Understanding Failure in the Estimative Process
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UNDERSTANDING FAILURE IN THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS The German Misapprehensions Regarding Overlord: Understanding Failure In the Estimative Process By: T. L. Cubbage II Major, MI, USAR (ret.) A PAPER PRESENTED AT THE INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS CONFERENCE U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE MAY 1987 / September 2015 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government. 1 UNDERSTANDING FAILURE IN THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS INDEX I Introduction ……………………………………………………………………….... 6 II German Collection and Analysis Capability ………………………………...….. 8 III The German Estimates …………………………………………………….…… 10 A. The How of the Main Invasion ……………………………………….…….. 10 B. The Where of the Main Invasion …………………………………….…….. 10 C. The Date of the Main Invasion ………………………………….………….. 11 D. The Strength of the Main Invasion …………………………………………. 11 IV The Roots of Failure ………………………………………………..…………… 13 A. The Human Factor ………………………………………………….……….. 16 1. Particular Person ………………………………………………………… 17 2. Training and Experience ………………………………...……………… 19 3. Attitudes ………………………………………………………………..…. 21 4. View of Intelligence …………………………………………...…………. 21 5. Application …………………………………………………..……………. 24 6. Intuition and Luck………………………………..……………………….. 25 7. Summary ………………………………………………...……………….. 25 B. The Bias Factor ……………………………………………………………… 26 1. Cultural Bias ……………………………………………………………… 27 a. Arrogance …………………………………………………..………… 27 b. Projection …………………………………………………..…………. 28 2. Motivational Bias ………………………………………………………… 28 a. Risk Taking …………………………………………………………… 29 b. Overconfidence ………………………………………………………. 30 3. Cognitive Bias ………………………………...……………….…………. 31 2 UNDERSTANDING FAILURE IN THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS a. Attribution of Causality …………………………………….………… 31 b. Estimate of Probability ………………………………………………. 33 c. Evaluation of Evidence ……………………………………………… 34 (1). Oversensitivity to Continuity ………………………..………… 34 (2). Absence of Evidence …………………………………….……. 35 (3). Discredited Evidence …………………………………..……… 35 4. Perceptual Bias …………………………………………………….……. 36 a. Modeling ……………………………………………………………… 36 b. Plots and Narratives …………………………………………………. 37 c. Sagacity …………………………………………….………………… 39 c. Acumen ……………………………………..………………………… 40 C. Perception Factor ……………………………………………………………. 43 1. Knowing the Unknowable ………………….…………………………… 43 2. The Worst Expectation Problem …………..…………………………… 44 3. Attitude and Predisposition of Others …………………………………. 47 4. Internal Influences ……………………………………………….………. 47 5. Cornerstone Theory …………………………………….……………….. 48 a. Unconscious Suppression ………………………..………………… 48 b. Stubborn Attachment …………………………………..……………. 48 c. Psychological Investment …………………………………………… 49 D. The Options Factor ……………………………………….…………………. 49 1. German Assumptions …………………………………………………… 49 2. Intentions and Capability ……………………………………..……….… 51 3. Developing the Hypothesis ………………………………..……………. 51 4. Availability …………………………………………………………..……. 52 5. Consistency ………………………………………………..…………….. 52 3 UNDERSTANDING FAILURE IN THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS 6. Alternative Hypothesis …………………………………….…………….. 53 7. Doing the Impossible ……………………………………...…………….. 54 8. Testing the Hypothesis ………………………………………………….. 56 a. Enemy’s Viewpoint ………………………………………...………… 56 b. Attribution ………………………………………………….…………. 57 c. Risky Options ……………………………………….…………..…… 58 d. Probability ……………………………………………..………..……. 59 e. Unique Case ………………………………………………….……… 60 E. The Plausible Interpretation Factor …………………………….………….. 61 1. Ambiguity Resolution ……………………………………………….…… 61 2. The Operatives Biases ……………………………………………..…… 63 a. Unconscious Suppression …………………………..……………… 63 b. Stubborn Attachment …………………………………..……………. 64 c. Assimilation …………………………………………………...……… 64 d. Consistency ………………………………………………….…….…. 65 e. Rationality …………………………………………………….…….… 65 f. Casual Illusion …………………………………………………….…. 65 g. The Leading Question ……………………………………….……… 66 h. Occam’s Razor ………………………………………………………. 66 F. The Distraction Factor …………………………………………….………… 67 1. Overview ………………………………………………………..………… 67 2. Distraction of Noise ……………………………………..……….…….… 68 3. Distraction of Work …………………………………………..….………. 69 4. Distraction of Fear …………………………………………………….…. 70 5. Distraction of Hope …………………………………………………..….. 71 6. Distraction of Self-Righteousness ……………………………….…….. 72 4 UNDERSTANDING FAILURE IN THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS 7. Distraction of Alert Fatigue …………………………………………….. 72 G. The Intelligence Collection Factor ………………………………….…….. 75 1. Ignorance is Bliss …………………………………………………….… 75 2. Weather Data …………………………………………………………… 76 3. Kriegsmarine Patrols …………………………………..………………. 77 4. Luftwaffe Patrols ………………………………………….….…………. 77 5. Agent Operations ……………………………………………………….. 78 6. Compromised Systems ……………………………………………..….. 79 H. The Deception Factor ……………………………………………………….. 79 1. Passive Deception …………………………………………….………… 79 a. Secrecy ………………………………………………..……………… 79 b. Cover …………………………………………….……………………. 80 2. Active Deception ……………………………………..………………….. 81 I. Time Factor ……………………………………………...…………………… 83 1. Time and the Event Horizon ……………………………….…………… 83 2. Time and the Perception Horizon ……………………………………… 85 3. Time and the Analysis Horizon ………………………………...………. 86 4. Time and the Warning Horizon …………………………………..…….. 87 J. The Organizational Factor ……………………………………….…………. 88 1. Interagency Rivalry ……………………………………………………… 88 2. The Role of Intelligence ………………………………………………… 89 3. Decentralized Estimates ………………………………..………………. 91 4. Organizational Reform ………………………………………………….. 92 V Surprise …………………………………………………………………………… 92 VI Implications ………………………………………………………………………. 94 VII Epilogue ……………………………………………………………………………97 5 UNDERSTANDING FAILURE IN THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS I. - INTRODUCTION From the German perspective, the D-Day invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944 came as close as possible to being an attack out of the blue, and it came as both a strategic and tactical surprise to the Germans.1 Within the context of the German intelligence analysis and command decision apparatus, the purposes of this article are to examine two vital questions: 1. What are the root causes of failure in the estimative process? 2. Why does strategic surprise always appear to be inevitable? The goal of this paper is to find rational answers to both questions.2 Some popular historians have labeled the failure of German "intelligence" regarding the Normandy landings as one of modern history's most extraordinary military blunders. In point of fact, there was nothing "extraordinary" about the Wehrmacht's apparent unreadiness for the main Allied assault, the Schwerpunkt as the Germans called it. Rarely has a nation at war been more expectant of invasion. By late April 1944, Radio Berlin had broadcast to the German people that an enemy invasion in France would come at "any minute, anywhere."3 On 18 May 1 For "out of the blue" see Michael I. Handel, "Intelligence and Deception," Journal of Strategic Studies 5 (March 1982): 149. 2 Several modern writers have concluded that strategic surprise "comes close to being inevitable." Michael I. Handel, "Clausewitz in the Age of Technology" (Monograph, U.S. Army War College, 1985) 74 n.29. Also, Idem, "Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise," Journal of Strategic Studies 7 (Sept. 1984): 229-82; Idem, "Intelligence and Deception," 137; Klaus Knorr, "Lessons in Statecraft," in Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1982), 256; Ronald G. Sherwin and Barton Whaley, "Understanding Strategic Deception: An Analysis of 93 Cases," in Strategic Military Deception, eds. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), 179; Richard K. Betts, "Analysis of War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," World Politics 31 (Oct. 1978): 61-89. 6 UNDERSTANDING FAILURE IN THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS Radio Berlin announced that "the ports [of England] are bristling—crammed to the bursting point—with … invasion equipment."4 The Germans certainly were anticipating the Grosslandung; and yet, the critical details of their expectations about the Second Front invasion simply were wrong. The Germans were expecting a diversionary attack to be made in Normandy, but they were absolutely convinced that the Allied Schwerpunkt would come in the Pas-de-Calais sector. Everything was set to await the arrival of the Allied forces on the shores of France north of the River Seine—where, in due time, Adolf Hitler and the Wehrmacht expected to destroy them. But, in their effort to build and man the Atlantikwall, the Germans made one critical mistake—one the French had made earlier. They too forgot that a concrete and steel barrier with an exploitable weakness is no shield at all. The D-Day invasion of the Normandy coast provides a dramatic and well- documented example of a strategic attack which, though presaged by a variety of indicators, nevertheless, came as a complete strategic and tactical surprise. While this article is by no means a historical summary of the Normandy story, it does contains sufficient factual information to highlight the major threads of development and errors existing in the German pre- and post-invasion estimates.5 As will become apparent, there was nothing unique about the factors that blocked or inhibited the German perceptive process; there was nothing to make the factors inapplicable outside the historical context of World War II or the 3 "World Battlefields," Time, 1 May 1944, 23. 4 Army Times Editors, The Tangled Web, (Washington: Robert B. Luce, Inc.,