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Project Vista and Nuclear Weapons in Europe

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Project Vista and Nuclear Weapons in Europe Project Vista and David C. Elliot Nuclear Weapons in Europe Thecommunist inva- sion of South Korea in June 1950 created a crisis that had ramifications far beyond Korea. With the communists on the march, the threat to Western Europe seemed greatly to increase, and there was not yet much defense to counter it. NATO, recently created, still lacked organization and effective Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/11/1/163/690064/isec.11.1.163.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 power. Conventional forces available to it on the Continent were such that defense on the Rhine-IJssel line against the Soviet armies seemed highly optimistic, and some pessimists even feared that allied forces might be pushed behind the Pyrenees.’ The main assurance Europe had against Soviet aggression lay in the atomic weaponry of the United States organized for delivery since 1946 in the Strategic Air Command. The atomic bombs themselves were still huge, cum- bersome, and hardly deliverable except by large aircraft from overseas bases,2 and they seemed best suited for use against cities and other targets of high value within the Soviet Union. That situation, however, was about to change as smaller warheads became available. What use could be made of this new technology? The question sparked a lively controversy, in the midst of which came Project Vista. Begun in the spring of 1951, the Project developed a report that was issued early in 1952. It argued for the tactical use of nuclear weapons as initially a more effective way to stop the Soviet armies than strategic bombing. With this recommen- dation, it thus challenged directly the prevalent ideas of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The Air Force sought to modify and then suppress the report. In the early stages of this paper, I was greatly helped by support from the Arroyo Center. I wish to thank those concerned in that organization and also the many others who were willing to gve up their time to share ideas and recollections. David C. Elliot is a Professor of History at the California Znstitute of Technology. 1. History of the Joint Chiefs of Staf, Vol. 2, pp. 404-405, in the Military Section of the National Archives, Washington, D.C. 2. David Alan Rosenberg, ”The Origins of Overkill,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 14-15. In 1950, there were three SAC bases in England with more planned. History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Vol. 4, p. 168. ~ ~~~~ Internntional Security, Summer 1986 (Vol. 11, No. 1) 0 1986 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 163 International Security I 264 It is hard to tell what effect this report, thus buried, had directly on U.S. policy. It was, however, one of the earliest efforts to base the defense of Europe on theater nuclear weapons. This attempt avoided both the notion of massive retaliation and the prospect of a huge conventional buildup as proposed contemporaneously at the Lisbon Conference. Vista argued, as Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/11/1/163/690064/isec.11.1.163.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 NATO itself came to argue, that nuclear power can be used to offset defi- ciencies in conventional arms. At a time of great uncertainty, it presented a coherent case for a different use of atomic power than current military doc- trine envisaged, but in offering an alternative it avoided doctrinaire commit- ment and urged flexibility in a manner that seemed to foreshadow the later pronouncements of McNamara and Schlesinger. Project Vista may also be viewed as one response to a national emergency; or it can provide an example of problem-solving through technology. Finally, it touches on relations between the military and civilians, and among the military services themselves. However, the nuclear question was the central issue, and it is on that issue that this article focuses. Origins of Project Vista The study grew quite naturally out of the extensive, important, and widely known contribution of scientists to the national effort in World War 11. This involvement continued into peacetime as scientific advisers and scientific committees proliferated in and around the Department of Defense. Science had become very much a part of war, and scientists on the fringes of gov- ernment enjoyed a special and no doubt exciting prestige. So, when problems arose during the course of the Korean War in regard to tactical air support, the services had recourse to scientific advice. In early September 1950, General James Gavin, then assigned to the Weapons Sys- tems Evaluation Group (WSEG) with the obligation to study ”the possible tactical employment of nuclear weapons,” was sent to review the situation in Korea. He was accompanied by Professor Charles C. Lauritsen of the California Institute of Technology (Caltech); Dr. William Shockley of Bell Labs; and Professor Edward L. Bowles of M.I.T. As General Gavin tells the story, Professor Lauritsen ”was particularly impressed” with the problems of ground commanders and, when the group returned to the United States some six weeks later, its discussions made apparent the need for tactical air support not only for fire power but also for logistical reasons. Perhaps ”a study group of top scientists and military men” Project Vista and Nuclear Weapons I 165 could be helpful in providing answers; "Dr. Lauritsen and I had particularly in mind nuclear rocket support. from these discussions was born Project Vi~ta."~Thus, before the study began, the key element in the final report- nuclear rocket support-was already identified. Meanwhile, the Air Force was talung a hand. In the fall of 1950, the Office Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/11/1/163/690064/isec.11.1.163.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, was attempting to expand its capabilities by enlisting university expertise. Officials felt that in the absence of anything like the old wartime OSRD such support might provide a means of mobilizing scientific talent should a worldwide conflict de~elop.~Negoti- ations were undertaken with M.I.T. which led to Project Charles and the establishment of Lincoln Labs. A smaller project was set up at the Case Institute of Technology. An approach to the University of Chicago was less successful, though some support was made available for Edward Teller's work on fusion. Caltech's experience in rocketry and nuclear physics made it a natural target. Discussions began late in 1950 when a conversation between Lee A. DuBridge, President of Caltech, and Louis Ridenour, Chief Scientist of the Air Force, took place. Would Caltech be interested in tackling problems either of strategic or of tactical air? An answer was not immediately forthcoming. Caltech, it seems, needed a good deal of persuasion to undertake anything at all, and in this it was probably prudent. Further discussions between DuBridge and the Air Force Development staff took place in Washington on January 7, 1951 and in Pasadena on January 12. On the latter occasion not only DuBridge but also Professor Lauritsen and other members of the faculty were involved. "The Caltech group," as DuBridge later wrote, "expressed the feeling that it was not qualified or greatly interested in the strategic air problem, but that the tactical air problem, particularly the problem of close support of ground troops, was more nearly in line with our interests, and the group agreed to give the matter further th~ught."~The emphasis on "close support" was very much in line with the interest of the project spon- sors in the Air Force. Meanwhile, the Army, stimulated both by the WSEG group that had gone to Korea in the preceding September and by an approach from the Air Force,6 3. James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New York, 1958), pp. 129-132. 4. Letter from Ivan A. Getting, September 23, 1984. 5. DuBridge to W.A. Fowler, March 27, 1951. C.C. Lauritsen papers, Box 8, File 9, Millikan Library, California Institute of Technology. 6. Dr. Getting approached Karl R. Bendetson, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Development, International Security I 266 was considering similar studies. DuBridge was invited to lunch on February 13, 1951 with Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army, and Professor E.L. Bowles. Pace felt that the study of air support for ground forces should be conducted under the Army. DuBridge argued for a joint all services project, and urged the Army and the Air Force to get together. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/11/1/163/690064/isec.11.1.163.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 There were good reasons for this. The two branches of the armed services did not see eye to eye at all. The Air Force thought it should control every- thing that could fly, and at this time, apart from the Navy, it almost did. It did not, however, agree with the Army on how to support ground opera- tions. In the list of its priorities, close support ran a poor third to control of the air and interdiction. It was organized and prepared with these priorities in mind. The Army, however, emphasized the need for close and immediate air support, when, as, and how it might require it. The solution of the problem of tactical defense involved, therefore, the reconciling of these con- flicting priorities, and at least some thought that the intervention of Caltech, a neutral party, might help to bring the Army and the Air Force closer together on this issue.
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