ROBERT OPPENHEIMER' (1904-1967)

ROBERT F. BACHER Professorof Physics, Institute of Technology

ROBERT OPPENHEIMER died in Princeton,New Island. His fatherpresented him witha sailboat Jerseyon February18, 1967, at the age of sixty- which Robert named Trimethyafter a chemical two. He was the leading American theoretical compoundthat interested him. He and his younger physicistof his generation,the founderof the brotherFrank, born in 1912, sailed the Great most importantschool of theoreticalphysics, and South Bay endlessly. He becamean accomplished one of the leadingintellectuals of our day. sailor and kept an interestin sailing for the rest Robert Oppenheimer,whose full name was J of his life. Robert Oppenheimer,was born in New York In spite of outdoorsummers, Robert was frail City on April 22, 1904. His father,Julius and was oftenill, especiallyduring the winters. Oppenheimer,was a very successfulmember of a He completedhis workat Ethical CultureSchool firmof textile importerswhich had been started earlyin 1921 and thentook some advanced chemis- by his uncle and which his fatherhad joined at trybefore the close of the springterm and gradua- an early age after immigratingfrom Germany. tion. Afterthat his familywent to Europe where His mother,Ella FriedmanOppenheimer, shared Robert and Frank had a finetime exploringand her husband's interest in the Ethical Culture seeing the sights. Robert became ill apparently Societyand had manyinterests of her own. She with dysenteryand was broughthome to recover was an accomplishedpainter. Robertgrew up in and recuperate. By fall he had not acquired suf- an atmosphereof cultureand affluencein which ficientstrength to enter Harvard where he had his intellectualcuriosity was stimulatedand en- been admitted. Instead he stayed in New York couraged. At a very early age he became in- and then his fatherpersuaded one of his former terested in minerals and by age eleven was a instructorsat Ethical Culture School to go west member of the New York Mineralogical Club, with him to a ranch in the upper Pecos area of largelyon the basis of an eruditecorrespondence the Sangre de Cristo Mountainsin New Mexico. whichhe carriedon withsome of the members. Katherine Page, who owned and operated this Robert attendedthe Ethical Culture School in ranch, encouragedRobert's interestin the out- New York where he apparentlykept much to doorsand riding. He rapidlygained strength and, himself, having little interaction with other after spendingthe summeragain at Bay Shore, students. He had great facilitywith languages headed for Harvard withenthusiasm. and beforehe graduatedhe had masteredseveral To quote his own wordshe "almostcame alive" languages as well as almost everythingelse the at Harvard. He was able to startwith advanced school had to offer. His familyhad long before standing and each year audited more courses recognizedhim as a prodigyand fedhis voracious (includingexaminations) than he took regularly. appetitefor learningwith books about his latest He soon realizedthat his interestswere in physics interests. His interestsmoved towardchemistry and was attractedto Percy Bridgman,who gave and he had the good fortuneto have a stimulating him help and good advice. Robert Oppenheimer teacher,Augustus Klock. graduatedsumma cum laude in three years. During the summersthe familywould move to The next year he went to Cambridge Uni- a house in Bay Shore on the southshore of Long versitywhere he tried his hand at some experi- ments. He was greatly attractedby visiting 1 Dr. Bacher's memoirof Robert Oppenheimer,dis- lecturerswho were reportingon the new work tinguishedmember of theAmerican Philosophical Society, in quantummechanics, especially Max Born. As preparedby requestfor the Society'sYear Book, is of such fullnessand historicalvalue thatit is presentedin- a result, he transferredto Gottingenand im- stead in the Proceedingsfor the benefitof a wider mediatelyfound himself in the midstof an extra- circleof readers. ordinarygroup of professors,postdoctoral fellows PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY, VOL. 116,NO, 4, AUGUST 1972 279

This content downloaded from 131.215.225.219 on Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:47:52 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 280 ROBERT F. BACHER [PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC. and studentswho were deep in the applicationof as a base fromwhich he and his brotherFrank the new quantum mechanics. Robert worked took long rides throughthe mountainsand high withgreat intensityand with such success that in desertfor days at a time. It was a vigorouslife the springof 1927 afterless than two years he and doubtlesshelped to developthe extraordinary was awarded the Ph.D degree. staminawhich he showed later. Many visitors, For the followingyear he had a National Re- especiallyhis studentsand physicistfriends, visited search Council fellowshipat Harvard and the thereand had lively discussionson new work in CaliforniaInstitute of Technology. By this time quantumtheory. he had made some major contributionsin the Robert Oppenheimergradually shortenedhis applicationof the new quantummechanics and was visitsto Caltechand made Berkeleyhis mainbase. widelysought after for a universityposition. He Justbefore World War II he lived almostentirely decided that he needed anotheryear to studybe- in Berkeleyexcept for occasional visits and a few fore he startedto teach and he was awarded an weeks in the early summerin Pasadena. He had InternationalEducation Board fellowshipto study manyfriends in Pasadena and always kepta close in Europe at Leiden and at Zurich. Ehrenfest interestin the work in cosmic rays and high- and especially Pauli made deep impressionson energyradiation, since it was so close to his long- him. time theoreticalinterests. During the years be- At thispoint he expresseda strongdesire to go fore the war, Robert Oppenheimer'sgroup in home. He had decidedon an unusualarrangement theoreticalphysics was the strongestone in the of a double appointmentas assistantprofessor at country.2 In addition to excellent graduate Caltech and at the Universityof Californiaat students,numerous postdoctoral fellows, including Berkeley. For several years he taughtthrough Schwinger,Serber, and manyothers, worked with group the fall term at Berkeley,then after Christmas him. It was a vigorous and productive most wentto Pasadena forthe spring.His teachingwas and formermembers now staffmany of the not an immediatesuccess. He felt that he was distinguisheduniversity faculties in theoretical going much too slowly; yet his studentshad real physics. Katherine difficultykeeping up the pace. In addition,he In 1940 RobertOppenheimer married in Pasadena. spokevery softly with a fairamount of mumbling. PueningHarrison, whom he had met in This once caused Ehrenfest,a sticklerfor clear In 1941 they had their first child, Peter, house exposition,to call repeatedlyin a Caltechseminar Pasadena. Aboutthis time Robert bought a over "Louder, please, dear Oppenheimer." When at 1 Eagle Hill whichcommanded a fineview Robert'svoice quicklydropped after the thirdcall San FranciscoBay and whichprovided a delight- co-workers. he banged his desk. Robert stopped and said ful spot to entertainhis studentsand "But this room is so big." Ehrenfestshouted The discoveryof nuclear fissionin 1939 tied "You always adjust your voice so we can't hear. intomany current activities in the RadiationLabo- I couldn'thear you in a telephonebooth." Before ratoryat Berkeley,where neptunium and laterplu- of very manyyears Robert Oppenheimerbecame an toniumwere discoverednot long after.The fall excellentlecturer and manyof his generallectures France and the battleof Britainbegan to displace are known for their lucid expositionsof funda- theoverpowering concern for research in Berkeley. mentalideas in physics. In late 1940 and early 1941, many of Robert's researchfor Studentswere attractedto RobertOppenheimer colleagues leftto work on weapons was not yet and he soon establisheda group of studentsand a war in which the be. postdoctoralfellows with whom he worked. Their involvedbut mightsoon relationwith him was close and personal. When Some work continuedon the fission project he went to Pasadena in the spring most of his whichwas financedon a relativelysmall scale by groupfollowed along. Some too, followedhim to the governmentthrough a committee. In early nuclear his ranchin the upper Pecos, a beautifulspot not 1942 workon thepossibility of producing a farfrom where he had stayedbefore and whichhe chain reactionwas broughttogether at the Metal- had acquiredbefore going to Europe in 1928. He lurgicalLaboratory of the Universityof Chicago called it "Perro Caliente," Hot Dog, reputedly 2 An accountof Robert Oppenheimer'swork in the exclamationhe made when he firstsaw it. theoreticalphysics by Hans Bethemay be foundin Through the thirtieshis summerswere almost BiographicalMemoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society always spentthere in New Mexico. He used it 14 (1968): p. 391.

This content downloaded from 131.215.225.219 on Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:47:52 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions VOL. 116, NO. 4, 1972] ROBERT OPPENHEIMER (1904-1967) 281 and given greatersupport. The director,Arthur Groves appointed Conant and Tolman as his Compton,asked Robert Oppenheimerto get a scientificadvisers. Tolman, especially,followed theoreticalgroup togetherin the summerof 1942 the project closely and provided a link to the to look into the possibilityof whether,if reason- scientificcommunity. ably pure fissionablematerial were available, an Grovesconsulted Oppenheimer about the status explosive could be made, and if so how. Work of the theoreticalstudies of the assemblyof suf- on the electromagneticseparation process was ficientfissionable material to make a bomb and being undertakenat the Radiation Laboratoryin whatwould be the expectedeffects of the resulting Berkeleyunder the drivingleadership of Ernest explosion. Oppenheimerpointed out manyof the Lawrence, who asked Robert to help with some basic unknowns,among them being the wide of the separationmagnet design problems. It limitsthat must be placed on the amountof valu- seemedalmost an impossiblejob to get fissionable able materialneeded. He recommendedto Groves material in quantityby this methodbut it was that proper studiescould only be conductedif a certainlypossible in principle. Other methods separatelaboratory were establishedfor this pur- had even more fundamentaldifficulties. pose and if therewere freeexchange among those By mid-1942 the workby Fermi and othersat workingon the overall problem. Groves was a Chicago on the possibilityof a nuclearchain reac- strongbeliever in compartmentalizationfor this tionlooked very promising. The firstself-sustain- highlysecret project. He likedthe idea of separat- ing nuclearchain reaction was achievedon Decem- ing the bomb work fromthe rest of the project ber 2, 1942. Althoughthe problems seemed almost but recoiledat the idea of no compartmentaliza- insurmountable,this opened the real possibility tion withinsuch a laboratory. Groves also had that plutoniummight be producedin quantityas to finda directorfor such a laboratory. He ap- an alternativeto 235 as a fissionable parentlydiscussed this at lengthwith Bush and material. Conant and with the heads of the otherprojects. The advancesof the uraniumproject, especially There were not manysuitable candidates and such Fermi's work, supplementedby urgingfrom the as there were had major responsibilitieselse- British,prompted and JamesCon- where. Groves had been greatly impressedby ant who held the top responsibilityto seek much Oppenheimerand decidedthat if a separatelabora- broadersupport from President Roosevelt. If any- torywere to be established,he would make a good thingwere to be accomplishedhere, huge industrial director. This decisioncertainly took a greatdeal plantswould be neededand thesemust be planned of insightand nervebecause Robertdid not have immediatelyand startedas soon as possible even any administrativeexperience and had never beforemany technicalproblems were solved. A directedanything. It was a brilliantchoice. new project,the ManhattanProject, was created In thefall, steps were taken to locatethe labora- with the highest prioritiesand Colonel Leslie tory. A site in southernCalifornia was examined Groveswas put in charge. Actuallythe organiza- but Groves thoughtit was insufficientlyisolated. tion started earlier but was formallyset up in New Mexico was suggested and Groves sent September, 1942, just after Groves was made membersof his staffto investigate. Finally on a brigadiergeneral. trip with Oppenheimer,Edwin McMillan, and Groveswas a veryfortunate choice to head this some of his staff,Groves drove over the Jemez project. He was energeticand forcefulbut very Mountainsto the site of the Los Alamos Ranch blunt. He was a good judge of people, knew School high on a mesa west of the Rio Grande when to trustadvice and when he did, he backed and close to the JemezMountains. This site was thatadvice withoutwavering. Heads of the pro- sufficientlyisolated for Groves and appealed to jects aimed at U-235 and plutoniumproduction Oppenheimer,who knewthe countrywell. Water were already selected: Lawrence for the electro- was limitedbut Groves thoughta supplycould be magneticmethod, Urey for the diffusionmethod, found,and stepswere takento acquirea large site. and Comptonfor the nuclear reactorsor piles as With the assistanceof John Manley, who had theywere thencalled. While Groves was put in been helpingOppenheimer with the projectalmost charge of production,it was soon agreed that he ever since Comptonhad given him his firstre- should take total responsibilityincluding research sponsibilityin this area, and of Edwin McMillan, and developmentwith a MilitaryPolicy Committee he startedto draw up requirementsfor a labora- includingBush and Conant. Not long thereafter, torythat would be adequatefor about one hundred

This content downloaded from 131.215.225.219 on Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:47:52 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 282 ROBERT F. BACHER [PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC. scientistsand engineers. Equipment was bor- be helpfulat Los Alamos. Membersof otherwar rowed fromseveral universitiesin order to get a laboratoriesalso came to Los Alamos and the workinglaboratory as quickly as possible. Op- assembledgroup representedwide experiencein penheimerspent a greatdeal of his timerecruiting. new technicaldevelopments. He had been persuadedby Grovesthat this under- The conferencelasted about ten days. A takingmust be a militaryproject with the director primeron the subject had been preparedand all an officer. Robert was dismayed to find that of the knowninformation was discussedat length. those who had experience in war projects de- The preferredmethod of assembling a super- claredvigorously that this would not work. After criticalmass with adequate speed was discussed a good deal of discussionit was agreed that the by Serber and others. The idea was to shoot a laboratorywould startout as a civilianlaboratory piece of U-235 into anotherpiece whichwas sur- reportingto Groves but would probablybecome rounded with neutronreflector, or tamperas it a militarylaboratory when significantamounts of was called,at such speed thatno neutronreaction fissionablematerial began to arrive. This was would be initiateduntil the entiremass was highly formalizedin a letter signed by Groves and supercritical. Other methodsof assemblywere Conant. discussed,especially an implosionmethod which Fortunatelyseveral small groups that had been Neddermeyerdiscussed. The ordnance people workingon problemsassociated with the Metal- were disturbedat the problemsthat this would lurgical Laboratory in Chicago could be closed raise and had major doubts that a sufficiently down now, and, if the personnelinvolved could symmetricalimplosion could be achieved. The be persuaded,might form a nucleusof a stafffor gun methodlooked much easier provided there Los Alamos. Robert was very persuasive. The were no reallyserious surprisesamong the many largestnumber came fromPrinceton where Robert unknownnuclear propertiesof U-235 and plu- Wilson with a small group had been workingon tonium. Throughall of this,Robert Oppenheimer an alternativeelectromagnetic method of isotope furnisheda very skillfulguiding hand. He had separation. Others came fromBerkeley, Illinois, a tremendousability to put his fingeron critical Cornell, Minnesota,Purdue, Chicago, and Wis- issues and his clarityof summaryafter a com- consin. Robertattracted a verystrong theoretical plicated discussionoften made the differencebe- group centered around those who had worked tweenmoving forward and backward.These were with him during the summerof 1942, and in- qualitieswhich he demonstratedover and over as cluding Bethe, Teller, Weisskoff,Konopinski, the laboratorydirector. Serber,Placzek, Marshak,Christy, and Feynman. During this same period,Robert Oppenheimer It was an outstandinggroup. was having other difficulties.These were not The building went up with incrediblespeed, known to his associates but greatly concerned beingmade forthe mostpart out of greenlumber GeneralGroves and some of his staff. These were fromtrees cut down nearby. By mid-Marchof clearance problems. During the thirties,Robert 1943 staffmembers started arriving and were had manyleft-wing friends. He had supportedthe forcedto live off-site.By earlyApril the labora- Spanish Loyalists through communistchannels torywas sufficientlycomplete that a conferenceto but had driftedaway fromthese connections when pull togetherall the knowninformation pertinent the flip-floppingcommunist line made no sense to to the bomb project was scheduledfor April 15. him. Of course, clearance was required of the The confereeswere almost entirelycommitted directorof the Los Alamos Laboratoryand the project membersbut there were a few others, securitypeople must have jumped out of their includingFermi, withoutwhom any conference skins at his record. Clearance had been hanging on chain reactionswould not have been complete, fireever since his firstassociation with the pro- and Rabi and Bacher from the Massachusetts ject. No securityofficer would recommendhis Institute of Technology Radiation Laboratory clearance. Finally General Groves reviewedthe (Radar) who had been advising Oppenheimer case carefullyand on July 20, 1943, instructed since the end of 1942 on problemswhich a new the securityofficers to issue a clearance"irrespec- laboratorymight encounter. Subsequentlya dozen tive of the informationwhich you have concerning or more membersof the MIT laboratorycame Mr. Oppenheimer. He is absolutelyessential to to Los Alamos, bringingwith them technology the project." whichhad been developedthere and whichmight The problemsthat Robert Oppenheimerhad in

This content downloaded from 131.215.225.219 on Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:47:52 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions VOL. 116, NO. 4, 1972] ROBERT OPPENHEIMER (1904-1967) 283 getting the Los Alamos Laboratory started, served with uranium or plutonium. Ordinary covered everyconceivable subject. Living in an impurities,of course,would not produce such an isolated spot and unable to travel except nearby, effectand this was believed to be a fundamental was an entirelynew experiencefor most labora- propertyof reactor-producedplutonium due to tory staffpeople. The problemsof gettingthe neutroncapture by Pu-239 to produce Pu-240 in necessaryequipment for the laboratorieson very the high neutronflux of the reactor. This would short notice and with such a complicatedcom- inevitablybe muchworse in the materialfrom the munciationsystem with the outside world were productionreactors under construction at Hanford. unbelievable. To solve these and at the same It was a project crisis. With the expected time keep a close watch on the essential sub- spontaneousfission rates, plutoniumfor a bomb stantiveproblems of the project was almost too could not be assembledby the gun method. If much. But Robert did it and at the same time plutoniumwas to be used, anothermethod must kepta close personaltouch with most of the work be found. The only likely methodwas the im- going on and the people who were doing it in plosion methodwhich Neddermeyerand a small those early days. Robert had great staminaand group had been workingon since the startof the althoughhe lost weightand was muchtoo thin,he laboratory.Their experimentshad shownpromise could outlastalmost anyone on the project. but also many difficulties,especially in tryingto During thatfirst summer of 1943, Robertoften findout whatwas goingon in the veryshort time expressed privately his real doubts about his during the explosion and inward shock. After suitabilityfor the director'sjob and his concern considerationand consultationwith the Governing as to whetherhe could reallydo it. In a sense he Board, Robert decided to make a completere- was riding the tiger and he felt very heavily organizationof the laboratory,establishing new pressedby the manyproblems of the project and divisionsand puttingmore emphasison the study doubtlessalso by his difficultieswith the security of explosivesand throwingmuch of the technical people. It was perfectlyclear to the membersof experience of the laboratoryinto the measure- his laboratorythat he was doing a superbjob no ments of sample implosions. No one could be matterhow much theywould complainabout the sure where this would lead but it was an all-out slownessof gettingequipment, the irregularityof effort. power or the difficultiesin living in this remote With increasedeffort and the ingenuityshown encampment. by Neddermeyer,Kerst, Froman, Graves, Rossi, During the remainderof 1943 and early 1944 Staub, McMillan,Creutz, Critichfield, Barnes, and the laboratorymade real advances in determining a host of otherexperimenters, information began the needed nuclear cross sections of fissionable to accumulatemuch faster. Explosives improved and other materialsfor the bomb. Information and new ideas for their use were developed by was also obtainedabout the numberof neutrons Kistiakowskyand thegreatly strengthened division emittedper fissionand some limits,not adequate workingwith him on this problem. These new but encouraging,on the time after fissionwhen resultsprovided new informationfor the theorists neutronswere emitted. One basic studybrought who were now able to studyboth the course of forthsome very disturbinginformation. It was theimplosion and the subsequentnuclear explosion knownthat U-238 fissionedspontaneously but the whichthey had studiedfor the gun method.There rate was sufficientlylow that the gun methodof were many crises duringthe winterof 1944 and assemblyof a highlysupercritical mass was still the springof 1945 but the work moved forward believedto be adequate. Segre had set up equip- ment in a remotelocation to measure the rates and showedpromise. of spontaneousfission or at least to put upper It had been concludedthat a full scale nuclear limitson them.It was a difficultand painstaking test of the implosionweapon mightbe necessary job buta muchneeded one. At firstthe amountsof and this was made definiteduring the winterof plutoniumavailable were infinitesimaland these 1944-1945. This project, named ,was were all produced by cyclotronbombardment. itself a major undertakingand Kenneth Bain- Material was soon receivedfrom the firstinter- bridgewas put in chargeof it. He, withthe help mediatepower reactorlocated at Oak Ridge and of others,found a site on the Alamagordobomb- Segre foundindisputably that this materialhad a ing range and preparationsfor the test went higher spontaneous fission than previouslyob- forwardboth there and at Los Alamos. Now

This content downloaded from 131.215.225.219 on Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:47:52 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 284 ROBERT F. BACHER [PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC.

Oppenheimerhad even more to worryabout and earth,has writtenthese words. The atomicbomb has spelled them out for all men to understand. to administer. other thatas soon Othermen have spoken them, in othertimes, of The schedulefor the test was such wars, of otherweapons. They have not prevailed. as the plutoniumfor the bomb was ready,every- There are some,misled by a false sense of history, thingelse should be ready and the test would be who holdthat they will not prevailtoday. It is not held. There was a littledelay but not much. In- for us to believethat. By our workswe are com- united,before this Washingtonwere thatno day was mitted,committed to a world structionsfrom commonperil, in law and in humanity. to be lost and it wasn't. The nuclear assembly and finalexplosives were completed at Alamagordo After leaving Los Alamos, Robert Oppen- and the shot was scheduled for July 16. This heimer'sscientific interest immediately went back was a difficultperiod for everybodybut particu- to the role of the meson in the originof nuclear larly for Robert Oppenheimer. There were now forces. He had followedthe work of Anderson not onlythe nuclearproblems to worryabout but, and Neddermeyerbefore the war and realizedthat even worse, the possibilitythat some electrical the "mesotron" which they had found did not failurewould ruinthe test. On top of everything interactwith nuclei very strongly. Here was a else it rained in various spots throughoutthe test basic dilemma. He was immediatelyin demand site duringthe nightof July 15. In spite of this to lecturefar more than he possiblycould, on the it was decidedto go ahead. The weatherprospects futurerole of atomic energy,on the nature and forthe futurewere uncertainat this time of year organizationof its developmentin the United and it was clear to some at least thateveryone was States for peacefulpurposes, and most of all on so tired that a postponementwould of necessity how the newly developed bomb could serve to be forseveral days. diminishthe likelihoodof wars. At the test Robert was thin,worn, and bone- In November,1945, the AmericanPhilosophical tired,but he keptgoing and functioningvery well. Society and the National Academy of Sciences He was at the same time jubilant that it had heldin Philadelphiaa jointsymposium on "Atomic worked and produced such a big explosion,and Energyand its Implications." Oppenheimer,who concernedat the terribleforces now unleashedon had been electeda memberof the Society in the the world. But these were concernsthat he had spring of 1945, contributedto the symposiuma thoughtabout beforeand he knew that the final discussionof atomicweapons. No one who heard decisions on use of the bomb must be made by him ever forgotthe eloquence and deep emotion President Truman, consideringwhat the alter- withwhich he picturedthe destructivenessof the nativeswould be forthe next stagesof the war in bomb or the force of his call for international the Pacific. controlof this new awesome development. The bombson Hiroshimaand Nagasaki caused The newly establishedUnited Nations set up Robert and many others great sadness. Some an Atomic Energy Commission,and a high-level scientiststhought that a demonstrationwould be committeewas establishedwith Under-Secretary adequate. Robert and many others had doubts of State Dean Acheson as chairmanto preparea that this would work. The decision,of course, positionfor the United States. This was a dif- had to be the President's. ficultand complicatedjob, and to get it done a full Most of the staffmembers at Los Alamos were time Board of Consultantswas set up withDavid on leave frompositions elsewhere "for the dura- Lilienthalas chairman. RobertOppenheimer was tion" and it was natural that they would soon a member of this board and its assignment begin to leave. Robert Oppenheimermade plans was the subject that he thoughtmost crucial,the to return to California,actually this time to internationalcontrol of atomicenergy. The Board Pasadena, and Norris Bradburywas to succeed went into continuoussession and by mid-March himas director. Beforehe left,a publicceremony had prepareda reportwhich was wide-sweeping was held to make an award to the laboratory. in its recommendations.The "Report on the In- The citationgiven by General Groves was most ternationalControl of Atomic Energy," usually complimentaryand Robert'sreply gave indication referredto as the Acheson-Lilienthalreport, pro- of the thoughtsthat would guide his actions for posed an internationalagency which through manyyears to come: several stages would eventuallycome into control atomic developmentsincluding the produc- of thisworld must unite or theywill of all The peoples of U-235, the perish. This war,which has ravagedso muchof the tion of raw material,the separation

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productionof plutonium,the productionand con- repressiveto many and to be too much involved trol of weapons,and the ownershipof the whole with the militaryestablishment. Many scientists project. activelyopposed this bill and Robertwas criticized Robert Oppenheimerplayed a major role in by themfor his initialsupport of it. He seemed workingout the nature of the proposals and the to feel at the end of the war thatany plan which preparationof the report. The Acheson Com- could go into actionwould be betterthan no plan mitteein passingthe reporton to the Secretaryof and an intervalof no action. State, said: A bill providingfor a cilivian commissionof five full-timemembers, the McMahon bill, was We lay the reportbefore you as the Board has submittedit to us, "notas a finalplan, but as a place passed in the summerof 1946. This bill had been to begin,a foundationon whichto build." In our vigorouslysupported by the Federationof Ameri- opinionit furnishesthe most constructive analysis of can Scientistsand Robertapproved of it but was the questionof internationalcontrol we have seen perturbedat the delay. The bill providedfor a and a definitelyhopeful approach to a solutionof the entireproblem. We recommendit foryour con- Military Liaison Committeeand for a General siderationas representingthe frameworkwithin Advisory Committeeto advise the Commission which the best prospectsfor both securityand especiallyon scientificand technicalproblems, but developmentof atomicenergy for peacefulpurposes since these questions were oftentied closely to maybe found. long-rangepolicies, the scope was very broad. This reportreceived support from many mem- The Commissionwas appointed in the fall and bers of the governmentand others, especially started work in early November. A General scientistswho had workedon the Manhattanpro- Advisory Committee(GAC) was appointedby ject. There were some scientistsand a good many the President on recommendationby the Com- membersof the militarywho viewed the report missionand Robert Oppenheimerbecame one of with deep suspicionin spite of the recommenda- its members. The Commissionformally took over tions for a series of stages and provisionfor de- the managementof the on tailed inspection. There were some who thought January1, 1947, and the GAC held its firstmeet- such a plan would neverbe internationallyaccept- ing almostimmediately. able, especiallyto the Soviets. Robert Oppenheimerwas elected chairmanof President Truman appointed Bernard Baruch the Committeeand continuedin thisposition until as representativeon the United Nations Atomic the expirationof his term in 1952. The Com- Energy Commissionand Richard Tolman became missionwas facedwith long hearingson the con- his chiefscientific adviser. Robert Oppenheimer firmationof itsmembers and withserious problems and several others served as scientificadvisers, in settingup a propersystem for the clearanceof but Robert had major concernthat the Baruch personnelfor work which was classifiedunder proposal to eliminatethe veto would in fact give the AtomicEnergy Act. There was at that time the Soviets an excuse not to agree. No political very little recourse for the individual whose progresswas made and it took almost the entire clearancewas deniedor revokedby othergovern- summerof 1946 to get the Soviets to agree that ment agencies,and a new systemwas developed internationalcontrol was technicallyfeasible. In which was generallyregarded as being fairestto retrospectit seems clear that the Soviets had no the individual. The GeneralAdvisory Committee intentionof agreeing,especially since they were immediatelydug into some of the long-range well along on the developmentof theirown pro- plans. There were seriousproblems in severalof ject with significanthelp fromespionage on both the laboratoriesdue to the exodus of personnelat the United States and British projects. Robert the end of the war. Nowhere was this more Oppenheimersaw his hope that the bomb would serious than at Los Alamos, and it was a major provide the impetusfor new internationalagree- and urgent problem for the Commission. The ment vanishingand he was disheartenedby the GAC clearlyrecognized the currentsituation and Soviet introductionof the "Iron Curtain,"a move was most helpfulin its correction. There were in the oppositedirection. so many thingsthat needed doing that some had During this same timea greatdebate was going to be postponedand the GAC worked thought- on about the managementof the atomic-energy fullyin relatingcurrent activities to long-range project in the United States. The firstproposal objectives. had been the May-Johnsonbill which seemed Throughall of this Robert Oppenheimermade

This content downloaded from 131.215.225.219 on Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:47:52 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 286 ROBERT F. BACHER [PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC. major contributionsas a memberand chairman the more mathematicalside and there was not of the Committee. He had widerexperience than muchactivity in the area of fundamentalparticles anyoneelse in theproject as a wholeand especially and the originof nuclear forces. Robert moved withthe weapons work. There were otherswho quickly to strengthenthis area by major staff had greaterexperience in particularareas of the appointmentsand made the Institute a world project and greaterbackground in technicalman- centerfor young postdoctoral fellows in theoretical agement. Robert's clarityin summationof com- physics. plicated situationswas most helpful. He could Early Septemberof 1949 broughtthe serious summarizeand formulatea recommendationthat news to Robert Oppenheimerand others that took into account varyingpoints of view to the some "positive information"had been obtained satisfactionof all concernedand which definitely fromthe networkset up to detectairborne radio- contributedconstructively to the solution of the activity. He was asked whetherhe could become problem. In his conduct of the GAC, he was a member of a panel with Vannevar Bush as inclined to listen to all views and reserve his chairman,to reviewthe findingsand assess them. thoughtsto the end. Very oftenhe stayedafter In mid-Septemberthe panel met withthe special- the meetingfor a day to preparestatements of the ists in a greatvaultlike room, and the resultswere agreed positionswith the needed backgroundand clear. Debris from an atomic bomb had been formulationof the problem. All GAC members picked up. It was not a reactoraccident. The worked hard and Robert Oppenheimerworked Soviets had explodedtheir first atomic bomb. harder than anyone else. The contributionsof There was immediatereaction by the public the GAC under his chairmanshipto the work of and by the government. The monopolyof the AEC were major ones in all the scientificand United States was ended. It would,of course,be technicalareas and especiallyin the formulation some time before the Soviet nuclear capability of plans. An enumerationof the major recom- would be significant,but this was a new situation. mendationsof GAC wouldbe a long documentand It called for reexaminationof the entire atomic all these were enhancedby the effectivepersonal energy programand for reassessmentof inter- interactionof GAC withthe Commission,especi- national relationsand objectives. One area in ally effectivewith Robert as chairman. weapon developmentwas singled out for special During this same period Robert served on consideration. This was the thermonuclearwea- committeesto advise the State Departinenton pon based on the nuclear energyreleased when internationalquestions involvingatomic energy theheavy isotopes of hydrogen, naturally occurring and the Departmentof Defense regardingareas deuteriumand artificiallyproduced tritium, react of interestto the militaryand especiallyweapons at very high temperatureto produce helium. development. He broughtthe same knowledge The thermonuclearor H-bomb had been and insightto thesecommittees and inevitablyhis worked on almost since the beginningof bomb advice was soughtand was respected. It was a work. It had been a subject for some of the ex- new lifefor him. perimentalwork done outside the Metallurgical In 1947 Oppenheimer,then in residence in Laboratoryin 1942 and it had been a principal Berkeleyas professorof theoreticalphysics, was subject for the theoreticalstudy conducted under invitedto becomethe directorof the Institutefor Robert Oppenheimer'sguidance in Berkeley in Advanced Study in Princeton. Aftermany pangs the summerof 1942. During the war a group over his separationfrom California, he accepted. workedat this projectat Los Alamos, difficultas The post offeredan opportunityto start a new thiswas underthe pressureof the manyproblems advanced school of theoreticalphysics with gen- connectedwith the fissionbomb. Work continued erous financialsupport, close ties with subjectsof on thisproject after the war but the reducedman- interestto Robert,and a naturalplace fora person power of the laboratoryand later the promising with his broad intellectualscope. In addition, developmentsof fissionweapon developmenttook it was close to Washingtonand meant that he precedence. One of the principaldifficulties was could continue his ties with governmentmuch that the early ideas for a "Super" which would more easily. The Institutehad a reputationfor couple deuteriuminto a fissionbomb looked less very strongwork in pure mathematics.Its work promisingas they were examined in greaterde- in theoreticalphysics, while excellentunder Ein- tail and seemed to require significantquantities nuclear stein and von Neumann,was largelyinvolved in of tritium. Tritiumhad to be producedin

This content downloaded from 131.215.225.219 on Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:47:52 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions VOL. 116, NO. 4, 19721 ROBERT OPPENHEIMER (1904-1967) 287 reactors and its productionwould diminishthe made. The issues became very confusedin the productionof plutonium. public debate in major part because sufficientin- This question of the H-bomb or Super came formationfor intelligentdiscussion by ordinary beforethe General AdvisoryCommittee in Octo- citizenswas not available. ber, 1949. The discussion has been recounted There has been a great deal of argumentabout manytimes and therewere manydifferent shades immediatelysubsequent events. The records of opinionperhaps not all appreciatedfully today. available seem to show that the Commissionand Even the question being decided-whether a the GAC triedto get forwardas fastas theycould researchprogram, a crash developmentprogram, with what appeared to be an unpromisingjob. or any programon the H-bomb-is subject to There were recriminationsfrom the militaryand debate in the public print. However it was, the othersthat the work was not being pushed hard GAC recommendedagainst a vigorousprogram to enough. develop the H-bomb. A part of their recom- In Juneof 1951 a meetingwas called by Robert mendation was later published, quoted in his Oppenheimerin Princetonto discuss some radical hearingsby Robert Oppenheimeras follows: new suggestionswhich were presentedby and for whichhe and Ulam, with stimula- We all hope that by one means or another,the developmentof theseweapons can be avoided. We tion from von Neumann, were principallyre- are reluctantto see theUnited States take the initia- sponsible. The ideas met with a very favorable tive in precipitatingthis development.We are all receptionand it was generallyagreed that these agreedthat it wouldbe wrongat thepresent moment were thebest ideas yetto be broughtinto the ther- to commitourselves to an all-outeffort towards its monuclear development. development.Everyone at thismeeting feltthat these ideas shouldbe pursued. They were To what extentthe unpromisingstate of thermo- sufficientlydifferent from the originalline of the nuclearwork at thattime contributed is not clear. Super that apparentlythe question was subse- Also to what extent the imitativenature of the quentlyraised whetherfollowing them was really Soviet program up to that time influencedthe pursuingthe President'sdirective. Nevertheless recommendationis also not clear. Subsequent they were pursued and a large thermonuclear developmentmade it clear that in this area the device based on the developmentof these ideas Soviets had brilliantmen at work. was explodedin the South Pacificin late 1952. The recommendationof the GAC, to which RobertOppenheimer's term as a memberof the therewas no dissent,was passed on to the Com- General Advisory Committeeexpired in 1952 mission. Afterlong discussion,the Commission and he had requestedthat he not be considered reported to President Truman that there was for reappointment,believing that some rotation unanimous agreementamong the commissioners was desirable. It subsequentlybecame known that that this decision,which involvedbasic national he had offeredto submithis resignationfrom the policy on defenseposture and internationalrela- GAC earlier followingthe President's decision. tions,must be made by him. There was not an He had, however,been persuaded by Chairman agreed recommendationby the commissionerson Gordon Dean to stay on at least untilthe end of what this decision should be. Their divergent his appointment. individualviews were appended or submittedlater. From 1951 to 1953 therewere several studies The GAC reportwas also appended. The com- sponsored by the Departmentof Defense and missioners'report was made in early November carried out by various universities. These grew and the President pondered his decision with out of our participationin the and furtheradvice fromthe special committeeof the concernsexpressed over our vulnerabilityto air National SecurityCouncil set up to considerthe attack. Some of these studies considered the production of fissionablematerial and nuclear possibilitiesof developing atomic weapons for weapons. There was vigorous oppositionto the otherthan strategic bombing use. The tacticaluse GAC recommendationfrom some scientists,from of nuclearweapons was consideredat some length the militaryestablishment, and fromsome mem- in Project Vista at Caltech. This subjectdid not bers of the Joint CongressionalCommittee on find support among those who wished to rely Atomic Energy. In late January,the President on strategic bombing. The problemsof air de- instructedthe AEC to go ahead withthe develop- fensewere consideredat Project Charlesat MIT. ment of an H-bomb and an announcementwas F3RobertOppenheimer participated in these and

This content downloaded from 131.215.225.219 on Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:47:52 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 288 ROBERT F. BACHER [PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC. otherstudies as a consultantand as usual withhis "blank wall" be placed between Robert Oppen- clarity of mind and backgroundin the subject heimerand any informationof a sensitiveor classi- made major contributions. fiednature. For severalyears the McCarthyera in Washing- When Robert Oppenheimerhad retiredfrom ton had been buildingup. Several scientistshad the GAC his voluminousand highlyclassified files been called before the House Un-American in Princetonhad been returnedto Washington. ActivitiesCommittee, among themEdward Con- He still was a consultantto AEC, althoughnot don and Frank Oppenheimer. The climatewas very active and his serviceshad been soughtby quite intolerantof even relativelyweak left-wing the ScientificAdvisory Committee of the Officeof connections. It was a timeof fearfor many who Defense Mobilization. The President'sorder, of had had such connectionsin the thirties. Both course, stoppedthese relations,but was in itself Frank and Robert Oppenheimerwere called to an interimmeasure. testifyin 1949 and had been mentionedin other Further action soon came from AEC in the hearingsand in variousnewspaper stories. Robert formof a set of charges in a letterfrom AEC was asked about people whomhe had knownand General Manager Kenneth Nichols. This letter about various incidentsthat had worriedsecurity questionedwhether Robert Oppenheimer's". officersin 1943. Frank was accused of being a continuedemployment on Atomic Energy Com- memberof the Communistparty. He firstdenied missionwork will endangerthe commondefense this but, testifyingunder oath before the com- and securityand whether such continued em- mittee,both he and his wifeadmitted having been ploymentis clearlyconsistent with the interestsof members. This admissionmade headlinesall over national security." In brief summarythe letter the countryespecially because of Robert's close statedthat ". . . these allegations,until disproved, ties to the government. raise questionsas to your veracity,conduct and In a climateof continuedaccusations of com- even your loyalty." These charges were deadly munistsand fellowtravelers in government,ques- serious especiallyby includingRobert's loyalty. tions began to be raised in public about Robert To many people they were unbelievable. The Oppenheimer'sassociations before the war. There specificcharges for the most part involvedassocia- were membersof the militaryestablishment, both tions with communistsor fellowtravelers before officersand civilians,who put this recordtogether Los Alamos started. Some of these were people withthe recommendationsabout the H-bomb and who were subsequentlycleared for work on the the developmentof tacticalnuclear weapons which ManhattanProject. There was the charge that theyfound strongly distasteful and came out with Oppenheimerhad contributedto communist-front strongsuspicion of RobertOppenheimer's motives. organizationsbefore the war. There was the Other scientistshad been just as muchresponsible charge of negligencein reportingthe Chevalier forthe recommendationsmade, but theywere not incidentinvolving an indirectapproach to Robert otherwise as vulnerable. In November, 1953, for informationregarding the Berkeley project, William Borden,a formermember of the staffof and of the refusaluntil ordered to give Chevalier's the Joint Congressional Committeeon Atomic name, and then not giving the complete story. Energy addressed a letter to J. Edgar Hoover Chevalierwas a Berkeleypre-war friend with left- which containedthe followingcharge and elabo- wing sympathiesand the Oppenheimerssaw him ratedat lengthupon it: occasionallyafter the war. There was also a that he had, in the autumn of 1949 and The purposeof this letteris to state my own charge exhaustivelyconsidered opinion based uponyears of subsequently,strongly opposed the developmentof studyof the availableclassified evidence, that more the hydrogenbomb. There were numerousother probablythan not J. Robert Oppenheimeris an charges but they were all related to these two agentof the SovietUnion. principal areas. The general manager's letter These chargesproduced immediate and vigorous stated that in view of these charges Robert Op- actionin the government.First therewas further penheimer'seligibility for access to restrictedin- FBI investigationand presumablya report. The formationwas suspendedpending final determina- subject was so inflammatoryand the charges so tion. He was offeredthe opportunityof appearing categoricalthat it soon came to PresidentEisen- beforean AEC personnelsecurity board if he so hower's urgent attention. Within a month of statedin writingwithin thirty days. Borden's letter, the President directed that a Robert Oppenheimerhad firstbeen shown a

This content downloaded from 131.215.225.219 on Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:47:52 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions VOL. 116, NO. 4, 1972] ROBERT OPPENHEIMER (1904-1967) 289 copy of the generalmanager's letter in draftand be introduced. This clearance was not obtained toldthat if he wishedto terminatehis contractas a beforethe conclusionof the hearings. According consultantto AEC he could do so and "avoid an to Lloyd Garrison's commentson the hearings explicit considerationof the charges." Robert's muchlater, this absence of clearancefor restricted reply the next day to Chairman Lewis Strauss data was not reallya seriousmatter. said in part: What was a seriousmatter, and what witnesses called to testifyin Robert Underthe circumstances this would mean that I ac- Oppenheimer'sbehalf ceptand concurin theview that I am notfit to serve were shocked to discover, was the adversary thisGovernment, that I havenow served for 12 years. nature of the proceedings in contrast to a This I cannotdo. If I werethus unworthy, I could "hearing." Roger Robb was an experiencedtrial hardlyhave servedour countryas I have tried,or lawyer and he proceededin this fashion. been directorof our Institutein Princeton,or have Lloyd spoken,as on morethan one occasionI have found Garrison and his associates were carefulnot to myselfspeaking, in the name of science and our discuss the natureof the hearingswith new wit- country. nesses and a good many of themwere surprised to findthe extent RobertOppenheimer felt that he was forcedby to whichthe AEC attorneyacted like a the natureof the formalcharges to requesta hear- prosecutor. Witnesses discoveredthat in- ing. In due course the letter from General formationabout which theywere questionedwas often not available to Manager Nichols was received. In formalreply Robert Oppenheimer's counsel or to Robert sent back a long letter in early March, him. This was not because it in- 1954, whichwas volved AEC-restricteddata but because allega- tionsreported by the FBI were involvedand were . . . in the formof a summaryaccount of relevant thereforenot available. Such informationwould aspectsof my life in moreor less chronologicalorder, not have been available even if Garrisonand his in thecourse of which I shallcomment on thespecific items in your letter. Through this answer and associateshad been cleared. They were thus put throughthe hearings of thepersonnel security board, in the positionof havingto disprovecharges with- whichI herebyrequest, I hopeto providea fairbasis out being able to know and assess the fullallega- uponwhich the questions posed by your letter may be tions on which these charges were based. It is resolved. oftenvery difficult in a securitycase to get the full Robert had asked Lloyd Garrisonof the New storygrowing out of some allegation,and indeed York law firmof Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,Wharton this is one of the principal reasons why early and Garrison to serve as his counsel. Lloyd securitycases forAEC were oftensent back more Garrison had Herbert Marks, former AEC thanonce to get a morecomplete investigation. general counsel, as associate. Garrison was as- The hearingswere confidentialand each witness sisted by several of his colleagues, especially was cautionedby the Board chairmanaccordingly.. Samuel Silverman who conductedmuch of the Of the hearingsthemselves remarkably little was examination of witnesses. AEC appointed a known publiclyuntil they were released by the hearingboard consistingof Gordon Gray, presi- Commission.This came about because a summary dent of the Universityof North Carolina and of the hearingshad been lost and it was feared formerSecretary of theArmy, as chairman;Ward that it had falleninto hands that would make it Evans, professoremeritus of chemistryat Loyola public. Subsequently,it was found,but stepshad University in Chicago; and Thomas Morgan, been started to release the complete transcript chairmanof the Board of the SperryCorporation. (withoutsome passages judged unwise to release The AEC decided to get a lawyer fromoutside because of theirrelation to classifiedinformation) AEC and settledon Roger Robb, an experienced and these steps were not stopped. and successfulWashington trial lawyer. The list of witnesses who testifiedfavorably The Board convenedin early April, 1954, and forRobert Oppenheimer included ten membersor spent a week reviewingthe files and material formermembers of the GAC, severalmembers of which had been prepared for it. The hearings the high commandof the Officeof ScientificRe- actuallystarted on April 12. Lloyd Garrisonand search and Development,five former AEC com- his associates had elected not to be cleared for missionersincluding two formerchairmen, three classifiedinformation but just prior to the actual formerchairmen of the Research and Development hearingshad requestedclearance in order to be Board of the Departmentof Defense, General able to be presentif classifiedinformation should ,John McCloy (AssistantSecretary

This content downloaded from 131.215.225.219 on Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:47:52 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 290 ROBERT F. BACHER [PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC. of War duringmuch of the war), and many col- the Board to draw in questionany honestopinion leagues who had worked with Oppenheimeron expressedby Oppenheimeron the H-bomb. It is various studies and committees. There were not easy to square this view with the statement some, includingcolleagues who had workedwith of the originalcharges or the positionsof several him in various capacities,who testifiedunfavor- witnesses who testifiedadversely on Oppen- ably., heimer's views. Finally, the general manager Robert Oppenheimertestified at great length stated that Oppenheimer's services had been and admittedthat the story which he had be- utilized on only three occasions since he leftthe latedlyreported about the Chevalierincident was GAC and thatit was unlikelythat ". . . the AEC, not true. He acknowledgedthat his initial ac- even if the questionof his securityclearance had count to securityofficers had been a fabrication not arisen, would have utilized his servicesto a and thathe had been an "idiot" not to have given markedlygreater extent in the next few years." a straightforwardaccount promptly. To Robert's No mentionwas made of the Board's finding manyfriends this was a sad incidentand not to be with which all members agreed, that Robert excused but it hardly warranted the severe Oppenheimerwas a loyal citizen. charges made as being generallytrue. As one The case next came beforethe AtomicEnergy witness,Hartley Rowe, said: "I thinka man of Commission. The commissionershad beforethem Dr. Oppenheimer'scharacter is not goingto make all of the materialalready considered including the the same mistaketwice. I would say thathe was transcriptof the hearings,the findingsand rec- all the more trustworthyfor the mistakes he ommendationsof the Personnel SecurityBoard, made." the briefsof Oppenheimer'scounsel and the rec- The hearingsconcluded on May 6, 1954, and ommendationof thegeneral manager as well as the towardthe end of the monththe Board presented FBI files. The commissionersgave a decisionon its recommendationsto theAEC generalmanager. June 29, 1954, one day before Robert Oppen- It was a split vote, with Dr. Evans dissenting, heimer'sconsultant contract with AEC expired. recommendingthat Robert Oppenheimer'sclear- Four commissioners,Strauss, Campbell,Murray ance not be reinstated. On the questionof loyalty and Zuckert,voted to deny clearance for access all membersconcurred that ". . . he is a loyal to restricteddata, and CommissionerSmyth voted citizen."The Board acknowledgedthe importance to reinstateclearance. of its task notingthat ". . . in a very real sense CommissionersStrauss, Zuckert,and Campbell this case puts the securitysystem of the United prepareda majoritystatement which emphasized States on trial,both as to its proceduresand as to the Chevalierincident and Oppenheimer'sassocia- substance." tions datingback to beforethe war. Comments In his minorityreport, Dr. Evans pointedout on the charge about his opinionson the H-bomb that most of the derogatoryinformation which were not includedexcept for an incidentinvolving had been presentedhad been in the hands of the a missingletter from Glenn Seaborg. No state- Commissionwhen he had been cleared in 1947. mentwas made abouthis loyaltyor the conclusions He feltthat Oppenheimerwas now being investi- of the Gray Board thathe was a loyal citizen. It gated again for "practicallythe same derogatory was notedat the start,however, that "The Atomic information." The majority found his conduct EnergyAct of 1946 lays upon the Commissioners in the hydrogenbomb programdisturbing. Dr. the dutyto reacha determinationas to 'character, Evans stated,"He did not hinderthe development associations and loyalty' of the individuals en- in of the H-bomb and thereis absolutelynothing gaged in the work of the Commission." Com- the testimonyto show thathe did." missionerZuckert submittedan additional con- Kenneth In mid-JuneAEC General Manager curringopinion and CommissionerMurray sub- to the Nichols forwardedhis recommendations mitteda separate opinion statinghis reasons for Commission,based on the hearingsand the con- votingthat clearance should be denied. clusions of the Personnel Security Board. He Commissioner submitteda concurredwith Gordon Gray and Thomas Morgan Smyth dissenting the incidents and that Robert Oppenheimer'sclearance should not opinion, reviewing principal be reinstated. In so doinghe put specialemphasis points that had been raised in the majority on the Chevalier incident. He also stated that opinion. Hs conclusionswere quite opposite. He therehad been no intentionon his part or that of wrote:

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Characterand associationsare importantonly in- come out the way they did. In a sense Robert sofaras theybear on thepossibility that secret infor- Oppenheimerwas an unfortunatevictim of the mationwill be improperlyrevealed. In my opinion nationalparoxysm of this witchhunt. the most importantevidence in this regardis the factthat there is no indicationin the entirerecord The Gray Board had remarkedwhen it started thatDr. Oppenheimerhas ever divulgedany secret its hearingsthat Robert Oppenheimer'scase put information.The past 15 yearsof his lifehave been the securitysystem on trial. One can only con- investigatedand reinvestigated.For much of the clude that the securitysystem did not stand the last 11 yearshe has been underactual surveillance, his movementswatched, his conversationsnoted, his test. The resultwas a grossmiscarriage of justice mail and telephonecalls checked. This professional for a man who had made some of the greatest review of his actions has been supplementedby contributionsto our countryand who was one of enthusiasticamateur help frompowerful personal the world'sintellectual leaders. It would be hard enemies. to maintainthat the case was conductedas stated On the H-bomb which he consideredto be the by AEC procedures: subject of the most importantallegations of the The factsof each case mustbe carefullyweighed general manager's letter, CommissionerSmyth anddetermination made in thelight of all theinforma- said that he was ". ., not surprised to find that tion presented,whether favorable or unfavorable. the evidencedoes not supportthese allegationsin The judgmentof responsiblepersons as to the in- any tegrityof the individualsshould be considered.The way." He concludesthat "Dr. Oppenheimer's decisionas to securityclearance is an overall,com- employmentwill not endangerthe common de- monsense judgment, made afterconsideration of all fense and securityand will be clearly consistent of the relevantinformation as to whetheror not with the interestsof national security. I prefer thereis riskthat the grantingof securityclearance the positive statementthat Dr. Oppenheimer's wouldendanger the commondefense or security. furtheremployment will continueto strengthen The securitysystem of AEC was not set up for the United States." the prosecutor-typetactics that were used in the This decision marked the end of Robert Op- hearings. Probably the only place for such penheimer'swork as an adviserto the government tacticsis in an open courtof law. Perhaps nothing and any participationin or access to classified could have been done by Oppenheimer'scounsel work. Afterhaving contributed so much during to avoid entrapmentof Oppenheimerand other the war as directorof Los Alamos and so much witnesses whose memoriesof details of events after the war in many differentcapacities, his twelveyears or more past were not as reliableas contributionwas now completelyended. Robert writtenrecords or transcriptions. Perhaps, as was deeplywounded and hurtbut muchless bitter JosephVolpe had recommended,a toughcriminal than almost anyone else would have been. lawyerwas neededby Robert'scounsel to counter Scientistsin all the westernworld rallied to his such tactics. supportand continuedto supporthim for the re- To conductsuch hearingsin privateand to have mainderof his life. the informationavailable to the Board not more Everywherepeople inquired,"How could this fullyavailable to counsel for the defendant,made happen in the United States?" Some were in- it almost impossibleto achieve a fair conclusion clinedto blamethose who opposedhis views about at the heightof a periodof nationalapathy and a the H-bomb, but in fact these charges had been period of fear of the use of innuendoand smear excluded both by the Board and by the Com- by parts of our government. The nature of mission. Others were inclined to blame those securityfor classifiedinformation makes it dif- who had becomeRobert's enemies for one reason ficultto conducthearings openly. While no in- or another,often because his lucid mind some- formationcan be keptsecret indefinitely and while times gave expression in a very sharp tongue. much is classifiedthat need not be, still there is Still othersblamed the whole climateof the Mc- and there will in the futurebe need for closely Carthy era which unfortunatelywas just at its guardednational secrets. It is verydoubtful that peak in the springof 1954. No one of these can we have a securitysystem that can provide fair be singled out as a principal reason for what hearingsand decisionsfor an individualwho is happenedbut it is probablyfair to say that,if the broughtup at a time such as the springof 1954. countryhad not been paralyzedby the witchhunts It is not clear whetherat thattime Robert Oppen- and the fear of communists,none of the other heimermight not have been betteroff before the factorswould have been sufficientto make things McCarthy committeeor the Jenner committee.

This content downloaded from 131.215.225.219 on Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:47:52 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 292 ROBERT F. BACHER [PROC. AMER. PHIL. SOC.

At least what came out would have been currently impacton our society. In late 1953 he had de- subjected to public scrutinyand might have liveredthe Reith Lectures over the home service helpedto bringour nationto its senses somewhat of the BritishBroadcasting Corporation and these sooner. were publishedin 1954 withsome added notesand Robert Oppenheimerreturned to his work as appendices. These six lecturescovered parts of directorof the Institutefor Advanced Study in sciencefrom Newton to the present,the relation- Princeton. The liveliness and intensitywhich ship of the sciences and a concludingtalk on had characterizedhis activitiesbefore were gone. "Science and Man's Community." They carried He was greatlychanged. In recentyears so much the appropriatetitle "Science and the Common of his efforthad been devoted to his advisory Understanding." These lectures were typically activitiesand his interestsin internationalco- Robert Oppenheimerin their breadthof vision, operationthat he had not personallybeen really depthof understanding,and beautyof expression. activein particle-physicsresearch. Now he lacked In succeedingyears Robert gave many talks the strengthand perhaps the interestto throw principallyon subjects covered in his Reith himself completely into this work. He felt, Lecturesand especiallyon someof the fundamental probably rightly,that intense participationwas dilemmas of physics but includingmany other for younger men. The Institute under his topicsas well. Three of thesegiven at McMaster directorshiphad become the leading center for Universityin 1962 were published under the theoreticalphysics. He had a distinguishedsenior title "The Flying Trapeze: Three Crises for staffwith Dyson, Pais, Placzek, Lee, and Yang, Physicists." There were a great many lectures in addition to Einstein and von Neumann,who given in the late fiftiesand early sixties which had been therefor many years. The large school were not published. Many of these were given of postdoctoralfellows which he had developed at universitieswhere students,faculty, and others was in full bloom and not only did he continue gave him standingovations. In addition,he ap- to encouragethem but his remarkableability to peared in a long televisioninterview with Edward stimulateyoung physicistswas an importantpart R. Murrow which attractedwide attentionand of its success. Princetonwas a centerof intense showedclearly his reflectivemood in these years. activityand much of it was due to Robert's Whereverhe went he was recognizedand it was stimulatingleadership of discussionsand seminars. impossiblefor him to travelin this countryor in His clarity,insight, and capabilityfor summation Europe withoutstrangers coming up to greethim of the most complicatedand difficultsituations and wish him well. always playedan importantrole wheneverhe was In 1960 the International Atomic Energy present. He was always in demand as a dis- Agency of which SterlingCole, formerlya mem- cussion leader or summaryspeaker for the im- ber of the Joint Congressional Committeeon portantinternational meetings which had really Atomic Energy, was directorgeneral, appointed grown up from small conferencesthat he had Robert Oppenheimerrepresentative to an inter- startedafter the war. national conference. In 1961, after Kennedy For manyyears RobertOppenheimer had been became President,he began to be accepteda little in great demandas a speaker. He had talkedto by Washington. There was greater sympathy widely differentaudiences on subjects which in- and appreciationfrom some of the President's cluded "The Scientist in Society," "The En- close advisers. He visited Latin America to couragementof Science," "Physics in a Contem- lectureunder the sponsorshipof the Organization poraryWorld," "Atomic Weapons and American of American States. His visit and his lectures Policy," and "Atomic Energy as a Contemporary attractedgreat attention and enthusiasticcomment. Problem." In 1955 he collected these and He was invitedto attenda dinnerat the White publishedthem under the title of anotherof the House for Nobel Laureates as a special guest. talks,"The Open Mind," in whichhe pointedout In the springof 1963, ChairmanGlenn Seaborg the need in a democracyfor informationif the told him that the AEC was awardingthe Fermi the citizens are to arrive at sensible conclusions. Prize to him. Although announced earlier These talks were all cogent and beautifullypre- formalaward by the Presidentwas scheduledfor self- sented. After 1954 his intereststurned more December 2, the anniversaryof the first President's toward the relationshipof science to other sub- sustaining chain reaction. The doubt jects includingthe arts, and its developmentand assassinationin Dallas threwall plans into

This content downloaded from 131.215.225.219 on Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:47:52 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions VOL. 116, NO. 4, 1972] ROBERT OPPENHEIMER (1904-1967) 293 and confusion,including these. But President the American Physical Society was held at the Johnsondecided that the award ceremonywould springmeeting in Washingtonat which Serber, go ahead at the White House as planned. Robert Weisskopf,Pais, and Seaborg spokeof the various was deeply moved. It was a recognitionlong phases of Robert Oppenheimer'svery productive deservedbut to which therewas still strongop- career. All spoke of the feelingwhich they all position. In his reply,Robert said "I think it shared of how excitingit had been to work with is just possible,Mr. President,that it has taken him. Rabi, who was unableto be presentand who some charityand some courage for you to make had knownhim since the early days in Germany, this award today." wrote a penetratingand glowingintroduction to The late fiftiesand early sixties were difficult the publishedaccounts. ones too for his wifeand children. The hearings Abraham Pais, his close colleagueat the Insti- had been an ordeal for them,especially for Kitty, tute in Princetonsaid: who was presentwith him most of the time. It was hard for the childrenwho could not under- Anysingle one of the following contributions would have markedOppenheimer out as a pre-eminent standwhat it was all about exceptthat everything scientist:his own researchwork in physics; his seemed unfair. The hearings meant that they influenceas a teacher;his leadershipat Los Alamos; were separatedfrom their parents for much of the thegrowth of the Institutefor Advanced Study as a spring. Later Kitty was plagued by recurrent leading center of theoreticalphysics under his com- illnesswhich bothered directorship;and his effortsto promotea more her formany years. Robert monunderstanding of science. Whenall is combined acquireda place on the ocean in the VirginIslands we honorOppenheimer as a greatleader of science. and the whole familyspent much of the early Whenall is interwovenwith the dramatic events that summerthere as well as shorterperiods during centeredaround him we rememberOppenheimer as the year. It was a welcomerespite from a busy one of the most remarkablepersonalities of this century. life and so much publicity,and it gave an op- portunityfor the familyto be close togetheragain. Robert Oppenheimer'sthoughts on scienceand Robert'shealth had neverbeen reallygood and its relationto man and societyare shown in the for many years he seemed to live on nervous concludingremarks of his Reith Lectures: energy. This now desertedhim and he became increasinglyfrail. He had for many years been We knowthat our workis rightlyboth an instru- mentand an end. A greatdiscovery is a thingof subjectto a severe raspingcough. In early 1966 beauty;and our faith-ourbinding, quiet faith-is it was discoveredthat he had throatcancer. There thatknowledge is good and good in itself. It is also was an operationand extended radiationtreat- an instrument;it is an instrumentfor our successors, ments. For a time, Robert could still travel who will use it to probeelsewhere and moredeeply; around but he resignedas directorand became it is an instrumentfor technology, for the practical arts, and for man's affairs. So it is with us as senior professorat the Institute. Before long scientists;so it is withus as men. We are at once therewas recurrenceof his disease and it became instrumentand end,discoverers and teachers,actors clear thatthe end was not far off. Though weak, and observers.We understand,as we hope others he kept his clarityof mind and, as much as his understand,that in thisthere is a harmonybetween knowledgein the sense of science,that specialized strengthwould bear, he enjoyed seeing friends and generalknowledge, which it is our purposeto and rememberingearlier and morepleasant times. uncover,and the communityof man. We, like all The end came on Saturday,February 18, 1967. men,are amongthose who bringa littlelight to the A memorialservice was held in Princetonon vastunending darkness of man'slife and world. For February 25. , Henry Smyth,and us as forall men,change and eternity,specialization and unity,instrument and finalpurpose, community GeorgeKennan gave movingsummaries of Robert and individualman alone, complementary each to the Oppenheimer'scareer as they knew him and his other,both requireand defineour bonds and our many accomplishments.A memorialsession of freedom.

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