The Royal Air Force, Combined Operations Doctrine and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942 By Ross Wayne Mahoney A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham For the degree of Master of Philosophy Department of Modern History College of Arts and Law The University of Birmingham August 2009 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract This thesis seeks to examine the use of air power during Operation JUBILEE. In recent revisionist accounts, the role of the Royal Air Force has come in for criticism. Therefore, this thesis seeks to examine why the RAF fought the battle in the manner that it did. It examines both the doctrinal and operational context of the forces involved in JUBILEE and in doing so examines their effectiveness. This thesis contends that Combined Operations doctrine argued that the key role for air power was to maintain air superiority in order to protect assaulting force. It then examines this alongside the development of the offensive use of RAF Fighter Command in the battle for air superiority in the period 1940-1942. In understanding, these twin pillars of doctrine and operations this thesis challenges the perceived failure of the RAF during the raid by arguing that in seeking to battle the Luftwaffe in the manner that it did during JUBILEE it provided the most appropriate protection that it could for the assault forces. The thesis then examines the impact that JUBILEE had upon Fighter Command strategy and various aspects of Combined Operations development in 1943 thesis in order to assess its effectiveness. This thesis argues that while there may not be a direct link to Operation OVERLORD in 1944 operations at Dieppe had an impact during 1943 and needs to be considered as one line of development in parallel with those from other theatres of war. 3 Dedication This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Robert and Patricia Mahoney, who have provided unflinching support through each step of my education. 4 Acknowledgements A work such as this would not be possible without the support and help of many different people and institutions and this is my opportunity to say thank you to them. First, thanks must go to the staffs of the various institutions where I conducted research. These were the Department of the Research and Information Services at the RAF Museum, Hendon, London; the National Archives, Kew, London; and the Department of Heritage and History, Canadian National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa. The staffs of the University of Birmingham’s Information Services were also helpful in providing books and articles to a long-distance student. In particularly I am indebted to Sarah Lower and her team of the Library at my place of work, Penwith College, latterly Truro and Penwith College. Personal thanks must go to my colleagues and students at Truro and Penwith College in Penzance who for the past two years have heard me go on about this project. I am sure that at some point, I have bored them half to death about it but their good humour has helped me through this project. In particular, I must thank Colin Fell, George Yates, Chrissie Denis and Amanda Miller who with me reside in the ‘Dungeon’ of the college and have kept my spirits high. Thanks must also go to my friends of the Cornish Scale Modellers who have helped in keeping my spirits up through this process. A paper on the historiography of the Dieppe Raid was delivered to the 2008 postgraduate symposium at the Centre for First World War Studies, University of Birmingham, and thanks must go to the members who gave useful comments on some of the points raised. Thank you to Dr John Bourne who gave me the opportunity to deliver the paper. My biggest thanks must go to my supervisor, Professor Gary Sheffield, who has guided me through the process of writing this thesis. Without his guidance and support this thesis would not have been half as good as it may be. Gary has been supportive of my ideas and has opened up opportunities that I may not have the chance to experience. Of particular note was the opportunity to participate in the RAF’s Exercise TALLY-HO in 2007. This gave me the chance to visit Dieppe and experience a RAF Staff Ride. I am grateful to Sebastian Cox, Head of the Air Historical Branch (RAF), Air Commodore Neville Parton, then Director of Defence Studies (RAF), and Dr David Jordan who allowed me to discuss the air action during JUBILEE when we visited Dieppe. A sympathetic and knowledgeable supervisor is all that a young postgraduate would want and I am glad to say that is what I have had. Finally, thanks must go to my family who have supported me through each step of my education and have never tried to steer me away from whatever course I chose. Both my parents and my sister provided accommodation and a good cup of tea when conducting research in London. Without this support, this thesis would have been much more of a financial burden and would have been more difficult to complete. Thank you for your support. 5 Contents Abstract 3 Dedication 4 Acknowledgements 5 List of Tables, Charts and Maps 8 List of Abbreviations 10 List of Operational Codewords 12 Introduction 13 I.1 Outline of Operation JUBILEE 13 I.2 Thesis Rationale, Aims and Limitations 20 I.3 The Historiography of Operation JUBILEE 24 I.4 Definitions 28 1. Air Power and Combined Operations Doctrine from 1914 to the Second World War 33 1.1 Lessons of the First World War 34 1.2 The Royal Air Force and the Problems of the Inter-War Years 37 1.3 The Role of the Staff Colleges and Combined Operations Exercises 46 1.4 The Royal Air Force and the Manual of Combined Operations 58 1.5 The Royal Air Force and Air Superiority Missions 64 1.6 Conclusion 66 2. The RAF, the Battle for Air Superiority and Planning Operation JUBILEE 68 2.1 The Battle for Air Superiority, 1940-1942 69 2.2 Training for Combined Operations 80 2.3 Planning JUBILEE 88 2.4 Conclusion 100 3. Operational Analysis of Operation JUBILEE and ‘Lessons Learnt’ 102 3.1 Contemporary Qualitative Analysis of Air Power at Dieppe 104 3.2 Quantitative Analysis of Air Power at Dieppe 109 3.3 Raiding as an Intruder Strategy, 1942-1943 126 3.4 Command and Control of Air Power during Combined Operations 138 3.5 The Graham Report and Aerial Bombardment 149 3.6 Conclusion 163 Conclusion 165 Appendices 171 Appendix 1 – Air Force Order of Battle for Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 171 Appendix 2 – Fire Support for an Opposed Landing: Statement by the Air Staff on the Destruction or Neutralisation of Coast Defences, 16 September 1943 177 6 Appendix 3 – Fire Support for an Opposed Landing: Statement by the Air Staff on the Destruction or Neutralisation of Beach Defences, 16 September 1943 192 Bibliography 195 7 List of Tables, Charts and Maps Introduction Chart I.1 No. of Squadrons and Mission Profile of Aircraft deployed in Support of Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 Map I.1 Outline of Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 Chapter 1 Chart 1.1 Expenditure on Armaments and Warlike Stores, 1923-1933 Chapter 2 Chart 2.1 No. 11 Group Combat Statistics for Operation DYNAMO Chart 2.2 German Fighter Claims by Type Destroyed for period of Operation DYNAMO Chapter 3 Chart 3.1 Enemy Casualties by Type Chart 3.2 RAF Fighter Claims for Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 Chart 3.3 JG26 Claims during Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 Chart 3.4 Types of Aircraft lost during Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 Chart 3.5 Nature of Spitfire Losses during Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 Chart 3.6 Cause of Aircraft Losses during Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 Chart 3.7 Relative Casualties and No. of Sorties by Time Period during Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1943 Chart 3.8 Predicted losses to No. 2 Group Squadrons over a sustained period Chart 3.9 Pilot Losses during Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 Chart 3.10 Luftwaffe Fighter Pilot Casualties during Operation JUBILEE, 19 August 1942 Chart 3.11 Effort Required to Destroy or Render Unserviceable Coastal Defence in a Sector Chart 3.12 Effort Required to Neutralise Beach Defences Table 3.1 Summary of Relative Casualties by Type of Sortie 8 Table 3.2 Effort Required by Sorties to Neutralise Beach Defences 9 List of Abbreviations 8AAF United States Eighth Army Air Force AA Anti-Aircraft AACO Air Advisor on Combined Operations AACO (Air) Assistant Advisor on Combined Operations (Air) ACO Advisor on Combined Operations ACAS (G) Assistant Chief of the Air Staff – General Branch ACAS (Ops) Assistant Chief of the Air Staff – Operations ACAS (P) Assistant Chief of the Air Staff – Plans ACAS (T) Assistant Chief of the Air Staff – Technical Requirements AEAF Allied Expeditionary Air Force AHB Air Historical Branch, RAF AOC-in-C Air Officer Commander in Chief ASR Air Sea Rescue BAFF British Air Forces in France BEF British Expeditionary Force BWC Black Watch of Canada CAS Chief of the Air Staff CCO Chief of Combined Operations CCSDCO Combined Committee on Staff Duties in Combined Operation CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff CMHQ Canadian Military Headquarters