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Home , Battlecruiser, Fleet Problem, HMS Furious (47), Military aviation, Naval aviation, USS Langley (CVL-27)

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Crashed VE–7 on USS Langley, 1925.

Military Innovation

and Carrier — Naval Historical Center An Analysis

USS Langley leading task in the , 1944. Naval Historical Center

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By JAN M. VAN TOL interesting things at sea. While proponents of air- craft as independent strike weapons were a mi- he first part of this article, which ap- nority, aviators were already well accepted by the peared in the last issue of JFQ, charted commanding officers of . Flying was not re- the historical development of British garded as a bad tour, though it is noteworthy that and American carrier aviation, with most aviators continued to do traditional - T board tours. particular emphasis on the complex interplay of technological, operational, and organi- zational factors. The second part treats legislation requiring commanding officers of key questions on how this revolution succeeded in the U.S. and was carriers to be aviators created career paths rather less successful in the and what that implies for innovation. Risk was further reduced by establishing an Among questions considered are: institutional home for champions and a venue ■ How quickly did those who grasped the vision for experimenting with new capabilities and con- move from a vague to a clearly-defined vision? How cepts of operation. This led to a viable career path quickly did change take place? that kept officers employed when their few years ■ Which mattered more to making progress, indi- of flying ended. (There were inevitably too many viduals or groups? pilots for the available senior billets. There was ■ What were the barriers to change and how were concern over the future of aviators who were not they overcome? selected to be commanders or executive officers.) ■ Did change depend on having a particular The establishment of the enemy? in 1921 and the legislation passed in 1925 requir- ■ How important was competition? ing commanding officers of carriers, sea- ■ How important was a consciousness of the new concept’s potential? plane tenders, and naval air stations to be avia- tors created career paths. The British case was simpler. If one wished to fly during the he joined the Royal where advancement was based on belief in the strategic . Maritime flyers were not usually on a fast track. Even after reestablishment of a , aviation duty was something separate from principal shipboard duties. In short, in the Royal Navy there were better ways to the top than through aviation. Bureaucratic factors, while perhaps necessary, were not by themselves sufficient to ensure the fu- ture of aviation. On personal and intellectual levels in the 1920s, there was great enthusiasm over technology, particularly in the field of aviation. Prominent in the accounts of this period was the sense of adventure among those who wanted to Naval Historical Center fly. The newspapers were filled with stories of barn- Mustin (fourth from storming and aviation firsts. Together with images right) at Pensacola, Then and Now of aviators as the only glamorous warriors of World 1914. War I, this inevitably made flyers an elite group in What was it like to be a junior officer follow- the eyes of the public. ing I? An aviator? A senior naval offi- There was professional excitement as well. cer vis-à-vis a carrier aviator? Most junior officers The debate over the role of generated by who sought naval careers considered which spe- General , the media, and others was cializations were best for advancement. Many of- prolonged and serious if raucous. Many of the ficers wanted to minimize professional risk. propositions about airpower were prima facie not Perceptions of present and future relevance trivial, including questions about the future via- minimized that risk. In the early 1920s, there was bility of . Other events such as the ample evidence that aircraft could do militarily mass production of automobiles and expansion of electricity, if not directly relevant to aviation, Commander Jan M. van Tol, USN, is commanding officer of USS O’Brien further stimulated interest in technical solutions and formerly served in the Office of Net Assessment within the Office and applications. All this suggested in the early of the Secretary of Defense. 1920s that had a future of its own.

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Flying-off platform on turret of USS Arizona, 1921. Naval Historical Center Whiting (third from left), 1918. Naval Historical Center

They knew they would not participate in the next paradigm so they had less incentive to get in- volved. Moreover, having done well in compari- son to their peers, seeing the paradigm under which they served slowly becoming less relevant was hard to accept on a personal level and may have led to a certain skepticism. But though they continued to serve, they still influenced fellow of- ficers and the flags under whom they worked and were a source of resistance to change. Then there are those who continued to serve as senior captains or flag officers. They had to Naval Historical Center make decisions on the future of the service and Japanese nature of combat. They faced a choice between Tsugaru being bombed continuing with proven systems and methods or in experimental attack What was it like to be a senior officer then, shifting resources to new concepts which might (photo obtained by with responsibility for evaluating new concepts have been promising but difficult to realize. The Billy Mitchell during foreign inspection, that might supplant or change the paradigm in latter involved both opportunity cost and risk of 1924). which he had served? There would appear to be failure. Such choices would seem particularly dif- two types of senior officers whose views mattered ficult in a time of budgetary constraint. One finds in different ways. The first were those serving in this kind of conundrum facing the General Board key billets but who would not reach flag rank. in the 1920s and 1930s as it weighed the value of battleships versus carrier aviation. So what en- abled senior officers to make the choices they did about naval aviation in the 1920s?

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Army “bombing” USS Alabama with white phosphorus, 1921. Naval Historical Center HMS Furious after conversion from light . Naval Historical Center

The intellectual tradition of relying on an rank because they knew the answers. In short, experimentalist approach to tactics and technol- young and innovative would-be naval aviators ogy allowed for evaluating evidence in making had little reason for optimism regarding receptiv- operational and technical judgments. By implica- ity to their ideas. tion, the feeling that serious ideas ought to get a hearing undoubtedly encouraged would-be inno- Ideas for Carriers vators. As the potential of aviation increased, se- Aircraft potential for spotting for battleships nior officers gave it their support. was noted very early by Britain and America. It The Royal Navy, by contrast, lacked an addressed how to shoot accurately when spotting equivalent intellectual tradition. The British only was no longer possible from the shooting ship established a naval staff shortly before the war (using other ships has the drawback of exposing and then at the insistence of civilian leaders. Staff them to enemy fire). The value of scouting from colleges in Britain did not have the standing of the air was underlined by its absence at Jutland the during that period, nor and presence () on subsequent occasions were assignments to them desirable, whereas which enabled the German fleet to avoid battle many future American flag officers attended and with the Royal Navy. served on the staff at Newport. The Royal Navy was more hierarchical, with the putative pre- sumption being that flag officers reached that

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Vought VE-7 landing on board USS Langley. Naval Historical Center Naval Historical Center USS Langley, 1923.

Other uses for aircraft were driven by specific could win engagements in minutes. He started tactical problems. Rifles then machine guns were with the idea of light aircraft carried and mounted in friendly aircraft to stop enemy air- launched from battleships, then moved to craft from doing reconnaissance in 1914. Air- launching and recovering them with a special air- dropped torpedoes were used to reach anchored craft-carrying ship. Sometime before 1917 he ad- enemy ships when the were blocked vocated the use of aircraft to attack in support of to friendly ships in 1915. Zeppelins and friendly battleships. It is not clear why he made found the enemy at sea in 1916. Sub- this leap, but he discussed such ideas with W.S. marine and bases were bombed a year Sims and others. After war broke out Mustin re- later. Targets too distant for land-based forces sponded to an appeal by the Secretary of the were attacked from the sea in 1918. All these Navy for war-winning ideas by suggesting - ideas were tried in combat. ing of land targets from sea-based platforms. This Henry Mustin came and a similar proposal by Lieutenant Ken Whit- up with novel ideas for employing aircraft on his ing, assigned to Pensacola during Mustin’s tenure, own. While commanding the school at were endorsed by British and American planners Pensacola (1915–17), he prepared a lecture on the in early 1918. “naval .” As a gunnery expert with service on battleships, he knew that devastating long- range gunfire, effectively controlled from aircraft,

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the salutary effect of highlighting the question of the proper role of naval aviation. In 1925, Admiral Moffett reassigned Captain Reeves, then head of the tactics department at Newport, as commanding officer of the experi- mental carrier USS Langley to test his ideas, many of which stemmed from games. Reeves, having determined through wargaming that the number of aircraft aloft was the key measure of striking power, solved practical problems associated with launching and landing more planes. As a result, USS Langley was deemed an operational unit by 1926. The presence of USS Lexington and USS Saratoga in fleet problems in 1929–31 suggested their utility and acceptance in a variety of roles, although not as independent strike weapons. However, the mature concept envisioned car- riers as an independent strike force against sea and Naval Historical Center land targets and was only achieved in 1944 after Moffett (second years of trial and error. Interestingly, after the fleet from left), 1922. problems noted above, little work was done on In sum, many innovations appeared to be at- employing larger numbers of carriers or what their tempts to solve specific problems. There seems to role would be vis-à-vis the fleet. Because of treaty have been a lot less of “Given technology X, what constraints, there were not enough carriers for ex- militarily useful things might we do with it?” perimentation. But there is also no record of work/gaming at Newport in the 1930s on such Grasping the Vision matters. This is puzzling given that Reeves became How quickly did those who grasped the con- Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, in the mid-1930s cept arrive at a clearly-defined vision? In the U.S. and was presumably in a position to have such Navy, Mustin was describing carrier aircraft as simulation and exercising done. landstrike and seastrike forces in 1915–17. By the In the British case, the vision died early early 1920s, Newport was gaming specific tactical when those naval aviators who experimented questions, getting at physical realities and con- with operations entailed in carrier strike warfare, straints. The president of albeit in primitive form, were transferred en because of treaty constraints, the Naval War College, Ad- masse to the where success de- miral Sims, stressed the manded adherence to . there were not enough connection between gam- Those who remained in the navy were by all carriers for experimentation ing rules and actual data. accounts also “air-minded.” However, their con- This was facilitated through cept was wedded to bringing about battle with an regular correspondence enemy fleet, then combining air spotters with ad- among faculty members and aviators and, fol- vanced long-range gunnery to kill ships. Based on lowing its establishment in 1921, the Bureau of wartime experience it was clear what aircraft were Aeronautics. expected to do, and much of British naval avia- The games suggested things like the pulsed tion was dedicated to those ends. The clarity of nature of carrier striking power, the importance that vision was such that there was little room to of many aircraft in the air, the need to strike first, question it. The British experience suggests that and carrier air hitting an enemy carrier as the overconfidence in operational concepts can blind leading objective. Game outcomes had concrete an organization to better alternatives. results. By 1923 there were explicit connections between gamed ideas and design of both fleet ex- Individuals or Groups? ercises and . Similarly, lessons from the The relationships between individuals in exercises and technical information on ships and their institutional settings is vital. The presidency aircraft were fed into game design and rules. of the Naval War College, the post of chief of the Outside the Navy, political pressures gener- Bureau of Aeronautics, and the commodore’s role ated by airpower purists such as Billy Mitchell as head of fleet aviation squadrons is what gave and his congressional supporters pushed the Sims, Moffett, and Reeves an arena to interact Navy to put ideas into at-sea operational capabili- ties by the mid-1920s. The prolonged and highly public versus airplane controversy had

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van Tol Naval Historical Center Bomber landing on USS Lexington during fleet problem, 1929. professionally. By contrast the removal of the air- An individual may matter in other ways. The craft component of naval aviation from direct longevity of a senior officer in a key billet some- Royal Navy control in 1919 precluded appropri- times appeared crucial. Moffett remained the ate players from conducting planning and design- chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics from 1921 ing experiments and exercises essential to devel- until his death in 1933. His incumbency gave oping the carrier concept. But there may be more him credibility with individuals and organiza- to it. It is rather like the dispute between the tions closely involved with developing naval avi- “great man” and “impersonal forces” schools of ation, such as the General Board, Congress, and history. Both individuals and organizations are senior Navy leaders. This also enabled him to pro- crucial at different times and in different ways. tect innovators such as Reeves from interference The creative spark necessarily comes from in- and influence the advancement of junior officers. dividuals or from interactions between them. It may have saved good ideas from being aborted Mustin appeared to be the first officer to see carri- in case of early failure. While such longevity has ers as strike weapons. He actively discussed it risks, its virtual absence today because of rapid with officers who later occupied positions where billet changes may contribute to a lack of com- such ideas could be explored. The institutional mitment to programs, inability to take the long setting mattered. This suggests that officers as- view, and incapacity to build credibility for the signed to influential positions should be per- bureaucratic struggle to get visions implemented. ceived as receptive to innovative people. Institutions played significant roles as well, particularly in seeing to the incremental details vital to translating ideas into practical reality. Or- ganizations like the Bureau of Aeronautics and

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now wore air force blue. It had no organizational mechanisms for relating technical choices with operational capabilities, a striking failure that ac- counts for much of the stunted development. Neither did it have, in the absence of acceptable platforms and aircraft, institutional mechanisms to examine alternative concepts as did the Naval War College. Overcoming Barriers Various barriers faced the U.S. Navy. Those confronted by Britain are of interest as well, if only to contrast the effect of America having avoided them, not always by intention. Budgetary constraints. While significant, the effect of budgetary constraints was indirect. Cer- tainly there were not funds for large numbers of expensive platforms to experiment with, but many would-be experiments could be primitively Naval Historical Center simulated through iterative gaming. The Bureau T4M–1 of Aeronautics was established to control funding bomber on of which gave it the freedom to dedicate money to USS Lexington. the Naval War College were key. The role of the develop engine starters, , better en- latter was important in two ways. First, long be- gines, etc., which incrementally solved many of fore carriers and real aircraft emerged, innovators the small technical problems. This also meant like Mahan and Luce established intellectual rigor that such items were not hostage to yearly bud- at Newport which was maintained into the getary tradeoffs, ensuring continuity in develop- 1930s. There was a reliance on rules of evidence ment and easing a barrier to entry in contrast to with the proper questions asked, exercises done, many R&D efforts today. and results weighed which made it credible to ex- Possible effects of the absence of budgetary amine key questions with simulation in the constraints have been noted. Had the incipient ri- 1920s. Second, iterative gaming at the Naval War valry between the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy con- College provided the theoretical underpinnings tinued unconstrained by treaty, spending on bat- for tests by Reeves with early carriers, inputs into tleships might have crowded out spending for exercise and scenario design, and contributions to carriers and carrier aircraft. ship and aircraft design. In short, creative individ- Scarce funds ensured that Britain would be uals also needed the right sandbox to play in. stuck with carriers built before requirements for The role of the Bureau of Aeronautics in pro- sustained carrier operations were understood. The viding data for Naval War College simulations and Royal Air Force focus on strategic bombing, cou- a home for aviation and aviators was also a factor. pled with control of all aviation assets, slowed The bureau’s interaction with nonmilitary institu- British naval aviation development since aircraft tions was key. It provided financial support for in- acquisition was a zero-sum game. It precluded ex- dustry and initiated research in areas such as radial perimentation and may have lessened pressure to engines and served as a conduit for incorporating increase carrier aircraft capacity since the navy commercial advances to meet military needs, had little chance of getting more aircraft. The which was particularly critical as they outstripped Royal Air Force consistently opposed increasing military developments (like C4I today). carrier capacity for just that reason. The General Board played a significant role in Treaty constraints. Some have argued that the integrating technology and tactics. Through it, Washington naval treaties limited advances in voting on such issues as the future of aviation was carriers, particularly multi-carrier operations. But carried out in a community of professionals, not it appears that USS Langley, USS Lexington, and all aviators, with a shared sense of what mattered. USS Saratoga would not have been built faster Any large organization should have some mecha- without treaties. Yet key developmental work was nism through which new concepts which are done on them and was directly reflected in the proved worthwhile become institutionalized. design of the USS Essex class carriers. By the time Again, the British case is instructive for what more carriers became available in the late 1930s, was lacking. The Royal Navy had no senior cham- pions along the lines of Moffett, Sims, and Reeves since those who might have assumed such roles

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USS Saratoga. Naval Historical Center

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■ CARRIER AVIATION Naval Historical Center USS Ranger, circa 1930s. the treaties were no longer in force. There is no five small carriers of the unsatisfactory USS Ranger compelling evidence that more carriers would design that might have put the U.S. Navy in that have been built in the 1920s and 1930s absent position. In the late 1930s, the General Board was the agreements, especially given the political cli- aware of that problem regarding aircraft in a pe- mate against defense spending. riod of rapid technological progress and recom- What kind of carriers might the U.S. Navy mended against acquiring a large inventory. have bought had battle cruiser hulls not been Technical barriers. Even had the Royal Navy available for conversion? Lacking treaties, USS Lex- grasped the carrier strike vision, it is difficult to ington and USS Saratoga see how it would have overcome the technical were not shipkillers would have been com- obstacles, given the financial inability to rid itself pleted as battle . of the “wrong” ships and aircraft. Admiral Reeves and naval aircraft could not What kind of carriers solved a key technical problem for the Navy on- have carried them if they were America might have de- board USS Langley and thus paved the way for ac- signed then is hard to ceptance of carriers as fleet units. know, but Britain had sent The principal technical barrier to going be- the design of its first built-for-purpose carrier to yond that to the wider conception of carriers as the in late 1917, and one may won- an independent strike force was aircraft and ord- der if and why American designers would have de- nance performance. In the 1920s bombs were not parted significantly from the plans of the ac- shipkillers and naval aircraft could not have car- knowledged world leaders. ried them if they were. Torpedoes were ship- The Royal Navy, on the other hand, paid an killers, but it was almost suicidal to attack anti- immediate and lasting price for its four extant aircraft equipped ships given the flight profile carriers. Given the inability to replace them for required. Until aircraft and ordnance that could budgetary reasons, it was stuck with the physical kill ships were developed, it was difficult to sell limits built into them. Since that directly affected the mature carrier concept, which was one reason aircraft design, and in turn concepts of operation, battleships continued to have pride of place into the Royal Navy was effectively locked into learn- the 1940s. ing the wrong lessons from the wrong ships. The risk of being wrong. In the early 1920s the Sunk costs. The effect of sunk costs sticking General Board observed almost plaintively that Britain with the wrong ships has been noted. The United States did not face that problem; but the 1927 Taylor Board recommended acquisition of

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“it would be the height of unwisdom for any na- vis-à-vis promotion and assignments, may be a factor in tion possessing sea power to pin its faith and RMA-related progress.) change its practice upon mere theories as to the Competing organizations. The British and future development of new and untried American cases contrast sharply. The Royal Air weapons.” The burden of proof lies heavily on Force crimped naval aviation efforts from the those who propose change. The current way os- start by removing aircraft and naval aviators from tensibly works well; the new way may not be bet- the control of the Royal Navy. The fortunate fail- ter, and it may be worse. Moreover, a particular ure of corresponding efforts to establish a sepa- new way may not be the best alternative. And rate air service probably prevented similar dis- new ways often imply high costs. torted effects on U.S. and Japanese carrier The key to overcoming this barrier is data development. which demonstrates the practical superiority The impact of competing concepts must not (that is, lowers risks) of the new way. Initially, be overlooked. The Mitchell campaign forced such data must come from theoretical explo- naval aviation proponents to demonstrate their rations, simulation, and where possible testing case. Within naval aviation there was competition with extant systems. Incremental experimental with the carrier idea as well; land-based naval avi- gains reduce risk and make it reasonable to con- ation played a significant role in both the British tinue the process on an increasing scale until and American during World War II. their practical effect and superiority became insti- Political and military interaction. The relation- tutionally accepted. This was basically what the ship between political and military leadership dif- Naval War College-Bureau of Aeronautics-fleet fered greatly in Britain and America, particularly operations exchange achieved for carrier aviation access to political officials by military officers. in the 1920s. Since the Royal Air Force controlled all aircraft in Inability to experiment. Failing to consider al- Britain, the Royal Navy effectively could only pre- ternatives is a certain barrier to entry and was sent its views and requirements to an often hostile manifested in various ways by the Royal Navy Air Ministry. By contrast, the U.S. system afforded and U.S. Navy. Examples included: alternate ways of advancing ideas. Congress, by ■ Unwillingness to experiment, best characterized virtue of being outside the military but able to in- by “we already have the answers.” To an extent, the tervene decisively in its affairs (beyond the power Royal Navy as the leader in early carrier aviation was of the purse), could push ideas, even against sub- sometimes guilty of assuming that its way of operating stantial military opposition. The press also circu- was the correct one, its problems were faced by all com- lated ideas on various occasions during the 1920s petitors, etc. when Congress intervened substantively in carrier ■ No platforms. Arguably this was what precluded aviation development. While outside intervention developing multi-carrier operations before the outbreak of war. But there remains the key question of to what may add chaos, it may also prevent good ideas extent other means, such as simulation or analysis, can from being prematurely stifled. get around the need for actual platforms until further Costs. Change meant investing in both carri- down the conceptual road. It is conceivable that the ers and battleships. Aircraft and pre- support of senior officers discussed above could have, sented greater technological opportunities for and perhaps ought have, led to better ideas of what navies in the 1920s even as reduced tension multi-carrier operations would be like. The Royal Air meant reduced funding to develop alternatives. Force chokehold over naval aircraft prevented some ex- There was not money to buy enough carriers to perimental work that might have alerted the Royal show that battleships and were Navy earlier to problems it would encounter in 1940. about to be superseded. At the same time the evi- ■ No means by which to evaluate. The U.S. Navy was able to evaluate operational and tactical concepts dence of carrier superiority was not clear enough through an intellectual tradition among senior officers. for navies to gamble on not buying battleships The Royal Navy was unable to do the same in a rigorous and other forces. So America and invested manner. in both carriers and battleships. In Britain, the ■ Training realism. Moffett consciously accepted a need for carriers to support the battle force was high rate of peacetime damage to naval aircraft to push clear. Moreover, the limited carrier aircraft capac- the envelope. Similar approaches prevailed in the Luft- ity meant a greater number of carriers was re- waffe and Japanese navy in the 1930s. Both tolerated a quired—if not actually purchased. high level of training casualties and damage to see what Rapid technological progress rendered air- really worked. craft obsolete in the late 1930s and raised the ■ Error tolerance. To the extent reasonable error is not tolerated, the willingness to experiment is reduced. cost of change, which is why the General Board The counter to this is largely the open experimentalist in 1937 was against high production levels of “trial and error” approach so much in evidence at New- port in the 1920s. (Its relative absence today, certainly

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■ CARRIER AVIATION Naval Historical Center USS Lexington during fleet concentration off Maui, 1932. carrier aircraft. But this had to be considered The distinction between strategic opponent against the number of aircraft required to con- and technical rival is interesting. Is today a duct current operations, train new pilots, and potential strategic foe or Japan a technical rival? keep unit costs acceptable. Which stimulates more competition? Although crucial, there was no competition Competition and Change in the sense of directly playing off Britain or There is a distinction between an enemy and Japan (save in the latter case to describe the sand- a rival. Were the United States not forced to con- box). Rather, competition to develop commercial sider how to fight Japan in the Pacific, the need aviation played a notable role in to take aviation to sea might not have been so ap- and later in increasing production. While there parent. Royal Navy design considerations, even in was little spillover from the civil sector to the the post-treaty 1930s, were also affected by where Navy during the introduction of carrier aviation carriers would be used (such as armored flight in the 1920s, an active exchange occurred over decks to survive against land-based aircraft in the time. The National Advisory Committee for Aero- Mediterranean). However, it was rivalry with nautics promoted dual-use technology, including Britain in engineering and on the operational aerodynamic streamlining, supercharged piston level that helped drive early U.S. carrier develop- engines, and internally pressurized engines, as- ment. Indeed, so little was known of the specifics sisted by and Navy financial and engineer- of Japanese carrier aviation that “orange” avia- ing support. Because of restrictions imposed on tion was usually given the same characteristics as service contracting, the commercial aviation in- U.S. naval forces in wargames. dustry often led the Army and Navy in adopting new technology. (This is an interesting parallel with what appears to be the case today in such

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sectors as telecommunications, , and A last significant factor was accumulating a possibly satellites.) pool of junior officers who were enthusiastic over There was much less stimulative effect from the concept in its formative years—when its full British industry. It arguably showed in the lower potential could not be actually demonstrated be- quality of its aircraft. Perhaps the only top quality cause of technological limitations (such as weak British plane in 1940, the Spitfire, was more the ordnance and engines) and fiscal limitations (too product of an individual designer few platforms to experiment). They would be- than a solidly based industry. come senior leaders when better technology al- there was no clear enemy The effect of competing or- lowed full realization of the concept. and there were strong ganizations may warrant further indications of significant study, especially since so many According to Tom Hone, vision is twisting a conditions today resemble those familiar situation in one’s mind and seeing it in a technological changes of the 1920s. There was no clear new light. It requires a thorough understanding of enemy to plan against and there extant technology and ideas, their strengths and were strong indications of significant technologi- weaknesses, and their potential to solve problems. cal changes to come, major budget constraints, The way visionaries get visions may also affect and a bitter roles and missions debate brewing. what they do with them. Visionaries tend to fall While being conscious of change was essen- into two groups. The first is comprised of what tial, there was no particular way of achieving it. might be called the “unconstrained” visionaries The meaning of carrier aviation varied even who believe in their vision as an end in itself among naval aviators. In the U.S. Navy what al- (Mitchell). The second is more realistic—aimed lowed leading players with conflicting views to less at a visionary mission and more at a visionary cooperate was a shared commitment to deciding approach to fulfilling an existing mission (Reeves). rationally, on the basis of experimentation. By The vision that is eventually fulfilled may contrast the Royal Air Force, repository of all not be the one that starts the process. Along the post-1918 British aviation assets, did not have an way other players become interested and start to ethos of experimentation. It could not afford to participate in various ways, thereby changing the in that financially constrained environment since vision incrementally over time. There may be its whole existence depended on maintaining and competing versions of the vision, which in this selling its fixed vision of strategic bombing. case may be reflected by the competing visions of The lack of senior level involvement was diverse factions within the naval aviation com- striking in the Royal Navy. Without awareness at munity in the 1920s when not all aviators saw Naval Historical Center decisionmaking levels, new concepts may never large carriers as the proper vision. This is likely to take practical effect. That was the most pernicious happen with our vision of the emerging revolu- effect of Royal Air Force control over aviation. tion in military affairs. JFQ Whereas the experience of the Royal Navy during World War I convinced many senior American This article is directly based on a study entitled “The admirals to support aviation, no relevant audi- Introduction of Carrier Aviation into the U.S. Navy and ence of any size remained in the Royal Navy. the Royal Navy: Military-Technical Revolutions, Organi- Senior leaders extended consciousness to im- zations, and the Problem of Decision” by Thomas C. Hone, Mark D. Mandeles, and Norman Friedman, which portant external players. For example, Moffett was conducted for the Office of Net Assessment within urged prominent figures to talk to the President, the Office of the Secretary of Defense in July 1994. gained influence with members of Congress, and A book-length version of the original study will be appealed to the public through the press and sup- published by U.S. Naval Institute Press. port for popular films such as “Helldivers” (1931). This was in stark contrast to the situation in Britain where senior officers could not approach senior civilian officials and so had less opportu- nity to present their case. The Naval War College played an important role in two ways. First, the Newport games con- vinced fairly senior officers like Reeves of the po- tential of carrier aviation, thus making allies in the Navy. Second, games posed relevant questions and provided data, thereby reducing the risk of embracing a new concept.

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