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Quarterly—VOL. 71 No. 4—71403-Gergen

Social Psychology Quarterly 2008, Vol. 71, No. 4, 331–337 On the Very Idea of Social Psychology KENNETH J. GERGEN Swarthmore College

iven the centennial of the publication To the stage for this analysis, let us of the first two textbooks in social consider briefly the challenge confronting Gpsychology, the one by William these early authors. Both McDougall and Ross McDougall and the other by Edward Alsworth were essentially setting out to write grounding Ross, it is an auspicious time for reflection. It texts for a newly emerging , one that is a time to reconsider the movements into could bring together the study of both which these volumes were secreted, and the and social . In terms of the mind, the resulting trajectories of scholarship. We works of Wundt, Titchner, James, and Freud— should also consider the ruptures developing among others—had already given way to an over the decades among those calling them- active and rapidly growing science. In effect, a social and the possibili- world of psychological phenomena was ties now before us. In my view, while both already in place. On the side of the social these classics attempted to link psychological world, Tarde, LeBon, and Durkheim—among process with , neither proved others—had established a strong case for a successful. The currently dominant form of science of social life. In this sense a discipline social psychology, largely issuing from the of social psychology could be viewed as an discipline of psychology, struggles to relate intellectual tour de force—uniting these other- psychological process to social life; nor have wise separate enterprises. Yet, the differing emphasis of these early works is instructive. sociological accounts of behavior com- Both were working within a scientific tradi- pellingly demonstrated the significance of tion in which the of efficient causa- psychological underpinnings. In effect, the tion was prominent. Thus, one of the most sig- early visions of relating mind to social process nificant questions confronted by McDougall have not fully flourished. In my view, there are and Ross was the causal status to be accorded fundamental impediments to their ability to to mind on the one hand, and the social world ever do so. on the other. The contrasting answers to this As I propose in what follows, when the question furnish the basis for a conflict that problem of forging a social psychology is has persisted until the present. For McDou- examined in terms of discursive , we gall, mental activity is fundamentally ground- find the attempts of both McDougall and Ross ed in the biological makeup of the person, in to be fundamentally misconceived. There is no his terms the force of . For example, legitimate means of establishing a social psy- McDougall proposes that the vast share of chology that links mental process to social social life is governed by inherent , activity. The compelling promise of such an such as reproduction, parenting, pugnacity, enterprise was, and continues to be, the result gregariousness, acquisition, and habit. The of a linguistic confusion. This confusion also social surrounds are given far less of a role, inhabits the many empirical demonstrations of and whatever their influence, it is largely seen what appear to be realizations of the early to result from a more primary, instinctual vision. At the same time, I do believe there is basis. In contrast, for Ross, “Social psycholo- at least one highly promising means at hand of gy .|.|. studies the planes and currents establishing an account of social activity that that come into existence among men in conse- can simultaneously incorporate psychological quence of their ”(1908:1). Thus, . A brief account of this alternative Ross focuses his major on the effects close the present offering. of crowds, fashions, and conventions on the 331 Social Psychology Quarterly—VOL. 71 No. 4—71403-Gergen

332 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY individual. Whatever the role of biologically nomena—coupled with precise measures of based psychology, it is of marginal signifi- psychological process—would ultimately cance. In effect, the two volumes established a clarify the importance of social as opposed to fault-line that ultimately gave rise to what are psychological determinants. The question of commonly identified as “the two social psy- relative emphasis, and the possibility of com- chologies,” a psychological social psychology plex interactions, could be settled empirically. (PSP) on the one hand and a sociological In terms of research opportunities, these were social psychology (SSP) on the other. rich, uncomplicated, and productive years.

EARLY EQUANIMITY: FAITH IN FACT THE GROWING DIVIDE In the early years these differences were As these halcyon years drew to a close, a of no major consequence. Indeed, one could more ominous cloud emerged on the horizon. well imagine vistas of research in social Jones and Thibaut joined many other highly behavior traced to psychological wellsprings, visible social psychologists to establish what and in which mental process would bear the was subsequently to become the elite Society stamp of the social milieu. Speaking personal- for Experimental Social Psychology. The soci- ly, by the time I was in graduate in ety was to function as the wave of the future, social psychology at Duke University in the establishing social psychology as an empiri- early 1960s, the anticipation of a bi-direction- cally based discipline. And, because laborato- al social psychology was pervasive and ener- ry experimentation was viewed as the most gizing. A mutually supportive relationship rigorous means of testing hypotheses, lending flourished between social psychologists in itself most fully to tracing cause/effect rela- psychology and in . My mentor, tions, the was to be the chief Edward E. Jones, was an experimental social means of solidifying scientific status. Slowly, with a cognitive orientation, but method began to take precedence over con- enamored with Erving Goffman’s work. He tent. The impact was subtly divisive: the rigor- was also a close friend of Kurt Back, a ous experiment necessarily confined itself to Lewinian with a keen interest in macrosocial the behavior of the single, -contained sub- process. They, in turn, had a close relationship ject. In effect, social life could only be defined with John Thibaut, a social psychologist at the in terms of the summation of individual University of North Carolina, who was work- actions. There was no social process in itself, ing in synchrony with sociologist George and it was only a decade later that Ivan Steiner Homans’s of social exchange. At that (1983) lamented, “Whatever happened to the time and place, the visions of McDougall group in social psychology?” By 1999 (who had been a professor at Duke) and Ross Rodrigues and Levine defined a century old, did not represent competing traditions. As a free-standing discipline of “experimental graduate student I could shuttle across these social psychology.” And by 2003, one of the contexts of inquiry, with advisors in each most prominent wings of the field devoted its domain welcoming anything I might bring efforts to linking social behavior with evolu- from the camps of their colleagues. The indi- tion and functioning. Psychological vidual/relationships, mind/society, micro/macro, social psychology (PSP) had become experimentation/correlation—it was one grand autonomous.1 world, replete with mutual respect and appre- This closing of the ranks also reflected a ciation. national trend toward the disciplining of What did unite these endeavors was a col- knowledge making. As the social lective commitment to , expanded in numbers, and the number of sub- whether in the form of experi- ments, survey research, participant observa- 1 For more on the significance of the experimental tion, or case studies. The common belief was method in the splitting of the social psychologies, see that the systematic of social phe- Brannigan 2002. Social Psychology Quarterly—VOL. 71 No. 4—71403-Gergen

ON THE VERY IDEA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 333 divisions began to grow exponentially, it was structed by the physicist differs dramatically no longer possible to read effectively across from that of the psychologist, the economist, the social sciences. Because of the sheer vol- or the spiritualist. These contrasting ontolo- ume of material to be mastered, expert knowl- gies are accompanied, supported, and sus- edge was becoming parochial. And as the divi- tained by differing practices and values. sions in knowledge communities increased, so Empirical research cannot be employed to did the publication outlets, reputations, and determine the comparative truth or falsity of research funding become more specialized. embraced in differing traditions, The result of such forces meant that a degree because such research is already committed to in psychology largely restricted the student’s the assumptions embraced within a particular to a view of in . which biologically based universals were In the case of social psychology we have, more or less presumed. In effect, there was no then, an attempt to unite two disparate com- viable alternative to the McDougall orienta- munities of discourse, each with its own ontol- tion, and no particular to search beyond ogy. We essentially have “mind talk” on the the perimeters of the discipline. Nor, for most one hand and “social talk” on the other. In the of my colleagues in the experimental domain, former case we may speak at length on psy- did this loss seem particularly important. As chodynamics, cognitive structure, attitudes, one glanced at one’s potential relatives in soci- dissonance reduction, and so on; in the latter ology (SSP), all that seemed to remain of the we may intelligibly describe processes of con- Ross tradition in social psychology were formity, reciprocity, negotiation, and the like. somewhat isolated camps of symbolic interac- These ontological orientations can fill the tionists, labeling theorists, dramaturgists, and of description for participants within the ethnomethodologists. And in many of these communities. Thus, in describing and explain- domains, the chief interest was not so much on ing the vicissitudes of psychological process, mind/world relations as the relationship talk of the social world is not essential. One between microsocial behavior and social may describe the process of , prim- structure. Invitations from sociologists such as ing, expectancy confirmation, and the like Sheldon Stryker (1977) for mutual apprecia- without recourse to a discussion of social life. tion between SSP and PSP seemed largely Similarly, descriptions of social life—of self- unheeded. presentation, , and labeling—can proceed quite adequately without reference to THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY SCHISM: psychological process. The social investigator DISCOURSE AS DESTINY has no inherent for a world of mental process. Of course, one may lament the loss of the Indeed, it is this potential insularity of dis- “good old days” in which there was little to cursive domains that has lead many critics to separate the more social from the psychologi- question the social relevance of contemporary cal scholar. However, in my view the schism social psychology (PSP). McDougal’s biolog- was virtually inevitable, and there is no inno- ically based orientation was subsequently cent return. Further, when more carefully con- replaced in significance by Floyd Allport’s sidered, the very idea of a social psychology in 1924 volume, Social Psychology. This work which social and psychological life interact succeeded not only in integrating the behav- was misconceived at the outset. Although a iorist orientation of the day, but simultaneous- radical proposal on the surface, it is far less so ly replacing McDougall’s unpopular instinc- when we consider the case in terms of discur- tivism with the more widely accepted view of sive traditions. As emphasized by social con- brain .2 This latter commitment structionists from (1962) to the present, our disparate descriptions and expla- 2 For an account of the way in which Allport’s volume nations of the world are lodged within differ- signaled a terminating concern in PSP with social life, sui ing discursive communities. The world as con- generis, see Greenwood 2003. Social Psychology Quarterly—VOL. 71 No. 4—71403-Gergen

334 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY continues today, as evidenced in the first sec- duct, we misleadingly begin to ask, how does tion of the Higgins and Kruglanski’s (1996) the social world alter, transform, or our mammoth, Social Psychology, Handbook of , , values and so on; and how Basic Principles, devoted as it is to the do psychological processes determine the “Biological System.” Thus, with notable character of social life? exceptions contemporary research takes as its To be sure, the research purportedly focus of concern some form of psychological demonstrating such interactions is vast. From process—cognitive, affective, motivational, early research on formation and and so on—with the assumption of a univer- change to more recent investigations of preju- sal, biological basis. It is, for example, the dice and group , research indicates nature of cognitive accessibility, ego-enhance- two-way causal relations between the mind ment, self-regulation, and the like that one is and the social world. However, on the present attempting to illuminate in such undertakings. account, such causal linkages are conceptual- The context of study may indeed be social. ly precluded. Rather, the plausibility of this The “ conditions” may include oth- account is largely achieved in research ers—either actual or implied. And the behav- through a discursive sleight of hand. First con- ior under observation may be social in its sider the conceptual problem we encounter in implications (e.g., aggression, altruism, preju- attempting to link the individual mind with the dicial behavior). However, in the vast majority social world: As proposed, we have at hand of the cases, neither the social nature of the two universes of discourse, each offering a surrounds nor the social potential of the rich ontology of existents. The question, how- behavior are focal to the research, no more rel- ever, is how the existents in one realm causal- evant to the process under study than they ly affect those in the other? How do events in would be for a neuro- or cognitive psycholo- the social realm make their way into the psy- gist. In the main, we have a psychology that chological world; how do psychological may have implications for social life, but is events cause social behavior? No more than a not centrally concerned with illuminating the modicum of background in philosophy is social world. needed to recognize these questions as vari- We may ask, then, why should the early ants on two of the most perennially vexing vision of a united, social psychology be so problems in philosophy: the problem of epis- widely appealing? And why should social psy- temology in the first case, and the mind/body chologists (PSP) retain a commitment to the problem in the second. idea, even in their insularity? In my view the In the case of epistemology—the question plausibility of such a vision rests largely on a of how we know—recent centuries of Western of misplaced concreteness. That is, philosophy have served up what may roughly both conventions of discourse—the psycho- be viewed as two major of . logical and the social—had become so fully One school—the empiricist—views individ- compelling that practitioners came to presume ual knowledge largely in terms of the impact the existence of the reality they constructed. of the world on the mind. and Because of the broad cultural sharing of psy- David Hume typically figure as exemplars of chological discourse—of thought, motives, empiricist philosophy. The contrasting school , and —we are seduced into tak- —often termed rationalist—views knowledge ing for granted the world of existence to which largely in terms of inherent (“psychological”) such terms putatively refer. Similarly, because processes. Both Rene Descartes and of longstanding traditions we are accustomed are typically identified with in Western culture to see the world in terms of this orientation. Over the centuries, battles groups, communities, friendships, and so on. between these traditions have continued Given the presumption that both a psycholog- unabated and without resolution. Within the ical and a social world exist, we are drawn into twentieth century, however, the very founda- asking questions about their interaction. tions of this perplexing problem came under Because both refer to human con- attack. As such as Wittgenstein, Social Psychology Quarterly—VOL. 71 No. 4—71403-Gergen

ON THE VERY IDEA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 335

Austen, and Ryle began to demonstrate, the sume that the social behavior is actually relat- very presumption of a mind within a body— ed to an underlying state of some kind is whol- “the ghost in the machine”—lead to philo- ly gratuitous. And, as we have seen, given the sophical impasse. In what may be viewed as a problems of dualism, we have no way of summary conclusion, Richard Rorty (1979) how a such as an proposed that the way in which the problem of attitude could actually propel the physical epistemology had been conceived was essen- movement of the individual’s hand as he or she tially a by-product of a Western language completes the scale. In effect, coherent sense . That the problem of individual knowl- can be made of such findings only by remain- edge could not be solved was not a function of ing within a singular ontology, in this case a insufficient analysis, but of obfuscating dis- social one. cursive traditions. By the same token, one could also render Much the same may be said of the prob- such effects intelligible within the singular lem of how mental process activates social ontology of the mind. For example, anything behavior. Descartes proposed that the mind designated as an event in the social world (the and body intersected within the pineal gland. stimulus conditions) can be understood as a And, while long abandoned, no viable alterna- mental state. In traditional attitude-change tive has emerged. Even today, as psychologists research, for example, one may legitimately demonstrate the cognitive optimality of a given argue that “communicator credibility” or a behavior, they can offer no means of under- “one-sided message” is not publicly observ- standing how the psychological decision (“This able, but is defined by the person psychologi- is the optimal ”) is subsequently trans- cally. Likewise, there are no frustrating or formed into action. For neuropsychologists, the reinforcing situations in the world; rather, problem of how “material stuff ” affects “mind what we call “situations” actually index psy- stuff ” is typically abandoned by reducing mind chological conditions. And, remaining consis- to brain. As we may conclude, the problem of tent with the psychological ontology, we may relating mind to action can also be viewed as a say that there is no social behavior other than by-product of linguistic tradition. what the individual privately defines as social. If the presumption of mind/world dualism For example, social psychologists have wor- ultimately leads us into a conceptual cul-de- ried for decades about the study of aggression, sac, what are we to make of the enormous for if aggression can be defined differentially body of social that by the perpetrator and the “victim,” then there seems to demonstrate the significance of such can be no empirical study of aggression in relations? To be sure, such research does fur- itself. If aggression exists only “in the mind of nish a sense of causal relationships, but in my the beholder,” the entire psychology of view this effect is achieved through a discur- aggression collapses. sive artifice. Consider first research on the effects of the social world on psychological TOWARD A VIABLE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY process. Here the tradition of attitude-change literature provides an illuminating illustration. As I have argued, social psychology as a For decades such research has consistently composite discipline—uniting the study of demonstrated the effects of various stimulus mind and the social world—leads to a concep- conditions (the communicator, message, con- tual impasse. And too, ostensible demonstra- text, etc.) on individual attitudes. Thus we tions of causal linkages between these two have two forms of discourse, the one public realms are wholly misleading. In effect, I see (“out there”) and the other referring to a psy- little promise in sustaining the longstanding chological state (“in here”). Yet, when exam- vision of unity, or indeed any form of social ined more closely, we find that the word “atti- psychology relying on a dualistic distinction tude” actually refers to a public form of social between mind and social world. However, behavior (e.g., words communicated to the there is another possibility of far greater researcher via responses to a scale). To pre- promise. This would entail incorporating both Social Psychology Quarterly—VOL. 71 No. 4—71403-Gergen

336 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY mind and social life within a single or monis- ,” “anger” or “sadness” is the hallmark of tic ontology. We might generate a coherent one’s effective participation in society. vision of social psychology either by reducing Rudiments of this view may indeed be the social world to the discursive ontology of found in early work in and eth- the mind, or of incorporating the mind within nomethodology. The works of Cicourel (1974) an ontology of social life. The second choice and Coulter (1979) were singularly signifi- is by far the more compelling. If we attempt to cant. It is against this background that a num- build a social psychology on the premise that ber of psychologists have begun to illuminate the social world is a mental construction, we the social contexts and usages of psychologi- ultimately enter the cul-de-sac of solipsism. cal discourse. For example, Potter and We would have to conclude that each individ- Wetherell (1987) have pointed to the advan- ual lives within his or her subjective world, tages of viewing attitudes as positions taken in unable to communicate, unable to compre- conversations; Billig (1996) has illuminated hend the other, unable to take action. In philo- the way in which reason functions as a form of sophic terms, we take on the notorious and social rhetoric; Gergen (1994) locates the insoluble problem of “other .” function of emotional expressions in relation- In contrast, if we embrace the ontology of al scenarios; Lutz (1988) describes the social social life we can generate a coherent account function of emotion talk within non-Western of relationships and effective communication. cultures; and Middleton and Brown (2005) Most importantly, we can successfully incor- demonstrate the way in which both experience porate the discourse of the mind.3 Further, if and are quintessentially social activi- we examine the contours of recent intellectual ties. There are numerous additional inquiries , we see that such a view is already of a similar nature. Many of these I incorpo- . In my view, the same philosophi- rate and extend in a forthcoming work, cal works that helped to undermine mind/body Relational Being: Beyond the Individual and dualism in the twentieth century also harbored the Community. premises for realizing this vision of social Such a view is congenial as well with psychology. Wittgenstein’s (1953) concept of much current research in such areas as inter- the language game was pivotal, in its - action , situated identity, identity , stration of the dependence of word gender construction, social positioning, mean- on the social coordination of people engaged ing making, and social norms. All tend to in a form of practice. Thus, for example, focus primarily on social process in itself, “pitch” and “home run” gain their signifi- with scant reference to psychological process- cance from the way these terms are tradition- es. Finally, this microsocial view of social psy- ally used in what we call the game of baseball. chology is congenial with the burgeoning dia- It is but a short jump to realize that the dis- logues on the social construction of knowl- course of the mind gains its’ meaning not edge (see Gergen 1994; Hacking 1999; because it reflects the nature of mind itself, Holstein and Gubrium 2007). Should this but from language use within particular kinds marriage take place, we will find that the of situations. Thus, we see that such words as empiricism presumed by both PSP and SSP love, anger, and sadness do not acquire their will become transformed. With scores of significance by of their reflecting men- scholars from the , the social tal states (or conditions of the neurons), but studies of science, and the sociology of knowl- because they have enormous “use value” in edge, we will come to understand that the real- our daily lives. The intelligible “doing of ities realized within research are circum- scribed by the conventions of understanding shared by particular social groups. This will 3 One might conclude that this gives final sway to the scarcely mean the end of what we take to be tradition of social sociological psychology (SSP), but this empirical research. However, it will require a is misleading. The early tradition was based on a dualism. In the present proposal, we have a monastic account of certain humility in what is claimed for such social life, in effect, an MSSP. research, and encourage critical reflection on Social Psychology Quarterly—VOL. 71 No. 4—71403-Gergen

ON THE VERY IDEA OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 337 the cultural and subcultural values with which Hacking, Ian. 1999. The Social Construction of What? such research is freighted. More significantly, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. it will invite dialogue on the political and Higgins, Edward Tory and Arie Kruglanski, eds. 1996. Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic moral significance of our research practices, Principles. New York: Guilford. and furnish a rationale for the liberalization of Holstein, James A. and Jaber F. Gubrium 2007. such practices and forms of representation Handbook of Constructionist Research. New (see for example Denzin and Lincoln 2005; York: Guilford. Reason and Bradbury 2008). This will be a Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific science in which prediction and control Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. become secondary, and the uses of research Lutz, Catherine. A. 1988. Unnatural . for collaborative transformation of society Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. will flourish. It will be a science centrally con- McDougall, William. 1908. An Introduction to Social cerned with pressing issues of the day, and Psychology. London, UK: Methuen. offering creative options for more viable Middleton, David and Steven D. Brown. 2005. The Social Psychology of Experience: Studies in forms of life. remembering and . Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications REFERENCES Potter, Jonathan and Margaret Wetherell. 1987. Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Alport, Floyd H. 1924. Social Psychology. New York: Attitudes and Behavior. London, UK: Sage. Macmillan. Reason, Peter and Hillary Bradbury. 2008. Handbook Billig, Michael. 1996. Arguing and Thinking. of Action Research. 2d ed. London: Sage. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Rodrigues, Aroldo and Robert V. Levine. 1999. One Brannigan, Augustine. 2002. “The Experimental Turn Hundred Years of Experimental Social in Social Psychology.” Society 39: 74–9. Psychology. New York: . Cicourel, Aaron. 1974. Cognitive Sociology: Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Language and Meaning in Social Interaction. Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University New York: Free Press. Press. Coulter, Jeff. 1979. The Social Construction of the Ross, Edward Alsworth. 1908. Social Psychology. Mind. New York: Macmillan. New York: Macmillan. Denzin, Norman and Yvonna Lincoln . 2005. The Sage Steiner, Ivan D. 1974. “Whatever Happened to the Handbook of . Newbury Group in Social Psychology?” Journal of Park, CA: Sage. Experimental Social Psychology 10:93–108. Gergen. Kenneth J. 1994. Realities and Relationships. Stryker, Sheldon. 1977. “Developments in Two Social Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Psychologies: Toward an Appreciation of Gergen, Kenneth J. Forthcoming. Relational Being: Mutual Relevance.” Social Psychology Beyond the Individual and Community. New Quarterly 40:145–60 York: Oxford University Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical Investi- Greenwood, John. 2003. The Disappearance of the gations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Social in American Social Psychology. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kenneth J. Gergen is a Senior Research Professor in Psychology at Swarthmore College, and the President of the Board of the Taos Institute. He is also the Associate Editor of Theory and Psychology, a position in which he has also served for the American Psychologist. He is internationally known for his contributions to social constructionist theory, technology and cultural change, the self, and relational practices. Among his most notable books are Toward Transformation in Social Knowledge, Realities and Relationships, The Saturated Self, and An Invitation to Social Construction. His forth- coming book is entitled, Relational Being: Beyond the Individual and Community.