THE GEOPOLITICS OF U.S. – TURKEY BILATERAL RELATIONS, 1947-2006
A Thesis
Presented to
The Graduate Faculty of the University of Akron
In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
Mahmut Gokmen
May, 2008
THE GEOPOLITICS OF U.S. – TURKEY BILATERAL RELATIONS, 1947-2006
Mahmut Gokmen
Thesis
Approved: Accepted:
______Advisor Dean of the College Dr. Ghazi W. Falah Dr. Ronald F. Levant
______Committee Member Dean of the Graduate School Dr. Mark de Socio Dr. George R. Newkome
______Committee Member Date Ms. Deborah King
______Department Chair Dr. Robert B. Kent
ii
ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the geopolitical changes and continuity in bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S. from the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to the present. While the relationship was referred to as an “alliance” during the Cold War era, established with a common interest to contain the Soviet Union, the post-Cold War era posed important challenges and transformed the relations into a “strategic partnership”. The post-
September 11 era has put the viability of the strategic partnership under scrutiny, since relations between the two countries have been going through a crisis, especially under the impact of the war on Iraq waged by the U.S. from March 2003. Bilateral relations in this era have evolved from a “strategic partnership” to a “partnership for democracy and war on terrorism” in the greater Middle East.
A survey involving 288 participants from three Turkish universities (Sabanci
University, Gebze Institute of Technology and Istanbul University) was carried out to evaluate and analyze students’ opinions on U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations. This survey ascertains the wider geopolitical perspectives of Turkish university students regarding the relationship between the two countries. It attempts to give a ‘voice’ to those actually affected by policies emerging from this bilateral relationship, and thus opens another empirical and ‘grounded’ window on the students’ perceptions of bilateral situations. The survey asks a range of questions about the nature of U.S. – Turkey relations, current constraints and obstacles in the relationship, and the future prospects and strengths of the
iii
U.S. – Turkey ties. The survey results reveal an increased scrutiny of the viability of this strategic partnership, especially with the impact of the U.S. war in Iraq and its ramifications for Iraqi and Turkish Kurds.
Keywords: U.S. – Turkey relations; geopolitics; student opinions; Iraq War; Middle East
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The present thesis would never have come to fruition without the support, cooperation, insight and generosity of many persons in Ohio and in my native Turkey.
Like the bilateral relations which are here the focus, my wish to acknowledge all the help
I have received also forms an arc of gratitude between the United States and Turkey.
First and foremost, I would like to express my great thanks and heartfelt respect to my academic advisor, Dr. Ghazi-Walid Falah, for his untiring guidance in the completion of this study. Dr. Falah also deserves praise for his patience with me as a student and researcher, and for helping to shape me into the political geographer I am today. He is and remains an important mentor, who has taught me to love what research can mean and aspire to be in the discipline that is geography. I also would like to thank my thesis committee members, Dr. Mark de Socio, Mrs. Deborah King and Dr. Kwadwo Konadu-
Agyemang for their insights and encouragements. Dr. Konadu passed away on Friday,
July 27 after suffering an extended illness, but his vivid smiles have been and will always stay with me.
I am deeply indebted to all 288 participants from three Turkish universities
(Sabanci University, Gebze Institute of Technology and Istanbul University) in the survey in Turkey for their time and effort in answering the questionnaire. Without their cooperation and input of invaluable information, the collection of the data would have been almost impossible. I am very grateful to a number of university administrators at
v three universities in Turkey for assisting me with the survey. Without that help, it would have been extremely difficult to collect the data in the short time that was available.
In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Falah’s family for their hospitality and kindness during my stay in Akron. It was much appreciated. Finally, a special word of loving thanks to my parents, wife and her family for their devotion and support during both good and bad times, and the sacrifices they made due to my absence from Turkey while completing this thesis. They gave me the strength to persevere and complete this work that spans two continents.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES...... ix
LIST OF FIGURES ...... xi
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION...... 1
Objectives of the Thesis...... 2
Methodology...... 3
Geopolitics of Turkey ...... 5
II. LITERATURE REVIEW...... 8
Geopolitics and critical geopolitics...... 8
Classical Geopolitical Theories ...... 9
Cold War and Post-Cold War Geopolitics...... 13
III. THE GEOPOLITICS OF U.S. – TURKEY BILATERAL RELATIONS: CHANGES AND CONTINUITY ...... 16
U.S. – Turkey “Alliance” in the Cold War Period...... 16
The End of the Cold War: From "Alliance" to "Strategic Partnership"………….22
Post-September 11 Period: The War on Iraq and U.S. – Turkey Relations...... 26
IV. POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. – TURKEY BILATERAL RELATIONS: A SURVEY OF STUDENT OPINIONS...... 35
Demographic structure of the participants and the profile of the universities...... 35
The nature of U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations ...... 45
vii
Current constraints and obstacles in the U.S. – Turkey relations ...... 64
Future prospects and strengths of the U.S. – Turkey ties ...... 76
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS...... 90
Assessment of the survey results ...... 90
Concluding Summary: Prospects for the Future...... 94
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 97
APPENDICES ………………………………………………………………………… 103
APPENDIX A IRB APPROVAL ...... 104
APPENDIX B LETTER TO PARTICIPANTS...... 105
APPENDIX C SURVEY FORM…………………………………………….106
viii
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
4.1 Distribution of Qestionnaires...... 37
4.2 Gender profile of the participants ...... 39
4.3 Parent income profile of the participants in comparison to the average income of Turkish households ...... 41
4.4 Self – Described Political ideology profile of the participants ...... 42
4.5 Self – Described Religious belief profile of the participants ...... 43
4.6 Turkish university students’ perception of the U.S. – Turkey bilateral relation ...... 46
4.7 Gender differences in describing U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations...... 48
4.8 Political ideology factor on describing the relationship...... 49
4.9 Religious belief factor on describing the relationship...... 51
4.10 Student perception of the relationship by university...... 52
4.11 Parent income profile of the universities ...... 54
4.12 Student opinion toward Turkish Grand National Assembly’s decision...... 55
4.13 Gender factor on student opinions towards TGNA’s decision ...... 56
4.14 Parent income factor on student opinions towards TGNA’s decision ...... 58
4.15 Political ideology factor on student opinions towards TGNA’s decision...... 59
4.16 Religious belief factor on student opinions towards TGNA’s decision...... 61
4.17 Student opinions towards TGNA’s decision by university...... 63
ix
4.18 Turkish university students’ answers to the statement that U.S.’ 2003 military intervention in Iraq has been a significant turning point for U.S. – Turkey relations...... 67
4.19 Turkish university students’ answers to the statement that U.S.’ 2003 military intervention in Iraq has been a significant turning point for U.S. – Turkey relations by each university...... 69
4.20 University students’ ranking of current constraints and obstacles in the U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations ...... 71
4.21 Turkish university student’s answers to the statement that the presence of U.S. military installations in Turkey helps promote a better future for Turkey...... 78
4.22 Turkish university student’s answers to the statement that the presence of U.S. military installations in Turkey helps promote a better future for Turkey by each university...... 80
4.23 Turkish university students’ answers to the statement that aspects of the American way of life should be adopted in Turkey...... 82
4.24 Turkish university students’ answers to the statement that aspects of the American way of life should be adopted in Turkey by each university...... 83
4.25 Turkish university students’ answers to the statement that the style of democracy practiced in the United States would not be beneficial if adopted in Turkey...... 85
4.26 Turkish university students’ answers to the statement that the style of democracy practiced in the United States would not be beneficial if adopted in Turkey by each university...... 86
4.27 University students’ ranking of the areas that are most likely to be the future strength of U.S. – Turkey relations...... 87
x
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1.1 Geographical location of Turkey ...... 5
2.1 Geopolitical views of the world: Mackinder, Spykman, and Cohen...... 10
4.1 Geographical locations of the universities ...... 36
4.2 Age profile of the participants...... 40
4.3 Geographical locations of the U.S. military installations in Turkey...... 79
xi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study examines the influence of geographical factors on the dynamic web of political actions and reactions between the U.S. and Turkey in terms of their alliance and bilateral relations.
The time frame for the present study is July 1947 to the present. Its point of departure is U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations beginning with the ‘alliance’ agreement of
July 12, 1947, which implemented the Truman Doctrine. It was followed by the acceptance of Turkey’s application to join NATO in 1952. Since these events, Turkey has been a key strategic partner of the United States for decades, and a reliable ally through the years of the Cold War and beyond. During the Cold War, U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations were concentrated primarily on ‘containment’ of the U.S.S.R., (Turkey’s geographical and geopolitical significance for U.S.), and other areas such as strategic energy cooperation, security ties, regional stability, and the global war on terrorism. U.S.
– Turkey bilateral relations have been strained by the developments in the post-
September 11 world, especially after the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s rejection of the U.S. demand to use Turkish territory for toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq at the time (March 1, 2003). Nevertheless, the bilateral relations regained momentum steadily thereafter and mutual interests remain strong across a wide spectrum of issues.
1
Objectives of the Thesis
The aim of the present thesis is to analyze the geopolitical changes and continuity in bilateral relations between Turkey (as the regional partner) and the U.S. (as the global power) from the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to the present.
Regarding their intensity, pace and nature, it is possible to analyze the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Turkey by drawing a triangle of global change, regional crisis, and Turkish internal politics in three structurally different historical eras within the contemporary world geopolitical order: the Cold War era (1947-1989-91), the post-Cold
War era (1990-2001), and the post-September 11 era (2001-present). While the relationship was referred to as an “alliance” during the Cold War era, established with a common interest to contain the Soviet Union, the post-Cold War era posed important challenges and transformed the relations into a “strategic partnership”. The post-
September 11 era has put the viability of the strategic partnership under scrutiny, since relations between the two countries have been going through a crisis, especially under the impact of the war on Iraq waged by the U.S. from March 2003. Bilateral relations in this era have evolved from a “strategic partnership” to a “partnership for democracy and war on terrorism” in the greater Middle East. The present thesis is aimed at identifying and analyzing the geopolitical factors and dynamics behind this transformation in the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Turkey over three distinct periods of time.
2
Methodology
The study is built upon two sources of data. The first is a review of published data in research literature related to the topic. The second is the result of original, empirical field work, involving a survey conducted in three Turkish universities: Istanbul
University and Sabanci University in Istanbul, Turkey and Gebze Institute of Technology in Kocaeli, Turkey during December 2005 and January 2006.
A literature review was conducted: first, to search, analyze, and build the theoretical framework of U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations by evaluating it in terms of classical and contemporary geopolitical theories; and second, to analyze the changes and continuity in the bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S. by drawing the triangle of global change, regional crisis, and Turkish internal politics in three structurally different historical eras within the contemporary world geopolitical order: the Cold War era (1947-1989-91), the post-Cold War era (1990-2001), and the post-September 11 era (2001-present).
For each era, this study aims to provide a geographically unique comprehensive analysis of changes and continuity in bilateral relations of the U.S. and Turkey. The first two eras, the Cold War period and the post-Cold War period, provide the framework and background of subjects that were examined in the third era by explaining determinants, factors, changes, and continuity in the geopolitical structure of U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations in light of historical incidents.
The empirical data gathered through surveying 288 Turkish university students form the primary data of the study. The survey was carried out to evaluate and analyze Turkish university students’ opinions on U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations. Turkish university
3 students were selected as the target population for the survey because they are the future leaders of Turkey and they arguably have the capability to evaluate the U.S. - Turkey bilateral relations better than any other sector of Turkish society. In developing countries like Turkey, the public lacks a tradition of giving their opinion to survey takers, and most of the public is not literate enough to comprehend and respond to questions in an appropriate way. Therefore, Turkish university students were selected as the target population for the survey. Clearly, their opinion will reflect an educated, upwardly mobile and probably privileged segment of the Turkish population. This bias works in favor of the research by creating a population that is familiar with the issues at hand.
Global geo-strategic theories such as Mackinder’s Heartland Theory, Spykman’s
Rimland’s Theory, Cohen’s Shatterbelt/Gateway Theory, etc. are so preoccupied with the contest between superpowers that the geopolitical perspectives of the people of the regions are distorted or ignored altogether (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: 28). Therefore, the survey aimed to ascertain the wider geopolitical perspectives of Turkish university students regarding the relationship between the two countries and to give a ‘voice’ to those actually affected by policies emerging from this bilateral relationship. This creates an empirical and ‘grounded’ window on the students’ perceptions of bilateral situations.
The survey asks a range of questions about the nature of U.S. – Turkey relations, current constraints and obstacles in the relationship, and the future prospects and strengths of the
U.S. – Turkey ties.
The sampling was a convenience sample of students who were in the student union cafeteria. The students were notified of the survey by a sign set up in the area where the survey was conducted. This author conducted the survey in each university. At
4 the time the survey started, the participants received a letter that explained the survey.
The letter ensured that all subjects understand that participation is voluntary and they can withdraw at any time without penalty, and that their responses would remain confidential.
Geopolitics of Turkey
Turkey has several identities, one of which is Middle Eastern. Another is
Levantine, the countries bordering on the eastern Mediterranean Sea from Turkey to
Egypt. Located geopolitically and culturally at the conjuncture point where Europe and
Asia interface, Turkey has both similarities and contrasts with other Middle Eastern states
(Fig.1.1). Though its common historical legacy – its cultural and religious ties – is
Figure 1.1: Geographical location of Turkey
5 important in regard to situating Turkey in the Middle East, several other traits place it into a non-Middle Eastern context. As a kind of East-West hybrid polity and nation,
Turkey is especially interesting in terms of its location in world geopolitics. Turkey’s geographical location is the most dominant factor in political discourse about Turkey’s relation to the world around it.
The primary importance of Turkey for the United States also revolves around
Turkey’s geographical location. Turkey, in its geopolitical and geostrategic position, is in an influential location: a single glance at the map illustrates Turkey’s strategic importance and its high degree of relevance in a geopolitical context (Fig.1.1). As Fig.1.1 illustrates, Turkey’s relative location vis-à-vis: (1) the Middle East and the Caspian
Basin, which together have the most important oil and energy reserves in the world; (2) the Mediterranean Basin, which is at the intersection of important sea lines of communication; (3) the Black Sea Basin and the Turkish Straits (Bosphorus and
Dardanelles), which have always maintained their importance in history as routes of trade and communication; (4) the Balkans, which have undergone structural changes as the result of the break up of both the U.S.S.R. and the former Yugoslavia; and (5) the center of Caucasia, which has abundant natural resources. These factors underscore Turkey’s strategic position in several geopolitical contexts. Furthermore, Turkey is adjacent to most of today’s geopolitical hot spots in West Asia, such as Iraq, Iran, Lebenan and
Israel.
During the Cold-War era, U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations primarily revolved around the containment of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, reciprocal visits and shared issues started to increase, within the context of U.S. hegemonic interests and Turkey’s
6 increasing geopolitical, geo-cultural and geo-economic importance, with respect to its ties with the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Also, the strategic importance of Turkey for the U.S. has increased symbolically, with Turkey serving as the sole democratic and secular Muslim society within the Middle East. In recent years, especially after September 11, changes in domestic politics in the U.S. and Turkey have impacted the relationship between the two countries. With the shocking impact of the
September 11 events on the world geopolitical order, both in terms of global power contest and the recent authority crises in the Middle East, Turkey’s geopolitical importance for the U.S. has increased dramatically. However, the national interests of the
U.S. and Turkey began to differ as a result of the impact of September 11.
Turkey’s geopolitics is significant for Europe and the Middle East as illustrated by Turkey's membership in NATO, continued interest in joining the European Union despite contentious negotiations, and sponsorship of the recent Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative (NATO Alliance leaders meeting in Istanbul, Turkey in June 28-29, 2004).
Turkey officially began accession talks with the European Union on October 3, 2005.
This development will have a great impact on two significant aspects of the geopolitical status of Turkey: (1) Turkey will become increasingly important because of its function as a crossroads for energy supplies. Turkey is adjacent to the Middle East and Caspian
Basin oil and natural gas reserves. Turkey’s accession to the European Union could help secure access to these resources and their safe transportation into European countries; and
(2) Turkey’s accession would extend the European Union’s borders to countries in
Central and West Asia which are presently sources of tensions, and bring problems of the region higher onto the agenda of the European Union’s external relations.
7
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Geopolitics and critical geopolitics
Geopolitics is the study of the distribution, concentration and divisions of power and their influence on the conduct of world politics. In its original usage it referred to the impact on inter-state relations of the spatial disposition of continents and oceans and the distributions of natural and human resources. Today, however, the term also includes examination of all of the geographical assumptions, designations, and understandings that enter into the making of world politics (as in critical geopolitics) and how these change in concert with material conditions (historical geopolitics) (Agnew, 2003).
As O’Tuathail and Dalby (1998, 5) have emphasized, “Geopolitics saturates the everyday life of states and nations. Its sites of production are multiple and pervasive, both
‘high’ (like a national security memorandum) and ‘low’ (like the headline of a tabloid newspaper), visual (like the images that move states to act) and discursive (like the speeches that justify military actions), traditional (like religious motifs in foreign policy discourse) and postmodern (like information management and cyberwar).” The field of critical geopolitics, as defined by O’Tuathail and Dalby, investigates geopolitics as social, cultural and political practice, rather than as a “manifest and legible” reality of world politics (O’Tuathail and Dalby, 1998, 2). Critical geopolitics attempts to
8
“deconstruct” the structures and representations used by those in power to shape the way individuals understand international issues (Vujakovic, 1999, 45). Individuals’ perceptions of geopolitical issues are an important topic for geopolitical analysis.
Therefore, the empirical field work of this thesis consists of a survey involving 288 participants aimed at creating data that are usable to evaluate and analyze Turkish university students’ opinions on U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations. These students are the individuals whose social, cultural and political practices will impact the U.S. – Turkey relationship. As I have identified the target population as potential leaders and elites within Turkish society, this is a group whose practices will produce new geopolitical realities.
Classical Geopolitical Theories
Political geographers and international relations experts have made several attempts to devise global geopolitical models of the relationships between states. Some of those are Mackinder’s Heartland Theory (1904), Spykman’s Rimland Theory (1942), and
Cohen’s Shatter Belt/Gateway Theory (1973 and 2005). Arguably, as any model and theories, those classical geopolitical theories are open to criticism or revision.
Almost all discussions of global geopolitical perspectives begin with Halford
Mackinder. Mackinder (1904) described the heartland in geographical terms as “the northern part and the interior of Europe-Asia,” extending “from the Arctic coast down to the central deserts,” extending westward to “the broad isthmus between the Baltic and
Black Sea” (Fig. 2.1). The Heartland concept, Mackinder explained, was equivalent to
9 the territory of the Soviet Union. In 1919, Mackinder revised his theory to include
Eastern Europe and the theory became known as Mackinder’s Heartland Theory. As Fig.
2.1 indicates Turkey is situated immediately south of the pivot region. Based on this geographical view, Mackinder (1919) formulated his famous hypothesis:
“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island
Who rules the World-Island commands the World”
Figure 2.1: Geopolitical views of the world: Mackinder, Spykman, and Cohen. Source: Drysdale, A and Blake, G. The Middle East and North Africa: a political geography. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Page: 26
Despite criticism of the Mackinder’s geopolitical idea, American foreign policy makers treated Mackinder’s theory as valid and capable of materialization. This belief
10 persisted during most of the Cold War period. According to his last revision of the heartland map, Turkey is more or less at the border of the pivotal area and within the
Inner and Marginal Crescent. Taylor (1993) points out that Mackinder’s Heartland
Theory regarding the significance of the world-island and ‘the inevitability of an era of sea power versus land power conflict’ became the new world order. Mackinder’s two worlds finally came into being as the Cold War geopolitical world order. Turkey and
Greece were in the buffer zone for superpowers at that time. When the U.S. supported
Turkey and Greece the Cold War was firmly in place (Taylor, 1993).
Gearoid O’Tuathail (1996), one of the advocates of critical geopolitical theory, judges Mackinder’s vision to be ‘a triumphalism blind to its own precariousness’. He wrote that in interpreting the ‘end of geography’ as a diversion from the struggle for territorial expansion to the struggle for relative efficiency among imperial states,
Mackinder was oblivious to those who came to define it as the struggle for cultural and territorial independence.
In 1942, Nicholas Spykman proposed a theory that countered Mackinder’s
Heartland Theory. In his book The Geography of the Peace (1944) he argued that the critical geopolitical area of the globe was Mackinder’s inner crescent, which he renamed the “Rimland” (Fig. 2.1). He wrote that “The Mackinder dictum is false. If there is to be a slogan for the power politics of the Old World, it must be:
Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia
Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world”
During World War II, Spykman asserted that the United States must adopt policies that would promote American influence in the marginal crescent. In this case,
11
Western Europe and Turkey were buffer states for the U.S. in order to contain the
U.S.S.R. Another American geographer, D. W. Meinig, argued that some rimland states were inward-looking toward the heartland, and others outward-looking toward the oceans. Therefore, the preference of allies in the rimland could be a complicated matter, and the orientation of individual states might change through time (Drysdale and Blake,
1985: 27).
Saul Cohen used the term shatterbelt as roughly equivalent to the concept of the
Rimland. Cohen defines a shatterbelt as “a large, strategically located region that is occupied by a number of conflicting states and is caught between the conflicting interests of adjoining Great Powers” (Cohen, 1973: 251). Cohen saw the Middle East and
Southeast Asia as the primary shatterbelt regions (Fig. 2.1). Cohen modified his idea of which regions constituted the world’s shatterbelts several times. Cohen (2005) made the last modification of shatterbelts in his recent article in Eurasian Geography and
Economics titled “The Eurasian Convergence Zone: Gateway or Shatterbelt?”
Throughout the study of geopolitics, the Middle East has always been a region of strategic importance as it connects Eurasia and Africa. Whether in part of Mackinder’s
World Island or Spykman's Rimland, the Middle East has always been seen as a region of strategic importance. In Cohen's model, the Middle East is a shatterbelt where the maritime realm meets the continental realm. Where once it was a powerful region of great empires and an important trade region, in more recent times the Middle East found itself susceptible to foreign influence in the form of colonial domination and as a pawn in an international chess match between the Soviet Union and the United States. The position of the region will always be important geographically. It is unclear if the Middle
12
East will be able to overcome its economic and social difficulties to reestablish itself as an important region of trade and culture or if it will continue to be a shatterbelt caught between colliding external cultural and political forces.
Cold War and Post-Cold War Geopolitics
John Agnew (2003) identifies three discourses in the evolution of geopolitical thought from the early 19th century until the end of the Cold War: civilizational geopolitics, naturalized geopolitics, and the ‘ideological geopolitics’ of the Cold War years, when the world was divided in line with the ideological leanings of the U.S. as capitalist and former U.S.S.R. as communist (Agnew, 2003).
In a divided world, the dominant goal of U.S. foreign policy from the late 1940s to the end of the Cold War was to contain Soviet power within the geographical boundaries established at the end of World War II. Containing Soviet power was the subject of George F. Kennan’s famous 1947 article in Foreign Affairs, “The Sources of
Soviet Conduct.” Kennan argued that, for historical and ideological reasons, the Soviet
Union would seek to expand its political control beyond the immediate postwar geographical boundaries. He urged the U.S. to respond with a policy of “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment.” He called for “the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy” (Kennan, 1947).
Under the inspiration of the Containment Theory, U.S. presidential administrations started to form political and military alliances around the Soviet territory and the sphere
13 of Soviet influence. In this context, as Erickson (2004) states, Turkey was a vital Cold
War ally in the implementation of ‘containment’ and deterrence against the Soviet Union during peacetime.
Turkey and Greece became crucially important for the strategy of containment.
Support for Turkey and Greece was what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. On
12 March 1947, U.S. President Harry Truman said that the U.S. must help ‘free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures’ and pledged military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. The Truman Doctrine established the groundwork for the U.S. Cold War with the Soviet Union (Agnew, 1993).
O’Loughlin (1989) examines similar bilateral relations between the superpowers
(U.S. and Soviet Union) and two African countries (Somalia and Ethiopia). He indicates that the Third World includes some of the most unstable regimes, anxious to acquire protection and aid from regional and global allies. Soviet attention to Third World politics was mainly focused on ‘the Arc of Crisis’ for the most basic of reasons: it contains a long border with one of the world’s most unstable regions, from Turkey to
Afghanistan.
As emphasized in many studies, the strategy of containment of the Soviet Union was one of the dimensions of U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations during the Cold War years.
Due to Turkey’s geographical location, population size, and capabilities, such as the size of its military forces and its economic strength, U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations have been multi-dimensional from the inception of the bilateral relations to the present. As
Cohen notes, American strategists tend to see Turkey either as ‘a passive bridge or forward point’ for NATO and the West to the Middle East, to Transcaucasus and Central
14
Asia (Cohen, 2004). Turkey is a potential regional hegemon influencing the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. This uniqueness of Turkey’s geopolitics forged a solid relationship between the militaries of the U.S. and Turkey (Erickson, 2004).
Agnew argues that the post-Cold War geopolitical order is still organized geographically. The Cold War geographical structure of U.S., Soviet Union, and Third
World no longer exists (Agnew, 2003). The collapse of the Soviet Union has introduced some modifications within Cohen’s Shatterbelt and Gateway regions (Cohen, 1999). As
Falah predicted in 1993, when the remnants of the collapse of the Soviet Union and breakup of Yugoslavia was underway, Turkey is key to the Middle East geographically, but Turkey has been becoming more Europe-oriented within the post-Cold War geopolitical order. Turkey’s integration into Europe will be consolidated by future developments (Falah, 1993).
In the Post-Cold War geopolitical order, Turkey became a key country in the future geopolitical formation of the new Caucasus and Central Asian states (Cohen,
1999). This is largely because the unexploited oil fields of Central Asia have become a major geo-strategic concern in post-Cold War geopolitics (Dodds, 2003). Despite the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of communism, there was a strong basis for strategic cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey. Turkey’s geographical location and pro-
Western identity are factors supporting strategic cooperation (Kirisci, 2001). In addition, the post-Cold War geopolitics forced Turkey to initiate a new activism in the Balkans,
Middle East, Caucasus, and Central Asia that was congruent with American interest
(Yavuz, 1998).
15
CHAPTER III
THE GEOPOLITICS OF U.S. – TURKEY BILATERAL RELATIONS:
CHANGES AND CONTINIUTY
U.S. – Turkey “Alliance” in the Cold War Period
U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations mirror, in part, changes in the distribution of global power and global geopolitical structures. From this vantage point, Turkey acquired great importance for the U.S. in the Cold War (1947 to early 1990s) as long as the Soviet
Union and its power was intact.
The origins of the U.S. - Turkey alliance appear to contradict the prominent political scientist Kalevi Holsti’s (1967: 111) argument that “geographic conditions do not appear to play a significant role in alliance making”. As explained ealier, Turkey’s strategic position was its main asset and was the major reason for the U.S. – Turkey alliance during the Cold War period and beyond. The U.S. alliance with Turkey was of particular significance and complexity because of geography. As Spykman (1944: 41) observed, “Geography is the most fundamental factor in foreign policy because it is the most permanent.”
The end of the Second World War marked a watershed in Turkish – Soviet relations as well as in U.S. – Soviet relations. Towards the end of the war, on March 19,
1945, the Soviet Union gave notice to Turkey of its intention to abrogate the 1925 Treaty
16 of Friendship and Non-Aggression signed between them, and on June 7, 1945 it claimed rights to some eastern provinces of Turkey (Kars, Ardahan, and Batum) as well as rights to controlling passage through the Straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles) by establishing a base there. Turkey’s objective to contain the imminent Soviet threat was coupled with a similar concern of the U.S., which feared Soviet expansion into the Middle East and the
Mediterranean, where oil was the most important strategic concern of the U.S. In this respect, Turkey’s geopolitical location was crucial for the containment of such ideological and territorial expansion. As a result, U.S. military analysts reached the conclusion that Turkey was “the most important military factor in the Eastern
Mediterranean and the Middle East” and that “the Soviet expansion would have a serious impact on the vital interests of the U.S.” (Campany, 1986:80).
With the end of World War II, a new era in the contemporary geopolitical order emerged. The emergent structure of the Cold War was one of bipolarity, in which the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. occupied opposing poles of the ideologically separated international system. In this structure of the contemporary geopolitical order, relations between countries were determined mostly under the shadow of this bipolarity.
Therefore, especially the smaller countries in the geopolitical order had to side either with the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., and had various reasons for their choice (Kirisci, 2001).
For Turkey, there were three reasons to set up close relations with the U.S.: (1)
Turkey felt insecure in the face of the emerging expansion of the U.S.S.R. Soviet political leaders had unilaterally annulled the Treaty of Friendship Pact and Non-
Aggression that was signed in 1925; had claimed a revision in the Montreux Agreement for the sake of the states which had coasts on the Black Sea and demanded some territory
17 in East Anatolia (Uslu, 2000: 204). This Soviet threat caused Turkish political leaders to call for American military and diplomatic support; (2) Turkey needed to gain economic and military aid from the U.S. It is a generally known fact, that developing countries feel the need to improve their military and defense capabilities by setting up close relations with a developed country. Turkey was in need of both economic and military aid because its economy was so sensitive to fluctuations, and its critical geographical position made it necessary for Turkey to have enough money to develop and buy weapons for defense in
Cold War conditions. In this endeavor, Turkey started to move closer to the U.S. to gain that aid. For this reason, Turkey sent nearly four thousand soldiers to the Korean war of
1950-4 to help the American forces and showed an ardent desire to participate in NATO and obtain the aid provided by the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan (Sander, 2005:
231-234); and (3) Turkey’s quest for participation in the Western bloc was related not only to its security concerns, but also to its domestic ideological considerations. Turkey’s coalition with a democratic and secular power would propagate the westernization process of Turkey, which meant that Turkey’s identification with the western world would be ratified by those relations developed with the U.S.
In this context, Turkey’s relations with the U.S. have been hierarchical and uneven one in which Turkey as the weaker partner generally took positions in accordance with U.S. national interests. However, sometimes Turkey has deviated from the
American path, and therefore immediately faced the threat of being left alone in the geopolitical system, and in dealing with the Soviet threat. In light of this fact, the Cold
War years of the U.S. – Turkey relations are divided into three periods: i) 1950-1964, ii)
1964-1980s, iii) 1980s-1991.
18
During the period of 1950-1964, U.S. – Turkey relations enjoyed its heyday because of Turkey’s enthusiasm in following American policies, considering its immediate security situation in the face of the Soviet threat, and the Turkish Democratic
Party’s plan to obtain economic aid for the projects to be implemented in reforming the domestic structure of the country. Thus, for example, Turkey opted to follow the U.S. in
the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 rather than Britain, and gave unconditional support to the
Eisenhower Doctrine of the U.S., which envisioned the protection of Middle Eastern
countries against communist truculence and destructiveness (Documents on International
Affairs, 1951: 65). Despite the fact that this led Turkey to isolation within the region,
Turkey continued to follow the path of the U.S. by complying with the adaptation of its
defense plans and army to the American model proposed by the American experts, even
though this could jeopardize the sovereignty of the country (Uslu, 2000: 214-5). Uslu
asserts that U.S. reluctance to donate stability funds to redress the Turkish balance of
payments was the most serious problem in U.S. – Turkey relations during the 1950s
(Uslu, 2000: 215).
The 27 May 1960 coup in Turkey and the Cuban Missile crisis could not paralyze
the relations (Kirisci, 2000; Uslu, 2000; Yavuz, 1998). However, in the period 1964-
1980, U.S. – Turkey relations were shaken for a number of reasons. In the early years of
this period, the Turkish side posed a number of criticisms. First, the dismantling of the
Jupiter missiles was thought to decrease the strategic importance of Turkey in the eyes of
the West and would create a security vacuum in Turkish defenses (Kirisci, 2000: 73).
Second, the insufficiency of American military aid deteriorated bilateral relations (Uslu,
2000: 218). Third, the U.S. remained silent about the events in Cyprus and blocked
19
Turkish intervention in the island (Uslu, 2000: 218). Furthermore, President Johnson sent a letter to the Turkish government that implied that the U.S. would not give support if there were to be a Soviet attack on Turkey (Yavuz, 1998: 28-30). This, in particular paved the way for a wave of anti-American movements in Turkey, which was also supported by the greater freedoms of expression brought about by the 1961 Constitution
(Yavuz, 1998: 32-35). Turkey tried to calm the rise of internal criticism by withdrawal from the Multilateral Forces, forbidding the flights of American U-2s over Turkish airspace, making alterations in applications of the service files of American staff in
Turkish lands, giving permission to use the Incirlik base only for NATO, and reconsidering the bilateral agreements that were signed with the U.S. (Uslu, 2000: 216).
Moreover, Turkish leaders paid extensive visits to the countries of the Eastern bloc and signed economic agreements with them (Kirisci, 2000: 82). Furthermore, Turkey began to differ on some issues with the U.S. in the UN and gave support to the Third World and
Arab countries so it would have their support, especially on the Cyprus issue.
Nevertheless, the U.S. acted cautiously and kept the intensity of disagreements low, due to Turkish loyalty to their NATO commitments, and their permission for use of the bases.
In 1969, the U.S. blamed Turkey for producing opium that was consumed by
American youth; and the U.S. pressed Turkish political leaders to cease the planting of poppies (Kirisci, 2000: 78). This was the beginning of a problematic era in the relations.
The inception of the leftist groups’ terrorist activities targeting Americans, and the
Turkish ban on use of the Incirlik base, were additional factors that worsened relations.
Moreover, the military note of March 12th, 1971 caused the relations to further deteriorate
(Yavuz, 1998: 32). The application of martial law stopped the leftist groups’ terrorist
20 activities against American staff and the planting of the poppy. Yet, the Ecevit government’s rearrangement of the decision of poppy planting, and the breakout of the
Cyprus crisis in 1974, brought bilateral relations to a low point. The U.S. imposed an embargo on Turkey, and kept it in force until it realized the importance of Turkey as the most important ally against the Soviet Union in the face of the end of detente with the
Soviet intervention into Afghanistan. Moreover, Turkey’s importance grew further in the eyes of the U.S. with an Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran. These developments culminated with the normalization, at last, of the bilateral relations in the 1980s.
In the 1980s, relations followed the same path on which they were built and were molded by the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) of 29 March
1980 (Kirisci, 2001). The ratification of the signature of the agreement by the diverse political groups in Turkey, and Turkey’s abrogation of its opposition to NATO membership for Greece, indicated Turkey’s new enthusiasm in developing relations with the U.S. Although there were a number of reasons for Turkey to be dissatisfied with its relations with the U.S., it still insisted on carrying on those relations. The problems were mainly related to the DECA’s application, the Armenian problem, the Cyprus issues between Turkey and Greece, and the insufficiency of U.S. support in redressing Turkish economic problems.
From the American standpoint, good relations with Turkey stemmed from
Turkey’s rapprochement with Israel, and Ozal’s desire to reform the Turkish economy along the line of the American economic model of the time (neo-liberalism), and the opening of the Turkish economy to American firms, were the basis of U.S. – Turkey relations in the 1980s. Furthermore, Turkey’s geopolitical importance to the U.S. in
21 empowering its hand in the Middle East, Turkey’s block to Soviet expansionism in the neighboring region, and locking Soviet sea power in the Black Sea, which tipped the
Eastern Mediterranean balance to the West, triggered U.S. enthusiasm for improving relations with Turkey. Moreover, the Iranian Islamic Revolution, the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan, and uncertainties in the Middle Eastern countries rendered it essential to develop relations with Turkey (Uslu, 2000: 219).
The End of the Cold War: From “Alliance” to “Strategic Partnership”
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the significance of Turkey’s geopolitical location has diminished and in order to regain its importance in the eyes of the U.S.,
Turkey shifted its foreign policy toward playing a larger role in regional politics. This shift ultimately coincided with the U.S. interests in the region and the broader U.S. global
‘war on terror’ and its fallout in West Asia. This explains why Turkey forged good relations with Israel in the 1990s (Kirisci, 2000: 73), and has deepened them over the past decade. U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations are a function of Turkish engagement in the politics of its region: in effect, how can Turkey pursue its own interests while serving those of Washington? Questions of petro-politics in West Asia and the political economy of petroleum access and control in Central Asia play a major role in this connection.
Direct Israeli involvement in Iraqi Kurdistan and the building of its autonomy since 2003 are perhaps other factors causing potential friction between Ankara on one side and Tel
Aviv and Washington on the other.
22
During the post-Cold War era, the U.S. – Turkey relationship evolved under new geopolitical conditions, namely a new World Order. The end of the Cold War, marked by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, opened another phase in U.S. – Turkey relations.
The basic nature of this new relationship can be defined as extended cooperation in the political field, an increase in diplomatic consultations, and an emphasis on enhanced economic partnership, in compensation for the decreasing emphasis on security and defense-related matters.
Within this new structure of contemporary geopolitical order, U.S. – Turkey relations were conducted around those rules of the ‘new world order’ (Bush, 1999). As
Kirisci pointed out, in the post-Cold War era, both U.S. and Turkey were in agreement to advance democratic, secular and pro-Western regimes in the Middle East, and the prevention of the rejuvenation of the Russian/Soviet Empire (Kirisci, 2000: 73).
One may think that at the end of the Cold War, Turkey found itself in a safer situation and no longer exposed to military threat from the former U.S.S.R. The same is true for the U.S. Thus follows the fact, that Turkey may have now lost its former geopolitical importance, especially in the eyes of the U.S. Therefore, Turkey issued a policy that ‘siding with the winner was always advantageous’;1 and it tried to stage its
geopolitical importance to the Western interest by blending its regional identities with
Westernism. Hence, Turkey initiated a new activism in the Balkans, the Middle East, the
Caucasus and Central Asia, that was congruent with American interest (Yavuz, 1998: 19-
41).
Since Turkey did not want to be isolated in the region, the U.S. felt the need to
strategically intervene in the regions neighboring Turkey, for the application of the new
1 New York Times, 13 March 1991 23 world order. The relations between Turkey and the U.S. acquired momentum and depth with the end of the Cold War. Thus, Turkey and U.S. co-acted in the Middle East,
Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Central Asia.
The first Iraqi crisis was the earliest indication of the close relations between
Turkey and the U.S. in this new Post-Cold War ear. Turkey gave great support to the U.S. in the Iraqi crisis. Although Turkish troops did not engage the Iraqi military, Turkey nonetheless served the coalition in two important ways. First, it massed an estimated
100,000 troops along its 240-kilometer border with Iraq, thus forcing the Iraqis to commit an equivalent force. This deployment caused Iraq concern, as it feared that the coalition forces would initiate a second front in the North. Second, the Turkish government allowed the U.S. to use bases (principally the Incirlik air base in southeastern Turkey) to bomb targets in northern Iraq during the Gulf War (Bahceli, 1994: 435).
Turkey was accordant with the U.S. in the Middle Eastern peace process.
President Turgut Ozal also actively sought to participate in the Madrid peace process, and had already advocated the idea of building water pipelines from Turkey across the
Middle East, as a project to help promote peace in the area (Kirisci, 1998: 65). Although
Turkey was not invited to the Madrid talks, it did later take, with U.S. support and urging, an active part in the multilateral talks' working groups.
Turkey began to develop relations with Israel, especially after the September 1993
Israel – Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreement (Altunisik, 2000: 172-191).
Since then this relationship has expanded considerably and clearly received active U.S. support, including U.S. participation in the first joint naval exercise between Israel and
Turkey in January 1998. The U.S. did object, though, to certain aspects of Israeli-Turkish
24 military cooperation, particularly in the area of anti-missile technology (Kirisci, 1998:
68).
Turkey and the U.S. were also in agreement regarding pipelines for the distribution of Caspian oil and gas to the world markets. The Americans have advocated multiple routes for pipelines including one from Baku across Turkey, to its oil terminal at Ceyhan on the Mediterranean. The Turkish government has supported this route with much greater single-mindedness, irrespective of commercial or economic factors, and has felt its U.S. counterpart has not sufficiently pressured oil companies to do the same (Kirisci,
1998: 75). Nevertheless American decision makers have still repeatedly expressed public support for the Baku-Ceyhan route, and clearly see this project as one to enhance
Turkey's ties with the West, boosting its economy and improving its stability.
Although the attitude of the U.S. on Kurdish issues that supported political solutions, (such as official recognition of the Kurds' ethnic, cultural and linguistic identity), and U.S policy on northern Iraq's status were creating problems for Turkey, such as triggering Turkish ‘Sevres phobia’ (Zanger, 2002), U.S. – Turkey relations went smoothly on high political issues, and were along the same line in the realm of economic and other low-level political issues through the 1990s. The election of the Democratic
Party (DP), and its liberal internationalist attitude towards world politics, prevented the inflammation of the disagreements in U.S. – Turkey relations that would have been caused by American direct involvement in the Middle East and the Caucasus. The relations were molded around the concepts of democracy and human rights. However, it is hard to say that the U.S. government put pressure on Turkey to increase its democracy
25 and human rights level, which played a considerable role in the well-being of the relations.
Post-September 11 Period: The War on Iraq and U.S. – Turkey Relations
After September 11, 2001 U.S. - Turkey bilateral relations were shaped and
reshaped by the internal politics of Turkey, where there were conflicting views between
various political parties and elites, and within the Turkish public and differing social
strata of that public; between those who want Turkey to shift toward American and
Western countries, with full integration into the EU and all that may entail or portend,
and others who see Turkey as more of a Muslim and a Middle Eastern country with its
own heritage and interests that are national and regional. This domestic political complex
is impacted by foreign-policy factors such as the question of Kurdistan and the Kurdish
minority in Turkey (a regional majority in some provinces in eastern Turkey), as they
arise from the continuing occupation of Iraq. That is further compounded by the rejection
of the American presence in Iraq by a large segment of the Turkish population and some
Turkish political elites. Proponents in Turkey of a kind of pan-Turkic unity of peoples
stretching far into Central Asia and led by Turkey is another voice calling for greater
Turkish autonomy in a kind of ‘Turkic’ rather than Turkish nationalism.
Nationalist discourses may call for greater Turkish opposition to Israeli policies in
the name of Muslim unity, greater criticism of U.S. policy in the region in the name of
Turkish-Arab solidarity, and greater Turkish influence in Central Asia in the name of
pan-Turkic geopolitical aims. Religious fundamentalism in Turkey calls for a
26 preservation of and return to more Islamic values. Intellectual discourses call for a struggle against a new ‘Orientalism’ and demonizing of Islamic belief and practice by various elites in Europe and North America. All this stands in conflict with
Washington’s primary strategic and economic interests as perceived by the governing political and corporate elites in the U.S.
The transition of the American government from Democrats to Republicans is a vital point in understanding U.S. – Turkey relations in the post-September 11 world. The election of G.W. Bush as the American president brought a government that was constituted mostly of neo-conservatives (Insel, 2003: 10). The Clinton government was an interregnum between the preceding and following presidencies, whose leaders shared the same ideals. During the presidencies of R. Reagan, of G. Bush, and of G.W. Bush, the same politics have been pursued. The so-called PNAC, which was established in 1997
(Project for New American Century) was pursued by the ‘inner group’ in the government, and is the guide for the current foreign affairs of the U.S.2 The core of this project is U.S.
leadership in world affairs; and its emphasis is on security matters and military power:
As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world’s most prominent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievement of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests? [What we require is] a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities. Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to
2 For more information, http://www.pnac.info/ 27
shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of the past century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership.3
This project is claimed by a powerful group in the current government to be in the
interest of U.S. citizens. The attitude of this group is hegemonic, and it tends to disrespect
international law in the face of an insecure world for the U.S., and the interests and
choices of other countries and the voice of the international community are by-passed. In
this context, Turkey’s relations with the U.S. have become strained, due to the U.S. desire
to act unilaterally and disregard the Turkish interests and priorities. Although Turkey
regards the developments that have taken place in Northern Iraq with concern, U.S.
policymakers usually tend to disregard the warnings of Turkish government officials and
figures. Moreover, there are other points of open friction, such as the method of solving
the problems in the region and the Palestinian problem in U.S. – Turkey relations at the
regional level, which now are widening the gap between two the countries.
The Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP)’s ascent to power, after the
November 3, 2002 election, is important in understanding U.S. – Turkey relations in the
post-September 11 world. The impact of the JDP’s vision on relations with the U.S. is
generally evaluated as negative. Many have criticized the JDP for not giving support in
the Iraq war. However, the opposition party - Republican People’s Party (RPP)-, and the
army, which have an enormous impact in the formation of the foreign policy options, also
rejected giving support to the U.S. in the Iraq war. This moderated the reactions directed
against the JDP’s Iraq war policies. Nevertheless, U.S. – Turkey relations have been
damaged because of the JDP’s position in Turkish politics. As a peripheral party, JDP’s
3 The Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, September 2000. 28 ties with foreign interest groups and lobbies are weak and it is closer to society’s periphery than to the core or the center of politics, which has been occupied by civil bureaucrats and the military, which have strong ties with the international pressure groups (Pipes, 2003). This core, which has dominated Turkish politics for a long time, has played an important role in developing close relations with the Western countries, especially with U.S. In opposition to the center’s close relations with the U.S., JDP’s concern for the Islamic world and EU membership is higher than the core’s. In other words, the JDP did not want to cause Turkey’s prestige to decrease in the eyes of the
Muslim countries -- as a result of the pressure coming from a party base, which is comprised of Islamists -- by giving support to the U.S. in the Iraq war. Because the
Islamic world (at least as regards the public’s conception) viewed the American action in
Iraq as a direct assault on Islamic civilization, it was impossible to accept the war as legitimate. If Turkey had given support to the U.S., it would probably have been excluded from the Islamic world; and it would have lost its ties with the Middle East.
Turkey’s attitude in the Iraq war was appreciated by the E.U., although there was a divide in E.U. over the issue of giving support to the U.S. Despite the fact that it is only a small possibility, the opportunity of E.U. membership would have been lost if Turkey had insisted on siding with the U.S. in the war. The current developments in Turkey –
E.U. relations show that Turkey’s importance increased in the eyes of the E.U., in regard to strategy, its commitment to the European values of democracy, human rights and rule of law, and with attitudes during the war. Nevertheless, the Turkish government has acted ambiguously, as a result of its legitimacy problem in the arena of domestic politics, and the insistent pressure from the U.S. For instance, President Tayyip Erdogan, who blamed
29
Israel for pursuing state terrorism after the Israeli forces murdered Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, and for declining the Israeli government’s appeal for a meeting, paid a two-day visit to
Israel on 2 – 4 May 2005, which was partly aimed at placating the U.S. government. 4
Turkey has its own projection, neo-Ottomanism, in the region, which is autonomous from U.S. and Israel’s priorities, and has had the highest potential for damaging U.S. – Turkey relations. This project simply envisions the revival of relations with ex-Ottoman communities, and creates a sphere of influence in the region. It was first voiced by the late Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, in the post-Cold War era, in an environment which was pushing Turkey to develop relations with its co-religionists in the
Balkans, Caucasus, North Africa, and the Middle East and Turkic communities in Central
Asia. However, this project failed to be implemented under Ozal’s rule, and then was abandoned by the subsequent governments. They had a different perception for the
Turkish identity, (which is as a secular Western country), and role (which seeks to join with the U.S. and Israel in the region, regardless of the reactions of the public and other
neighboring states there. The erosion of the Motherland Party (MP)’s conservative identity, (which projected such foreign policy views) after Mesut Yilmaz (the new party leader after Ozal) was elected the President of the Turkish Republic, the ‘postmodern’ coup by the army and anti-Islamist civil society organizations (which toppled the Islamist
Welfare Party and put pressure on Islamist groups), and subsequently the establishment of government by the coalition- constituted by Third World nationalist (Democratic
Leftist Party), liberal-right (Motherland Party under Mesut Yilmaz), and extreme- nationalist (Nationalist Movement Party)- paved the way for the abandonment of neo-
Ottomanist strategy in foreign policy. However, this project has been revived after the
4 Economist (U.S.) May 10, 2005. Erdogan’s travels: Turkey and the Middle East. 30 election of the Islamist JDP. This pendulum in foreign policy behavior reflects the ideological struggle within domestic politics. The crisis of Kemalism, (the state ideology of the Turkish state), and the rise of Islamist groups with the urbanization of periphery since the 1960s, that tend to pursue politics on the basis of Muslim identity and Ottoman past, has transformed the social norms and state identity. Therefore, today in Turkish foreign policy, the JDP moves in a zigzag pattern, as a result of its Islamist-Ottomanist identity, internal pressures coming from Westernist-secular elites, and the U.S. through its embassy in Ankara, and the U.S. media. U.S. – Turkey relations will not be as they have been in the past as long as the U.S. pursues an offensive foreign policy in the region, and the Turkish government is represented by JDP (with nearly 60% of electoral support), which continues its opposition to the Bush government’s foreign policy directives to Turkey.
In this new muddied environment, the U.S. – Turkey relations were tested first in
Afghanistan. The U.S. expected Turkey to be involved in the Afghanistan operation, and expected that due to its NATO membership, Turkey would provide NATO with access to airspace and bases, and would share the intelligence it had gathered over many years in
Afghanistan as a sponsor of the Northern Alliance. Second, the U.S. envisioned that
Turkey would share what it learned while fighting the Kurdish groups in the 1980s and
1990s in southeast Turkey. The terrain there is similar to Afghanistan, and the tactics and weaponry of the Kurds are similar to those of the Taliban (Kinzer, 2001). Thirdly, Turkey could be involved if a peacekeeping force were needed in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Turkey, with historical and cultural ties with Afghanistan, is also a Muslim country. That could make the American control legitimate in the neighboring Islamic countries.
31
However, Iran was opposed to Turkey’s involvement in Afghanistan, as it was always concerned about Turkey’s influence in the region.
Turkey, especially since the November 3, 2002 election, has begun to pursue a foreign policy that is in agreement with opinion of the masses and the political and corporate elites. This gives priority to global peace and values in a regional and global context. Therefore, Turkey re-activated its potential role in its region by strengthening the ties with Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East. An example of this is the NATO and
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) summits held in Turkey in 2004.5
Moreover, Turkey’s opening of its bases to international powers for supporting the re- structuring of Iraq under the framework of UN decisions shows that Turkey is prepared for the promotion of peace in the region.6 This might also play a positive role in U.S. –
Turkey relations in the context of Iraq and the war there. Turkey gave support to the U.S.
in this frame of promoting peace and security both in a regional and global context. On
the other hand, Turkey’s support for the U.S. has contributed strategically and
ideologically to American plans that were put into practice in the post-September 11
world. 7
The second phase in the post-September 11 world important for U.S. – Turkey
relations was the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. The U.S. invasion and occupation
of Iraq differed from Afghanistan war in many respects. First, from the Turkish view
point, there was no legitimate reason for the U.S. to attack Iraq. For this reason, the U.S. could not secure Turkish support for its invasion. Second, the invasion of Iraq had a
deeper reason than the intervention in Afghanistan. The U.S. invasion of Iraq, promoted
5 Radikal, June 26, 2003. 6 Zaman, June 26, 2003. 7 Yenisafak, September 26, 2001. 32 as the second step in Bush government’s global project, embodied the U.S. government’s real intention of establishing a unilaterally hegemonic order. For this reason, many states took a skeptical position about the U.S., and the global civil society, through massive protests and demonstrations, raised its criticism on the illegitimacy of the Iraqi invasion.
Third, the invasion of Iraq has been viewed with skepticism by Turkish officials in light of Turkey’s Kurdish problem and the spread of Islamist politics (especially among the
Army and state diplomats) inside Turkey. Fourth, the invasion of Iraq obstructs neo-
Ottomanist foreign policy in the region via the huge U.S. presence next to Turkey.
Turkey, within this context, felt the greatest pressure. Through criticism and threats, the domestic and the international groups tried to persuade the Justice and
Development Party (JDP) government, but the parliament that was constituted by the JDP and Republican People’s Party (RPP) declined the U.S. demand to use Turkish military bases for opening a front from the north to Iraq. The Turkish army was also reluctant to open military bases to the U.S. The past lessons from the first Iraqi crisis and U.S. hegemonic attitude, and Turkey’s potential economic loss, were the factors in the refusal of the U.S. demand. However, this situation shook U.S. – Turkey relations.
Nevertheless, the Turkish government started an initiative that searched for a peaceful solution to the Iraqi crisis. This was praised in the majority of European capitals. Greece's foreign minister wanted to attend the Istanbul summit, dubbed the
‘Regional Initiative on Iraq’, yet he was politely turned away. The German foreign minister Joschka Fischer visited Turkey during the summit and expressed his sympathies, and the French conveyed their congratulations. During Erdogan's talks with Russian officials, and his visit (January 7 – 11, 2003) to China, both states openly supported the
33
JDP's attempts to avert war (Caliskan and Taksin, 2003). Besides the Istanbul summit, the Turkish government paid visits to neighboring countries; and the former foreign minister Abdullah Gul (the new president) attended the summits held in Riyadh and
Tehran. He gave the message of peace in the region and voiced a reform in the Islamic world to realize a transmission to policies that are democratic, respectful of human rights, and aim to improve the living conditions of their citizens.
After Iraq, the U.S. has begun to turn its attention to Iran. Designating Iran as the next target was meaningful if the U.S. global operation of ‘systemic transformation’ in the post-September 11 world is taken into account (Baran, 2003). First of all, Iran has been effectively excluded from the international system since the revolution in 1979. On the other hand, Iran is a direct threat, by standing for so long without any dependence toward the international community and engaged in policies of opposition and defiance to it, as in the current row over nuclear power. Iran with nuclear weapons would be a fundamental challenge to U.S. plans in the region. Besides, Iran’s autonomy might provoke sympathy for an ‘Iranian model’ of government in other countries of the region.
Former foreign minister Gul’s call for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the Tehran summit was meaningful, in connection with the picture of Iran in American’s
Greater Middle East project.
34
CHAPTER IV
POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. – TURKEY BILATERAL RELATIONS:
A SURVEY OF STUDENT OPINIONS
Demographic structure of the participants and the profile of the universities
Students at three universities participated in this survey (Table 4.1 and Fig. 4.1).
A total of 288 questionnaires were distributed among these universities: Sabanci
University, Gebze Institute of Technology and Istanbul University. They were chosen for two reasons: First, these universities represent a cross-section of sentiments in Turkey concerning politics and internal relations. Second, Istanbul and Kocaeli provinces are important cultural, historical and industrial centers of Turkey and contain almost 20 % of
Turkey’s overall population. The inhabitants of these two provinces are mostly internal migrants from many cities in Turkey. The universities in these provinces receive a significant number of students from different regions of Turkey and most of the students are temporary residents of these provinces. Arguably, the opinions of these students may represent overall Turkish public opinions on U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations.
Sabanci University represents the liberal-western-leaning group which wants
Turkey to shift toward American and Western countries and favors full integration into the European Union and all that may entail or portend. Sabancı University is a private
35 research institution located in Istanbul, Turkey. Founded in 1994, it is the only college in
Turkey that offers a liberal arts undergraduate curriculum. Sabanci University is a small and highly focused university with 2,734 undergraduates and 556 graduates, maintaining a strong emphasis on social and natural sciences.
Figure 4.1: Geographical locations of the universities
Undergraduate students enroll in Sabanci University after a rigorous screening in
Turkey's annual nationwide Student Selection Examination (OSS), which is comprised of
a verbal and a quantitative section. Based on Sabanci University student selection and
placement success within the last four OSS Examinations, 30% of Sabanci University's
students have been selected from the top 1000 candidates nationwide8.
8 For more information, http://www.sabanciuniv.edu/eng/ 36
Gebze Technology Institute represents the rightist-center group who see Turkey on the crossroad between West and East. Gebze Technology Institute was established to provide graduate programs. Currently, there are approximately 1500 MA/MS and Ph.D. students studying at GIT in the departments of Environmental Engineering, Computer
Engineering, Electronics Engineering, Materials Science and Engineering, Energy
Systems, Geodesy and Photogrametrics, Architecture, City and Regional Planning,
Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Mathematics and Business Administration9.
Table 4.1: Distribution of Questionnaires
Universities Frequency Percent
Sabanci University 110 38.2
Gebze Institute of Technology 91 31.6 Istanbul University 87 30.2 Total 288 100.0
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
Although it has been ruled by a motivated republican board and a group of
professors, Istanbul University represents the conservative-religious group who see
Turkey as more of a Muslim and Middle Eastern country with its own heritage and
interests that are national and regional. Istanbul University currently has seventeen
faculties on five campuses and a teaching staff of 2,000 professors and associates and
4,000 assistants. More than 60,000 undergraduate and 8,000 postgraduate students take
the courses offered by Istanbul University every year. Istanbul University graduates have
9 For more information, http://www.gyte.edu.tr/default.asp?changelang=1 37 frequently been the main source of academic staff for the Turkish university system, as well as producing a very large number of Turkish bureaucrats, professionals, and business people10.
Table 4.1 indicates the distribution of questionnaires by three universities. There
is fairly equal distribution among the universities with Sabanci University having a
slightly larger sample. The other two (Gebze Institute of Technology and Istanbul
University) are almost equal. The purpose of the study was to survey at least 110 students
in each university and obtain 330 students’ opinions on U.S – Turkey bilateral relations.
As an investigator of the survey, the author spent one week in each university11 and surveyed these numbers of students. Due to limited time the author could not spend more days in Gebze Institute of Technology and Istanbul University to reach the 110 respondents. In fact, the distribution of questionnaires among universities (Table 4.1) may give an idea about the level of willingness of the students for giving their opinion on the U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations even though the same amount of time and the same effort was expended to obtain their opinions. Perhaps, this may reflect the political cultures of the universities.
When we look at the gender profile of the participants, the gender profiles of the participants consist of 49.3 % males and 50.7 % females (Table 4.2). The size of male and female is almost equal across the three universities as Table 4.2 indicates, with 4 more females than the males. This is an interesting result in terms of female students’ willingness to express their opinion and it contrasts with most of the contemporary gender studies on Turkish society and general westerners’ perception of Muslim women
10 For more information, http://www.istanbul.edu.tr/english/ 11 Surveying stopped around early morning of the last day of the week in Sabanci University when the author reached 110 respondents. 38 in predominantly Muslim countries such as Turkey. Perhaps, women who are earning university degrees might be different from the ones who are the subject of cited studies above. In terms of the strength of the survey analysis, having almost equal numbers of male and female participants encourages me to investigate the gender factor’s influence on the outcomes of specific questions.
Table 4.2: Gender profile of the participants
Gender Number of Percent Participants Male 142 49.3
Female 146 50.7
Total 288 100
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
As the age distribution of the participants is summarized in Figure 4.2 one can
observe four different age groups: first, 54.1 % of the participants in the age group of 18-
20 which is higher than the half of the rest of the sample; second, 26.4 % of the
participants is in the age group of 21-23 which is slightly less than the half of the first age
group; third, 16.7 % of the participants is in the age group of 24-27 which is slightly
higher than half of the second age group; and forth, 2.6 % of the participants is in the age
group of 28-35 which is the smallest age group in comparison to the other three age
groups. As the table indicates, the sample of the survey is composed of very young
people who are university students and, quite possibly, the future leaders of Turkey. Their
opinions on U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations are important for future predictions on the
long standing alliance of American and Turkish governments.
39
25
20
15
Percentage 10
5
0 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 33 35
Figure 4.2: Age profile of the participants Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
Students in Turkey are, by and large, supported by their parents and this often determines which university a student attends. Parent income profiles of the participants were obtained by including a question in the questionnaire:
Which of the following best describes the level of your parents’ income? Please circle the letter that corresponds with your answer.
a) My parents’ income is much lower than that of the income of average Turkish households b) My parents’ income is slightly lower than that of the income of average Turkish households c) My parents’ income is equal to that of the income of average Turkish households d) My parents’ income is slightly higher than that of the income of average Turkish households e) My parents’ income is much higher than that of the income of average Turkish households
40
Table 4.3: Parent income profile of the participants in comparison to the average income of Turkish households
Parent income profile Frequency Percent
Much lower 4 1.4 Slightly lower 32 11.1 Equal 90 31.3 Slightly higher 115 39.9 Much higher 37 12.8 No Answer 10 3.5 Total 288 100
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
As Table 4.3 indicates, 39.9 % of the students’ parent income is “slightly higher”,
31.3 % of the students’ parent income is “equal to”, 12.8 % of the students’ parent
income is “much higher”, 11.1 % of the students’ parent income is “slightly lower”, 3.5
% of the students did not give an opinion of their parent income, and 1.4 % of the
students’ parent income is “much lower than that of the income of average Turkish
households” (Table 4.3). Of course, these results have to be approached with caution
because they are based on student perceptions and not on actual knowledge of the
income. Table 4.3 shows that most of the students come from “equal to” and “slightly
higher” parent income categories compared to other income categories (71.2 % versus
28.2 %) and “much higher” and “slightly lower” income categories are almost equal. This
distribution is expected and insures a reliable cross-section of classes. Additionally, most
41 of the students answered this question and only a very small number of students did not want to reveal their parents’ income level (3.5 %).
Table 4.4: Self – Described Political ideology profile of the participants
Political ideology Frequency Percent
Very Liberal 10 3.5 Liberal 76 26.4 Mix of Lib & Cons 76 26.4 Conservative 39 13.5 Very Conservative 9 3.1 Other Ideologies 43 14.9 No Answer 35 12.2 Total 288 100
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
Table 4.4 provides us with information about the students’ self-perception on their political ideological inclinations. It shows that 26.4 % of the students described their
political ideology as “liberal”, 26.4 % of the students described their political ideology as
“a mixture of liberal and conservative”, 14.9 % of the students describe their political
ideology as “other beliefs” such as “nationalist”, “leftist”, “islamist”, “anti-Americanist”,
“Marxist” etc., 13.5 % of the students described their political ideology as
“conservative”, 12.2 % of the students did not give an opinion of their political ideology,
3.5 % of the students described their political ideology as “very liberal”, and 3.1 % of the
students described their political ideology as “very conservative” (Table 4.4). Table 4.4
42 demonstrates that the frequency of answers given to the questions related to political ideology produce interesting results. Three categories of answers can easily be identified after the first glance at the table. In the first category, “liberal” and “a mixture of liberal and conservative” groups have the highest number of answers and the frequency of answers given to these groups are perfectly equal. In the second category, “conservative” and “other ideologies” groups have the second highest number of answers and the frequency of answers given to these groups is almost equal. In the third category, “very liberal and “very conservative” groups have the lowest number of answers and the frequency of answers given to these groups is almost equal. Also, very high number of students did not want disclose their “political ideology” (12.2 %) compared to the “parent income” question (3.5 %). The number of students who opted to identify their “political ideology” with “other ideologies” seems relatively high as well (14.9%)
Table 4.5: Self – Described Religious belief profile of the participants
Religious belief Frequency Percent
Very Secular 40 13.9
Secular 86 29.9
Mix of Sec & Rel 85 29.5
Religious 37 12.8
Very Religious 12 4.2
Other beliefs 12 4.2
No Answer 16 5.6
Total 288 100
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
43
Table 4.5 provides information about the students’ self-perception on their religious belief inclinations. It shows that 29.9 % of the students described their religious belief as “secular”, 29.5 % of the students described their religious belief as “a mixture of secular and religious”, 13.9 % of the students described their religious belief as “very secular”, 12.8 % of the students described their religious belief as “religious”, 5.6 % of the students did not give an opinion of their religious belief, 4.2 % of the students described their religious belief as “very religious”, and 4.2 % of the students described their religious belief as “other beliefs” such as “atheist”, “deist”, “non-religious” etc.
(Table 4.5). Of special interest is that in the frequency of answers given to the question related to religious belief, one can identify three main categories: “secular” and “a mixture of Secular & Religious” groups have the highest number of answers and the frequency of answers given to these groups is almost/perfectly equal; then the category of
“religious and “very secular” has the second highest number of answers and the frequency of answers given to these groups is almost equal but each has almost the half amount of answers in comparison to the groups in the first category. The third category consists of the smallest groups, “very religious” and “other beliefs”, which received perfectly equal number of answers. Very few students did not answer this question (5.6
%) compared to the “political ideology” question (12.2 %). This indicates greater comfort in revealing their “religious belief” than their “political ideology”. This result may be attributed to the fact that having a religious identification might be more acceptable than having a political identification in Turkey. Interestingly, the number of students who identify their religiosity with “other beliefs” than the stated categories is low (4.2 %) in comparison to the “political ideology” question (14.9 %). This might be evidence that
44
Turkey is a politically diverse and cosmopolitan country, as the country has 21 political parties.
In summary, the sample of the survey is composed of people with diverse backgrounds in terms of parent income, political ideology and religious belief. Arguably, this fact increases the validity of the survey results with regard to capturing the different voices and sentiments of the Turkish population. It is important that people from all social strata that exist in Turkey are represented in this study in order to capture the geopolitical perspectives. Also, the sample has almost equal distribution in terms of gender; it is important to obtain the opinions of women in order not to run analysis based solely on male opinions. The sample of the survey has a notable concentration on a younger age group (18-23) with 80.5% of participants. Indeed, having younger participants for the survey by targeting university students was one of the purposes of the study because of the fact that, arguably, their opinions reflect an educated, upwardly mobile and probably privileged segment of the Turkish population.
The nature of U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations
Public opinion is a crucial component in the bilateral relationships between states.
In the Turkish tradition of foreign policy, public opinion has always been accepted as an important component of the country’s international relations. Turkish public policy makers and diplomats have always underlined the importance of the role played by
Turkish public opinion and used it as a bargaining tool during negotiation processes
(Erdogan, 2005:1). Also, as a democratic country, the United States has always been
45 concerned about Turkish public opinion and about its policies towards Turkey and surrounding regions. Especially during the Cold War period, U.S. and pro-American environments in Turkey were concerned with the political and social tendencies of
Turkish people and conducted highly effective campaigns aimed at strengthening anti-
Soviet sentiments.
A sample of Turkish university students was asked to describe the U.S. – Turkey relationship in order to understand how they perceive the nature of the bilateral relations between the Turkish and American governments. Moreover, Turkish university students’ perception of the U.S. is an important factor in the future of Turkish-American relations.
I argue that the existence of a relatively small percentage of negative characterization of the relations because of the recent developments in the Middle East caused by the military actions of the U.S. and Turkish Grand National Assembly’s rejection of the U.S.’ demands before and during the Iraqi War and the U.S.’s response to this.
Table 4.6: Turkish university students’ perception of the U.S. – Turkey bilateral relation
Relationship Frequency Percent
Allies 53 18.4
Partners 39 13.5
Friends 23 8.0
Enemies 31 10.8
Other Definitions 121 42.0
No Answer 21 7.3
Total 288 100
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
46
As Table 4.6 indicates, my questionnaire clearly suffers from limitations (this appears as evidence when over all 42.0 % of the students preferred “other definitions”) concerning the stated categories in this specific question:
Which of the following terms best defines United States – Turkey relations?
a) Allies b) Partners c) Friends d) Enemies e) Other (Please specify) ______
This question revealed that 42 % of all university students did not limit their view
of the relationship within the given choices. Instead they identified the relationship with
“other definitions and terms”. Most described their definition of the relationship as
“hegemonic relationship”, “pragmatic relationship”, “proxy state (Turkey) – global
power (U.S.) relationship”, “economically and politically dependent relationship”,
“unequal power relations” etc.12 18.4 % of the students identified the U.S.-Turkey relations as “allies”, 13.5 % of the students identified U.S. – Turkey relations as
“partners”, 10.8 % of the students identified the U.S. – Turkey relations as “enemies”, 8
% of the students identified the U.S. – Turkey relations as “friends”, and 7.3 % of the students did not respond (Table 4.6). On the one hand, one can claim that despite the negative consequences of the recent strained relationship between the U.S. and Turkey, the 39.9 % of the students who identified the relationship as “allies”, “partners” and
“friends” still hold positive attitudes toward the U.S. – Turkey relations. On the other hand, it appears that the negative consequences of the recent strained relationship between the U.S. and Turkey might be an explanation for the 10.8 % of the students who
12 These definitions are obtained from the place where students specified their definition of identifying the relationship in “other (please specify) ______” category. 47 identified the relationship as “enemies”. This figure reflects the minor negative perception of the U.S. in the eyes of Turkish university students in particular and the
Turkish people in general.
Table 4.7: Gender differences in describing U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations
Frequency Percent Relationship Male Female Male Female
Allies 21 32 14.8 21.9
Partners 22 17 15.5 11.6
Friends 9 14 6.3 9.6
Enemies 19 12 13.4 8.2
Other Definitions 64 57 45.1 39
No Answer 7 14 4.9 9.6
Total 142 146 100 100
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
A closer analysis of the results revealed that gender and political orientation play
a significant role in overall perception of the U.S. – Turkey relations. The survey results show that female students have a more positive attitude towards the U.S. than the male students. They are higher in the categories of “allies” (21.9 % versus 14.8 %) and
“friends” (9.6 % versus 6.3 %). Females obviously see U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations
in the light of less animosity than their male counterparts (8.2 % versus 13.4 %). The fact
is that females score double for “no answer” (9.6 % versus 4.9 %). It shows they are less
politicized than males (Table 4.7) on this issue.
48
The survey results revealed that male students would like to see U.S. – Turkey relations in terms of “partner” (15.5 % versus 11.6 %). It is obvious that males are more critical than females towards the U.S. in Turkey because of the fact that most of the political parties are dominated by masculinity. Moreover, male students must serve in the military as it is mandatory for all Turkish males over 20 years of age (students can defer
Table 4.8: Political ideology factor on describing the relationship
Political ideology
Relationship Mix of Total Very Very Other No Liberal Lib & Cons. Liberal Cons. Ideology Answer Cons. F 3 14 15 9 0 6 6 53 Allies P 18.4 30 % 18.4 % 19.7 % 23.1 % 0 % 14 % 17.1 % % F 1 13 12 8 2 2 1 39 Partners P 13.5 10 % 17.1 % 15.8 % 20.5 % 22.2 % 4.7 % 2.9 % % F 0 11 3 3 1 2 3 23 Friends P 0 % 14.5 % 3.9 % 7.7 % 11.1 % 4.7 % 8.6 % 8.0 % F 0 7 7 6 6 1 4 31 Enemies P 10.8 0 % 9.2 % 9.2 % 15.4 % 66.7 % 2.3 % 11.4 % % F 6 27 32 12 0 30 14 121 Other Definitions P 42.0 60 % 35.5 % 42.1 % 30.8 % 0 % 69.8 % 40 % % F 0 4 7 1 0 2 7 21 No Answer P 0 % 5.3 % 9.2 % 2.6 % 0 % 4.7 % 20 % 7.3 % F 10 76 76 39 9 43 35 288 Total P 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
49 their military service until they are done with their studies). Their inclination to identify the relationship as “partner” may be attributed to this fact. That is because “alliance” involves more military collaboration than “partnership”.
In Table 4.8, of special interest is the comparison between those who identified themselves as “very liberal” and “very conservative”; the result is 66.7 % versus 0 % for seeing the U.S. as “enemy”. It is obvious that “very conservative” respondents do not see any possibility for “alliance” with the U.S. as well. They give a score of “zero” in comparison with the “very liberal” who give a score of 30 % for the “alliance”. This is probably the most interesting finding of the survey. It seems that “very conservative” and
“conservative” people would like to see a relation with the U.S. in terms of “partnership”.
When it comes to “partnership”, Table 4.8 illustrates that the combined score of “very conservative” and “conservative” (42.7 %) is much higher than the combined score of
“very liberal” and “liberal” (27.1 %). Interestingly, the students who have “other political ideologies” mostly defined the relationship with “other definitions” (69.8 %). This shows that the stated descriptions of the relationship in the question do not represent the way these students see the U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations.
Table 4.9 reveals a similar pattern concerning the limitation of the questionnaire.
It shows that 42.0 % of respondents indicate that they would like to define the relationship with “other definitions”. This table provides an interesting comparison between the answers of the “very secular’ and the “very religious”. The “very religious” students’ score is “zero” for the category of “other definitions”. It means that they are very clear in their answers with regard to the stated categories in the questionnaire. It is
50
Table 4.9: Religious belief factor on describing the relationship
Religious belief
Relationship Mix of Total Very Sec & Very Other No Secular Secular Rel Religious Religious Religions Answer F 9 12 17 9 2 1 3 53 Allies P 18.4 22.5 % 14.0 % 20.0 % 24.3 % 16.7 % 8.3 % 18.8 % % F 4 16 9 5 4 1 0 39 Partners P 13.5 10 % 18.6 % 10.6 13.5 % 33.3 % 8.3 % 0 % % F 2 10 4 4 0 2 1 23 Friends P 5 % 11.6 % 4.7 % 10.8 % 0 16.7 % 6.3 % 8.0 % F 4 7 7 6 6 0 1 31 Enemies P 10.8 10 % 8.1 % 8.2 % 16.2 % 50 % 0 % 6.3 % % F 20 36 37 12 0 7 9 121 Other Definitions P 42.0 50 % 41.9 % 43.5 % 32.4 % 0 % 58.3 % 56.3 % % F 1 5 11 1 0 1 2 21 No Answer P 2.5 % 5.8 % 12.9 % 2.7 % 0 % 8.3 % 12.5 % 7.3 % F 40 86 85 37 12 12 16 288 Total P 100 % 100 % 100 % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
obvious that they are sure and conscious about their answer when 50 % of the “very religious” students who identified the relationship as “enemies” in comparison to the 10
% of the “very secular” students who identified the relationship as “enemies”. It is quite surprising to see that “very religious” students do not mind entering into “partnership” with the U.S. Their score of identifying the relationship as “partner” is three times higher than the “very secular” students’ score (33.3 % versus 10 %). Obviously, they do not see
51 the U.S. as a friendly country because of, perhaps, religious polarization. However, they do not have much of a problem doing business with a powerful and rich country such as the U.S.
Table 4.10: Student perception of the relationship by university
University
Relationship Sabanci Gebze Istanbul University Institute of University Total Technology Frequency 23 12 18 53 Allies Percent 20.9 % 13.2 % 20.7 % 18.4 %
Frequency 22 6 11 39 Partners Percent 20.0% 6.6% 12.6% 13.5 %
Frequency 7 11 5 23 Friends Percent 6.4% 12.1% 5.7% 8.0%
Frequency 8 7 16 31 Enemies Percent 7.3% 7.7% 18.4% 10.8%
Frequency 46 48 27 121 Other Definitions Percent 41.8% 52.7% 31.0% 42.0%
Frequency 4 7 10 21 No Answer Percent 3.6% 7.7% 11.5% 7.3%
Frequency 110 91 87 288 Total Percent 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
52
Table 4.10 shows the result obtained from cross-tabulation of U.S. – Turkey relationship by the three universities that are selected for the study. It is clear that this specific question has certain limitations since 49.3 % of the respondents give answers for two categories: “other definitions” and “no answer” combined. The remaining 50.7 % of respondents accounted for 39.9 % compared to 31 students (10.8 %) who see the U.S. as an “enemy” country. But if we look at the entire sample these 31 students are out of 288 or 10.8 % of the entire sample. By similar observation, there are 23 respondents out of the entire 288 participants who see the U.S. as a “friend” country. For those who responded to first 4 categories, it is clear that the U.S. and Turkey are viewed in “Allied relationship” with 18.4 % or 53 respondents. In this category, Sabanci University is the leading university with followed with Istanbul University and Gebze Institute of
Technology. We see the same pattern in the category of “partners” which comes second after “allies”. Yet for the category of “friends”, Gebze Institute of Technology comes first with answers that are almost equal to the total answers of other two universities. Here
Istanbul University is in third place. Istanbul University is ranked first when it comes to defining the U.S. – Turkey relations as “enemies”. Half of the 31 students who responded to this category come from Istanbul University; the other two universities having almost an equal share.
The difference between the universities can be accounted for by two main factors.
First, the students who study at Sabanci University are primarily from wealthy families
(Table 4.11) and their parents’ employers often have a strong relationship with U.S. companies through selling American products in Turkey, owning an American franchised company in Turkey or exporting raw materials to the U.S. and importing goods from the
53
Table 4. 11: Parent income profile of the universities
University
Relationship Sabanci Gebze Istanbul University Institute of University Total Technology Frequency 0 1 3 4 Much lower Percent .0% 1.1% 3.4% 1.4% Frequency 2 10 20 32 Slightly lower Percent 1.8% 11.0% 23.0% 11.1% Frequency 11 44 35 90 Equal Percent 10.0% 48.4% 40.2% 31.3% Frequency 63 30 22 115 Slightly higher Percent 57.3% 33.0% 25.3% 39.9% Frequency 32 3 2 37 Much higher Percent 29.1% 3.3% 2.3% 12.8% Frequency 2 3 5 10 No Answer Percent 1.8% 3.3% 5.7% 3.5% Frequency 110 91 87 288 Total Percent 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
U.S. to Turkey. This type of economic relationship affects student attitudes towards the
U.S. This may explain why 47.3 % percent the students in Sabanci University see the
United States as an “ally, friend and partner” country (Table 4.10). Second, the students
54 who study at Istanbul University come from families whose income level is slightly lower or equal to the average income of Turkish households (Table 4.11). These groups often see Turkey as more of a Muslim and Middle Eastern country with its own heritage and interests that are both national and regional. The U.S. military actions in the Middle
East might have had an impact on the 18.4 % (16 students out of 288 students) of the students of Istanbul University who identified the relationship between the U.S. and
Turkey as “enemies”.
Table 4.12: Student opinion toward Turkish Grand National Assembly’s decision
Frequency Percent
Strongly Agree 169 58.7
Agree 56 19.4
Moderately Agree 32 11.1
Moderately Disagree 9 3.1
Disagree 7 2.4
Strongly Disagree 9 3.1
No Answer 6 2.1
Total 288 100.0
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
On March 1 2003, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) made a
decision to reject the United States’ demand to use Turkish soil in its military operation
to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. The students were asked to respond to the
55 question of whether they “agree” or “disagree” with the TGNA’s decision in order to find out their opinion towards the rejection of the U.S. demands.
The great majority of the students (89.2 %) agreed with the decision made by
Turkish Grand National Assembly (Table 4.12). In Table 4.12, when we look at the agreement levels (“strongly agree”, “agree” and “moderately agree”), the students strongly support the TGNA’s decision with 58.7 % of “strongly agree” score. The
“Strongly agree” category is almost twice as high as the combination of “agree” and
“moderately agree” categories (30.5 %). This shows that they are firm in their answers.
Turkish students believed that Turkey should oppose the war and not help the United
States. Perhaps, the negative ramifications of the First Gulf War for the Turkish economy
Table 4.13: Gender factor on student opinions towards TGNA’s decision
Frequency Percent
Male Female Male Female
Strongly Agree 80 89 56.3 61.0
Agree 32 24 22.5 16.4
Moderately Agree 12 20 8.5 13.7
Moderately Disagree 6 3 4.2 2.1
Disagree 4 3 2.8 2.1
Strongly Disagree 4 5 2.8 3.4
No Answer 4 2 2.8 1.4
Total 142 146 100 100
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
56 might have had an impact on students’ agreement with the TGNA’S decision. Turkey gave military support to U.S. and stood beside the American government as a loyal ally during the First Gulf War, resulting in an economic crisis in Turkey and the Turkish economy experienced high inflation until the late 90s. University students, well-versed in international affairs, are well aware of the fact that if Turkey goes to war with American troops again, the Turkish economy could be adversely affected.
When examining gender’s impact on U.S. – Turkey relations, Table 4.13 indicates that the differences between males and females’ answers to this question can just be observed in the categories of “agree”. When we look at these categories, we can notice that female students are firmer than the male students in terms of their agreement with
TGNA’s decision (61 % versus 56.3 %), male students come first when it comes category of “agree” (22.5 % versus 16.4 %) and the highest gap between male and female answers is in the category of “moderately agree” (8.5 % versus 13.7 %) regarding their opinions toward TGNA’s decision. There is no significant difference between males and females’ answers to this question in the categories of “disagree”.
Even though there is no significant difference between different income levels in terms “agreement” and “disagreement” with the TGNA’s decision, the Table 4.14 reveals a slight but observable tendency that as the parental income level of students gets closer to the “slightly higher and much higher than that of the income of average Turkish households” the likelihood of opposing the TGNA’s decision increases. This becomes apparent especially in categories of “disagree” (0 %, 0 %, 1.1 %, 2.6 % and 8.1 %) and
“strongly disagree” (0 %, 0 %, 2.2 %, 4.3 %, and 5.4 %) categories. When we look at the individual categories separately; one can observe significant differences in each level of
57
Table 4.14: Parent income factor on student opinions towards TGNA’s decision
Income
Much Slightly Equal Slightly Much No Total lower lower higher higher Answer F 4 24 48 65 20 8 169 Strongly Agree P 100.0% 75.0% 53.3% 56.5% 54.1% 80.0% 58.7% F 0 5 24 21 5 1 56 Agree P .0% 15.6% 26.7% 18.3% 13.5% 10.0% 19.4% F 0 2 11 13 6 0 32 Moderately Agree P .0% 6.3% 12.2% 11.3% 16.2% .0% 11.1% F 0 0 2 6 1 0 9 Moderately Disagree P .0% .0% 2.2% 5.2% 2.7% .0% 3.1% F 0 0 1 3 3 0 7 Disagree P .0% .0% 1.1% 2.6% 8.1% .0% 2.4% F 0 0 2 5 2 0 9 Strongly Disagree P .0% .0% 2.2% 4.3% 5.4% .0% 3.1% F 0 1 2 2 0 1 6 No Answer P .0% 3.1% 2.2% 1.7% .0% 10.0% 2.1% F 4 32 90 115 37 10 288 Total P 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
“agreement” and “disagreement” categories between the answers of the students who identified their parent income as “slightly lower” (24 students) and “much higher” (20
students). The students whose parent income is “slightly lower” than average income of
Turkish households show “stronger agreement” (75 % versus 54.1 %) with their
parliament compared to the students whose parent income is “much higher” than average
58 income of Turkish households. The students whose parent income is “much higher” are not firm in their “agreement” with the Turkish parliament as 16.2 % of them answered
Table 4.15: Political ideology factor on student opinions towards TGNA’s decision
Political ideology
Mix of Total Very Very Other No Liberal Lib & Conserver. Liberal Conserv. Ideology Answer Cons F 5 40 44 22 6 27 25 169 Strongly Agree P 50.0% 52.6% 57.9% 56.4% 66.7% 62.8% 71.4% 58.7% F 3 17 10 12 3 7 4 56 Agree P 30.0% 22.4% 13.2% 30.8% 33.3% 16.3% 11.4% 19.4% F 0 10 11 4 0 5 2 32 Moderately Agree P .0% 13.2% 14.5% 10.3% .0% 11.6% 5.7% 11.1% F 1 3 4 0 0 0 1 9 Moderately Disagree P 10.0% 3.9% 5.3% .0% .0% .0% 2.9% 3.1%
F 1 1 3 0 0 2 0 7 Disagree P 10.0% 1.3% 3.9% .0% .0% 4.7% .0% 2.4% F 0 4 3 0 0 1 1 9 Strongly Disagree P .0% 5.3% 3.9% .0% .0% 2.3% 2.9% 3.1% F 0 1 1 1 0 1 2 6 No Answer P .0% 1.3% 1.3% 2.6% .0% 2.3% 5.7% 2.1% F 10 76 76 39 9 43 35 288 Total P 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
59
“moderately agree” compared to the students whose parent income is “slightly lower”
(6.3 % of them answered “moderately agree”). Other significant differences can be observed between these two groups of students who come from different levels of parent incomes in the levels of “disagreement” categories. None of the students who come from families whose income is “slightly lower” answered any categories of “disagreement” compared to the students who come from families whose income is “much higher” , 2.7
% of whom answered “moderately disagree”, 8.1 % of them answered “disagree” and 5.4
% of them answered “strongly disagree”. In the light of this statistical information, one can claim that the students hailing from poorer families have slightly more trust in their government than students who are come from richer families.
Table 4.15 reveals an interesting result. 71.4 % of the students who didn’t want to reveal (opted “no answer” for political ideology) their “political ideology” strongly support the TGNA’s decision. This shows that even though they are not comfortable with disclosing their “political ideology”, they do not have any problem with answering this question and strongly support their government on this specific issue. “Very conservative” students are the firmest in supporting the Turkish parliaments. They are either “strongly agree” (66.7 %) or “agree” (33.3 %) with the TGNA’s decision. In general, no matter what their “political ideology”, participants give strong support to their government by having at least 50 % of “strongly agree” answers in each political ideology category. Also, the students who have “other ideologies” firmly support the
TGNA’s decision, having 62.8 % of “strongly agree” answers (Table 4.15).
60
Table 4.16: Religious belief factor on student opinions towards TGNA’s decision
Religious belief
Mix of Total Very Sec & Very Other No Secular Secular Rel Religious Religious Religions Answer F 26 41 49 25 8 8 12 169 Strongly Agree P 65.0% 47.7% 57.6% 67.6% 66.7% 66.7% 75.0% 58.7% F 6 22 15 7 4 1 1 56 Agree P 15.0% 25.6% 17.6% 18.9% 33.3% 8.3% 6.3% 19.4% F 4 11 13 2 0 2 0 32 Moderately Agree P 10.0% 12.8% 15.3% 5.4% .0% 16.7% .0% 11.1% F 1 4 3 1 0 0 0 9 Moderately Disagree P 2.5% 4.7% 3.5% 2.7% .0% .0% .0% 3.1%
F 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 7 Disagree P 5.0% 2.3% 2.4% 2.7% .0% .0% .0% 2.4% F 1 4 2 1 0 0 1 9 Strongly Disagree P 2.5% 4.7% 2.4% 2.7% .0% .0% 6.3% 3.1% F 0 2 1 0 0 1 2 6 No Answer P .0% 2.3% 1.2% .0% .0% 8.3% 12.5% 2.1% F 40 86 85 37 12 12 16 288 Total P 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
When we look at the Table 4.16, the first thing one can notice is the “strongly agree” (66.7 %) and “agree” (33.3 %) answers’ percentages of the “very religious” students are exactly same as the “very conservative” students. Based on this statistical information, one can claim that “very conservative” and “very religious” students have exactly same attitudes towards the Turkish parliament on this specific issue. “Very
61 religious” and “very conservative” students strongly agree with the Turkish parliament with an identical percentage (66.7 %). Based on the religious factor investigation on student opinions towards TGNA’s decision, the students who did not identify their religious belief are the firmest in supporting the Turkish parliament with having 75 % of
“strongly agree” answers. The students who have “very secular” (65 %), “religious” (67.6
%), “very religious” (66.7 %) and “other religions” (66.7 %) religious beliefs hold almost equal percentages in giving strongly support to their parliament. This shows that no matter what religious belief they have, they hold similar ideas on the rejection of U.S. demands to send Turkish troops to Northern Iraq.
When we examine the universities individually, as it is indicated in Table 4.17, it is obvious the students who study at Istanbul University are the firmest in supporting their parliament with 78.2 % “strongly agree” answers. In terms of the category of
“strongly agree”, Gebze Institute of Technology comes second with 57.1 % “strongly agree” answers and Sabanci Univesity comes last with the lowest percentage of “strongly agree” answers (44.5 %) compared to other two universities. In terms of the category of
“agree”, the ranking of the universities reverses; first, Sabanci Univeristy (23.6 %); second, Gebze Institute of Technology (19.8 %); and third, Istanbul University (13.8 %).
In the category of “moderately agree”, the ranking is the same as “agree” category but with different percentages; first, Sabanci University (17.3 %); second, Gebze Technical
Istitute (9.9 %); and third, Istanbul University (4.6 %).
62
Table 4.17: Student opinions towards TGNA’s decision by university
University
Sabanci Gebze Istanbul University Institute of University Total Technology Frequency 49 52 68 169 Strongly Agree Percent 44.5% 57.1% 78.2% 58.7% Frequency 26 18 12 56 Agree Percent 23.6% 19.8% 13.8% 19.4% Frequency 19 9 4 32 Moderately Agree Percent 17.3% 9.9% 4.6% 11.1% Frequency 3 5 1 9 Moderately Disagree Percent 2.7% 5.5% 1.1% 3.1%
Frequency 7 0 0 7 Disagree Percent 6.4% .0% .0% 2.4% Frequency 4 4 1 9 Strongly Disagree Percent 3.6% 4.4% 1.1% 3.1% Frequency 2 3 1 6 No Answer Percent 1.8% 3.3% 1.1% 2.1% Frequency 110 91 87 288 Total Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
63
Even though there is no significant difference between the universities in terms of
“agreeing” and “disagreeing” with TGNA’s decision, as described above, there are significant differences between the universities in terms of the level of their “agreement” with TGNA’s decision. The difference in the level of agreement with TGNA’s decision in the answers of students from different universities might be explained by the fact that each university represents different sentiments in Turkey concerning politics and internal relations.
Current constraints and obstacles in the U.S. – Turkey relations
Strategic military and economic alliances are based on the principle that unity brings strength, which necessarily entails perceived common interests and the political goodwill of the countries involved. Such pacts usually provide for mutual assistance in the case of aggression. In this context, the origins of the alliance between the U.S. and
Turkey are the product of perceived common interest and political goodwill, specifically the containment of former Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Turkey played a critical role in the containment of Soviet power. The end of the Cold War was marked by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This transformation in the geopolitical arena eroded the importance of Turkey’s geopolitical location as a strategic military ally from an American perspective.
As the nature of global geopolitical systems and political realities change, so, too, do the purpose and content of strategic military alliances. The alliance of the countries involved comes to an end if the member countries do not agree on same “geopolitical
64 codes” in order to maintain the strategic relationship in the newly transformed geopolitical world order. The U.S. and Turkey alliance coped with the transition of political realities in the new geopolitical world order during the post-Cold War era and continued its common interests in a multidimensional platform which includes strategic energy cooperation, security ties, regional stability, and the global war on terrorism.
What must be kept in mind is that today’s geopolitical circumstances are far different from those in which the U.S.-Turkey alliance was forged (Cohen, 2004:578).
Unfortunately, the strategic military alliance between the U.S. and Turkey has been greatly damaged in the post-September 11 era. This point is supported by events surrounding the Iraq War. This fact was also pointed out by Paul Wolfowitz, former
Deputy Secretary of Defense, at the beginning of 2004 as stated in Turkish Daily News,
January 31, 2004:
“Our strategic partnership has changed. It is no longer as it was before. In the past, this relationship was based on a military basis. Only military relations used to be discussed. This era is now closed. Military relations, of course, do exist but the new strategic partnership is not based on a military field but rather on democracy and politics.”
March 1, 2003 was a watershed event in the history of the U.S.-Turkey relations
when the Turkish Grand National Assembly rejected the government’s motion to allow
U.S. troops to open a second front against Iraq from the Turkish soil. This development
initiated the current constraints and obstacles in U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations. The
decision angered the Pentagon and caused a rift in U.S. – Turkey relations. The strain in
U.S. – Turkey relations was immediately clear as seen in several prominent American
newspapers on March 2, 2003: “The Turkish Parliament dealt a heavy blow to the Bush
administration's plans for a northern front against Iraq, narrowly rejecting a measure that
would have allowed thousands of American combat troops to use the country as a base
65 for an attack”, The New York Times (March 2, 2003) said “Turkey's cooperation was important to the Pentagon's plan to divide the forces of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein by simultaneously attacking from the south, through Kuwait, and from the north, across the Turkish border”, The Washington Post (March 2, 2003) said “The Bush administration finds itself in a jam following the refusal of Turkey's parliament Saturday to let 62,000 U.S. forces use the country as a base to launch an invasion of Iraq from the north. With the White House saying that war is just weeks away, Turkey's unexpected rebuff forces the Pentagon to reshuffle its war plans”, USA Today (March 2, 2003) said
“In a stunning rejection that appeared to kill U.S. plans for a "northern front" in any war against Iraq, Turkey's parliament refused Saturday to authorize the deployment of 62,000
U.S. troops on Turkish soil”, Los Angeles Times (March 2, 2003).
Starting with the war on Iraq, the U.S. and Turkey’s national interests diverged, and they lost their perceived common interests and political goodwill which exacerbated declining positive perceptions of the U.S. The failure of both the U.S. and Turkey to recognize and resolve their divergent strategic interest in Iraq is to blame for much of the worsening relations (Kapsis, 2005:381).
In order to find out the impact of U.S.’ 2003 military intervention in Iraq on U.S.
– Turkey relations, Turkish university students were asked to answer the following question:
United States’ 2003 military intervention in Iraq has been a significant turning point for United States – Turkey relations.
a) Strongly Agree b) Agree c) Moderately Agree d) Moderately Disagree e) Disagree f) Strongly Disagree
66
Table 4.18: Turkish university students’ answers to the statement that U.S.’ 2003 military intervention in Iraq has been a significant turning point for U.S. – Turkey relations.
Frequency Percent
Strongly Agree 58 20.1
Agree 101 35.1
Moderately Agree 70 24.3
Moderately Disagree 18 6.3
Disagree 28 9.7
Strongly Disagree 5 1.7
No Answer 8 2.8
Total 288 100.0
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
According to the present survey of Turkish university student opinions, the
majority of students (79.5 %) agreed that United States’ 2003 military intervention in Iraq
has been a significant turning point for United States – Turkey relations (Table 4.18).
This shows that the Iraq War and developments before and after the Iraq War affected
people’s attitude toward this relationship at the present. We have to keep in mind that the
Turkish government’s reluctance to support the U.S. Iraq policy place stress on the U.S. –
Turkey alliance.
When we look at each category of agreement levels, it is obvious that students are not firmly in agreement with this hypothesis. As it is indicated in Table 4.18, ranking of the students’ answers in terms of receiving high to low percentages of answers is “agree”
(35.1 %), “moderately agree” (24.3 %), “strongly agree” (20.1 %), “disagree” (9.7 %),
“moderately disagree” (6.3 %), “no answer” (2.8 %) and “strongly disagree” (1.7 %). 67
This ranking indicates that even though the majority of students see the U.S.’ 2003 military intervention as a significant turning point for U.S. – Turkey relations, they do not firmly believe that this fact was important. Their agreement level with this hypothesis is scattered over three agreement levels (strongly agree, agree and moderately agree).
One of the most important indicators in Table 4.18 is that the majority of the students (97.2 %) answered this question and very small percentage of the students (2.8
%) skipped the question. This result connotes that students have very clear opinions on this question.
When we look at the universities individually, we see that Istanbul University holds a higher percentage of “strongly agree” (24.1 %) answers compared to Sabanci
University (19.1 %) and Gebze Institute of Technology (17.6 %). This implies that the students at Istanbul University are slightly firmer in their agreement with the statement above than the other two universities. When it comes to “agree” category, Sabanci
University comes first with relatively higher percentage (40.9 %) compared to Istanbul
University (33.3 %) and Gebze Institute of Technology (29.7 %). Interestingly, all three universities have almost equal percentage of “moderately agree” answers (Table 4.19).
As Table 4.19 indicates, Gebze Institute of Technology has a very interesting distribution of answers compared to other two universities, having higher percentages in each categories of “disagreement” with the statement. Moreover, on the one hand, the percentages of “strongly agree” (17.6 %) and “disagree” (14.3 %) answers are almost equal at this university. On the other hand, the percentage of “strongly agree” (24.1 %) is much higher than the percentage of “disagree” (5.7 %) in Istanbul University.
68
Table 4.19: Turkish university students’ answers to the statement that U.S.’ 2003 military intervention in Iraq has been a significant turning point for U.S. – Turkey relations by each university.
University
Sabanci Gebze Istanbul University Institute of University Total Technology Frequency 21 16 21 58 Strongly Agree Percent 19.1% 17.6% 24.1% 20.1% Frequency 45 27 29 101 Agree Percent 40.9% 29.7% 33.3% 35.1% Frequency 25 22 23 70 Moderately Agree Percent 22.7% 24.2% 26.4% 24.3% Frequency 6 8 4 18 Moderately Disagree Percent 5.5% 8.8% 4.6% 6.3%
Frequency 10 13 5 28 Disagree Percent 9.1% 14.3% 5.7% 9.7% Frequency 2 2 1 5 Strongly Disagree Percent 1.8% 2.2% 1.1% 1.7% Frequency 1 3 4 8 No Answer Percent .9% 3.3% 4.6% 2.8% Frequency 110 91 87 288 Total Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
69
As it was indicated in the literature and according to the outcomes of the survey of Turkish university students’ opinion, the U.S. decision to intervene in Iraq militarily and the subsequent demand for Turkish assistance created a new turning point in the
U.S.-Turkey relations. Turkey's full support for Washington's 1991 war with Iraq did not further Turkish interests as was expected. In fact, as a result of the economic embargo on
Iraq, Turkey lost a large amount of revenue due to lost trade and investment opportunities. The new conflict with Iraq was seen by Turkish university students as a significant turning point in the U.S. – Turkey relations because of the Turkish Grand
National Assembly’s rejection of the proposal to allow U.S. forces to use Turkish territory for the war, and the U.S. officials’ angry response to this rejection.
In the light of the literature review and landmarks in the history of U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations, this study identified eight different current constraints and obstacles in
U.S. – Turkey relations and asked Turkish university students to rank these obstacles in terms of their importance where 1 is the most important obstacle and 8 is the least important obstacle. These eight constraints can be identified as follows; “Presence of
PKK in northern Iraq”, “U.S.’ Kurdish Policy”, “U.S.’ Middle East Policy”, “Invasion of
Iraq”, “U.S.’ Cyprus Policy”, “Armenian problem”, “War on Terrorism”, and “U.S.’ other policies”.
According to the survey results, students ranked the “U.S.’ Kurdish policy” as the
1st most important obstacle, “presence of PKK in North Iraq” as the 2nd most important
obstacle, “U.S.’s Middle East policy” as the 3rd most important obstacle and “invasion of
Iraq” as the 4th most important obstacle. As the Table 4.20 indicates, these are the top four most important and challenging obstacles in U.S.-Turkey bilateral relations. These
70 obstacles and constrains have roots in the history of U.S – Turkey bilateral relations and might be caused by the different national interests of the allies in certain issues.
Table 4.20: University students’ ranking of current constraints and obstacles in the U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations
Ranking of the obstacles where 1st is the most important obstacle 8th is the least important Ranking by obstacle obstacles 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th No Total Answer 1st U.S.’s F 62 96 43 30 18 2 10 0 27 288 Kurdish Policy P 21.5% 33.3% 14.9% 10.4% 6.3 % .7 % 3.5 % 0 % 9.4 % 100%
2nd Presence F 68 42 54 34 14 27 15 6 28 288 of PKK in North Iraq P 23.6% 14.6% 18.8% 11.8% 4.9 % 9.4 % 5.2 % 2.1 % 9.7 % 100%
3rd U.S.’s F 72 33 38 40 31 29 18 4 23 288 Middle East Policy P 25% 11.5% 13.2% 13.9% 10.8% 10.1% 6.3 % 1.4% 8 % 100%
F 18 27 39 50 32 47 43 3 29 288 4th Invasion of Iraq P 6.3 % 9.4 % 13.5% 17.4% 11.1% 16.3% 14.9% 1 % 10.1 % 100%
F 16 28 35 30 59 57 28 4 31 288 5thArmenian problem P 5.6 % 9.7 % 12.2% 10.4% 20.5% 19.8% 9.7 % 1.4% 10.8 % 100%
6th U.S.’s F 11 24 32 41 51 47 47 6 29 288 Cyprus Policy P 3.8 % 8.3 % 11.1% 14.2% 17.7% 16.3% 16.3% 2.1% 10.1 % 100%
F 13 11 19 29 47 44 82 10 33 288 7th War on Terrorism P 4.5 % 3.8 % 6.6 % 10.1% 16.3% 15.3% 28.5% 3.5% 11.5 % 100%
8th U.S.’s F 11 3 3 4 3 2 8 214 40 288 other policies P 3.8 % 1 % 1 % 1.4 % 1 % .7 % 2.8 % 74.3% 13.9 % 100%
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
71
1st most important obstacle: “U.S.’s Kurdish policy”
The primary importance of Turkey (as the regional power) and “Kurdish
inhabited area” (as a contested area) for the U.S. (as the global power) revolves around
their geographical location.
The geopolitics of “Kurdish issue” have their roots in the division of the Ottoman
Empire, but have also been greatly affected by more recent American geopolitical
interests in the Middle East, such as Cold War containment policies, anti-Khomeini
policies after the 1979 Iranian Revolution and Hostage Crisis, support for Iraq during the
Iraq – Iran War, as well as the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq Invasion in which U.S.
policy was reversed and Iraq became the enemy in the latter conflicts.
As mentioned above, the geopolitical situation of both sides for the U.S. above,
the U.S. has had a close relationship with both sides during the conflict between Turks
and Kurds. However, the U.S. has never tried to be a mediator in this conflict. This is
because; the U.S. has used the geopolitical situation of Turkey and “Kurdish inhabited
area” for U.S. geopolitical imaginings, visions, codes and political agendas in the Middle
East since the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Whenever Turkey opposed U.S.
military actions or interventions in the Middle East, U.S. officially and unofficially
blackmailed Turkey to support possible emergence of “Kurdistan” on the eastern and
southeastern flank of Turkey that would propagate a mobilization among Turkey’s
Kurdish population and threaten Turkey’s territorial integrity. The U.S. used the same
strategy after Turkey’s refusal to allow the U.S. to launch an attack from their soil for
toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq at the time. After this event, the U.S. treated
72
Kurds as a potential ally to invade Iraq. The attitude of the U.S. on Kurdish issues which support political solutions, such as official recognition of the Kurds’ ethnic, cultural and linguistic identity, and U.S. policy on northern Iraq's Kurds have created problems for
U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations.
On the one hand, the Kurdish issue in general and U.S.’ Kurdish policy in particular is attracting keen attention from Turkish media, scholars and public.
Participants in the survey live with it in every aspect of their lives. This might be the reason why they identify this particular obstacle as the most important constraint in the
U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations. On the other hand, the Turkish government and people perceive U.S.’s Kurdish policy as one of the most important obstacles and expect U.S. to be the adjudicator in the resolution of this conflict.
2nd most important obstacle: “presence of PKK in North Iraq”
At the beginning of 1980s, Kurds who lived in Turkish territory started to seek
independence for the southeastern part of Turkey where the majority of the Kurdish
population in Turkey resides. Kurds claimed that they are the victims of policies that
suppressed any expression of Kurdish identity. These policies eventually created the
conditions for the formation of Kurdish separatist groups seeking independence. In 1984
Abdullah Ocalan formed the PKK (The Kurdistan Workers Party), a Kurdish separatist
group that gained a reputation as ruthless revolutionaries (McDowall, 2000: 421). Turkey
retaliated against the PKK, which was listed as a terrorist organization internationally by
a number of states and organization, and warfare ensued in the southeastern part of
73
Turkey in the late 1980s. The battle between Turkish soldiers and Kurdish insurgents continued thorough the 1990s. According to the Turkish government, more than 30.000
people have been killed in the Turkish – Kurdish conflict since 1984. Political scientist
Michael Gunter believes the Kurdish issue will “become the single most important issue
in the volatile, geo-strategically important Middle East if and when the Arab – Israel
dispute is finally settled” (Gunter, 1999, 133).
Since the emergence of the PKK, Turkey’s primary interest in Iraq has
consistently been to protect the integrity of its border and to eliminate PKK separatists.
These separatists have used the mountains of northern Iraq as a base for attacking Turkish
targets. U.S. unwillingness to address Turkey’s security concerns by eliminating the PKK
forces in Northern Iraq, and its ambivalent position regarding the future of Northern Iraq
and the role of the Iraqi Kurds caused Turkish society to support a negative shift in
attitudes toward the United States. This shows that even though the allies have common
interests on a regional and global level, the primary problem of the countries involved
and national interest is always the first priority.
Interestingly, participants ranked the “presence of PKK in North Iraq” as the
second most important obstacle while they ranked “U.S.’s Kurdish policy” as the most
important obstacle. This means participants believe that if U.S. wants to be an adjudicator
in this conflict the Kurdish issue is very likely to be solved, or at least mitigated. Most
importantly, participants believe that these two obstacles are interrelated and significantly
hinder U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations.
74
3rd most important obstacle: “U.S.’s Middle East policy”
As students revealed in their comments in the open question of the survey13 and
according to the survey results, students believe that “U.S.’s Middle East policy” in
general and “invasion of Iraq” in particular entangle the U.S. – Turkey alliance. As it was
discussed in the analysis of the previous question, the majority of the participants (79.5
%) see the “U.S.’ 2003 military intervention in Iraq” a significant turning point for U.S. –
Turkey relationship (Table 4.18).
Students ranked the “U.S.’s Middle East policy” as the third most important
obstacle. We have to keep in mind that this obstacle includes the Kurdish issue as well.
Students’ rankings of first three most of important obstacles are interconnected and they
are associated with the Kurdish issue whereas the third most important obstacle also
embraces other subjects.
4th most important obstacle: “invasion of Iraq”
Turkish university students generally hold more positive opinions of the regional
neighbors than of the U.S. Some respondents mentioned, in a positive way, the visit by
the former Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul to the countries of the region. The
purpose of these visits was to find a solution for the Iraqi question. This shows that the
U.S. has not justified the war on Iraq in the eyes of Turkish students, and ongoing U.S.’
military actions in Iraq discomfort the students. Moreover, Turkish students do not want
13 These comments are obtained from the open question in which participants have expressed their thoughts about the U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations. 75 war beyond the country’s immediate borders, and believe that Turkey needs to have good relationships with its neighbors.
Survey results revealed that Turkish university students believe that the War on
Terrorism, U.S.’s Cyprus policy and Armenian policy are the less important constraints and obstacles in comparison to the top four most important obstacles that are mentioned above. In terms of the importance of these obstacles, the response that these impediments received is very low and incomparable with first four most important obstacles.
Nevertheless, these obstacles are also significant and have effects on the U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations.
Future prospects and strengths of the U.S. – Turkey ties
The aim of this study was to highlight the fact that Turkey’s geographical location attracts the U.S., and that the national interests of the U.S. in the region entail engagement in bilateral relations with Turkey. The nature of U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations is a function of U.S. current and future objectives in Turkey’s neighboring regions and Turkey is in need of U.S. economic and political support. In other words, the
U.S. needs Turkey and Turkey needs the U.S. in many ways. Hence, the strained relations between the U.S. and Turkey are having a real impact on both countries’ strategic interests. These facts show that there are always future prospects, new directions, and strength in a variety of areas and hope for U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations. The U.S. and
Turkey should and must take real steps to improve their relations in the immediate future.
Therefore, the future transformation of the U.S. – Turkey alliance will depend on, to a
76 great extent, the compatibility of mutual interests in the partnership in the search for a new order in the neighboring regions of Turkey.
From a western perspective, Turkey is often associated with a secular form of
Islam, its geopolitical location and alliance with the United States. Turkey’s exceptional place in U.S. hegemonic interests stems from its geographical location. Despite recent strained relations, Turkey will remain an important ally in U.S. strategic planning as long as U.S. continues to pursue its interests in the neighboring regions of Turkey, especially in the Middle East (Dahlman, 2004:570; Murphy, 2004). If the U.S. - Turkey alliance is maintained, Turkey will not be alone in the process of its accession into the European
Union, dealing with the PKK’s terrorist activism in the southern part of Turkey, the
Cyprus issues with Greece, the Armenian issues in the international community, and its economic and cultural initiatives in Caucasia, Central Asia and Balkans. What also makes
Turkey valuable to the U.S. geopolitical interests in the region is that most of Turkey’s neighboring states have historical, ethnic, and cultural ties with Turkey; the legacy of the
Ottoman Empire to Turkey.
Turkey’s economy, combined with its access to the European Union, Central
Asia, and the Middle East, is making Turkey increasingly important to the U.S. government and American private businesses. Moreover, a half century of strategic cooperation, especially through NATO provides an important experience of working together, as manifested by U.S. enthusiasm for Turkish military units in UN and NATO peacekeeping operations (Kirisci, 1998:132). These are clearly important forces that will push both countries towards continued cooperation at the bilateral as well as regional level. Furthermore, the U.S. strongly supports Turkey in the process of its accession into
77 the European Union. One of the reasons for this support is that by accepting Muslim
Turkey into the European Union, the West is demonstrating that it is not set against Islam
(Debnar and Smith, 2006:20).
Table 4.21: Turkish university student’s answers to the statement that the presence of U.S. military installations in Turkey helps promote a better future for Turkey.
Frequency Percent
Strongly Agree 5 1.7
Agree 9 3.1
Moderately Agree 17 5.9
Moderately Disagree 23 8.0
Disagree 86 29.9
Strongly Disagree 146 50.7
No Answer 2 .7
Total 288 100.0
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
It is interesting to note that 99.3 % of the students (just two students skipped this
question) answered this question and 88.6 % of the students disagreed with this statement
with a high percentage of “strongly disagree” (50.7 %). 8% of the students “moderately
disagree” and 29.9 % of the students “disagree” with the statement. This shows that students are firm in their answers. The percentage of answers given in each category exponentially increases when it gets closer to “strongly disagree” from “strongly agree”
(Table 4.21). This result is a reference that students do not want U.S. military presence within Turkish territorial boundaries and do not think that the presence of U.S. military
78 installations in Turkey helps promote a better future for Turkey. Arguably, they might be aware of the fact that foreign military deployments, especially powerful states’ military installations, within the territorial boundaries of nation-states have negative effects on the sovereignty of weaker states in bilateral relations, especially with hegemonic states. One of the students also commented that the presence of U.S. military installations in Turkey
Figure 4.3: Geographical locations of the U.S. military installations in Turkey, December 2007. erodes the Turkish sovereignty rather than promoting a better future for Turkey14. The
conclusion one can draw from this result is that the U.S. and Turkey should work on the
justifications for the U.S. military installations in Turkey and their cooperation inside
Turkish territory or its immediate neighboring countries (Fig. 4.3).
14 This comment is obtained from the open question in which participants have expressed their thoughts about the U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations. 79
Table 4.22: Turkish university student’s answers to the statement that the presence of U.S. military installations in Turkey helps promote a better future for Turkey by each university.
University
Sabanci Gebze Istanbul University Institute of University Total Technology Frequency 5 0 0 5 Strongly Agree Percent 4.5% .0% .0% 1.7% Frequency 4 5 0 9 Agree Percent 3.6% 5.5% .0% 3.1% Frequency 11 3 3 17 Moderately Agree Percent 10.0% 3.3% 3.4% 5.9% Frequency 16 5 2 23 Moderately Disagree Percent 14.5% 5.5% 2.3% 8.0%
Frequency 31 30 25 86 Disagree Percent 28.2% 33.0% 28.7% 29.9% Frequency 42 47 57 146 Strongly Disagree Percent 38.2% 51.6% 65.5% 50.7% Frequency 1 1 0 2 No Answer Percent .9% 1.1% .0% .7% Frequency 110 91 87 288 Total Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
80
As shown in Table 4.22, the majority of students (88.6 %) believed that the presence of United States military installations in Turkey does not help promote a better future for Turkey. When we look at the universities individually, there are significant differences in answering this question according to universities (Table 4.22). 18.1 % of the students who study at Sabanci University agree (4.5 % strongly agree, 3.6 % agree and 10 % moderately agree) with this statement and see the presence of the U.S. military installations in Turkey in a positive light. 18.1 is a very significant percentage compared to the percentage of overall disagreement (10.7 %) and other universities’ disagreement
(8.8 % of Gebze Technical University students and 3.4 % of Istanbul University students) with the statement. This shows that Istanbul University students are the firmest in their answers with 96.4 % of disagreement with the statement and all of the Istanbul
University students answered this question. When we look at the “disagree” category, there is a noticeable convergence of the percentage of “disagree” answers across universities; Gebze Technical University comes first with 33 %, Istanbul University comes second with 28.7 % and Sabanci University comes last with 28.2 % in this category. The most significant divergence of the percentage of answers is in “strongly disagree” category; Istanbul University comes first with 65.5 %, Gebze Technical
University comes second with 51.6 % and Sabanci University comes last with 38.2 % in this category (Table 4.22).
Students’ answers to this question mostly are gathered in “moderately agree”
(17.4 %), “moderately disagree” (11.4 %), “disagree” (31.4 %) and “strongly disagree”
(34.4 %) categories. A very small number of students strongly agrees (1.4 %) and agrees
81
Table 4.23: Turkish university students’ answers to the statement that aspects of the American way of life should be adopted in Turkey.
Frequency Percent
Strongly Agree 4 1.4
Agree 9 3.1
Moderately Agree 50 17.4
Moderately Disagree 33 11.5
Disagree 90 31.3
Strongly Disagree 99 34.4
No Answer 3 1.0
Total 288 100.0
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
(3.1 %) with this statement and 3 students (1 %) did not answer this question. Even
though students do not strongly agree or agree with the statement that aspects of the
American way of life should be adopted in Turkey they do not totally reject the American way of life, because a significant percentage of students (17.4 %) moderately agree with this statement and the American lifestyle is attractive (Table 4.23). As indicated in Table
4.23, on the one hand 50.7 % of the students strongly reject and 8 % of the students moderately want to have the U.S. military installations in Turkey. On the other, 34.4 % of the students reject and 17.4 % of the students want to have the American way of life in
Turkey (Table 4.23). Thus, students are more open to aspects of American way of life than the presence of U.S. military installations in Turkey.
82
Table 4.24: Turkish university students’ answers to the statement that aspects of the American way of life should be adopted in Turkey by each university.
University
Sabanci Gebze Istanbul University Institute of University Total Technology Frequency 3 1 0 4 Strongly Agree Percent 2.7% 1.1% .0% 1.4% Frequency 6 3 0 9 Agree Percent 5.5% 3.3% .0% 3.1% Frequency 28 15 7 50 Moderately Agree Percent 25.5% 16.5% 8.0% 17.4% Frequency 15 9 9 33 Moderately Disagree Percent 13.6% 9.9% 10.3% 11.5%
Frequency 30 31 29 90 Disagree Percent 27.3% 34.1% 33.3% 31.3% Frequency 27 30 42 99 Strongly Disagree Percent 24.5% 33.0% 48.3% 34.4% Frequency 1 2 0 3 No Answer Percent .9% 2.2% .0% 1.0% Frequency 110 91 87 288 Total Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
83
As the responses indicate, 17.4 % of students moderately agree with the statement and find American way of life attractive. When we look at the universities individually, we see that significant percentage of students (25.5 %) who study in Sabanci University moderately agree with the statement that the American way of life should be adopted in
Turkey. This result can be attributed to the liberal-western profile of Sabanci University which is arguably congruent with American lifestyle. Gebze Institute of Technology comes second in the category of “moderately agree” with 16.5 % and Istanbul University comes last with 8 %. When we look at the “strongly disagree” category, Istanbul
University comes first with a significant percentage (48.3 %) which doubles the percentage of Sabanci University (24.5 %) and is much higher than the overall percentage of “strongly disagree” (34.4 %). This shows that the students who study at Istanbul
University firmly oppose to the American lifestyle. This result can be attributed to the conservative-religious profile of Istanbul University which is arguably incongruent with the American lifestyle. Gebze Technical University comes second with 33% in the category of “strongly disagree” (Table 4.24).
Even though majority of students (73.3 %) believed that American style of democracy would not be beneficial if adopted in Turkey, students are not firm in their answers. Because, when we look at the categories of agreement with the statement individually; we see that the “moderately agree” category comes first with 28.5 %, the
“agree” category comes second with 26 % and the “strongly agree” category comes last with 18.8 %. Moreover, 4.2 % of the students did not answer this question. It means that students do not have clear opinions on this question. Furthermore, a significant percentage of students (22.5 %) did not agree with the statement and believed that the
84 style of democracy practiced in the U.S. would be beneficial if adopted in Turkey (Table
4.25).
Table 4.25: Turkish university students’ answers to the statement that the style of democracy practiced in the United States would not be beneficial if adopted in Turkey.
Frequency Percent
Strongly Agree 54 18.8
Agree 75 26.0
Moderately Agree 82 28.5
Moderately Disagree 32 11.1
Disagree 26 9.0
Strongly Disagree 7 2.4
No Answer 12 4.2
Total 288 100.0
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
Students’ hesitation toward the American style of democracy can be attributed to
two facts: first, they might think that American style of democracy can not be congruent
with Turkish societal context; and second, the U.S. foreign policy for spreading
democracy in the Middle East and its failure in Iraq would have negative impacts on
students’ perception of American style of democracy. It is not that they oppose the nature
of democracy, merely which they oppose the American way of exercising democracy,
especially outside of the U.S.
85
Table 4.26: Turkish university students’ answers to the statement that the style of democracy practiced in the United States would not be beneficial if adopted in Turkey by each university.
University
Sabanci Gebze Istanbul University Institute of University Total Technology Frequency 13 15 26 54 Strongly Agree Percent 11.8% 16.5% 29.9% 18.8% Frequency 31 25 19 75 Agree Percent 28.2% 27.5% 21.8% 26.0% Frequency 34 25 23 82 Moderately Agree Percent 30.9% 27.5% 26.4% 28.5% Frequency 15 9 8 32 Moderately Disagree Percent 13.6% 9.9% 9.2% 11.1%
Frequency 11 12 3 26 Disagree Percent 10.0% 13.2% 3.4% 9.0% Frequency 3 1 3 7 Strongly Disagree Percent 2.7% 1.1% 3.4% 2.4% Frequency 3 4 5 12 No Answer Percent 2.7% 4.4% 5.7% 4.2% Frequency 110 91 87 288 Total Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
86
When we look at the universities individually, we can observe that there is a significant difference between Istanbul University and the two other universities in terms of “strongly agree” with the statement that the style of democracy practiced in the U.S. would not be beneficial if adopted in Turkey. Istanbul University comes first in the category of “strongly agree” with 29.9 %, Gebze Institute of Technology comes second with 16.5 % and Sabanci University comes last with 11.8 % which is much lower than the overall percentage of “strongly agree” (18.8 %). This result is arguably congruent with the ideological profile of Sabanci University (liberal-westerner), Gebze Technical
University (rightist-close to the mainstream) and Istanbul University (conservative- religious). There is no significant difference between the universities in terms of “agree” and “moderately agree” with the statement. In the “moderately agree” category, Sabanci
University comes first with 13.6 %, Gebze Technical University comes second with 9.9
% and Istanbul University comes last with 9.2 % (Table 4.26). This shows that Sabanci
University is more open to the American style of democracy than the two other universities.
In the students’ ranking of the areas that are most likely to be the future strength of U.S. – Turkey relation, “trade and economic exchange” is ranked as the first area with
42.7 %, “military and security cooperation” is ranked as the second area with 42 %,
“other areas” is ranked as third with 6.9 %, “cultural exchange” is ranked as the last area with 4.5 % and 3.8 % of the students did not answer this question. “Trade and economic exchange” and “military and security cooperation” received almost equal answers and these two areas together have been seen the future strength of U.S. – Turkey bilateral
87 relations by 84.7 % of the students. “Cultural exchange” got the lowest percentage (4.5
%) and has not been viewed as a future strength for U.S. – Turkey relations (Table 4.27).
Table 4.27: University students’ ranking of the areas that are most likely to be the future strength of U.S. – Turkey relations.
Areas Frequency Percent
Cultural exchange 13 4.5 Trade and economic 123 42.7 exchange Military and security 121 42.0 cooperation Other areas 20 6.9
No Answer 11 3.8
Total 288 100.0
Source: Author’s fieldwork, January 2006.
Table 4.27 indicates that majority of the students (84.7 %) anticipate a future in
which “trade and economic exchange” and “military and security cooperation” will be the
areas of strength for the U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations. This result can be attributed to
four factors that might impact students’ prediction. Firstly, current developments in the
Middle East increase the importance of Turkey for the U.S. as a major regional ally.
Secondly, U.S. economic and militaristic interests in the Middle East entail Turkey’s
support as one of the most powerful militaristic and economically developing countries in
the region. Thirdly, Turkey’s position in the region as a sole democratic and secular
Muslim society is important for the U.S.’s regime changing interventions in the region.
And lastly and most importantly, the presence of the PKK in North Iraq which has to be
88 resolved through U.S. – Turkey collaboration necessitates the strong relationship of the
American and Turkish governments in “military and security cooperation” area. As students’ anticipation shows, U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations will remain strong with a common interest in “trade and economic exchange” and “military and security cooperation” areas.
In April 25, 2006 United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made her first foreign trip to Turkey and said “I wanted to come here as a part of my first trip as
Secretary of State to talk about the very important strategic relationship that the United
States and Turkey enjoy. A relationship that is based on interest, a relationship that is based on a common view of the future, but most importantly, a relationship that is based on common values”15. Since the Secretary of State’s visit to Ankara, U.S. – Turkey
relations have entered an era of revitalization. Hopefully, the future prospects will bring a
stronger relationship, like it was before the Iraq war.
15 Milliyet, April 25, 2006 89
CHAPTER V:
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Assessment of the survey results
The survey results related to the nature of U.S. – Turkey relations revealed that
Turkish university students do not have a clear idea about the nature of the bilateral relationship (Table 4.6) in its fuller depth and complexity. Despite the fact that the negative characterization of the relationship is small (10.8 %), the percentage describing the relationship outside the sphere of “alliance, friendship and partnership” is significantly high, with 42 % percent of the students defining the relationship with other terms such as “hegemonic relationship”, “pragmatic relationship”, “proxy state (Turkey)
– global power (U.S.) relationship”, “economically and politically dependent relationship”, “unequal power relations” etc. This reflects a quite critical attitude.
Moreover, 7.3 % of the students have no idea how they perceive the relationship between the two countries. Their perception might be distorted or strongly influenced in a negative way by the recent incongruent attitudes of the two countries toward each other in regard to the recent developments in the region, especially in Iraq.
This study yields two main areas that can be developed to revitalize the relationship between the U.S. and Turkey. First, both sides should diligently work on
90 constructing and giving a clearer picture of the relationship to the Turkish public by engaging in more public initiatives to underscore close and strong U.S. – Turkey relations. Moreover, in order for the U.S. to regain its prominent place in the eyes of the
Turkish public, it should side with Turkey on the issues of Kurds, EU accession, and the
Turkish position on Armenia and Cyprus. The Turkish government needs the support of the U.S. as a powerful and strong ally in the international arena, related to questions vital to Turkish interests. A separate question is of course the Kurdish ‘lobby’ in the United
States, its possible influence for some politicians and in Washington. That question, which impinges on geopolitical relations, has not been dealt with in the present thesis.
Second, the U.S. and Turkey should engage in better diplomatic efforts in cases of disagreement, rather than taking hostile and even punitive steps to pressure each other.
As the survey results revealed, students had a negative view of the TGNA’s rejection of the U.S. demand to use Turkish territory during the 2003 Iraq War. Before and after the
TGNA’s decision, the American and Turkish government paid enormous attention to the
TGNA’s decision and described it as the most important decision of the long-standing alliance. The rejection of the U.S. demand increased the negative characterization of the relationship between the two countries in the eyes of the Turkish public due to the U.S. aggressive response to the TGNA’s decision.
The survey results related to the current constraints and obstacles in the relationship part of the study reveal a scrutiny of the viability of the U.S. – Turkey alliance, especially with the impact of the U.S. war in Iraq and its ramifications for Iraqi and Turkish Kurds. As was discussed in a previous chapter, students see the 2003 Iraq
War as a turning point in the bilateral relationship (Table 4.18). Students are not just
91 opponents of the 2003 Iraq War. This population is aware of the war’s ramifications for
Turkey. Students ranked the “U.S.’s Kurdish policy” and “the presence of PKK in North
Iraq” as the most important obstacles in U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations. The student rankings of current constraints and obstacles in the relationship may produce answers to the questions of why students see the Iraq War as a turning point in the relationship and why students strongly support the TGNA’s decision to reject the U.S. demand to use
Turkish territory during 2003 Iraq War. The Iraq War creates a security vacuum in the north of Iraq and on the southeastern flank of Turkey, where PKK separatists reside and claim to have sovereign territory for Kurdistan. Turkish students seem highly sensitive about U.S. attitudes toward Kurdish people since they rank it the most important obstacle in their responses. This is a nationalist perception but is part of their core identity and must be appreciated. The year 2003 may of course prove to be one of the most fateful watersheds in modern American history, its repercussions still hard to assess, not just in bilateral relations between Ankara and Washington.
This study underscores the idea that U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations in the past and the future are fundamentally based on a range of concerns that serve the national interests of the two countries in the region. The bilateral relationships faced many threats in the past but were with time and effort resolved, enabling the relationship to continue.
The only current real threat to the relationship is the Kurdish issue and the possible emergence of an independent Kurdistan in the region. If one day U.S. – Turkey relations come to an abrupt end or slip into a crisis phase, the reason will likely be the Kurdish issue. Another potential friction point is the question of the Armenian “genocide’ in the early 20th century. There is a very powerful Armenian immigrant lobby in the United
92
States that pursues this issue with great intensity, even though it is a distant historical question unrelated to the lives of almost anyone today. There are virtually no Armenians alive who actually lived through the convulsions of that period, nor are there any living
Turks. But the question of the Armenian ‘historical narrative’ and the need to resurrect a
‘historical memory of genocide’ has come to play an important political role.
The survey results addressing the future prospects and strengths of the U.S. –
Turkey ties indicate that despite recent entanglements in the relationship, U.S. – Turkey relations will regain momentum in the “trade and economic exchange” and “military and security cooperation” areas. Even though the students see the “military and security cooperation” area as the potential solid prospect and positive strength of the relationship, students do not feel that the U.S. military installations help promote a better future for
Turkey. The reason for this contrast might be the unilateral U.S. use of these military installations. If these military installations could be used for bilateral and multilateral issues serving the national interests of both countries, like during the Cold-War era, students might see U.S. military installations in a positive light for the future of Turkey.
If the U.S. is perceived as an aggressor in the region, and perhaps fighting an ‘anti-
Islamic’ war in its ideology, then many students will reject this as a form of neo- hegemony. The present military posture of Washington in the region is destructive to the
U.S. image among all Muslims. In the case of Turkey, it is not so closely linked with the
Palestine question. Turkey is the only large Muslim country that has had productive ties with Israel over many years.
As the survey results reveal, “trade and economic exchange” area is one of the bases on which U.S. – Turkey relations should proceed (Table 4.27). This study suggests
93 that U.S and Turkey can initiate trade and economic activism in Central Asia by using
Turkey’s historical and cultural ties in the region, where the natural resources are already receiving enough attention from global investors. Turkey is a gateway to Central Asia and the U.S. should recognize that, many international investors do. This is the real space for future cooperation. And it is very much a geographical dimension of what Turkey is, and its positioning in Western Asia both physically and as a center of Turkic culture, which spreads in a broad band into Central Asia.
Concluding Summary: Prospects for the Future
Nearly fifty years of U.S. – Turkey relations have evolved into a situation of strategic partnership in the post-Cold War era because the interests of two countries were over decades in basic agreement, and also because both tried to perpetuate these good relations by limiting themselves to some extent to certain core issues, centered on the
Cold War and containment of the Soviet Union for much of the period under examination. However, after September 11, the relations between U.S. and Turkey have been relatively troubled, perhaps even paralyzed, because of the developments in northern Iraq, Iraq’s constitution, the status of Kirkuk, and the broader question of Israel.
Moreover, the divergence between the U.S. and E.U., and the factor of the JDP government’s peripheral position in Turkish politics, brought a different look to the relations with the neighboring regions. The E.U. and United States should attempt to better understand Turkey’s interest in seeing an equitable solution to the current stalemate situation on Cyprus, and perhaps recognition of Northern Cyprus as an autonomous area
94 within a federation of what has become in effect two separate Cypriot states, with separate languages and religious majorities. The E.U. and Washington should also better appreciate the concern of Turkey over the entire question of Kurdistan and its own
Kurdish minority. The United States would do well to exert some influence in convincing the E.U. to include Turkey as a member in the near future, and to nurture realistic hopes in the Turkish elite and the working masses that this will indeed occur. Turkey needs to feel it is on a clear path to being inside the E.U. That is a geopolitical aim with considerable potential impact on a whole array of attitudes and issues.
The present situation seems to open what will become a new era in relations between Turkey and Washington. However, the Turkish government seems somewhat erratic in its foreign policy-making due to the ambiguities and pressures of the new era; this has generated seemingly contradictory swings to the opposing policy choices, such as siding with the U.S. (or more precisely, the U.S., Britain, and Israel alliance) in the region that envisions enlarging the influence of the state’s core – the army, bureaucracy, and intellectual elite. Once Turkey’s own policy choices and plans are added to the equation, a picture emerges of conflicting policy options promulgated by the U.S., E.U., and
Turkey in the Middle East, Caucasus, the Central Asia, and South Asia. What will emerge in the near future will probably be determined by the JDP government’s performance in passing the reform packages, the E.U.’s response to these developments; and Turkey’s attitude toward a potential regional crisis which might occur between U.S. and Iran or Syria or Saudi Arabia, or all three. Another potential factor is the emergence of Kurdistan on the eastern and southeastern flank of Turkey that would propagate a mobilization among Turkey’s Kurdish population and would threaten Turkey’s territorial
95 integrity. Within these poles of idealism and realism, the JDP government is under pressure to choose the best policy options for the shorter and long term.
These options open to the JDP and the current U.S. government will not only determine the health of bilateral relations, but will doubtless also affect the regional security and Islamic world’s relations with the Western world over the long term regarding Turkey’s rising role within the Islamic world (e. g. for the first time the
Organization of Muslim Countries has been led by a Turk – Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu). U.S. success in the war on terrorism and Turkey’s achievement in its regional aims may intersect. It is hard for Washington to succeed in the war on terrorism without having the support of major Islamic countries. And as long as the U.S. pursues its current policies in the region, it would hardly have the genuine support of the regional countries. Therefore, regional and international security would appear to rest on more cooperative and equal relations between U.S. and regional countries, especially Turkey, which has the potential to influence other states in the region with its current Islamist government. Otherwise, the international environment will likely be less secure for all concerned.
96
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abramowitz, M.(ed.) Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy. New York: Century Foundation Press, 2002.
Agnew, J. Hegemony: the new shape of global power. Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 2005.
Agnew, J. “Bounding the European Project”. Geopolitics, Autumn 2005, Vol. 10 Issue 3, p575-580, 6p.
Agnew, J. Geopolitics: re-visioning world politics. London; New York: Routledge, 2003.
Agnew, J. “The United States and American Hegemony”. Political geography of the twentieth century : a global analysis. Ed. Taylor, P. London : Belhaven Press, 1993.
Agnew, J. “American Hegemony into American Empire? Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq”. Antipode, Nov2003, Vol. 35 Issue 5.
Altunısik, M. “The Turkish-Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era”. Middle Eastern Studies, 36 (2, April), pp.172-191.
Aras, B. “The Caspian Region and Middle East Security”. Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 2002, p. 43.
Armaoglu, F. Belgelerle Turk - Amerikan Munasebetleri. Ankara: TTK Yay., 1991.
Aydın, M. and Cagri, E. (Ed.) Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future. London; New York: Routledge, 2004.
Aykan, M. “Turkish Perspectives on Turkish - US Relations Concerning Persian Gulf Security in the Post-Cold War Era: 1989-1995”. Middle East Journal 50, no. 3 (1996): 344-58.
Baran, Z. “Turkish-American Strategic Partnership on the Brink: Who is to Blame?”. The National Interest, Vol.2, No. 17.
97
Barkey, H. (Ed) Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey’s role in the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996.
Bolukbasi, Suha. The superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American relations and Cyprus. Lanham, MD: University Press of America; [Charlottesville]: The Miller Center, The University of Virginia, 1988.
Braden, K. and Shelley, F. Engaging Geopolitics. Harlow, England ; New York : Prentice Hall, 2000. Brunn, S. (ed) 11 September and its aftermath: the geopolitics of terror. London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004. Caliskan, K and Taksin Y., “Litmus Test: Turkey’s Neo-Islamists Weigh War and Peace”. MERIP, January 30, 2003.
Celik Y. Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy. Wesport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999.
Cohen, S. “The Eurasian Convergence Zone: Gateway or Shatterbelt?”. Eurasian Geography and Economics. 2005, 46, No. 1, pp. 1-22.
Cohen, S. “The Geopolitics of Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”. Eurasian Geography and Economics. 45, 8:575-582, 2004.
Cohen, S. Geopolitics of the world system.Lanham, Md.; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003. Cohen, S. “Geopolitics in the New World Era: A New Perspective on an Old Discipline”. Reordering the world : geopolitical perspectives on the twenty-first century. Eds. Demko, G. and Wood, W. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999.
Cohen, S. Geography and politics in a world divided. New York, Oxford University Press, 1973.
Dahlman, C. “Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: The Geopolitics of Enlargement”. Eurasian Geography & Economics; Dec2004, Vol. 45 Issue 8, p553-574, 22p.
Daalder, I and Lindsay, J. America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2005.
De Seversky, A. Victory through air power. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1942.
De Seversky, A. Air power: key to survival. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1950.
98
Dodds, K. Geopolitics in a changing world. Harlow, England ; New York : Prentice Hall, 2000.
Dodds, K. “Licensed to Stereotype: Popular Geopolitics, James Bond and the Spectre of Balkanism”. Geopolitics. Summer 2003, Vol. 8, Issue 2.
Drysdale, A and Blake, G. The Middle East and North Africa: a political geography. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Erdogan, E. “The Missing Element: Turkish Public Opinion Towards The US”. Turkish Policy Quarterly. Vol 4, No. 1, Spring 2005.
Erickson, E. “Turkey as Regional Hegemon-2014: Strategic Implications for the United States”. Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp.25-45
Falah, G. “Demography and division: a view from the Middle East”. Political geography of the twentieth century: a global analysis. Ed. Taylor, P. London: Belhaven Press, 1993.
Glassner, M. and Fahner, C. Political Geography. Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, c2004
Graham, F. and Lesser, L. with Henze, P. and Brown, J. Turkey’s new geopolitics: from the Balkans to Western China. Boulder : Westview Press, 1993.
Hale, W. Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000. London; Portland: Frank Cass, 2000.
Ismael, T. and Ismael, J. (eds) The Gulf War and the new world order : international relations of the Middle East. Gainesville : University Press of Florida, 1994.
Johnston, R., Taylor, P. and Watts, M. Geographies of Global Change: Remapping the World. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.
Karasapan, O. “Turkey and US Strategy in the Age of Glasnost”. Middle East Report. No. 160, (Sep.-Oct. 1989), 4-10+22.
Kennan, G. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”. Foreign Affairs, 1947.
Kissinger, H. American Foreign Policy. New York: Norton, c1977.
Kissinger, H. American Foreign Policy: Three Essays. New York: Norton, 1969.
Kramer, H. A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, c2000.
99
Kirisci, K. “Turkey and the United States: Ambivalent Allies”. US allies in a changing world. Eds. Rubin, B. and Keaney, T. London ; Portland, OR : Frank Cass, 2001.
Kirisci, K. “Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri: Belirsizlikten Yakınlasmaya”. Avrasya Dosyası, Cilt 6, Sayı 2, Yaz 2000, p. 68-90.
Kinzer, S. “Turkey’s Place in the War against Militant Islam”. The Middle East Forum, October 17, 2001.
Kuniholm, B. The origins of the cold war in the Near East : great power conflict and diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994.
Lahlos, S. (Ed.) Turkey: Current Issues and Background. New York: Nova Science, 2003.
Mackinder, H. “The Scope and Methods of Geography”. Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, Vol. 9, 1887.
Mackinder, H. “The Geographical Pivot of History”. Geographical Journal, Vol. 23, 1904. Mackinder, H. “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace”. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 21, July 1943.
Mackinder, H. Democratic ideals and reality. With additional papers. Edited and with an introd. by Anthony J. Pearce New York, Norton, 1962.
Martin, L. and Dimitris, K. (Ed.) The future of Turkish Foreign Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004.
Mcghee, G. The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East connection : how the Truman Doctrine contained the Soviets in the Middle East. New York : St. Martin’s Press, 1990.
Murphy, A. “Turkey's Place in the Europe of the 21st Century”. Eurasian Geography & Economics; Dec2004, Vol. 45 Issue 8, p583-587, 5p.
National Security Strategy. The White House, September 2002, (
O’Loughlin, J. “World Power Competition and Local Conflicts in the Third World”. A World in Crisis? Geopolitical Perspectives. Eds. Johnston, R. and Taylor, P. Oxford [England] ; Cambridge, Mass. : Basil Blackwell, 1989.
100
O’Loughlin, J. (ed) Dictionary of Geopolitics. Westport, Conn. : Greenwood Press, 1994.
O’Loughlin, J. and Talbot, P. “Where in the World is Russia? Geopolitical Perceptions and Preferences of Ordinary Russians”. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2005, 46, No. 1, pp. 23-50.
Ó Tuathail, G. Critical geopolitics: the politics of writing global space, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1996.
Pipes, D. Turkiye-AKP: Bekleyelim Gorelim. Radikal (August 11, 2003).
Philip, R. Suits and Uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the Cold War. Seattle: University of Washington Press, c2003.
President Bush enunciated his version of the new world order in his now famous State of the Union speech in January, 1999.
Rubin, B. and Kirisci, K. (eds) Turkey in world politics: an emerging multiregional power. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.
Radikal, June 26, 2003.
Secor, A. and O’Loughlin, J. “Social and political trust in Istanbul and Moscow: a comparative analysis of individual and neighbourhood effects”. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers; Mar2005, Vol. 30 Issue 1, p66-82, 17p.
Sharp, J. Condensing the Cold War: Reader’s Digest and American Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, c2000.
Spykman, N. America’s strategy in world politics, the United States and the balance of power. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1942.
Spykman, N. The Geography of the Peace. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944.
Stearns, M. Entangled allies: U.S. policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992.
Schmergel, G. (Ed.) US Foreign Policy in the 1990s. London: Macmillan, 1991.
Tareq, I and Aydin, M. (Ed.) Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics. Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003.
Taylor, P. “Geopolitical World Orders”. Political geography of the twentieth century : a global analysis. Ed. Taylor, P. London: Belhaven Press, 1993.
101
Taylor, P. and Flint, C. (eds) Political geography : world-economy, nation-state and locality. Harlow; New York : Prentice Hall, 2000.
The 9/11 Commission Report. July 22, 2004, (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911).
The Analysis of Turkish-American Economic and Commercial Relations and Suggestions for the Future: Executive Summary. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 2003.
The Project for the New American Century, Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century, September 2000,
Truman Dockrine, 1947.
O’Tuathail, G. and Simon Dalby. 1998. “Introduction: Rethinking geopolitics, toward a critical geopolitics”. In Rethinking geopolitics, ed. G. O’Tuathail and S. Dalby, 1 – 15. New York: Roudledge.
Turkish-American Relations: Forty Years of Continuity and Change: 2-4 April 1986. İstanbul: SİSAV, c1986.
Uslu, N. Turkish foreign policy in the post-cold war period. Hauppauge, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2004.
Uslu, N. “1947’den Gunumuze Turk-Amerikan Iliskilerinin Genel Portgresi. Avrasya Dosyası, Cilt 6, Sayı 2, Yaz 2000, p. 204.
Vujakovic, P. (1999). “A new map is unrolling before us’: Cartographiy in the News Media Representation of Post-Cold War Europe”. The Cartographic Journal. 36 (1): 43 – 57.
Yavuz, H. “Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism”. Journal for Critical Studies of the Middle East, No. 12, Spring 1998, pp. 19-41.
Yetkin, M. Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gercek Oykusu. İstanbul: Remzi Kitapevi, 2004.
Zanger, M. “The US and the Kurds of Iraq”. MERIP, August 9th, 2002.
102
APPENDICES
103
APPENDIX A
IRB APPROVAL
104
APPENDIX B
LETTER TO PARTICIPANTS
105
APPENDIX C
SURVEY FORM
Popular Perceptions of the U.S. – Turkey bilateral relations: A survey of student opinions
In order to understand the background of survey respondents, I want to ask you a few questions about yourself. Your answers are completely anonymous. Please circle or fill in the response that best describes your answer.
2- What is your age? ______years old
3- Are you? Please circle one.
1. Male 2. Female
4- What is the name of your university?
______
5- Which region of Turkey are you from?
Region: ______Province: ______
6- Which of the following best describes the level of your parents’ income? Please circle the letter that corresponds with your answer.
a) My parents’ income is much lower than that of the income of average Turkish households b) My parents’ income is slightly lower than that of the income of average Turkish households c) My parents’ income is equal to that of the income of average Turkish households d) My parents’ income is slightly higher than that of the income of average Turkish households e) My parents’ income is much higher than that of the income of average Turkish households
7- How would you describe your political ideology?
Very A mixture of Very Other Liberal Liberal Lib. and Cons. Conservative Conservative (Please Specify)
106
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
8- How would you describe your religious beliefs?
Very A mixture of Very Other Secular Secular Sec. and Rel. Religious Religious (Please Specify) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
This section asks about your opinions regarding United States – Turkey bilateral relations. Please choose the response which best describes your opinion.
9- Please rank the following identities in terms of the best description of the identification of Turkey for you where 1 is the most suitable identity 3 is the least suitable identity.
______A Middle Eastern A Western Secular A Central Asian Other Country Country Turkic Country (Please specify)
10- Which of the following terms best defines United States – Turkey relations?
a) Allies b) Partners c) Friends d) Enemies e) Other (Please specify) ______
11- The style of democracy practiced in the United States would not be beneficial if adopted in Turkey.
a) Strongly Agree b) Agree c) Moderately Agree d) Moderately Disagree e) Disagree f) Strongly Disagree
107
12- Please rank the following obstacles in the United States – Turkey bilateral relations in terms of their importance where 1 is the most important obstacle 8 is the least important obstacle.
______Presence of PKK United States’ United States’ Invasion of Iraq in North Iraq Kurdish policy Middle East Policy
______United States’ Armenian problem War on Terrorism United States’ Cyprus policy other policies (Please specify)
13- On March 1 2003 the Turkish Grand National Assembly made a decision to reject the United States' request to use Turkish soil in its military mission to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Which of the following best describes your opinion towards this decision?
a) I strongly agree with the Assembly's decision b) I agree with the Assembly’s decision c) I moderately agree with the Assembly’s decision d) I moderately disagree with the Assembly’s decision e) I disagree with the Assembly’s decision f) I strongly disagree with the Assembly's decision.
14- United States’ 2003 military intervention in Iraq has been a significant turning point for United States – Turkey relations.
a) Strongly Agree b) Agree c) Moderately Agree d) Moderately Disagree e) Disagree f) Strongly Disagree
15- The presence of United States military installations in Turkey helps to promote a better future for Turkey.
a) Strongly Agree b) Agree c) Moderately Agree d) Moderately Disagree e) Disagree f) Strongly Disagree 108
16- Please rank the following reasons for the United States’ military presence in Turkey where 1 is the most important reason and 6 is the least important. ______Containing Fighting Protecting Securing Spreading Other Russia Terrorism Israel Oil Democracy
17- Aspects of the American way of life should be adopted in Turkey.
a) Strongly Agree b) Agree c) Moderately Agree d) Moderately Disagree e) Disagree f) Strongly Disagree 18- Which of the following areas is most likely to be the future strength of United States – Turkey relations?
a) Cultural exchange b) Trade and economic exchange c) Military and security cooperation d) Other (Please specify) ______
19- In general, the United States has a greater influence on Turkey than the countries of the European Union have.
a) Strongly Agree b) Agree c) Moderately Agree d) Moderately Disagree e) Disagree f) Strongly Disagree
Thank you very much for your cooperation! Please feel free to use the available space to tell me any additional information or share any additional comments.
109