Naval War College Review Volume 56 Article 18 Number 2 Spring

2003 Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941 Robert Cressman

Mark R. Peattie

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Recommended Citation Cressman, Robert and Peattie, Mark R. (2003) "Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941," Naval War College Review: Vol. 56 : No. 2 , Article 18. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss2/18

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essay, Jeffrey Record points out that those many historians have also been in a hall who emphasize the failures of civilian of mirrors, preoccupied with the Amer- policy makers in Washington ignore both ican side of the struggle. It is the great the achievements of Vietnamese revolu- strength of this volume that, at least in tionaries and “the defective professional part, it suggests the insights that can be U.S. military performance in Vietnam gained by moving beyond the American within the political limitations imposed perspective. on the use of force.” If politicians were CHARLES E. NEU stabbing the military in the back, “the Brown University military also was shooting itself in the foot.” He concludes that it is unlikely that the United States could have done more than increase the price of an en-

emy victory. John Prados analyzes the Peattie, Mark R. Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese uses of intelligence by both sides, em- Naval Air Power, 1909–1941. Annapolis, Md.: Na- phasizing the difficulties of the Ameri- val Institute Press, 2002. 392pp. $36.95 cans and South Vietnamese in This work compellingly describes how collecting accurate information, and Japanese naval aviation, both land and the extent of North Vietnamese and carrier based—like that of its principal Vietcong penetration of the Saigon adversary in the Pacific War, the United government and army. Gilbert chal- States—grew to maturity through trial lenges the views of Harry Summers, and error. Its maturation period ex- Jr., and William E. Colby, both of tended from the earliest days of pow- whom, he believes, fail to understand ered flight through the bloody crucible that America in Vietnam was betrayed of war with China. The story of U.S. na- “by its own collective limited vision of val aviation during this time is a famil- the nature of the war and the require- iar one, but that of the Japanese is less ments of victory.” Andrew Rotter ex- so, due to the formidable barrier posed amines the respective economic by language. As more scholars equip cultures of America and North Vietnam themselves with the tools necessary to that shaped each side’s response to the mine riches from the sources and publi- war, while Marilyn Young explores the cations of a former enemy, however, impact of the American peace movement, the other side of the story is becoming suggesting that whatever its effect on the known. One such diligent student of length of the conflict, widespread protests Japanese naval history is Mark R. “increased the price to the government of Peattie, familiar as the coauthor (with continued prosecution of the war.” David C. Evans) of the highly praised In a thoughtful reflection on these es- Kaigun: Tactics and Technology in the says, Lloyd Gardner writes that “the re- Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941 ality of Vietnam was as elusive to (Naval Institute Press, 1997). Holder of American policymakers as the enemy a doctorate in modern Japanese history forces were to the men they sent to this from Princeton University and author, hall of mirrors. They saw only their coauthor, or editor of seven other own reflections, multiplied over and works, Peattie brings unique qualifica- over.” Like policy makers at the time, tions to the daunting task.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003 1 158 NAVAL WAR COLLEGENaval War REVIEW College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 2, Art. 18

Sunburst’s meat lies in seven chapters concludes that the “catastrophic col- that discuss the early development of lapse” of Japanese naval air power lay in Japanese naval aviation (1909–21), Jap- the Imperial Navy’s failure “to antici- anese naval aircraft and the tactics de- pate the kind of air combat it would be veloped for their employment (1920– obliged to wage,” its failure “to make 36), the design and construction of Jap- the right kinds of decisions” to cope anese aircraft carriers and formulation with the realities of a “new kind of air of doctrine for their employment war,” and, importantly, “the inability of (1920–41), the Japanese aircraft indus- Japanese industry and technology to try and the design and construction of support Japanese naval aviation against aircraft (1937–41), and Japanese naval the emerging numerical and qualitative aviation, both land and carrier based superiority of American air power.” In during the undeclared war with China that connection, this reviewer was par- (1937–41). Paralleling the wartime ex- ticularly pleased with how Peattie dis- perience is a chapter on the develop- poses of the most common of persistent ment of Japanese naval air power in Midway myths, that the battle resulted projecting the empire’s power as it pre- in the catastrophic loss of aircrew. pared for the Pacific conflict. The final While heavy, the loss of pilots and ob- chapter, “Descending the Flame,” be- servers by no means equaled the loss of gins with the attack on Pearl Harbor the “trained maintenance personnel,” and with the destruction, at sea and un- invaluable to maintain modern naval der way, of the British battleship HMS aircraft, who went down with their Prince of Wales and battle cruiser HMS ships. “Similarly,” he contends, “the Repulse. It ends with the battle of the loss of skilled ground crews, often Philippine Sea in June 1944, after which abandoned to their fates when the navy “the Japanese Navy never again launched evacuated remaining aircrews from is- a significant effort to contest the hege- lands under siege, substantially weak- mony of the skies over the Pacific.” ened the land-based air groups.” Augmenting the text are nine appendi- “In the end,” Peattie concludes, “the ces: biographical sketches of those men- Japanese naval air service was outpro- tioned in the text; a glossary of naval duced, outorganized, outmanned, and aviation terms; the generic organization outfought.” Yet in the ashes of defeat, of Japanese naval aviation; naval aviation however, “the precision, skill, and . . . ships (carriers, seaplane carriers, and the technical mastery” with which the Japa- like); naval air bases and air groups; prin- nese crafted the Zero fighter “gave wings cipal naval aircraft; aircraft designation to the phoenix of postwar Japanese tech- systems; principal engines; and a descrip- nology.” Students of the Pacific War will tion of the “turning-in” maneuver. A find Sunburst (based on an impressive common thread found in the graphics array of Japanese sources, including the that appears throughout the text is the official war history volumes and a variety superb work of Jon Parschall, who ren- of book or article-length studies) invalu- ders tactical maneuvers, ordnance, air- able for its insights on an important craft, and ships with equal facility. subject.

Sunburst, which Peattie affectionately ROBERT CRESSMAN dedicates to his former coauthor, Naval Historical Center https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss2/18 2