The Emancipative Theory of Jürgen Habermas and Metaphysics
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Beaneyanalyticphil Historyphil.Pdf
King’s Research Portal DOI: 10.1007/978-1-137-30487-2 Document Version Peer reviewed version Link to publication record in King's Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Beaney, M. (2013). Analytic Philosophy and History of Philosophy: The Development of the Idea of Rational Reconstruction . In E. Reck (Ed.), The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy (1 ed., pp. 231–260). (History of Analytic Philosophy). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-30487-2 Citing this paper Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. •Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research. •You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain •You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. -
Rational Reconstruction and the Construction of an Interlocutor
Rational Reconstruction and the Construction of an Interlocutor The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Prescott-Couch, Alexander. 2015. Rational Reconstruction and the Construction of an Interlocutor. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:23845505 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN INTERLOCUTOR A dissertation presented by Alexander Prescott-Couch to The Harvard Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Philosophy Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts September 2015 ©2015 Alexander Prescott-Couch All rights reserved. DISSERTATION ADVISOR: NED HALL ALEXANDER PRESCOTT-COUCH RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN INTERLOCUTOR Abstract There has been much recent work in philosophy of science on idealization – the way inaccurate representations can be used to understand a target system. My dissertation concerns a particular sort of idealization that is familiar but often overlooked: rational reconstruction. Rational reconstructions are “cleaned-up” – more coherent and accurate – versions of an individual’s or a group’s attitudes. They are the kind of idealized model that facilitates a crucial aim of the interpretive sciences, the understanding of another’s point of view. I provide an account of rational reconstruction and argue that such an account can help us make sense of many intellectual projects in the humanities and the interpretive social sciences. -
Hegel's Apocrypha
Chapter 3 Hegel’s Apocrypha 1 A Rediscovery The term Jugendschriften—writings of youth, is used to refer to a series of texts and fragments produced during Hegel’s years as student and private tutor from the period 1793 to 1800 which he did not himself publish. In 1801 Hegel moved to Jena with the help of Schelling, published his first book, took his habilitation and began his academic career. The Jugendschriften were first published by Hermann Nohl in 1907.1 Nohl was a student of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), the advocate of the philosophy of life and of hermeneutics, who is also important as one of the founders of historicism. Dilthey himself held the view that a phi- losophy is best described in terms of the history of its development and hence that the biography of a philosopher is often the key to his philosophy. In 1905 he published a work with the title Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels—The history of the young Hegel,2 which was based on the documents in the Royal Prussian Library in Berlin that Nohl published two years later. Dilthey’s concern with Hegel’s early works was thoroughly determined by his own philosophy. For instance, he found that Hegel’s interest in the importance of biography to his- tory was comparable to his own. Hegel had written a Life of Jesus, which means that Hegel tried, just as Dilthey did in the history of philosophy, to consider Jesus Christ not as a dogmatic ‘object’ of theology, but historically, as a matter for historical investigation. -
Introduction Is the Relationship Between Philosophy and Empirical Science
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by NORA - Norwegian Open Research Archives Habermas’ method: Rational reconstruction Jørgen Pedersen Dissertation for the degree philosophiae doctor (PhD) at the University of Bergen 2011 Til Thale, Synne og Anne Scientific environment This four year PhD project has been funded by the Faculty of Humanities. It has been located at the Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities/ Senter for Vitenskapsteori (SVT) at the University of Bergen, which has provided the candidate with supervision and working facilities. Acknowledgments This PhD dissertation is the result of a collective effort where many of my friends and colleagues have contributed. I feel extremely privileged to have had so many supervisors who have given me excellent advice along the way. I want to thank my only formal supervisor, Cathrine Holst. Cathrine has the special gift of always finding the strong as well as the weak spots in a text. This gift, combined with her ability to suggest how to correct the weaknesses has been of great importance for my project. I also want to thank Cathrine for always being available for counselling, and for connecting me with many of my informal supervisors. I want to thank Anders Molander for suggesting the theme of rational reconstruction as a blind spot in the research literature on Habermas. This topic has offered me a great opportunity to explore the relationship between philosophical theory and empirical research, and thus enabled me to follow one of my research interests. Thank you also for good supervision along the way. -
Jürgen Habermas and the Third Reich Max Schiller Claremont Mckenna College
Claremont Colleges Scholarship @ Claremont CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship 2012 Jürgen Habermas and the Third Reich Max Schiller Claremont McKenna College Recommended Citation Schiller, Max, "Jürgen Habermas and the Third Reich" (2012). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 358. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/358 This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized administrator. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Introduction The formation and subsequent actions of the Nazi government left a devastating and indelible impact on Europe and the world. In the midst of general technological and social progress that has occurred in Europe since the Enlightenment, the Nazis represent one of the greatest social regressions that has occurred in the modern world. Despite the development of a generally more humanitarian and socially progressive conditions in the western world over the past several hundred years, the Nazis instigated one of the most diabolic and genocidal programs known to man. And they did so using modern technologies in an expression of what historian Jeffrey Herf calls “reactionary modernism.” The idea, according to Herf is that, “Before and after the Nazi seizure of power, an important current within conservative and subsequently Nazi ideology was a reconciliation between the antimodernist, romantic, and irrantionalist ideas present in German nationalism and the most obvious manifestation of means ...modern technology.” 1 Nazi crimes were so extreme and barbaric precisely because they incorporated modern technologies into a process that violated modern ethical standards. Nazi crimes in the context of contemporary notions of ethics are almost inconceivable. -
Husserl's Position Between Dilthey and the Windelband-Rickert School of Neo-Kantianism John E
Sacred Heart University DigitalCommons@SHU Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies Faculty Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies Publications 4-1988 Husserl's Position Between Dilthey and the Windelband-Rickert School of Neo-Kantianism John E. Jalbert Sacred Heart University Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/rel_fac Part of the Philosophy of Mind Commons, and the Philosophy of Science Commons Recommended Citation Jalbert, John E. "Husserl's Position Between Dilthey and the Windelband-Rickert School of Neo-Kantianism." Journal of the History of Philosophy 26.2 (1988): 279-296. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies at DigitalCommons@SHU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@SHU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. +XVVHUO V3RVLWLRQ%HWZHHQ'LOWKH\DQGWKH:LQGHOEDQG5LFNHUW 6FKRRORI1HR.DQWLDQLVP John E. Jalbert Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 26, Number 2, April 1988, pp. 279-296 (Article) 3XEOLVKHGE\7KH-RKQV+RSNLQV8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV DOI: 10.1353/hph.1988.0045 For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v026/26.2jalbert.html Access provided by Sacred Heart University (5 Dec 2014 12:35 GMT) Husserl's Position Between Dilthey and the Windelband- Rickert School of Neo- Kanuamsm JOHN E. JALBERT THE CONTROVERSY AND DEBATE over the character of the relationship between the natural and human sciences (Natur- und Geisteswissenschaflen) became a central theme for philosophical reflection largely through the efforts of theo- rists such as Wilhelm Dilthey and the two principal representatives of the Baden School of Neo-Kantians, Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert.~ These turn of the century theorists are major figures in this philosophical arena, but they are by no means the only participants in the effort to grapple with this issue. -
Wilhelm Dilthey's Doctrine of World Views and Its Relationship to Hermeneutics
David Naugle Philosophy 5329/501 Hermeneutics Spring 1993 University of Texas at Arlington Dr. Charles Nussbaum WILHELM DILTHEY'S DOCTRINE OF WORLD VIEWS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO HERMENEUTICS INTRODUCTION Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), whom José Ortega y Gasset called "the most im- portant philosopher in the second half of the nineteenth century"1 (1946: 131), was a man of passion, vision, and calling. The great crises of his age gripped his soul and propelled him on an intellectual and spiritual journey in quest of solutions to the prob- lems of Western culture at his moment in history. Here is his own personal testimony to the single-minded objective of his life. The great crisis of the sciences and European culture which we are now living through has so deeply and totally taken possession of my spirit that the desire to be of some help in it has extinguished every extraneous and personal ambition (JD vii; in Ermath 1978: 15). This crisis of modernity, of mammoth proportions to Dilthey who described it as "a shaking of human society and its foundations such as has not been seen since the declining days of the Greco-Roman world" (GS 6: 246), could be called a Streit der Weltanschauung—a clash, or "protracted crisis of consciousness or 'world view'" (Ermath 1978: 15). Dilthey lived through "the Hegelsstreit, Religionsstreit, Materialis 1 This is no small compliment when we realize that the competitors for this distinction include J. S. Mill, C. Darwin, H. Spencer, H. Bergson, K. Marx, F. Engels, J. Royce, F. Bradley, A. N. -
Three DECONSTRUCTION and HERMENEUTICS. on THE
Three DECONSTRUCTION AND HERMENEUTICS. ON THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN JACQUES DERRIDA AND HANS-GEORG GADAMER Piotr Dehnel In his Songs of Experience, Martin Jay1 cites Jacques Derrida’s critical assessment of the fact that experience has always been referred to in terms of metaphysics of presence, which he finds both in Edmund Husserl’s experience of meaning and in Emmanuel Levinas’s utterances about experiencing the other or a difference. Jay reflects also on the 1981 debate between Derrida and Hans- Georg Gadamer and stresses Derrida’s objections to the hermeneutical reliance on the dialogic experience. In this paper I would like to have a closer look at the aforementioned debate and shed some light on the question whether Gadamer’s hermeneutics can be grasped in the categories of the metaphysics of presence. Gadamer, the founding father of philosophical hermeneutics, and Derrida, the founding father of deconstruction, met in April 1981 in the Goethe Institute in Paris during the Text and Interpretation Symposium organized by Philippe Forget.2 Inaugurating the symposium with an eponymous paper, Gadamer discussed various elements of his own intellectual biography, which commenced with a critique of idealism and methodologism of the prior epistemological theory and was decisively influenced by his encounter with Martin Heidegger’s philosophical thought. Heidegger, namely, broke with Wilhelm Dilthey’s concept of understanding as a method of humanities and made it into an existential, i.e. into a basic determinant of the human Dasein. For Heideggger, understanding is simply a certain mode of being, and not a mode of knowledge. Such formulation enabled Gadamer to include the experience of art and the experience of history into the sphere of hermeneutics, both types of experience culminating in the concept of historically effected consciousness (wirkunggeschichtliches Bewußtsein). -
Immanuel Kant and the Development of Modern Psychology David E
University of Richmond UR Scholarship Repository Psychology Faculty Publications Psychology 1982 Immanuel Kant and the Development of Modern Psychology David E. Leary University of Richmond, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/psychology-faculty- publications Part of the Theory and Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Leary, David E. "Immanuel Kant and the Development of Modern Psychology." In The Problematic Science: Psychology in Nineteenth- Century Thought, edited by William Ray Woodward and Mitchell G. Ash, 17-42. New York, NY: Praeger, 1982. This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1 Immanuel Kant and the Development of Modern Psychology David E. Leary Few thinkers in the history of Western civilization have had as broad and lasting an impact as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). This "Sage of Konigsberg" spent his entire life within the confines of East Prussia, but his thoughts traveled freely across Europe and, in time, to America, where their effects are still apparent. An untold number of analyses and commentaries have established Kant as a preeminent epistemologist, philosopher of science, moral philosopher, aestheti cian, and metaphysician. He is even recognized as a natural historian and cosmologist: the author of the so-called Kant-Laplace hypothesis regarding the origin of the universe. He is less often credited as a "psychologist," "anthropologist," or "philosopher of mind," to Work on this essay was supported by the National Science Foundation (Grant No. -
Passmore, J. (1967). Logical Positivism. in P. Edwards (Ed.). the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vol. 5, 52- 57). New York: Macmillan
Passmore, J. (1967). Logical Positivism. In P. Edwards (Ed.). The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vol. 5, 52- 57). New York: Macmillan. LOGICAL POSITIVISM is the name given in 1931 by A. E. Blumberg and Herbert Feigl to a set of philosophical ideas put forward by the Vienna circle. Synonymous expressions include "consistent empiricism," "logical empiricism," "scientific empiricism," and "logical neo-positivism." The name logical positivism is often, but misleadingly, used more broadly to include the "analytical" or "ordinary language philosophies developed at Cambridge and Oxford. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The logical positivists thought of themselves as continuing a nineteenth-century Viennese empirical tradition, closely linked with British empiricism and culminating in the antimetaphysical, scientifically oriented teaching of Ernst Mach. In 1907 the mathematician Hans Hahn, the economist Otto Neurath, and the physicist Philipp Frank, all of whom were later to be prominent members of the Vienna circle, came together as an informal group to discuss the philosophy of science. They hoped to give an account of science which would do justice -as, they thought, Mach did not- to the central importance of mathematics, logic, and theoretical physics, without abandoning Mach's general doctrine that science is, fundamentally, the description of experience. As a solution to their problems, they looked to the "new positivism" of Poincare; in attempting to reconcile Mach and Poincare; they anticipated the main themes of logical positivism. In 1922, at the instigation of members of the "Vienna group," Moritz Schlick was invited to Vienna as professor, like Mach before him (1895-1901), in the philosophy of the inductive sciences. Schlick had been trained as a scientist under Max Planck and had won a name for himself as an interpreter of Einstein's theory of relativity. -
Rational Reconstruction in the Nature of Scientific Truth
Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh (Hum.), Vol. 60(1), 2015, pp. 91-107 RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION IN THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC TRUTH Md. Abdul Mannan* Abstract Conventional wisdom suggests that scientific knowledge is objective and a proven truth. This paper challenges the conventional wisdom and argues that scientific knowledge offers only partial or relative truth. If we analyze some scientific phenomena such as theory-change and the unobservable entities assumed in science, we will find a different picture about the nature of scientific truth. Philosophers of science view these phenomena and seek to rationalize what is achieved by scientific discoveries: truth or something else. Looking at some such views we finally find that achievement of scientific enterprise is not absolute truth, but it is human truth - the truth which is relative to human conditions, be it intellectual or psychological. Introduction What kind of truth science obtains by its theoretical investigations? The question becomes more significant when we find that scientific theories assume some entities which are not observable -- neither in experience nor in instrument. Scientific entities such as aether, electron, gene, field and many other entities assumed by different theories are not observable. In describing these entities, are our theories true --- where there is no scope to compare between the assumed entities and the reality as such? Answer to this kind of questions depends on what we think about the nature of scientific enterprise. Our theories may or may not be true, but first of all, there must be the world external to our thinking. This view is called metaphysical realism which holds that there are truths about the actual structure of the real world that do not depend on cognitive capacities of human investigators. -
The Experience of Meaning and Hermeneutics
THE EXPERIENCE OF MEANING AND HERMENEUTICS Vasile Macoviciuc∗∗∗ [email protected] Abstract : The author sustains the necessity/possibility of a theoretical- methodological complementarity among structuralism, semiotics, and hermeneutics within the effort to conceptualize meaning as existential experience. These analytic perspectives must be also received as contributions pertaining to the sphere of the ontology of the humane. Keywords : semiotics, understanding/comprehension, interpretation, hermeneutics, meaning, language. “Language – notes Hans-Georg Gadamer – is the environment in which the I and the world unite or rather in which we are presented with their primal [co]-belonging.” 1 Due to this multi-dimensional symbiosis, the grasping of meaning cannot be a purely intellectual operation, but “engages the entire human being” 2, assuming the recognition of some methodological criteria, very different as source, significance or comprehensive goal. If the structural method and semiotics are relatively recent in European culture, hermeneutics had a historical evolution from antiquity on, receiving changes that seriously affected its theoretical shape, fields of problems, and stakes. Schleiermacher is taken as the founder of modern hermeneutics since, on the one hand, he believes that this can no longer be reduced to its traditional realm (interpretation of the Bible), but covers the large field of moral sciences and, on the other hand, it notices the fact that the understanding of the part (the element) is conditioned by the understanding of the text as a whole. His intention is to ground a general theory of the art of understanding and interpretation that unifies and guides the special hermeneutics. This is why he displays the phenomena of language: what must (and can) be assumed within the hermeneutic act and what can be discovered in and by it is no more than language.