The Influence of Asymmetry on Territorial Dynamics in “Hybrid” Multinational States: the Case of Spain
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The Influence of Asymmetry on Territorial Dynamics in “Hybrid” Multinational States: The Case of Spain Adam Holesch Department of Political and Social Sciences Universitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF) - Barcelona [email protected] Preliminary draft – please do not quote Paper presented in the Department of Political Science of the Central European University in Budapest 13. November 2014 2 1. Introduction: Territorial dynamics in multinational states develop on two principal axes, the centralization – decentralization axis and the symmetry - asymmetry axis, with asymmetry being an important part of the decentralisation process. Questions of decentralization are in vogue and have become a well-analyzed topic. Not the same can be said about the asymmetric solutions, which stay a barely inquired subject. This gap is surprising due to two facts. First, all multinational states have some asymmetrical aspects. Second, even if institutionally applied, asymmetrical solutions do not really match the preferences of the citizens. For example in 2010 in the Spanish “State od Autonomies” the majority of Spaniards (67,3%) was against institutional asymmetry.1 Nevertheless, this analysis will show, that even if not congrunet with the preferences of its citizens, asymmetry become an essential factor of the political decentralisation and federalisation process in Spain. The research question to be asked is the following. How does asymmetry influence the territorial dynamics in the Spanish “State of Autonomies”? I will use the case study of Spain for reasons of expositional simplicity. It presents the advantage of undergoing a constant institutional remodeling in form of reforms of the “Statutes of Autonomy” of the AC. The discussion how far the multinational Spain could be interpreted as federal is far from being closed.2 But because we deal in this 1 Surprising is that also over 54,2 % of the Catalans and 48,3% of the Basques were against the fact that the Autonomous Communities (AC) could provide different services in each AC. (CIS 2011) 2 The degree to which Spain is a federal state continues to be an object of debate and discussion. On the one hand, the high level of autonomy or self-rule of the seventeen Spanish AC supports a federal interpretation. For Riker a federal state is to be found where “(1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some [constitutional] guarantee . of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere” (Riker 1964:11). According to Riker’s definition, Spain could be classified as federal. Watts (2008) argues with similar arguments that Spain has structural attributes typical for a federal political system like two levels of government, constitutional distribution of legislative and executive authority and allocation of revenue resources, a Constitutional Court, which arbitrates disagreements, and institutions that can ease intergovernmental cooperation. But finally Watts calls Spain not a full federation, but a federation in praxis. Many scholars like Burgess (2006), Rodden (2006) or Moreno (2007) use a similar approach. Agranoff (1996) argues that Spain is a unitary system that appears to be in the process of becoming federal. On the other hand, there are numerous academics like Elazar (1987), Filippov et. (2004), Requejo (2005) or Nagel (2010) who doubt or refuse to define Spain as federal, because of the following institutional features: The AC are barely involved with the institutions of the central state. The Spanish upper house, the Senate, in particular, is no chamber of the ACs, as three quarters of the senators represent administrative sub-units of the central state, e.g. the 50 provincias which are also the electoral districts of the lower house. Besides that, the Senate has not many powers. In addition, the provincias depend heavily on the centre, while eluding the AC. Coming back to Riker, the AC (besides Basque Country and Navarre) apparently do not have any area of action, where they act autonomous, because the central control have been maintained and eventually re-established by using framework legislation. In the Catalan case some central state politicians threaten with the 3 article with quasi-federal dynamics its definition is of big importance. We claim, that the official term “State of Autonomies” expresses to some extent the “hybrid” aspect of Spain on the unitary-federal axis, which we will define as a “hybrid” multinational state. We will position this paper in the strand of historical institutionalism (HI), which see institutions as continuities and puts the emphasis on path-dependency. The HI- approach allows us to connect questions dealing with territorial dynamics with the literature on the constitutional origins of Spanish state. The HI approach will be mixed with the actor-centered institutionalism approach developed by Mayntz/Scharpf (1995) and Scharpf (1997). It claims that political decisions are not made in a political vacuum, but between different actors acting in different institutional settings. For that reason in order to analyze the political decisions we will distinguish the type of actors, the positions of the actors and the institutional settings they work in. With that above all Scharpf (1997) showed that what really matters in the analysis of political decisions are the institutions as actors and not the social or cultural factors or informal rules.3 The mixing of these two approaches will allow us for simple game-theoretical modeling. Even if in its essence this paper is of a qualitative nature, we would like to define our variables. The dependent variable is the dynamics of the development of the Spanish “State of Autonomies”, in particular its political decentralisation/federalisation process. As independent variable I will use four variations of asymmetry, which will be developed in this paper: de facto asymmetry, institutional de jure asymmetry, symbolic de jure asymmetry and ultimate de jure asymmetry.4 The HI-methodology binds us to a chronological approach. After explaining the concepts used and presenting a short literature review, we will analyze how the actors bargained aspects of asymmetry and decentralisation in the constitution. Then, we will concentrate on territorial dynamics identifying two phases: first, the withdrawal of autonomy applying the Art.155 of the Spanish Constitution. If that would be the case, following our conceptual definitions, Spain would qualify as a unitary and not a federal state. Besides that, the AC do not have any stake in constitutional amendments nor do they have direct influence upon the election of the judges of the Spanish constitutional court. Moreover, terms like federalism or federation do not appear in the Spanish constitution. If both terms appear in the Spanish debate, then usually they mean a future reform suggestion. 3 However they can strongly influence the development of the institutions and the position of the actors. 4 We are aware that there are also other variables influencing decentralisation like questions of efficiency or democratization. 4 “constitutionally conform accommodations of asymmetry” and second, the “constitution-destabilizing development of asymmetry”. The latter development reduced the territorial dynamics to a game between the central state and Catalonia, which we will explain with a simple analytical game-theoretical model. When talking about institutional change, we have to define clearly the relevant institutions.5 In the Spanish “State of Autonomies” the territorial dynamics did not take place inside the Constitution6, but within the “Statutes of Autonomy”. Starting from this point this analysis claims the following: First, that the permanent reform of the “Statute of Autonomies” challenges the view that the Spanish constitution established a path-dependency from which the actors could difficulty deviate. Second, that the alleged growth of the asymmetrical demands by the Minority Units brought this reform process to an end, because no reform or replacement has been any more possible. After exhausting the possibilities at the “Statute”-level, the requests have to be solved at the highest constitutional level. Third, that the crucial actor of the territorial dynamics has been the central state on two levels. Once in form of the two statewide parties (SWP): Popular Party (PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE), and second as the sum of the central state institutions and the regional Majority Units, which are clearly opposed to the two Minority Units. Without the approval of these two parties, the Autonomous Communities (AC) in general and the Minority Units in particular have no leverage for a possible constitutional reform.7 Seen from the game-theoretical perspective, it is because of the missing threat of the Minority Units that the “ultimate asymmetry” game can find only one equilibrium: the Status Quo. 5 We define institutions as architecture and as rules that determine opportunities and incentives for behaviour. 6 The constitution has been resistant to change with two small exceptions in 1992 and 2011. The first reform was to adapt the voting rights of foreigners from the European Union (EU) to the Maastricht Treaty. The second reform planed to establish strict budget rules. Both are strongly influenced by exogenous factors: the EU-Treaties or the political pressure of the EU. 7 There is however one exception, when the minority government of PP or PSOE needs support from the NSWP parties