Notes

Introduction 1. P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (: Ashfield Press, 1995 revised paper back ed.), p. 306. 2. For a modern account informed by Italian language sources, see J. Greene and A. Massignani, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943 (Rochester, Kent: Chatham Publishing, 1998), pp. 63–81. 3. L. Kennedy, The Death of the Tirpitz (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 56 uses the term ‘much worry’; ‘bogeyman’ is from P. Kemp, ! Drama in Arctic Waters (London: Arms Armour Press, 1993), p. 191; Rear W. H. Langenberg, USNR, in ‘The German Tirpitz: A Strategic Warship?’, Naval War College Review, 34 (4), p. 82, uses the term ‘concern’. See also T. Gallagher, The X-Craft Raid (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969), chapter 2. 4. Langenberg, ‘The German Battleship Tirpitz’, p. 82.

1 The and the Home Fleet: Men, Material, Strategy 1919–39 1. This process is described in detail by P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 205–37. However, the conventional view of naval policy ca 1900–14 has recently come under critical review; see, for example, J. T. Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy (London: Routledge, 1993), N. Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia, SC: South Carolina University Press, 1999). Certainly, it was a cost-saving measure. But whether Britain employed a Dreadnought fleet or ‘flotilla defence’, it became clear between 1906 and 1912 that most of the Fleet would be needed in Home Waters if war with Germany erupted. 2. Quotation from A. Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray, 1996), p. 21. 3. For an introductory look at the Washington Naval Conference, see Kennedy’s Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 274–83, and Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield’s memoir It Might Happen Again (London: Heineman, 1947) chapter 1. To see how domestic politics, strategy, money, and President Harding’s need for acclaim and foreign policy success figured into the Washington Conference, see R. Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914–1922 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). 4. A. Marder, From the Dardanelles to : Studies of the Royal Navy in Peace and War 1915–1940 (London: , 1974), pp. 108–9. The responsibilities of the First Sea Lord are delineated in the Introduction to M. Murfett’s The First Sea Lords (London: Praeger, 1995). 5. Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran, p. 108.

163 164 Notes

6. Or, as A. J. P. Taylor has noted, Churchill was responsible for ‘trespassing into operations more than any other first lord had ever done’; see A. J. P. Taylor, English History 1914–1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 480. For Churchill’s activity (meddling?) as First Lord, see Murfett, The First Sea Lords, pp. 26–9, 48–9, and 55–87; for a general critique, see S. Roskill’s Churchill and the (London: Collins, 1977). 7. For three differing opinions about Pound, see S. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2 (London: Collins, 1976), pp. 463–7; Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran chapter 4; and more generally, R. Brodhurst’s chapter on Pound in Murfett, The First Sea Lords. A spirited defence of Churchill can be found in both R. Lewin, Churchill as Warlord (New York: Stein & Day, 1973) and in R. Lamb, Churchill as War Leader (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1993), especially pp. 339–48. Recent revelations in Lord Allenbrook’s War Diaries 1939–1945 (A. Danchev and D. Todman (eds), Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001) of Pound’s napping at COS meetings, his inarticulate- ness, and Churchill’s drunkenness supports my negative impression of both. 8. This rift with Japan can be seen in Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 290, and Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2, pp. 168 and 346. 9. See C. M. Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 59–98. 10. For moneys allotted to the Royal Navy, see S. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 1 (London: Collins, 1968), appendix D. 11. Quotation in Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2, p. 145. 12. Quotation in Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 276. 13. For an all-out assault on Appeasement, see C. Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (New York: Morrow, 1972). Britain’s strategic situation in the inter-war years is well covered in Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 278–98, and in his The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage, 1988), pp. 275–320, and I have drawn heavily for my analysis from these sources. Britain’s Achilles’ Heel in the Mediterranean is brought to light in L. R. Pratt, East of , West of Suez (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975). And, for a magisterial synopsis of what the Admiralty and Cabinet were thinking at that time, read N. H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy Volume 1 (London: HMSO, 1976), esp. pp. 323–438. 14. Figures in Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2, p. 335. The dread fear was from poison gas. And, ironically, air advocates like Churchill had compounded the problem, echoing Baldwin that ‘the will always get through’. For a manifestation of the popularly imagined horror which people in the 1930s expected might be the face of the next war, see the 1938 film Things to Come. 15. Part of that diplomacy was the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, limiting the re-emerging German Navy to 35 per cent of British tonnage in surface ships and 45 per cent in . The best work on this is J. Maiolo, The Royal Navy and 1933–1939 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1998). On Britain’s decision to reach such an agreement with the Germans in contravention of the Versailles Treaty, Eric Grove has written: ‘Having used arms control successfully to contain the power of one rival, the USA, why not use it against Germany too?’, E. Grove, ‘A War Fleet Built Notes 165

for Peace: British Naval Rearmament in the 1930s and the Dilemma of Deterrence versus Defence’, Naval War College Review (Spring 1991): 82–92. Quotation from p. 83. 16. Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, pp. 218–19. 17. Ironically, , the Cassandra of the 1930s, was largely respon- sible for the running down of the Navy in the 1920s. It was Churchill who wielded the ‘Geddes Axe’, cutting naval expenditures during his tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1924–29. Churchill was also responsible for the disastrous decision to re-establish the value of the Pound at its pre- 1914 $4.86, instantly making British exports noncompetitive, thus damaging Britain’s balance of payments and reducing the funds available to purchase supplies for rearmament. 18. Maiolo, The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, p. 136. 19. Quotation from Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 290. 20. Maiolo stresses the desire of Chatfield to lock in the existing British position of naval pre-eminence through an interlocking series of qualitative and quan- titative arms limitation treaties. See also Bell, The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy Between the Wars. Bell shows that the British fully understood ‘the need for securing bases, defending imperial trade, and enforcing a maritime blockade’. (p. 134) They were not hidebound battleship bumpkins forever trapped at 7 o’clock on the evening of 31 May, 1916. 21. Japan would have six and four rebuilt , plus the battleship Yamato completing. Germany would have her two battlecruisers plus Bismarck, with Tirpitz on the way. Italy would have six modern or modernised battleships and two building. The Royal Navy could count on having two ‘King ’ class battleships built and another three on the way, Hood, Nelson, Rodney, Renown, Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, and, generously, Warspite. See Table 1.2 and R. Chesneau, Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships 1922–1946 (New York: Mayflower Books, 1980). British estimates of their future battleship strength and proposals for additional warship modifications in early 1939 are in ADM 1/10139. 22. A. Gordon, ‘The Admiralty and Imperial Overstretch, 1902–1941’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 17 (1) (1994), 63–85. Quotation is from p. 71. See also G. C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury 1932–1939 (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979), esp. pp. 179–84. 23. A. Raven and J. Robert, British Battleships of World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976), esp. pp. 107–43 and pp. 165–269; E. H. H. Archibald, The Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy (New York: Military Press, 1987), chapters 20 and 21. 24. Quotation in Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 1, p. 167. 25. See Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2, pp. 333–4. 26. For details of Nelson and Rodney, see Raven and Robert, British Battleships, pp. 107–27. 27. CAB 16/147, ‘Sub-Committee on the Vulnerability of Capital Ships to Air Attack, 1936’. 28. For a general discussion of the concept, see Archibald, Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy, chapter 21. The details of Renown and Repulse are given in Raven and Robert, British Battleships on pp. 45–52, 141–3, 206–17, and 250–63. For the particulars of Hood, see ibid. pp. 60–75, 189–97. 166 Notes

29. M. J. Whitley, of World War II: An International Encyclopedia (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), p. 9. 30. For a description of these five ships, see J. C. Taylor, German Warships of World War II (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 16–20. 31. The strategic value of operations is related in M. Simpson, ‘Force H and British Strategy in the Western Mediterranean 1939–1942’ The Mariner’s Mirror, 83 (1) (1997), 62–75. 32. An excellent book is N. Friedman, British Carrier Aviation (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988). See also R. Chesneau, Aircraft Carriers of the World 1914 to the Present: An Illustrated Encyclopedia (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), and Archibald, Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy, chapter 30. 33. See R. Chesneau, Aircraft Carriers of the World, p. 92. 34. Letter, A. G. Kirk of 12 December, 1940 in RG 38 Intelligence Division Confidential Reports of Naval Attachés Box 1202, US National Archive, College Park, Maryland. 35. A fine popular account of the exploits of the can be found in J. Winton, Find, Fix and Strike! The Fleet Air Arm at War 1939–1945 (London: Batsford, 1980). 36. These surprising figures were obtained from W. T. Larkin, US Navy Aircraft 1921–1941 (New York: Orion Publishers, 1988 edn), pp. 243–5. 37. See Friedman, British Carrier Aviation, appendix B. 38. All three planes are described in O. Thetford, British Naval Aircraft Since 1912 (London: Putnam, 1962). For the Swordfish, see pp. 133–5; for the Skua, pp. 56–7; for the Sea Gladiator, pp. 190–1. 39. Quote from M. Simpson (ed.), The Somerville Papers (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1995), pp. 54–5. 40. For the designation of FAA squadrons and their composition in the autumn of 1939, see Winton, Find, Fix, and Strike!, pp. 2–3. 41. From Friedman, British Carrier Aviation, appendix B, and Winton, Find, Fix, and Strike!, pp. 2–3. Roskill in the Official History, The War at Sea Volume 1 (London: HMSO, 1954) points out that the FAA also had 191 aircraft for training purposes. Before the war, the Admiralty had projected a strength of 480 frontline FAA aircraft (360 embarked on ten ships with Courageous as the training carrier), plus 480 aircraft in immediate reserve to replace losses and wastage, and 332 training aircraft in the air establishment by 1 April 1942. The British, given budget limitations, were very carrier conscious. See ADM 1/10112. Their big mistake was estimating that at that date the Japanese would have only 278 planes embarked! 42. Winton, Find, Fix, and Strike!, p. 3. 43. For a complete description of the cruisers serving with the Home Fleet, see M. J. Whitley, Cruisers of World War II: An International Encyclopedia, pp. 66–128. 44. This section on British is drawn from H. T. Lenton and J. J. Colledge, British and Dominion Warships of World War II (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 95–109, and Archibald, Fighting Ships of the Royal Navy, p. 235. 45. For an American take on this faith, and the technology behind it, see On His Majesty’s Service: Observations of the British Home Fleet from the Diary, Reports, and Letters of Joseph H. Wellings, Assistant US Naval Attaché in London 1940–1941 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1983), edited by J. B. Hattendorf, p. 40. Notes 167

Chatfield, the First Sea Lord from 1933–38, thought British anti- methods would prove ‘80% successful’, Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2, p. 227. See also the notes on pp. 40–1 of A. Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran. 46. D. van der Vat’s The Atlantic Campaign (New York: Harper & Row, 1988) devotes a great deal of attention to the technology and tactics that won the . W. J. R. Gardner in Decoding History: The Battle of the Atlantic and (Annapolis, MD: Naral Institute Press, 1999) deals with how organisation, technology, production, and tactics were just as important as Ultra. 47. For Raeder’s information regarding when war might come, see S. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1 (London: HMSO, 1954), p. 52. 48. For a comparison of the relative modernity of German surface warships compared to their Royal Navy counterparts, see Taylor, German Warships of World War II, pp. 11–45, and Lenton and Colledge, British and Dominion Warships, pp. 16–109. 49. For the serious lack of coherence in German naval strategy and policy before and during the war, see Holger Herwig, ‘The Failure of German Sea Power 1914–1945: Mahan, Tirpitz, and Raeder Reconsidered’, International History Review, 10 (1) (February 1988), esp. pp. 86–105, and Maiolo, Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, pp. 70–4, 164. 50. A. J. P. Taylor wrote of Chamberlain that ‘He had led every step towards rearmament and, indeed, more than any other man, laid the foundations for British fighting power during the Second World War’. Quotation from Taylor, English History 1914–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 414. Chamberlain’s weakness was his insistence on rearming within the constraints of Britain’s ability to pay for it. For the surprising similarities between the strategic outlook of Churchill and Chamberlain in the 1930s, see G. C. Peden, ‘Winston Churchill, Neville Chamberlain and the Defence of Empire’, in J. B. Hattendorf and M. Murfett (eds), The Limitations of Military Power: Essays presented to Professor Norman Gibbs on his eightieth birthday (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990). 51. Figures are from Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 286. It should be noted that monies for the RAF surpassed those for the Navy and Army in 1938, and again to September 1939, revealing Chamberlain’s preference for this arm of defence.

2 The Home Fleet at the Outset of War 1. Taken from ADM 187/1. 2. ADM 196/45, p. 219 (Forbes’ naval record); The Dictionary of National Biography 1940, pp. 26–7 (for Backhouse); The Dictionary of National Biography 1960 (for Forbes). 3. ADM 196/45, p. 219. 4. Letter, Sir G. Style to Roskill, 10 March, 1979 in the Roskill Papers, File 4/50. 5. For a discussion of the senior flag officer crisis affecting the Royal Navy in the late 1930s, see Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2, pp. 463–8; R. Brodhurst, Churchill’s : The Biography of Admiral of the Fleet Sir (Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword, 2000), pp. 113–16; 168 Notes

Michael Simpson, The Cunningham Papers Volume 1: The Mediterranean Fleet 1939–1942 (Alde shot: Ashgate Press, 1999), pp. 7–8. 6. See R. Brodhurst’s chapter in Murfett, The First Sea Lords, esp. p. 186. 7. Quoted from C. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, (New York: Norton, 1991), p. 51. 8. Roskill in Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2, p. 466, argues that Chatfield or Forbes could have been given the post of First Sea Lord, but Brodhurst in Murfett, The First Sea Lords, pp. 186–7, says that Pound was the only logical appointee. In Churchill’s Anchor, Brodhurst argues persuasively (if not to this author’s mind, convincingly), that Pound was the not only the logical, but the best choice for Lord Stanhope to make. 9. Tovey to Roskill, 1 January, 1962, Roskill Papers File 4/17. 10. Other outside possibilities such as Admirals of the Fleet Lord Cork and Keyes, and Admirals James and Drax, were considered too long retired or away from a sea posting to sit in the First Sea Lord’s chair. Andrew B. Cunningham, Backhouse’s Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, was held to be too junior for the post and had yet to serve as a -in-Chief. 11. Organization and seniority based on ADM 187/1, and ADM 177 The Navy List for September 1939, pp. 93–8. 12. At the outset of hostilities, Coastal Command had ‘about 170’ operational aircraft for employment throughout the entire . B. Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom (London: HMSO, 1957), p. 59. 13. This section is drawn from ADM 116/3831. 14. Forbes to Backhouse, 8 October, 1938 in ADM 205/3. 15. Backhouse to Forbes, 18 October, 1938 in ADM 205/3. 16. See correspondence in ADM 116/3831. 17. Correspondence between Admiralty and Commanding Officer Coast of , 3 May, 1938, 1 July, 1939, and letter from Metal Industries Ltd to Admiralty, 18 January, 1939, all in ADM 116/3831. 18. Lawson to Commanding Officer Coast of Scotland, 12 February, 1939 in ADM 116/3831. 19. Letter from Forbes, 28 June, 1939 in ADM 116/3831. 20. Letter to Forbes, 2 August, 1939 in ADM 116/3831. 21. Forbes to the Admiralty, 25 September, 1939 in ADM 116/3831. 22. J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy Volume 2 (London: HMSO, 1957), p. 14. 23. For a positive take on this ‘offensive-mindedness’, see ‘Winston’s Back’ in Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran. 24. W. Murray in his The Change in the European Balance of Power 1938–1939 (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1984). pp. 310–69 argues that Germany was susceptible to Allied blockade, especially if they could force Italy into the war quickly and compel Germany to come to her aid with economic assistance; Kennedy, in The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 306–12 has a counterpoint to Murray’s dubious claim: ‘Mahan-ite methods were ineffective against a power which had adopted a Mackinder-ite expansion program.’ p. 307. 25. See ADM 199/393, p. 13. 26. For a detailed discussion of the tactical fighting systems promulgated during the First World War, see A. Gordon, The Rules of the Game, esp. pp. 55, 517–19, and 527–9. Notes 169

27. The ‘Fighting Instructions’ are listed as ADM 239/261. 28. ADM 239/261, p. 11. 29. Quotation is from Lieutenant (later Vice-Admiral) Ed Hooper, in I. Musicant, Battleship at War: The Epic Story of the U.S.S. Washington (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p. 39. A related issue was fire control. This had been a problem in wherein British capital ships had been equipped with the Dreyer Table for calculating the angle and elevation of the big guns so that they could ‘lead’ the target and land the salvo where the ship would be when the shells arrived. Although adequate for speed and distance, the Dreyer Table could not properly handle changes in bearing. The Admiralty fire control table (AFTC) was introduced after the war, based on the work of Arthur Pollen. A sophisticated mechanical computer, the AFCT largely solved the problem, but it was only installed in 6 of Britain’s 15 capital ships (Warspite, Queen Elizabeth, Valiant, Renown, Nelson, and Rodney) at the beginning of World War II. AFTC or no, the British still preferred to close the range. For a related discussion, see J. Sumida, ‘A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912–1916’, Journal of Military History, 67 (1): 85–136. 30. ADM 239/261, p. 62. 31. For the persistence of the ‘battlefleet concept’, see Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2, esp. pp. 430–1, and 475. For a persuasive argument for the continued value of the battleship, see J. Sumida, ‘“The Best Laid Plans”: The Development of British Battle-Fleet Tactics, 1919–1942’, International History Review, 14 (4) November, 1992: 681–700. In R. O’Connell’s book Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the US Navy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), the author maintains that the battleship was always overrated as a weapon system, and persisted in the arsenals of the major powers because of the unique culture of naval officers and the appeal of such impressive-looking ships to politicians and the public. 32. See Marder, From the Dardanelles to Oran, p. 53–4. For additional insight into the reigning tactical doctrine, and the continued anxiety over a battle fleet showdown with Japan, see Gordon, The Rules of the Game, pp. 574–6. 33. ADM 239/261, pp. 53–7, 67–73. 34. ADM 239/261, p. 49. 35. ADM 239/261, p. 49. 36. However, no less an authority than A. B. Cunningham told Roskill that during the war nobody paid any heed to the Fighting Instructions. Cunningham to Roskill [n.d.] in ROSK 6/52. 37. ADM 187/1. 38. Quotation from Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, p. 166. 39. See Gordon, The Rules of the Game, p. 369. 40. The letter, along with Forbes’ response, can be found in the British Library in Add Ms 52565 (the Cunningham Papers), Pound to Forbes, 18 August, 1939. 41. Quotation from letter to Pound, 22 August, 1939 in Add. Ms. 52565. 42. Pound to Holland, 25 October, 1939 in ADM 205/3. 43. ADM 199/393, p. 7. 44. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Volume 2, p. 484. 45. ADM 199/393, p. 7. 170 Notes

46. For the position of German naval units at the onset of hostilities, see Roskill, War at Sea Volume 1, p. 591. 47. See the Official History of British Intelligence, F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 1 (London: HMSO, 1979), pp. 103–7. 48. For the Organization of British Intelligence at the opening of the Second World War, see Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 1, pp. 3–43. 49. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 1, p. 103. 50. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 1, p. 106. 51. A perusal of the unpublished ‘War Diary of the German Naval Staff (Operations)’ translated by the US Office of Naval Intelligence in the late 1940s shows that, in the summer of 1940, German Intelligence was doing sterling service. I owe access to this source to Dr S. Papadopoulos of the Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. The microfilm copy is designated TM-100C. 52. Hinsley, British Intelligence Volume 1, p. 105. 53. Letter, Forbes to Admiralty, 12 January, 1940 in ADM 1/10, 715. Godfrey commented on the letter, saying that Forbes did not understand the limita- tions under which the IOC operated and expected too much. 54. ADM 199/393, p. 8. 55. Coastal Command’s weakness would persist into 1943. 56. See ADM 199/393, p. 8. The actual strength of the formations trained in anti-shipping tactics was, on 9 September, 1939, 85 aircraft, of which 71 were serviceable. Figures from Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, p. 80. 57. ADM 199/393, p. 8. 58. ADM 199/393, p. 10. 59. See Roskill, War at Sea Volume 1, p. 69. 60. ADM 199/393, pp. 11–12. For an analysis of the problems experienced in this encounter, see ADM 1/9920. 61. See van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign, pp. 86–7; Doenitz, Memoirs, pp. 55–6 gives the date of the sinking as 19 September. 62. ADM 199/393, p. 9. 63. ADM 199/393, p. 10. 64. ADM 199/393, p. 10. 65. ADM 199/393, p. 14. 66. ADM 199/393, p. 13. 67. Furious at that time was operating 18 Swordfish of 816 and 818 Squadrons; Ark Royal had disembarked part of her air group but still carried 24 Swordfish and 9 Skuas on her trek south. See ADM 187/3. 68. ADM 199/393, p. 13. 69. Quotation from Gibbs, Grand Strategy Volume 1, p. 341.

3 Cat and Mouse: German Initiatives, British Reactions, October 1939–March 1940 1. Grand Admiral Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days (New York: Da Capo Press, 1997), p. 69. 2. Doenitz, Memoirs, p. 69. 3. ADM 199/158, p. 75. Notes 171

4. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 73–4. 5. This account of the sinking of Royal Oak is derived from ADM 199/158, pp. 75–6; Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 73–4; Doenitz, Memoirs, pp. 67–70; van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign, pp. 89–91. 6. ADM 199/158, p. 75. 7. ADM 199/158, pp. 76–8. 8. ADM 199/158, pp. 78, 81. 9. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 73–4. 10. ADM 199/158, p. 82. 11. The battleship Barham, launched in the same year (1914) as Royal Oak, took three hits on 25 November, 1941. She exploded and sank with over 800 men lost. 12. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 74. 13. Doenitz, Memoirs, p. 69. 14. Quoted in van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign, p. 91. 15. Quotation from Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, p. 86. 16. van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign, p. 86. 17. Doenitz, Memoirs, p. 65. 18. Quotation from Doenitz, Memoirs, pp. 69–70. 19. Doenitz, Memoirs, p. 67. 20. Doenitz, Memoirs, p. 65. 21. Pound’s meetings listed in ADM 205/4. 22. Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, p. 87. 23. Doenitz, Memoirs, p. 71. 24. For evidence of this, see Doenitz, Memoirs, pp. 73, 84–99. For a discussion of what the Germans considered a ‘torpedo crisis’, see van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign, pp. 115–116. 25. Doenitz, Memoirs, p. 55. 26. Doenitz, Memoirs, p. 95. 27. This anecdote appears in Doenitz, Memoirs, p. 89. 28. Doenitz, Memoirs, p. 94. 29. van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign, pp. 148, 170. 30. Doenitz, Memoirs, p. 95. 31. For details of the debate, see ADM 199/393, entry for 31 October 1939. See also Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, pp. 117–118, and Churchill, The Second World War Volume 1 (London: Cassell & Co., 1948), p. 388. 32. Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, p. 118. 33. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 75. 34. Forbes to Roskill, 5 September, 1949 in the Roskill Papers, File 4/49. 35. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 78. 36. ADM 199/393, p. 20. 37. ADM 199/393, p. 32. 38. van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign, p. 92. 39. ADM 199/393, p. 17. 40. For Rawalpindi, see van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign, p. 92; for the operation, see Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 82–7. 41. ADM 199/393, pp. 22–3. 42. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 85–6. 43. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 83. 44. ADM 199/393, pp. 27–31. 172 Notes

45. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 87. 46. ADM 199/393, p. 32. 47. ADM 199/393, p. 32. 48. ADM 199/393, pp. 33–5. 49. ADM 199/393, p. 38. 50. ADM 199/393, p. 40. 51. ADM 199/393, p. 40. 52. ADM 199/393, p. 39. 53. ADM 199/393, pp. 40–1. 54. This account is based on ADM 199/280. Quotations are from this file unless otherwise noted. 55. van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign, p. 98. 56. ADM 199/280. 57. Letter, Pound to Forbes in British Museum file Add Ms 52565. All quotes in this paragraph are from that file. 58. ADM 199/393, pp. 45–7; Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 153. 59. ADM 199/393, p. 51. 60. ADM 199/393, p. 80. 61. ADM 199/393, pp. 84–5. 62. ADM 199/393, p. 85. 63. ADM 199/393, p. 83. 64. For Operations ‘Wilfred’ and ‘R4’, see Marder, From the Dardenelles to Oran, pp. 148–71, and Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, pp. 97–9. 65. During the Russo-Finnish ‘’ of 1939–40, Churchill and Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Secretary, entertained thoughts of landing in , press- ing on into to take control of the iron ore mines to deny their products to the Germans, and then sending forces to help the Finns fight Hitler’s ‘friend’, Stalin. C. Ponting, Armageddon (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 27–8. How Britain and France could have coped with a war against Germany and the Soviets is anyone’s guess, and highlights Churchill’s strategic naivety. 66. Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, p. 98. 67. An invaluable source is ADM 234/427 written by German officers after the war. See also Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1939–1945 (London: Greenhill Books, 1990), pp. 83–8. 68. ADM 234/427, p. 5. 69. ADM 234/427, p. 7. 70. ADM 234/427, pp. 7–8. 71. ADM 234/427, p. 9. 72. Doenitz, Memoirs, p. 77. 73. ADM 234/427, p. 10. 74. See ADM 187/3 for 5 April 1940. 75. Letter, Forbes to Roskill, 28 January, 1950 in ROSK 6/30. 76. ADM 199/361, p. 48.

4 : A Man-Made Disaster, April–June 1940 1. See ADM 199/361, pp. 53–4. 2. For a detailed description of the invasion of Norway from the German perspective, see ADM 234/427. Notes 173

3. Home Fleet War Diary entry for 5 April in ADM 199/361, and Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 107. 4. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, pp. 108–9, and Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 158. 5. Home Fleet War Diary entries for 7 April and 8 April in ADM 199/361. 6. Forbes was warned by Admiralty Intelligence on 7 April of a possible German move against Norway, but the signal ended with this dismissive statement: ‘All these reports are of doubtful value...’. Text of message in M. Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers Volume 1 (New York: Norton, 1993), p. 977. 7. Quoted from Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 158. 8. See Forbes’s signal of 2110, 7 April in ADM 199/361. 9. Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, p. 100. 10. Home Fleet War Diary entry for 8 April in ADM 199/361. 11. ADM 234/427 and C. Bekker, Hitler’s Naval War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 96–7. 12. T. K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway (London: HMSO, 1952), p. 20. 13. Quoted from ADM 234/427, p. vii. 14. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 122. 15. Ibid., p. 125, and ADM 234/427, pp. 24–5. 16. See ADM 234/332, p. 13. 17. At the peak of operations, the Luftwaffe had 360 , 50 Stukas, and 120 modern fighters operating over Norway. See Air Ministry, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933–1945 (New York: St Martin’s Press repr., 1983), p. 63. 18. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 122. 19. See the ‘Pink Sheet’, ADM 187/3, 15 April. 20. ADM 187/3, 22 April. 21. ADM 187/3, 17 May. 22. Quotation from J. Winton, Carrier Glorious (London: Leo Cooper, 1986), p. 156. 23. For the decisive impact of air power on the ground campaign in Norway, see J. Adams, The Doomed Expedition: The Norwegian Campaign of 1940 (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), pp. 171–3. 24. F. Kersaudy, Norway 1940 (London: Collins, 1990), pp. 135, 180–1. 25. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 191. 26. Kersaudy, Norway 1940, maps between pages 63–7, and Bekker, Hitler’s Naval War pp. 96–9. 27. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 158. Roope survived the sinking only to die in a POW camp in 1945, and was awarded a posthumous VC. 28. See entry for 1000 9 April in ADM 199/361. 29. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 110. 30. Ibid., pp. 110–14. 31. Admiralty to Forbes, received 1300 8 April in ADM 199/361. 32. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 161–2, and read between the lines. 33. Ibid., pp. 177–8. 34. For details of the action that followed see Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 166, and Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 111. 35. British Library Add. Ms. 52569, letter, Whitworth to Cunningham, no date. 36. Signal, Forbes to Admiralty, 0620 9 April in ADM 199/361. 174 Notes

37. Signal, Admiralty to Forbes, 0825 9 April in ADM 199/361. 38. See signal, Forbes to Captain (D) 2nd DF, 0952 in ADM 199/361. 39. For Forbes’s decision and orders, see Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 170. 40. Ibid., p. 171. 41. See message of 1438 in ADM 199/361. Strangely, no reply to this message appears in the Home Fleet War Diary. 42. This quote, and the Admiralty’s opinion at the time, is taken from Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p 171, with additional input from Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 113. 43. At a War Cabinet meeting of 8:30 AM on 9 April, Churchill stressed the need to ‘take immediate steps’ to seize Narvik and prevent the Germans ‘establishing themselves at and Bergen’. This makes the cancel- lation of ‘R4’ and countermanding of Forbes’s Bergen attack order even more inexplicable. Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers Volume 1, pp. 988–9. 44. Kersaudy, Norway 1940, pp. 67–99. 45. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 165. It has been brought to the author’s attention that a complete, modern account of this incident can be found in Rolf Hobson and Tom Kristiansen, Total krig, noytralitet og politisk splittelse 1905–1940 (Bergen, 2001). 46. Quoted in Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 173. 47. For German destroyers, see ibid., pp. 590–1. 48. Quoted in ibid., p. 173. 49. Later, Whitworth did decide to send Penelope and four destroyers to Narvik, but countermanded the order, van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign, p 103. 50. Quotation from Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 174. 51. This account of the First Battle of Narvik is based on Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 172–5. 52. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 110. 53. Ibid., p. 117, and Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 172. 54. Sinkings and losses are taken from Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 117; Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 179. 55. Barnett Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 117. 56. Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 262; Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 120. 57. Derry, The Campaign in Norway, p. 265. 58. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 188. 59. See ADM 234/332, p. 12, and ADM 234/427, pp. 45–6. 60. For details of the second Battle of Narvik, see ADM 234/332, pp. 21–3, and Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 119. 61. Derry, Campaign in Norway, p. 262. 62. Ibid., p. 263. 63. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, pp. 120–1. 64. Letter, Forbes to Roskill 9 Feb (no year, probably 1949) in the Roskill Papers 4/49. 65. Hankey’s comment was recorded by John Colville, the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary, and appears in Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers, p. 1086. 66. Quotation from Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 121. 67. ADM 234/332, p. 29. Notes 175

68. One such raid by fast French destroyers yielded poor results because the ships could not linger. 69. Quotation from ADM 234/332, p. 31. 70. ADM 234/427, p. 60. 71. Plan and quotation can be found in ADM 234/332, pp. 31–2. 72. Forbes’s reply can be found in ADM 234/332, pp. 31–2. 73. Kersaudy, Norway 1940, pp. 135–6. 74. The Doomed Expedition, pp. 179–84 and ‘Operation Weserubung: A Case Study in the Operational Art’ by R. D. Hooker, Jr and C. Coglianese in R. D. Hooker, Jr (ed.), Maneuvre Warfare (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), pp. 374–90. 75. Quotation from M. Harvey, Scandinavian Misadventure (Tunbridge Wells, Kent: Spellmount, 1990), p. 303. 76. This is the title of chapter 5 of his book Engage the Enemy More Closely. 77. For the political crisis which propelled Churchill into Number 10, see Kersaudy, Norway 1940, pp. 175–95; for the speeches in Parliament which helped to doom Chamberlain, see Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers Volume 1, pp. 1227–40. To his credit, Churchill continued to treat Chamberlain with respect. See Churchill’s letter of 11 May, 1940 to Chamberlain in M. Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers Volume 2 (New York: Norton, 1995), pp. 7–9. In the same volume, pp. 1080–2, one can read Churchill’s magnanimous, eulogizing speech to the House of Commons announcing Chamberlain’s death. 78. For a dissenting view, see Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers Volume 1, p. 1284. King George VI preferred Lord Halifax as Prime Minister if Chamberlain had to go. 79. A telling example of Churchill’s dubious grasp of military strategy is exem- plified in the following minute of 13 January, 1941 sent to the Chiefs of Staff Committee: ‘I do not remember to have given my approval to these very large diversions of forces [to the Far East]. On the contrary, if my minutes are collected they will be seen to have an opposite tendency. The political situation in the Far East does not seem to require, and the strength of our Air Force by no means warrants, the maintenance of such large forces in the Far East at this time.’ The ‘large forces’ Churchill to which was referring were the 336 aircraft that the Chiefs of Staff had agreed to send to Malaya and over the next twelve months in lieu of a fleet. In fact, the Commander-in-Chief Far East, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, had informed London that without a fleet he would need 582 front-line aircraft to hold Singapore and keep the Japanese out of the Bay of Bengal. Churchill was therefore rejecting as too great a force one which the com- mander on the spot believed 40 per cent too small. When war came on December 8, 1941, Brooke-Popham had 180 planes available in the Far East Command, none of which were modern. The Japanese committed 530 modern aircraft to the drive on Singapore. The result was the sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales (whose dispatch was itself a misguided Churchillian half-measure), the fall of Singapore, and the loss of Britain’s Asian Empire. Quotation is from S. Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan Volume 1 (London: HMSO, 1957), p. 55. See also pp. 53–4, 162 (for British air strength), and 192 (for Japanese air strength). 80. ADM 178/201, findings of the Board of Enquiry into the loss of HMS Glorious; ADM 234/427, pp. 73–76; Winton, Carrier Glorious, pp. 165–82; 176 Notes

Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 195–200; Hinsley, British Intelligence Volume 1, pp. 141–2; Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, pp. 134–9. 81. ADM 1/12467, pp. 137–8. 82. Quotation from Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 136. 83. Winton, Carrier Glorious, p. 164. 84. J. Levy, ‘The Inglorious End of the Glorious: The Release of the Findings of the Board of Enquiry into the loss of HMS Glorious’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 86 (3) (August 2000), pp. 302–9. An earlier take on ADM 178/201, of which this author was unaware when he wrote his article, was T. Slessor, ‘The Tragedy of HMS Glorious’ Royal United Services Institute Journal February/ March 1999, pp. 68–74. Mr Slessor’s thoughts on Cunningham knowing more than he let on, and information that the Germans were jamming Glorious’s transmissions, are important. In my article, I maintain that the Valiant heard Glorious’s signal, too. Mr Slessor disagrees, and on further investigation the evidence points to his conclusion. 85. Winton, Carrier Glorious, p. 165. 86. Winton, Carrier Glorious, p. 174. 87. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 195–6. 88. ADM 178/201 (not paginated). It should be pointed out that Glorious had on board not only the 5 Swordfish mentioned, but also 9 Sea Gladiators of 802 Squadron that could have flown CAP and kept an eye out for enemy ships.

5 Thin Grey Line: The Home Fleet in the Defence of Great Britain, June 1940–June 1941 1. In fairness, for part of the period discussed , and later Yugoslavia, were at war with one or both Axis Powers. 2. German ships delivered a total of 127,114 personnel to Norway in the month of April 1940 with 115,282 tons of cargo. This did not include any tank formations or much heavy artillery. The German army insisted on landing 90,000 men and at least 600 tanks on the first day of an invasion of Great Britain, not into captured harbours but over open beaches under enemy fire. It is not unrealistic to believe that the Germans would have had to bring a million men over to England to conquer and occupy the country. See TM-100C ‘War Diary of the German Naval Staff (Operations)’, pp. 97, 240. 3. Collier, Defence of the United Kingdom, p. 231. This number would increase within a few weeks to include another 2 light cruisers and 6 destroyers – facing which were a British anti-invasion force of 8 light cruisers and 36 destroyers, plus the two battleships, one battlecruiser, and five cruisers normally with the Home Fleet, and about 40 destroyers under various commands around the British Isles. See K. G. Larew, ‘The Royal Navy and the ’, The Historian, 54 (2), pp. 243–52. 4. The threat faced by the Germans from mines is well covered, as are German problems and British strengths in general, in Larew, ‘The Royal Navy and the Battle of Britain’. 5. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, pp. 186–93; for the general naval situation, see Roskill; for the political climate, see Taylor, English History 1914–1945, pp. 479–501, and A. Bullock, Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives (New York: Vintage, 1993), pp. 673–8. Notes 177

6. Insight into Churchill’s thoughts on a possible invasion can be found in his letter to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff of 10 July, 1940 in ADM 205/6. 7. For details of these two diversions of resources from home defence, see Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, pp. 209–13, 228–34. 8. The COS and the Joint Planning Committee certainly spent time considering the issue of invasion and measures to deal with it, but in the summer of 1940 they were at least as concerned about the planning of Operation ‘Menace’, the attack by De Gaulle on Dakar, and with Egypt, Turkey, Greece, and the situation in the Far East. The Minutes of their meetings can be found in CAB 79/6 and CAB 84/2. All this implies that the invasion scare, and the deploy- ment of so many Royal Navy ships to different ports, was at least as much a political act as it was a military one. Forbes seems never to have grasped that the dispersal of his fleet may have been to boost morale and show the people that the Government was doing something to defend them. This hypothesis is supported by a minute of the Joint Planning Committee in CAB 79/6 of 31 August: ‘we are confident of our ability to withstand any attack on this country, and our whole policy is based on this assumption’. The day before, the JPC representatives had been to Chequers for a meeting with Churchill – they discussed the problems of bombing, ship losses, German batteries closing the Channel narrows at Point Gris Nez, and offen- sive options for 1941. Invasion talk is conspicuously absent from John Colville’s lengthy description of the meeting. J. Colville, The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street Diaries 1939–1955 (New York: Norton, 1985), pp. 232–4. 9. See Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, p. 119. Churchill himself states in a letter to Pound of 17 August 1940 that he was ‘much concerned’ with ship- ping losses, but seems to imply the problem was Admiral Dunbar-Nasmith, C-in-C Western Approaches, for keeping his headquarters at Plymouth when the convoys were being routed to the north around Ireland to . See Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers Volume 2, pp. 679–80. 10. Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, p. 120. 11. ADM 199/450. 12. For German problems with, and doubts about the viability of, a cross-Channel invasion, see J. L. Wallach, ‘The Sea Lion That Did Not Roar: Operation Sea Lion and its Limitations’, in J. B. Hattendorf and M. Murfett, (eds), The Limitations of Military Power: Essays presented to Professor Norman Gibbs on his eightieth birthday (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990), pp. 173–202. 13. Quotation from Wallach, ‘The Sea Lion That Did Not Roar’, p. 181. 14. Ibid., p. 180. 15. Ibid., p. 185. 16. See ‘War Diary of the German Naval Staff’, TM-100C, pp. 38, 75. 17. ‘War Diary of the German Naval Staff’, p. 113. 18. Report of the C-in-C (especially 13 August, 1940), Fuehrer Naval Conferences, p. 126. 19. For anti-invasion planning, see ADM 234/436 especially pp. 36–9. Forbes wanted the anti-submarine trawlers back on convoy escort as early as August, but was ignored (p. 43). 20. Bomber Command was also contributing a not insignificant effort against the invasion ports. M. Middlebrook and C. Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries (New York: Viking, 1985), pp. 61–91. 178 Notes

21. ADM 187/9, 18 September 1940. On 6 September the Admiralty ordered all cruisers and destroyers to be at immediate notice for operations during all hours of darkness, and all ships were to cease cleaning boilers (a necessary bit of preventative maintenance) so that they would be ready for sea at all times. This effectively immobilized the fleet in Home waters. See ADM 234/436, p. 27. 22. ADM 234/436, appendix F. 23. Ibid. 24. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 257–9. 25. Quotation from Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, p. 120. 26. Everything depended, as Forbes and the COS knew, on Fighter Command. J. Ellis has pointed out in his marvellous book Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (New York: Viking, 1990), pp. 24–9 that Fighter Command was never seriously in jeopardy of losing the Battle of Britain. Also, Grand Admiral Raeder quickly lost faith in the invasion plan, Operation Sea Lion. See Fuehrer Naval Conferences, Reports of 13 August, 14 August, 3 September, and 13 September (esp. pages 126, 127, 129–30, and 137). Wallach in ‘The Sea Lion That Did Not Roar’ (Hattendorf and Murfett, 1990) concludes that an invasion was not likely. 27. Vice Admiral Max Horton turned it down due to the endemic tinkering from the Admiralty that he had no desire to deal with. See M. Stephen, The Fighting Admirals: British Admirals of the Second World War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 201–2. 28. Quotations from Pound’s letter to Cunningham, 20 September, 1940 in Add Ms 52561; see also Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, p. 121. 29. Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, p. 121. 30. Ms Forbes had read a biographical article about her father that I wrote in The Mariner’s Mirror (May, 2002). Her great kindness in considering me for custodian of these documents is deeply appreciated. The letter mentioned is in the author’s possession, but will in future be deposited at the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich. 31. Quotation from Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 198. 32. Forbes to Roskill, 28 January, 1950 in the Roskill Papers, File 6/30 33. Speculation: when Cunningham had to leave the Mediterranean, who would have better replaced him, Harwood or Forbes? 34. Quotation and information about Tovey from ADM 196/49, p. 131. 35. Cunningham to Pound, 16 October, 1940 in British Library Add Ms 52561. 36. Letter, Pound to Forbes, 21 March, 1940 in ADM 178/322 37. Letter, Forbes to Pound, 28 March, 1940 in ADM 178/322. Forbes said bluntly ‘I do not want Tovey’. 38. Letter, Churchill to Ismay, 2 September, 1940 in Gilbert, The Churchill War Papers Volume 2, p. 761. Churchill would have read Cunningham’s dispatch after Calabria praising Tovey’s skill and fighting ability; see CAB 106/338. 39. Gilbert, Churchill War Papers Volume 2, p. 786. Churchill speaks in this letter to Alexander about giving Harwood and Tom Phillips major sea postings. Wisely, Churchill gravitated towards Tovey for the Home Fleet. 40. This section, and quotations from Tovey’s letter to Cunningham of 17 October, 1940 in Add. Ms. 52569. Notes 179

41. ADM 187/10, 2 December, 1940. 42. Roskill in The War at Sea Volume 1 gives the details for the War Emergency, 1940, and 1941 RN building programmes in his Appendix F. 43. Compiled from ADM 187/1 and ADM 187/10. 44. The operations of the German supply system in van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign, pp. 158–60. 45. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 279. 46. For convoy HX84, see Roskill, War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 288–300, and van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign, p. 157. 47. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 289; Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 197. Was the interference by Pound simply a parting shot at Forbes, or just another example of his foolish meddling? 48. Quotation from van der Vat, The Atlantic Campaign, p. 158. 49. Quotation from Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 197. 50. Grand Admiral E. Raeder, My Life (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1960), p. 349. 51. For the sortie of the Hipper see, Bekker, Hitler’s Naval War, pp. 207–8, and Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 291. 52. See the entry for this period in ADM 199/447. 53. The January–March 1941 operations of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are in G. Rhys-Jones’s article ‘The Loss of the Bismarck: Who was to Blame?’, Naval War College Review, 45 (1) (Winter, 1992), p. 28, and Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 373–9. 54. See ADM 199/396, p. 22. Tovey had two battleships, a battlecruiser, eight light cruisers and 11 destroyers to take to sea at midnight on 25 January. 55. ADM 199/396, pp. 22–3. 56. Quotation from Rhys-Jones, ‘The Loss of the Bismarck: Who was to Blame?’, p. 28. 57. Taken from Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 279. 58. See ADM 199/396, pp. 30–1, 36. Earlier, when reporting on Naiad’s sighting report, Tovey incorrectly concluded ‘that it was unlikely that an enemy vessel had in fact been present’. ADM 199/396, p. 23. 59. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 374–5. 60. Quotation is from Roskill, p. 376. 61. ADM 199/396, p. 55. 62. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 376. 63. ADM 199/396, p. 70. 64. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 379. 65. Quotation from Add Ms 52569, letter, Tovey to Cunningham, 21 March, 1941.

6 The Germans Rolls the Dice: April–June 1941 1. See Chapter 5 and Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 362–88. 2. The all-out diplomatic efforts of Foreign Secretary Eden are discussed in Playfair, The Mediterranean and the Middle East Volume 1 (London: HMSO, 1954), pp. 377–80. 3. The author supports the view put forward by the German staff officer General F. W. von Mellenthin, who served in the Greek Campaign and with 180 Notes

the Afrika Korps, when he wrote: ‘Of all British enterprises during the war, the expedition to Greece seems to me the most difficult to justify on purely military grounds...The British forces sent to their support – while they deprived Wavell [C-in-C Middle East] of an excellent opportunity of getting to – were a mere drop in the ocean by standards of continental warfare’, von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles (New York: Ballantine Books, 1984), p. 39. General Alanbrooke considered it ‘a definite strategic blunder’, War Diaries (Danchev and Todman, 2001), p. 141. However, the argument for helping the Greeks was largely political. It was intended to keep the Turks out of the Axis camp, aid in the war against Italy, give encouragement to the anti-German Yugoslavs, and impress neutral (in other words US) opinion as to Britain’s value as a military ally. The debacle did nothing to further Britain’s political ends. 4. Home Defence, Battle of the Atlantic, the Bomber Offensive, Mediterranean (naval), North Africa, East Africa, and Greece. Churchill ignored the Far East, and could never fully comprehend the Japanese threat. To do so would have led to a recapitulation of the arguments over sending much of the Fleet to Singapore and shutting down operations in the Mediterranean that had dogged the Cabinet throughout the 1930s. Such a fundamental reappraisal of British strategy was not in Churchill’s interest, and may well have led to the adoption of a radically more defensive posture than Churchill could intellectually or emotionally tolerate. 5. The British could begin to qualify their fear of invasion by because intelligence sources indicated that Hitler intended to invade the that spring. The British, and the Americans, passed this infor- mation on to Stalin, who ignored and profoundly distrusted the warnings. See Bullock, Hitler and Stalin, pp. 712–13. 6. The need for reinforcements is spelled out in Kirby, The War Against Japan Volume 1 pp. 48–55. 7. Rommel’s campaign is covered in Playfair, The Mediterranean and the Middle East Volume 2, pp. 19–30. 8. Hitler’s decision and a synopsis of its execution can be found in Bullock, Hitler and Stalin, pp. 707–9. 9. The Royal Navy’s losses are given in Playfair, The Mediterranean and the Middle East Volume 2, p. 147. This period is fully discussed in M. Simpson, The Cunningham Papers Volume 1: The Mediterranean Fleet 1939–1942, pp. 231–446. For a lively account of the Greek/ campaigns see Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, pp. 346–64. Barnett believes, as does the author, that the British commitment of forces to Greece was a mistake. 10. Playfair, The Mediterranean and the Middle East Volume 2, pp. 177–97. An interesting look at German strategy in this period is K. Macksey, Why the Germans Lose at War (London: Greenhill Books, 1996), pp. 120–31. 11. Losses are given in Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 616. 12. Any discussion of the career of the Bismarck owes a debt to S. Roskill who compiled the Admiralty’s ADM 199 series. See ADM 199/1187 titled ‘Pursuit and Destruction of the German battleship Bismarck’. See also ROSK 4/17; Captain R. Grenfell, RN, The Bismarck Episode (New York: Macmillan, 1949); L. Kennedy, Pursuit: The Chase and Sinking of the Bismarck (London: Book Club Associates, 1974); Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 394–418, and, Notes 181

unfortunately, ADM 1/11,726, the findings of Board of Enquiry into the loss of HMS Hood. 13. Details of the Bismarck can be found in Chesnau, Conway’s, p. 224, 14. The terrible trade-off between the need for escorts and the need for capital ships is explained in A. Lambert, ‘Seapower 1939–1940: Churchill and the Strategic Origins of the Battle of the Atlantic’, Journal of Strategic Studies (1994) pp. 86–108. Admiral Forbes, then C-in-C Plymouth, wrote to Pound in the summer of 1941 to remind him that the partially completed Lion and Temeraire might still be finished in time to participate in the war. Pound and Churchill discussed the idea but nothing came of it. See PREM 3 324/12. 15. Chesnau, Conway’s, p. 97. 16. Ibid., p. 15. 17. In fact, Duke of York became operational in while Tirpitz did not become fully operational until January 1942. 18. G. Rhys-Jones, ‘The Loss of the Bismarck: Who was to Blame?’, pp. 30–1. 19. L. Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 29–30. 20. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 280; L. Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 27–8; Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 393. While in dry dock four days later, Gneisenau was hit by four bombs during an RAF raid, further damaging the battlecruiser. 21. L. Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 30–1. 22. Ibid., p. 31. 23. B. Baron von Mullenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck: A Survivor’s Story (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, new and expanded edn, 1990), p. 101. 24. Table 6.1 is drawn from ADM 187/13, 23 May, 1941. 25. Rhys-Jones, ‘The Loss of the Bismarck’, pp. 31–2. 26. See ADM 199/399 18th CS and HF Command War Diaries p. 127 and Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 341–2. 27. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World Volume 1, p. 337. 28. ADM 199/409 1st, 2nd, and 10th CS and 2nd-in-C HF War Diaries, p. 250. 29. Holland’s activities can be found in ADM 199/399, p. 34. 30. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 1, pp. 340–1. 31. L. Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 39. 32. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 1, p. 340; L. Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 18–19. 33. L. Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 29. 34. Mullenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, p. 83. 35. L. Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 32. 36. Mullenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, p. 108n. 37. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 1, p. 341. 38. Ibid. 39. Technically, while operating with destroyers BCS was referred to as the Battle Force. 40. The composition and instructions to the BCS are contained in ADM 199/409; see also Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 29. 41. ADM 199/409, p. 44. 42. Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 21. 43. Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 29; L. Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 44–5. 182 Notes

44. L. Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 44. 45. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 396 and Map 30. 46. Armament for the Hood upon completion of its refit in April 1941 in ADM 239/70. 47. For the weakness of Hood’s armour scheme, and how she was sunk, see W. J. Jurens, ‘The Loss of H. M. S. Hood – A Re-Examination’, Warship International, 24 (2) esp. pp. 122–7. 48. ADM 199/1187, p. 162. 49. Quotation from Mullenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, p. 128. 50. Mullenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, p. 117. 51. L. Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 51. 52. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 289. 53. See Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 397–8. 54. Suffolk could detect Bismarck out to a range of approximately 10 miles, tech- nically well within 15-inch gun range. See Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 404. 55. Roskill, The Navy at War 1939–1945 (Ware, Hereford: Wordsworth Editions, 1998), p. 129. 56. This problem is discussed in Gordon, The Rules of the Game, especially in the Appendices. 57. ‘Holland expected that he might make contact any time after 0140 on the 24th...’ Quotation from Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 290. L. Kennedy supports the contention that Holland expected a night battle. 58. Quotation from ADM 239/261, p. 11. 59. ADM 234/321, p. 5 60. ADM 234/321, p. 5. 61. Quotations from Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 292. 62. Quotation from Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 402. 63. W. J. Jurens, ‘The Loss of HMS. Hood’, esp. p. 128. 64. Quotation from L. Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 76; his critique is found on pp. 83–4. 65. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 402. 66. ADM 199/363, C-in-C Rosyth War Diaries, p. 103. 67. Quotation from ADM 178/322, personal letters of First Sea Lord, Tovey to Pound, 12 July, 1941. 68. Currie’s position is laid out in a letter to Roskill of 20 December, 1951 in ROSK 4/17. 69. I noted with satisfaction that Graham Rhys-Jones, The Loss of the Bismarck (London: Cassell, 1999), pp. 120–2 reached a similar conclusion regarding Holland’s handling of his force. 70. Quotation and speculation about the activity on Bismarck’s are from Mullenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, p. 139. 71. Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, p. 49. 72. ADM 234/321, pp. 5–6. 73. Mullenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, p. 139. 74. L. Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 84–5. 75. ADM 234/321, p. 6. 76. ADM 234/321, p. 6. 77. Mullenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, p. 144. Notes 183

78. Mullenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, p. 141. After the war, the experts at the Royal Navy Tactical School determined that given the relative speed of Bismarck vis-à-vis Norfolk and Suffolk, they had no chance to engage their German opponent. See Captain G. S. Swallow to Roskill of 8 January, 1952 in ROSK 4/17. 79. L. Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 88–90. 80. ADM 234/321, p. 6. 81. Mullenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, pp. 147–9. 82. Jurens, ‘The Loss of HMS Hood’, p. 129. 83. Quotation from ADM 1/11,726, p. 14. 84. ADM 1/11,726, p. 12. 85. I am in debt here to the excellent detective work of Jurens in ‘Loss of HMS Hood’, esp. pp. 155–7. See also ADM 1/11, 726, pp. 16–17. 86. D. Mearns and R. White, Hood and Bismarck (London: Channel 4 Books, 2001), pp. 215–16. 87. By comparison, the similarly weakly armoured Japanese battlecruiser Kirishima received nine 16-inch shell hits and approximately 45 5-inch gun hits at the Battle of Guadalcanal from the modern US battleships Washington and South Dakota, yet took over 3 hours to sink with the help of her own crew who opened her sea cocks when it became obvious she could not escape the scene of the action. Either German shells were vastly more destructive than their American counterparts (the evidence of the shell hits on Prince of Wales does not support this) or Bismarck just happened to land a very lucky hit. See R. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun (New York: Free Press, 1985), pp. 212–3, and P. S. Dull, A Battle History of the (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978), pp. 245–6. 88. See Rhys-Jones, ‘Loss of the Bismarck’, pp. 36–8. 89. Ibid. 90. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 407; Rhys-Jones, ‘Loss of the Bismarck’, pp. 38–9. 91. M. Simpson (ed.), The Somerville Papers, pp. 54–5, 266–7. 92. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 407–8. 93. ADM 199/1187, p. 16. 94. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 408. 95. ADM 239/261, p. 49. 96. Victorious is described by Tovey in ADM 199/1187, p. 162. 97. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 408. 98. Quotation from ADM 199/1187, p. 162. 99. See ADM 199/1187, p. 163. 100. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 299. The difference between warmth and cold was very real, as an 8-inch salvo had shattered the windows of his bridge and left he and his staff exposed to the elements. 101. Quotation from Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 298. 102. ADM 199/1187, p. 163. 103. The story is related in a letter from Lord Tovey to Roskill, 14 December, 1961 in ROSK 4/17. By the spring of 1942, Churchill wanted Tovey out, but could not convince Cunningham to take his place. 104. Quotation from ADM 239/261, p. 19. 105. ADM 199/1187, p. 164. 184 Notes

106. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 302. 107. Simpson, Somerville Papers, p. 267. 108. Quotation from ROSK 4/17, Tovey to Pound, 30 May, 1941. 109. L. Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 32. 110. Tovey’s thoughts and actions are discussed by him in ADM 199/1187, pp. 164–5. 111. ADM 199/1187, p. 166. 112. For a fine account of Rodney’s part in the Bismarck chase, see Hattendorf (ed.), On His Majesty’s Service, pp. 204–7. 113. Simpson, Somerville Papers, p. 271. 114. The reasons for the mistake in fixing Bismarck’s position are in Rhys-Jones, Loss of the Bismarck, appendix. It would appear that the Master of the Fleet (chief navigator) used the wrong measuring tool, not the wrong type of chart, in making his critical error. 115. This section is based on Rhys-Jones, ‘Loss of the Bismarck’, pp. 39–40, and Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 1, p. 343. 116. Admiralty signal is found in Hattendorf, On His Majesty’s Service, p. 207. 117. Bletchley Park had broken the Luftwaffe Enigma months before. Confirma- tion that Bismarck was headed to France in Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 1, pp. 344–5. 118. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 306. 119. Simpson, Somerville Papers, p. 271. 120. Simpson, Somerville Papers, p. 272. 121. Quotation from Simpson, Somerville Papers, p. 55. 122. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 307. 123. Quotation from letter, Tovey to Roskill, 20 November, 1954 in ROSK 4/17. 124. Tovey is referring to Vice Admiral John Byng, who, after his poor perform- ance at the Battle of Minorca in 1756 was court martialled and shot to, as Voltaire wryly put it, ‘encourage the other admirals’. 125. Captain L. E. Maund’s Report of Proceedings in ADM 199/1187. 126. Quotation from Mullenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, p. 206. 127. Quotation from Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 309. Damage to the Bismarck can be found in Mullenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, pp. 206–9; Mullenheim-Rechberg thought that Bismarck was hit by three torpedoes, not two. Recent evidence from the wreck indicates that he may have been correct. 128. Letter, Tovey to Pound, 30 May, 1941 in ROSK 4/17. This same letter also appears in ADM 178/322. 129. For Tovey’s thoughts and actions during the approach to battle, see L. Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 200–1. 130. Quotation from letter, Tovey to Pound, 30 May, 1941 in ROSK 4/17. 131. Quotation from Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 415. 132. For an eyewitness account of the Bismarck’s sinking, see Mullenheim- Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, pp. 246–86; for a well-researched modern account see Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, pp. 311–14. 133. Quotation from Mullenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, p. 256. 134. Dorsetshire’s part in the Bismarck operation is found in ADM 199/1187, pp. 16–17. Notes 185

135. The evidence for what caused the Bismarck to sink is in W. H. Garzke, Jr and R. O. Dulin, Jr, ‘Who Sank the Bismarck?’, Naval Institute Proceedings 117 (June 1991): 48–57; quotation from page 53. 136. Quotation from Tovey to Pound, 30 May, 1941 in ROSK 4/17. 137. L. Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 218. 138. Quotation from L. Kennedy, Pursuit, p. 209. 139. Quotation from ADM 234/321, p. 35. 140. Quotation from L. Kennedy, Pursuit, pp. 221–2. 141. Quotation from Mullenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, p. 289. 142. The Yamato incident is recorded in Russell Spurr, A Glorious Way to Die (New York: Newmarket Press, 1981), p. 285. 143. Admiralty signal taken from Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 315. 144. See Tovey to Roskill, 14 December, 1961 in ROSK 4/17. 145. Quotation from Tovey to Roskill, 20 November, 1954 in ROSK 4/17. 146. For losses in the Mediterranean and the strategic situation see M. Simpson, ‘Wings over the Sea’, in N. A. M. Roger (ed.), Naval Power in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996) pp. 134–50. 147. The American ships arrived on 10 July, 1941. See ADM 199/409, p. 53. The occupation of gave the Americans the excuse of escorting convoys all the way there. Hitler’s decision to declare war on the USA, often por- trayed as insane or inexplicable, made some sense – the USA, for all intents and purposes, was already at war with him. See T. Bailey and P. Ryan, Hitler vs Roosevelt: The Undeclared Naval War (New York: Free Press, 1979) esp. pp. 171–87. 148. For the Bomber Command raids, see Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 487. 149. Hinsley points out that in mid-June 1941 Bletchley Park began reading German naval Enigma signals on the day of their transmission, giving the Admiralty timely tactical intelligence for the first time. See Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 1, p. 346. The failed sortie of the Lutzow is in ADM 199/409, p. 51, and Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 2 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 164–5, and Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 484. 150. German armed merchant raiders are discussed in Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 2, pp. 165–7; statistics on losses are found in Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, p. 616. 151. Hitler’s thinking is well documented in Bullock, Hitler and Stalin, pp. 687–720; for a powerful argument that Britain’s position should not have been helped, because the Germans had victory in their grasp that summer and threw it away, see R. H. S. Stolfi, Hitler’s Panzers East (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992). If the Germans had won a crushing victory that summer, Hitler’s Directive No. 32 of 11 June, 1941 envisioned an immediate switch of economic resources to naval and air armaments. This included a huge ship building programme. In twelve years, the Naval Staff believed, they could build a fleet that, in alliance with Japan, could defeat the USA and whatever was left of the British Empire (interestingly, none of this involved a discussion of a cross-channel invasion) and expel all Anglo-American influence from continental Europe, Africa, Asia, and the world’s oceans. For these plans see 186 Notes

Militargeschichtiches Forschungsant, Germany and the Second World War Volume 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 630–6. Such plans strike this author as a bit far-fetched. 152. Quotation from Churchill, The Second World War Volume 3: The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 372. 153. Ibid., p. 381

7 The Hard Road to : June 1941–May 1943 1. Quotation from P. Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 200. 2. Quotation from P. Kemp, Convoy!, & p. 12. 3. Kemp, Convoy!, p. 14. 4. Roskill to Hinsley, 10 July, 1982 in ROSK 5/72. 5. A. Lambert, ‘Seizing the Initiative: The Arctic Convoys 1944–45’, in N. A. M. Roger, Naval Power in the Twentieth Century, p. 160. Lambert, how- ever, because of his stress on the overall struggle with the U-boats, sees the Arctic Campaign in a different light than this author. 6. For Tovey’s strategic dilemma, see Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, pp. 695–6. 7. Tovey knew that the Home Fleet could not do two jobs at once when he wrote to the Admiralty: ‘no disposition of the Home Fleet could adequately protect both the Russian convoys and the northern passages...’ Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, p. 119. 8. Numbers are from Kemp, Convoy!, p. 235. 9. The Soviets produced 157,261 planes and 105,251 tanks in World War II, and received 21,906 planes and 12,755 tanks, respectively. They produced 197,100 trucks and received 409,000. Statistics for planes are taken from Kemp, Convoy!, pp, 235–7 and J. Ellis, World War II: Encyclopedia of Facts and Figures (Military Book Club, 1993), p. 278. Tank figures are from Kemp, Convoy!, pp. 236–7, and Ellis, Encyclopedia, p. 277. The number of trucks produced and received are from Ellis, Encyclopedia, p. 278 and W. Murray and A. Millett, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 388. 10. Quotation from F. W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles (New York: Ballantine Books, 1984), p. 333. 11. Quotation from Murray and Millett, A War to be Won, p. 388. 12. The details of Operation E. F. can be found in ADM 199/447, Home Fleet War History, especially Tovey to the Admiralty, 12 September, 1941 and ‘Commanding Officer HMS Furious Report on Operation “E. F.” 30 July 1941’. Also of interest is Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 485–6, and Winton, Find, Fix, and Strike!, pp. 54–6. 13. Fleet Air Arm Order of Battle can be found in Winton, Find, Fix, and Strike!, p. 54. 14. The British did have the hybrid Barracuda / in the development pipeline, but it was slow and proved a poor performer. 15. Quotation from ‘Commanding Officer HMS Furious Report on Operation “E. F.” 30 July 1941’ in ADM 199/447. 16. Losses are from Winton, Find, Fix, and Strike!, p. 55. Notes 187

17. Tovey to Admiralty, 12 September, 1941 in ADM 199/447. 18. Table 7.1 is compiled from Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 3 Part 2, pp. 432–3, and Kemp, Convoy!, pp. 17, 18, 28, and 35. 19. For German U-boat operations and Hitler’s fear for Norway, see Doenitz, Memoirs, pp. 197, 206–9. 20. Hinsley et al. British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 2, p. 202. 21. For Churchill’s thinking and the opposition of both Pound and Tovey to it, see Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, pp. 196–7; for the debate over deploy- ment and the subsequent fate of the deterrent force, see M. Stephen, Sea Battles in close-up: World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp. 99–114. 22. Greene and Massignani, Naval War in the Mediterranean, pp. 202–4. 23. For an overview of that untapped potential and how it was translated into military power, see Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, pp. 347–57. 24. Churchill’s famous lines read as follows: ‘Hitler’s fate was sealed. Mussolini’s fate was sealed. As for the Japanese, they would be ground to powder. All the rest was merely the proper application of overwhelming force.’ Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 347. Churchill was dead on target. 25. This account of the raid on Vaagso Island is based on CAB 106/343, Operation ‘Archery’, 27 December, 1941. 26. Kemp, Convoy!, p. 27. 27. ADM 199/429, p. 4. 28. ADM 199/429, p. 10. 29. ADM 199/429, p. 5. 30. ADM 199/429, pp. 8–10. 31. Quotation from Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, p. 116. 32. Table 7.2 is taken from ADM 234/369, Appendix D. 33. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, p. 115. 34. For the , see Stephen, Sea Battles in close-up, pp. 115–36. 35. Kemp, Convoy!, p. 28. 36. Quotation from Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, p. 124. 37. For Churchill’s thoughts on Tirpitz, see Langenberg, ‘The German Battleship Tirpitz: A Strategic Warship?’, p. 82; Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, p. 117; Kemp, Convoy!, pp. 26–8. 38. For Bomber Command raids on Tirpitz, see Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, pp. 117, 127. 39. Signal, Tovey to Admiralty, 1801, 25 February, 1942 in ADM 199/347. 40. Signal, Tovey to Curteis, 1412, 27 February, 1942 in ADM 199/347, and ADM 199/1427 p. 24. 41. Signal, Curteis to Tovey of 2207, 1 March, 1942 in ADM 199/347. 42. Signal, Tovey to Curteis of 1735, 2 March, 1942 in ADM 199/347. 43. Curteis did not prove a fully satisfactory VA2 and was soon to be replaced by the Third Sea Lord, Vice Admiral Bruce Fraser. 44. For Ciliax’s problems and PQ 12, see Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, pp. 120–4, and Kemp, Convoy!, pp. 30–6. 45. ADM 199/429, p. 22. 46. ADM 199/429, p. 22. 47. ADM 199/429, p. 22. 48. ADM 199/1427, p. 25. 188 Notes

49. ADM 199/429, p. 23. 50. M. Evans, Great World War II Battles in the Arctic (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), p. 66. 51. ADM 199/429, p. 24. 52. Tovey to Secretary of the Admiralty, 14 March, 1942 in ADM 199/721. 53. For an interesting discussion of the role of Tirpitz in Grand Strategy, see Langenberg, ‘Tirpitz: A Strategic Warship?’, pp. 81–92. 54. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, p. 125. 55. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, p. 120. 56. ADM 199/429, pp. 28–9. 57. Kemp, Convoy!, p. 42. 58. Kemp, Convoy!, p. 44. 59. Kemp, Convoy!, p. 44; Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, p. 127. 60. ADM 199/721, p. 5. 61. CS10’s activities are reported in ADM 199/721, pp. 78–80. 62. Kemp, Convoy!, p. 45. 63. Kemp, Convoy!, p. 45. 64. N. Friedman, U.S. Battleships (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1985), p. 347. 65. Kemp, Convoy!, p. 47. 66. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, p. 128. 67. ADM 199/721, pp. 62–4. 68. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, p. 129. The Operations Branch of the German Naval Staff was miffed that their destroyers had not gone all-out to destroy the convoy, but very happy that they had pressed the attack and (they hoped) sunk the Edinburgh. TM-100-E May 1942, pp. 32–3. 69. Kemp, Convoy!, pp. 53–4. 70. Tovey’s influence with Churchill was rapidly approaching nil. In April, Churchill asked Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham to replace him, but Cunningham refused, stating ‘If Tovey drops dead on his bridge I will certainly replace him, otherwise not.’ As late as June, Churchill was trying to get Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and Pound to back him in his quest to fire Tovey. See Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, p. 142. 71. ADM 234/369, p. 46. 72. Kemp, Convoy!, pp. 56–60. It should be noted that at the time of PQ 16, the Royal Navy was finally doing some limited refuelling of warships at sea. ADM 199/1427, p. 75. 73. Quotation from R. Woodman, Arctic Convoys (London: John Murray, 1994), p. 185. 74. For British losses, see Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, pp. 35–44, 71–111, and Conway’s, p. 12. 75. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, p. 97. 76. ADM 187/19. FAA strength was slowly raising: Eagle had two Sea Hurricanes and 17 Swordfish embarked; Victorious, 12 Fulmars and 21 Albacores; Formidable, 12 Fulmars, 12 Martlets, 12 Albacores; Illustrious, 16 Martlets, 21 Swordfish; Indomitable, 18 Fulmars, nine Hurricanes, 24 Albacores. Total: 81 fighters, 95 torpedo bombers. By contrast, the Japanese and Americans were both able to field over 200 carrier planes that month at Midway. 77. Greene and Massignani, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943, pp. 232–41. Notes 189

78. 99, Order of Battle from ADM 199/427, p. 98. 79. This account of Convoy PQ 17 is based primarily on: ADM 199/427, Home Fleet War Diaries 1942, esp. pp. 92–100; ADM 1/20,021; letters from ROSK files 5/50 and 5/72; Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, pp. 130–44; Hinsley et al. British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 2, pp. 215–22; D. Irving, The Destruction of Convoy PQ 17 (New York: Richardson & Steirman, 1987); and Evans, Great Battles of World War II in the Arctic, pp. 71–84. 80. See Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, p. 130, and Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, pp. 701–2. 81. Irving, The Destruction of Convoy PQ 17, p. 30. 82. Pound to King, 18 May, 1942, US Naval Historical Center: Operational Archives, E. J. King Correspondence, Box 1. 83. For Churchill and Roosevelt’s communication, see Churchill, The Second World War Volume 4: The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), pp. 230–4, and Irving, Destruction of Convoy PQ 17, pp. 30–1. 84. The orders to Tovey and the convoy can be found in ADM 1/20,021 and in Irving, Destruction of Convoy PQ 17, Appendix. 85. Quotation from ADM 1/20,021, p. 5145. 86. Irving, Destruction of Convoy PQ 17, pp. 59, 68. 87. See Roskill to Hinsley, 10 July, 1982 in ROSK 5/72. 88. Evans, Great World War II Battles in the Arctic, pp. 72–3. 89. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, pp. 134–7. 90. The activities of the two American destroyers while with the convoy can be found as File A16–3 FE 24–99 in the US National Archives, College Park, Maryland. 91. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, p. 136. 92. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, p. 135. 93. Air Ministry, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933–1945, p. 114. 94. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 701. 95. Kemp, Convoy!, pp. 68–71. 96. For a discussion of the Ultra intelligence Pound was receiving and his actions during this period, see Hinsley et al. British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 2, pp. 215–22. 97. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 2, p. 216. 98. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 2, p. 217. 99. For these orders and counter-orders, see ADM 1/20,021, p. 5146. 100. These orders can be found in ADM 1/20021, p. 5146. 101. Quotation from Kemp, Convoy!, p. 76 102. For Broome’s reasoning when he left the scattering convoy and headed off with Hamilton, see his letter of 8 July, 1942 in ADM 205/22A. 103. Tovey to Roskill, 12 December, 1954 in ROSK 5/50. 104. Losses are given in ADM 199/427, p. 99. 105. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 718. 106. Irving, Destruction of PQ 17, pp. 197–8. 107. For the mood of the surface fleet, see Bekker, Hitler’s Naval War, pp. 278–9. 108. No less an observer than Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham noted that ‘I thought in this war the German navy was a very pale shadow of that of 1914.’ British Library Add Mss 52581B, p. 106. 109. Roskill to Hinsley, 10 July, 1982 in ROSK 5/72. 190 Notes

110. Quotation from R. Humble, Fraser of North Cape (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 153. 111. Quotation from Evans, Great Battles in the Arctic, p. 86. 112. ADM 199/427, p. 98. 113. ADM 199/429, pp. 176–89. 114. ADM 199/427, pp. 114–16. 115. ADM 234/369, p. 169. 116. ADM 199/758, p. 3. 117. ADM 199/1427, pp. 137–8. 118. ADM 199/1427, p. 136. 119. TM-100-F, September 1942, p. 119. 120. ADM 199/758, pp. 116–18. 121. TM-100-F, p. 143. 122. Woodman, Arctic Convoys, p. 271. 123. TM-100-F p. 175. 124. Woodman, Arctic Convoys, pp. 272–3. 125. ADM 199/758, p. 3. 126. TM-100-F, p. 154. 127. Winton, Find, Fix, and Strike!, p. 102. 128. TM-100-E, May 1942, p. 62. 129. We know that in March 1942 Anthony Eden was ‘nervous lest Russia should make peace with Germany’. Danchev and Todman (eds), Alanbrooke, War Diaries, p. 236. 130. TM-100-E, July 1942, p. 97. 131. ADM 199/427, p. 166. 132. ADM 199/1427, pp. 174–9. 133. Tovey to Secretary of the Admiralty, 4 December, 1942 in ADM 199/721. 134. Air Ministry, Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, p. 115. 135. ADM 199/427, p. 197. 136. A. W. Clarke (Captain of HMS Sheffield) to Roskill, 20 December, 1954 in ROSK 5/50. 137. Clarke to Roskill, 20 December, 1954. 138. Tovey to Secretary of the Admiralty, 9 February, 1943 in ROSK 5/50. 139. Armament statistics are from Stephen, Sea Battle in close-up Volume 1, pp. 183, 196–7. and Conway’s, pp. 232–4. 140. Quotation from Stephen, Sea Battle in close-up Volume 1, p. 183. 141. See letter, Tovey to Secretary of the Admiralty, 9 February, 1943. 142. Tovey to Secretary of the Admiralty, 9 February, 1943. 143. ADM 199/429, p. 124. 144. Tovey to Secretary of the Admiralty, 9 February, 1943. 145. Stephen, Sea Battles in close-up Volume 1, p. 188. 146. Tovey to Secretary of Admiralty; see also E. P. von der Porten, The German Navy in World War II (London: Arthur Barker, 1970), p. 209. 147. Clarke to Roskill, 20 December, 1954. 148. von der Porten, The German Navy in World War II, p. 209. 149. Stephen, Sea Battles in close-up Volume 1, p. 193. 150. Tovey to Secretary of the Admiralty, 9 February, 1943. 151. Clarke to Roskill, 20 December, 1954. 152. Stephen, Sea Battles in close-up Volume 1, p. 194. Notes 191

153. The following is based on Raeder, My Life, pp. 368–73. 154. For Doenitz’s actions upon taking over as C-in-C, see his Memoirs, pp. 310–11. 155. Resistance inside the pocket collapsed between 31 January and 2 February, 1943. 156. Statistics are drawn from the following sources: for the , see Roskill, The Navy at War, pp. 186–91; for ‘Pedestal’, see Roskill, War at Sea Volume 2, Map facing p. 305; for PQ 18, see Kemp, Convoy!, pp. 100–1; for ‘Torch’ see Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 2, pp. 464–5. I count Argus as an escort carrier. 157. For the magnitude of the US naval building programme, see H. P. Willmott, The Barrier and the Javelin (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983), p. 522. The Americans completed 10 battleships, 14 fleet and nine light fleet carriers during the war, and six heavy and 27 light cruisers, and 291 destroyers just from December 1941 through the end of 1944. The Royal Navy commissioned five battleships, six fleet and four light fleet carriers, 29 light cruisers, and 227 fleet and ‘Hunt’ class destroyers from September 1939 to the end of the war. ADM 209/5 Blue List of ships built and building for the RN. 158. ADM 199/632, p. 3. 159. Kemp, Convoy!, pp. 143–9. 160. Kemp, Convoy!, pp. 149–51.

8 The Path to Victory: May 1943–May 1945 1. ADM 199/632, p. 66. 2. For the state of the Home Fleet on Fraser’s appointment, see Humble, Fraser of North Cape, pp. 164–5. 3. ADM 196/51, p. 96. 4. ADM 187/25, 10 May, 1943. 5. ADM 199/632, p. 60. S. E. Morison in the ‘semi-official’ History of US Naval Operations in World War II Volume 10 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1956), pp. 229–33 covers the operation of US naval forces with the Home Fleet in 1943. However, he is perfunctory and caution should be applied in reading his account. 6. ADM 199/632, p. 78. 7. ADM 199/632, p. 89. 8. ADM 199/632, p. 92. 9. R. Humble, United States Fleet Carriers of World War II (Dorset, England: Poole Press, 1984), p. 31. 10. Doenitz, Memoirs, p. 374. 11. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 3 Part 1, pp. 254–5. 12. Ibid., p. 255. 13. Churchill, The Second World War Volume 4: The Hinge of Fate, p. 112. 14. Kemp, Convoy!, p. 245. 15. ADM 234/348, p. 5. 16. ADM 234/348, pp. 6–7. This account is based on ADM 234/348; E. J. Grove, Sea Battles in Close-up: World War II Volume 2 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), pp. 122–31. 192 Notes

17. ADM 234/348, p. 9. 18. Grove, Sea Battles in Close-up Volume 2, p. 129. 19. ADM 234/348, p. 11. 20. ADM 234/348, p. 14. 21. Grove, Sea Battles in Close-up Volume 2, pp. 129–31. 22. Hinsley et al. British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 3 Part 1, p. 261. 23. ADM 199/1440, pp. 4–5. 24. US National Archives, College Park, Maryland, RG 38 Box 1365, War Diary USS Ranger, p. 353. 25. RG 38 Box 1364, Aircraft Action Report of Carrier Group 4, p. 4. 26. RG 38 Box 1364, Aircraft Action Report of Carrier Group 4, pp. 1–4. 27. RG 38 Box 1364, Report of Commander Task Force 121, 18 October, 1943 by O. M. Hustvedt, p. 3. 28. Report of Commander Task Force 121, October 18, 1943, p. 1. 29. Humble, United States Fleet Carriers of World War II, p. 31; Hinsley et al. British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 3 Part 1, p. 282. 30. Losses in RG 38 Box 136, Action Report of Captain Gordon Rowe of USS Ranger, 9 October, 1943. 31. Report of Commander Task Force 121, October 18, 1943 p. 1. 32. Letter, Rear Admiral Tully Sherry USN to Fraser recounting his days as captain of the USS Augusta with the Home Fleet in the Fraser Papers File 28/9. Sherry’s comments are some of the only interesting material in the Fraser Papers on Fraser’s time as C-in-C Home Fleet. Fraser seems to have been liked and respected by the Americans, and Sherry makes the important observation that even in August and September the weather in the North Atlantic was consistently bad, worse than one would encounter normally in the Pacific. This may seem obvious but it explains some of the differences between how ships and fleets were handled in the two theatres. 33. Letter, King to Stark, 5 November, 1943 in E. J. King Correspondence Box 3, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. See also memo King to Knox, 23 October, same box, complaining about how the British had praised the actions of Ranger and her fliers in the press – King thought this a British trick to hold onto Ranger! The author is sure that if they had gone unmentioned, he would have seen it as a perfect example of ‘limey’ ingratitude. 34. ADM 199/632, pp. 132–3. 35. ADM 199/1440, p. 4. 36. Barnett, Engage the Enemy, pp. 737–8. 37. ADM 199/632, p. 128. 38. For the Intelligence picture at that time, see Hinsley et al. British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 3 Part 1, pp. 264–9. 39. For Doenitz’s thoughts on the impending action, see his Memoirs, pp. 374–85. 40. This account is based on ADM 199/913 and Stephen, Sea Battles in close-up Volume 1, pp. 198–218. 41. Quote from Bey’s orders in letter Roskill to Doenitz, 9 November, 1960. See also Doenitz’s reply (no date), both in ROSK 5/77, in which Doenitz takes responsibility for the defeat. In the same file can be found a document titled ‘Background Information on the Circumstances Leading to Scharnhorst’s Last Operation’ which clearly shows that Bey was expected by his superiors to Notes 193

fight. It also quotes a member of the German Naval Staff as appreciating that any German threats to Arctic convoys helped ‘the situation of our Japanese ally’. 42. Stephen, Sea Battles in close-up Volume 1, p. 204. 43. It should be pointed out that JW55B had a 15 destroyer escort and was hardly left defenceless. ADM 199/913, p. 7. 44. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 3 Part 1, p. 266. 45. Stephen, Sea Battles close-up Volume 1, p. 204. 46. ADM 199/913, p. 8. 47. ADM 199/913, pp. 8–9. 48. ADM 199/913, p. 9. 49. ADM 199/913, p. 13. 50. ADM 199/913, p. 7. 51. ADM 199/913, p. 13. 52. ADM 199/913, p. 13. 53. ADM 199/913, p. 14. The perennial problem with the 14-inch gun turrets seems to have been a classic case of overcorrecting. The British had suffered the catastrophic loss of 3 battlecruisers at Jutland caused by a flash fire propagating down through the shell hoists to the magazines. To prevent this from happening, the British had designed the 14-inch turret with flash-tight doors. However, these slowed the movement of shells and charges to the guns. Under combat conditions, the sailors would try to speed the process by keeping the hoist in neutral rather than locking it as every shell came up. This led to slack, which led to the flash-tight doors not closing properly, which automatically stopped the hoist as a safety precaution until the door was properly closed. Thus, any attempt to speed the process simply jammed up the works. ADM 199/913 pp. 84–5. 54. ADM 199/913, p. 74. 55. Stephen, Sea Battles in close-up Volume 1, p. 211. 56. ADM 199/913, p. 74. 57. ADM 199/913, p. 75. 58. Stephen, Sea Battles in close-up Volume 1, p. 216. 59. Figures are from ADM 199/913, p. 76 and Stephen, Sea Battles in close-up Volume 1, p. 203. 60. ADM 199/913, p. 11. 61. Fraser Papers file 18/21. 62. Fraser Papers file 18/25. 63. Woodman, Arctic Convoys, pp. 376–97. 64. ADM 199/351, pp. 16–26. 65. Barracuda performance: crew of two, capable of carrying one torpedo or one 1600 pound armour-piercing (AP) bomb, speed approximately 200 mph fully loaded with a combat radius of only 194 miles. ADM 239/365 Naval Aircraft Performance Data, pp. 14–15. 66. For Fraser’s thoughts on the planning of the operation, see ADM 199/1440, p. 8. 67. A comparison with US Navy organization and operational practices is illu- minating. In November 1943, the US Navy was massing all its carrier strength in one formation, Task Force 50, with an escort of six modern 194 Notes

battleships, three heavy and three AA cruisers, and 21 destroyers. During December, TF 50 hit Kwajelein Atoll. The available carrier force, four fleet and two light fleet carriers had an astonishing 386 planes embarked including 104 dive-bombers and 89 torpedo-bombers. Although the British did not have such a strong force (their six fleet carriers in the spring of 1944 could, however, embark at least 255 planes), they failed to mass the forces they did have. S. E. Morison, History of US Naval Operation in World War II Volume 7, pp. 116, 190. 68. ADM 234/345, Staff Battle Summary , p. 1. This section is additionally based on ADM 199/941, ADM 199/942, and Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 3 Part 1, pp. 276–7. 69. ADM 199/1440, p. 7. 70. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 3 Part 1, p. 274. 71. ADM 234/345, p. 4. 72. ADM 234/345, p. 5. 73. ADM 199/941, Report of Commanding Officer HMS Victorious; ADM 234/345, p. 7 74. ADM 234/345, p. 6. 75. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 3 Part 1, p. 277. 76. ADM 199/941, Report of Commanding Officer HMS Victorious. 77. ADM 234/345, pp. 7–8. 78. ADM 234/345, p. 8. 79. ADM 199/941, Report of Commanding Officer Victorious; ADM 234/345, pp. 7–8. 80. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 3 Part 1, p. 277. 81. Hinsley et al. British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 3 Part 1, p. 275. 82. ADM 234/345, p. 9. 83. ADM 234/345, p. 11. 84. ADM 199/1440, p. 8. 85. Quotation from Humble, Fraser of North Cape, p. 231. 86. Ibid., p. 232. 87. Dull, Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, pp. 17–18. 88. ADM 187/35. 89. See ADM 199/942, Comments of Director of Naval Warfare ‘on the extreme weakness of German Air Forces in Norway during May–December 1944’. 90. Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 3 Part 2, p. 451. 91. In 1943, the British were still deeply divided about all aspects of carrier operations. ADM 1/15576, ‘Operational Grouping of Carriers’, shows that two of their most experienced carrier officers, Boyd and Lyster, did not agree on how many carriers could operate effectively together, whether they should operate as one unit, or each have its own screen. Boyd went so far as to say that the close operation of more than two carriers with large air wings ‘will prove impossible’. Analysis of American experience did not help much, since up to that point in the war each American carrier commander seems to have done things his own way. 92. Humble, Fraser of North Cape, pp. 176–8; Roskill, Churchill and the Admirals, pp. 236–7. Notes 195

93. For Operations ‘Planet’ and ‘Tigerclaw’, see ADM 199/1440, pp. 8–9. 94. For Moore’s career, see ADM 196/50, p. 329 and the Navy List. 95. C-in-C Home Fleet Report on Operation ‘Mascot’ in ADM 199/942; Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 3 Part 2, p. 156. 96. C-in-C Home Fleet Report on Operation ‘Mascot’, p. 3. 97. C-in-C Home Fleet Report on Operation ‘Mascot’, p. 4. 98. Details of Operation ‘Goodwood’ are found in ADM 199/942; Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 3 Part 2, pp. 159–60. 99. ADM 199/942, Report of Proceedings Operation ‘Goodwood’ (not paginated). 100. ADM 199/1440, p. 31. 101. Sir C. Webster and N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939–1945 Volume III (London: HMSO, 1961), pp. 195–6. 102. ADM 199/1440, p. 32. 103. ADM 199/1440, p. 31. 104. Lambert, ‘Seizing the Initiative’, esp. p. 157. 105. ADM 199/1440, p. 36. 106. ADM 199/1440, p. 37. 107. ADM 199/1440, p. 51. 108. ADM 199/1440, p. 54. 109. ADM 199/1440, p. 52. 110. ADM 199/1440, p. 52. 111. ADM 199/1440, p. 53.

Conclusion 1. J. Corbett, in E. Grove (ed.), Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 115. 2. Roskill, The Navy at War 1939–1945, p. 29. 3. A solid argument for why Ultra can be overrated is in Ponting, Armageddon, pp. 182–4. 4. Statistics are drawn from Roskill, The War at Sea Volume 1, pp. 615–16, and Roskill, The Navy at War 1939–1945, p. 447. 5. Quotation from Grove, Sea Battles in Close-Up Volume 2, p. 115. 6. Danchev and Todman (eds), Alanbrooke, War Diaries, p. 515. 7. In correspondence with M. Simpson, I was asked, ‘What was the alternative?’ A statement by Marshal Petain from 1917 came to mind. To paraphrase: France can do no more – we must hold out and wait for the Americans. See J. L. Stokesbury, A Short History of World War I (New York: William Morrow, 1981), p. 237. It is interesting that in July 1943, Alanbrooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was arguing that Britain was fighting beyond her means, but Churchill would not face the implications. See Danchev and Todman (eds), Alanbrooke, War Diaries, pp. 427–30. 8. Quotation from Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 316. 9. Chamberlain laid out a clear theory of deterrence in a letter he wrote to his sister in July 1939. The point of rearmament was to create ‘defensive forces sufficiently strong to make it impossible for the other side to win except at such cost as to make it not worth while’. G. Stewart, Burying Caesar: The Churchill–Chamberlain Rivalry (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2001), p. 387. 196 Notes

10. This estimation is contested. A recapitulation of the Roskill–Marder debate on Pound would be futile. See ROSK 5/124 and R. Brodhurst, Churchill’s Anchor. 11. Pound justified this treatment of officers like Somerville and North as a tonic against the caution and indecision of the First World War navy as exemplified in Troubridge’s failure to engage the Goeben and Breslau. Pound to Cunningham, 12 December, 1940 in Add Ms 52561. Whether this was a wise way to cultivate initiative is another matter. 12. Roskill, The Navy at War, p. 99. 13. For some indication of the irrationality of the ‘bomber barons’, Arthur Harris wrote to Churchill claiming that ‘Coastal Command is therefore merely an obstacle to victory’. That Churchill took this seriously and denigrated Tovey is just one more example of his poor judgment. W. Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933–1945 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1983), p. 130. 14. Fraser is shockingly absolute in his defence of the Pound–Churchill ‘line’. He refused to find fault in anything they did: Norway, Oran, the sacking of Dudley North, Singapore, PQ 17. See the Fraser Papers File 31/13 with Fraser’s comments on Roskill’s The War at Sea Volume 1, and Fraser’s answers to questions posed to him by Marder in File 38/14. 15. Quotation from Humble, Fraser of North Cape, p. 171. 16. See Ellis, World War II, p. 274. 17. Kemp, Convoy!, p. 235. 18. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 748. 19. Tovey to Admiralty in ADM 234/578, Appendix 11. 20. J. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (New York: AMS Press, 1972), p. 14. 21. The author believes that although the Soviets would likely have held on in single combat against the Germans, it is very unlikely that they could have defeated the German Army and driven into Germany proper. The Soviets needed both the diversion of German resources to counter British and American military actions and critical aid in the form of trucks, radio equip- ment, and rolling stock to win in the East. Bibliography

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AA (anti-aircraft) cruisers, 19, 22, 49, Anti-aircraft (AA) guns, 9, 32, 145 54, 59, 60, 76 Anti-submarine warfare (ASW), 32, AA (anti-aircraft) guns, 9, 32, 145 71, 143, 144, 145, 177n.19 Abyssinian Crisis (1935–36), 23 Anton Schmidt (destroyer), 58 Acasta (destroyer), xiv, 63, 66–7, 131 ANZAC troops, 82 Achates (destroyer), 88, 125, 129–30 AP (armour-piercing) bombs, 144, 146 Admiral Graf Spee, see Graf Spee Appeasement policy, 4–7, 156–7 (pocket battleship) Arctic convoys: casualties and losses Admiral Scheer, see Scheer of ships in, 114, 124–7, 130, 133; Admiralty fire control table (AFTC), Dervish convoy, 112, 113, 160; 169n.29 difficulties faced by, 15–16, 109, Afridi (destroyer), 8, 42, 54 116, 118, 119, 120, 186n.7; and Afrika Korps, 180n.3 ‘E.F.’ Operation, 110–12; and AFTC (Admiralty fire control table), Force P’s raids against 169n.29 and Petsamo, 110–12, 138; Air force, see (RAF) importance of, 109–10, 162; from Aircraft carriers, 8, 11–13, 16, 18, 19, June 1941–May 1943, 108–33; 21, 22, 27, 76, 85–6, 114, 147, JW51A and B convoys, xiv, 113, 154, 191n.157, 193–94n.67, 128–31; JW52 and JW53 convoys, 194n.91; see also specific ships 133; JW54A and B convoys, 138; Alabama (battleship), 135 JW55A and B convoys, 139–41; Alam Halfa, Battle of, 143 JW57–59 convoys, 143, 144; Alanbrooke, Lord, 155, 180n.3, 195n.7 JW61 convoy, 150; political Albacores, 12, 76, 110–11, 116–17, considerations of, 108–9; PQ 1–6 121, 136, 138, 188n.76 convoys, 112, 113, 114, 115, 160; Alexander, A. V., 73, 75, 178n.39, PQ 7 convoy, 113, 114, 115; PQ 8 188n.70 convoy, 113, 114, 116; PQ 9 , 37, 75, 113, 119, 124, 136 convoy, 113, 115, 117; PQ 10 , 45–6, 48 convoy, 113, 115, 118; PQ 11 Amazon (destroyer), 14, 118 convoy, 113, 115, 118; PQ 12 Ambuscade (destroyer), 14 convoy, 113, 116; PQ 13 convoy, AMC, see Armed merchant cruisers 113, 117, 121, 160; PQ 14 (AMC) convoy, 113, 117–18, 126–7, 160; American Civil War, 61, 87 PQ 15 convoy, 113, 118, 160; PQ Anaconda plan, 61 16 convoy, 113, 119, 127, 160; Anglo–German Naval Agreement PQ 17 convoy, xv, 108–9, 113, (1935), 164n.15 120–5, 127, 128, 154, 157, 160, Anson (battleship), 126, 128, 133, 135, 196n.14; PQ 18 convoy, 113, 138, 144 125–7, 128, 133, 157, 160; RA53 Antelope (destroyer), 88 convoy, 133; RA54A and B Anthony (destroyer), 88 convoys, 138; RA59 convoy, 143; Anti-aircraft (AA) cruisers, 19, 22, 49, suspensions of, 125, 133, 157; in 54, 59, 60, 76 winter 1943–44, 138–41, 143, 150

203 204 Index

Ardent (destroyer), xiv, 63, 66–7, 131 Battle of Britain, 68–9, 176n.3 Arethusa (), 49, 88 , 63, 67, 69 Arizona (battleship), 146 Battle of the Atlantic, 72, 107, 128 Ark Royal (): aircraft on, (BCS), 21, 22, 11, 13, 53, 77; and Bismarck 59–60, 63, 76, 78, 86, 88, 90–3, chase of and attack, xiv, 100–2, 181n.39 106; and main Battlecruisers, 8, 16, 19, 21, 22, 45, armament of, 8; first plane shot 76, 85–6, 89, 114; see also specific by carrier-based aircraft from, ships 31–2; in Force H, 76; at Battleships, 7–10, 14, 16–19, 26, 45, , 47, 49; and Norwegian 49, 83–6, 169n.31, 191n.157; see Campaign (1940), 63, 66; and also specific battleships organization of Home Fleet in BCS, see Battlecruiser Squadron (BCS) 1939, 22; at outset of war, 31–3; Beagle (destroyer), 118 and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau Bedouin (destroyer), 42 sighting, 80; sinking of submarine BEF, see British Expeditionary Force by, 32; size and displacement of, (BEF) 11; Swordfish and Skuas of, (light cruiser), xvi, 22, 31, 38, 170n.67; U-39’s unsuccessful 42, 135, 138, 139, 141, 142, 144 attack on, 39 Bell, C. M., 165n.20 Arkansas (battleship), 106 Bellona (light cruiser), 148, 150, 151 Armament, see Guns Benn, Captain W. G., 36, 37 Armed merchant cruisers (AMC), Bermuda (light cruiser), 135 77, 107 Berwick (cruiser), 41, 44, 49, 78, 116, Armour of ships, 7 128, 135 ASDIC (SONAR), 15 Beverly (destroyer), 118 Ashanti (destroyer), 125 Bey, Rear Admiral, 140–3, 192–3n.41 Augusta (cruiser), 135 Bi-planes, 12 Aurora (light cruiser), 8, 22, 31, 32, (light cruiser), 49, 60 42, 49, 59, 89, 96 Bismarck (battleship): in Battle of the Avenger (escort carrier), 126 Denmark Strait, xiv, 92–5, 105; Avenger torpedo-bombers, 138, 146 damage to, and repair of, 95, 96, AWS, see Anti-submarine warfare 97, 100, 102–3; and Lutjens, (ASW) 87–8, 90, 92, 93, 95–100, 105, 106; operational career and Backhouse, Sir Roger, 19, 20, 21, 23, British chase of, 83–5, 87–103, 134, 148 105–6, 120, 157, 158, 182n.54, Baker-Faulkner, Lt Commander R., 145 183n.78, 183n.87, 184n.114; Baldwin, Stanley, 5, 164n.14 production of, 84, 165n.21; Barbarossa Operation, 85, 107 sinking of, xiii, xiv, xv, 68, Barents Sea, Battle of, xiv, 124, 103–5, 132, 184n.127; size and 129–32, 141, 154, 159, 160 capabilities of, 83–4; speed and Barham (battleship), 9, 44, 171n.11 endurance of, 153 Barnett, Correlli, xvii, 52–3, 60, 62, Bison (destroyer), 54 79, 92, 180n.9 Bisset, Rear Admiral, 144, 145, 147 Barracuda cypher, 140 Bittern (anti-aircraft sloop), 54 Barracuda torpedo/dive bombers, 46, Blagrove, Rear Admiral Henry, 21–2, 144, 145, 149, 186n.14, 193n.65 36, 37 Battle fleet concept, 26, 27, 169n.31 Blake, Vice Admiral, 20 Index 205

Blockade by Royal Navy Home Fleet, Campbell, Kenneth, 85 xvi, 25, 41, 44–5, 47, 86, 160, Canada, 44, 80 168n.24 Caradoc (light cruiser), 148 Blucher (), 52, 57 Carls, Admiral, 48, 132 Board of Admiralty, 2–3, 5–6 Casualties: British casualties in World Bodo raid, 137–8 War II, 37, 66, 85, 94, 95, 114, Bomber Command, see Royal Air 124–5, 130; German casualties in Force (RAF) Bomber Command World War II, 103, 104, 114, 142, Bombers, 77, 88–9, 101, 115, 164n.14 149; in World War I, 5 Bonham-Carter, Rear Admiral, 118, 119 Catalina flying boats, 100 Boyd, Rear Admiral D., 194n.91 Catherine Operation, 157 Bracken, Brendan, 72 Ceylon, 44, 119 Britain: and alliance with Japan, 4; Chamberlain, Neville: and appeasement policy of, 4–7, appeasement policy, 5, 7, 156–7; 156–7; and beginning of World assessment of, 156–7; and War II, 30; economy of, 4, 5, 153, Churchill, 156–7, 175n.77; death 156; lend-lease for, 12, 84, 100; of, 175n.77; as Prime Minister, rearmament of, 17, 18, 167n.50, 6–7, 63, 156–7; and rearmament 195n.9; shipbuilding industry in, of Britain, 18, 167nn.50–1, 5, 37, 76, 83; threat of German 195n.9; and Royal Air Force (RAF) invasion of, in 1940, 68–71, budget, 67n.51 176n.2; and three-front war Channel Dash, 115, 116 scenario, 5–6, 15, 17; and Chatfield, Admiral of the Fleet Lord, Washington Naval Pact, 4, 83–4; 20, 21, 33, 75, 155, 167n.45, see also Churchill, Winston; 168n.8 Royal Air Force (RAF); Royal Chiddingfold (escort destroyer), 114 Navy; Royal Navy Home Fleet Chiefs of Staff (COS), 70, 139, 177n.8 Britannia (Royal Navy cadet school), China, 5, 44, 86 19, 34, 74 Christopher Newport (freighter), 122 British Empire, 1, 6, 68, 77, 83, 156 Churchill, Winston: and air power, British Expeditionary Force (BEF), 6, 63 164n.14; and Altmark Incident, British navy, see Royal Navy 46; appointment of Lord Cork as Brodhurst, Robin, 168n.8 naval C-in-C, Narvik, 59, 61, 63; Brooke-Popham, Sir Robert, 175n.79 and Arctic convoys, 108–9, 119, Brooks, Joe, 104 120, 122, 125, 127, 133; Broome, Commander, 121, 123 assessment of, 155–7; and base Bulldog (destoyer), 118 for Home Fleet, 40–1; and Battle Burke, Arleigh, 15 of the Atlantic, 72; and Bismarck, Burnett, Rear Admiral Robert, xiv, 97, 105, 157; and Chamberlain, 126, 128–31, 139, 141, 159 156–7, 175n.77; as Chandellor of Burrough, Rear Admiral H. M., 114, 118 the Exchequer, 165n.17; and Byng, Vice Admiral John, 101, commando units, 114; and 184n.124 completion of Lion and Temeraire, 181n.14; and Dakar Expedition, ‘C’ class cruisers, 33, 41 63, 70; and defensive strategy of Cairo (anti-aircraft cruiser), 49 Royal Navy Home Fleet, 24–5; Calabria, Battle of, xiii, 178n.38 dislike of, and interest in replacing Calcutta (anti-aircraft cruiser), 22, 49 Tovey, 115, 134, 155, 183n.103, California (battleship), 118 188n.70, 196n.13; as First Lord of 206 Index

the Admiralty, 2, 24–5, 47, Corbett, Sir Julian, 153, 161 164n.6; and Forbes’s dismissal as Cork, Admiral of the Fleet Lord, 59, commander of Home Fleet, 57, 61, 63–4, 148, 155, 168n.10 72, 73; and Gallipoli landing in Cornwall (heavy cruiser), 119 World War I, 62, 63; and German Corsair fighter-bombers, 144, 145, 149 invasion of Soviet Union, 107, COS, see Chiefs of Staff (COS) 108; and Japanese threat, 112–13, Cossack (destroyer), 45–6, 102 180n.4, 187n.24; leadership ‘County’ class heavy cruisers, 78 abilities of, 63; and military Courageous (aircraft carrier), 11, 13, strategy, 12–13, 60–1, 63, 72, 82, 32, 76, 155, 166n.41 155–6, 161–2, 175n.79, 195n.7; Crete, 83, 106, 116, 120 and mining of Norwegian Crossing the ‘T’, 78–9 territorial waters, 47–8; and Cruiser Squadrons: 1st, 41, 49, 65, Norwegian Campaign (1940), 25, 122; 2nd, 21, 31–2, 41, 49; 54–6, 58–63, 67, 174n.43; and 10th, 114; 18th, 22, 86, 118 offer of First Sea Lord’s chair to Cruisers, 8, 13–14, 16–19, 22, 49, Fraser, 147, 155–6; Pound’s 59, 76, 191n.157; See also relationship with, 74, 155, 157; specific ships as Prime Minister, 62–3, 69–70, Cumberland (heavy cruiser), 121, 128 175n.77; and Roosevelt, 106; and Cunningham, Admiral Andrew B.: sinking of German submarines, assessment of, 157; and Battle 33; and Stalin, 172n.65; and of Calabria, xiii; on Fighting threat of German invasion of Instructions, 169n.36; as First Sea Britain in 1940, 69–70, 177n.8; Lord, 144, 145–7, 156, 157, 159; and Tirpitz battleship, xv, 115, on Forbes, 72; and Fraser, 147; 119, 122, 136; and Tovey’s on German Navy, 189n.108; and appointment as commander of Norwegian Campaign (1940), 55; Home Fleet, 74, 75, 178nn.38–9; and plans for sinking Tirpitz, 144; on victory in World War II, 114, as possible replacement of Tovey, 187n.24; and X-craft, 136 183n.103, 188n.70; size of fleet Ciliax, Admiral, 116 under, 76, 106; and Tirpitz strikes, Civil War, American, 61, 87 145–8; and Tovey, 74, 75, 81, Clarke, Captain, 131 178n.38; as Vice Chief of the Clausewitz, Karl von, 108 Naval Staff, 168n.10 Claymore Operation, 86 Cunningham, Vice Admiral J. H. D., Coastal Command, see Royal Air Force 41, 65, 176n.84 (RAF) Coastal Command Curlew (light cruiser), 8, 54 Collier, Basil, 51 Currie, Captain R. A., 93 Colorado (battleship), 9 Curteis, Vice Admiral A. T. B., 16, 96, Colville, John, 177n.8 99, 134, 187n.43 Commando units, 114 Czech Crisis (1938), 23 Condors, 70, 87, 121 Convoy escort ships, 14 ‘D’ class cruisers, 33, 41 Convoys: Arctic convoys, 108–33, D-Day, 71, 147 138–43, 160, 186n.7; Canadian Dakar Expedition, 63, 70 troop convoys, 44; defence of Dalrymple-Hamilton, Rear Admiral, ships in, 27–8; HX84, 77; HX106, 99, 150–1 79; SL67, 80; SL74, 103; WS5A, Daring (destroyer), 47 78; WS8B, 102 Dauntless (light cruiser), 148 Index 207

Dauntless dive-bombers, 111, 138 ‘E.F.’ Operation, 110–12 De Gaulle, Charles, 177n.8 Eagle (aircraft carrier), 11, 13, 119, Delhi (light cruiser), 42 132, 188n.76 Denmark Strait, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90 Echo (destroyer), 88, 110, 114 Denmark Strait, Battle of, xiv, 68, Eclipse (destroyer), 53, 110, 116, 92–5, 105, 159 117, 118 Denning, Commander, 123 Eden, Anthony, 190n.129 Dervish convoy, 112, 113, 160 Edinburgh (light cruiser), 22, 31, Destroyer Flotillas: 2nd, 49, 56, 57, 42, 44, 86, 96, 114, 118, 58; 3rd, 49; 4th, 49, 102; 7th, 41; 188n.68 8th, 32; 17th, 129–30 Edward-Collins, Vice Admiral George, Destroyers, xv, 8, 14–16, 18, 19, 22, 21, 32, 60, 74 49, 59, 76, 114, 191n.157; see also Effingham (cruiser), 33, 59 specific ships Egypt, 70, 82, 177n.8 Deutschland (pocket battleship), 30, Electra (destroyer), 88 42, 43; see also Lutzow (pocket Ellis, J., 178n.26 battleship) Emerald (cruiser), 33 ‘Deutschland’ class pocket Emil Bertin (light cruiser), 50 battleships, 11 Emperor (escort carrier), 144 Devonshire (heavy cruiser), 41, 42, 44, England, see Britain; Churchill, 49, 65, 110, 148 Winston; Royal Air Force (RAF); Diadem (light cruiser), 150–1 Royal Navy; Royal Navy Home Dido (light cruiser), 151 Fleet ‘Dido’ class light cruisers, 126 , 71–2 Dietl, General, 60 Enigma code, 30, 86, 87, 100, 122, Displacement of ships, 7, 8 184n.117, 185n.149 Doenitz, Grand Admiral Karl, 35, Enterprise (cruiser), 33, 59 37–40, 48, 51, 70, 107, 112, Escapade (destroyer), 110, 114 119, 132, 139–40, 150, 155, Eskimo (destroyer), 116 160, 192n.41 Esmonde, Lt Commander E., 97 Dornier Do , 31–2 Ethiopia, 5, 82 Dorsetshire (heavy cruiser), 96, Excellent (Royal Navy gunnery 103–4, 119 school), 19, 134 D’Oyly-Hughes, Captain Guy, 64–7 Exeter (heavy cruiser), 86 Drax, Admiral, 37, 64, 168n.10 Eyres-Monsell, Sir Bolton, 27 Dreyer Table, 169n.29 Duke of York (battleship): and Arctic ‘F class destroyers, 32 convoys, 116, 121, 126; FAA, see Fleet Air Arm (FAA) beginning of operations of, 84, Faulknor (destroyer), 116, 126 181n.17; and Bodo raid, 138; Fegen, Captain E. S. F., 77 and chase of Scharnhorst, 139, Fencer (escort carrier), 144 141–2; off Norway coast, 135; Fighting Instructions, 25–9, 91, 93, 97, and Pedestal Operation to Malta, 98, 169n.36 133; and strikes on Tirpitz, 144, , 110–12 145–6, 148; and Torch landings Fire control table (AFTC), 169n.29 in North Africa, 128 Firefly (fighter-bomber), 149 Dunbar-Nasmith, Admiral, 177n.9 Fisher, Admiral ‘Jacky’, 1–2, 74, Dunkirk evacuation, 63, 65, 67, 68, 76, 89 116, 120 Fisher, Admiral W. W., 20 208 Index

Fleet Air Arm (FAA): aircraft carriers Forbes, Elizabeth, 73, 178n.30 in, 12, 166n.41; basic tactical unit Force A, 125 of, 12–13; fighters and bombers of, , 126 146–7; function of, 12; needs of, Force H, 76, 80, 96, 98–100, 119, 135 37, 155; and Norwegian Force P, 110–12 Campaign (1940), 53, 59, 61; and Force Q, 126 raids on Kirkenes and Petsamo, Force R, 128–9 110–12, 138; relationship of, to , 116 Royal Air Force (RAF), 12; Skuas Formidable (aircraft carrier), 12, 35, 76, and Swordfish of, xv, 12–13, 23, 106, 119, 128, 132, 133, 148, 49, 59, 60; squadrons of, 12–13; 188n.76 strength of, 49, 76–7, 106, 146–7, France: Allied forces in, during World 188n.76; and Tirpitz strikes, 145, War II, 63, 67, 69; British defence 146–7; training aircraft of, against, 1; German conquest of, 166n.41 17, 61, 67, 68, 160; Navy of, 6, Fliegerkorps X (Air Corps 10), 52, 53 16, 26, 50, 175n.68; and ‘Flower class corvette, 27 Washington Naval Conference Forbes, Admiral Sir Charles: and (1921–22), 3 Admiralty intervention in Fraser, Admiral Sir Bruce: and Arctic tactical operations, 28; and convoys, 126, 129, 133, 138–43; Altmark Incident, 45–6; and assessment of, 158–9; and Battle anti-submarine trawlers, 177n.19; of North Cape, xiv, 139, 141–3, assessment of, 158; and base for 158; and Bodo raid, 137–8; career Home Fleet, 40–1; on blockade, and honors of, 143; career of, 25; and British intelligence, 30–1, 134, 144; Churchill’s offer of 33, 73, 170n.53, 173n.6; career First Sea Lord’s chair to, 147, of, 19–21, 62, 68, 74, 168n.8; 155–6; as commander of British Churchill’s dislike of, 72, 74, 155; Pacific Fleet, 148, 157, 196n.14; as C-in-C Plymouth, 74, 181n.14; as commander of Home Fleet, and Coastal Command patrols 134, 158–9, 192n.32; and over , 23; criticisms of, Cunningham, 157; and Home 33; and defence of Great Britain Fleet off coast of Norway, 135; from June 1940–December 1940, and Lutzow incident, 139; from 68–74, 77–8; dismissal of, May 1943–May 1945, 134–51; as commander of Home Fleet, 68, and Moore, 148; and raid on 72–4, 157, 158; and Fighting Spitzbergen Island, 135–6; as Instructions (1939), 25–8; and replacement for Curteis as Vice Norwegian Campaign (1940), Admiral, 134, 187n.43; reports 50–67, 73; from October and correspondence by, xvi; and 1939–March 1940, 41–9; at outset Scharnhorst chase and sinking, of World War II, 29–33; and 139–43, 160; and Tirpitz raids and pairing of battleship with sinking, 143–8; and Tungsten battlecruiser, 45; and Rawalpindi Operation, 144–7, 158 sinking, 41–4, 73; reports and French Indochina, 106 correspondence by, xvi; Friedrich Eckholdt (destroyer), 131 retirement of, 74; on , Fulmar fighters, 12, 76, 89, 97, 23–4, 37; and threat of German 110–11, 188n.76 invasion of Britain in 1940, Furious (aircraft carrier): aircraft on, 69–70, 72, 177n.8; and Tovey, 74 11, 13, 53, 76; Albacores of, 138; Index 209

in April 1940, 49; at end of war, and Enigma code, 30, 86, 87, 100, 150; and hunt for Graf Spee, 33; 122, 184n.117, 185n.149; and in North Sea, 32; and Norwegian First Battle of Narvik, 58–9, 159; Campaign (1940), 59; off Norway ‘fleet in being’ strategy of, 117, coast in July 1943, 135; and 123–4, 135; hit-and-run raid by, organization of Home Fleet in 41–4, 47; initiative held by, 1939, 22; at outset of war, 32, 33; during World War II, xv, 22–3; and Pedestal Operation to Malta, in inter-war years, 164n.15; and 125, 132–3; in September 1940 at Luftwaffe, 17; Lutjen’s raiding Scapa, 72; speed of, 11; Swordfish cruise in Atlantic, 79–81; from of, 170n.67; and Tirpitz strikes, May 1943–May 1945, 135–51; 144, 145, 148 in Norway, 112, 114–15; and Fury (destroyer), 116, 117, 118, 126 Norwegian Campaign (1940), 50–67; from October 1939–March Galatea (light cruiser), 20, 49, 89, 96 1940, 35–49; in October , 62, 63 1940–June 1941, 77–81; and Garland (destroyer), 119 Operation Weser, 48, 50–1; at Geisler, General, 52 outset of World War II, 32, 34; George V, King, 1–2 and raid on Spitzbergen Island, George VI, King, 143, 175n.78 135–6; rescue of German sailors German Army, 51–3, 62, 68, 71, 85, by Home Fleet, 104–5; and 107, 176n.2 resignation of Raeder, 132; and German Navy: from April–June 1941, Second Battle of Narvik, 60, 63, 82–107; and Arctic convoys, 60, 159; sinking of Bismarck by 108–33, 133, 138–43, 188n.68; Home Fleet, xiii, xiv, xv, 68, and Battle of Barents Sea, xiv, 103–5, 132; sinking of Glorious 124, 129–32, 141, 154, 160; and by, 63–7, 73; sinking of Hood by, Battle of Britain, 176n.3; and 94, 104; sinking of Jervis Bay by, Battle of Denmark Strait, xiv, 77; sinking of Rawalpindi by, 92–5, 105; and Battle of North 41–4, 73; sinking of Scharnhorst Cape, xiv, 139, 141–3, 158; by Home Fleet, 142–3, 154, 160; battlecruisers of, 11, 16; battles strengths and weaknesses of, 6, of, during World War II, xiii, xiv, 14–17, 23, 69, 71, 77, 81, 91, 92, xv; battleships of, 11, 16, 17, 114; 140, 153–4, 165n.21, 176n.3, and Bismarck battleship, xiii, xiv, 189n.108; and threat of invasion 68, 83–5, 87–106, 120, 158; of Britain in 1940, 71; and Tirpitz blockade of, by Royal Navy Home battleship, xv, 84, 107, 109, 112, Fleet, xvi, 25, 41, 44–5, 47, 86, 114–17, 119, 120–4, 126, 136–7, 160, 168n.24; Bodo raid against, 139, 144–9; in World War I, xv, 137–8; and British mining of 1–2, 117, 189n.108; X-craft used Norwegian territorial waters, against, 136–7, 154, 160, see also 47–8, 50, 51; casualties of, 103, German submarines (U-boats); 104, 142, 149; and Channel and specific ships Dash, 115, 116; crossing the ‘T’ German submarines (U-boats): and by, 78–9; cruisers of, 16, 17, 114; Arctic convoys, 118, 121, 125, destroyers of, 14, 16, 114; Doenitz 126–7, 139–40, 143, 150; appointed as commander-in-chief attack on Scapa Flow by, 35–7; of, 132; in early twentieth British anti-submarine sweeps century, 1; at end of war, 150–1; against, 32; detection of, 210 Index

by ASDIC (SONAR), 15; in on southern flank of convoy inter-war years, 164n.15; routes, 81; and Norwegian magnetic mines laid by, 38–9; Campaign (1940), xv, 55, 58, 65; in Norwegian waters, 112, 115; raiding cruises by, 46–7, 79, 87, number of, in 1939, 16; from 92; sightings of, 46–7, 50, 80; and October 1939–March 1940, sinking of Rawalpindi, 30, 41, 43; 35–40; and Operation Weser, 48, speed of, 23 50–1; at outset of World War II, Goddard, Noel, 89 32; production of, 17; sinking of, Godfrey, Admiral J., 30–1, 170n.53 32; torpedoes of, 36, 39–40; Type Goering, Hermann, 17, 37, 71 XXI U-boats, 150; see also Goodwood Operation, 148–9 Submarines Gordon, Andrew, 6–7 Germany: and beginning of World Graf Spee (pocket battleship), 33, 41, 45 War II, 30; blockade of, xvi, 25, , see Royal Navy 41, 44–5, 47, 86, 160, 168n.24; Great Britain, see Britain; Churchill, intelligence activities of, 35, 43, Winston; Royal Air Force (RAF); 73–4, 90, 170n.51; invasion of Royal Navy; Royal Navy Home Soviet Union by, 68, 84–5, 107, Fleet 124, 127, 180n.5; and magnetic Greece, 82, 83, 155, 176n.1, 177n.8, mines, 37–9; pact between 179–80n.3, 180n.9 Soviet Union and, 25, 29, 160; Greenland, 87 possibility of peace with Grey Ranger (oiler), 126–7 Soviet Union, 127, 190n.129; Greyhound (destroyer), 50 rearmament of, 5; shipbuilding Grove, Eric, 95, 155, 164n.15 industry in, 185n.151; threat of Grumman Wildcat, 76 invasion of Britain by, in 1940, Guadalcanal, Battle of, 183n.87 68–71, 176n.2; and three-front Guadalcanal, Second Battle of, 143 war scenario against Britain, 5–6, Guam, 124 15, 17; and Washington Naval Guderian, Heinz, 147 Pact, 83; see also German Navy; Guns: of aircraft carriers, 8, 11; German submarines (U-boats); anti-aircraft (AA) guns, 9, 32, 145; Hitler, Adolf of battlecruisers, 8, 10, 89; of Gibraltar, 37, 47, 76, 78, 86, 119 battleships, 7, 8–10, 83; Browning Giffen, Rear Admiral R. C., 120 machine guns of Gloser Sea Gladiators, 13, 49, 53, 64 Gladiator bi-plane fighter, 13; Glasgow (light cruiser), 31, 42, 44, 49, of cruisers, 8, 14; of destroyers, 56, 135 8, 14, 15; measurement of, 7; Glorious (aircraft carrier): aircraft on, problem with 14-inch gun 11, 13, 53, 176n.88; Fraser as turrets, 142, 193n.53 captain of, 134, 144; in Gurkha (destroyer), 42, 53 Mediterranean, 49; mishandling of, 155; sinking of, xiv, 63–7, 73, ‘H’ class ships, 57 76, 131, 176n.84 Haakon, King, 57 Glowworm (destroyer), 50, 54, 131 Halifax, Lord, 172n.65, 175n.78 Gnat acoustic homing torpedo, 143 Hallifax, Rear Admiral Ronald H. C., 22 Gneisenau (battlecruiser): blockade of, Hamilton, Rear Admiral L. H. K., 120–3 85, 86; damage to, 106–7, 159, Hammer Operation, 61–2 181n.20; and defence of Hankey, Lord, 60 Norway, 50, 51, 52; location of, Harding, Warren, 3–4 Index 211

Hardy (destroyer), 58 sailing on Rodney, 47; Harpoon Operation, 120 displacement and main Harris, Arthur, 196n.13 armament of, 8, 10–11; and Harwood, Sir Henry, 155, 178n.39 organization of Home Fleet in Havock (destroyer), 58 1939, 22; at outset of war, 31, Hawaii, 26 32, 165n.21; pairing of, with Heath, J. B., 64 Warspite, 45; and search for Hellcats, 112, 144, 145, 149 Scheer, 78; in September 1940 at Henderson, Admiral Sir Reginald, 20 Rosyth, 72; sinking of, by Hermes (aircraft carrier), 13, 119 Bismarck, xiv, 94, 95, 104, 106; Hermione (light cruiser), 89, 96 speed of, 11, 23; U-boat Hero (destroyer), 50 unsuccessful attack on, 39 Hinsley, F. H., 108–9, 124, 136, Horton, Vice Admiral Max, 25, 44, 185n.149 178n.27 Hipper (heavy cruiser), 30, 46, 52, 54, Hostile (destroyer), 58 78, 86, 107, 115, 121, 123, 125, Hotspur (destroyer), 58 126, 129–32 Howe (battleship), 128 Hitler, Adolf: aggression by generally, Hungary, 110 5, 25; and Arctic convoys, 139; ‘Hunt’ class escort destroyers, 18, 27, and attack on Yugoslavia and 114, 126, 191n.157 Greece, 83; and Battle of Barents Hunter (destroyer), 58 Sea, 132; and Bismarck, 85; Hurricane fighters, 53, 64, 70, 86, 89, Churchill on, 63, 187n.24; 110, 111, 126, 188n.76 declaration of war against Husky Operation, 135 United States, 185n.147; and Hustvedt, Rear Admiral O. M., 138 German Navy, 126, 127, 132, Hyderabad (corvette), 129 155; goals of, 162; invasion of Hyperion (destroyer), 50 by, 11, 17; and invasion of Soviet Union, 107, 180n.5; and Icarus (destroyer), 88, 110 Norway, 112, 114–15, 125; and Iceland, 88, 106, 160, 185n.147 pact with Soviet Union, 25, 29, Iceland–Faeroes gap, 78, 79, 80, 88, 89 160; and possibility of victory in Illustrious (aircraft carrier), 12, 35, 76, summer 1941, 185n.151; and 106, 119, 132, 146, 188n.76 possible peace with Britain, 71; ‘Illustrious’ class aircraft carriers, 12 and Stalingrad defeat, 132 Implacable (aircraft carrier), 149 Holland, Rear Admiral Lancelot E., 21, Impulsive (destroyer), 126 28–9, 74–5, 86, 88, 90–4, 102, Indefatigable (aircraft carrier), 148, 149 105, 159, 182n.57 India, 82 Hollyhock (corvette), 119 Indiana (battleship), 118 Home Fleet of Royal Navy, see Royal Indomitable (aircraft carrier), 112–13, Navy; and specific ships 119, 132, 135, 188n.76 Hong Kong, 124 Inglefield (destroyer), 110 Hood (battlecruiser): in Battlecruiser Inskip, Sir Thomas, 5 Squadron (BCS) under Intelligence activities: and Altmark Whitworth, 76; and Bismarck Incident, 45; American chase, 88, 89, 90–4; and intelligence, 112; and Barracuda Canadian troop convoy, 44; cypher, 140; British code-breaking and chase of Scharnhorst and success, 86–7, 184n.117, Gneisenau, 47; and Churchill’s 185n.149; British intelligence on 212 Index

Lutzow, 107; British intelligence torpedo-bombers of, 146; sinking on Norwegian Campaign (1940), of Repulse and Prince of Wales by, 173n.6; British intelligence on 113; and three-front war scenario Scharnhorst, 141, 154; British against Britian, 5–6, 15, 17; and intelligence on Tirpitz, 112, Washington Naval Pact, 4, 83; 122–3, 154; and Enigma code, 30, in World War II, 82–3, 106, 112; 86, 87, 100, 122, 184n.117, see also Japanese Navy 185n.149; failures in British Japanese Navy: and Battle of intelligence, 30–1, 33, 43, 73, 87, Guadalcanal, 183n.87; battleships 122, 136, 154; German B-dienst of, 9, 16; destroyers of, 14, 16; code-breaking success, 73–4, 90; losses of Royal Navy in German intelligence, 35, 43, encounters with, 119; at outset 170n.51; on German submarines of World War II, 26; strength of, and Arctic convoys, 139; and 6, 16, 165n.21, 188n.76; Norwegian Campaign (1940), 56; and Washington Naval and Ultra decrypts, 30, 107, 136, Conference (1921–22), 3, 4; 139, 140, 154 in World War II, xiv Intrepid (destroyer), 110, 126 Jellicoe, Sir John, 19, 20, 93 Iraq, 83 Jervis Bay (armed merchant cruiser), 77 Iron Duke (WWI battleship), 19 Jeschonnek, General, 99–100 Ismay, General, 75 Joint Planning Committee, 70, 177n.8 Italian Navy: attack on Greece in, 82; Jurens, W. J., 92 attack on Royal Navy by Italian Jutland, Battle of, xiii, 2, 19, 26, 51, frogmen, 13, 119, 136; in Battle 74, 93, 148 off Calabria during World War II, xiii; destroyers of, 14, 16; ‘K’ class destroyers, 14 at outset of World War II, 26; Karlsruhe (light cruiser), 52, 59 size of, 6, 16, 165n.21; strength Kate torpedo-bombers, 146 of, in 1939, 16 Kelly, Admiral Sir John, 21 Italian Somaliland, 82 Kennedy, Captain, 41–2 Italy: aggression against Ethiopia by, Kennedy, Ludovic, 87–8, 92, 5; Churchill’s policy toward, 155; 182n.57 and three-front war scenario Kennedy, Paul, 156, 168n.24 against Britain, 5–6, 15, 17; and Kent (heavy cruiser), 135, 148, 150 Washington Naval Conference Kenya (light cruiser), 89, 96, 114, 116 (1921–22), 3; and Washington Kerr, Captain R., 88, 93 Naval Pact, 83; in World War II, Keyes, Sir Roger, 64, 155, 168n.10 59, 68; see also Italian Navy KG (Kampfgreschwader or bomber wing), 53 ‘J’ class destroyers, 14 King, Rear Admiral Edward, 21, Jackson, Thomas J. ‘Stonewall’, 87 192n.33 Jamaica (light cruiser), xiv, 126, 128, King, Admiral Ernest J., 120–1, 129, 131, 135, 139, 142, 144, 148 125, 138 James, Admiral, 168n.10 King George V (battleship): and Arctic Japan: aggression against China in convoys, 118, 128; and Bismarck 1930s, 5; and alliance with chase of and attack, xiv, 57, 89, Britain, 4; and Churchill, 112–13, 90, 96, 99, 102, 105; in Force H, 180n.4, 187n.24; and fall of 135; strike against Tirpitz by, 149; Singapore, 175n.79; Kate and Tirpitz, 116 Index 213

‘King George V’ class battleships, 7, Lutzow (pocket battleship), 52, 107, 10, 83, 153–4, 165n.21 115, 121, 123, 125, 129–32, 139 Kingston (destroyer), 42 Lyster, Rear Admiral A. L. St. G., 25, Kirishima (battlecruiser), 183n.87 194n.91 Kirkenes raid, 110–12, 138 Koln (light cruiser), 52, 115, 126 Madden, Admiral Sir Charles, 20 Konigsberg (light cruiser), 52, 59 Magnetic mines, 37–9 Kranke, Captain, 77, 78 Maiolo, J., 165n.20 Krebs (armed trawler), 86 Malaya, 83, 175n. 79 , see German Navy Malaya (battleship), 9, 80 Kummetz, Vice Admiral, 129, 131–2 Malcolm (destroyer), 25 Malta, 06, 37, 82, 119–20, 125, 133 Lambert, Albert, 160, 186n.5 Manchester (light cruiser), 44, 56, Lancaster bombers, 149 60, 88 Layton, Vice Admiral G., 44, 60 Maori (destroyer), 102, 104 Leach, Captain J. C., 88, 91, 93, 94–5, Marines, see 97–8, 157 Marne (destroyer), 118, 126, 144 Leda (corvette), 127 Marschall, Admiral, 43, 66 Lend-lease, 12, 84, 100, 110 Martin (destroyer), 126 Libya, 83 Martin, B. C. S., 103–5 Lindemann, Captain, 93, 95, Martlet fighters, 76, 188n. 76 102, 103 Maryland (battleship), 9 Lion (battleship), 181n.14 Mascot Operation, 148 ‘Lion’ class battleship, 7–8, 10, 84 Mashona (destroyer), 104 Liverpool (light cruiser), 118 Matabele (destroyer), 114 Lloyd George, David, 156 Matchless (destroyer), 141, 144 Lofoten Islands, 86 Maund, Captain, 101 London (heavy cruiser), 118, 121, (light cruiser), 150–1 128, 135 Mayrant (destroyer), 120 Loveitt, Flight Sergeant R. H., 107 McGrigor, Rear Admiral R. R., 148, Luftflotten 2, 35 150, 151 Luftwaffe: and Arctic convoys, 109, Mediterranean, 75, 76, 86, 128, 133, 112, 115, 116, 119–21, 124–7, 135, 160 139–40, 160; bases for, in Mediterranean Fleet of Royal Navy, Norway, 48; and bombing of 59, 70, 76, 82 Britain, 71; British fear of, 37, 47; Menace Operation, 177n.8 British intelligence on, 87; Merchant ships, 77, 83, 107, 112, 113; and German Navy, 17; in see also Arctic convoys Norway, 138; and Norwegian Meteor (destroyer), 126 Campaign (1940), 49, 52–4, 57, Middle East, 82, 83, 162 61, 62, 173n. 17; skill of, 37, 47, Midway, Battle of, 188n.76 68; strength of, 121, 170n.56, Millett, Allan R., 110 173n.17; and strikes against Milne (destroyer), 126 Tirpitz, 146; and threat of Mines, 37–9, 47–8, 50, 51, 71, 150 invasion of Britain in 1940, 69, Minorca, Battle of, 184n.124 71; and Torch Operation, 128 Monoplanes, 13 Lutjens, Vice Admiral Gunther, Montgomery, Sir Bernard, 143 79–81, 85, 87–90, 92, 93, 95–100, Moore, Vice Admiral Henry Ruthven, 105, 106 xvi, 144–9, 158, 159 214 Index

Morison, S. E., 191n.5 organization of Home Fleet in Mountbatten, Louis, 155, 157 1939, 22; at outset of war, 33 Mullenheim-Rechberg, B. Baron von, Normandie (luxury liner), 96 184n.127 North, Admiral Dudley, 97, 157, Murray, Williamson, 110, 168n.24 196n.11, 196n.14 Musketeer (destroyer), 141 North Africa, 82, 124, 125, 128, 133 Mussolini, Benito, 82, 187n.24 North Cape, Battle of, xiv, 139, Mutsu (battleship), 9 141–3, 158 North Carolina (battleship), 84 Nagato (battleship), 9 North Sea, 1, 29, 32–3, 40, 44, 47, Nagumo, Vice Admiral C., 145 48, 49, 71–72 Naiad (light cruiser), 79, 179n.58 Norway: and Altmark Incident, 45–6, Nairana (escort carrier), 151 48; and Arctic convoys, 109; and Narvik, First Battle of, xiv, xv, Bodo raid, 137–8; British mining 57–59, 159 of territorial waters of, 47–8, 50, Narvik, Second Battle of, xiv, 60, 63, 51, 150; British off coast of, in 159 July 1943, 135; British raids on Navy, see Royal Navy Home Fleet; coast of, 110–12, 114; at end of and specific countries’ navies war, 150–1; German conquest of, Nelson (battleship): armament of, xvi, 17, 160; German ships in, 9–10; damage to, 38, 43; near 112, 114–15, 125; Hitler’s Iceland, 80; and organization of concerns about, 114–15; and Home Fleet in 1939, 22; at outset strikes against Tirpitz, 148–9; see of war, 23, 30, 31, 32, 165n.21; also Norwegian Campaign (1940) and Pedestal Operation to Malta, Norwegian Campaign (1940): Ark 125, 132–3; at Scapa Flow, 76; Royal in, 11; British evacuation of and search for Scheer, 78; in Narvik, 63–4; British intelligence September 1940 at Rosyth, 72; on, 173n.6; British mistakes speed of, 153; and Torch landings during, 62–3, 67; and cancellation in North Africa, 128; U-boat of British attack on Bergen, 56, unsuccessful attack on, 39 63, 67; and Churchill, 25, 54–6, ‘Nelson’ class battleships, 7 58–63, 67, 174n.43; First Battle Neptune (light cruiser), 148 of Narvik, xiv, xv, 57–9, 159; New York (battleship), 106 Forbes’ strategic plans for, 61–2; Newcastle (light cruiser), 22, 32, 33, German ground and air forces in, 42, 43 51–3, 62, 176n.2; and German Nigeria (light cruiser), 80, 118, 121 Navy, 17, 54–67; German plans Night fighting, 91 for, 48, 49, 50–1; Konigsberg air Norfolk (heavy cruiser): and Arctic attack on and sinking, 59; and convoys, 121, 128, 139; and Luftwaffe, 49, 52–4, 173n.17; Bismarck chase and sinking, 91, Norway’s response to German 94–5, 98, 102, 105, 183n.78; invasion, 57; and Operation and chase of Deutschland, 42; Hammer, 61–2; and Royal Air damage to, 43, 47, 141; in Force, 53–4; and Royal Navy Denmark Strait, 87, 88; firing on Home Fleet, 54–67; Second Battle Scharnhorst by, 141, 142; in 1st of Narvik, xiv, 60, 63, 159; Cruiser Squadron, 41; to Norway sinking of Glorious during, 63–7, in January 1945, 150; off Norway 73; submarines in, 59 coast in July 1943, 135; and Nurnberg, 115 Index 215

Obdurate (destroyer), 129 Palmerston, Lord, 156 Obedient (destroyer), 129 Pearl Harbor, 112, 124, 145, 146 O’Connor, General, 82 Pedestal Operation, 125, 132–3 Offa (destroyer), 114, 116, 125 Pegasus (seaplane carrier), 36 OIC, see Operational Intelligence Penelope (light cruiser), 49, 50, 54 Centre (OIC) Petain, Marshal, 195n.7 Onslaught (destroyer), 125 Petsamo raid, 110–12, 138 Onslow (destroyer), 74, 125, 126, Philippines, 124 129–30 Phillips, Tom, 97, 148, 155, , 85, 107 178n.39 Operation Catherine, 157 Phony War, 45, 48 Operation Claymore, 86 Piorun (destroyer), 102 Operation ‘E.F.’, 110–12 Planet Operation, 147 Operation Goodwood, 148–9 Poison gas, 164n.14 Operation Hammer, 61–2 Poland, 11, 17, 29, 110, 160 , 120 Portugal, 28 Operation Husky, 135 Pound, Admiral Sir Dudley: and Operation Mascot, 148 Altmark Incident, 46; and Operation Menace, 177n.8 Arctic convoys, 109, 119–25, 157; Operation Pedestal, 125, 132–3 assessment of, 157; and base for Operation Planet, 147 Home Fleet, 40–1; and Bismarck, Operation ‘R4’, 48, 50, 54–5, 56, 61, 97–8, 104, 105, 106, 157; career 63, 67, 174n.43 of, 21; Churchill’s relationship Operation Rhine Exercise, 85, 98 with, 74, 155, 157; and Operation Sea Lion, 71 completion of Lion and Temeraire, Operation Tigerclaw, 147 181n.14; on dismissal of Operation Torch, 127, 128, Forbes as commander of Home 133, 135 Fleet, 72–3, 157; and Fighting Operation Tungsten, xiv, 144–7, Instructions (1939), 25–9; as First 158, 160 Sea Lord, 3, 21, 28–9, 72, 155, , 120 157, 168n.8, 196n.11; and Operation Weser, 48, 50–1 Fraser, 134; on Holland, 92; Operation Wilfred, 48, 49, 50, 54, 67 and intervention in tactical Operation Workshop, 157 operations, 28–9; and Japanese Operational Intelligence Centre threat, 112; and magnetic mines, (OIC), 30–1, 87, 88, 122–3, 139, 39; military career of, 105; and 141, 170n.53; see also Intelligence Moore, 148; and Norwegian activities Campaign (1940), 51, 54–5, 56, Opportune (destroyer), 125, 141 58, 62, 67, 157; personality of, Oribi (destroyer), 114, 116, 118 21, 157; replaced by Orkney Islands, 1 Cunningham, 144, 157; Orwell (destroyer), 129 and replacement of Tovey, Orzel (submarine), 59 188n.70; and sinking of Glorious, Ouvry, J. G. D., 39 66; and sinking of Jervis Bay, 78, 179n.47; and Tovey, 72, 74, 75 P-39s (fighter-bomber), 110 PQ convoys, see Arctic convoys Pacific Fleet of Royal Navy, 148, Premier (escort carrier), 151 149, 157 Prien, Lt Commander Gunther, 35–7, Palestine, 82 39–40. 216 Index

Prince of Wales (battleship): armament mines laid off Norwegian coast, of, 84, 94–5; and Bismarck chase, 50; and organization of Home 84, 88–91, 93–7, 99; Churchill’s Fleet in 1939, 22; at outset of war, mistakes concerning, 63; 31, 33, 165n.21; and refuelling completion date of, 84; damage during Norwegian Campaign to, 94, 99, 183n.87, 183n.100; (1940), 60; size and displacement Pound’s opposition to dispatch of, 10; speed of, 11, 23; and Torch of, 157; repair of, 106; sinking of, landings in North Africa, 128, 113, 175n.79; and war with 133 Japan, 112, 113 Repulse (battlecruiser): in April 1940, Prinz Eugen (heavy cruiser), 85, 87–90, 49; in April–June 1941, 85, 86, 92, 94, 96, 97, 106–7, 115 88, 89, 90, 96, 99; and attack on Prisoners by war, 45–6, 114, 137 Glowworm, 54; in Battlecruiser Puncher (escort carrier), 151 Squadron (BCS) under Punjabi (destroyer), 116, 118 Whitworth, 76; and Churchill’s Pursuer (escort carrier), 144 sailing on Rodney, 47; and false report of German raider in North Queen (escort carrier), 151 Atlantic, 63; to Gibraltar, 86; in Queen Elizabeth (battleship), 9, 13, 19, North Sea, 32; and organization 62, 119, 136, 165n.21 of Home Fleet in 1939, 22; at ‘Queen Elizabeth’ class battleships, outset of war, 31, 32; pairing of, 7, 9 with Rodney, 45; Pound’s opposition to dispatch of, 157; ‘R’ class battleships, 22, 76, 153 and R4 Operation to Norway, 50; ‘R4’ plan, 48, 50, 54–5, 56, 61, 63, 67, and refuelling, 60, 99; and search 174n.43 for Scheer, 78; in September 1940 Radar, 15, 88, 98, 101, 129, 130–1, in Scapa, 72; sinking of, 113, 142, 145 175n.79; size and displacement Raeder, Admiral, 17, 48, 49, 71, 78, of, 10; speed of, 11, 23; and war 79, 83–5, 107, 114, 126, 132, 140, with Japan, 112, 113 178n.26 Resolution (battleship), 21, 134 RAF, see Royal Air Force (RAF) Revenge (battleship), 7, 8–9, 96 Raikes, Vice Admiral, 44 Rhind (destroyer), 120 Ramillies (battleship), 22, 79, 80, 96 Rhododendron (corvette), 129 Ramsay, Vice Admiral Bertram, 20 Rhys-Jones, Graham, 84, 182n.69 Ramsay, Vice Admiral C., 66 Rio de Janeiro (supply ship), 59 Ranger (aircraft carrier), 35, 137–8, Robeck, Admiral Sir John de, 20 139, 192n.33 Rocs, 49 Rawalpindi (armed merchant cruiser), Rodney (battleship): in April 1940, 49; 30, 41–3, 47, 73, 77 in April–June 1941, 85, 86, 96, Refueling at sea, 77, 116, 154, 99; and Bismarck chase of and 188n.72 attack, xiv, 96, 99, 100, 102–3; Renown (battlecruiser): in April 1940, and chase of Deutschland, 42; 49; and Arctic convoys, 116; and Churchill’s sailing on, 47; damage Churchill’s sailing on Rodney, 47; to, 43; displacement and main and encounter with Scharnhorst armament of, 8, 9–10; at end of and Gneisenau, xv, 55; and false war, 150; and organization of report of German raider in North Home Fleet in 1939, 22; at outset Atlantic, 63; in Force H, 76; and of war, 23, 31, 32, 165n.21; Index 217

pairing of, with Repulse, 45; and Royal Navy: and appeasement policy, Pedestal Operation to Malta, 125, 4–6; battles of, during World War 132–3; and R4 Operation to II, xiii, xiv, xv; command Norway, 50; repair of, 106; at authority over, 2–3; in early Scapa Flow, 76; and Scharnhorst twentieth century, 1, 163n.1; and Gneisenau sighting and Eastern Fleet of, 119–20; chase, 47, 80; and search for expenditures for, 4, 18, 165n.17, Scheer, 78; in September 1940 at 167n.51; historical victories of, Rosyth, 72; speed of, 153; and xiii; in inter-war years, 3–18; Torch landings in North Africa, and magnetic mines, 38–9; 128, 133; Tovey as commander Pacific Fleet of, 148, 149, 157; of, 74; U-boat unsuccessful strength of, 6, 16, 18, 119–20, attack on, 39 165n.21, 191n.157; in World Romania, 160 War I, xiii, 1–2, 25, 134, 153, Rommel, General Erwin, 83, 124 196n.11; see also Royal Navy Roope, Lt Commander G. R. B., 54, Home Fleet; and specific ships 173n.27 Royal Navy Home Fleet: aircraft Roosevelt, Franklin D., 100, 106, 109, carriers of, 8, 11–13, 16, 18, 19, 119, 120, 127, 133 21, 22, 27, 76, 85–6, 114, Roskill, Stephen, xvii, 21, 41, 51, 194n.91; American ships in, 135, 73–4, 92, 108–9, 124, 154, 158, 137–8, 139; from April–June 166n.41, 168n.8, 169n.36 1941, 82–107; and Arctic Rotherham, Commander, 89 convoys, 108–33, 138–43, 160, Rowan (destroyer), 120 162, 186n.7; assessment of Royal Air Force (RAF): and Arctic performance of, 152–62; attack convoys, 109; for defence of on Scapa Flow by German metropolitan Britain, 6; submarines, 35–7; base for, 1, 32, expenditures for, 67n.51; and 40–1; and Battle of Barents Sea, Norwegian Campaign (1940), xiv, 124, 129–32, 141, 154, 159, 53–4, 61, 62, 69; reconnaissance 160; and Battle of Britain, 176n.3; of, in April, 1940, 50; and role of and Battle of North Cape, xiv, Home Fleet in protection of 139, 141–3, 158; battlecruisers of, British Isles from invasion, 152; 8, 10–11, 16, 19, 22, 45, 76, 85–6, strikes against Tirpitz by, 149; 114; battleships of, 7–10, 16, 18, and threat of invasion of Britain 19, 45, 49, 85–6, 114; blockade in 1940, 69, 82; see also Fleet Air by, xvi, 25, 41, 44–5, 47, 86, 160, Arm (FAA) 168n.24; Bodo raid by, 137–8; Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber and Canadian troop convoys, 44; Command, xv, 31, 46, 53, 69, casualties of, 37, 66, 94, 95, 114, 71, 82, 106–7, 115, 136, 155, 124–5, 130; collisions of ships in, 177n.20 118; command authority over Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal and command structure of, 2–3, Command, 23, 31, 43, 44, 63, 71, 19–22, 27, 44, 59, 61, 63, 68, 74, 88, 100, 107, 139, 154–5, 160, 75, 155–9; cruisers of, 8, 13–14, 161, 168n.12, 196n.13 16, 18, 19, 22, 49, 76, 114; defeat Royal Air Force (RAF) Fighter of, in Denmark Strait, xiv, 68, Command, 69, 70, 160, 161, 92–5, 105; and defence of Great 178n.26 Britain from June 1940–June Royal Marines, 60 1941, 68–81, 178n.21; defensive 218 Index

strategy of, 24–5; destroyers of, battles of generally, xiv, xv; and xv, 8, 14, 14–16, 18, 19, 22, 49, X-craft, 136–7, 154, 160; see also 76; disposition of major forces of, specific and ships in May 1941, 85–6; at end of war, Royal Navy Mediterranean Fleet, 59, 149–51; Fighting Instructions for, 70, 76, 82 25–9, 91, 93, 97, 98, 169n.36; Royal Oak (battleship), 3, 21–2, 24, and First Battle of Narvik, xiv, xv, 32, 36–7 58–9, 159; as ‘floating reserve’ for Royal Sovereign (battleship), 22, 134 Royal Navy, 12–13, 33, 119, 125, Royalist (light cruiser), 144 128, 132–3; handicaps of, 22–3, Russia, see Soviet Union 33, 49, 77, 81, 106, 153–5; in Russo–Finnish ‘Winter War’ inter-war years, 3–18; and keeping (1939–40), 172n.65 German surface fleet out of Atlantic, 153–9; from May Salmon (submarine), 44 1943–May 1945, 134–51; and SAP (semi-armour piercing) mining of Norwegian territorial bombs, 144 waters, 50–1; and Norwegian Saumarez (destroyer), 142 Campaign (1940), 50–67; from Savage (destroyer), 142 October 1939–March 1940, Scapa Flow: attack on, by German 35–49; origins of, 1–2; at outset of submarines, 35–7, 39; as base of war, 19–34; pairing of battleship Royal Navy Home Fleet, 1, 2, 32, with battlecruiser in, 45; and 40–1, 47, 71, 73; defences of, protection of British Isles from 23–4; distance from English invasion, 152–3; and raid on Channel to, 72; at outset of Spitzbergen Island, 135–6; raids World War II, 23–4, 28–33 on Norwegian coast, 110–12, 114; Scharnhorst (battlecruiser): and Arctic and refuelling at sea, 77, 116, convoys, 139–42; blockade of, 86; 154, 188n.72; rescue of German British chase and sinking of, sailors by, 104–5; roles of, xiv–xv, 139–43, 160; damage to, 106–7, xvi, 26, 152–62; and Scharnhorst 141, 142; and defence of Norway, chase and sinking, 139–43, 154, 15, 50, 51, 52, 133; location of, 160; and Second Battle of Narvik, on southern flank of convoy xiv, 60, 63, 159; sinking of routes, 81; Lutjens as commander Bismarck by, xiii, xiv, xv, 68, of, 79, 87; and Norwegian 103–5, 132; sinking of Hood by Campaign (1940), xv, 55, 58, 65, German Navy, 94, 104; sinking 66; overhaul needed by, 85; RAF of Jervis Bay by German Navy, 77; Bomber Command’s raids on, sinking of Rawalpindi by German 106–7; raid on Spitzbergen Island Navy, 41–4, 47, 73; sinking of by, 135–6; raiding cruises by, Scharnhorst by, 142–3, 154, 160; 46–7, 79, 87, 92; sightings of, speed of ships of, 7, 22–3; 46–7, 50, 80; sinking of, xiv, 15, strength and losses of, 16, 17–18, 142–3, 154, 160; sinking of 49, 59, 75–6, 80, 83, 85–6, 89–90, Rawalpindi by, 30, 41–3; speed of, 106, 114, 125, 135, 149, 150, 23, 142; as X-craft target, 136–7 176n.3, 194n.67; submarines in, ‘Scharnhorst’ class battlecruisers, 11 16, 59; and threat of German Scheer (pocket battleship), 77–8, 107, invasion of Britain in 1940, 115, 121, 123, 125, 126 69–70, 177n.8; and Tirpitz raids Schneider, Lt Commander Adalbert, 93 and sinking, 143–9; World War II Schniewind, Admiral, 123, 126, 140 Index 219

Schnorkel, 150 Somerville, Vice Admiral Sir James, Schoemann (destroyer), 118 20, 75, 76, 97–101, 106, 119, 157, Scorpion (destroyer), 142 196n.11 Scotland, 31, 35, 40, 41, 59 SONAR (ASDIC), 15 Scott, Winfield, 61 South Dakota (battleship), 135, Scylla (light cruiser), 126 183n.87 Sea Gladiators, 12, 49, 53, 176n.88 Southampton (light cruiser), 31, 42, 43, Sea Lion Operation, 71 44, 49, 56, 59 Seafires, 112, 149 Soviet Union: Anglo–American aid to, Sealion (submarine), 59 109–10, 196n.9, 196n.21; and Searcher (escort carrier), 144, 151 Arctic convoys, 108–33, 138–43, Seawolf (submarine), 116 160, 186n.7; and Battle of Second Battle Squadron (Home Fleet), Stalingrad, 110, 127, 132, 22, 36 191n.155; British defence against, Semi-armour piercing (SAP) 1; and Churchill, 155, 172n.65; bombs, 144 German invasion of and offensive Sheffield (light cruiser): accidental in, 68, 84–5, 107, 110, 124, 127, Swordfish attack on, 100–1; in 180n.5; pact between Germany April 1940, 49, 50; and Arctic and, 25, 29, 160; and possibility convoys, 128, 129, 133; in Battle of peace with Germany, 127, of the Barents Sea, xiv, 131; and 190n.129; production of planes, chase of Deutschland, 42; and tanks and trucks by, 186n.9; and Norwegian Campaign (1940), 50, Royal Navy in World War II, xv, 56; and organization of Home xvi; victory of, against Germany, Fleet in 1939, 22; at outset of war, 196n.21 31, 32; and R4 Operation, 50; Spain, 160 and Scharnhorst chase, 139, 141; Spearfish (submarine), 31, 59 and Tirpitz raid, 144 Speed of ships, 7, 22–3, 153–4 Sherbrooke, Captain R. St. V., xiv, Spitfires, 88, 136, 137 129–31, 159 Spitzbergen Island, 135–6 Shermans (tanks), 110 Squadrons, 12–13 Sherry, Rear Admiral Tully, 192n.32 Stalin, Joseph, 29, 107, 119, 127, 133, Shipbuilding industry, 5, 37, 76, 83, 156, 172n.65, 180n.5 185n.151, 191n.157 Stalingrad, Battle of, 110, 127, 132, Shore-to-ship communications, 191n.155 see Telegraphy Stanhope, Lord, 20, 168n.8 , 128, 135 Stark, Admiral, 138 Sikh (destroyer), 102 Stord (destroyer), 142 Simpson, Michael, 12, 100–1, 195n.7 Stuarts (tanks), 110 Singapore, 4, 6, 23, 33, 37, 83, 106, Stuka dive bombers, 111, 121, 173n.17 112, 155, 175n.79, 180n.4, Submarines: Arctic convoys and 196n.14 German submarines, 118, 121, Sirius (light cruiser), 125 125, 126–7, 133, 139–40, 143, Skuas, xv, 12, 13, 32, 49, 53, 59, 66, 150; attack on Scapa Flow by 77, 111, 170n.67 German submarines, 35–7; Slessor, T., 176n.84 British anti-submarine sweeps, Smith, Ensign Leonard, 100 32, 71, 177n.19; detection of Snapper (submarine), 59 German submarines, by ASDIC Somali (destroyer), 114, 125, 126 (SONAR), 15; German submarines 220 Index

in inter-war years, 164n.15; Tirpitz (battleship): and Arctic German Type XXI U-boats, 150; convoys, 114–17, 119–24, 126; in inter-war years, 164n.15; British attitudes toward, xv; magnetic mines laid by German British raids and strikes against, submarines, 38–9; in Norwegian 115, 136, 143–9; and Churchill, Campaign (1940), 59; number of, 115; damage to, 137, 139, 143, in 1939, 16; from October 145, 147, 149, 154, 160; and 1939–March 1940, 35–40; defence of Norway, 115, 125; Operation Weser and German Fraser on plans for sinking, U-boats, 48, 50–1; at outset of 143–4; and Operation ‘Tungsten’, World War II, 32, 34; production xiv, 144–7, 158, 160; power of, of German submarines, 17; xv, 109, 114, 117, 119, 120; sinking of German submarines, production and sea-readiness of, 32; torpedoes of, xv, 23, 39–40 84, 107, 112, 154, 165n.21, Suckling, Flying Officer, 88 181n.17; and raid on Spitzbergen , 82 Island, 135–6; repair of, 137, 144; Suffolk (heavy cruiser): in April–June sinking of, xv, 115, 149; X-craft 1941, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 94–5, 98; attack on, 136–7, 139, 154, 160 and Arctic convoys, 128; and Torch Operation, 127, 128, 133, 135 Bismarck chase and sinking, 90, Torpedo–Spotter–Reconnaissance 91, 94–5, 98, 105, 182n.54, (TSR) bi-planes, 12, 76 183n.78; and convoy HN3, 43; Torpedo tubes, 14 damage to, 53–4, 62; in Torpedoes, xv, 10, 14, 23, 36, 39–40, Denmark Strait, 86, 87, 88; 89, 101, 106 and Deutschland chase, 42; Torpex bombs, 145 displacement and main Tovey, Admiral Sir John: armament of, 8; in 1st Cruiser accomplishments of summarized, Squadron, 41; in Iceland–Faeroes 134; from April–June 1941, 86–9, gap, 86; in May 1943, 135; and 93, 96–105; and Arctic convoys, Norwegian Campaign (1940), 109, 114–33, 157, 186n.7; 53–4; at outset of war, 33; assessment of, 158; and Battle and raid on Kirkenes and of Denmark Straits, 93, 95; and Petsamo, 110 Bismarck, xiv, 86, 88–90, 93, Sunfish (submarine), 59 96–106, 157, 158; and British Surigao Strait, Battle of, 143 intelligence, 86–7; career of, 74–5, Sweden, 47, 48, 50, 160, 172n.65 178n.38; Churchill’s dislike of, Swordfish , xiv, xv, 12, 13, and interest in replacing, 15, 134, 23, 49, 53, 59, 60, 65, 76, 89, 96, 155, 183n.103, 188n.70, 196n.13; 97, 100–2, 110–11, 126, 145, as commander at The Nore, 134; 170n.67, 176n.88, 188n.76 as commander of Home Fleet, 68, 72, 74–6, 158; crossing the ‘T’ by Tankers, 77 German Navy, 78–9; and defence Tartar (destroyer), 125 of Great Britain from June Task Force 99, 120, 125 1940–December 1940, 78–81, Taylor, A. J. P., 164n.6, 167n.50 179n.65, 179n.58; on failure of Telegraphy, 28 sea communications, 161; and Temeraire (battleship), 181n.14 Japanese threat, 112; on Pound Tennessee (battleship), 118 and Forbes, 21; Pound’s Tigerclaw Operation, 147 assessment of, 74; and raids on Index 221

Norwegian coast, 110–12, 114; Naval Pact, 4, 83–4; see also replacement for, as commander US Navy of Home Fleet, 134; reports and US Marines, 106 correspondence by, xvi US Navy: aircraft carriers of, 12, 16; ‘Town’ class light cruisers, 49 and Arctic convoys, 119, 120–5; Treaty of Versailles, 2, 5, 164n.15 attack on Kwajelein Atoll by, Triad (submarine), 59 193–4n.194; battleships in, 9, 16; ‘Tribal’ class destroyers, 14, 19, 41, 45, collisions of ships in, 118; 53, 114 destroyers of, 15, 16; in Iceland, Trinidad (light cruiser), 114, 117, 106, 185n.147; at outset of 118–19 World War II, 26; and , Truant (submarine), 59 27, 133, 135; ships from, in Trumpeter (aircraft carrier), 51 Royal Navy Home Fleet, 135, Tsingtao (depot ship), 52 137–8, 139; and SONAR, 15; TSR bi-planes, 12, 76 strength of, 16, 133, 188n.76, ‘Tungsten’ Operation, xiv, 144–7, 191n.157; Task Force 99 of, 120, 158, 160 125; and Washington Naval Turkey, 177n.8 Conference (1921–22), 3–4; in Tuscaloosa (heavy cruiser), 118, 120, World War II, xiii–xiv 121, 125, 135, 138 USSR, see Soviet Union Type XXI U-boats, 150 Vaagso Island, 114 U-16 submarine, 38 Val (dive-bomber), 111 U-27 submarine, 32 Valentines (tanks), 110 U-29 submarine, 32 Valiant (battleship), 9, 19, 47, 49, U-30 submarine, 32 50, 63, 113, 119, 136, 165n.21, U-33 submarine, 38 176n.84 U-39 submarine, 32 Vampire (destroyer), 119 U-47 submarine, 35–7, 39 Versailles Treaty, 2, 5, 164n.15 U-56 submarine, 39 Vian, Captain Phillip, 05, 45–6, U-64 submarine, 60 57, 102 U-134 submarine, 114 Victorious (aircraft carrier): aircraft on, U-456 submarine, 118 12, 89–90, 188n.76; and Arctic U-589 submarine, 126 convoys, 116, 118, 119, 121–2; U-boats, see German submarines and Bismarck hunt, 88, 89–90, (U-boats) 96–7, 99, 101; and convoy for Ultra decrypts, 30, 107, 136, 139, Gibraltar, 85–6, 89; in Pacific, 140, 154 135; in Pedestal Operation to United States: and Arctic convoys, Malta, 125, 133; and raid on 119, 120, 125; entrance of, into Petsamo and Kirkenes, 110–11, World War II, 113; and German 138; speed of, 12; and Tirpitz invasion of Soviet Union, 180n.5, raids and strikes, 136, 144; and 196n.21; Hitler’s declaration of Torch landings in North Africa, war against, 185n.147; 125, 128, 133 intelligence activities of, 112; Vigorous Operation, 120 lend-lease from, 12, 84, 100, 110; Virago (destroyer), 141 and neutral rights, 47–8; Voltaire, 184n.124 shipbuilding industry in, Von Mellenthin, General F. W., 191n.157; and Washington 179–80n.3 222 Index

Wainwright (destroyer), 120, 122 World War I: in, Wake Island, 124 xiii, 2, 19, 26, 51, 74, 93, 148; Wake-Walker, Rear Admiral W. F., 87, casualties in, 5; and Churchill, 88, 90, 92, 96–9, 105, 110–11, 157 59, 62, 105; Dreyer Table used Warburton-Lee, Captain, xiv, xv, during, 169n.29; German Navy 57–8, 131, 159 in, xv, 117, 189n.108; Lloyd Warspite (battleship), 9, 39, 42, George’s accomplishments 44, 45, 49, 59, 60, 132, 159, during, 156; magnetic mines in, 165n.21 38; Royal Navy in, xiii, 1–2, 25, Washington (battleship), 26, 84, 118, 134, 153, 196n.11 120, 121, 125, 153, 183n.87 World War II: British declaration of Washington Naval Conference war against Germany, 30; (1921–22), 2, 3–4, 9 casualties of, 37, 66, 85, 94, 95, Washington Naval Pact, 4, 83–4 103, 104, 114, 124–5, 130, 142, Wavell, Archibald Percival, 180n.3 149; Churchill on victory in, 114, Wells, Vice Admiral Lionel ‘Nutty’, 187n.24; German initiative 21, 63, 64 during, xv; German invasion of Weser Operation, 48, 50–1 and offensive in Soviet Union, West Virginia (battleship), 9 68, 84–5, 107, 110, 124, 127, Wheatland (escort destroyer), 126 180n.5; Home Fleet at beginning Whitworth, Rear Admiral ‘Jock’: of, 19–34; losses of merchant assessment of, 159; and tonnage during, 155, 160; naval blockade, 86; as commander of battles of, xiii–xiv, xv; Phony War Battlecruiser Squadron (BCS), 21, during, 45, 48; prisoners of war 76, 86; and encounter with during, 45–6, 114, 137; as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, xv, two-front war, 162; United States 159; and Norwegian Campaign entry into, 113; see also Royal (1940), xiv, 50, 51, 54, 55, 57–60; Navy Home Fleet; and specific at Second Battle of Narvik, xiv, battles 60, 159 Wichita (heavy cruiser), 118, 120, X-craft, 136–7, 154, 160 121, 125 Wildcat fighters, 138, 144 Yamato (battleship), 105, 165n.21 Wilfred plan, 48, 49, 50, 54, 67 York (heavy cruiser), 49 Wilhelm Heidkamp (destroyer), 58 ‘Yorktown’ class aircraft carriers, 12 Wilson, Admiral Sir Arthur, 28 Yugoslavia, 83, 176n.1 Wilton (escort destroyer), 126 Wireless telegraphy, 28 Z26 (destroyer), 117 Woodman, Richard, 127 Zahn, Lt Commander, 39 Workshop Operation, 157 Zulu (destroyer), 102