Elites, Citizens and Identity Discourse Changes in the Basque Country Francisco José Llera. University of the Basque Country (UPV-E U) francisco.llera"ehu.es Rafael Leonisio. University of the Basque Country (UPV-E U) rafael.leonisio"ehu.es Sergio Pérez Casta'os. University of the Basque Country (UPV-E U) sergio.perezc"ehu.es Paper prepared for the Workshop ”The Dynamics of Nationalist Evolution in Contemporary Spain‘, arcelona, 25-26 September 2014 Is there any difference between elite discourse and society opinion? In this paper, we would like to compare the discourses of the as,ue elites -parliamentary speeches, electoral pro.rams, etc.0 with the as,ue public opinion re.ardin. centre-periphery issues such as re.ional status, independence and reinforcement of the as,ue 1utonomy. So, usin. content analysis methodolo.y we would e2plore the nationalist parties. In the same line, we would seek for information to compare the citi3enship position in this same issues, lookin. forward to compare both of them to conclude if e2ist any coherence within the as,ue population in .eneral, and the voters of concrete parties in particular, and their political representatives. Introduction In general terms, nation-,uilding processes in the European states .ere carried out from a nationally and linguistically homogeneous /center0 that marginalized the /periphery0, .hich .as culturally or linguistically different from the model employed to ,uild the nation1 generally, such peripheral minorities .ere national or ethnic. In this .ay the so- called center-periphery cleavage emerged1, .ith the appearance of centralist parties and, a,ove all, parties that defended the periphery1 in this respect, Spain is one of the ,est e2amples due to the quantity, variety and importance of the latter 2. The presence of this type of parties has given rise to research that has advanced on t.o lines5 the first refers to an acceptance that parties of an ethnic or nationalist type tend to e2acer,ate conflict31 the second specifies that parties of an /ethnic0 type do not necessarily inflame conflict7, and can even cause the emergence of opportunities for improving political coe2istence ,et.een groups8. On this line, the construction of Spanish national identity since the end of the :I: century has encountered an o,stacle in the strong presence of nationalist movements in several of its peripheral territories, principally Catalonia and the Basque Country6. This has continued to ,e a live issue throughout the entire democratic period 1 inaugurated .ith the Constitution of 19787, in spite of the e2traordinary political decentralization carried out over this period of time8. In the Catalan and Basque cases .e find the e2istence of t.o models of nationalism that .e could classify as moderate and radical. The former term refers to parties like the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista 4asco A PNV) and, historically, Basque Solidarity (Eusko 1lkartasuna A EA) in the Basque case and to Convergence and Union (Conver.encia i 5ni6 A CiU) in the Catalan case. The term radical refers to the Basque Patriotic Left (I3,uierda 1bert3ale A IA)9 in the Basque Country, .hile Repu,lican Left of Catalonia (Es,uerra Republicana de Catalunya A ERC) .ould fit that perspective in this territory. At the same time, there is the question of the relation ,et.een the political positioning of the political elite and the citizenry, .here t.o ideal situations can ,e configured. On the one hand, it is the evolution of pu,lic opinion that determines the discourse of the elites10 and, on the other, it is the elites that influence the attitudes and values of citizens.11 Thus, for e2ample, in recent years there have ,een changes in Catalan pu,lic opinion .ith respect to its insertion in the Spanish state, .hile the positioning .ith respect to independence rose from 13.6D in 2008 to 87.7D in 201312. This has ,een accompanied (cause, consequence, or ,oth at once) ,y a turn in the discourse of the political leaders of the Catalan nationalist formations, and even .ithin some parties not considered to ,e nationalist, .hich raises questions a,out the influence of the discourse of the political eliteEs discourse on pu,lic opinion. Research on ho. elites influence pu,lic opinion (and viceversa) has ,een summarized in several studies that seek to find the connection ,et.een the t.o and e2plain ho. the relationship of dependence ,et.een citizenry and elite is structured. On this line, there are several studies that tend to confirm the e2istence of a direct relation ,et.een the communicative patterns of political leaders and the change of attitude of the citizenry in general, and voters in particular, .ith respect to key issues in voting or questions of clear political relevance13. In this respect, it can ,e underscored that the maFority of the e2isting literature has ,een developed in a search to understand the capacity of politicians to e2ercise an influence over the mass media and ho. pu,lic opinion is influenced through the latter. Special mention is merited ,y the .ork of Schneider and Jaco,i, .ho conclude that the change of perception of the North American citizenry regarding .elfare spending is influenced ,y the discourse of the political elite5 /elite political discourse is the key factor in accountin. for this chan.e in public opinion0, although not in a homogeneous .ay in the population, as /the structure of elite influence varies markedly dependin. upon individual levels of attentiveness to politics and public affairs017. In this paper, .e intend to test this hypothesis of the influence of the discourse of elites on the political attitudes of citizens (,oth of society in general and of different groups .ithin it), through a case study centered on the Basque Country. Thus, follo.ing this line of research, our starting hypothesis is precisely ho. the discursive turn of moderate nationalism (PNV and EA) from the 1990s on.ards influenced pu,lic opinion concerning particular attitudes and values related to the center-periphery cleavage. In ela,orating our analysis .e com,ine content analysis of the discourse of the Basque political elites .ith data on pu,lic opinion o,tained ,y the Eusko,arGmetro18 research team, in order to understand the influence of the former on the latter. Finally, .e .ill note do.n a series of conclusions. 2 Data and method After the fall of the Francoist dictatorship, one of the greatest innovations ,rought ,y the Spanish democratic transition .as a rapid and intense decentralization that com,ined the cohesion of a unitary state .ith the functionality of advanced federalism .ith an asymmetrical character16. In this .ay the Basque Country o,tained autonomy in the year 1979 .ith the approval of the Statute of Hernika in a referendum. This te2t, and therefore the autonomy it inaugurated, o,tained a ,road political consensus, .ith only the non-nationalist right-.ing Popular Alliance (1lian3a Popular A AP)17 and the more radical sector of the Basque Patriotic Left (Popular Unity A 8erri atasuna A B)18 remaining outside this consensus. Thus, during the 1980s and most of the 1990s, B .as the only political force that opposed the status ,uo of the Autonomy Statute, .hile the other forces, including the nationalists, supported it in a more or less qualified .ay. Focusing on the latter, it must ,e said that PNV defended the Statute for almost t.o decades. In this .ay, for e2ample, in 1981 it said that, /Ie do not dou,t that all of those .ho occupy these JparliamentaryK seats value the Statute as the feasi,le course for solving and satisfying the pro,lems and aspirations of the Basque people019, and in 1989 it considered it to ,e /the most valid instrument, and the only one e2isting, availa,le to this people020. Even in 1992 .hen, as advance notice of .hat .as to come later, PNV .arned that facing nonfulfillment of the transfer of competencies it might in future opt for going ,eyond the e2isting political frame.ork21, it continued to clearly support the autonomous charter5 /The Statute is not e2hausted. It is not an outdated formula and, facing adventures .ith an unclear horizon, it continues in our opinion to ,e a space .here the maFority can come together022. But not only PNV1 EA too, in spite of its more markedly pro-independence character in contrast to the am,iguities of PNV23, supported the autonomous status ,uo from its emergence. Thus, for e2ample, in 1989 it firmly defended the Statute5 /I have to say, dra.ing a ,alance of the attitude and commitment of my party to self- governmentL that if anyone has ,elieved in the Statute, .e are the ones. Ie do not deny this to anyone, ,ut say that if anyone has ,elieved in it, .e are the ones027. That defense of the Statute .as at times accompanied ,y the option of going further in an unspecified future5 /From this vie. of things, from EAMs clear and unam,iguous declaration that it considers the Statute to ,e a political commitment to ,e respected so long as it is not replaced ,y another commitment that is more am,itious and more in line .ith JEAMsK defense of the self-government and sovereignty of the Basque Country028. Nonetheless, as .e shall shortly see, appeals to go ,eyond the frame.ork of self-government ,arely found room in its discourse (or in that of PNV), and in general the main claim of EA consisted in the development, or integral fulfillment, of the Statute5 /Ie resume our attempt to advance self-government, fulfilling at least one incontroverti,le aim5 the development of todayMs statutory frame.ork0261 /Ihile the minimum self-government contained in the Statute is not attained, and in the terms in .hich it .as interpreted in 1979, this demand, posed in these terms, .ill continue to ,e a ,asic and permanent political question .ith a priority character for us027.