Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War Robert L
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Naval War College Review Volume 61 Article 21 Number 4 Autumn 2008 Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War Robert L. Perry Hugo Slim Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Perry, Robert L. and Slim, Hugo (2008) "Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War," Naval War College Review: Vol. 61 : No. 4 , Article 21. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss4/21 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Perry and Slim: Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, and Morality in War BOOK REVIEWS 157 A cursory review of Scahill’s online medium to take stock of the myriad is- postings, blogs, and congressional testi- sues that confront policy makers on this mony reveals a clear and evident bias. controversial subject. Yet Scahill’s an- But hardly any reasonable military pro- tipathy toward all things Bush, Republi- fessional would argue that the actions can, and the Christian right ultimately of companies like Blackwater have not takes over. Coupled with untidy organi- harmed the coalition forces’ counterin- zation and the author’s tendency to re- surgency effort in Iraq. Downstream peat himself, this renders his work less and third-order effects of these some- constructive and credible than it other- times reckless and frequently arrogant wise might have been. mercenaries are not part of the calcula- R. G. BRACKNELL tion—they get paid for keeping the Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army principal alive and unharmed. On the Regimental Judge Advocate, other hand, Scahill’s rejection of private Regimental Combat Team 5, Al Asad, Iraq security companies as a concept leaves little room for the possibility that com- panies like Blackwater could be useful in the national security apparatus if fu- ture administrations and Congress Slim, Hugo. Killing Civilians: Method, Madness, could muster the political will to con- and Morality in War. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2008. 300pp. $29.95 trol them under an effective and feasi- ble system of accountability. Moreover, Hugo Slim has written a remarkable and while there is plenty to condemn about disturbing book that everyone con- Blackwater’s legacy, tactics, and man- cerned with the safety of “civilians” agement, that is only half of Scahill’s should read—and then join the public story. That Blackwater founder Erik debate about protecting them. Slim Prince is a deeply and evidently reli- states that while the word “civilian” has gious conservative is prima facie evi- long been an ambiguous concept, it is dence, according to Scahill, that he and one we must do more to support be- his business is or should be thoroughly cause it is grounded in basic Western discredited. values. He encourages wide public dis- cussion about defending and expanding Finally, Scahill laments that Blackwater the civilian concept in an age of terror- has been able to recruit seasoned intelli- ism, failing states, and ethnic strife. He gence and operational professionals, has fulfilled this purpose admirably, with such as Cofer Black, without acknowl- a deep and wide breadth of scholarship edging that it is a common practice for that should spark serious debate at all corporations to recruit talent from the levels. government, and vice versa. He paints Black, in particular, as a sellout, when This book is remarkable because the au- Black’s hiring by Blackwater only fol- thor, who has worked in humanitarian lows the typical pattern of Washington assistance for more than twenty years, professionals across many vocations. tells of the horrendous evil that men do Faulting his decision to move to the with a dispassionate tone that allows private sector is shallow and naive. both the deadly logic of civilian killing and its terrible results to seep into the ThebottomlineonBlackwater is that it reader’s mind. It is disturbing. This is worth reading. The book is a useful Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008 1 Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 4, Art. 21 158 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW reader was taken aback to realize that Historians are charged with applying rather than build revulsion, the accumu- twenty-twenty hindsight to incidents lation of damning evidence created the that, at the time, seem to be only a curi- same “not my job” effect that allows na- ous combination of blurring events. tions to ignore atrocities against whole Charles Gati, a leading commentator on peoples. Central European history and politics, Slim describes in detail the “seven does just that in Failed Illusions, his spheres of civilian suffering”: direct vio- study of the abortive Hungarian Revo- lence (murder, genocide, etc.), rape and lution of 1956 against the Soviet Union. sexual violence, forced movement, im- Hisbookwasfiftyyearsinthemaking, poverishment, famine and disease, emo- partly because many of his primary tional suffering, and postwar suffering. sources have only recently been made The book’s most disturbing aspect is the available. Although he was a firsthand six chapters that describe the painful de- observer of events in Hungary in the tails about civilian killing. Only one 1950s, Gati delayed this work to ensure chapter is dedicated to promoting civil- that it reflected an appropriate level of ian protection. This offers practical ex- objectivity. Gati was in Budapest at the pressions of philosopher Howard time of the revolution, having recently Gardner’s seven “levers” for changing been fired from a state-run newspaper human minds as Slim’s answer to the di- for no ostensible reason. While this lemma: reason, research, resonance made him sympathetic to the revolu- (emotion and morality), representa- tion, he readily admits to a certain tional redescription (shared identity), re- naiveté about why it was happening. sources and rewards, real world events, This work is largely a result of his per- and resistance. Oddly, Slim’s suggestions sonal quest to retrospectively under- as to how to apply these levers, such as stand this seminal event that shaped his international criminal courts, fail to res- life. He emigrated to the United States onate with the same passion as the myr- shortly after the revolution. iad justifications for civilian killing. But Imre Nagy, prime minister of Hungary this may be the point: killing results and the leader of the revolution, is the from the strongest passions, while the story’s protagonist. Through superb us- act of sparing life results from the more age of primary and personal sources, enduring, yet more difficult to evoke, Gati humanizes this ultimately tragic feelings of mercy, compassion, and love. figure. The book’s most profound in- sights are in its handling of the decision ROBERT L. PERRY Naval War College makers in Moscow and Washington. Moscow possessed the ultimate power and was responsible for the decisions that led to the Soviet invasion of Hun- gary in November 1956. However, Gati, Charles. Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washing- Gati’s use of recently opened records ton, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt. proves conclusively that Soviet leader- Cold War International History Project. Stan- ship was not “trigger happy.” It is eye ford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2006. 264pp. opening to see just how close the Soviet $49.95 politburo came to allowing Hungary to https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss4/21 2.