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The Death of Violence Zanias, Stephen 2005

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Introduction separatists are legitimately fighting for their rights of freedom and self-determination. Like Following the lead of the , many terrorist groups, the issue comes down the world has taken a stand against terrorism,1 to a matter of perspective, one that involves in- which plays a role on many different stages depth analysis of the history and motivations of around the world. Each stage has its unique set the parties involved. of characters and history; and while the groups However, setting aside the issue of legiti- may differ in geographic location, ideals, or macy, a more pressing question for ETA con- objectives, they are joined by the fact that they cerns not its present status, but more impor- have terrorized others to achieve their goals. tantly its future. In conjunction with issues that To many there is no justification for the atroc- will be detailed in this article, the internation- ities they have committed; to others the vio- al backlash against terrorism makes ETA’s lence and the reasons for which a terrorist future appear dismal. In short, ETA appears to group fights may be acceptable. As the saying be dying. While ETA has been pursuing its sep- goes, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s aratist agenda for over forty-five years, a large freedom fighter.” majority of the Basque people are finally taking One such group is ETA, an acronym in a stand against the group and its practices. Euskara (the language of the Basques) for ETA’s reign of terror and power is coming to a “Basque Fatherland and Liberty.” (“Terrorist close. Group...”) While many feel ETA is an unjustifi- However, the separatist movement is mov- able terrorist group, there are those who would ing forward — though with a different argue that this relatively small group of Basque approach. Where violence and terrorism failed to accomplish ETA’s objectives, great strides are 1In Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 2656f(d), the U.S. being made in the political arena. Under the government has defined terrorism as “premeditated, polit- direction of Basque President Juan José ically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombat- Ibarretxe, the Basque Country government has ant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usu- ally to influence an audience.” (“Terrorism…”) passed several resolutions to provide for 97 increased Basque autonomy. Drawing on pop- location throughout their history. (Hooper, ular support, these efforts have produced some pp. 386–87) limited dialogue with the Spanish government. The Basque people are distinguished fur- While the success of the political initiatives ther by their language, Euskara. The language remains to be seen, there is increased hope for helps to give them a cultural identity and define those Basques who wish to see a more inde- them as a people, and is therefore of great pendent state. importance and a significant source of their This article first presents information national pride. Today, several hundred thousand about the background of the Basque people and people speak the language in the Basque region, the origins of ETA. It then analyzes the various which extends from northeastern into reasons for the weakening of ETA. Lastly, it southwestern . explores the potential ramifications of ETA’s Combining these distinctions with archae- political aspirations and the future of the ological evidence leads Hooper, an expert in Basque cause. Spanish affairs, to suggest that the Basques ... might be direct descendants of Different Communities Cro-Magnon man.... [T]he absence from Basque folklore of any sort of The Kingdom of Spain is a conglomera- migration legend, when combined with the linguistic and serological tion of several states molded together through evidence, would seem to suggest that time and conquest and, today, is politically the Basques have lived where they divided into nineteen “autonomous communi- are now to be found since the Stone ties,” districts which assume varying degrees of Age. (Hooper, pp. 387–88) responsibility ranging from tax collection to The Basques are further distinguished by education. As a result of this history, there exist their historical isolation and consider them- several peoples within the political borders of selves to be unique and separate from the rest this state, each with their own unique heritage, of Spain. A strong Basque desire for freedom culture, language, and history. Among the and sovereignty, combined with their geo- many cultural minorities in Spain, three clear- graphic isolation, has caused resistance to out- ly predominate. The first two, the Catalans and side influence to become a hallmark of Basque the Galicians, reside along Spain’s east coast history. (Hooper, p. 388) When the Moors ruled and northwestern corner, respectively. The Spain for nearly 800 years (AD 718–1492), the Basques make up the third predominant cul- Basques were one of the few unconquered peo- tural entity and are, perhaps, the most cultur- ples and thus were kept isolated from Muslim ally distinct of the three. influence that had so great an impact on the culture of the surrounding regions. When Basque Distinctions Franco hoped to minimize the differences among the Spanish people and establish a Several types of evidence suggest that the stronger state by suppressing the country’s var- Basques have lived relatively isolated in the ious languages, cultures, and groups in the northeastern corner of Spain for centuries. twentieth century, the Basques were one of the These people are culturally different from their staunchest resisters to his efforts. Euskara was Spanish neighbors on several levels: physical- banned, intellectuals were imprisoned and tor- ly, linguistically, and historically. Physically, the tured, and the Basque fueros2 were revoked Basque people are generally taller than the aver- under Franco’s “unification” effort. (“Who...”) age Spaniard, with a more muscular appearance and distinctive facial characteristics. (Hooper, 2Fueros are historic provisions granted by the Spanish p. 387) As their antigen pattern (predominant- federal government that had allowed the Basques to enjoy ly type A) and Rhesus count (Rh–) indicate that a greater degree of autonomy than many of the other Spanish regions. Responsibilities such as tax collection and they are of a strong European and Westerly ori- military conscription were allowed to be handled by the gin, serology also presents a good argument for rather than controlled by the Spanish the Basque people to have lived in their present government.

98 This persecution of their freedoms, culture, and The Birth of ETA language only infuriated the Basque people. As a result, rather than bringing the unity he True to the Basque hallmark of resistance desired, Franco’s cultural and political perse- and in conjunction with the growth of nation- cution resulted in the polar opposite — a cul- alism, a movement sprang up against Franco tural backlash and an explosion of ethnic pride. and the injustices against the Basque people. In It is worth noting that while Franco’s 1959 a group of young activist students from actions may have led to the growth of Basque the Spanish provinces of Vizcaya and identity, the formation of Guipuzkoa became displeased with the appar- can be attributed almost entirely to Sabino de ent inaction of the leading political party (the Arana Goiri (1865–1903). (Flynn, p. 105) In the moderate Basque National Party [PNV]). latter part of the 1800s, Arana devoted himself Organizing themselves to stand against to promoting Basque nationalism; not only was Franco’s dictatorship, this group formed the he responsible for organizing the Basque cause, political party/nationalist group EKIN. EKIN but he also designed the national flag, wrote the soon took a more radical approach and within national anthem, and revived Euskara and a few years evolved into ETA. (“Basque shaped it into the language it is today. With Homeland...”) such an impact, it should come as no surprise Decades later, ETA still remains true to its that Arana’s views formed the ideological basis dual purpose: to claim “an independent home- for Basque nationalism. (Flynn, p. 105) Arana’s land for the Basque people in the Basque views soon increased in popularity. By the end region,” and to gain “self-determination in the of the and the start of form of a socialist Basque state.” (“Terrorist Franco’s regime, the Basques had grown to see Group...”) It is important to note that the themselves as increasingly Basque and decreas- Autonomous Community of the Basque ingly Spanish. Franco’s actions only hastened Country, or Euskadi, in Spain is not considered this identification, and within decades surveys by Basques, including ETA, to be the sole extent of the Basque people reported that 60 percent of the “Basque region.” Euskadi, rather, is only of the population considered themselves as only part of the Euskadi Herria, “the Basque Basque, while 24 percent felt a dual Basque- Homeland.” (“Euskal...”) According to the offi- Spanish identity, and only 13 percent saw them- cial Basque Country website, the Euskadi selves primarily as Spanish. (Conversi, p. 160) Herria, shown in Figure 1, is the true extent of

Figure 1 Map of Euskadi Herria

Source: Richburg.

99 Basque territory and consists of seven herri- attacks. (“U.S....”) aldes, or districts, located at the western end of This rise in violence was not due to any the Pyrenees on the Bay of (“Euskal...”). failure by the Spanish government to include The three provinces of the Basque Country or represent Basque interests in the formation (Vizcaya, Alava, and Guipuzkoa) and the of the new government. In fact, the Basque Autonomous Community of are both Country gained a greater level of liberty with regions within the Kingdom of Spain, while the the transition to democracy, and the BBC three departments of Labourd, Basse-Navarra, reports that the Basques have a higher level of and Soule reside in southwestern France. autonomy than any other Spanish region. (“Euskal...”) (“Who...”) Passed on December 18, 1978, the Statute of Autonomy of the Basque Country Dictatorship to Democracy granted broad powers to the Basque Country and served as the basis for Basque rights. These The members of ETA have used force to powers and rights include maintaining its own try to accomplish their nationalist and social- parliament and police force, running an edu- ist goals of independence and self-autonomy — cation program (in which Euskara is promot- force, that is, in the form of terrorism. Since its ed) (“Basque Homeland...”), and handling their first strike in 1959 with a series of bombings own tax collection. (“Who...”) Nevertheless, ETA and its first “premeditated political murder” steadfastly continues to fight for full indepen- (Conversi, p. 99) in 1968 of a secret police chief dence, regardless of risk or cost. to the present day, ETA has continued its cam- paign of violence and terror. ETA has relied Weakening and Decline much on the use of bombings and political assassinations of leaders in the government, Despite its determination, it has become military, and judiciary to advance its agenda. apparent that ETA has been weakening. The (“Basque Homeland...”) Perhaps the most sig- structure of the organization has been taxed by nificant of these acts was the assassination of ideological divisions and the loss of its leader- Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s likely ship. Strong public support has been trans- successor, in December 1973. This assassina- formed to strong public opposition. The gov- tion, a retaliatory strike for the execution of ernments of Spain and many other countries Basque militants (“ETA: Key...”), aided Spain’s have taken strong stances against the group, transition to democracy. (Kasmir, p. 96) The and its numbers have been dwindling. As a International Policy Institute for Counter- result of these contributing causes, the group Terrorism (ICT) believes that his death “may has lost much of the strength and support it have significantly hastened the end of Spanish once wielded.3 .” (“Basque Homeland...”) While ETA originally organized to combat Disorganization, Reduction, and the abuses under Franco’s dictatorship, the Public Alienation group did not disband with the Spanish transi- tion to democracy after his death in 1975. On Two of the leading causes of ETA’s weak- the contrary, ETA’s work assumed a new fervor; ness spring from its internal conflicts and 1980 was ETA’s deadliest year and resulted in resulting disorganization. ETA was originally 118 deaths. As Michel Wieviorka, a professor of organized into five different “fronts” on which sociology in France, notes, “As Spanish society the ideals of the movement were to be carried made the transition to democracy, [ETA] out: the promotion of Euskara, education, became more violent and more separatist rather political propaganda, legal action, and military than less. Terrorism escalated just as democra- action. However, a succession of internal con- cy had indisputably established itself.” (Wieviorka, p. 292) Since its formation, ETA has 3Several of the points made in this section rely upon the been responsible for the deaths of more than work that Washington Post foreign correspondent Keith B. 850 people and approximately 1,600 terrorist Richburg presented in his December 2003 article. (Richburg) 100 flicts over political and ideological disputes A second critical turning point occurred a resulted in a series of divisions. Hooper states decade later. In July 1997 ETA kidnapped 29- that after each of these divisions “the more vio- year-old Miguel Angel Blanco, a councilor for lent, less intellectual group... survived intact.” the Popular Party (PP) in the Basque region, (Hooper, p. 399) The remaining membership and demanded the release of 460 ETA prisoners no longer has the capacity to engage efficient- as ransom. After the Spanish government ly on five fronts; today, membership primarily refused to comply, Blanco was shot twice in the consists of what used to be the military wing of head and killed. (“Who...”) Public indignation the organization. over this murder far exceeded any previous What was once strong public support of grievance against ETA. People previously hesi- ETA has transformed over time to strong pub- tant to speak out against ETA violence and lic opposition. In the early years of the group’s oppression no longer feared for their lives as formation, the public viewed ETA members as more than six million people across Spain martyrs for their cause and demonstrated their demonstrated over a four-day period and support publicly. For instance, the 1968 killing demanded an end to ETA’s violence. For the first of an ETA member by police brought about time, even several ETA supporters publicly con- mass demonstrations in every city throughout demned the murder. (“Who...”) This public the Basque Country, and priests held masses in mobilization allowed more open expression of the martyr’s memory for weeks afterward. Such displeasure with ETA; no longer did the people popular uprisings encouraged large numbers of need to fear ETA in the way they once had. supporters to join in ETA’s work. (Conversi, As alluded to earlier, perhaps the most p. 99) critical reason for the weakening of ETA’s pub- Years later, the situation has changed lic support is its extremist viewpoints. While greatly. Daniele Conversi, a senior lecturer at many Basques support independence,4 other the University of Lincoln (U.K.) and an expert Basques are content with the extensive auton- in nationalism, refers to a survey in 1982 of the omy they currently have and accept that they Basque population. Fewer than fifteen years are Spanish as well as Basque. (“The Basque after the demonstrations mentioned above, 77 ETA”) While the people may be divided about percent of the population were opposed to ETA’s this issue, there is a strong majority of people activities and only 8 percent claimed to support in the Basque Country who are opposed to ETA’s the group. Subsequent surveys since 1982 show use of violence (“ETA Violence...”), as clearly a continual decrease in ETA popularity, result- demonstrated in the protest over Blanco’s mur- ing largely from ETA’s “indiscriminate killings der. The BBC further reports that ETA and its and purely terrorist acts which departed sharply extremist followers are losing support because from its original tactics.” (Conversi, p. 159) many believe that ETA is “desperately out of One of the critical turning points in pub- touch with public opinion.” (“Who...”) This lic opinion occurred in 1987. In the deadliest extremism has alienated many of the Basque single attack the group has committed to the people, including members of the intelligentsia. present time, a car bomb was set off in a park- Richburg quotes Andolin Eguzkitza, a profes- ing garage beneath a Barcelona supermarket. sor of Basque culture in : “You can’t kill Although ETA had phoned to warn of the blast, people just because they disagree with you the civilians were unable to be evacuated in ...[and] [p]eople of goodwill are getting fed time; 21 people were killed. While the BBC up....Today, many people who have been defend- quotes the group as apologizing for their “mis- ing the work of ETA would say they have to take” (“ETA: Key...”), ETA was not dissuaded stop.” (Richburg ) from its quest. Instead, ETA has continued its It is important to note that some public attacks against military and political targets, support for ETA does remain. In August 2000 including two high profile attempted assassi- thousands of people showed their support after nations in 1995 against both King Juan Carlos and Jose Maria Aznar, the former Prime 4Opinion polls suggest that diehard secessionists make Minister. (“ETA Violence...”) up almost a quarter of the population. (“A House…”)

101 Table 1 ETA Attacks Year Deaths Attacks/Bombings 2000 23 44 2001 15 43 2002 5 20 2003 3 17 Source: Richburg. four ETA members were killed transporting cess and has kept the group on the defensive. explosives. (“ETA: Key...”) However, at the time (Richburg) In a September 2004 speech at of this writing, the organization’s strength Georgetown University, Aznar acknowledged appears to be fairly low. As Table 1 indicates, the that “ETA itself is prostrated, but not finished.” number of attacks and murders committed by (Aznar) A strong, determined fight against ETA the group have also decreased dramatically. requires clear identification of what ETA truly Annual results from 2003 show a reduction of is, as he expounded upon in his speech. over 60 percent in the number of attacks and Terrorism must be condemned in all over 85 percent in the number of deaths since circumstances. There are no good 2000. The National Memorial Institute for the forms of terrorism. Many times I Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism have read and heard in the U.S. Knowledge Base estimates group strength to be media about ETA terrorists being described as “young rebels” and “pro- only about 300 members. (“Terrorist Group...”) independence militants.” These indi- The ICT concurs, believing that ETA member- viduals murder, kidnap, torture and ship is “quite small, perhaps no more than 20 bully free citizens in a democratic hard-core activists and several hundred sup- country. They are terrorists, and porters.” (“Basque Homeland...”) nothing more. To look with sympa- thy upon those who commit crimes Strong Spanish Political Stance thousands of miles away is immoral under Aznar and detrimental.... Calling ETA a “separatist group”... would be The Spanish government has also taken a like calling al-Qaeda “a spiritual strong stance against the group and its vio- organization.” Simply unacceptable. lence, and its efforts have successfully ham- (Aznar) pered the group’s logistic, recruitment, and However, regardless of their effectiveness operational capabilities. (“Patterns...,” p. 54) In in weakening the group, Aznar’s views and poli- its 2004 “Patterns of Global Terrorism,” the U.S. cies have not been without skeptics. Many in State Department affirms that Spain has made the Basque region believe his policies lacked a “extensive progress” as it fights to eliminate crucial component by failing to open political ETA, carrying out many seizures of supplies and dialogue with moderate Basque nationalists, weapons and making numerous arrests. potential allies who run the government and (“Patterns...,” p. 54) Richburg argues that who also reject violence. (Richburg) Yet, despite although Spain has given the Basques a great the strong criticism, Aznar has garnered inter- degree of freedom, it refuses to grant indepen- national support for his stance against ETA, and dence. (Richburg) As long as ETA demands his arrests, seizures, and efforts have greatly complete autonomy, it will be at odds with the weakened it. Spanish government. International Cooperation Former Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar’s hard-line policy toward ETA — “No negotia- tions, no concessions and unrelenting police Despite its modest roots, ETA has grown pressure” (Richburg) — has brought much suc- into an international organization, reported

102 to have members and underground supporters ing of ETA’s operations. In May 2002 the U.S. spread around the globe. (“Basque Department of the Treasury froze the accounts Homeland...”) Of all its locations, the most cru- of seven individuals accused of supporting ETA cial for ETA activity has been France. Not only and also took action against the organization is part of southern France part of Euskadi Askatasuna, which Paul O’Neill, the U.S. Herria, but also, being outside Spanish juris- Secretary of the Treasury, claimed was “an ETA diction, it has served as a rear base and safe front whose actions are controlled by ETA to haven for ETA. (Fraysse) However, with the complement and support ETA militants.” international response to the events of (“U.S....”) September 11th and the increased govern- mental cooperation occurring within Europe, IRA “Conversion” to Peace ETA has been forced to adapt its techniques and methods. The result of the signing of the Northern In 1997, the United States added ETA to Ireland Peace Agreement in April 1998 also its terrorism list (Richburg), and in 2001 the dealt a strong blow to the ETA cause. ETA has Spanish government achieved a significant been known to have dealings with the Irish diplomatic victory when, for the first time, all Republican Army (IRA); and its political wing, fifteen member governments of the EU desig- , has been schooled on negotiation nated ETA as a terrorist organization. (“ETA: strategy by Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Key...”) This designation was critical to the suc- IRA. (“ETA: Key...”) However, some believe that cess of the efforts against ETA, and many the connection runs much deeper. In a report nations have aided in capturing and bringing presented to the U.S. Congress, experts believe ETA members to justice. Over the past several that ETA “has often followed the IRA’s lead in years, many arrests have been made, resulting terms of tactics and operations.” (Cronin, p. 21), in the imprisonment of nearly 700 ETA mem- while Richburg adds that the IRA can be viewed bers in Spain and France. In 2003 alone, as ETA’s ideological big brother. (Richburg) Spanish and French authorities arrested 171 With the IRA observing a cease fire, reducing ETA members and accomplices. Germany, the its arsenal, apologizing for killing civilians, and Netherlands, and several countries in Latin progressing through a peace process, ETA has America have also helped to detain ETA mem- become more concerned as to what its own bers. (“Patterns...,” p. 118) France’s commit- future holds. ment to fight ETA, prompted by the EU’s des- Following the IRA peace agreement, ETA ignation of it as a terrorist organization, has announced a cease fire in September 1998, the been a leading cause of this success. Whereas first time the group has done so since its for- the French police had been previously slow in mation. While the fourteen-month respite was their efforts, French anti-terrorism police have to allow for talks to begin between Batasuna and put “severe pressure” (Richburg) on ETA mem- the Spanish government, ETA instead utilized bers. (Richburg) the truce as a means to obtain more supplies As mentioned previously, the loss of top and munitions. (“Basque Homeland...”) leadership due to these arrests and actions has According to the ICT, when the cease fire ended also been critical to ETA’s weakening. While ETA blamed “the repressive measures taken by new leaders often quickly step in to replace the the Spanish government” and the “failure of lost leaders, ETA has been devastated by its fluc- mainstream Basque nationalists to work with tuation in leadership and organization. (Woolls) it toward the creation of an independent Basque Moreover, these new leaders, too, have been state.” (“Basque Homeland...”) In an official arrested as the international community fights statement, ETA claimed, “The [peace] process against ETA. is blocked and poisoned. Responding to a pledge The international effort has not solely to defend the Basque Country, the decision has been limited to arrests and seizures of weapons. been taken to reactivate the use of armed strug- Financial assets have been frozen by the U.S. gle.” (“Basque Homeland...”) and other nations in an attempt to cut the fund-

103 Politics As Basque politicians — with the exception of Batasuna members — generally support ETA’s The international cooperation evident in goals but not its methods (“Q&A...”), many peo- ETA arrests and financial disruptions has also ple now believe that politics, rather than vio- existed in Spanish dealings with Batasuna and lence, is the means to achieving Basque inde- has contributed to the further weakening of the pendence. group. Batasuna is to ETA what Sinn Fein has One of the men leading this charge is Juan been for the Irish Republican Army. Formed in José Ibarretxe, the , or president, 1979, this nationalist-left party has had support of the Basque Country. Elected by the Basque fluctuating between five and ten percent from Parliament in July 2001, Ibarretxe has been an a Basque population of little more than two mil- outspoken advocate of increasing Basque sov- lion. (Aulestia) ereignty. In a recent speech, Ibarretxe stated, “I Batasuna denies ties to ETA (Tremlett), want you to know that the Basque Country will but the Spanish Interior Ministry argues to the never take part in a project of joint co-existence contrary. The government maintains that with the State, if it is not done of its own free Batasuna has “never condemned an attack, nor will, because the Basque Country is not a sub- have they ever asked ETA to abandon its ordinate part of Spain.” (Ibarretxe) However, weapons.” (“ETA: Murder...”) According to the Ibarretxe has also been unwavering in his con- Interior Ministry, Batasuna has attended inter- demnation of ETA and its tactics. As quoted by national forums and presented ETA as a sepa- Richburg, Ibarretxe condemns the violence ratist organization, discredited Spanish democ- “totally and absolutely.... We have never defend- racy, and complained of supposed oppression ed our ideas with guns and we will never defend experienced under the Spanish state. (“ETA: our ideas with guns.” (Richburg) He also argues Murder...”) that the true desire of the Basque people is to Acting on the connection between ETA determine their own future and to be rid of and Batasuna, Aznar decided to take a stance ETA’s barbarity. (Font) Politics, instead, will against the political arm of ETA. Following a replace violence in what Ibarretxe calls the court case in August 2002, Judge Baltasar beginning of the “post-ETA era.” (Ibarretxe, as Garzon suspended the party for three years due quoted in “Ibarretxe Maintains...”) to its connections with ETA, which he declared Ibarretxe seeks to establish recognition “guilty of crimes against humanity.” (“ETA: and an international presence for the Basque Key...”) Nine months later, Batasuna was per- people: politically, culturally, socially, and polit- manently banned by the Spanish Supreme ically. At an international Basque gathering in Court as a result of the party’s failure to con- October 1999, Ibarretxe stated in the opening demn the acts carried out by ETA. This ban not speech: only prohibits Batasuna members from serving [O]ur aim should be to move from on local and regional government positions, but the knowledge of a Basque reality in the world to gradual international also freezes the group’s funding. (“Patterns...,” recognition as a people. Recognition p. 54) Again, other nations have supported the not only of our history and past char- Spanish government, with the United States acteristics. This is important, but it (May 2003) and the EU (June 2003) designat- is insufficient. A recognition of what ing Batasuna a terrorist organization. This ban we are today: a country with its own has caused a gradual yet progressive decrease identity. (“World...,” p. 23) in electoral votes (“ETA: Murder...”), thereby Despite these statements, Ibarretxe has decreasing ETA’s political power. maintained that he does not desire political independence for the Basque Country, but Political Options would only like to have freedom to be able to represent Basque interests in world affairs. This ETA’s weakening has provided opportuni- has led to the creation of the “.” ties for a new political deal between the Spanish The plan, “Proposal for the Political Statute of government and the Basque people. (Richburg) the Community of the Basque Country,” was

104 passed October 25, 2003, by the Basque gov- feels that it is essential to have communication ernment on what Ibarretxe claimed as “a his- between the Lehendakari and the Prime toric day for our people.” (“Institutional...”) As Minister, despite their differing viewpoints. Ibarretxe continues in his speech: (“Ibarretxe Maintains....”) This new Political Statute of the Despite new opportunities arising to dis- Basque Country represents...[a] com- cuss these issues, consensus among the Basque mitment to provide a solution, a pos- people remains a more fundamental problem, itive commitment, a commitment to one that will need to be worked out in the near an affirmative response, to a “yes” future. Iñaki Galdós, the President of Eusko response. Yes to human rights and Alkartasuna (one of the leading political parties the freedom of all individuals. Yes to respecting the democratic rights of in the Basque Country), states, “The problem is Basque society to decide their own that Basques do not agree on how to resolve the future without violence. Yes to the situation they live in.... [We have to find] a com- social construction of a Basque mon diagnosis about the and Country for all Basque citizens, with- about our identity, because so many different out exclusion....We are fully con- interpretations block the way forward.” (Galdós, vinced that a higher degree of self- as quoted by Font) government will also bring with it a higher level of well-being for each Moving Forward and every one of us...[and] a better life.... The new Statute does not pro- The goal of the most recent international pose a split but a new framework of coexistence with the Spanish State.... Basque meeting was Aurrera Goaz, Basque for We ask only for the right to express “We go forward.” (Totoricagüena) With ETA vio- ourselves. (“Institutional...”) lence in decline and a growing chance for a The plan calls, in short, for the Basque Country political solution, the opportunity to move to have status as a freely-associated state, com- toward a resolution to the question of Basque plete with its own foreign policy, separate autonomy in northeastern Spain may be greater courts, and even its own representation in the than it has ever been. The installation of a new European Union. Spanish government and communication However, the plan has met great resis- between the Basque Country and pro- tance, especially from the Spanish government. vide hope that an end may be in sight. Provided As quoted by Richburg, Ibarretxe maintains that that the government continues its strong poli- his plan “is not an independence plan...[nor] a cy towards ETA and its violence, there remains plan to break up Spain, but a plan to coexist the potential for an end to the violence. Gorka with Spain.” (Richburg) But Gustavo de Landaburu, a magazine editor and radio com- Aristegui, a member of Spanish parliament and mentator, states: “Little by little, it’s the end of the majority leader on foreign policy, claims ETA.... ETA is arriving at the end of the road.... that the plan is “a back door to sovereignty.” It’s the end of ETA, thanks to the pressure, (Richburg) Aznar responded to Ibarretxe’s plan thanks to the international cooperation.” by introducing legislation that would change (Landaburu, as quoted by Richburg) the criminal code; with the change, a politician In its efforts to bring about the end of ETA, who calls for a referendum outside of his juris- the Spanish government must be careful not to diction could be jailed — a change that would alienate those Basque citizens who are willing apply directly to Ibarretxe and his sovereignty and anxious to talk about their future. The lead- plan. (Font) ers must take into account the Basque desire With Zapatero’s election as Prime Minister for independence. The Basque people must also of Spain, Ibarretxe has stated that he looks for- realize that complete independence or autono- ward to working with the new leader. While he my may not be a feasible option, although sen- noted a “lack of communication” under Aznar’s timents for independence still remain strong. Popular Party, Ibarretxe believes “the era of dia- In time, a solution will be reached. The open- logue had been ushered in with Zapatero in ing of communication between the two parties power.” (“Ibarretxe Maintains...”) Ibarretxe also is only the first step. 105 REFERENCES

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