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Review of Daniel Heider: Universďs in Second HabilitačníPráce, 2013

Daniel Heider's book on the universals in three major representatives of the so called Second Scholasticism is a detailed examination based on close reading of the relevant primary sources and gives access to the debate as it was lead among the philosophers of the rlh century. It proves the author's intimate familiariý with the issues and his mastery of the philosophical questions.

Heider's goal is to unfold varieties of moderate realisml within the philosophical current of Second Scholasticism. (Further dornm I will make observations about terminology.) The immediate problem is that of the ontological and epistemic status of first and second intentions (p. r5), the purpose is to show varieties of solutions to that problem, and the method is to read three representatives both as three typical ways of solving the problem and as responding and building upon each other, thus adding the claim that history of does not consist of insulated "disparate opinions" but as a cooperative continuum within which the philosophical problem evolves (p.tň. However, it should be noted that the historical perspective is rather accidental to Heider's agenda as he expressly sympathizes with the "problem-driven character of philosophical analysis", which he imputes on Second Scholasticism as "not dissimilar to that of contemporary analytical philosophy."

The three representatives are Franciscus Suarez, S.J., Johannes a Sancto Thoma, OP, and Bartholomaeus Mastrius together with Bonaventura Bellutus, OFM.2 Evidently, the second and the third responded to the antecedent authors, and Suarez took into account the schools the others represent, namely and . So we have a perfect setting to compare three major currents in rlh-century school philosophy, nameý the Jesuit school, which is knor,l'rr to negotiate Thomist, Scotist, and nominalist metaphysics, then the two strains of realism in a Thomist Dominican and in the Franciscan co-authors who defend a version of Scotist realism.

The study begins with an overview over these schools and major themes, which is based on generally agreed research of the last decades. The major interest is that as a result of Humanism andthe continuity of medieval in the 16ů centurythe tree major strains in discussing universals, namely, realism, moderate realism, and nominalism, kept competing and enteredthe academic teaching of philosophy, particularly through the Jesuits (pp. 8-r+).

1 Defined on p. Bz: "t) the universal denomination of the intellect attaining the real natures of things; z) formal uniý as the ontological (remote) ground of the nature's non-repugnancy to being in the many; 3) the conception of universality embedded in the context of the theory of triple universal." ' I disapprove of the fashion of artificialý using vernacular, or even English' names for authors who are exclusively known and treated through their works in Latin. This fashion creates the illusion as though one were concerned with the personality of the philosopher, which is evidently not at all the case. Blum Reuiew Heider

In the chapter on Suarez, Heider explains the role of the universals in the lisputationes metaphysicae and in De anima. What is important to the Heider is that for Suarez treatment of the notion of unity has to preďede that of universals (p. z3), and hence great deal of this chapter explores the varieties of unity [pun intenáed] in scholasticism. The chapter gives occasion to contrast Suarez with twďother famous Jesuit philosophers, namely Petrus Fonseca and Petrus Hurtadus de Mendoza. Fonseca seems to prompt Suarez to stress the epistemic perspective on unity (p. 4r), whereas Hurtadus (being influenced by Suarez) is known as introducing nominalism into Jesuit school philosophy. Hurtadus's nominalism in claiming that'iwhat is immediately signified by universal concepts is a class of individuals"(p. 9o) helps profiling Suarez's compromises between Scotist realism and nominalism. From a historicď-philosophical point of view both comparisons are important because they dispe] the two conflicting prejudices that Suarez was the epitome of Jesuit philosophy_ and that Jesuits were nominalists (cf. p. z77 anďz8s). Heider's interpretation of Suarez ýelds the insight that the problem of universals has to be tackled epistemologically for the sake of metaphysically defendable understanding of reality (pp.8z-qo).

Johannes a S. Thoma explicates uniuersale in essendo et praedicando to be relational in character, and hence the "division of labor'' is similár to that in Suarez, namelythat Íirst intentions are object of metaphysics, whereas second intentions (what in ordinary-parlance we call concepts) interest, unsurprisingly, the logician (pp. 92f.). Johannes also clearly blames nominalists of erring with Plato in not distinguishing the mode of being from the mode of cognizing; this gives rise to the modern notion of conceptual platonism (lower case!) that entertains the option that there are parallel worlds of reďity and ideas (pp.g+-g6; cf.p. 275f).Aiming at realism, Johannes has to deal with philosophical psycholog'and tackles theleal ďstinction between the agent and the potential intellect in the tradition of Thomas Aquinasby assigning them the functions of active/passive motion and actuality and potentiality (pp.pf ff.). Heider also deals with the category of relation, which not only marks Johannes's understanding of universal, as mentioned, but also is fundamental to his metaphysics, for the "essence of relation is to be identiÍied with the ontological relation(relatío secundum esse)" (p. rss).This has awakened great interest in contemporary semiotics, and Heider duly refers to John Deely's work (p. 156 n. S66); but then he adds (p. 16o f.) some remarks and a "historiographical hypothesis" suggesting that Suarez had some impact on Johannes's semiotics. Unfortunately Heider seems to underestimate the systematic coherence of sign theory with universals within Johannes and to misunderstand the agenda of present- day semiotics. It appears that Johannes differs from Suarez in shifting the burden of non-being from concepts to'nature as such'while maintaining principles to be real, which then modifies his understanding of individuation and other components of Thomistic metaphysics but also his epistemology and psycholog' (pp. 158-16o).

Bartholomaeus Mastrius and Bonaventura Bellutus, two Franciscan Scotists, co-authored most of their Cursus of philosophy, but only Mastrius authored the part on metaphysics. For the sake of brevity Heider deals with the work throughout as Mastri/Belluto. The Scotist work battles with the full arsenal of Scotist method and subtleties. Here, the universal is captured with the tools of distinction, difference/indifference, precision, denomination etc. Heideř pays close attention to the fact that these Scotists understand their task to be surveying the history of scholastic and. their contemporary school philosophy in order to tease out the viable Blum Reuiew Heider 3

doctrine. This is fortunate because it justiÍies Heider's project to compare the major competitors in the Íield. The Scotists exhibit "greater ontoio5cat exactlyby scrutinizing the epistemic status of precision andóther "o*'*it*ents,,mental operations (section 4.4, pp. 2-g}-zzg; cf. p. z7t),which among others, the distinction "r.jtuil., between universaliý and commonalit{. Specificalý in the"Scoti"t ;'p;"ch the contiguiý ofJogic, m_etaphysics, and philósophicaítheology plays u"'i."po.tant role (e.9., p. zogf., zr5; cf. z7z, zB5).

In his conclusion, Heider correctly claims to have presented an alternative view on modern philosophy. In "Tly ryodern philosophy (branching into conceptualism, platonism, and rationďism), moderat^e."uli'- not Jnýexisted and competed internally, but it also paved the way for modern rationalism and nominalism (pp. 275il.

The strength and the weakness of this book is its "painstakingly extensive elaboration of the issue'' (p.'z76, said of the school philosoph;.'i;řuáer unable to read the original sources tll s"]a full picture of thó philosophi""r -.ir'.d of those wgrks. Heider-presents each of his souices paylng du! attention to the internal coherence of the arguments and leads the róaáer-step by step throug}ru.gu-ents and objections, refutations and distinctions as his'oor""i d"o, alirost trr ró doing he shows his sovereign mastery of the problematic at hand and his extensive'''] and intensive familiariýwith the topic. on the other hand, a reader only remoteý informed about scholastic method will have troubles fóilowing the írain of tháught.

This leads me to a-major conc€rn. The author, being so ad'mirably at home in this sýle of thought, could have made an effort of hármeneutics and'translation'and explicitly shown how the same problem in one author has one set and framework of terminology and is conceptualized and systematized in a different manner in another author. At times he makes hints in this direction, but it would, have been philosophpqtlY lnore profound and communicatively more effective if he had confronted this feature while mwing from o'" to the next. Such an approach 'orr.ěe to the scholastic way9f-p.|rilosophizing would necessarily have historicized tňó subject matter for the sake of philosophical understanding. porit is not enough to record ihe thought of one philosopher at a time, one must ďň show the internařconnection b-etween tbg* by analyzing how and why one philosopher'responds'to another even if thewording appe_ars ďsparate. For inštance: geidei observós correctly (pp. qrf.) that the question of universals pervades the entire course of philosopnytr}^ot árro". u Sancto Thoma, because it is at the same time and under different peispectives a key iss9e of logic, of psycholo5l, and of physics. The fact that Suarez discussed universáls within metaphysics is_easiý explained by the fact that in his Disputationes he aimed at provingthat metaphysics is the lead discipline of philosophy, a claim that was unsuccessful withinrlh-century school philósophy.Ťr'i. .o.'tó*t, which could shed systematic light on thethree approaches to univerials in this book, seems to be unimportant to the author. In other words: one has to lift the discourse to that level on which for each philosopher individuďly and for the group or school it becomes clear: what is the qderýing philosophicai probr"* ir'"y aró about to solve? (To refer to unfinished work in Aristotle, the ňaster óf au, is a gobd start but not yet philos-ophy.) As a welcome consequence, by showing řr'ut the problem was that moved the Jesuit, the Dominican, and the Franciscň, o''u *o,ild also und'erstand in more than general cues how and why they might have contributed to the various - isms rampanl these {afs,{he key difference between "problem-driven" philosophy now and in the schools of the rlh century was the oldef philosophers' ke'en awareness BIum Reuiew Heider

of the concatenation (or systematics) of any philosophical problem with all other questions, including theologr. This systematic coherence plays out after the end of scholastic philosophy, even unbeknownst to the philosophers.

Now, if the question would be raised, whether this book should be published, the answer is that it needs thorough re-writing. That there are weaknesseš of English language is natural and can easiýbe edited. But, as I mentioned earlier, the book pays little respect to a reader. For instance, although the position of the three authorities in moderate realism is the major theme, a definition of moderate realism comes only on p. 82 and in passing. Although the author tries to summarize and preannounce the topics of each chapter and section, he makes no effort to give an 'eagle's point of view' on the philosophical importance. Why and according to which logic, for instance, is it coherent to talk about formal unity of nature, aptitude of being in the many' ďistinctío uirtualis intrinseca, and uniuersale materiale - in this order (p. qzP The author knows, the reader should know. Finally, there is a linguistic problem in the philosophicď sense: Heider is comfortable using "fulýfledged'' in connection with uniuersale, "moderate" regarding realism, "more" with regard to internalist or mentalist postitions (p. 274), "more robust" as quali$ring the foundation of common concepts (p. z7t),"greater" ontological commitments (ibid.), and so on. This is language from present-day analytic philosophy; it is nevertheless the wrong interpretive tool with regard to the subject matter of this study. For this language conveys appraisal, relativiý, fuzziness, imprecision, and intensification in a strictly systematic philosophythat explicitý consists in extensive elaboration of conceptual and terminological exactitude. Hence, even as a convenient shortcut for a complex inference, it has no explanatory function and undoes its or,rm achievements. I gave a few examples, but this style is what should be corrected throughout the book so that its philosophical accomplishments can be duly appreciated.

Heider proves himself to be an outstanding scholar and specialist of rTth- century school philosophy and of present-day epistemolog'. Therefore I recommend this work to be defended in the habilitation process in front of the Scientific Board of the Philosophical Faculý of Palacký University.

June 20, 2o1g

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Paul Richard Blum, Loyola University Maryland