DOCSLIB.ORG

Introduction 1 the Royal Navy and the Home Fleet: Men, Material

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Introduction 1 the Royal Navy and the Home Fleet: Men, Material Notes Introduction 1. P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Ashfield Press, 1995 revised paper back ed.), p. 306. 2. For a modern account informed by Italian language sources, see J. Greene and A. Massignani, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943 (Rochester, Kent: Chatham Publishing, 1998), pp. 63–81. 3. L. Kennedy, The Death of the Tirpitz (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 56 uses the term ‘much worry’; ‘bogeyman’ is from P. Kemp, Convoy! Drama in Arctic Waters (London: Arms Armour Press, 1993), p. 191; Rear Admiral W. H. Langenberg, USNR, in ‘The German Battleship Tirpitz: A Strategic Warship?’, Naval War College Review, 34 (4), p. 82, uses the term ‘concern’. See also T. Gallagher, The X-Craft Raid (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969), chapter 2. 4. Langenberg, ‘The German Battleship Tirpitz’, p. 82. 1 The Royal Navy and the Home Fleet: Men, Material, Strategy 1919–39 1. This process is described in detail by P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 205–37. However, the conventional view of naval policy ca 1900–14 has recently come under critical review; see, for example, J. T. Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy (London: Routledge, 1993), N. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia, SC: South Carolina University Press, 1999). Certainly, it was a cost-saving measure. But whether Britain employed a Dreadnought fleet or ‘flotilla defence’, it became clear between 1906 and 1912 that most of the Fleet would be needed in Home Waters if war with Germany erupted. 2. Quotation from A. Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray, 1996), p. 21. 3. For an introductory look at the Washington Naval Conference, see Kennedy’s Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 274–83, and Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield’s memoir It Might Happen Again (London: Heineman, 1947) chapter 1. To see how domestic politics, strategy, money, and President Harding’s need for acclaim and foreign policy success figured into the Washington Conference, see R. Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914–1922 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). 4. A. Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in Peace and War 1915–1940 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 108–9. The responsibilities of the First Sea Lord are delineated in the Introduction to M. Murfett’s The First Sea Lords (London: Praeger, 1995). 5. Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran, p. 108. 163 164 Notes 6. Or, as A. J. P. Taylor has noted, Churchill was responsible for ‘trespassing into operations more than any other first lord had ever done’; see A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914–1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 480. For Churchill’s activity (meddling?) as First Lord, see Murfett, The First Sea Lords, pp. 26–9, 48–9, and 55–87; for a general critique, see S. Roskill’s Churchill and the Admirals (London: Collins, 1977). 7. For three differing opinions about Pound, see S. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2 (London: Collins, 1976), pp. 463–7; Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran chapter 4; and more generally, R. Brodhurst’s chapter on Pound in Murfett, The First Sea Lords. A spirited defence of Churchill can be found in both R. Lewin, Churchill as Warlord (New York: Stein & Day, 1973) and in R. Lamb, Churchill as War Leader (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1993), especially pp. 339–48. Recent revelations in Lord Allenbrook’s War Diaries 1939–1945 (A. Danchev and D. Todman (eds), Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) of Pound’s napping at COS meetings, his inarticulate- ness, and Churchill’s drunkenness supports my negative impression of both. 8. This rift with Japan can be seen in Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 290, and Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2, pp. 168 and 346. 9. See C. M. Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 59–98. 10. For moneys allotted to the Royal Navy, see S. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 1 (London: Collins, 1968), appendix D. 11. Quotation in Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2, p. 145. 12. Quotation in Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 276. 13. For an all-out assault on Appeasement, see C. Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (New York: Morrow, 1972). Britain’s strategic situation in the inter-war years is well covered in Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 278–98, and in his The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage, 1988), pp. 275–320, and I have drawn heavily for my analysis from these sources. Britain’s Achilles’ Heel in the Mediterranean is brought to light in L. R. Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975). And, for a magisterial synopsis of what the Admiralty and Cabinet were thinking at that time, read N. H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy Volume 1 (London: HMSO, 1976), esp. pp. 323–438. 14. Figures in Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2, p. 335. The dread fear was from poison gas. And, ironically, air advocates like Churchill had compounded the problem, echoing Baldwin that ‘the bomber will always get through’. For a manifestation of the popularly imagined horror which people in the 1930s expected might be the face of the next war, see the 1938 film Things to Come. 15. Part of that diplomacy was the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, limiting the re-emerging German Navy to 35 per cent of British tonnage in surface ships and 45 per cent in submarines. The best work on this is J. Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany 1933–1939 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1998). On Britain’s decision to reach such an agreement with the Germans in contravention of the Versailles Treaty, Eric Grove has written: ‘Having used arms control successfully to contain the power of one rival, the USA, why not use it against Germany too?’, E. Grove, ‘A War Fleet Built Notes 165 for Peace: British Naval Rearmament in the 1930s and the Dilemma of Deterrence versus Defence’, Naval War College Review (Spring 1991): 82–92. Quotation from p. 83. 16. Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, pp. 218–19. 17. Ironically, Winston Churchill, the Cassandra of the 1930s, was largely respon- sible for the running down of the Navy in the 1920s. It was Churchill who wielded the ‘Geddes Axe’, cutting naval expenditures during his tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1924–29. Churchill was also responsible for the disastrous decision to re-establish the value of the Pound at its pre- 1914 $4.86, instantly making British exports noncompetitive, thus damaging Britain’s balance of payments and reducing the funds available to purchase supplies for rearmament. 18. Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, p. 136. 19. Quotation from Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 290. 20. Maiolo stresses the desire of Chatfield to lock in the existing British position of naval pre-eminence through an interlocking series of qualitative and quan- titative arms limitation treaties. See also Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars. Bell shows that the British fully understood ‘the need for securing bases, defending imperial trade, and enforcing a maritime blockade’. (p. 134) They were not hidebound battleship bumpkins forever trapped at 7 o’clock on the evening of 31 May, 1916. 21. Japan would have six battleships and four rebuilt battlecruisers, plus the battleship Yamato completing. Germany would have her two battlecruisers plus Bismarck, with Tirpitz on the way. Italy would have six modern or modernised battleships and two building. The Royal Navy could count on having two ‘King George V’ class battleships built and another three on the way, Hood, Nelson, Rodney, Renown, Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, and, generously, Warspite. See Table 1.2 and R. Chesneau, Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships 1922–1946 (New York: Mayflower Books, 1980). British estimates of their future battleship strength and proposals for additional warship modifications in early 1939 are in ADM 1/10139. 22. A. Gordon, ‘The Admiralty and Imperial Overstretch, 1902–1941’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 17 (1) (1994), 63–85. Quotation is from p. 71. See also G. C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury 1932–1939 (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979), esp. pp. 179–84. 23. A. Raven and J. Robert, British Battleships of World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976), esp. pp. 107–43 and pp. 165–269; E. H. H. Archibald, The Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy (New York: Military Press, 1987), chapters 20 and 21. 24. Quotation in Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 1, p. 167. 25. See Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2, pp. 333–4. 26. For details of Nelson and Rodney, see Raven and Robert, British Battleships, pp. 107–27. 27. CAB 16/147, ‘Sub-Committee on the Vulnerability of Capital Ships to Air Attack, 1936’. 28. For a general discussion of the battlecruiser concept, see Archibald, Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy, chapter 21. The details of Renown and Repulse are given in Raven and Robert, British Battleships on pp. 45–52, 141–3, 206–17, and 250–63. For the particulars of Hood, see ibid. pp. 60–75, 189–97. 166 Notes 29. M.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Semaphore Circular No 661 the Beating Heart of the RNA July 2016
    The Semaphore Circular No 661 The Beating Heart of the RNA July 2016 The No 3 Area Ladies getting the Friday night raffle ready at Conference! This edition is the on-line version of the Semaphore Circular, unless you have registered with Central Office, it will only be available on the RNA website in the ‘Members Area’ under ‘downloads’ at www.royal-naval-association.co.uk and will be emailed to the branch contact, usually the Hon Sec. 1 Daily Orders 1. Conference 2016 report 2. Remembrance Parade 13 November 2016 3. Slops/Merchandise & Membership 4. Guess Where? 5. Donations 6. Pussers Black Tot Day 7. Birds and Bees Joke 8. SAIL 9. RN VC Series – Seaman Jack Cornwell 10. RNRMC Charity Banquet 11. Mini Cruise 12. Finance Corner 13. HMS Hampshire 14. Joke Time 15. HMS St Albans Deployment 16. Paintings for Pleasure not Profit 17. Book – Wren Jane Beacon 18. Aussie Humour 19. Book Reviews 20. For Sale – Officers Sword Longcast “D’ye hear there” (Branch news) Crossed the Bar – Celebrating a life well lived RNA Benefits Page Shortcast Swinging the Lamp Forms Glossary of terms NCM National Council Member NC National Council AMC Association Management Committee FAC Finance Administration Committee NCh National Chairman NVCh National Vice Chairman NP National President DNP Deputy National President GS General Secretary DGS Deputy General Secretary AGS Assistant General Secretary CONA Conference of Naval Associations IMC International Maritime Confederation NSM Naval Service Memorial Throughout indicates a new or substantially changed entry 2 Contacts Financial Controller 023 9272 3823 [email protected] FAX 023 9272 3371 Deputy General Secretary 023 9272 0782 [email protected] Assistant General Secretary (Membership & Slops) 023 9272 3747 [email protected] S&O Administrator 023 9272 0782 [email protected] General Secretary 023 9272 2983 [email protected] Admin 023 92 72 3747 [email protected] Find Semaphore Circular On-line ; http://www.royal-naval-association.co.uk/members/downloads or..
    [Show full text]
  • Reginald James Morry's Memoirs of WWII
    THE MORRY FAMILY WEBSITE -- HTTP://WEB.NCF.CA/fr307/ World War II Memoirs of Reginald James Morry Including an eyewitness account of the sinking of the German battleship “Bismarck”. Reginald James Morry 10/6/2007 Edited by C. J. Morry Following long standing Newfoundland maritime tradition, when hostilities broke out at the beginning of WWII, Reginald James Morry chose to serve in the “Senior Service”, the Royal Navy. This is his personal account of those momentous years, including one of the most crucial naval battles of the war, the sinking of the German battleship “Bismarck”. © Reginald James Morry; Edmonton, Alberta, Canada; 2007 World War II Memoirs of Reginald James Morry (then Able Seaman R. Morry P/SSX 31753) Including an eyewitness account of the sinking of the German battleship “Bismarck”. Newfoundland’s Military Legacy Newfoundland participated in both World Wars. Even though the province is small, it produced a famous Regiment of Infantry that fought in Gallipolis and from there to France. They lost quite a few men in Turkey and were decimated twice in France, once in Beaumont Hamel and again at Arras and other areas on the Somme. Total casualties (fatal) were 1305, and at sea 179 lost their lives. Of those that returned, many died of wounds, stress, and worn out hearts. They were given the title “Royal” for their role in the defence of Masnieres (the Battle for Cambrai) by King George VI, the reigning Monarch of the time. World War II is practically dead history, especially since some anti-Royals disbanded the regiment in 2002, as it's territorial section, according to the present army regime in HQ Ottawa, did not measure up!! During WWII the British changed the regiment over to Artillery so they became known as The Royal Newfoundland Light Artillery to lessen the chances of heavy losses.
    [Show full text]
  • A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations from 1941 to the Present
    CRM D0006297.A2/ Final July 2002 Charting the Pathway to OMFTS: A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations From 1941 to the Present Carter A. Malkasian 4825 Mark Center Drive • Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1850 Approved for distribution: July 2002 c.. Expedit'onaryyystems & Support Team Integrated Systems and Operations Division This document represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Specific authority: N0014-00-D-0700. For copies of this document call: CNA Document Control and Distribution Section at 703-824-2123. Copyright 0 2002 The CNA Corporation Contents Summary . 1 Introduction . 5 Methodology . 6 The U.S. Marine Corps’ new concept for forcible entry . 9 What is the purpose of amphibious warfare? . 15 Amphibious warfare and the strategic level of war . 15 Amphibious warfare and the operational level of war . 17 Historical changes in amphibious warfare . 19 Amphibious warfare in World War II . 19 The strategic environment . 19 Operational doctrine development and refinement . 21 World War II assault and area denial tactics. 26 Amphibious warfare during the Cold War . 28 Changes to the strategic context . 29 New operational approaches to amphibious warfare . 33 Cold war assault and area denial tactics . 35 Amphibious warfare, 1983–2002 . 42 Changes in the strategic, operational, and tactical context of warfare. 42 Post-cold war amphibious tactics . 44 Conclusion . 46 Key factors in the success of OMFTS. 49 Operational pause . 49 The causes of operational pause . 49 i Overcoming enemy resistance and the supply buildup.
    [Show full text]
  • British Imperialism in Books from the “Third Reich”
    Empire and National Character: British Imperialism in Books from the “Third Reich” Victoria Jane Stiles, MA, MA Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy July 2015 Abstract This thesis examines the variety of representations and rhetorical deployments of the theme of British Imperialism within books published in the “Third Reich”. The thesis considers these books not only as vehicles for particular ideas and arguments but also as consumer objects and therefore as the product of a series of compromises between the needs of a host of actors, both official and commercial. It further traces the origins of the component parts of these texts via the history of reuse of images and extracts and by identifying earlier examples of particular tropes of “Englishness” and the British Empire. British imperial history was a rich source of material for National Socialist writers and educators to draw on and lent itself to a wide variety of arguments. Britain could be, in turns, a symbol of “Nordic” strength, a civilisation in decline, a natural ally and protector of Germany, or a weak, corrupt, outdated entity, controlled by Germany’s supposed enemies. Drawing on a long tradition of comparing European colonial records, the British Empire was also used as a benchmark for Germany’s former imperial achievements, particularly in moral arguments regarding the treatment of indigenous populations. Through its focus on books, which were less ephemeral than media such as newspaper and magazine articles, radio broadcasts or newsreels, the thesis demonstrates how newer writings sought to recontextualise older material in the light of changing circumstances.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Introduction
    Notes 1 Introduction 1. Donald Macintyre, Narvik (London: Evans, 1959), p. 15. 2. See Olav Riste, The Neutral Ally: Norway’s Relations with Belligerent Powers in the First World War (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965). 3. Reflections of the C-in-C Navy on the Outbreak of War, 3 September 1939, The Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939–45 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 37–38. 4. Report of the C-in-C Navy to the Fuehrer, 10 October 1939, in ibid. p. 47. 5. Report of the C-in-C Navy to the Fuehrer, 8 December 1939, Minutes of a Conference with Herr Hauglin and Herr Quisling on 11 December 1939 and Report of the C-in-C Navy, 12 December 1939 in ibid. pp. 63–67. 6. MGFA, Nichols Bohemia, n 172/14, H. W. Schmidt to Admiral Bohemia, 31 January 1955 cited by Francois Kersaudy, Norway, 1940 (London: Arrow, 1990), p. 42. 7. See Andrew Lambert, ‘Seapower 1939–40: Churchill and the Strategic Origins of the Battle of the Atlantic, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 1 (1994), pp. 86–108. 8. For the importance of Swedish iron ore see Thomas Munch-Petersen, The Strategy of Phoney War (Stockholm: Militärhistoriska Förlaget, 1981). 9. Churchill, The Second World War, I, p. 463. 10. See Richard Wiggan, Hunt the Altmark (London: Hale, 1982). 11. TMI, Tome XV, Déposition de l’amiral Raeder, 17 May 1946 cited by Kersaudy, p. 44. 12. Kersaudy, p. 81. 13. Johannes Andenæs, Olav Riste and Magne Skodvin, Norway and the Second World War (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1966), p.
    [Show full text]
  • Eighty Years Since the Tragic Sinking of HMS Glorious
    52 I MARCH 8, 2020 THE SUNDAY TIMES OF MALTA THE SUNDAY TIMES OF MALTA MARCH 8, 2020 I 53 LIFEANDWELLBEING HISTORY Eighty years since the tragic sinking of HMS Glorious She told me her grandmother Carmela Bartolo was very young, and to help her family she THE "GLORIOUS" AND worked in a lace shop in Valletta, TWO DESTROYERS LOST I near Castille. A young Fridolin :4.f.. i.:11 TRfJOP.-.HTP .4,Vl> · SAVIOUR saw her there and became a reg­ nn~r ..t.VKElt , ( .......... ~) : AZZOPARDI ular visitor to the shop. He J. .o~DON . fone 10. I would explain his frequent visits I~ 11' offkia\l~· unnounU<i i.l1•& t;.., ! by saying he was buying presents Hriti~h 11irc·1·ar1 c:t1rrtn H.~.8 . <11n1tll)"C~ i,. 11t'Hntn~ !Mt. AIJG the lnm~tt 1 for his mother in the UK whom !t•.a~r "Or11mo:" llnd tbe t11nker stHmer l During World War ll many Mal­ be1oved.somucb. "Oil Piontl'r... Th~ t'lro cll'S<troyert l tese lives were affected by When Carmela accepted his H.'.\f.f.1. At-.tlll'A 11ri.i H.\l.!I. Ant1r.n ~H events that were to unfold as the invitation to meet after work 1.tl>'O flfP~tlntt<d !<)tit. war progressed. A huge shock­ Fridolin never looked back, and ADltt•ALTY COMM\llltQUE wave hit Malta on June 8, 1940 the two were soon meeting on a ,..... ,..,... ......... ; with the news that the aircraft regular basis. They married in LONDOM. Jnue 10. 1 TIHf Actml1111lty ,..,nm1unlq11.; ~t•tft carrier HMS Glorious had been 1922 and had nine children, tllU Ne 110 further information i~ re- sunk with a huge loss of lire.
    [Show full text]
  • Tikkanen, Henrikki Leader Personality, Managerial Attention, and Disruptive Technologies
    This is an electronic reprint of the original article. This reprint may differ from the original in pagination and typographic detail. Tikkanen, Henrikki Leader personality, managerial attention, and disruptive technologies Published in: MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY DOI: 10.1080/17449359.2017.1308259 Published: 31/03/2017 Document Version Peer reviewed version Please cite the original version: Tikkanen, H. (2017). Leader personality, managerial attention, and disruptive technologies: the adoption of the battlecruiser concept in the Royal Navy, 1904–1918. MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY, 12(1), 47-75. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449359.2017.1308259 This material is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, and duplication or sale of all or part of any of the repository collections is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for your research use or educational purposes in electronic or print form. You must obtain permission for any other use. Electronic or print copies may not be offered, whether for sale or otherwise to anyone who is not an authorised user. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org) Tikkanen, Henrikki (2017) Leader Personality, Managerial Attention and Disruptive Technologies: The Adoption of the Battlecruiser Concept in the Royal Navy, 1904-1918, Management & Organizational History, 21(1), 47-75. Abstract Managerial attention to the leader’s strategic designs has been identified as a key prerequisite for success in the adoption of new technologies. The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze how the battlecruiser concept as an organizational gestalt was developed, adopted and assessed in the British Royal Navy (RN) in 1904- 1918 from the perspective of the top leader’s personality and managerial attention.
    [Show full text]
  • World War II at Sea This Page Intentionally Left Blank World War II at Sea
    World War II at Sea This page intentionally left blank World War II at Sea AN ENCYCLOPEDIA Volume I: A–K Dr. Spencer C. Tucker Editor Dr. Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr. Associate Editor Dr. Eric W. Osborne Assistant Editor Vincent P. O’Hara Assistant Editor Copyright 2012 by ABC-CLIO, LLC All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data World War II at sea : an encyclopedia / Spencer C. Tucker. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-59884-457-3 (hardcopy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-59884-458-0 (ebook) 1. World War, 1939–1945—Naval operations— Encyclopedias. I. Tucker, Spencer, 1937– II. Title: World War Two at sea. D770.W66 2011 940.54'503—dc23 2011042142 ISBN: 978-1-59884-457-3 EISBN: 978-1-59884-458-0 15 14 13 12 11 1 2 3 4 5 This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America To Malcolm “Kip” Muir Jr., scholar, gifted teacher, and friend. This page intentionally left blank Contents About the Editor ix Editorial Advisory Board xi List of Entries xiii Preface xxiii Overview xxv Entries A–Z 1 Chronology of Principal Events of World War II at Sea 823 Glossary of World War II Naval Terms 831 Bibliography 839 List of Editors and Contributors 865 Categorical Index 877 Index 889 vii This page intentionally left blank About the Editor Spencer C.
    [Show full text]
  • Cab-65-16.Pdf
    W.M.(40) 281st Conclusions, Minute 1. Greece! Military assistance. Minute 3. Prance: The French Fleet. 282nd Conclusions, Minute 2. Greece: Military assistance. 283rd Conclusions, Minute 1. Naval Operations: Enemy Raider in the Atlantic: Counter-Measures adopted. 285th Conclusions, Minute 4. France: The French Fleet: . "JEAN BART" and "RICHELIEU". 287th Conclusions, Minute 1. Naval Operations: Escort for Convoy. Minute 5. Middle East: Visit of Secretary of State for War. 290th Conclusions, Minute 1. Naval Operations: Loss of aircraft from H.M.S. ARGUS. 291st Conclusions, Minute 2. Greece: Military Assistance. 295th Conclusions, Minute 4. The Balkans: Italian invasion of ; Greece: possible explanation. 296th Conclusions, Minute 2. Air Defence: Air Defence of ' Great Britain. 297th Conclusions, Minute 1. Air Operations: Effectiveness of British Bombs: Air Bases in Greece 302nd Conclusions, Minute 1. Military Operations: Libya. 305th Conclusions, Air Policy: Operation "Abigail". * 306th Conclusions, Minute; 3. Germany: Future Intentions. 309th Conclusions, Minute 3. Air Policy: Christmas Eve and Christmas Day. : 310th Conclusions, Minute 2* The Balkans: Air Bases. 311th Conclusions, Minute 5 (a). France: Relations with the Vichy Government. Minute 5 (b). Royal Navy: Mediterranean Fleet Movements. .-7IIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP.ffiXS BRXTANNIG MAJSSTY' S GOVERNIIEITT.. TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY. It is requested that special care may betaken to ansure the secrecy of thLs docu., ei.c. MOHT SECRET i COPIJSP-i 'W.M..(-40^ 281ST CONCLUSIONSi MINUTE 1* Confidential Annex,. (1st November, 1940 - IS Noon.) pEEOEo' The War Cabinet were informed that a squadron of Blenheims was being sent from Egypt to Athens. filitary ^istancee One British Battalion was arriving in Crete that day.
    [Show full text]
  • DEATH of a BATTLESHIP the LOSS of HMS PRINCE of WALES December 10, 1941
    DEATH OF A BATTLESHIP THE LOSS OF HMS PRINCE OF WALES December 10, 1941 A Marine Forensics Analysis of the Sinking Garzke - Dulin - Denlay Table of Contents Introduction to the 2010 Revision................................................................................................... 3 Abstract........................................................................................................................................... 5 Historical Background.................................................................................................................... 6 Force Z Track Chart.................................................................................................................. 11 The Fatal Torpedo Hit .................................................................................................................. 13 Figure 1 – Location of the First Torpedo Hit............................................................................ 15 Figure 2 – Transverse Section...................................................................................................18 Figure 3 – Arrangement of Port Outboard Shaft Tunnel .......................................................... 20 Figure 4 – Flooding Diagrams after First Torpedo Hit............................................................. 22 Figure 4a – Machinery and Magazine Arrangements Schematic ............................................. 22 Figure 4b – Location of the Port Torpedo Hit .........................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Aircraft Carriers Royal Canadian Navy (Rcn)
    CANADA AVIATION MUSEUM AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT CARRIERS ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY (RCN) Prepared by Commander E.J. L’Heureux CD, RCN (Ret’d) Introduction Naval Aviation had its start only eight years after the Wright Brothers first flew their “Flyer” at Kill Devil Hill, Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, USA, in 1903 and less than two years after J.A.D. McCurdy made the first airplane flight at Baddeck, on Bras D’Or Lake, Nova Scotia. It was in 1911 that Eugene Ely, an exhibition pilot, flew a Curtiss off the deck of the United States Ship (USS) BIRMINGHAM at anchor in Hampton Roads, Virginia, and flew it to Norfolk. Two months later he flew from Camp Selfridge to a 120 foot wooden deck fitted on the USS PENNSYLVANIA anchored in San Francisco Bay, proving the feasibility of the aircraft carrier. It would not be many years before the fledgling country of Canada was to participate in carrier based aviation, initially through the pilots who flew with the Royal Navy (RN) and latterly through the acquisition of aircraft carriers themselves. This story is a synopsis of that participation. Aircraft Carrier Development In the formative era of aircraft carrier development navies were tied to the concept that the bigger the ship and the larger the guns the more capable the navy. The bireme and trireme, referring to the numbers and layers of oars used in Greek and Roman galleons, gave way to the wooden hulls and big guns of later ships used in the Napoleonic Wars, and the battles of the Nile and Trafalgar.
    [Show full text]
  • Otto Schniewind Testimony University of North Dakota
    University of North Dakota UND Scholarly Commons Elwyn B. Robinson Department of Special Nuremberg Transcripts Collections 5-25-1948 High Command Case: Otto Schniewind Testimony University of North Dakota Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/nuremburg-transcripts Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation University of North Dakota, "High Command Case: Otto Schniewind Testimony" (1948). Nuremberg Transcripts. 16. https://commons.und.edu/nuremburg-transcripts/16 This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Elwyn B. Robinson Department of Special Collections at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nuremberg Transcripts by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 25 May–A–MW–17–2–Gallagher (Int.Evand) COURT V, CASE XII THE PRESIDENT: You may have the same privileges and rights with respect to the documents that have been heretofore indicated. DR. FRITSCH: I merely have one request, Your Honor. In my opening statement I made a motion to strike Counts I and IV of the Indictment. I would now like to ask the Tribunal to rule on this motion. THE PRESIDENT: If you desire a ruling on that motion at this time, inasmuch as the testimony is now in,the [sic] motion will be overruled, because that is one of the essential questions that will have to be determined when the opinion is written. If there is no proof of these, why, of course, then those Counts have not been substantiated, but at this time the motion will be overruled.
    [Show full text]