Avant & de Nevers 6/1/2011 4:32 PM Page 1

Military Contractors & the American Way of War

Deborah D. Avant & Renée de Nevers

Abstract: Contractors are deeply intertwined with the American military and U.S. foreign policy. Over half of the personnel the United States has deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 have been con- tractors. Their relationship with the U.S. government, the public, and domestic and international law differs from that of military personnel, and these differences pose both bene½ts and risks. America’s use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) can provide or enhance forces for global gover- nance. Yet PMSCs can also be used to pursue agendas that do not have the support of American, inter- national, or local publics. Thus far, the use of PMSCs has proved a mixed bag in terms of effectiveness, accountability, and American values. Moving forward in a way that maximizes the bene½ts of contrac- tors and minimizes their risks will require careful management of the uncomfortable trade-offs these forces present.

More than one-half of the personnel the United States has deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003 have been contractors. Part of the global pri- vate military and security industry, contractors are deeply intertwined with the American military and U.S. foreign policy.1 Whatever one chooses to call them–mercenaries, contractors, or private mili- tary and security companies (pmscs)–they have a different relationship to the U.S. government, the DEBORAH AVANT American public, and domestic and international D. is Professor law than do military personnel. These differences of Political Science and Director of the program and center for pose both bene½ts and risks to the effectiveness, International Studies at the Uni- accountability, and values represented in American versity of California, Irvine. actions abroad. In the best case, American use of pmscs can pro- RENÉEDENEVERSis an Associ- vide or enhance forces for global governance. ate Professor of Public Adminis- pmscs can recruit from around the world to quick- tration at the Maxwell School of ly mobilize expertise as needed. If their employees Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. are instilled with professional values and skills and engaged in a way that is responsive to the demands (*See endnotes for complete contribu- of the U.S. public, the international community, tor biographies.) and local concerns, these forces could contribute to

© 2011 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

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Military managing a global demand for security tion’s announcement of the troop surge Contractors that U.S. forces alone cannot meet. In the in Afghanistan, contractors made up an & the American worst case, pmscs can provide a means estimated 62 percent of the U.S. presence Way of War for pursuing agendas that do not have in that country.4 The use of contractors the support of American, international, in these conflicts represents a dramatic or local publics. They may siphon off expansion in the U.S. military’s reliance U.S. dollars for practices that are waste- on pmscs. During the 1991 Gulf conflict, ful, are antithetical to U.S. interests, or the ratio of troops to contractors was undermine global stability. Thus far, the roughly ten to one; in 2007, the ratio of use of pmscs has produced mixed troops to contractors in Iraq was roughly results: it has increased effectiveness one to one.5 In Afghanistan in 2010, there somewhat, but often at the expense of were roughly 1.43 contractors for every accountability and with dubious atten- American soldier.6 The Commission on tion to the values the United States and Wartime Contracting (cwc), established the international community hold dear. by Congress in 2008, estimates conserva- Moving forward in a way that maxi- tively that at least $177 billion has been mizes the bene½ts of contractors and obligated in contracts and grants to sup- minimizes their risks will require care- port U.S. operations in Afghanistan and ful management of the uncomfortable Iraq since 2001.7 trade-offs these forces pose. Pmscs offer a wide range of services, The degree to which the United States including tasks associated with military relies on private security vendors has operations, policing, and the gray area become clear during the hostilities in between the two that is an increas- Iraq and Afghanistan, as contractors have ingly large part of twenty-½rst-century provided logistical support for U.S. and conflict. Common services include sup- coalition troops. Less well known is that port for weapons systems and equip- as U.S. forces were stretched thin by the ment, military advice and training, lo- lawlessness resulting from the fall of Sad- gistical support, site security (armed dam Hussein in 2003, the ½rst “surge” and unarmed), crime prevention, police involved private personnel mobilized to training, and intelligence.8 While some protect expatriates working in the coun- ½rms specialize in a speci½c area, others try and train the Iraqi police force and provide an array of services, and a few army; and a private Iraqi force was hired offer the entire range. The cwc divides to guard government facilities and oil the services provided by contractors into ½elds.2 Retired military or police from three categories: logistics, security, and all over the world, employed by a wide reconstruction.9 array of pmscs, worked for the U.S. gov- Logistics services include the supply of ernment (and others) throughout the food, laundry, fuel, and base facility con- country. struction. Kellogg Brown and Root (kbr) Although precise ½gures are dif½cult to held the U.S. Army’s logistics civil aug- determine, by 2008, the number of per- mentation contract (logcap) in the sonnel in Iraq under contract with the early years of the Iraq and Afghanistan U.S. government roughly equaled or was conflicts. In June 2007, the new contract greater than the number of U.S. troops on (logcap iv) was awarded to three the ground.3 In September 2009, two companies: DynCorp International llc, months prior to the Obama administra- Fluor Intercontinental, Inc., and kbr. In

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Iraq alone, the logcap contract paid out tory of providing military training in Deborah D. $22 billion between 2003 and 2007.10 Saudi Arabia; mpri, a ½rm that gained Avant & Renée Security services include guarding peo- prominence by training Croatian and de Nevers ple, buildings, and convoys. Many securi- then Bosnian troops in the 1990s; and ty contractors are armed; in carrying out usis, which was established as the result their duties, they routinely shoot and are of an Of½ce of Management Personnel shot at.11 The Congressional Budget Of- privatization effort in 1994.16 Parsons ½ce estimated that in 2008, 30,000 to Corporation, another older ½rm with 35,000 of the contractors working in Iraq a long record in the building of infra- were armed; in early 2010, private se- structure, has worked on many large curity contractors numbered roughly infrastructure projects. Myriad others 11,000.12 Blackwater (now Xe) employ- have delivered various capacity-building ees, recruited to support both the mili- services.17 tary and the U.S. State Department, have Though their use in Iraq and Afghan- received the most notoriety for their istan dominates the discussion of con- security work in Iraq and, more recently, tractors in the U.S. context, pmscs are in Afghanistan. Working under the State important players in all aspects of the Department’s Worldwide Personal Pro- U.S. military and U.S. foreign policy.18 tective Services (wpps) contract in Iraq, Contractors working for the Depart- Blackwater personnel carried weapons, ments of Defense (dod) and State con- had their own helicopters, and defended tribute signi½cantly to U.S. foreign policy against insurgents in ways hard to distin- projects aimed at enhancing develop- guish from military actions.13 They were ment and security in a number of states; later joined by newer companies such as they also support U.S. troops and dip- Triple Canopy, Crescent Security Group, lomats. Their tasks cover all three cat- and Custer Battles.14 egories noted above. Consider, for in- Reconstruction services incorporate every- stance, the contractor support for U.S. thing from building physical infrastruc- foreign assistance policies in Africa and ture (for roads, communication, water, Latin America. and power) to strengthening institutions In Africa, the United States has relied (for example, by training government on the private sector to support missions employees, including military, police, such as military training and peacekeep- and justice personnel at the national, ing operations. These programs fall with- provincial, and local levels; supporting in africom, the U.S. military command civil society groups; and promoting rule for Africa established in 2007, and the of law and democratization). A wide State Department’s Africa Peacekeeping range of pmscs, along with other con- program (africap), which is similar in tractors, have delivered these services. structure to the army’s logcap con- DynCorp, an old company with roots in tract. In 2008, africap’s stated objec- technical support and an increasing pres- tives were to enhance regional peace and ence in policing and police training, has stability in Africa through training pro- trained Iraqi police, constructed police grams in peacekeeping and conflict man- and prison facilities, and built capacity agement and prevention for African for a justice system.15 Three companies armed forces, as well as through logistics that provided training for the new Iraqi and construction activities in support of Army early in the conflict are Vinnell peacekeeping and training missions.19 Corporation, a company with a long his- africom’s stated purposes are “to build

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Military strong military-to-military partnerships,” ed about 20 percent (38,700) U.S. citi- Contractors to help African countries better address zens, 37 percent (70,500) Iraqis, and & the American the threats they face by improving Afri- 43 percent (81,006) third country nation- Way of War can military capacity, and to bolster als.25 In March 2010, the total number peace and security there.20 Since its in- of contractors had dropped to 95,461, ception, africom has awarded con- 26 percent of which were U.S. citizens, tracts for training, air transport, informa- 56 percent third country nationals, and tion technology, and public diplomacy to 18 percent Iraqis.26 The number of locals companies such as DynCorp, which is working as private security contractors training Liberia’s armed forces, and pae, (as opposed to logistics or reconstruction a company specializing in infrastructure, contractors) in Iraq has been relative- mission support, and disaster relief.21 ly low: about 10 percent of private securi- U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, ty contractors in 2010 were Iraqi. In dominated since at least 2000 by anti- Afghanistan, the dod has relied more narcotics and counterterrorism efforts, heavily on locals. The total number of also relies heavily on contractors.22 contractors in March 2010 was 112,092, Plan Colombia, the central element of a 14 percent of which were U.S. citizens, counterdrug initiative focused on the 16 percent third country nationals, and Andean region, has sought to reduce drug 70 percent Afghans. Also, the numbers production in Colombia and strengthen of locals who work in private security Colombian security forces to better are higher than those who provide other secure the state against threats posed by services. About 93 percent of the pri- terrorists, drug traf½ckers, and paramili- vate security contractors in 2010 were tary groups. The program has failed to Afghans.27 slow drug production there, but military When the United States hires pmscs to and police training conducted by both train militaries abroad, the contractor U.S. troops and civilian contractors has may take a small team of U.S. personnel led to security improvements.23 Roughly (as mpri did in Croatia), or it may recruit half of the military aid to Colombia is an international team (as DynCorp did in spent on private contractors funded by Liberia). Companies providing logistics the dod and the State Department. Like support abroad often rely on locals or Plan Colombia, the 2007 Mérida Initia- third country nationals to cut costs. Hir- tive, a U.S.-Mexico assistance agreement, ing locals or third country nationals can seeks to disrupt drug-traf½cking activi- also avoid a variety of political restric- ties by providing equipment and training tions and diminish visibility when the to Mexican security forces.24 United States is undertaking more con- troversial missions. For instance, Con- Pmscs are incorporated in many coun- gress restricted the number of American tries and employ a mix of U.S. citizens, contractors the United States could use local citizens, and “third country nation- under Plan Colombia to three hundred als” (recruits from neither the United (raised to four hundred in 2001); pmscs States nor the host state). That combi- bypassed this restriction by hiring per- nation changes over time and from con- sonnel from Peru, Guatemala, and other tingency to contingency. For example, Latin American countries.28 an April 30, 2008, census by the U.S. In addition to nationality, personnel Army Central Command found that the hired by pmscs vary in their employ- 190,200 contractors in Iraq includ- ment backgrounds. pmscs that offer

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military training primarily hire former lize civilian police forces, ½rst for Haiti in Deborah D. military of½cers. Those that offer armed 1994, and then for contingencies in the Avant & Renée security services hire a broader range of Balkans, via contracts with DynCorp. de Nevers military veterans. Those that offer police Different concerns regarding effective- training often hire former police of½cers. ness emerge with contracting for logis- As the number of companies and the tics, security, and reconstruction servic- range of services they offer have expand- es. Logistics services are fundamental to ed to meet market demand, companies the military’s ability to operate. Without have hired employees with more diverse personnel to provide logistics services, experience. the U.S. military simply cannot go to war. Contracting for logistics also requires Contracting for military and security strong oversight. Early in the Iraq con- services has raised questions about the flict, serious concerns were raised about effectiveness of using force, political adequate staf½ng for logistics contracts. accountability for the use of force, and General Charles S. Mahan, Jr., then the the social values to which force adheres. Army’s top logistics of½cer, complained Some concerns vary according to which of troops receiving inadequate support service is provided, while others apply because of problems deploying contrac- more generally across different tasks. tors.30 After the Coalition Provisional Military effectiveness rests on a range of Authority appointed him the new Head components, including skill of person- of Contracting Authority in February nel, quality of materiel, and military 2004, Brigadier General Stephen Seay responsiveness to contextual or external hired more acquisition staff, enabling constraints. A critical component noted overburdened contracting of½cers to in recent research is integration: that is, do their jobs more effectively.31 More the degree to which military plans follow recently, military personnel have ex- from overarching state goals and to pressed general satisfaction with the which activities are internally consistent quality of logistics services.32 Many wor- and mutually reinforcing.29 ries over logistics contracting in Iraq and Contracting can influence both the Afghanistan have focused on lack of over- military’s effectiveness and its broader sight (particularly inadequate numbers mission. For example, when U.S. goals of contract of½cers), along with waste change, as they did after the Cold War’s and fraud.33 But logistics contracts re- end, contracting enhances the military’s quire fewer skills speci½c to military per- ability to integrate forces with (new) sonnel, and logistics contractors do not political goals. Speed and flexibility are need to work as closely with military per- the hallmark bene½ts of contracting, sonnel on the ground as do security and and contractors can quickly provide reconstruction contractors. tools or skills for new missions that The activities of contractors who pro- regular military forces may lack–or can- vide security services are most similar not identify rapidly within their ranks. to those performed by soldiers. Many Using a contract with mpri, for instance, are armed and, in carrying out their the Africa Crisis Response Initiative duties, pose deadly risks to those work- (acri) military training courses for ing around them. Periodic tensions be- French-speaking African countries were tween contractors and regular forces– staffed with employees who spoke French. aggravated by disparities in pay and The U.S. military was also able to mobi- responsibilities–have raised the issue

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Military of whether these two types of forces can In today’s conflicts, reconstruction Contractors work together effectively. A recent survey tasks–particularly training–are often & the American of dod personnel and their perceptions more crucial for achieving the goals of Way of War of private security contractors suggests the war effort than either logistics or that combining these forces in conflict security services. Often, reconstruction zones is problematic. Lower-ranking and tasks must be coordinated so that police younger personnel in particular claim training and justice reform, for instance, that pay disparities between military per- complement one another, and so that sonnel and contractors are detrimental to civilian leaders understand the military the morale of their units in Iraq.34 How- they are expected to oversee. Contractors ever, many security services tasks do not who provide reconstruction services require close interaction with military must not only deliver quality work but personnel. Roughly one-third of military coordinate that delivery with other con- personnel surveyed in Iraq, for example, tractors, the U.S. military, and other gov- had no ½rsthand experience with private ernment agencies. Thus, these services security contractors.35 These tasks are are among the most crucial for U.S. goals also frequently less crucial to the per- and the most challenging to coordinate. formance of military units than are lo- Moreover, concerns have been raised gistics services. about the military’s ability to ensure Nonetheless, the behavior of contract- that these tasks are carried out effective- ed security personnel matters to the over- ly when they have been outsourced. all U.S. mission. The hazards of question- Notably, DynCorp’s training of the able behavior were demonstrated most Afghan National Police and Army is vividly in the September 2007 Blackwater widely regarded as a failure, but the dod shoot-out in Nisoor Square. Both Iraqis has been unable to move the training and Americans, however, had consis- contract to a different company because tently reported this type of behavior long of DynCorp’s legal protest regarding before that dramatic incident. Private contract competition.37 Yet these jobs are forces have tended to focus on the strict less important to the functioning of mili- terms of their contracts (protecting par- tary units than logistics support, and they ticular people or facilities) rather than pose less deadly risk than security oper- on the overarching goals of the United ations do. Problems with integration States (effectively countering the insur- of activities–or unity of effort–were gency). Some of the tactics developed to among the most signi½cant challenges to protect clients, such as driving fast reconstruction, as noted by the cwc’s through intersections and rapid resort to 2009 interim report.38 force, alienated the local population in Thus, the overall picture of how con- ways that undermined the broader coun- tractors shape effectiveness is compli- terinsurgency strategy. Similar problems cated. Clearly, contractors can quickly persist in Afghanistan. Among military deploy skilled personnel, and the majori- personnel who had experience with secu- ty of contractors are good at what they rity contractors, approximately 20 per- do. But the United States does not have cent reported ½rsthand knowledge of the capacity to oversee these contracts pmsc failure to coordinate with military successfully, and this failure has led to forces “sometimes”; another 15 percent waste, fraud, and particularly with regard of this population witnessed such coordi- to security contracts, abuse. Further- nation problems “often.”36 more, the level of integration needed for

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the most effective delivery of services has claim contracted forces can be more re- Deborah D. lagged in Iraq and Afghanistan. sponsive (given the potential for losing Avant & Renée their contracts) than the military bureau- de Nevers How does contracting for military and cracy. Flexibility in how contracts are security services affect the United States’ written can accelerate mobilization in capacity to take political accountability for ways that military organizations often forces? Mobilization via contract oper- cannot deliver. Certainly, contractors are ates differently than military enlistment, designed to deliver whatever the client with consequences for the relationship wants. They are thus much less prone to between the force and civilians–the standard operating procedures or organi- political elite and the public included. zational bias that can inhibit responsive- The U.S. experience in Iraq suggests that ness in military organizations. forces raised via contract operate much Not at all apparent, however, is the U.S. more opaquely than military forces. government’s capacity to oversee con- Largely because of this reduced trans- tracts in a manner suf½cient to generate parency, Congress has struggled to exer- responsiveness. Even as dod contract cise constitutional authorization and transactions increased by 328 percent oversight. Furthermore, the public has between 2000 and 2009, the staff respon- less information about the deployment of sible for reviewing contractor purchasing contractors. Though evidence suggests at the Defense Contract Management that the public is just as concerned about Agency declined from seventy in 2002 to the deaths of contractors as it is about fourteen in 2009.40 Contracting in indi- military deaths, statistics on the former vidual service branches faced similar are much less likely to be known.39 problems. The dearth of contract of½cers Using contractors speeds policy re- makes it dif½cult to effectively oversee sponse but limits input into the policy contracts at home, but concerns about process. As the insurgency grew in Iraq, adequate oversight are even more press- for example, the United States mobilized ing when pmscs are operating abroad. 150,000 to 170,000 private forces to sup- The relevant contracting of½cer is often port the mission there, all with little or no not even in theater. Inadequate contract congressional or public knowledge–let staf½ng and oversight have been impor- alone consent. President Bush was not tant complaints in both Iraq and required to appeal to Congress or the Afghanistan and have been tied to public for these additional forces, which numerous problems–from poor per- doubled the U.S. presence in Iraq. As evi- formance to waste, fraud, and abuse. dence from the reaction to the request for Though the risks of poor oversight vary a mere twenty thousand troops for the according to task, dif½culties in oversee- 2007 surge suggests, the president may ing contractors have been common to all well not have been allowed to deploy three areas of contract services. The chal- additional personnel if he had been lenge of overseeing expeditionary oper- required to obtain permission. Because ations may undermine companies’ re- the use of pmscs garners little attention, sponsiveness to contractual obligations. their employment reduces public arous- Overall, then, the use of contractors al, debate, commitment, and response to has skirted accountability, making half the use of force. of U.S. mobilization largely invisible to How contracted forces relate to civilian Congress and the public; as a result, it leaders is an important question. Some has masked the number of conflict-relat-

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Military ed casualties.41 Though one could argue bring an even more diverse array of pro- Contractors that contractors are more responsive to fessional norms. Concerns about lax in- & the American political leaders, this likelihood can only dustry vetting of employees have raised Way of War be the case once political leaders know the question of whether pmscs are what contractors are doing–and evi- increasingly hiring employees with less dence shows that this has not been the distinguished service records.43 Finally, case in Iraq and Afghanistan. many pmscs also hire local personnel. In addition to lower costs, these forces A ½nal point of evaluation is to look bring many bene½ts: local knowledge at whether contractors allow the exer- and ties that can aid companies’ effec- cise of force in a way that is consistent tiveness. However, they also bring local with the larger values, culture, and expec- values that may not be consistent with tations of the society they represent. democracy, liberalism, or the laws of war. Over the course of the Cold War and in For instance, evidence suggests that local its aftermath, military professionalism companies hired by the United States to within advanced industrial states in- provide convoy security in Afghanistan creasingly enshrined principles drawn funneled money to Taliban forces or from theories of democracy (civilian were otherwise engaged in corrupt prac- control of the military and abidance by tices that promise to undermine U.S. the rule of law), liberalism (respect for goals and the values it seeks to support in human rights), and the laws of war.42 Afghanistan.44 Though marginal differences exist, the Even if all contractors were well-social- values that govern U.S. military person- ized military or police professionals, they nel are largely shared with their Western nonetheless operate in a different envi- partners. The ease of mobilization that ronment–vis-à-vis both the law and contracting offers is viewed by some as command and control–than troops do. consistent with the United States’ evolv- Commanders are less likely to notice or ing concerns with global security and to punish offenses committed by con- global governance. But in practice, the tractors than offenses committed by use of pmscs has not ½t well within the troops. Over time, a lack of punishment normative and legal frameworks that can be expected to lead to more lax underpin global security. behavior; indeed, many have claimed Two factors strain the impact of con- that this outcome is the case in Iraq and tracting on the values represented by mil- Afghanistan. Though reliable, systematic itary forces. First, precisely which profes- evidence is not yet available, a wealth of sional norms inform the pmsc industry anecdotal evidence lends credibility to remains unclear. Americans employed by this conclusion.45 Military of½cers have pmscs have a range of military and law expressed their concern that the “culture enforcement backgrounds–some distin- of impunity” surrounding pmscs has be- guished and others less so. However, come a real problem.46 the industry increasingly recruits from a global market. As recruiting and sub- The increasing U.S. reliance on con- contracting have become more transna- tractors suggests that national military tional, personnel are from countries as forces are unsuited to meet the foreign diverse as the United Kingdom, Nepal, policy goals that U.S. leaders consider Fiji, South Africa, El Salvador, Colombia, vital to national security. It may also re- and India. These geographic differences flect the degree to which leaders believe

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public support does not exist for the kind promise to improve behavior but may Deborah D. of foreign policy they deem necessary. also limit reliance on local residents in a Avant & Renée The fact that leaders can turn to contrac- way that could increase costs and inhibit de Nevers tors has allowed them to pursue their the input of local knowledge. To the ex- goals nonetheless. tent that U.S. standards are perceived as While potentially bene½cial to effec- national rather than global, they may tiveness, the availability of contractors omit a large portion of the global indus- has also permitted leaders to avoid rec- try. The effort now under way to coordi- onciling foreign policy with national val- nate regulatory and legal mechanisms ues and institutions. Enhancing effec- and create global standards of behavior tiveness in this way has undermined the for personnel and companies in the accountability of U.S. forces. Even as the pmsc industry is a promising develop- United States works to make the use of ment, but its implementation will re- contractors more ef½cient and effective, quire a good deal of cooperation between part of the attraction is that private forces the United States, other governments, are accountable to leaders, not publics ngos, journalists, industry groups, and or their representatives, thereby allow- additional stakeholders.48 ing elected representatives to pursue a Reliance on contractors has generated global mission without ½rst convincing tensions between the effectiveness of the electorate to make the sacri½ces re- forces, their accountability, and the de- quired. gree to which they represent U.S. values. Efforts to make contractors more These tensions, though not insurmount- broadly accountable, though, can under- able, are not easily resolved. They require mine the flexibility that makes them persistent management by U.S. leaders effective. For instance, spelling out more in cooperation not only with the Ameri- clearly in each contract the limits of can public but also with other govern- action can address congressional con- ments and the variety of additional stake- cerns and enhance accountability, but it holders that have an interest in how con- diminishes the flexibility that pmsc per- tractors behave. Thus, while contracting sonnel can deliver on the ground. Fur- is likely to remain, it is also likely to con- thermore, contractors are even more tinue to generate unease in U.S. foreign important to the State Department than policy. they are to the dod. Attempts to rein in contractor numbers, then, would further fuel questions about the appropriate bal- ance between civilian and military activi- ties in U.S. foreign policy initiatives. Although interagency efforts have sought to ensure that U.S. assistance in Africa, for example, extends beyond military training, the budgetary and personnel imbalance between the dod and the State Department makes such a realign- ment of programs unlikely to occur in the near future.47 Finally, efforts to implement profes- sional and legal standards for contractors

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Military endnotes Contractors DEBORAH D AVANT & the * . is Professor of Political Science and Director of the program and cen- American ter for International Studies at the University of California, Irvine. Her publications include Way of War Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (1994), The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (2005), and Who Governs the Globe? (with Martha Finnemore and Susan Sell, 2010). RENÉEDENEVERSis an Associate Professor of Public Administration at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. Her publications include Regimes as Mechanisms for Global Governance (1999), Comrades No More: The Seeds of Change in Eastern Europe (2003), and Combating Terrorism: Strategies and Approaches (with William Banks and Mitchel Wallerstein, 2007). 1 The contemporary “total force concept” explicitly includes contractor personnel. For general overviews of the private military and security industry, see Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); Deb- orah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 2005). For a discussion of the role of contractors in U.S. foreign pol- icy more generally, see Allison Stanger, One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of Amer- ican Power and the Future of Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009). 2 David Isenberg, “A Government in Search of Cover: Private Military Companies in Iraq,” in From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies, ed. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 83. 3 Determining exact numbers is dif½cult because the Department of Defense (dod) did not be- gin to collect reliable information on the contractors it employed until 2007. Furthermore, contractors were hired by many other government agencies in addition to the dod; Moshe Schwartz, “Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, December 14, 2009), 4. 4 In Afghanistan’s case, this percentage represents a drop in the ratio of contractors to uni- formed personnel, from a high of 69 percent contractors in December 2008; Ibid., 5–13. 5 This ratio was at least 2.5 times higher than the ratio during any other major U.S. conflict; Congressional Budget Of½ce, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq” (Washing- ton, D.C.: cbo, August 2008). 6 T. X. Hammes, “Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strate- gic Impact,” Strategic Forum no. 260 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, October 2010). 7 Commission on Wartime Contracting, “At What Risk? Correcting Over-reliance on Con- tracting in Contingency Operations” (Washington, D.C.: cwc, February 2011), 1. 8 Avant, The Market for Force. 9 Commission on Wartime Contracting, “At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan” (Washington, D.C.: cwc, June 2009). 10 Congressional Budget Of½ce, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq.” 11 Ibid. 12 Schwartz, “Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan,” 6. 13 Dana Priest, “Private Guards Repel Attack on U.S. Headquarters,” The Washington Post, April 6, 2004. 14 See descriptions of these companies in Steve Fainaru, Big Boy Rules: America’s Mercenaries Fighting in Iraq (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2008); T. Christian Miller, Blood Money: Wast- ed Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq (New York: Little, Brown, 2006); and Tom Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).

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15 See http://www.dyn-intl.com/history.aspx. Deborah D. 16 Avant See the discussion of Vinnell Corporation in Avant, The Market for Force, 18, 114, and 148. & Renée mpri stands for Military Professional Resources Incorporated; the company is now a part de Nevers of L-3 Communications. For a discussion of its role in the Balkans, see The Market for Force, chap. 3. For the history of usis (us Investigations Services), see http://www.usis.com/ Fact-Sheet.aspx. 17 See http://www.parsons.com/pages/default.aspx. 18 Stanger, One Nation Under Contract. 19 Of½ce of Logistics Management, AFRICAP Program Re-Compete (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, February 6, 2008), https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode= form&tab=core&id=4fbad7bde428a5595aca7bfe3cdbc02d&_cview=1 (accessed May 6, 2010). 20Government Accountability Of½ce, “Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command,” gao Report #gao-09-181 (Washington, D.C.: gao, February 2009). 21 See http://www.paegroup.com. 22Connie Veillette, Clare Ribando, and Mark Sullivan, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin Amer- ica and the Caribbean,” Congressional Research Service Report #RL32487 (Washington, D.C.: crs, January 3, 2006), 2. 23 Government Accountability Of½ce, “Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved,” gao Report #gao-09-71 (Washington, D.C.: gao, October 2008), 15. 24 Clare Ribando, “Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 19, 2010), 1–3. 25 Congressional Budget Of½ce, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq” (Washing- ton, D.C.: cbo August 2008), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/08-12- IraqContractors.pdf. 26 Moshe Schwartz, “Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Back- ground and Analysis” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 10, 2010), 9. 27 Ibid., 12; Moshe Schwartz, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contrac- tors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress” (Washing- ton, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 21, 2011), 10. 28 Lora Lumpe, “U.S. Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues,” Foreign Policy In Focus Special Report, May 2002, 11–12. 29 Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley-Mitchell, eds., Creating Military Power: The Sources of Mil- itary Effectiveness (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007). 30 This complaint was aired in a draft of what became Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, Tex.: Combat Institute Press, 2004). In the ½nal version of the document, however, the dis- cussion of the dif½culty with logistics did not mention contractors. General Mahan’s com- plaints were also reported by Anthony Bianco and Stephanie Anderson Forest, “Outsourc- ing War,” Business Week, September 15, 2003; and David Wood, “Some of Army’s Civilian Contractors are No-Shows in Iraq,” Newhouse News Service, July 31, 2003. 31 Of½ce of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Recon- struction Experience (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of½ce, 2009), 172–173. Another example of the negative consequences of poor oversight is seen in the contractor abuses at Abu Ghraib prison; see Steve Schooner, “Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government,” Stanford Law and Policy Review 16 (2005): 549–572.

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Military 32 On troop satisfaction, see Commission on Wartime Contracting, “At What Cost?” 45. Contractors 33 & the Ibid., 39–59. American 34 Sarah Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q. Burkhart, Meghan Zander-Cotugno, Way of War Edward O’Connell, and Michael Webber, Hired Guns: Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Santa Monica, Calif.: rand Corporation, 2010), Figure S1. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Christine Spolar, “Military Training of Afghan National Police Mired in Contract Dispute,” The Huf½ngton Post Investigative Fund, February 22, 2010, http://huffpostfund.org/stories/ 2010/02/military-training-afghan-national-police-mired-contract-dispute (accessed Febru- ary 23, 2010). 38 Commission on Wartime Contracting, “At What Cost?” 3. 39 Deborah D. Avant and Lee Sigelman, “Private Security and Democracy: Lessons from the us in Iraq,” Security Studies 19 (2) (2010). 40 Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, “Defense Agencies Must Improve Their Oversight of Contractor Business Systems to Reduce Waste, Fraud, and Abuse,” cwc Special Report 1, September 21, 2009, http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/ index.php/reports. See also, Jacques S. Gansler et al., Urgent Reform Required: Army Expedi- tionary Contracting (Washington, D.C.: Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, October 31, 2007), 4. 41 T. Christian Miller, “Contractors in Iraq are Hidden Casualties of War,” ProPublica, Octo- ber 6, 2009, http://www.propublica.org/feature/kbr-contractor-struggles-after-iraq-injuries- 1006 (accessed December 31, 2009). 42 See Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, The Postmodern Military (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 43 Senate Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the Role and Oversight of Private Se- curity Contractors in Afghanistan, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., September 28, 2010, http://info .publicintelligence.net/SASC-PSC-Report.pdf (accessed October 15, 2010). 44 Dexter Filkins, “Convoy Guards in Afghanistan Face an Inquiry: U.S. Suspects Bribes to Tal- iban Forces,” The New York Times, June 7, 2010. 45 See, for instance, Fainaru, Big Boy Rules. 46 Schwartz, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan,” 19. There are international efforts to establish standards for pmscs, codes of conduct for personnel, and standards for the legal responsibilities of companies and indi- viduals that may begin to address some of these concerns. See International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “The Montreux Docu- ment on Private Military and Security Companies” (Montreux, Switzerland: icrc, Sep- tember 17, 2008); Swiss Directorate of Political Affairs, “International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers” (Bern, Switzerland: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, November 9, 2010). 47Government Accountability Of½ce, “Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Im- prove Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command.” 48 See International Commission of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal Department of For- eign Affairs, “The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies”; Swiss Directorate of Political Affairs, “International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers.”

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