’ poem would likely have listened to it, not looked at it with his eyes.

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enargeia).665 Furthermore, Epicurus’ kanonic procedure also allows for analogies, based on physical sensations, to be utilized for discovering truth. The passage exemplifies Lucretian enargeia at its most vivid; through its stress on visual sensations, the reader is transformed from a passive listener into an active visualizer of a verbally described scene. Furthermore, the reader/student must test and verify along with the poet/teacher whether the description coheres with what they clearly perceive about the world. Since these judgments do not conflict with the clear evidence of the senses, they must be accepted as true.

Perhaps the finest example of Lucretius’ ability to make the unseeable seeable comes in his description of the atomorum, Epicurus’ (in)famous theory of the swerve of atoms

(described at DRN 2.216-93). This principle is a vital component of Epicurean physics, yet it presents challenges to our understanding as well as the poet’s expressive ability, because it occurs beneath the threshold of vision. How can we see something that is invisible? How can we even describe it? Again, the poet’s only recourse is to employ Epicurus’ procedure of non- contestation (ouk antimartyrȇsis), which was laid out in chapter four. By utilizing this technique, he puts the master’s teachings into action; he also, therefore, has a solid foundation for his line of reasoning. At the same time, he appeals to visible evidence as the clear proof for his conclusions.

This allows the reader to imagine and see the swerve through poetic imagery.

In Philodemus, we can also see evidence of the Epicurean procedures of attestation and non-contestation at work. This is especially important as it shows that Epicureans who were contemporary with Lucretius, and perhaps even known to him, continued to employ the inferential procedures established by their philosophical master. In a passage from his On

Methods of Inference (Frag. IV.6-17), Philodemus argues:

665 On antimartyrȇsis, see §1, chapter four and Bailey (1947) 55-60. Clay (1983) 68-9 emphasizes sense perception as a check on reason, writing, “Sensation is …the ultimate court of appeal for the constructs of reasoning, which they can either “corroborate,” testify against, or be neutral to”.

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…we should use the proper criteria, so that we shall not in any case think that we know objects temporally unperceived by the absence of conflicting evidence, and so that we shall not think that things which are subject to verification are unperceived by nature; and further, so that we may not consider a thing apparent [ἐναργῆ] on the ground that it does not seem to be unperceived by nature [ἄδηλα], or unperceived by nature [ἄδηλα] on the ground that it does not seem apparent [ἐναργ[ῆ]].666

What Philodemus (likely) calls the “proper” or “necessary criteria” [τοῖς δεομένοις

κ[ριτηρίοις], i.e. direct, clear sensory evidence (enargeia), attest to and verify our judgments about the sensory realm. They cannot be used, however, as the passage shows, for determining future outcomes (i.e. things that are awaiting evidence [[ἐ]πί τινων προσμένει[ν]]) or things that are “unclear by nature” (ἄδηλα φύσ[ει]).667 Enargeia is not helpful for determining things that are “unclear by nature” and, therefore, unknowable, such as the number of the stars. It does, however, provide us with a sound basis for inferences about non-sensible features of the world

(such as void, atoms, and the swerve); for these, we must check that our hypotheses and their necessary conclusions do not contest or conflict with sensory evidence in any way.668 By utilizing the procedure of non-contestation, ouk antimartyrȇsis, Epicurus and those who follow

666 Philodemus, Περὶ σημειώσεων (P. Herc. 1065), Frag. IV.6-17: [κ]αὶ τοῖς δεομένοις κ[ριτηρίοις] πρὸς τὸ μήτε γ[νῶσιν [ἐ]πί τινων προσμένει[ν ἡ[γ]εῖσθαι τῶι μὴ ἀντιμα[ρτυρῆσ]αι μήθ’ ὡς ἄδηλα φύσ[ει νομίζε]σθαι τὰ δι’ ἐπιµαρτυ̣[ρήσεως λαμβ]άνεσθαι δυ[νάμενα· τὰ] δὲ συνεχῆ πρὸς τὸ [μή τινα ν]ομίζειν ἐναργῆ διὰ [τὸ μὴ φύσει φαίνεσθ’] ἄδηλα κα[ὶ φύσει τίν’ ἄδηλα διὰ τὸ μῆ] ἐναργ[ῆ φαίνεσθαι]. Text and translation come from DeLacy and DeLacy (1978). See also Everson (1990) 178 ff. and Scott (1989) 363ff. 667 On things that are unclear by nature and therefore cannot be known, see Tuominen (2007) 256ff., which notes that in describing Epicurean epistemology Sextus distinguishes that which is “naturally non-evident [adēlon]… for instance the number of stars”, which can never be known, from that which is “homonymously non- evident” [M. 8.317: τὰ δ’ ὁμωνύμως τῷ γένει λεγόμενα ἄδηλα], which “is not altogether unknowable; it is hidden but can be made known to us”. See also Everson (1990). 668 The Epicurean inscription of Diogenes at Oinoanda likely from the 2nd century CE offers additional evidence of Epicurean reasoning from sensory perceived phenomena to unclear phenomena by means of the procedures of contestation and affirmation. Note, for example, how Diogenes argues for the Epicurean theory of eidōla from the example of images seen in mirrors (Fragment 9 (NF 5 +6) col.1-2): “[And] often mirrors too will be my witnesses [μαρτυρήσει] [that likenesses] and appearances are real [entities]. For what I say will certainly not be denied at all by the image which will give supporting evidence on oath in mirrors. We should not see ourselves in them, nor indeed would [any reflection] be created, [if there were not a continual flow being borne from us to the mirrors and bringing back an image] to us. For this too is convincing proof (ἀπελ̣έν[χ]ει) of the effluence, seeing that each of the parts is carried to the point straight ahead” (…καὶ] πολ[λ]άκις, ὅ[τι εἰκόνες] καὶ φάσµ̣α̣τα [φύσεις ἀλη]θεῖς ὑπάρχουσιν, καὶ τὰ κάτοπτρα μαρτυρήσει μοι· οὐ δὴ γὰρ ἀπερεῖ τι ἅ φηµι τ̣[ὸ] ε̣ἴδωλον ὃ προσοµ̣εῖται ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις. οὐκ ἂν ἐν ἐκείνοις ἑαυτοὺ[ς ἑ]ω̣[ρ] ῶµεν̣ κ̣α̣ὶ ο̣ὐδ̣’ ἂν ἐἐγ̣ε̣ί̣νετό [τι, εἰ μὴ ἦν ῥεῦμα συνε][χὲς ἀφ’ ἡμῶν πρὸς ἐκεῖ][να φερόμενον καὶ] ἡµε̣ῖν [εἴδωλον ἀναφ]έρον. ἀπελ̣έν[χ]ει γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τὴν ἀπόροιαν διὰ τὸ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων εἰς τὴν κατ’ εὐθὺ χώραν φέρεσθαι). Translations and Greek text come from Smith (1993). On the dating of the inscription, see the introduction to Smith (1993) 35-48.

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his teachings, like Philodemus and Lucretius, can in their view make truthful claims about unclear or unseeable phenomena and even achieve firm knowledge of them. Lucretius thus has a solid foundation in Epicurean reasoning (and one supported by the contemporary evidence of

Philodemus) for applying this rational mode to his discussions of sensible and non-sensible phenomena. In this way, he integrates Epicurus’ empirical strategies into his poetry by basing his conclusions on the clear and true evidence of the senses, i.e. enargeia.

To convey the concept of the swerve to his reader, Lucretius relies heavily on imagery and enargeia, along with reasoning that appeals to sense-evidence as he applies the Epicurean procedure of non-confirmation. He begins his description with an explicit appeal to the reader:

“One further point in this matter I desire you to understand” (2.216).669 The first-person, plural main verb “avemus” along with the emphatic accusative subject “te” addressed directly to the reader and linked to the verb for “understanding”, “cognoscere”, demands the reader’s attention.

Lucretius subtly draws him into the obscure philosophical topic and the poetic didaxis through this rhetorical move. It is both personal and subtle, as teacher and student embark upon the new topic together.

Over the next eight lines, Lucretius gives a cursory description of how a swerve takes place (2.217-24).670 Here too, the poet/teacher involves the reader as a pupil in the learning process. He notes that the atoms “swerve a tiny bit (depellere paulum) just so much as you might call (dicere possis) a change of motion” (2.219-20). The second-person verb wins a small concession from reader/student: he must admit that he, himself, would identify it as a tiny shift in

669 DRN 2.216: illud in his quoque te rebus cognoscere avemus. 670 DRN 2.216-24: Illud in his quoque te rebus cognoscere avemus, / corpora cum deorsum rectum per inane feruntur / ponderibus propriis, incerto tempore ferme / incertisque locis spatio depellere paulum, / tantum quod momen mutatum dicere possis. / quod nisi declinare solerent, omnia deorsum / imbris uti guttae caderent per inane profundum / nec foret offensus natus nec plaga creata / principiis; ita nihil umquam natura creasset. For atomic motion in Lucretius, see Fowler (2002).

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movement (with the implied future less vivid protasis, “if you were to see it yourself”). This allowance enables Lucretius to get his foot in the door, so to speak, and from this foundation he can now build up additional evidence and agreement through his rhetoric.671 He develops further arguments for the swerve (clinamen) alongside visual imagery, which persuades the reader of its occurrence. At the same time, he provides analogies and explanations so that the listener/reader can visualize how it must work.

Lucretius’ vivid introduction to the swerve culminates in a dramatic display of enargeia

(2.246-50):

namque hoc in promptu manifestumque esse videmus, pondera, quantum in sest, non posse obliqua meare, ex supero cum praecipitant, quod cernere possis; sed nil omnino recta regione viai declinare quis est qui possit cernere sese?

For this we see to be manifest and plain, that weights, as far as in them lies, cannot travel obliquely, when they fall from above, as far as one can perceive; but who is there who can perceive that they never swerve even a tiny bit from the straight undeviating course?

The verbal manipulations between the first- to second- to third-person forms draw the reader into a conversational type of exchange; the poet in the role of teacher/guide makes sure to win the student’s agreement before proceeding with each part of the lesson. The first-person plural

“videmus” is not (as it was in the case of “avemus” at 2.216 that began the passage) a poetic usage in which the poet refers to himself. Instead, the verb is collective as poet and reader, teacher and student, are linked together with one another in a sort of pedagogical lesson; both concede that they can visualize the image that Lucretius is describing as if it were right in front of their faces, “in promptu manifestuque” (2.246). The poet builds to a crescendo, climaxing in an impassioned rhetorical question where he again stresses sight, asking: “Who is there who can

671 In modern psychology, this is referred to as the foot-in-the-door phenomenon or “gradation technique”, see Freedman and Fraser (1966).

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perceive (cernere) that they [i.e. anything with mass, therefore including atoms] never swerve even a tiny bit?” (2.249-50). What is striking about the passage is that Lucretius demands that the reader see something, which is in fact beneath the threshold of human sense-perception. One must visualize the swerving movements of the atoms and yield to his assertion that the swerve is both possible and ultimately necessitated. Only the swerve provides a valid answer to his question and satisfies the principle of non-contestation (ouk antimartyrȇsis) by not being opposed to physical evidence. The succeeding analysis brings additional arguments for the swerve and its role in free will, both logical (2.251-62) and analogic (as in the image of race horses breaking out of the gate (2.263-270)).672 These also assist the reader in imagining the swerve before his eyes (note the appeal to vision with the verb “vides” at 2.263). It is, however, the vivid introduction to the swerve, which sets the reader on the path to knowledge as the

Epicurean poet applies Epicurus’ own procedure of inference from sensory evidence (ouk antimartyrȇsis). Lucretius’ enargeia is what makes the passage on the swerve so effective, as it engages the reader in a participatory visual experience in which both teacher and pupil visualize swerving atoms as if they were obvious (manifestum) and right in front of their eyes (in promptu). Indeed, manifestum seems to be his word of choice to translate Epicurus’ enargēs/enargeia.

4. Conclusion

As a final word, let us take up the famous passage from Book 3 where Lucretius argues that mankind should let go of the fear of death for “death is nothing to us” (3.830).673 Once again, we witness a striking instance of enargeia as his diatribe builds to an emphatic plea, phrased in a

672 For the comparison to horses leaving their stalls in a race (DRN 2.263-71), which gives vivid analogical evidence for free will, see especially Schiesaro (1984) 143-4. 673 DRN 3.830: Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinet hilum....

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future less vivid condition (3.902-3): quod bene si videant animo dictisque sequantur, / dissolvant animi magno se angore metuque (“but if [people] could see this [i.e. that death is nothing to worry about] clearly in mind and so conform their speech, they would free themselves from great anguish and fear of the mind”).674 Here, the poet presents vision as the cure to all of mankind’s worries. Sight directly leads to understanding and wisdom. Moreover, vision is not strictly an ability of the eyes, but rather is associated with the mind (the twice-repeated animo, animi), as both seeing and understanding are concurrent with one another. The lines offer a sort of statement of purpose for the whole poem: to make people see; for, if this could be possible, then all of humanity’s and fear (angore metuque) would be alleviated (dissolvant animi

...se). The poet seems to live and breathe Epicureanism to the point where even his mode of communication attests to his philosophy; his writing both presents Epicureanism and applies it to its every expression.675 Epicurus’ theories are part of the fabric of his poetry as he integrates sense-perception with the “clear view” of knowledge. Only by seeing clear evidence, i.e. enargeia, can mankind harness its ability to understand the world and, thereby, free itself from fear. It is the same as his link between species and ratio, described earlier. If we can see, we will know.

The didactic power of Lucretius’ poem encourages the reader to participate actively in a learning process.676 The poet does not just lecture at the reader, but rather the teacher-poet and student-reader learn together in a kind of pedagogic discussion. Sometimes he prods the student

674 On Lucretius’ “diatribe”, see Wallach (1976). On the arguments about death in the poem, see Segal (1990). 675 On ancient philosophy as a “way of life”, see Hadot (1995). On the DRN as “applied Epicureanism”, see Keen (1985) 8. 676 Schiesaro (2007) 67 describes how Lucretius’ model reader/pupil must participate in the reasoning of the poem, noting that, “This didactic relationship, more articulate and more mature, is the one the poet intends to establish with his general readership, not just with Memmius. In fact, the essential principles of Epicureanism are relatively few, and on their basis a sufficiently intelligent disciple-reader can work out the explanation of a fair number of phenomena. Especially in the later books of the poem, Lucretius presupposes precisely this kind of self- initiative, for instance when he invites the reader to reflect autonomously on certain aspects of meteorology (6.527- 34)…”.

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gently, while at other times he is harsher in his tone; in either instance, he is practicing the same sort of Epicurean frank speech encouraged by Philodemus.677 Furthermore, as with his Epicurean contemporary, Lucretius’ pedagogy also requires constant visualization by both teacher and student. Conte captures this joint philosophical endeavor by noting that, “the true of the De rerum natura is an observer guided by the poet”. 678 His comment highlights the importance of vision at the poem’s core. Lucretius teaches us how to see the world with a new kind of gaze, one which can penetrate even down to the unseeable atoms and void or survey the entire cosmos and its infinite universes. By means of enargeia, he seizes his reader’s attention and invites him/her to visualize and see the truth offered by Epicurean philosophy through both imagery and arguments based on sensory evidence. In this way, Lucretius combines the

Hellenistic rhetorical theory of enargeia with the epistemological.

Sheppard argues that, “In antiquity, …the search for a connection between imagination and knowledge led …away from realism”.679 While this assertion is, perhaps, correct in regards to the mainly Neo-Platonist texts which she studies in her monograph, it is clearly not the case for Epicureans, and especially not for Lucretius. Descriptive realism and visual evidence is at the core of his poetic method and at the heart of his philosophy. This conception is rooted in

Epicurus’ modes of kanonic reasoning in which clear sensations provide the foundation for and check upon knowledge. Lucretian imagery is not merely decorative, but rather it provides synoptic encapsulations of Epicurean doctrine, which are left to the reader to see and understand.

Epistemic enargeia is the foundational bedrock on which all of his inferences rest; rhetorical enargeia provides him with the means for engaging readers as pupils in the poetic didaxis. For

677 See §3, chapter five. In general, Lucretius tends to take a harsher tone than Philodemus; see, especially, Armstrong (2004a) and Sider (2004). 678 Conte (1994) xxii. 679 Sheppard (2014) 38. See also Zanker (2004) and (1987).

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both Lucretius and Epicurus, self-evidence is the mechanism by which the invisible becomes visible before one’s eyes and it provides the limit for human reasoning. By recognizing it, we can attain knowledge and peace of mind. Indeed, enargeia—clear, compelling, and true evidence— allows mankind to see the world for what it truly is and by seeing to know the nature of things.

200 CHAPTER SEVEN

PROLĒPSEIS: CONCLUSION WITH ANTICIPATIONS

1. Putting it Together: A Synopsis

Over the course of this study, we have examined the concept of enargeia in all of its manifestations—philosophical, rhetorical, literary, therapeutic, pedagogical—and then applied these Hellenistic theories to a close reading of one test case, Lucretius’ De rerum natura.

Philosophically—particularly in Stoicism and Epicureanism—it is the defining mark of all criteria of truth, self-evidence, and as such it provides the basis for all knowledge

(epistēme/scientia). During the Hellenistic period, the term was adapted in rhetorical theory and in literary criticism to refer to the creation of visually rich passages, in which the senses of the audience are engaged so intensely that that they can practically see a verbally described scene. It was in the late Hellenistic and Imperial periods that philosophical and rhetorical enargeia became merged into the therapeutic and pedagogical practices of visualization. In the educational strategies of Epicureans, as preserved in the writings of Philodemus, and Stoics, as seen in

Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, students and teachers are encouraged to place their philosophical principles “before their eyes” (ante oculos). By focusing one’s mind on the school’s doctrines and by recalling its teachings in memory through short maxims, the student and/or teacher keeps him/herself on track and can modify his/her behavior to conform with what they know to be true, i.e. with enargeia.

The adjective enargēs first emerges in the Greek language in epiphanic or dream contexts in Homer. Throughout the archaic and classical periods, it continues to possess a sublime aspect linking the act of seeing with divinely inspired knowledge, which we have referred to as perspicuitas. In chapter three, we saw how in the fourth century BCE the adjective and the

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newly-coined noun enargeia came to have a more technical meaning in both philosophy and rhetoric—one which referred to clear evidence (evidentia), particularly from the sense of vision.

Entering into philosophy in the works of Plato, the adjective features prominently in the

Phaedrus in the charioteer myth; the myth articulates a special kind of vision—even of the impossible-to-see forms—which brings with it knowledge. In the Statesman, we find the first instance of enargeia, used in a description of a well-defined and detailed painting as opposed to a bare outline. By the mid- to late-fourth century BCE, Aristotle employs the terms in all of the major branches of his corpus: philosophical, rhetorical, and literary. In the Poetics and Rhetoric, in particular, he paves the way for the rhetorical and literary concept of enargeia in the

Hellenistic period by articulating the value of vivid descriptions, which he calls pro omattōn poiein (placing before the eyes) or energeia (actualization).680 He also utilizes the adjective (and the noun in a single instance in de Anima) in contexts where he addresses the power of vision, linking it with phantasia—a concept that can refer either to the imagination or to appearances from real world objects.681 For him phantasia is the mechanism that links the physical world with the mind.682 By the time of Aristotle’s death (in 322 BCE) the seeds of enargeia as a technical concept in philosophy as well as in rhetoric and literary criticism were already taking root.

It was not, however, until the end of the fourth century BCE that Epicurus arrived in

Athens. Stepping into an established philosophical milieu—the city of Plato’s Academy and

Aristotle’s Lyceum—he seized upon the term enargeia and raised it to a central piece of his own—very different—epistemology. For him, enargeia, meaning “self-evidence”, is the key feature of any criterion of truth. To recall, these included sensation (aisthēsis), preconception

680 See Newman (2002), Moran (1996), and Kennedy (2007) 218ff. For the rhetorical usage of enargeia in the Hellenistic period, see chapter five. 681 See Schofield (1992) and (1979), and Frede (1992). 682 See Sheppard (2014) 6-10.

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(prolēpsis), and feelings (pathē).683 For him, all judgments—ethical, sensual, cosmological, epistemic—must be based on self-evident truth, i.e. enargeia. In the following years, the Stoics appropriated Epicurus’ term, perhaps spurred on by its Platonic precedent. While their specific criteria of truth are less clearly defined, they too made enargeia, meaning self-evidence, central to judging truth from falsehood. They argued that judgment is only assured if it is based on a kataleptic impression (kataleptikē phantasia), a sensual (or mental) image, which was said to drag one to assent as if by the hair.684 In both of these schools, judgment requires a two-fold process involving both sense-evidence, particularly visual, and mental reasoning. To utilize them both correctly, they stress the importance of visualization as a didactic means of cajoling oneself or others to keep judgments in line with the evidence of the world. Only by constant attention to the self-evident can we know truth.

The close association of visualization, i.e. seeing with the mind, and the physical sense of vision in Epicurean and Stoic epistemology contributed to the development of the literary and rhetorical theories of enargeia during the Hellenistic period. In these spheres, Aristotle’s procedure of “placing before the eyes” becomes subsumed under the general heading of enargeia, referring to realistic and detailed descriptions that transform the reader or listener into a viewer, a technique that is closely related to ekphrasis.685 The Epicureans and the Stoics integrated these theories into their own epistemologies by making visualization an essential part of practicing philosophy, as is clear from the evidence of Philodemus, Cicero, and later Stoics like Seneca and Epictetus. In these cases, evidence is no longer direct from the senses, but rather it is preserved in the mind through memory, to be accessed through careful attention and mental

683 We also discussed in §1 of chapter four the (possible) fourth criterion, the “focusing of thoughts into an impression” in light of Epicurean epistemology and its appeal to sense-evidence, enargeia. 684 L&S 40K. 685 See §2, chapter five and Webb (2009).

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focus. It is precisely this sort of procedure that Philodemus’ works on free speech and anger (as in the phrase “Let us place before our eyes”) illustrate.686 Similarly, it is also an application of enargeia—therapeutic and epistemic—when the Stoic emperor Marcus Aurelius chides himself to keep true facts before his eyes (“let it be vivid”).687 In these philosophical writers, all of the forms of enargeia—philosophical, rhetorical, and therapeutic—are used together with one another; they can act and reason appropriately only by coaxing themselves to focus their mind strictly on self-evident truths.

While Lucretius’ poem with its explicitly Epicurean subject matter and its didactic nature, steeped in the rhetorical theories of its age, is an especially good starting point for an inquiry such as this, it is not the only place that such a study could be done. Indeed, virtually any ancient author could be examined for applications of enargeia, whether for vivid imagery (what we have discussed under the heading ante oculos, “placing before the eyes”) or for appeals to sensory evidence (evidentia). Ancient critics already applied these theories, as we have seen, to interpreting Homer, historians (particularly Thucydides), tragedy, oratory, and various genres of poetry. What I have illustrated, however, is that especially in cases where an author is known to have had philosophical interests—particularly in Stoicism or Epicureanism—such an inquiry becomes far more worthwhile, with a paradigmatic significance. In these instances, we must go further than simply pointing out descriptive passages, and instead take note of the epistemological nuances that arise when vision is linked to knowledge. Therefore, as an additional case study, I propose to take up one scene from Virgil’s Aeneid to see how epistemic and rhetorical enargeia are employed.

686 On Frank Criticism, fr. 26: τιθῶμεν δὲ πρὸ ὀμμάτων καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἣν ἔχει κηδεμονικὴ νουθέτησις [ἀρ] ἀρεσ-κούση]ς μέν, ἐπιει[κ]ῶς δὲ δ]ιακνούσης ἅπαντας <ε>ἰρωνείας. Let us set before our eyes also the difference that exists between a caring admonishment and an irony that pleases but pretty much stings everyone. Text and translation are from Konstan, et al. (1998). On this phrase, see §3, chapter five. 687 M. Aur. Med. 10.23: Ἐναργὲς ἔστω… On this phrase, see §2, chapter four.

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2. Monimenta: Epicurean Evidence in the Finale of the Aeneid688

Why the Aeneid? Certainly, Virgil’s Eclogues and Georgics, often recognized for their

Epicurean and especially Lucretian influences, would provide stimulating evidence for enargeia and vividness, and I would hope for such an inquiry to be conducted either by myself or someone else in the future.689 Nevertheless, the Aeneid offers helpful points of comparison with, as well as departure from, the De rerum natura. First of all, Virgil was deeply influenced by Lucretius’ poem, a debt that the Aeneid reveals on virtually every page.690 Johnson goes so far as to assert,

“Vergil’s reading of that poem was probably the most important thing in his life as a poet (to call that reading an event would be misleading since it is clear that the reading was habitual and unending)”.691 Furthermore, the Aeneid allows us to understand how enargeia continues to be at work in Latin poetry outside of the didactic genre in a more traditional, mythological epic.

Like Lucretius, Virgil was deeply influenced by Hellenistic philosophy, rhetorical theory, historiography, and literary criticism, and by Epicureanism, in particular.692 Critics have often noticed, for instance, his use of ekphrasis, which we can recall would have been regarded as an

688 This section is based on a paper given at the 2015 SCS conference in New Orleans as part of the panel: “New Frontiers in Roman Epicureanism”. It benefited greatly from input from the respondents and panel presenters. 689 The influence of Lucretius on the Georgics, for instance, as Thomas (1988) vol. 1, 4, notes, is “pervasive”. Nevertheless, Thomas downplays the influence of Epicureanism on the Georgics (indeed, he does not even mention the word in his two volume commentary), and argues that, “As for Lucretius, his linguistic influence upon the Georgics is pervasive, but it is chiefly so in a particular way: Virgil draws from him to create a didactic appearance for his poem. So he is at his most Lucretian on a very small scale, for instance with transitional or other phrases whose function is to provide a flavour”. He does mention as a Lucretian reminiscence Virgil’s use of the phrase nonne vides (1.56), one of the essential expressions in his procedure of enargeia as noted in chapter six. On the influence of the De rerum natura on the Georgics, see also Hardie (1986) 33-51. For Philodemus’ influence on the Georgics, see Johnson (2004) and Gigante (2004). For Epicurean readings of Virgil’s early poems, see the articles by Clay, Auricchio, Chambert, and Davis in Armstrong, et al. (2004). On Lucretian reception, see Hardie (2009). 690 See especially Hardie (1986) 157-240 and Bailey (1931). 691 Johnson (1976) 151. 692 For Virgil’s knowledge of ancient literary criticism through the Homeric scholia, see Schlunk (1974). For philosophy, to note just one famous example (among many others), notice the influence of Plato’s “” in Book 10 of the Republic on Anchises’ vision of the metempsychosis of souls in Aeneid 6. Virgil’s main use of historiography is not classical, but Hellenistic and Roman; note especially his employment of Roman antiquarians such as Varro (see especially Heinze (1928, Trans. 1993) 375-6 and under Varro in his index). For the influence of Hellenistic poetry on the Aeneid, see Clausen (1987).

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example of enargeia.693 Nevertheless, regarding the philosophy of the poet and the poem, scholars have often read the epic through a Platonic or Stoic lens, while downplaying

Epicureanism. For instance, Quinn argues that, “Epicureanism finds its place [in the poem], though a minor one—the study of Dido in Book 4, for example, is almost as much a study in

Lucretian Epicureanism as it is a study of love as a tragic passion”.694 Many scholars have also seen what Hardie calls “a process of deconversion”, from his Epicurean studies in his youth to a more Stoic or eclectic outlook. This view of Virgil remains inconclusive and, in my judgment, unnecessary.695 It is clear that he was closely associated with the Epicurean group centered in

Naples and was even a dedicatee of Philodemus’ On Vices and Virtues.696 As Stok notes, “The papyrus thus confirms information given by Servius (ad Ecl. 6.13; ad Aen. 6.264) about Vergil’s

Epicurean scholarship at the school of the philosopher Siro (who is mentioned in Catal. 5 and 8 as well)”.697 Epicurean influence is assuredly present in the poem and there is a lacuna in much of modern scholarship in explaining this debt.

In light of recent discoveries, particularly from papyri found at , scholars have in recent years increasingly tried to fill this lacuna by interpreting the Aeneid along

Epicurean lines.698 Even the poem’s stress on fate and its inclusion of gods as participants in the action, while on the surface far from Epicurean in outlook, can be adapted to fit with

Epicureanism, particularly through more allegorical readings. By looking at just one example— the end of the poem—I show that an understanding of Epicurean theories of evidence and

693 See §2, chapter five. On ekphrasis in the Aeneid, see especially Fowler (2000b), Putnam (1998), Barchiesi (1997), Boyd (1995), and Thomas (1983). 694 Quinn (1968) 287-8. For Epicurean influence on the Dido scenes, see Gordon (1998) and Dyson (1996). 695 Hardie (1986) 157. 696 See §3, chapter five, and especially the studies collected in Armstrong, et al. (2004). 697 Stok (2010) 116. 698 See, for instance, the first three chapters of Cairns (1989), which utilizes Philodemus’ On the Good King According to Homer in order to argue that Aeneas is the embodiment of Philodemus’ “good king”. See also Adler (2003), Kronenberg (2005), and Armstrong, et al. (2004) passim.

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emotions can help us explain epistemological issues that are raised in the final scene. Thus, even in a mythological epic, we can find much evidence of Epicurean influence. As I illustrate through a close reading of the poem’s conclusion, Aeneas’ actions and reactions are based solely on reasoning from self-evident sense perception; this procedure is, thus, consistent with the modes of reasoning taught by Epicurus and upheld by Lucretius and Philodemus.

By examining the Aeneid, we can furthermore correct an error, made by the venerable

Heinze. To wit: regarding Virgil’s visual imagery, Heinze singles out, “Virgil’s skill in making the reader feel that he is experiencing the events himself, and achieving the maximum ἐνάργεια

[vividness] by portraying the effect of an event on those who witness it, a technique derived from drama”.699 While he acutely recognizes Virgil’s use of enargeia throughout the poem, he erroneously attributes this practice solely to influence from tragedy (and we can assume, theories of tragedy, such as Aristotle’s Poetics).700 As we have seen throughout this study, enargeia was not only a component of tragedy or dramatic theory, but was also a rhetorical and philosophical concept prevalent (and much debated) in all schools of the Hellenistic period. Therefore, by broadening our study to include these applications of enargeia in the Aeneid, I show that the rhetorical strategies of the poem are deeply indebted to Epicurean epistemology and didaxis.

Enargeia provides objective knowledge both to the reader and to the characters in the epic; it is central to understanding Aeneas’ judgment and knowledge, as well as Virgil’s use of imagery in the final scene. Therefore, let us turn now to a close reading to see how this is achieved.

Commenting on the end of Aeneid 6 where Aeneas leaves the underworld through the gates of ivory, Servius writes: “And we know that the things we say can be false, while those that

699 Heinze (1928, Trans. 1993) 131. Recall, however, that Aristotle does not once use the term enargeia in his Rhetoric or Poetics. 700 I do not mean to undermine Virgil’s influence from tragedy, which is pervasive (see Hardie (1997)). On the so-called tragedy of Dido in book four (see the introduction to Austin (1955)). Nevertheless, Virgil’s practice of enargeia owes much to rhetorical and literary theory, as well as to philosophy.

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we see are true without a doubt”.701 Here, the ancient commentator articulates an important theme throughout the epic, the link between seeing and knowing (one which, as we have already seen, also played an important role in Lucretius’ didactic epic).702 It is, moreover, a sentiment that Epicurus and those who belonged to his school would surely have accepted. As we have seen, they claimed self-evident sense perception, i.e. enargeia, to be the sole arbiter of truth for all reasoning and for all knowledge; all of their criteria of truth were based upon it. In the final scene of the Aeneid, the theme of seeing and knowing reaches its culmination; Aeneas’ reasoning leads to knowledge, which in turn leads to his action of slaying Turnus, a procedure that is consistent with Epicurean epistemological theory.

In recent years, the Aeneid and especially its end have increasingly been read through the lens of Hellenistic philosophy; yet while critics have focused a great deal on the anger of

Aeneas, they have given far less attention to how he arrives at this condition.703 Galinsky, for instance, has acknowledged “a strong rational element” as a motivational force for the hero’s anger; however, precisely how this “rational element” works and how Aeneas achieves cognition and knowledge merits further explanation. I contend, based on Epicurean sources including

Epicurus himself and Virgil’s contemporary Philodemus, that Aeneas’ cognition comports with

701 Servius is commenting on on Aen. 6.893 [sunt geminae somni portae…]: et scimus quia quae loquimur falsa esse possunt, ea vero quae videmus sine dubio vera sunt. Cf. Wallace (1938) 68. Texts for Servius are from Thilo and Hagen (1881); translation adapted slightly from Adler (2003) xv. On Servius’ commentary, see Fowler (1997a). 702 I am, of course, not the first to notice the importance of vision throughout Virgil’s poem, see especially Smith (2005) and Reed (2007). Smith provides much enlightening discussion of the visual techniques throughout the poem, drawing on the terminology and insights of Merleau-Ponty. He discusses episodes where vision is highlighted and characters, especially Aeneas (p.10), “embod[y] the attributes of Merleau-Ponty’s voyant-visible: he is in the world as see-er and as one held up as an icon in the midst of those with whom he interacts. He is a participant in and an engager of his surroundings, not existential or removed from them”. Nevertheless, while Smith offers much engaging analysis and helpful close readings of the Aeneid’s visual techniques, his methodology is largely based on an anachronistic reading of Virgil through the procedure of Merleau-Ponty. My own study, on the other hand, is far more historicizing in its approach, offering philologically and conceptually close readings, like Smith, but based on Hellenistic, not modern, visual theories. This is advantageous to Virgil (as well as to his predecessor, Lucretius) as we can see how he knew and applied Hellenistic theories in order to achieve his telos. 703 For anger in the Aeneid, see Indelli (2004), Fish (2004), Wigodsky (2004), Fowler (1997b), Galinsky (1997, 1994, and 1988), Gill (1997), Wright (1997) and Erler (1992a). For the passion and emotions in the Aeneid and its readers, see especially Conte (2007) and Polleichtner (2009).

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Epicurean visual theory. My interpretation does not require us to understand Virgil as having been an Epicurean at the time of his writing of the Aeneid, although he clearly had close contact with Epicureans and with Philodemus, in particular, throughout his life.704 Rather, I argue that

Aeneas’ reasoning and actions in the final scene are compatible with Epicurean empiricism.705

Clear evidence, i.e. epistemological enargeia or evidentia, leads Aeneas to sure knowledge and, in turn, this cognitive state compels him to the emotion of anger and to the action of killing his foe. Thus, my study broadens the discussion to examine not just Aeneas’ anger, but also the ways in which he grasps and implements knowledge. At the same time, I argue, Virgil places the scene before the reader’s/listener’s eyes and rhetorically stimulates him/her to view the scene and, thereby, to render judgment along with the epic’s hero based on the evidence presented.

In this way, Virgil integrates rhetorical, epistemic, and therapeutic enargeia in a homogeneous unity. As we have acknowledged, the rhetorical application of enargeia (i.e.

“placing before the eyes”) was closely akin to the Epicurean practice of visualization, illustrated in Philodemus. 706 He applies the procedure of “placing a subject before the eyes” as a pedagogical technique and/or therapy.707 To recall, its aim is to keep one’s ethical behavior in

704 Cf. Cairns (2004) 314 and Braund’s (1997) assessment: “It is intrinsically unlikely that Virgil viewed himself as a card-carrying Stoic or Epicurean, however much he was drawn to Epicurean ideas. Above all, he was a Roman and he was an Italian, from Mantua in north Italy. At the same time, the desire to see Virgil as freed from those philosophical labels typifies his current reception into our world of agnosticism, in which challenges to sects and creeds are in vogue in scholarship as in the wider intellectual life of western Europeans”. For Virgil’s eclecticism and links with this to Arius Didymus, see Cairns (1989) 34ff. and (2004) 313ff. 705 Aeneas’ reasoning from evidence would also suit Aristotelian and Stoic methods of reasoning, but his reactions—chastising and slaying Turnus out of anger, which I will show include the therapeutic use of frank speech and visualization before his victim’s eyes in accordance with Epicurean practice—do not suit either Aristotle’s notions of anger, discussed in Wright (1997), nor do they suit Stoic , which treated all emotions, and anger, in particular, as evils and false reasoning. On Epicurean versus Stoic anger, cf. Cairns (1989) 79: “The epicureans tried to pretend that while the stoics considered all anger to be evil, which in fact they did, the peripatetics regarded all anger as good, which in fact they did not”. On Epicurean anger, see also Asmis (2011), Fowler (1997b), Erler (1992a), Galinsky (1997, 1994, and 1988), and Cairns (1989) 58-84. For Peripatetic anger in the Aeneid, see Wright (1997) and Thornton (1976) 159-63. 706 See §3, chapter five. 707 See, for instance, Philodemus, On Frank Criticism, fr. 26: τιθῶμεν δὲ πρὸ ὀμμάτων καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἣν ἔχει κηδεμονικὴ νουθέτησις [ἀρ] ἀρεσ-κούση]ς μέν, ἐπιει[κ]ῶς δὲ δ]ιακνούσης ἅπαντας <ε>ἰρωνείας.

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line with an imagined model of proper reasoning or to shun actions based on false opinions.

Schroeder notes the link between rhetoric and this Epicurean form of visualization, calling it, “a rhetorical avocatio, a system of training the imagination to avoid the seduction of passion and attain peace”.708 In his On Frank Speech, Philodemus argues for the need for frankness in order to “place before the eyes” a student’s right and wrong actions. Similarly in On Anger, he crafts elaborate descriptions to bring the causes and effects of anger before the reader’s eyes.709 For interpreting the end of the Aeneid, it is important to recognize how Virgil employs a similar form of enargeia or “placing before the eyes” to encourage his reader not only to visualize the scene, but also to evaluate whether the characters’ decisions and actions are based on sound reasoning.

So long as all judgments are based on clear evidence and do not introduce false opinion, they must be considered correct according to Epicureans.

Let us examine the final scene of the Aeneid in detail. Virgil writes (12.914-26):

…tum pectore sensus vertuntur varii; Rutulos aspectat et urbem cunctaturque metu letumque instare tremescit, nec quo se eripiat, nec qua vi tendat in hostem, nec currus usquam videt aurigamve sororem. Cunctanti telum Aeneas fatale coruscat, sortitus fortunam oculis, et corpore toto eminus intorquet. murali concita numquam tormento sic saxa fremunt nec fulmine tanti dissultant crepitus. volat atri turbinis instar exitium dirum hasta ferens orasque recludit loricae et clipei extremos septemplicis orbis; per medium stridens transit femur.

Then, Turnus’ senses alternate in different ways. He looks toward the Rutulians and the city, he hesitates fearfully, he trembles to meet his fate: nowhere to escape, no strength left to aim at his enemy. He does not see a vehicle anywhere, nor his charioteer—his own sister. Aeneas shakes his deadly spear at the hesitant Turnus and decides his fate with his eyes, and at a distance, his whole body becomes wrenched. Never have rocks groaned so loud when launched from a siege engine nor have the thunderous strikes of lightning. The

Let us set before our eyes also the difference that exists between a caring admonishment and an irony that pleases but pretty much stings everyone. Text and translation are from Konstan, et al. (1998). 708 Schroeder (2004) 139. 709 See Tsouna (2011), (2007) 195-238, and (2003).

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spear, bringing a dire end, flies through the air like a dark whirlwind, breaking through the edge of his armor and the shield’s seven outer layers; hissing, it pierces his leg through the middle.710

In these lines, which precede Turnus’ death, the poet stresses the combatant’s physical sensations, especially vision. The reader’s focalization is through Turnus’ eyes.711 His fear intensifies as he looks around the battlefield (Rutulos aspectat, 915), yet he finds no solace either in his fellow soldiers or even in his sister (nec currus usquam videt aurigamve sororem, 918).

The gaze then shifts to Aeneas, who “shakes his deadly spear” and “decides his enemy’s fate with his eyes” (sortitus fortunam oculis, 920). While Tarrant translates this last phrase as

“choosing the opportune moment”, the combination of sortitus and fortunam is also very

Jovian.712 Aeneas becomes the arbiter of Turnus’ fortune and must decide whether he lives or dies, a decision that rests solely on his sense of sight (oculis).

Virgil avoids describing the precise moment when Aeneas throws his spear, instead inserting a brief simile comparing the hero to boulders flung from a catapult and to lightning

(921-3), before changing subjects again, this time to the spear, itself. Once more, the poet utilizes a simile. He vivifies the weapon as it “flies through the air like a black whirlwind bringing a dire end with it” (923-4). The comparisons of Aeneas to a thunderbolt (fulmine, 922) as well as the weather imagery of a dark whirlwind (ater turbo, 923) continue the Jovian imagery, but Aeneas, not Jupiter, is judge and executioner. To continue the forensic metaphor, we next see how he carefully weighs the evidence and makes sure it is unambiguous before rendering a verdict and meting out justice.

710 All Latin text for the Aeneid is from Mynors (1969) although with “v” substituted for “u”; the translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. 711 On focalization in the Aeneid, see especially Fowler (2000a) and Reed (2007). On Book 12, see especially West (1998), and for Turnus, see Thomas (1998) and Stahl (1990). 712 Tarrant (2012) 328.

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It is this same sort of reasoning, as we have seen, that marks Epicurus’ brand of empiricism. Asmis summarizes “the Epicurean position” that “the evidence obtained directly by the perceptual organs is sufficient to show what is real, and moreover that all, and only, presentations obtained directly by the perceptual organs show perceptible reality”.713 Epicurus used a courtroom metaphor to articulate this method of inference from evidence. To avoid introducing false opinion, he established the procedures of attestation (epimartyrȇsis) and contestation (antimartyrȇsis); with these, he claimed, we could make accurate inferences about unclear phenomena from what is self-evident, i.e. from enargeia.714 For our purposes, only attestation (epimartyrȇsis) is important, as it is through this technique that we check and confirm opinions about the physical world by means of clear sense-evidence. To recall, we can test our opinion made at a distance, “that is Turnus”, against clear visual evidence. By walking closer and having a distinct view, the initial opinion (δόξα) [or supposition (ὑπόληψις) or thought

(ἐννόημα)]—which had been awaiting confirmation (προσμένον)—is either attested by evidence (ἐνάργεια), in which case it is confirmed to be true (it is Turnus), or else it is not attested (i.e. ouk epimartyrȇsis), in which case it is false (it is not Turnus).

To apply this procedure to the Aeneid let us gauge Aeneas’ sensory input and reasoning in the poem’s conclusion. Virgil writes (Aen. 12.928-52):

consurgunt gemitu Rutuli totusque remugit mons circum et vocem late nemora alta remittunt. ille humilis supplex oculos dextramque precantem protendens ‘equidem merui nec deprecor’ inquit; ‘utere sorte tua. miseri te si qua parentis tangere cura potest, oro (fuit et tibi talis

713 Asmis (1984) 160. 714 Epicurus, Ep. Herod. 10.51: …ἐὰν μὲν μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ ψεῦδος γίνεται· ἐὰν δὲ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ, τὸ ἀληθές. If it is not attested (μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ) or is contested (ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ) [i.e. by evidence, enargeia], it is false. On the other hand, if it is attested (ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ) or else not contested (μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ), it is true. The translation is my own, text from Arrighetti (1973). On these procedures, see §1, chapter four, as well as Ierodiakonou (2011), Asmis (2009, 1999, 1984), Striker (1996b), and Dumont (1982).

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Anchises genitor) Dauni miserere senectae et me, seu corpus spoliatum lumine mavis, redde meis. vicisti et victum tendere palmas Ausonii videre; tua est Lavinia coniunx, ulterius ne tende odiis.’ stetit acer in armis Aeneas volvens oculos dextramque repressit; et iam iamque magis cunctantem flectere sermo coeperat, infelix umero cum apparuit alto balteus et notis fulserunt cingula bullis Pallantis pueri, victum quem vulnere Turnus straverat atque umeris inimicum insigne gerebat. ille, oculis postquam saevi monimenta doloris exuviasque hausit, furiis accensus et ira terribilis: ‘Tune hinc spoliis indute meorum eripiare mihi? Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas immolat et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit.’ hoc dicens ferrum adverso sub pectore condit fervidus; ast illi solvuntur frigore membra vitaque cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras.

The Rutulians rise up with shouting—the whole mountain resounds all around and the tall glades far and wide. Turnus, prostrate, supplicates Aeneas, gazing up at him and lifting his hand in prayer, saying, “I have earned this, I don’t disclaim it. Enjoy your fate. If you have any consideration for a poor parent (for you were so close to your father, Anchises), then I beg you, pity Daunus in his old age and me too; whether or not you kill me, return my body to my kin. You have won and the Ausonians have seen me defeated and supplicating you; Lavinia is yours to wed; no need for further animosity.” Aeneas stands there, bitter in his arms, turning his gaze and holding back his hand; more and more the talk began to change his mind, still delaying, when high on his shoulder the baldric—unfortunate—appeared and the links from its studs, which he recognized—the boy Pallas’—whom Turnus had laid low and defeated with a wound. He now wore his rival’s insignia on his shoulder. Gazing upon the evidence of the savage tragedy, which Turnus had stripped, he becomes inflamed with rage and awful in his anger, answering: “Will you escape from me when you wear the spoils of my own people? Pallas sacrifices you, Pallas, with this stroke and he exacts punishment for his despoiled life!” As he says this, boiling, he buries his sword in the breast before him. Turnus’ limbs loosen with a chill and his spirit, groaning indignantly, flees down to the shades.

At first, Aeneas holds back from killing Turnus, waiting for confirmation from clear evidence.

He does not act rashly, but rather stops (stetit, 938), delays (cunctantem, 940), and restrains himself (dextramque repressit, 939). Details such as these, as Sheppard notes, were commonly remarked upon by ancient critics, particularly as they “enable the reader to visualize the whole

[scene], filling gaps in a description or narrative for themselves”.715 They are the hallmarks of

715 Sheppard (2014) 34-5.

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rhetorical enargeia, as we, the readers, must imagine the described scene before our eyes. At the same time, Aeneas examines his enemy closely with his eyes (volvens oculos, 939), placed mid- line and in the present tense to show that his gaze is ongoing and focused.716 Here, we can witness Epicurean attestation (epimartyrȇsis) at work. Aeneas was not present to witness Turnus’ killing of Pallas or the stripping of his corpse; according to Epicurean terminology, these facts were still “unclear” (ἄδηλον) and “awaiting confirmation” (προσμένον). He, therefore, looks for proof, holding off from any hasty reactions that could arise from false opinion.

For comparison, we can distinguish how Philodemus utilizes this same empirical method in On Anger. In it, he argues (XXXVII 16):

[Proper anger] results from seeing (ἀπὸ τοῦ βλέπειν) what the nature of states of affairs really is (ὡς ἡ φυσις ἔχει τῶν πραγμάτων), and from not having any false beliefs (μηδὲν ψευδοδοξεῖν) in our comparative estimations of the losses suffered, and in our chastisements of those who harm us (ἐν ταῖς συμμετρήσεσι τῶν ἐλαττωμένων καί ταῖς κολάσεσι τῶν βλαπτόντων).717

Like a good Epicurean, he stresses the importance of seeing (βλέπειν) clear evidence, i.e. “what the nature of states of affairs really is”. The latter phrase is really a synonym for enargeia. This is

716 For the present tense as a means for achieving vividness, see Sheppard (2014) 34, which discusses passages in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, On Sublimity, and Quintilian in which the “shifting of tenses (‘tralatio temporum’)” is included “among the techniques for ‘putting before the eyes’ (sub oculos subiectio’).” Tarrant (2012) 934 comments on the phrase that it is “a sign of fierce concentration”. Surely this is the case, but Aeneas is also, as we will soon see, looking for evidence, in a manner that is appropriate in the view of Epicureans. 717 Phld. Ir. XXXVII 16: αὐ[τὸ μ]ακά[ρ]ιον [ὑπο]λαμ⎜βά[ν]τες, οἱ δὲ κακόν, ⎜ τῶ[ι] δακνηρῶι προσπί⎜πτ`οντ´ες αὐτῆς. ἡμεῖς δὲ τῶι ⎜ καὶ κατὰ φωνήν τινα πα⎜ραλογισμὸν ἐντρέχειν ⎜ οὐχ ἁπλῆν ποιούμεθα ⎜ τὴν ἀπόφασιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ⎜ μὲν πάθος αὐτὸ κατὰ δι⎜άληψιν ἀποφαινόμε⎜θα κακόν, ἐπειδὴ λυπη⎜ρόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀνάλογον ⎜ λυπηρῶι, κατὰ δέ τὴν ⎜ συνπλοκήν τῆι διαθέσει ⎜ κἂν ἀγαθὸν ῥηθήσεσθαι ⎜ νομίζομεν· συνίσταται ⎜ γὰρ ἀπὸ το[ῦ] βλέπειν, ὡς ἡ ⎜ φύσις ἔχει τῶν πραγμά⎜των, καὶ μηδὲν ψευδο⎜δοξεῖν ἐν ταῖς σ[υ]μμε⎜τρήσεσι τῶν ἐλα[ττ]ω⎜μάτων καὶ ταῖς κολάσε⎜σι τῶν βλαπτόντων. …(some) understanding it (anger) to be a blessed (μακάριον) thing (the Peripatos), others an evil, fastening on its sting (τὸ δακνηρόν) (the Stoics). But we (Epicureans), because there is a kind of false reasoning induced by the word (sc. orgê), do not make any unitary pronouncement. Instead, we teach that the emotion, taken in isolation and per se, is an evil, since it is painful or resembles what is painful, but taken in conjunction with one’s character (διάθεσις) as a whole, it is something that can even be called a good, as we think. For it results (when good) from seeing what the nature of states of affairs really is (ἀπὸ τοῦ βλέπειν ὡς ἡ φυσις ἔχει τῶν πραγμάτων), and from not having any false beliefs (μηδὲν ψευδοδοξεῖν) in our comparative estimations of the losses suffered, and in our chastisements of those who harm us ( ἐν ταῖς συμμετρήσεσι τῶν ἐλαττωμένων καί ταῖς κολάσεσι τῶν βλαπτόντων). Translation is by David Armstrong, per litteras; text from Indelli (1988). On this passage, see Galinsky (1994) 197 and Asmis (1989) 157.

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achieved through the senses, most importantly through sight. The procedure is consistent with

Epicurus’ mode of attestation, epimartyrȇsis. For Philodemus and Epicurus, as well as for

Aeneas in this scene, anger arises from both a non-cognitive sensation, i.e. vision, and a cognitive element, including memory and a reasoned judgment based on observable data. Since the hero’s judgment is confirmed by self-evidence and does not introduce false opinion into the assessment of sensory input, then his conclusion must be correct according to Epicurean reasoning. The anger which then results from this sensation and knowledge is, in Philodemus’ terminology, “natural” (φυσικήν), as opposed to “empty” (κ̣[ενήν).718

As tensions rise, Virgil portrays Aeneas’ and Turnus’ actions and reactions in a manner that is consistent with rhetorical enargeia and Epicurean “placing before the eyes”. His method is very similar to Philodemus’ vivid examples of angry characters in his On Anger, which bring characters to life before the eyes of the listener/reader.719 While Virgil’s scene is not a diatribe like his, the characters are nevertheless portrayed in a highly realistic fashion with details that draw attention to slight movements as well as to their visual impressions, which the reader must imagine. For instance, the insertion of the Rutulians’ reaction to the combat at lines 928-9 appeals to the readers’ senses of both sight (consurgunt, mons, nemora alta) and sound (gemitu, vocem).720 Like the textual audience, readers are invited to view and even to hear the contest, albeit in their minds.721 Moreover, the pathetic groans, which resound throughout the hillside, as well as Turnus’ talk (his sermo, 940) briefly inspire Aeneas, as well as us, to look upon him with pity. Yet upon closer examination, Aeneas and, through his eyes, we see damning evidence

(saevi monimenta doloris, 945).

718 Phld. Ir. XXXVIII. 719 Phld. Ir. col. VII.16-XXXI.23. See §3, chapter five. 720 Aen. 928-9: consurgunt gemitu Rutuli totusque remugit / mons circum et vocem late nemora alta remittunt 721 For textual audiences as models for readers’ responses, see especially Walker (1993).

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Lying prostrate and wounded, Turnus admits his guilt (930-8), saying that he deserves what he has received (merui, 931).722 He goes further, however, begging for mercy and appealing to Aeneas’ love of Anchises, and pleading with him to put aside his anger (932-8). Lyne argues that, “This appeal for clemency, which, it should be stressed, Turnus makes not on his own selfish behalf, is based on both emotion and reason”.723 Yet from an Epicurean perspective, his reasoning is faulty. Indeed, Aeneas’ gaze and reasoning are based on self-evidence and do not include false opinion; Turnus, on the other hand, displays the same kind of fear of death railed against by Lucretius at the end of Book 3 of the DRN and by Philodemus in On Death.724 He applies false reasoning by clinging to life and by not accepting his death as a relatively trivial matter, what Lucretius calls “nothing to us”.725 Conversely, his rival reasons correctly and avoids the pitfall of introducing false opinion into his judgment by focusing only upon what is self- evident. We can recall Servius’ assessment from earlier as Turnus’ talk (sermo, 940) rings false, while what Aeneas sees “is true without a doubt.”

Only after seeing proof does Aeneas assent to the apparent facts: Turnus is guilty and must be punished. The turning point comes when he gazes upon Pallas’ baldric, the clear evidence, the monimenta, of Turnus’ savage crime (945). Virgil describes his hero as “drinking in the evidence with his eyes” (oculis …hausit), a phrase that denotes not simply seeing, but rather examining closely and with a great deal of scrutiny. The expression harkens back to

722 Aen. 930-8: ille humilis supplex oculos dextramque precantem / protendens ‘equidem merui nec deprecor’ inquit; / ‘utere sorte tua. miseri te si qua parentis / tangere cura potest, oro (fuit et tibi talis / Anchises genitor) Dauni miserere senectae / et me, seu corpus spoliatum lumine mavis, / redde meis. vicisti et victum tendere palmas / Ausonii videre; tua est Lavinia coniunx, / ulterius ne tende odiis.’ 723 Lyne (1987) 187. 724 Cf. Tsouna (2011) 187: “Philodemus suggests that emotions such as anger and the fear of death are in many cases empty emotions precisely because they often involve empty (i.e., both false and harmful) beliefs about their objects”. For Philodemus, see also Tsouna (2007) and Henry (2009). For Lucretius, see Segal (1990) and Wallach (1976). For links between the two, see Fish (1998). 725 DRN 3.830: Nil igitur mors est ad nos neque pertinent hilum… Therefore death is nothing to us, it matters not one jot… The translation and text are from Rouse and Smith (1992).

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Dido’s last words in which she appeals to Aeneas’ gaze and prays for him to drink in the blaze of her funeral pyre with his eyes (hauriat… oculis, 4.661).726 It is the same sort of autopsy that

Aeneas also practiced in Book 8, as he tours the Palatine hill and sees (vides) the “remains and evidence of earlier generations” (reliquas veterumque vides monimenta virorum, 8.356). In the latter instance, Virgil employs the same term, monimenta, as he does here (12.945) to refer to visual evidence whose epistemic value is certain.727 In each of these cases, clear vision brings sure knowledge. There is no longer any ambiguity about Turnus’ crime or about his deserved punishment, as it is plain that he slew Aeneas’ friend, even a sort of surrogate son. 728

Furthermore, the reader, even more than the hero, is cognizant of the clear facts that Turnus is guilty from reading Book 10 and knows that Rome’s foundation rests upon the victory of

Augustus’ ancestor, proof for which is seen within the poem (Books 6 and 8) and in the city of

Rome itself.729

Earlier in the epic, Aeneas had at times misread visual evidence, e.g. the walls of the temple in Carthage,730 or conspicuously lacked knowledge about what he saw, e.g. in Book 8, where he is described as “rejoicing” in the images of his shield while remaining “ignorant of its subjects”.731 In the end, however, he is fully aware and knowledgeable of the true facts. Any assessment such as Adler’s of a “tension between Aeneas’ ignorant rejoicing and Vergil’s

726 Aen. 4.661-2: hauriat hunc oculis ignem crudelis ab alto / , et nostrae secum ferat omina mortis. Let the cruel Dardanian [Aeneas] drink in this fire from his place on the sea, and let him register them as omens of my death. 727 On this passage, we can also note, how Virgil, like Lucretius, employs a second person verb form vides, in this case addressed to a character in the text, as an appeal to the reader to visualize a scene. Indeed, contemporary readers would not have had to struggle much, as they could have looked around at the city of Rome. 728 On Pallas as a surrogate son, see O’sullivan (2009), Petrini (1997) and Moskalew (1982). 729 For Turnus’ criminal actions and Aeneas’ moral judgment, see especially Galinsky (1988) and Stahl (1981 and 1990). For an alternative view, see Thomas (1991). 730 See Clay (1988) and O’Sullivan (2011). 731 Aen. 8.729-31: Talia per clipeum Volcani, dona parentis, / miratur rerumque ignarus imagine gaudet / attollens umero famamque et fata nepotum. He marvels at his mother’s gift—Vulcan’s fine work on the shield—and while ignorant of the subjects, he rejoices in the image and bears the glory and fame of his descendants upon his shoulders. For other expressions of ignorance in the poem, particularly inscius and nescius, see especially Johnson (1976) 75-87 and Lyne (1987) 196ff.

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knowing sadness” needs to provide an adequate explanation for why at the poem’s close Aeneas is patently not ignorant, but rather knows fully Turnus’ guilt. Johnston notes the relevance of

Epicurean views on friendship to the scene, arguing that, “Aeneas’ devotion to his companions is reminiscent of the importance of friendship in Philodemus’ circle”.732 We can go further with this line of reasoning. From an Epicurean point of view, the monimenta arouse the memory of

Aeneas’ deceased friend, moving material phantasia in his mind and bringing his rival’s wrongdoing directly before his own eyes, as also before the reader’s. Critics have often debated why Aeneas is overcome not just with anger (ira) but also with rage (furiis) (946-7), which

Galinsky notes “Philodemus considers inappropriate”.733 In contrast to the Stoics, however, anger was acceptable to Epicureans provided that empirical autopsy proved the wrongdoing to be self- evident. Thus, the rage we see Aeneas express has a rational motivation and results in an appropriate recompense.

Even in his inflamed state, Aeneas does not take vengeance, but instead exacts punishment (poenam, 949), a response that is justified according to Epicurean principles, in contrast to the Peripatetics, as we can see from Philodemus.734 As Armstrong has noted to me, for

Philodemus κόλασις, "chastising”—which Aeneas’ seems to be an example of—is the

“positive counterpart” to vengeance, τιμωρία, which is “used pejoratively”. Thus, Aeneas’ anger is “good” or “natural”, according to Philodemus’ logic, because it is grounded upon the

“impression [emphasis = Epicurus’ phantasia] of damage done intentionally to oneself (or one’s friends, XLI.18-20), ἔμφασις βλάβης ἑκουσίας, XL 33-38”.735 His sensory impression is clear

732 Johnston (2004) 173n.23. 733 For furor/furiae in the Aeneid, see especially Cairns (1989) 58-84. For alternate views, see Lyne (1989) 24-9 and (1983), and Thomas (1991), and Otis (1964) index for furor. 734 See Erler (1992a) 116. 735 Armstrong per litteras. Bold text is Armstrong’s. Note also Tsouna’s (2007) 222 summation of Philodemus’ view of proper anger and punishment: “persons who have a good disposition hold true beliefs about how things are,

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and accurate, as Turnus has assuredly harmed his friend; the visual evidence directly inspires him to vent his anger and to punish his enemy in the name of Pallas. Therefore, we must not assess his action to be vengeance, but rather a chastising punishment. His words are a piece of

Epicurean frank speech, parrhesia, as he vocalizes Pallas’ name twice to rebuke Turnus while claiming the death-stroke as his penalty.736 Just as Virgil places the scene before the reader’s eyes, so too does Aeneas place the crime before his victim’s.

In this vein, Stoicizing readings fall short of fully accounting for Aeneas’ anger and actions. Indeed, Lyne is right, from a Stoic perspective to argue: “And why does he [Aeneas] not spare him [Turnus] in the end? Because of grand passion, as Turnus had feared (‘Press no further in hatred’), in particular because of the passion that consists, according to Stoic doctrine, in the desire for revenge.”737 According to the Stoics, Aeneas has experienced a kataleptic impression; its veracity is without any doubt and therefore his assent (synkatathesis) to its truth is also assured. We can recall how they argued that a cognitive impression “all but seizes us by the hair… and pulls us to assent [sunkatathesis]”.738 Thus, Aeneas’ assent to the impression—that

Turnus slew Pallas—is perfectly acceptable and even necessary; it is his response to this impression—anger—that is not. One’s response or impulse (horme) always remains in one’s control; it is, they said, up to us (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν). Since the Stoics asserted that all emotions were irrational and based on faulty reasoning, Aeneas’ anger is wholly inappropriate. By assenting to correctly appraise the nature of the offense and the magnitude of the damage, and on that basis, seek the offender’s due punishment”. 736 Theodorakopoulos (1997) 164 notes the importance of memory—both the reader’s and Aeneas’—to the scene. She writes: “The killing of Turnus is an act of memory, and this memory is not merely that of the character Aeneas, but also that of the reader, and of the poet, who twice repeats the name of the Arcadian (Aen. 12.848-9 Pallas te hoc vulnere, Pallas ⎜immolate), just as, near the end of Eclogue 10, he repeats the name of Gallus, who tried and failed to become an Arcadian (Ecl. 10.72-3 vos haec facietis maxima Gallo, ⎜Gallo)”. 737 Lyne (1987) 188 and (1983) recognizes the shortcomings of a purely Stoic reading, but he does not deal with the alternative of an Epicurean reading. For readings that see Aeneas as undergoing a transformation throughout the poem into a Stoic sage, see especially Heinze (1993 [=1928]) passim and Bowra (1933), and the challenge of Lyne (1987) 166, with further bibliography. 738 L&S 40K (SE, M. 7.255). See §2, chapter four.

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the need for vengeance and surrendering himself over to anger, he would be guilty of wrongdoing. From an Epicurean perspective, however, his motivations and his reactions come into focus; his feeling of anger is natural and his assessment is accurate because it is based on objective criteria and does not introduce false opinion.

According to this reading, Virgil engages his audience and his characters in rhetorical and epistemological enargeia. On the one hand, the reader places the scene before his/her mind’s eye through the poetry and decides whether the hero’s reasoning accords with sense perception and with proper ethical concerns. Simultaneously, the characters, principally Aeneas, examine what they see and make decisions based on either proper or faulty reasoning. Turnus is not, as Pöschl claims, “resigned to his fate, however hard it may be”.739 The focalization shifts to him in the final line, but his mind and life (vita) are described as indignata, contemptuous of death—the opposite of a proper Epicurean attitude. An important intertext for the scene is from the De rerum natura, as Lucretius uses the same verb in chiding philosophers who are indignant before death.740 Like those who exercise false reasoning in the DRN, Turnus does not make a proper assessment about death or its consequences. Aeneas’ judgment, however, is proper and consistent with the phenomena. Galinsky is thus right to claim that, “Aeneas’ anger is anything but irrational”.741 He makes his decision based on clear, sensory proof and renders a correctly reasoned judgment about what the evidence requires. Turnus’ crimes are self-evident based on the monimenta that he wears, visible proof of Pallas’ slaughter. For Aeneas, the baldric is a sort

739 Pöschl (1962) 136. 740 DRN 3.1045-6: tu vero dubitabis et indignabere obire, / mortua cui vita est prope iam vivo atque videnti … Will you then hesitate and be indignant to meet your death, even though already your life is practically dead though you still live and can see… The translation is my own. Erler (1997) 89 notes the importance of this teaching for both Epicurus and Lucretius, but does not link it to the Aeneid. He writes: “Epicurus (Ep.Men. 123f.) and Lucretius (VI.68ff.) warn us that disquieting ideas are a punishment for those who do not reject what is unworthy and alien to the gods (dis indigna putare alienaque pacis eorum). In this case, superstition and unhappiness are the results (V.1161ff.)”. This is clearly the case for Turnus. 741 Galinsky (1988) 339.

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of objective correlative; the punishment is a necessary conclusion.742 As his cognition is sound according to Epicurean principles, i.e. it is based on enargeia, his judgment and anger are likewise sound or to use Philodemus’ terminology, natural (ὀργὴ κατὰ φυσιν, Col. XXXVII

19ff. Indelli).

Therefore, Aeneas’ sensations, judgments, and actions in the final scene are fully in line with Epicurean principles. Reed describes Virgil’s hero as being “often a proxy for ourselves, seeing what we must see”. This is surely the case here, as through a focalizing gaze, the poet encourages readers to place the scene before our eyes and to assess the evidence for ourselves.743

In contrast to O’Sullivan, who complains that Aeneas, “only sees the baldric for its function within the plot, not for its engraved warning”,744 I would argue that by heeding any warning,

Aeneas would be admitting false opinion into his reasoning, not simply taking the evidence for what it is—a trophy of Pallas’ death. Aeneas’ vision is keen and accurate, grasping the clear proof of Turnus’ wrongdoing. Thus, he has a sure cognitive foundation for knowledge, judgment, and even punishment in accordance with Epicureanism.

3. Prolēpseis: Potential Avenues for Future Study

While we have offered two case studies—of Lucretius’ didactic epic De rerum natura and Virgil’s founding epic the Aeneid—the same methodology would be applicable to many other works in a variety of genres (and, indeed, could also be expanded to other examples within these texts as well). Here, I offer some thoughts on potential avenues of study, while also noting in passing scholarship, which has already been conducted, on enargeia in later authors.

742 See Armstrong (2008) 114, who concludes that, “In [Philodemus’] view “natural” anger consists only in pain; pleasure in one’s anger and the persistence of the feeling when no pragmatic object is served by it are warning signals.” 743 Reed (2007) 180. 744 O’Sullivan (2011) 476.

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From the Republican period, we could look for enargeia in Catullus. As he was a contemporary of Lucretius (to whom he alludes in his work) and was closely associated with

Memmius, the dedicatee of the DRN, the evidence of vividness in his poems would further our understanding of the practice in late Republican Italy.745 Moreover, the poems of Catullus would also broaden the discussion outside of epic to include a variety of poetic genres including love poetry (the Lesbia poems), epithalamia (61, 62), epyllion (64), translations of Greek works (51,

66), , and vituperative poems. His works were also an important influence on Virgil and

Horace, as well as many other Latin poets, particularly Martial, so his works would provide a worthwhile point of study and comparison.746

Another author who would especially benefit from an inquiry into his use of enargeia would be Horace. As it is well known that he had close interactions within Epicurean circles, particularly under the sponsorship of Maecenas, the links between visualization and knowledge in his poetical works would provide many examples of the same sorts of Epicurean enargeia, noted in our studies of Virgil and Lucretius. In recent years his satirical works, as well as the

Odes, have increasingly been read for Epicurean (and especially Philodemean) influence, particularly in his use of frank speech. 747 His Ars poetica would also be a prime place for research, as it presents practical guidance for crafting poetry and engages in the rhetorical and literary debates of the age. Nevertheless, a specific inquiry into his use of enargeia remains a critical desideratum. Similar to Horace, Propertius was also under the patronage of Maecenas.

Tibullus, too, had close interactions with the poets of the Augustan age. All of these Augustan

745 See OCD entries for Catullus (pp.292-3) and Gaius Memmius (p.928). Catullus accompanied Memmius to Bithynia; see Cat. 10 and the introduction to Fordyce (1978) xii. 746 For Catullus’ influence on Horace and Virgil, see the index of Fordyce (1978). I would also add that Virgil’s use of monimenta, discussed above, also has important comparanda in Catullus 10, discussed by Fordyce p.127. 747 See, for instance, Armstrong (2004b) and (1993), Tsakiropoulou-Summers (1998), and Tait (1941). See also the index of Nisbet and Hubbard (1970), for Epicurus and vividness.

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poets would thus benefit from analysis of their recourse to enargeia, and they would further extend the discourse to include elegy and , as well as more serious poems like Horace’s

Odes.

Within the genre of epic, the poetry of Ovid, Manilius, Lucan, Statius, and Valerius

Flaccus of the early imperial period would all profit from further discussion of enargeia, particularly its philosophical aspects. All of these writers show influences from Hellenistic philosophy (to greater and lesser degrees) and from Lucretius and Virgil.748 Although their vivid spectacles and imagery have often been recognized (albeit, regularly earning derision as baroque or mannerist), these moments would also likely reveal epistemological nuances if read through a

Stoic or Epicurean lens.749 As Ovid’s and Statius’ oeuvre also include works in a variety of genres—elegy, mythological epic, didactic epic, occasional poems—their poetry would provide ample material for recognizing rhetorical and philosophical enargeia. Likewise, Lucan’s and

Manilius’ Stoic sympathies are certain; therefore it would be helpful to read their works through the Stoic theories of evidence and visualization laid out in chapter four.

Similarly, historiographers like Livy and Tacitus would supply additional evidence of visual imagery with epistemic underpinnings in another genre.750 Hardie links the rhetorical practice of enargeia in both epic and historiography, arguing that, “Imperial epic and historiography work overtime in what had always been a central goal of these genres, the verbal

748 Cf. Luck’s (1982) 418 assessment of Ovid’s didactic work, the Remedia amoris: “In this work, Ovid seems to have borrowed from both Stoic and Epicurean sources, and in a sense the Remedia represent a playful version of the ψυχαγωγία theme which was so popular in Hellenistic philosophy; it is a spiritual guidebook for the soul towards a better, saner, more rational life.” For the reception of Lucretius, see Hardie (2009); of Virgil, see Hardie (1993). 749 For spectacle in the Aeneid, see Leach (1999) and Feldherr (1995), in Lucan, see Leigh (1997). They have also been read for their theological nuances, see, for instance, Chaudhuri (2014) 256ff. on Capaneus’ Epicureanism in Statius’ Thebaid. 750 Some of this work has also been anticipated; e.g. for vision in Livy, see Feldherr (1998). For Tacitus, see, for instance, the commentary on Histories 2.34-6 in Ash (2007). For studies of rhetoric, visual procedures, and/or “the gaze” in historiography, see Woodman (1988), Davidson (1991), and Walker (1993). See also Goldhill (2002, 2001, and 1996).

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evocation of striking visual impressions (enargeia)”.751 He adds, “This ‘spectacularity’ is closely connected with the illusionism that characterizes realist aesthetics throughout antiquity, but which reaches a height of intensity in the early empire in writers like Pliny the Younger and

Statius”.752 While he attests to the importance of realism created by enargeia within different genres, we could perhaps go further by linking the imagery in these writers to the philosophical theory of self-evidence in both the Stoics and Epicureans, and to ancient pedagogy, which stressed the importance of visualization. We can also add to this picture the highly graphic dramas of Seneca. As he belonged to the Stoic school, these too could be interpreted in light of the epistemological theory of enargeia presented in chapter four. We have already noted a few instances of the therapeutic technique of visualization in Seneca’s , as well as in the writings of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, but far more could be said about these as well.

Some of this work has, in fact, already been anticipated. Mueller, for instance, presents a study of enargeia in Plutarch’s lives, which is well attuned to its philosophical and literary constructs.753 Similarly, several critics have discussed how the classical theory of enargeia can also help us to understand medieval and Renaissance literature. For instance, both Wells and

Plett discuss enargeia in the writings of Shakespeare.754 Plett even incorporates evidence of enargeia from “operatic libelli”, such as Gluck’s Le Cinesi. Similarly, Dubois has examined textual descriptions, i.e. ekphrases, not only in ancient writers (in particular, Homer and Vergil), but also in the Renaissance (in Dante and Spenser).755 Based on this study, however, we could also extend this methodology to include writers from virtually any age.

751 Hardie (2002b) 39. 752 Ibid. For Pliny, see also Chinn (2007). 753 Mueller (1993). 754 Wells (2002) and Plett (2012) passim. See also Plett (2010). 755 Dubois (1982).

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Enargeia held an important place in ancient philosophy, rhetoric, and literary theory from the Hellenistic through the Roman periods. As a concept, it provides an essential lens for interpreting imagery, as it was conceived to be a verbal means for conjuring visible images in the reader/listener. Moreover, it stands at an important crossroad in ancient thought—as it held a place in a liminal zone between physical sensation and mental reasoning; it refers to evidence, both direct and indirect, from inferential judgments. Enargeia, therefore, has an important position within the history of the imagination, providing the link between realism of description and reality itself. 756 What this study has shown, however, is that for a more nuanced understanding of ancient literature and how it was read, we need to be constantly aware of the influence of philosophy and rhetorical theory on both ancient writers and readers. Indeed, by integrating the various aspects of enargeia—philosophical, literary, rhetorical, pedagogic, therapeutic—with one another, we can become better attuned to the way these various influences affected the way literature was produced and received. In this way, we will benefit by not only singling out moments of rhetorical enargeia or visualization, such as ekphrasis, as instances of a literary figure or trope, but by going further and taking into account the philosophical baggage of such concepts, particularly in relation to Stoic and Epicurean philosophy. As enargeia provides an inroad for understanding philosophy, rhetoric, literary theory, and pedagogy, the best course is to keep all of these fields in mind in our interpretations and not to separate them from one another.

756 On the importance of authenticity in ancient aesthetics, see Peirano (2012).

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253 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Robert (Buddy) Hedrick grew up in Orlando, Florida. After graduating valedictorian of

Dr. Phillips High School in 2002, he attended Duke Univesity on an alumni scholarship. He attended the ICCS (the Centro) in Rome for the fall of 2004. After three years, he graduated magna cum laude with a B.A. in Classical Civilizations (and a minor in English) and returned to

Orlando. There he taught Latin and German at his alma mater, Dr. Phillips, for three more years.

He entered graduate school in the Classics Department at Florida State University in the fall of 2008. There, he taught a variety of classes and worked for two years as the editorial assistant for The Classical Journal. He won the Semple Award from CAMWS to attend the

American School in Athens for the summer of 2011. For the final year of his Ph.D. studies, he was awarded the M. Lynnette Thompson fellowship by the FSU Classics Department for the

2014-2015 school year.

He married his wife Ashley in the fall of 2013. He currently resides in Tallahassee,

Florida.

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