THE CAPITAL SHIP PROGRAM IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY, 1934-1945 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Malcolm Muir, Jr. ***** The Ohio State University 1976 Reading Committee: Approved By Professor Allan R. Millett Professor Harry L. Coles Adviser Professor Marvin R. Zahniser Department of History ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In reviewing the course of this project, it is sur­ prising to realize how many people have had a hand in it. The genesis of the paper can be traced to my father who gave me, along with so much else, an abiding interest in maritime matters and especially in the great ships. More immediately I owe much of the basic outline of this paper to my advisor. Professor Allan R. Millett of the Depart­ ment of History, The Ohio State University, who kept the project in focus through prompt and thorough editing. I would like to thank Professors Harry L. Coles and Marvin Zahniser for reading the manuscript. In gathering materials, I received aid from a great number of people, particularly the staffs of the Naval His­ torical Center, the National Archives (including both the main and the Suitland branches), the Library of Congress Manuscript Division, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the Naval War College Archives, and The Ohio State Univ­ ersity Library. I especially appreciated the kindness of such people as Ms. Mae C. Seaton of the Naval Historical Center, Dr. Gibson B. Smith of the National Archives, and Dr. Anthony Nicolosi of the Naval War College. Admirals Frank L. Pinney and Edwin B. Hooper, among other officers, shared some of their expertise in battleships with me. ii A number of people provided me with logistic support. Mike West of the House Armed Services Sub-Committee of­ fered a warm welcome to Washington. The Mennonite Volun­ tary Service Center gave me shelter and companionship there for seven weeks. Mr. and Mrs. Steve Layton of Fair­ field, Connecticut and Mr. and Mrs. T.JR. Burrell III of Westport, Massachusetts provided hospitality in New England, My wife's parents, Mr. and Mrs. John D. Thornton, donated invaluable financial and moral support, as did my mother. Ultimately, the backing of my wife Carol and of ny two sons, Thornton and Thomas, made this work possible. Without their understanding and forbearance, this paper quite simply would never have been finished. i n VITA April 24, 1943 Born— Williamsport, Pa. 1965 B.A.— Emory University, Atlanta, Ga. 1966 M.A.— Florida State University, Tallahasse, Fla. 1967-1972 Instructor and Assistant Professor of History, Middle Georgia College, Cochran, Ga. 1972-1976 Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State Uni­ versity, Columbus, Ohio FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field; Military History American Military History, Professor Allan R. Millett United States since 1933, Professor Harry L. Coles Twentieth Century Europe, Professor Carl Boyd Byzantine Empire, Professor Timothy E. Gregory IV TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................... Ü VITA................................................ iv INTRODUCTION ...................................... 1 Chapter 1 The Backbone of the N a v y ........ 8 Chapter 2 Planning for Renewed Construction. 47 Chapter 3 The North Carolina Class .............. 88 Chapter 4 Battleships for IVo O c e a n s ..... 141 Chapter 5 Capital Ships under Attack: 1942 .... 175 Chapter 6 New Missions.................... 198 Chapter 7 The Antiaircraft Record . 231 Chapter 8 Atlantic Operations .................. 264 Chapter 9 Surface Action in the South Pacific. 285 Chapter 10 Missed Chances: 1944............ 309 BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................ 336 "Until I see that other nations have ceased to build line-of-battle ships, they are not yet an an­ tiquated prejudice." — Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, ca. 1855 VI Tune: "I'm a ramblin' wreck from Georgia Tech" (Chorus ) It's a comfortable way to fight the war. In the good ship Iowa; The food is always tasty, Twice a month we draw our pay; We never get in action, every night we hit the hay, It's a comfortable way to fight the war, In a good ship Iowa. 1. We sail the broad Pacific seas. And never sight the foe; The birdmen do the fighting. They're always on the go; Marines land on the islands and the Army steals the show, The Iowa just steams along and never strikes a blow. (Chorus) 2. The food supplies are rationed. Back in the U.S.A.; The scotch is bad, gin can't be had, •'- Unless you want to pay; The transportation problem is terrific, so they say, We're glad we're here and not back there, we like it out this way. (Chorus) 3. At Truk we steamed at 30 knots To catch the crippled ships; Torpedoes, bombs and bullets. Were thrown at us by the Nips; "Don't waste your ammunition", the Force Commander cried, The cruiser boys will do the job, You're just here for the ride". (Chorus) 4. We've been in all the battles. Since the start of forty-four; Our campaign bars are filled with stars. For victories galore; The Nips come out to meet us, but they know we're pretty hot. So when we appear, they run away, we never fire a shot. (Chorus) by Frank L. Pinney, Chief Gunnery Officer, USS Iowa, 1944-45 VIX INTRODUCTION From the days of the Spanish Armada, the big gun and its carrier, the ship of the line and later the battleship, had been the ultimate arbiter of sea warfare. The size and complexity of these vessels made them necessarily ex­ pensive; as a result, some nations attempted to buy sea power cheapily through technological innovation. Some of these challenges to the battleship, such as Jefferson's gunboat navy, were frivolous. Others, such as torpedo- firing destroyers and submarines, posed a more real threat at the beginning of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, the battleship managed to weather these storms and emerged from World War I as the "backbone of the fleet" in the eyes of most naval experts. The rapidly developing airplane proved more difficult to manage. The controversial sinking of the Ostfriesland by General William Mitchell's bombers in 1921 unsettled public faith in the capital ship, although big ship ad­ vocates stressed the inconclusive nature of the test. Consequently, the debate over sea control through the air­ plane or big gun continued unabated during the 1920's and early 1930's. But by 1934, the battleship was in a peculiar position. Its development had been arrested since 1921 as a result of the Washington Naval Conference, while 1 2 the airplane had greatly improved in capability. In an event unparalleled in military history, the evolution of one weapon had been artificially suspended while others had gone on apace. As a result, all American battleships in 1934 were of First World War vintage, and the question of the re­ placement of the oldest of these vessels was a pressing one in light of the threatening international situation. The Navy was facing what would later be known as "block obsolescence," and the latest naval arms limitations pact, the London Conference of 1930, was due to expire on December 31, 1936. However, the replacement of the outdated ships by new construction required great expenditures and a heavy drain on naval construction facilities. Although Congress might be increasingly generous with money as the 1930's drew to a close, the rejuvenation of atrophied armaments plants would prove a difficult task. An even more fundamental problem facing naval planners was the extent to which rearmament should be devoted to the air­ craft carrier and its untied main weapon, the airplane. In fact, there was little debate on the question. The principal policy-making organ of the navy— the General Board— was of practically one voice that the battleship was the ultimate weapon of sea control, and this belief was echoed by the top admirals in the fleet. 3 The senior line officers' opinion was seconded by the civilian leadership of the Navy Department and by Presi­ dent Franklin Roosevelt, a chief executive who took a close interest in naval affairs. Some authorities also pointed to useful secondary roles for the battleships, although purists objected to violating the integrity of the battle line. The continued dependence on the battleship has been severely criticized with the advantage of hindsight, even by many sympathetic to the navy. Yet in the light of the foreign building programs of the time, it is hard to fault the planners. Not a single fleet was putting its trust in aircraft carriers. In fact, America's most probable enemies seemed notably unenthusiastic about carrier con­ struction. The Japanese had pushed for their abolition in 1935 and German and Italian programs emphasized trad­ itional capital ships, as did the announced plans of the British and French. In addition, the Soviets were soon pressing for American technical assistance in starting a modern capital ship program of their own. Thus, it would seem only basic prudence that Roose­ velt should have pushed secret preparations for the resumption of battleship construction as soon as the treaties expired. Unhappily, the dead hand of treaty restrictions placed severe constraints on the design of the new ships. Displacement was limited to 35,000 tons. The General Board was therefore faced with a difficult 4 choice: should the new battleships follow the tradition­ al American practice of emphasizing protection and gun- power over speed or should an attempt be made to match the new foreign ships, some known to be designed for thirty knots or better? The question was regarded as of such strategic and tactical importance that a secret advisory panel of civilian experts was established to review the deliberations of the General Board.