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http://www.jstor.org SLAVERY OVERSHADOWED: CONGRESS DEBATES PROHIBITINGTHE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE TO THE , 1806-1807

MatthewE. Mason

In December1806, as the NinthCongress of the UnitedStates convened in its second session, rumorsof a frightfulconspiracy in the West circulatedabout Washington. The reportsin the following months implicatedAaron Burr, past vice presidentof theUnited States (from 1801 to 1805)but already notorious, in partfor killing Alexander Hamilton in a duel,as the leaderof the plot. Overthe next several weeks, in all regionsread with great interest further details of Burr'salleged plans to stirthe southwesternstates and territories to fightfor independencefrom the UnitedStates, aided by a foreignpower such as GreatBritain or Spain. At the same time, the press and word of mouth broughttidings of Napoleon'sinvasion of Prussia.In the next few monthsAmericans learned of Napoleon'sBerlin Decree, announcing a blockadeof GreatBritain in retaliationfor Britain'sOrders in Councilthat had first proclaimeda blockadearound the Continent. Congressmenthat winter debated bills of greatimportance, but their wordsdrew less attentionthan developments in the West andin Europe. Oneof thosebills wouldprohibit the importation of slavesinto the United Statesafter January 1, 1808. This act, signedinto law at the end of the

Matthew E. Mason is presently a Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland. Sincere thanks to Stacie Mason, WhitmanRidgway, Leslie Rowland, John L. Larson, and the anonymousJER readersfor helpful comments on earlierdrafts.

JOURNAL OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,20 (Spring 2000). O 2000 Society for Historiansof the Early AmericanRepublic. 60 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC session,had a greatimpact on Americanhistory.' Yet Americansin 1806 and 1807 paidlittle attentionto thesehistoric debates, distracted as they wereby the doingsof Burrand Napoleon. Their distraction tells us more aboutthe nature of earlysectionalism and the perception of otherdangers in the new Republicthan does the rhetoricringing through the halls of Congress.2 WilliamFreehling, in his recentaccount of the growthof America's sectionalcrisis, places the end of the Africanslave trade near the heartof his interpretation.For Freehling, "no other early action so shapedthe later slaverycontroversy" as did the slave tradeproscription. The restriction reducedblack populationgrowth in the South, he argues, and thus diminishedthat section's representation in the nationalgovernment. The ban meant that states such as Kentuckyand Missouri would face a permanentshortage of slave labor;that Virginiaand Marylandwould continueto be "whitened"as they exportedexcess slaves to the Deep South;and that the Old Northwest never would develop a slavesystem. As a resultthe Border South would be less committedto slaverythan the Deep

' Estimates of numbers of Africans brought in illegally to the United States vary widely. Philip Curtin estimates that 54,000 of the United States' total of 427,000 slave importscame in illicitly after 1808. Althoughhis estimateof 1,000 per year is an admitted "shot in the dark," Curtin effectively demonstrates that other historians' higher estimates-which range from 250,000 to one million-are too high. See Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census (Madison, 1969), 74-75, 87-88, 231-33. See also Harmon Judd Scott, "Suppressand Protect:The United States Navy, the African Slave Trade, and Maritime Commerce, 1794-1862" (Ph.D. diss., The College of William and Mary, 1977). For contrary views, see David Northrup,ed., The Atlantic Slave Trade (Lexington, 1994), 37-66. The standard-and most persuasive-statement that the prohibition law was a "dead letter" remains W. E. B. Du Bois, The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the United States of America, 1638-1870 (1898; rep., New York, 1965). More recent statementsof the ineffectiveness of the law include Jay Coughtry,The Notorious Triangle: Rhode Island and the African Slave Trade, 1700-1807 (Philadelphia, 1981), 203-04, 233-37; and Donald L. Robinson, Slavery in the Structureof American Politics, 1765-1820 (New York, 1970), 336-46. Many AfricanAmericans did not think of the law as a worthless parchment;see Gary B. Nash, Forging Freedom: The Formation of Philadelphia's Black Community,1720-1840 (Cambridge,MA, 1988), chap. 6; David Waldstreicher,In the MidstofPerpetual Fetes: TheMaking of AmericanNationalism, 1776- 1820 (ChapelHill, 1997), chap. 6; Eugene D. Genovese, The Worldthe SlaveholdersMade: Two Essays in Interpretation(New York, 1969), 99; Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York, 1974), 5; Allan Kulikoff, "UprootedPeoples: Black Migrants in the Age of the American Revolution, 1790-1820," in Ira Berlin and Ronald Hoffman,eds., Slaveryand Freedomin theAge of theAmerican Revolution (Charlottesville, 1983), 143-71; andMichael Tadman, Speculators and Slaves: Masters,Traders, and Slaves in the Old South (Madison, 1989). 2 See Robinson Slavery in the Structureof AmericanPolitics, 301. SLAVERYOVERSHADOWED 61 South,and the Northwestwould not be committedat all. ForFreehling, "theclosure of the Africanslave tradewas probablythe most important slaverylegislation Congress ever passedand amongthe most important Americanlaws on any subject."3 Freehlingmakes a powerfulcase for the significanceof the effectsof the bill, butthere is moreto it thanhe recognizes,for the debatesleading to its passagethemselves reveal the depthof sectionalfeeling attached to slavery. Yet historianshave devoted very little attention to the legislative historyof the slavetrade ban and even less to responsesto thebill outside of Congress.The congressional slave trade disputes of 1806-1807exposed a dangerousform of Americansectionalism and a willingnessto tap its rhetoric.There was broad support from all regionsfor proscribing the slave trade,but the crafting of themeasure was riddled with sharp and revealing disputesin whichfeeling ran high between North and South. Whatwas said in these debates, though not widely scrutinizedat the time, foreshadowedthe dangerof engagingthe slaveryquestion. Accordingto theConstitution, Congress could not prohibit the foreign slave tradebefore the year 1808,although it couldimpose a dutyof up to tendollars on eachslave imported (Article I, Section9). Thiscontroversial clause provokedemotional arguments during the ratificationdebates, especiallyin theNorth. From to Virginia,advocates of the Constitutionwho opposed the slave trade looked with hope to this provision:after all, the Articlesof Confederationset no date at which Congresscould legislate in thisarea. Antifederalistsin antislaverystates, on the other hand, worriedthat congressmenmight not proscribethe execrablecommerce in 1808, while SouthCarolina and Georgiafeared equallythat they would.4 Opponentsof the slave tradecould not havebeen encouragedby the course of the debatein the first Congressover whetherto tax slave importations.In these earlydiscussions of the slave tradeDeep South representativesstood so stubbornlyagainst all barriers that Congress never laid a duty on importedslaves.5 Most state governments,however, restrictedor outlawedthe traffic between the end of the American Revolutionand 1808. Still, the stateshad no naviesto enforcesuch acts, andsmuggling continued apace. Furthermore, state statutes could be rather

3 WilliamW. Freehling,The Road to Disunion: Secessionistsat Bay, 1776-1854 (New York, 1990), 136-39, 538 (quotationsat 137, 136). 4 John P. Kaminksi, ed., A Necessary Evil? Slavery and the Debate over the Constitution(Madison, 1995). 5 Ibid., 204-30. 62 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC incomplete:for instance,New York's laws of 1788 and 1801 forbade importsinto the statebut left its citizensfree to supportthe slave trade. The significantexceptions among the states to at least a modestly antislaveryposture were Georgiaand SouthCarolina. Georgiakept its portsopen to Africanslaves until 1798,seeking only to excludeimports fromthe WestIndies and Spanish Florida-a responseto the spectacular slave uprisingon St. Domingue. SouthCarolina proscribed the foreign trade througha series of temporaryacts beginningin 1787 but found enforcementto be nearlyimpossible and reopened its legal slave tradein 1803at theurging of thegovernor. Five hours after the passage of thislast bill, two largeBritish ships sailed into Charleston harbor to supply-now legally-the insatiabledemand for new slaves. South Carolinians imported tens of thousandsof new slavesbetween 1803 and 1807, a numberfar in excess of the state's need for labor. The surplusslaves mostly were reshippedto New Orleansor Natchez.6With these massive importations into the Deep Southand the gapingloopholes in the laws of the other states,it was evidentthat state legislation could not be reliedupon to end the trafficin Africans. Congressdid take some notice of theslave trade before its abolitionin 1808. A 1794law, passedwithout debate in thewake of therevolution on St. Domingue,made it illegalfor Americans to prepareslaving vessels in Americanports. An 1800law prohibited citizens' participation in thetrade aboardslave ships,allowing the UnitedStates Navy to participatefor the first time in regulatingthis commerceand addingimprisonment to the monetaryfines alreadyin place. SouthCarolina's behavior after 1803 scandalizedmany constituents throughout the nation, and pressure mounted on Congress-often in the formof instructionsfrom statelegislatures to theircongressional delegations-to act moreboldly as 1808drew near.7 Congressionalaction toward the slavetrade ban began December 16, 1805, when SenatorStephen Row Bradley,a Democratfrom Vermont, introduceda bill prohibitingthe African slave trade after January 1, 1808. This bill only madeit to a secondreading in the Senate,which postponed

6 Elizabeth Donnan, ed., Documents Illustrativeof the History of the Slave Trade to America (1932-35; rep., 4 vols., New York, 1965), III,407; IV, 501-03,513; PeterDuignan and ClarenceClendenen, The UnitedStates and the AfricanSlave Trade, 1619-1862 (Palo Alto, CA, 1963), 15. 7 Scott, "Suppress and Protect," 60-62; Mary Stoughton Locke, Anti-Slavery in America from the Introductionof African Slaves to the Prohibition of the Slave-Trade (1901; rep., n.p., 1965), 148-49. See also VirginiaArgus (Richmond),Dec. 30, 1806; and Alexandria(VA) Daily Advertiser,Dec. 11, 1806. The South Carolinalegislature refused to so instructits congressmen;see Charleston(SC) Courier,Dec. 10, 1806. SLAVERYOVERSHADOWED 63 considerationfor a year. Undauntedby delayin theSenate, Massachusetts CongressmanBarnabas Bidwell pushedfor a similarenactment in the Houseof Representativesin February1806. He proposedto amenda bill thatwould tax slaveimports by declaringthat this tax wouldbe collected only untilJanuary 1, 1808,after which the foreigntraffic in slaveswould be illegal. Virginia'sJohn Randolph and others raised doubts about the constitutionalityof Congresspassing such a billbefore 1808, so themotion failed in this first sessionof the NinthCongress. But duringthe recess, Bidwelllater recalled, "the subject was discussedin the newspapers,and thepublic sentiment set in favourof myproposition."8 This illustrates both the strengthof northernopposition to theslave trade, and the sensitivity of northernrepresentatives to "publicsentiment." Whenthe Congress reconvened, the idea of passinga lawbefore 1808 gained supportfrom the executivebranch. In his annualmessage to Congresson December2, 1806,President insisted that the legislaturecould pass a law immediately,to takeeffect in 1808. The interveningperiod could be used to warn"expeditions which cannot be completedbefore that day." He congratulatedthe lawmakers that the time finallywas approachingat whichthey could "withdraw the citizensof the UnitedStates from all furtherparticipation in those violationsof human rightswhich have been so long continuedon the unoffendinginhabitants of Africa,and which the morality, the reputation,and the best interestsof our country,have long been eagerto proscribe."Jefferson himself had been waitingfor a long time to see the Africanslave tradeto America ended;he hadpublicly expressed this hope as earlyas 1774. In contrastto his recordon slaveryin general,Jefferson proved effective and decisive in his oppositionto the internationalslave trade.9 The president'smessage prompteda swift responsein Congress. SenatorBradley gave notice December3 that he plannedto introduce

8 Locke,Anti-SlaveryinAmerica,149; BarnabasBidwell to MarshallBidwell, Jan.27, 1830, Barnabas Bidwell Papers (Libraryof Congress, Washington, DC). Support for Bradley's bill was inflated by his insistence on a roll call vote. One senator "said he was opposed to the measurehe thoughtit wrong-but as the greatopinion of the people was in favor of it he should record his name for it." "The question," wrote Senator William Plumer,"prevailed by a largemajority. Hadnot the ayes and nays been required,it's certain the motion would have been negatived." Everett S. Brown, ed., William Plumer's Memorandumof Proceedings in the United States Senate, 1803-1807 (New York, 1969), 353-54. See also Memoirsof John QuincyAdams, ComprisingPortions of His Diaryfrom 1795 to 1848, ed. CharlesFrancis Adams 9 (12 vols., Philadelphia,1874-77), I, 378-79. Annals of the Congress of the United States; 9th Cong., 2d sess., 14; Kaminski,A Necessary Evil? 3. 64 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC legislation. The Houseappointed a committeeto discussthis partof the president'smessage.0° Throughoutthe second session of the Ninth Congress,the Houseand Senate versions of the bill workedthrough their respectiveselect committees, through debates in committeeof the whole, andthrough a conferencecommittee that worked out the differences in the finalversions. Thepattern was clear at eachstep: mostpeople supported the ban on the Africanslave trade,but certainprovisions of the various bills provokedsometimes heated controversy. Benjamin Tallmadge of New Yorksaid it best: "SinceI havehad the honor of a seatin thisHouse, I can scarcely recollect an instancein which the membersseem so generallyto agreein theprinciples of a bill, andyet differso widelyas to its details.""The three "details" which created the most controversy were what to do with blacksbrought illegally to America,what the penalty shouldbe for violatingthe law, andwhether or to whatdegree the federal governmentcould regulatethe domesticseaborne slave trade. Sectional lines weredrawn most clearly in relationto thesepoints, but the southern positioncarried all butthe lastby gainingthe cooperation of at leastsome northernrepresentatives. Theproblem of howto dealwith illegally imported blacks first showed the depthof sectionaldifferences. Existing state and territorial laws and previouscolonial laws gave Congress no clear guidance in dealingwith this quandary;their proposed solutions varied greatly. Virginia, in particular, demonstratedconfusion, passing a seriesof laws whichfirst freed,then exported,then sold people of color who had been importedillegally. Debatebegan December 17, 1806, whenthe bill emergedfrom a select committee,stipulating that persons of colorimported after the lastday of 1807 wouldbe forfeitedby the smuggler. JamesSloan, a Quakerfrom New Jersey,immediately moved that anyone thus forfeited "be entitled to his or herfreedom."12 This touched off a firestormwhich did not spend its furyuntil January. The strongestof the southerners'objections was theirfear of letting freeblacks loose in theSouth. Speaker Nathaniel Macon of NorthCarolina indicatedthat smugglers would be mostlikely to do theirbusiness in slave states, and that Sloan's idea wouldrender those states' situation"most

10 Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 2d sess., 16-17, 113-14. " Ibid., 232. 12 Ibid., 168; Donnan, ed., Documents, IV, 164-65, 172. The 1798 act to create Mississippi Territoryfreed illegally imported slaves. New York's 1785 slave-tradelaw emancipatedthem, but New Jersey's in 1786 did not. CompareRobinson, Slavery in the Structureof AmericanPolitics, 313, and ArthurZilversmit, The First Emancipation:The Abolition of Slavery in the North (Chicago, 1967), 150-53. SLAVERYOVERSHADOWED 65 deplorable."Historian Mary Locke has suggested that if southernmembers reallyhad expected the banto be effective"they would hardly have been so apprehensiveof the dispositionto be made of the negroes after forfeiture."But they were apprehensive,in largemeasure because they sharedPresident Jefferson's well-known views on theimpossibility of free blacksliving alongsidewhites.13 As he did at manyother points in the debates,Georgia's Peter Early statedthe most extremesouthern position. "To have amongus in any considerablequantity persons of thisdescription," he declared,"is an evil far greaterthan slavery itself." With such a provisionin the law, "the whole people [of the white South]will rise up againstit," because"to enforceit wouldbe to turnloose, in the bosomof the country,firebrands thatwould consume them." White southerners never would permit a large populationof freeAfricans or WestIndians to live amongstthem, and the resultwould be morecruel to theblacks than northerners imagined slavery to be. In such a situation, Early explained, "we must in self- defense-gentlemen will understandme-get rid of themin some way. We musteither get rid of them,or they of us; thereis no alternative.... Not one of themwould be left alive in a year."14 If the Southernstates did not welcome the possibilityof a second St. Domingue,neither were they enthusiastic about federal encroachments on local prerogatives.Throughout the debateson how to dispose of illegallyimported blacks, southern representatives repeatedly challenged the nationalgovernment's constitutional power to interferewith state decisionsregarding "negroes." They insisted that white southerners, who knew better than most congressmen,could best decide questionsof disposalof contraband.15 For their part,northerners objected that by selling any contraband slaves, the federalgovernment would find itself engageddirectly in the slavetrade. John Smilie of Pennsylvaniawould "never give his assent"to a bill that forced congressmento "takeupon ourselvesthe odium of becomingslave traders."Other northerners pointed to the absurdityof a law by which governmentofficials "condemnthe man-stealer"only to become"the receivers of his stolengoods. We punishthe criminal,and

13 Annals of Congress,9th Cong., 2d sess., 173; Locke, Anti-Slaveryin America, 155; Du Bois, Suppressionof the African Slave-Trade,95-96. 14 Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 2d sess., 174. Is Ibid., 168-69, 171-72, 183, 272. 66 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC then step into his place, and completethe crime which he had only begun."16 Some northernersobjected to the whole idea of the government confiscatinghuman beings. BarnabasBidwell of Massachusettsinsisted that "the idea of forfeiture"proceeded wholly on a "false principle," namely,"that a propertymay be had in humanbeings." By leavingthe question solely to the states, the federal governmentcould avoid recognizingproperty in man. Later,congressmen representing northern states(and one representingKentucky) said that while they were trying to be sensitiveto southernfeelings, "they claimed an equalrespect for the sentimentsand feelings of theirconstituents, which were so repugnantto slaverythat no considerationwhatever could induce them to give it their sanction."'7Here, according to theserepresentatives, was a sectionalissue in its truestsense: one sectionof the countrycompletely opposed to the otheron theissue of slaveryitself, beyond the point of compromiseor even "consideration." Suchtalk alarmed Early and other southerners, who perceivedthat in these Yankees'principled objections to confiscationconstituted a direct attackon slaveryitself. Bidwellwas not alone in denyingthe rightsof propertyin man. Othershad said that the Africansin questionwere "not, by any law, humanor divine,the slavesof any master.They are not the lawful propertyof any owner." The principlebehind these objections, declaredEarly, "went to affectnine-tenths of the propertyof the Southern States,and might in its effects strikeat all the propertyheld in slaves." Southernersstood prepared to respondstrenuously to anyquestions about theirrights to propertyin slaves.' Congressmenfrom both sections attempted to movethe debate into the realm of practicalpolitics. Contendingthat forfeiturealone struck sufficientlyhard at the economic interests of smugglers,some asserted that if manypeople of colorwere allowed to go free,southerners would never aid enforcementby informingon illicit slavers.Massachusetts Federalist JosiahQuincy spoke at lengthconcerning the need to examinethe "real,

16 Ibid., 170, 201. 17 Ibid., 221, 265. 18 Ibid., 201,266. JanLewis has arguedthat this emphasison propertyrights-resting on liberal ratherthan republicanprinciples-dominated the defense of slavery from the revolutionaryera well into the nineteenthcentury. See Lewis, "TheProblem of Slavery in SouthernPolitical Discourse,"in David Thomas Konig, ed., Devising Liberty:Preserving and Creating Freedom in the New American Republic (Stanford, 1995), 265-97. For anotherrecent treatment see JamesL. Huston,"Property Rights in Slavery and the Coming of the Civil War,"Journal of SouthernHistory, 65 (May 1999), 249-86. SLAVERYOVERSHADOWED 67 practicalstate of things,"and he invitedhis colleaguesto "descendfrom theirhigh abstract ground," lest, like "the renowned Knight of LaMancha," they allowedtheir fellow beingsto continuein miseryand chains while they declaimedon "theoreticimpulse."'9 The dilemmaover what to do withillegally imported people of color strainedthe spirit of practicalcompromise that had so precariously survivedfrom the ConstitutionalConvention of 1787. Sometimes"the spiritof '87"was held as a club over opponents'heads, as congressmen from either side proclaimedtheir own willingnessto compromiseand wonderedwhy the othersection's representatives would not do the same. Similarly unconvincingwere expressionsof shock that purportedly innocent statements had provoked such outrage from obviously unreasonablemen in the other region of the country. For instance, PennsylvanianJohn Smilie reacted in horrorto PeterEarly's forecast that freeingsmuggled Africans would provoke the Southto civil war.Early retreated,claiming that Smilie had misunderstood him: "I wish to know whathas becomeof commonsense? I disclaimthe threatof civil war." Although some debatersconsistently employed overheatedsectional rhetoric,such language alarmed the Congress. At onepoint, "the Chairman interruptedMr. Sloan, andsaid he consideredit out of orderto alludeto differentsections of the Union."20 Alreadyoutnumbered in Congress(despite overrepresentation under the three-fifthsclause), southerners required some accommodationfrom northernrepresentatives in orderto pass legislationfavorable to their interests.At importantmoments, they got it. Forexample, Timothy Pitkin of Connecticutdeclared that he wouldnot consentto confiscatinghuman beingsunless "absolute necessity" required it.21 Passing a bill to abolish the slave tradeconstituted such a necessity. On January7, after the principleof confiscationof contrabandAfricans had passedby a large majority,Bidwell of Massachusettsmoved to amendthe bill so thatthe governmentwould not sell anyperson thus confiscated. This vote resulted in a 60-60 tie, brokenby SpeakerMacon of NorthCarolina, who cast his vote againstthe amendment. Southerners had carried the matter only with theaid of thirteennorthern nays. Elevenof thethirteen northern dissenters

19 Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 2d sess., 170, 172-74, 176, 188, 202-03, 221-24. Although Quincy became an increasinglyoutspoken opponent of slaverylate in life, he had little use for "ultra-theories"on the subject as late as the early 1840s. See Robert A. McCaughey,Josiah Quincy,1772-1864: TheLast Federalist (Cambridge,MA, 1974), 203- 14. 20 Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 2d sess., 270, 272, 478. 21 Ibid.,185. 68 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC representedmid-Atlantic states, suggesting the allianceof New England andthe South,so evidentin the ConstitutionalConvention as well as in earlierslave trade debates in Congress,did not holdon this occasion.22 The final version of the law that emergedafter more committee meetingsand input from the Senate represented even further compromise. The seventh section decreed that those who captureda slaver could confiscatethe ship but mustdeliver the humancargo "to such personor personsas shallbe appointedby therespective States to receivethe same," or to otherstate government officials if sucha personcould not be found. This provisioncould be readboth ways: from a northernperspective, the nationalgovernment would not confiscate these people and thus would not be countenancingproperty in man; whitesoutherners received assurance that an intrusivefederal government would not turnloose thousandsof Africansto slaughteror be slaughteredin Dixie. Despite the strong sectional rhetoric,the South had gained a victory with crucial-if limited-northernacquiescence.23 Anothermomentous issue whichCongress debated hotly was thatof punishinginfractions under the law. Traditionallystates affixed fines to theiranti-slaving laws, and the original draft of thisbill stipulatedthat the importerwould be fined in additionto confiscationof the slave cargo. Onceagain it was a mid-Atlanticmember who droppedthe bombshellin theHouse chamber. On December 18, JohnSmilie expressed his "surprise to find no penalty attachedto one of the highest crimes man could commit." Insistingthat any captainof a slave vessel "was guilty of murder,"Smilie suggested they define participation in the slavetrade as a felonypunishable by death.24When a committeereport later recommended a punishmentof five to ten yearsimprisonment, northerners quickly went on theoffensive. Some speakers echoed Smilie's claim that the traffic was tantamountto murder,and Smilie himself called it "acrime above murder. It is man-stealingadded to murder."Benjamin Tallmadge of Connecticut dug intohis Bible andquoted Exodus 21:16: "Andhe thatstealeth a man and sellethhim, or if he be foundin his hand,he shall surelybe put to

22 Ibid., 265-67. For the alliance of New England and the South, see Kaminski,ed., A Necessary Evil? 201. 23 Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 2d sess., 1268-69. It took southern states many years to legislate on contrabandslaves, and most of the laws that finally were passed sold them-the exception being Georgia's 1817 law, which allowed themto be sold or delivered to "the Colonization Society to be transported"at the Society's expense. See Du Bois, Suppressionof the African Slave Trade, 109, 247, 249, 254-55, 274. 24 Donnan, ed., Documents, III, 289-90; IV, 164-65, 172; Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 2d sess., 167-68, 189-90. SLAVERYOVERSHADOWED 69 death."If sucha punishmentwas "Heavendecreed for man-stealersand man-sellersin thedays of theJews," had that crime "become less heinous in ourday, thatthe samepenalty should not be inflictednow?"25 Representativesof southernstates soon rose to answerthis indictment of all personswho hadbought or sold slaves. EdwardLloyd of Maryland questionedthe applicability of theMosaic code for the enlightened modem day. NorthCarolinian James Holland dismissed the "bloody"laws of Mosesand suggested that "if that good old bookis broughtin, manythings will be foundon theother side. Slaveryappears to be toleratedthere." Not yet the full-scalebiblical warfare of the laterantebellum period, here we see whatDavid Brion Davis has called "initial salvos." 26 Southernerstried to rescuethe slave trade from such a completemoral stigma,even though they did not try to claimit wasa positivegood. Lloyd deniedthat traders were "man-stealers": "very few of thenegroes brought into this countryare kidnapped and stolen away." Three-fourths of them werecaptives of Africanwars, "sent abroad on accountof the vindictive spiritof those people." Hollandwent further,claiming the tradeonly transferredthe slave "fromone master to another,"adding that the conditionof the slaves"in the SouthernStates is muchsuperior to thatof those in Africa. Who, then, will say that the trade is immoral?" ConnecticutFederalist Theodore Dwight responded: "Who empowered us to judgefor them[African slaves] as to whichis the worseand which the betterstate? Have these miserablebeings ever been consultedon the questionof theirremoval?" Not to be outdone,Peter Early explained that "inthe Southern section of theUnion," the slave trade was not "anoffense whichnature revolts at." Southernersmight "deprecate slavery as anevil; as a politicalevil, butnot as a crime."Thus the governmentcould expect no southernerto "senda slavetrader to his death."27 At theend of thelong debate, on December31, theHouse voted 63-53 to strikeout the clausethat inflicted "the punishment of deathon owners andmaster of vesselsemployed in theslave trade." The vote was sectional, butnot sharplyso. The Southdelivered fifteen of the fifty-threevotes in favor of the deathpenalty, while the Northstood almosteven with the Southin votingto strikeit out.The sectionalbalance was very similarin a vote on the samesubject two weekslater. The act ultimatelydecreed a

25 Annals of Congress, 9th 2d sess., 242, 232-33. 26 Cong., Ibid., 236-37, 240. See also David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca, 1975), chap. 11 at 27 (quotation 531). Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 2d sess., 236, 240-42, 238. 70 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC fine up to $10,000and two to fouryears imprisonment.28 The hesitance of northernrepresentatives thus helped the South gain another moral victory, andit was not until 1820 thatthe deathpenalty was affixedto smuggling foreignslaves into the UnitedStates. The final debate over a provision of the bill again illustrated southerners'deep anxietythat over-reaching northerners would interfere in slave property. On February12, PeterEarly successfully moved an amendmentexempting from prohibition the Americanseaborne interstate slave trade. Whenthe Senaterejected this amendment,John Randolph took the baton from Early and carriedthe extremesouthern position throughoutthe restof thedebates. The South would defy anymeasure, he declared,that outlawed the interstatemovement of slaves,and "he would beginthe example. He wouldgo withhis ownslaves, and be atthe expense of assertingthe rightsof slaveholders."If the slaveholdersuffered any restrictions,he confirmed, they would soon find themselves forbidden from "going from one State to another."29This concern with dangerous precedentwould informmuch of Randolph'scontinuing battle against prohibitingor regulatingthe slavetrade. The House decidedto insist on its amendment,and the conference committeeproduced another version, this time forbiddingthe coastwise internaltrade in vesselsunder forty tons. Early spoke "at length" against the provision,and Randolph objected that it "touchedthe rightof private property,"and "it mightbe madethe pretextof universalemancipation." Randolphfurther predicted that "if everthe timeof disunionbetween the States should arrive, the line of severance would be between the slaveholdingand the non-slaveholding States." Nevertheless, by a mostly sectionalvote of 63-49,this provision stood.30 Twelve men from the Upper South,voted for this restrictionand only ten northernersvoted against it. As with the othervotes relatedto this bill, therewas no clear partisan pattern. The forty-tonprohibition continued to rankleRandolph. The average Atlanticslave vessel in thisperiod bore 158 tons, but the coastal traffic that suppliedmany points south of ChesapeakeBay reliedheavily on vessels underforty tons. Failingto defeatthis provision,Randolph proposed an "explanatoryact" that would "disclaimand disavow all Constitutional right,title, or authoritywhatsoever, by any legislativeact, in any wise to abridge,modify, or affectthe rightof propertyof mastersof slaves, not

28 Ibid., 242-44, 483-84, 1268. 29 Ibid., 484, 527-28. 30 Ibid., 626-27. SLAVERYOVERSHADOWED 71 importedinto the UnitedStates" after 1807. Thisled to "asmart debate," in which Randolpheven moreclearly threatened secession: "if the law wentinto forceas it was, he doubtedwhether we shouldever see another southerndelegate" on thefloor of Congress.He, for one, would say, "ifthe Constitutionis thusto be violatedlet us secede,and go home.""Whatever mightbe thoughtof sedition,of alien,of excise laws,"he thundered,"they werenothing to this."He warnedthat the slave trade bill as it stoodwould serve as an "enteringwedge" in the abolitionistYankees' drive for emancipation.Pennsylvania's John Smilie repliedthat "the subjectof disunionhas been so muchspoken of lately,that I am afraidit may take place." If southernersagreed with Randolph, he wishedthey would come forwardand say so: "ForGod's sake, if theyare disposed let themgo. We trustedwe wereable to takecare of ourselves,and he believeda disunion wouldprove their destruction."31 Despitethe over-heated rhetoric, little came of suchtalk. Therewas no southernrush to Randolph'sbanner of secession,and the explanatorybill cameto nothing.The sessionended soon afterthis climacticdebate, and the slave tradebill becamelaw withoutRandolph's qualifier. Later that yearRandolph asked for a committeeto reinvestigatethe slave tradeact, but even with Randolphin the chairthis committeeapparently produced nothing.32 How meaningfulwere the fiery speechesand the sectionalvotes in relationto theslave trade bill? HistorianDonald Robinson has argued that "in terms of intersectionalpolitics," these discussionsin 1806-1807 "markeda turningpoint." They demonstrated "growing southern unity, and theyshowed a markedsectional cleavage." The spirit of compromisewas obviouslyfar from dead, and southerners had won crucial concessions from theirnorthern counterparts. Yet northernrepresentatives had warned that theirconstituents were growing less eagerto compromiseon slavery,while southernerslike Earlyhad provedthemselves unwilling to acceptmuch guiltabout the peculiar institution. As WilliamFreehling has written about the "gagrule" debates three decades later: "the slavery issue momentarily showed its potentialto wrencheverything national out of shape. The

31 Ibid., 636; The Phenix (Providence, RI), Mar. 14, 1807; Columbia Centinel (Boston), Mar. 11, 1807; TheBalance (Hudson,NY), Mar. 17, 1807; TheRepublican and Savannah (GA) Evening Ledger, Mar. 19, 1807. For size of slaving vessels see Tommy Todd Hamm, 'The American Slave Trade with Africa, 1620-1807" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1975), 116-17; and WalterE. Minchinton,'The SeaborneSlave Tradeof North Carolina,"North Carolina Historical Quarterly,71 (Jan. 1994), 22. 32 Annals of Congress, 10th Cong., 1st sess., 854-55. 72 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC momentpassed. But the momentaryscare prefigured all reasonswhy slaverycontentions were so dangerous."33 Manyarguments and issues prominent in later, more famous arguments wereevident in 1806. Statesrights, biblical and moral arguments about slavery(with New Englandersnow firmly in theantislavery camp), talk of secession,and concern with settingdangerous precedents rang out in the halls of Congressmore than a decadebefore the Missouricontroversy. Thesewere familiar and evolving assertions, and they wouldcontinue to evolve for a generation. For instance,there was little talk yet of the dearnessof the Unionso characteristicin the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s; Smilie,for one, seemed willing to let theSouth go its ownway. Neither did northernerssing the praises of freelabor, as theywould in the 1850s. Still, sectionalarguments received further attention and elucidationas they surfacedin thesedebates. Thediscussion also featuredforays into criticism of slaveryitself, no matterhow memberstried to keep it restrictedto the slave trade. This elementof the debatesbears further comment. Severalhistorians have chidedtheir colleaguesfor failingto distinguishbetween opposition or support of the slave trade and opposition or support of slavery. Southerners,they point out, could easily oppose the slave tradewhile supportingand participatingin slavery itself. But in 1806-1807 the southerncongressmen proved no better than others at keeping the questions separate.On December 31, in the midstof one of the mostheated debates on slavery itself, , a Massachusettsman, tried to refocus attentionon this narrowdistinction: "There is no connexion,"he said, "betweencontinuing the tradeand [southerners]continuing to hold their presentslaves."34 Yet the courseof the disputes,including the one into whichhe attemptedto insertthis reminder,made it nearlyimpossible to condemnthe slave tradewithout discussing the peculiarinstitution itself. This was hardlya novel or surprisinglinkage. As early as 1775 antislaveryspokesmen had publicly drawn a connectionbetween abolition of the slave tradeand emancipation.Efforts to sharpenthe distinction betweenthe two cameto littlein 1783as Congressconsidered anti-slave

33 Robinson, Slavery in the Structureof AmericanPolitics, 337-38; Freehling, Road to Disunion, 334. The debates over the gag rule were similar to the 1806-07 slave trade fracas in that they were given only passing contemporarynotice. 34 James Oakes, The Ruling Race: A History of AmericanSlaveholders (New York, 1982), 33; Peter Wallenstein, "Flawed Keepers of the Flame: The Interpretersof George Mason," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 102 (Apr. 1994), 247-50; Paul Finkelman,Slavery and The Founders:Race and Libertyin the Age of Jefferson(Armonk, NY, 1996), 116, 126, 208; Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 2d sess., 239. SLAVERYOVERSHADOWED 73 tradememorials. Throughout the late Federalist period, congressmen tried (unsuccessfully)to keep theirdebates on restrictingthe slave tradefrom touchingon the field of slavery. In 1791, despitehis oppositionto the slave trade, declined to introducea petitionagainst the trafficinto the Houseof Representatives,because "animadversions, such as it contains... on theslavery existing in ourcountry, are supposed by the holdersof thatspecies of propertyto lessen the valueby weakeningthe tenureof it." Sometimesit was northernmen who triedto convincetheir southerncolleagues that anti-slave trade petitions should be separatedfrom anti-slaverypetitions. But southerners'awareness of the correlationwas keptfresh throughout the 1790s,as abolitionsocieties sent memorialsto statelegislatures in theSouth, begging the end of theforeign and domestic commercein bondsmen"as a necessarypreliminary to the extirpationof slavery."When a Philadelphianewspaper reported the introductionof a slave tradebill in December1806, the headlineread, "ABOLITION OF SLAVERY."When Senator Bradley took credit for introducingthe slave tradebill, he referredto it as a "billto prohibitslavery."35 Indeed, we mightsee-as didmany white southerners at thetime-that thenarrowest attackson the slavetrade threatened slavery at leastby implication. Slaveryand the slave tradeinextricably were linkedin the mindsof laterantebellum Americans as well. As he foughtfor the freedomof the Amistadcaptives in 1840, claimed it was"impossible to separatethe discussion upon the African slave-trade from the moral and politicalaspects of slavery."Southern fire-eaters of the 1850sand 1860s understoodthe linkagetoo. WilliamLowndes Yancey of Alabamacalled fora repealof federalslave trade laws, not to reopenthe traffic but to purge fromthe statutesany "federal legislation branding slavery by implication as immoral."Indeed, the 1806-1807controversies paralleled many other earlynational and antebellum sectional donnybrooks in whichdebates over issues technicallydivorced from the moralityof slaveryspilled over into thatdangerous territory. These slave trade debates, then, clearly belong to the unfoldingdrama of the politicsof slavery.36

35 Kaminski, ed., A Necessary Evil? 6, 206, 225-26, 271; Locke, Anti-Slavery in America, 55,88,105,138-42; TheAurora(Philadelphia), Dec. 13,1806; Robinson,Slavery in the Structureof AmericanPolitics, 333, 303. 36 Adams,ed., Memoirsof John QuincyAdams,X, 450. See also J. Mills ThorntonIII, Politics and Power in a Slave Society:Alabama, 1800-1860 (Baton Rouge, 1978), 375-76. Confederateleaders also were keenly awareof the "stigma"that the slave tradeprohibition placed on slavery. See Drew Gilpin Faust, The Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identityin the Civil WarSouth (Baton Rouge, 1988), 74-75; Freehling,Road to Disunion, 455, 458; Linda K. Kerber,Federalists in Dissent: Imageryand Ideology in 74 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC But what of the impact of these debatesbeyond the chambersof Congress?Did the forcefulness of thelegislators' speeches seem important to contemporaries?Did they provokethe kind of responseamong the country'sleaders and in the public at large that was witnessedin the famousMissouri crisis "firebell in the night?"Although the slave trade bill claimedmuch time in Congress,sometimes taking the whole day's business,it seemedoddly unimportant to legislatorsand other government officialsoutside of theirtime on thefloor of Congress.President Jefferson wrotelittle in reactionto the debates,although he did rejoicein the bill's passage.The president's correspondence during this period was dominated insteadby foreignaffairs, especially reports of AaronBurr's conspiracy. It is hard to find evidence that membersof the Ninth Congress consideredthe slave tradedebates a centralevent in the historyof that Congress. Some scatteredreferences to the bill appearin theirwritings. VermontSenator Bradley boasted of his involvementin the bill. At least two othercongressmen remembered the bill yearslater as an important milestonein their careers,but they did not remarkon the heat of the debates. In 1829 HenryClay recalled"with great satisfaction"in an addressto theAmerican Colonization Society, that it hadbeen his "happy lot"to vote for a law that"terminated, we mayhope forever, in the United States, a disgracefultraffic, which drew after it a trainof enormities surpassingin magnitude,darkness, and duration, any that ever sprang from anytrade pushed by theenterprise or cupidityof man."After all, the law was a necessary part of the whitening of America to which the colonizationistswere devoted. WhenBarnabas Bidwell, then living in ,read Clay's address, he senta copyof it to his son,remarking that "withMr. Clay, I feel some satisfactionin recollectingthe partI took on thatsubject." And yet when legislators wrote to theirconstituents about the session'sbusiness at the time,they wrote about the slavetrade bill just as they wrote aboutother things they had accomplished;again, the only matterthat received extraordinary attention was the Burrconspiracy.38

JeffersonianAmerica (Ithaca, 1970), 45-49 (quotationat 47); and Robinson, Slavery in the Structureof AmericanPolitics, 263. 37 Alexandria(VA) Daily Advertiser,Jan. 1, 9, 1807; Newport (RI) Mercury,Jan 17, 1807; ColumbiaCentinel, Feb. 21, 28, 1807; TheBalance, Mar. 17, 1807. This conclusion is based on a search of The Writingsof ThomasJefferson, ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb (20 vols., Washington,DC, 1903), XI, 127-83, entries from Dec. 1806 to Mar. 1807. 38 Daily National Intelligencer (Washington,DC), Jan. 12, 1830; BarnabasBidwell to MarshallBidwell, Jan. 27, 1830, BarnabasBidwell Papers;Noble E. Cunningham,Jr., ed., CircularLettersof Congressmento TheirConstituents, 1789-1829 (3 vols., ChapelHill, 1978), I, 485-512. SLAVERYOVERSHADOWED 75 Whatis strikingabout most participants' papers is theirsilence on the subjectof the slave tradebill.39 Whendealing with events of this time period,their manuscripts dwell-like Jefferson's-on foreignpolicy and the Burrconspiracy. Clearly Napoleonic escapades in Europeand Burr's outragesalong the frontierseemed more noteworthy for officersin the federal governmentthan the rhetoricalfireworks of congressmenin Washington,no matterhow portentousthe subject. Theslave trade bill didreceive notice in thenewspapers. A few papers featurededitorials on the subject. One Boston editor decried the inconsistencyof the unfinishedbill that would have punishedslave importerswith death while selling contraband to be "addedto thestock of slaves of the State!" Was not "theReceiver, in this case, as bad as the Thief?"Also criticalof Congress(although apparently more out of habit thanreaction to this bill) was the correspondentof a Hudson,New York, sheet, who used the slave bill, with its endless debatesand committee referrals,chiefly as an exampleof congressionalbuffoonery. This same writerlater decried Congress's "waste" of timeon thebill, andmockingly dismissed"Friend Sloan's" emotional appeals. A thirdnorthern editor celebratedupon passage of theact, along with British abolition of theslave trade in the same month: "Thus . . . should the nations of the earth contend-who cando the most good, and the earliest. Divine emulation !"40 Many presses duringthese months aimed their contemptnot at membersof Congressbut at SouthCarolina. In 1806and 1807,when the legislatureof thatstate kept the infernalcommerce open, editors north of Charlestonwrung their hands. The editor of theNational Intelligencer in Washingtonled the way, complainingin 1806 that"our hopes are again blastedby thedecision of thesenate of South-Carolina."In 1807,the same sourcedeclared that "the Senate of South-Carolinahave inflicted another deep woundon the nationalcharacter" by keepingthe commercealive. Paperseverywhere reprinted these editorials.41

39 Josiah Quincy Papers;David RogersonWilliams Papers;Papers of AndrewGregg, 1749-1830, in Gregg Collection, 1716-1916; John Randolphof Roanoke Papers;Samuel Smith Family Papers; Stephen Row Bradley Papers, in Henry A. Willard II Collection; George Michael Bedinger Papers;Nathaniel Macon Papers;Benjamin Tallmadge Papers; ManuscriptDivision, Libraryof Congress. See also Adams, ed., Memoirsof John Quincy Adams, I, 444-66; and Brown, ed., WilliamPlumer's Memorandum,519-643, for evidence of how especially Burrdominated the Senate's attentionin those months. 40 Columbia Centinel, Dec. 31, 1806; The Balance, Feb. 17, Mar. 17, 1807; The Phenix, Apr. 17, 1807. 41 Daily National Intelligencer reprintedin The MarylandGazette (Annapolis), Jan. 9, 1806; National Intelligencerand Washington(DC) Advertiser, Jan. 7, 1807; TheAurora, 76 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC The Federalist CharlestonCourier led a spiritedresponse. In January 1806,the editornoted that "for a considerablelength of timepast," many northernpapers had denouncedCharleston's participation in the slave trade. Now the senatorswho voted for the continuancethereof were presentedas "horridmonsters in humanshape." He expected New England to be critical,"but that the Marylandersand Virginiansshould be among the numberis certainlyvery ridiculous." It was, the editor charged, Carolina'spurchase of Africanrather than Virginiaslaves that truly "grievesthem"-their new inability to profitfrom banishing "all their cut- throatscoundrels, who have been reprievedfrom the gallows." By July when it was clear that"the hue andcry" against Charleston slavers had come as close as Raleigh,North Carolina, the editorresumed his theme. With theirnorthern neighbors as with the Virginians,"it is neitherthe generalimpolicy nor the immorality of thetrade which galls their withers; but,as it preventsthem from smuggling their own villainsinto our state." Therewas a worse "reasonfor theirhowling-it is a deep and sinister attemptto dissolvethe affectionsand union of the peopleof the different states"by alienatingthe rest of Americafrom South Carolina's "manners, customs,and laws."42 This editorheaped contumely on morethan just his nearneighbors. Reactingto storiesof Charleston's"thieves," he repliedthat the epithet might as well be applied "to the pure, the immaculate,and demure Philadelphians,and some other of the northerncities, where they are bellowingout, humanity! humanity! Oh! the rights of dearinsulted nature!" For despite northernlaws, it was "a fact known to every citizen of Charleston,that where there is one shipbelonging to this port,employed in the slave trade, there are three vessels from the northernstates." Furthermore,to thuscondemn Carolinians "is certainly neither the way to show their good sense nor theirwish to harmonizethe feelings of the people in the differentstates."43 Juxtaposing this editor'sposition with CongressmanSmilie's reply to JohnRandolph leaves us witha pictureof the Southin 1806-1807more concerned than the Northabout Union. TheFederalist Charleston Courier took especial offense to Jefferson's role in encouragingslave traderestriction. Despite the sacredcompact

Jan. 12, 1807; The Phoenix, Jan. 17, 1807; Connecticut Gazette (New London), Jan. 21, 1807. 42 Charleston (SC) Courier,Jan. 22, July 12, 1806. 43 Ibid, July 10, 1806. A modem estimateshows thata somewhatsmaller proportion, but still a majorityof slave ships delivering to Charlestonwere not owned by natives of the place. Hamm, "AmericanSlave Trade with Africa,"98-102. SLAVERYOVERSHADOWED 77 madein 1787,"Lucius" denounced "MR. JEFFERSON," who "wantonly, officiously, and unconstitutionally obtrudes on Congress, a recommendationinDecember, 1806, to legislateon thissubject! !" Anyact of Congressbefore "the first of Jan. 1808," "Lucius"explained, was "absolutelynull andvoid." Therefore Jefferson "ought to havebottled up this frothyeffusion of his moralityand philanthropy."44 "Lucius"was hardlyalone in tryingto use slave tradeissues for partisanpurposes, no matterhow nonpartisanthe sectional votes in Congresshad been. A Federalisteditor in Bostonurged that, while they wereat the task of reducingpopulation flow intothe South, Congress ought to repealthe three-fifthsclause. "Thiswould be a real amendmentof the Constitution-an amendment loudly called for, by JUSTICE, and the principles of EQUAL REPRESENTATION;and would be perfectly in unison with the late recommendationof MR. JEFFERSONto abolish the Slave Trade!"A Federalistpaper in Marylandcondemned Jefferson for shamefully neglecting "the general welfare" while Congress went "groping"after "the African trade" and other trivialities.45 InfluentialRepublican editor, Benjamin Franklin Bache, who hated all things English, warnedAmericans to beware Great Britain's moves towardsabolition of the slavetrade. "We wish we couldsay," he wrotein an unconvincingphrase, "that the measurethere was takenup with the samebenevolent sincerity that it is pursuedhere" as led by Jefferson.But the "hypocritical"British regime was usingthe issue to keepEnglishmen "blindedto theequally galling slavery which that enemy to all libertywas forgingfor themselvesand otherwhite slaves of the oligarchyof Great Britain."Labor in theWest Indies, he claimed,was now to be suppliedby Asian importsunder the euphemismof "freelabourers," which would producea mortalityrate "ten times more dreadful" on those islands because of the changefrom "the hardy, robust and unsusceptible African" to the frail "Asiatic."In short,"the tragic farce of [British]abolition is of the blackest hypocrisy."46 All these editorialfulminations notwithstanding, what impresses the readerof the newspapercoverage of the 1806-1807slave tradebill is its relativepaucity. Several papers did print the debates at somelength, a few

44 Charleston Courier,Jan. 15, 1807. 45 Columbia Centinel, Dec. 24, 1806; Frederick-Town(MD) Herald, Jan. 24, 1807. On the three-fifths rule, see Albert F. Simpson, "The Political Significance of Slave Representation, 1787-1821," Journal of Southern History, 7 (Aug. 1941), 315-42; and Kerber,Federalists in Dissent, chap. 2. 46 The Aurora, Dec. 23, 1806. 78 JOURNALOF THEEARLY REPUBLIC withsmall commentaries. Others published merely abbreviated reports or summaries.Other congressional debates-such as the one concerninga tradeembargo against Britain-claimed much more copy in some papers than did the slave tradedebates. Many printedthe law soon after its passage. Some foundroom to printthe act (whichtook up on average aboutthree newspaper columns) only aftera long delay, or neverat all despiteprinting other national laws. A coupleof newspapersdid not even mentionthe bill.47 Notwithstandingthe variablecoverage of this bill, there was one constant:in everypaper, it wasovershadowed by Europeand Burr. North, South,East, and West newspaper readers found plentiful information on Burr'sand Napoleon'sdoings. Editorsdevoted roughly four times the spaceto Burr,and five timesthe spaceto Napoleon,that the slave trade debates occupied. Even in Washington,Burr took top billing far in advanceof the sectionalrhetoric reverberating in the hallsof the Capitol. The editor of the National Intelligencer summed up the state of the press nationwidefrom December 1806 to March1807, when he wrotethat "the greatimportance of the intelligencefrom the westward,has superceded muchmiscellaneous matter, as well as Congressionalproceedings." There is no evidencethat the slavetrade debates ever crowded out either of these otherevents.48 ThatEuropean affairs should have receivedso muchattention is not terriblysurprising. After the First Congress, foreign affairs dominated the nationaldeliberations throughout the earlynational period. This was due in large measureto the importanceof foreigncommerce to America's economy.49The Europeancounter-blockades announced in 1806-1807

47 Coverage may be found in: Daily National Intelligencer, Mar. 6, 1807; The Republicanand SavannahEvening Ledger, Mar. 26,1807; Newport(RI) Mercury, Mar. 28, 1807; ConnecticutJournal, Apr. 9, 1807; VirginiaArgus, Apr. 14, 1807; New-Hampshire Gazette,Oct. 20,1807. The following showed scantinterest: The Republican and Savannah Evening Ledger, Newport Mercury; Columbia Centinel; United States Gazette (Philadelphia); American and Commercial Daily Advertiser (Baltimore); Connecticut Gazette;Alexandria Daily Advertiser,Daily National Intelligencer, ConnecticutJournal (New Haven);New-Hampshire Gazette (Portsmouth); Boston Gazette;Virginia Argus; The Aurora;Spirit of the Press (Philadelphia);The Aurora; The CumberlandRegister (Carlisle, PA); Boston Courier. 48 This conclusion is based on a sample of twenty-one dates between Dec. 1806 and Mar. 1807 (as well as two from July 1806) in three newspapersfrom very differentregions and with very different purposes: The Balance, Daily National Intelligencer, and CharlestonCourier. The total columns devoted to the respectivestories in those 23 editions are: Napoleon, 57 columns; Burr,44; slave trade, 11. 49 Robinson, Slavery in the Structureof AmericanPolitics, 250-51. SLAVERYOVERSHADOWED 79 furtherbuffeted American commerce, demonstrating just how difficultit was for Americato keep tradeflowing duringthe Europeanwar. The strugglebetween Great Britain and France also became so inextricablytied to Americanpartisan identities that affinities for England or France became readyindicators of Americanideological persuasion. In a largersense, the behaviorof thegreat European powers was of intenseinterest to Americans concernedabout the survivalof theirfragile republican experiment in a worldof dangerousempires. The senseof the possibilityof directthreat to Americaitself is evidentin the fact thatfortifying American ports and harborswas so earnestlydiscussed in Congressand the pressat the same time as the slave tradebill. Yet alongsidethe news fromEurope was the newsprintdevoted to informingAmericans about the Burrconspiracy. One compelling reason for Burr'sdominance was that the affairsold copies like nothingelse. EditorBache in Philadelphia,for instance, received a letterin Januaryfrom Nashville,Tennessee, saying that his "publicationson Burr'sconspiracy havereached this place, and are universally admired, there never was such a demandfor the Aurora,in this town,as it has beenfor somedays past." Manywesterners, exceedingly anxious to distancethemselves from any associationwith conspiratorslike Burr,paid close attentionto the way eastern newspaperstreated the West. "Savvy westerners,"David Waldstreicherhas written,were "quitesensitive to the impressionsand perceptionsof themselvesheld back east and the consequences of negative portrayals,"especially since the national government's headquarters were in the East.5 Froma newsman'sperspective, Burr clearly made a betterstory than the slavetrade debates. Although the lattertook some unexpected turns, it was hardlya surprisethat Congress was debatingthe issue; since 1787 Americanshad anticipated that. The Burrstory also hadthe elementsof greatdrama: celebrity, intrigue, and possible foreign connections. Those foreignconnections-featuring either the Spanish, British, French, or some combination-tiedthe Burrhearsay to the prevailingfears of the threatto Americafrom abroad. Moreover, the rumors had something for editors on aboutany place on the Americanpolitical spectrum. The gossip proved malleableenough to implicateboth Federalists (it wasrightly rumored that manyof Burr'ssupporters were Federalist types) and Republicans (after all, hadn'tBurr served as Jefferson'svice president?).51

so TheAurora, Jan. 24, 1807; Waldstreicher,In the Midstof Perpetual Fetes, 275-78 (quotationat 277). 51 I am indebted to Bruce Guthrie of the University of Maryland, a former 80 JOURNALOF THE EARLY REPUBLIC More than simple sensationalismexplains the imbalancein the coverage,however. A westerncountry united behind Burr and backed by Spainwas a moresalient menace than what congressmen said in theHouse of Representatives,no matterhow bold theirsuggestions of disunion.52 Thewestern settlements of NorthAmerica apparently seemed more poised for secessionthan a Southwhich would not follow John Randolph's call to leavethe Congress-a callhe himselfdid not heed. Neitherdid Americans yet feel the resonanceof Randolph'sprediction-so prescientfrom our perspective-thatany rupture of the Unionwould come alongthe North- Southdivide. Burr'sconspiracy touched a presentdanger on American mindssince the 1780s: the threatthat a foreignpower in the Westmight exploit the grievancesof a frontierpopulation whose loyalties were suspect. HistorianPeter S. Onuf arguesthat before 1815, American citizenssaw "foreign manipulation of the 'clashingjurisdictions and jarring interests'of widelydispersed and doubtfully loyal frontier settlements" as "theclearest and most present danger to theunion." It wasonly in a second generationthat slavery became the prime threat to thefederal union.53 The actionsof Burrin the West andthe Europeanpowers in the Napoleonic conflict can thus be seen as two heads of the same hydrathat many Americanssaw threateningtheir Republic. Althoughthe slave trade debatesof 1806-1807 did not hold an importantplace in thehistory of theNinth Congress, they mark a milestone in the developmentof America'ssectional divide. The grandiloquence of thelegislators caused precious little alarm beyond the old Housechamber. Yet the expressionsused in the debatesfeatured a developmentand expositionof previousideas that foreshadowed a later sectional breakdown that would one day commandeverybody's attention. The increasingly cohesivesectional sentiments revealed in speechesand votes demonstrated thedanger of discussinghuman bondage in theUnited States Congress. It is clearthat Americans did not agreeand were not apatheticabout slavery andthe African slave trade. Northern and southern representatives seemed keenlyaware of how deeplytheir constituents cared about the issuesthey

newspapermanhimself, for the point on the newspaperman'sperspective. For the wide varietyof rumorsfloating amongsteven those with relativelygood informationon the Burr affair, see Thomas PerkinsAbemethy, The Burr Conspiracy(New York, 1954). 52 Talk of secession was not novel enoughto attractextraordinary attention in the early national period. See Simpson, "ThePolitical Significance of Slave Representation,"327. 53 Peter S. Onuf, '"TheExpanding Union," in Konig, ed., Devising Liberty, 50-80 (quotation at 78); Onuf, "Federalism, Republicanism, and the Origins of American Sectionalism,"in EdwardL. Ayers, ed., All Over the Map: RethinkingAmerican Regions (Baltimore, 1996), 28-29. SLAVERYOVERSHADOWED 81 werediscussing, and they kept an eye on how theiractions would play in theirhome states. Finally,in discussingthe slave tradeboth sides knew that they were reallydiscussing slavery itself. Americanscared about slavery,pro or con, beforethe MissouriControversy; but they interpreted the relativeimportance of manifestationsof sectionalismin lightof what theyperceived as thegreater present danger, and not through the lens of the Civil War.