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EBUPT180342.Pdf GERMAN IDEALISM German Idealism is one of the most important movements in the history of philosophy. It is also increasingly acknowledged to contain the seeds of many current philosophical issues and debates. This outstanding collection of spe- cially commissioned chapters examines German idealism from several angles and assesses the renewed interest in the subject from a wide range of fields. Including discussions of the key representatives of German idealism such as Kant, Fichte and Hegel, it is structured in clear sections dealing with: metaphysics the legacy of Hegel’s philosophy Brandom and Hegel recognition and agency autonomy and nature the philosophy of German romanticism Amongst other important topics, German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives addresses the debates surrounding the metaphysical and epistemological legacy of German idealism; its importance for understanding recent debates in moral and political thought; its appropriation in recent theories of language and the relationship between mind and world; and how German idealism affected sub- sequent movements such as romanticism, pragmatism, and critical theory. Contributors: Frederick Beiser, Jay Bernstein, Andrew Bowie, Richard Eldridge, Manfred Frank, Paul Franks, Sebastian Gardner, Espen Hammer, Stephen Houlgate, Terry Pinkard, Robert Pippin, Paul Redding, Fred Rush, Robert Stern. Espen Hammer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oslo and a Reader in Philosophy at the University of Essex. He is the author of Adorno and the Political (Routledge, 2006). GERMAN IDEALISM Contemporary Perspectives Edited by Espen Hammer First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Milton Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” # 2007 Espen Hammer for selection and editorial matter; individual contributors their contributions All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-03083-4 Master e-book ISBN ISBN10: 0-415-37304-2 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-415-37305-0 (pbk) ISBN10: 0-203-03083-4 (ebk) ISBN 13: 978-0-415-37304-3 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-415-37305-0 (pbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-203-03083-7 (ebk) CONTENTS Contributors vii Acknowledgements x Introduction 1 Part I German Idealism, Naturalism and Metaphysics 17 1 The Limits of Naturalism and the Metaphysics of German Idealism 19 SEBASTIAN GARDNER 2 From Quine to Hegel: Naturalism, Anti-Realism, and Maimon’s Question Quid Facti 50 PAUL FRANKS 3 Dark Days: Anglophone Scholarship Since the 1960s 70 FREDERICK BEISER Part II The Legacy of Hegel’s Philosophy 91 4 Hegelians – Young and Younger 93 FRED RUSH 5 Habermas and the Kant–Hegel Contrast 113 ESPEN HAMMER Part III Brandom and Hegel 135 6 Hegel and Brandom on Norms, Concepts and Logical Categories 137 STEPHEN HOULGATE v CONTENTS 7 Brandom’s Hegel 153 ROBERT PIPPIN Part IV Recognition and Agency 181 8 Recognition and Embodiment (Fichte’s Materialism) 183 J.M. BERNSTEIN 9 Liberal Rights and Liberal Individualism Without Liberalism: Agency and Recognition 206 TERRY PINKARD 10 Hegel, Fichte and the Pragmatic Contexts of Moral Judgement 225 PAUL REDDING Part V Autonomy and Nature 243 11 Freedom, Self-Legislation and Morality in Kant and Hegel: Constructivist vs. Realist Accounts 245 ROBERT STERN 12 From Epistemology to Aesthetics 267 RICHARD ELDRIDGE Part VI From Epistemology to Art: The Philosophy of German Romanticism 289 13 Philosophy as ‘Infinite Approximation.’ Thoughts arising out of the ‘Constellation’ of Early German Romanticism 291 MANFRED FRANK 14 German Idealism’s Contested Heritage 309 ANDREW BOWIE Index 331 vi CONTRIBUTORS Frederick C. Beiser is Professor of Philosophy at Syracuse University. He is the author of The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (1987); Enlightenment, Revolution, Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German Poli- tical Thought (1992); German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781–1801 (2002); The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanticism (2003); Schiller as Philosopher: A Re-Examination (2005); and Hegel (2005). He is also the editor of The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. J.M. Bernstein is University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research. Among his works are: The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno (1992); Recovering Ethical Life: Ju¨rgen Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory (1995); Adorno: Disen- chantment and Ethics (2001); and Against Voluptuous Bodies: Late Modernism and the Idea of Painting (2006). He is also the editor of Classical and Romantic German Aesthetics in the Cambridge History of Philosophy series. Andrew Bowie is Professor of Philosophy and German at Royal Holloway, University of London. His books include Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche (1990); Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduction (1993); From Romanticism to Critical Theory. The Philosophy of German Literary Theory (1997); and Introduction to German Philosophy: From Kant to Habermas (2003). His book, Music, Philosophy, and Modernity, will be published by Cambridge University Press. Richard Eldridge is Charles and Harriett Cox McDowell Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Swarthmore College. He is the author of On Moral Person- hood: Philosophy, Literature, Criticism, and Self-Understanding (1989); Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism (1997); The Per- sistence of Romanticism: Essays in Philosophy and Literature (2001); and An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art (2003). He is also the editor of Stanley Cavell (2003). Manfred Frank is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tu¨bingen. He is the author of numerous books, among them Das Individuelle Allgemeine. vii CONTRIBUTORS Textstrukturierung und -interpretation nach Schleiermacher (1977); Was ist Neostrukturalismus? (1983); Die Grenzen der Versta¨ndigung. Ein Geisterge- spra¨ch zwischen Lyotard und Habermas (1988); and Selbstgefu¨hl: Eine historisch- systematische Erkundung (2002). Paul Franks is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He is the author of several articles on Kant and post-Kantian idealism as well as All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism (2005). He is also an Associate Editor of the Interna- tional Yearbook of German Idealism. Sebastian Gardner is Professor of Philosophy at the University College London. He is the author of Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis (1993) and Kant and the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ (1998). He is also the co- editor of Art and Morality (2002). His book, Fichte, Schelling and Early German Idealism, will be published by Routledge. Espen Hammer is Reader in Philosophy at the University of Essex and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oslo. He is the author of four books, including Stanley Cavell: Skepticism, Subjectivity, and the Ordinary (2002) and Adorno and the Political (2005), and the Norwegian translator of Immanuel Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft. He is also a co-editor of Stanley Cavell: Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewo¨hnlichen. He is completing a book on modernity and time-consciousness. Stephen Houlgate is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. His publications include Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics (1986); An Introduction to Hegel. Freedom, Truth and History (2005); and The Open- ing of Hegel’s Logic: From Being to Infinity (2006). Terry Pinkard is Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University. He is the author of Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (1994); Hegel: A Biography (2000); and German Philosophy 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism (2002). His translation of Hegel’s Pha¨nomenologie des Geistes will be pub- lished by Cambridge University Press. Robert Pippin is the Evelyn Stefansson Nef Distinguished Service Professor in the Committee on Social Thought, the Department of Philosophy, and the College at the University of Chicago. He is the author of several books, including Kant’s Theory of Form (1982); Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (1989); Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfactions of European High Culture (1991); Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations (1997); Henry James and Modern Moral Life (2000); and The Persistence of Subjectivity: On the Kantian Aftermath (2005). Paul Redding is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney. He is the author of Hegel’s Hermeneutics (1996); The Logic of Affect (1999); and Analytic viii CONTRIBUTORS Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought, to be published by Cambridge University Press. Fred Rush is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He has
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