Rational Reconstruction: an Approach to a History of Philosophy

ISSN 1392-74-50 Marija ONIÐÈIK SOTER 2005.16(44)

The topic of an article belongs both to the philosophy Ðio straipsnio tema priklauso dviem filosofijos srit- of history as well as to a history of philosophy. The ims istorijos filosofijai ir filosofijos istorijai. notion under discussion is a rational reconstruction Straipsnyje analizuojama racionaliosios rekonstrukcijos as a method of reading the texts of thinkers of the samprata yra filosofijos istorijos tyrimo metodas, taiko- past, proposed by Richard Rorty. The article suggests mas praeities filosofø tekstams skaityti. Toks racio- some reflections on the relationships between philos- naliosios rekonstrukcijos supratimas bûdingas R. Rorty. ophy and its history. The method of rational recon- Straipsnyje siûloma apmàstyti filosofijos santyká su struction can be used in theological investigation as jos istorija. Racionaliosios rekonstrukcijos metodas well, for better understanding of past theological texts. gali bûti taikomas ir studijuojant teologijos istorijà. The article shortly discusses the origin of the notion Straipsnyje trumpai aptariama ðios sampratos kilmë, in question and emphasizes the link between contem- akcentuojamas ðiandienio filosofinio bei teologinio porary philosophical and theological discourse and diskurso istorinës sampratos ryðys su aktualiàja actual philosophical thought. filosofine mintimi.

Introduction cussion can be viewed as useful for students education stimulating their interest in The object of this ar ticle is a method of reading the thinkers of the past. rational reconstruction, presented by Richard I make no claim to give a definition of a Rorty as a useful way of reading the thin- method of rational reconstruction. I would kers of the past. The aim of the article is to like rather to propose some reflections on discuss a methodology of the history of phi- the relationship between philosophy and its losophy and theology in order to point out history, which can probably be of some in- the very relevance of historical studies in terest for those who are trying to teach a the fiel. The method of the article can be history of philosophy in our times, when it described as a careful analysis of Rortys seems that nobody knows how to do it pro- proposals together with an independent in- perly, so that a history of philosophy as an terpretation of the outcomes which can spring academic discipline simply falls out of the from reconstructional reading of philosop- curriculum of the bachelor in philosophy; hical and theological texts. The article as well as for those who are interested in a claims rational reconstruction being of in- history of theology. terest for historians seeking better understanding of our predecessors. However the main importance of the method consists in An Origin of a Notion of Rational its ability to serve the therapeutic purpose Reconstruction healing the metaphysical malaise of philosophy inherited from Modern times. The The question of rational reconstruction is a results of the analysis and successive dis- purely methodological one and it has its 244 Marija ONIÐÈIK

own story. Being a Thomist and doing some tuitively. The constructional system is a investigations in the field of Analytical Tho- rational reconstruction of the entire forma- mism I have been using a rational reconst- tion of reality, which, in cognition, is car- ruction as a method of text reading. And ried out for the most part intuitively.3 Car- whenever I have been asked if what I do is nap also uses the term rational justifica- a history of philosophy, my answer was tion, because the aim of a reconstruction no. What I am dealing with is a contem- can be considered a kind of vindication of porary philosophy. Why is it so? It is known reality.4 The criteria of Carnaps reconst- that St.Thomas Aquinas and others thinkers ruction are strictly scientific but the very of the past are definitely dead by now and process of reconstruction involves an as- well buried. How can one treat ones philo- pect of retrospection, e.g., sophy and theology as a living thought? In reconstructing the recognition of the plant, How can one actually do ones own philo- the botanist has to ask himself what, in the sophy together with them? So the question actual act of recognition, was really perceived belongs to a link between history and philo- and what was the apperceptive synthesis (Ve- rarbeitung)? But these two components which sophy, it lays on an edge between a history are united in the result he can separate only of philosophy and the philosophy of histo- through abstraction. Thus, in rational reconst- ry, where the former becomes an object of ruction, construction theory has to distinguish, the later: the philosophy of history reflects by means of abstraction, between the purely 5 on a history of philosophy. It is a question given and the synthesis. of life and death. Here a choise between Here an abstraction is made by turning living thought and dead matters depends on back to an initial unity of a cognitional act. methodological alternatives. In reconstructing the real intuitive process A rational reconstruction as a method of of cognition6 , or a world language throught dealing with past philosophy is proposed by a realistic language into the symbolic Richard Rorty. Speaking of a history of phi- language of logistics,7 or even the cultu- losophy Rorty calls its main method a re- ral sciences8 Carnap attempts to embrace construction, meaning that reading of the not only all reality but what is more impor- dead philosophers1 is or should be a kind of tant for us, all fields of philosophy. Such a re-vivification which philosophy probably notion of rational reconstruction has ma- needs for therapeutic purposes: Just as the de its way into the philosophy of science patient needs to relive his past to answer being employed by Popper, Kuhn, and Fey- his questions, so philosophy needs to relive erabend, and today appears as a legacy of its past in order to answer its questions.2 all analytical philosophy. The influence of The very term rational reconstruction Thomas S. Kuhn has been crucial for the has its own quite cautionary story. Origi- notion to become an important part of what nally it belongs to Rudolf Carnap and his one can call the philosophy of a history of seminal work Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt philosophy because of his exlusive preoc- (The Logical Structure of the World) where cupation with the history of science thereby he speaks of rationale Nachkonstruktion. changing the very paradigm of the philo- Here Carnap proposes his construction the- sophy of history. ory with an ambicious aim at showing all G. A. Davia attempts to find an original reality as a kind of a logical structure by form of requirements for the method of ra- converting each part of it into a constructional reconstruction. According to him, a tional system, that is, by re-constructing merely descriptive reconstruction makes reality which is given to our perception in- the requirement of similarity with the ori- RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION: AN APPROACH TO A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 245 ginal object. The second, more sophistica- thinkers in an imagined dialogue or conver- ted form of reconstruction called rational. sation about philosophical problems of our Rational reconstruction as a rational again- times. In doing this kind of reconstruction, construction (re- as again) is interested analytical philosophers are often accussed in making an object more equal to itself, of anachronism as anachronistic is con- e.g., by extracting essential elements and re- sidered to be the supposed force with which formulating and restructuring them. Its task is revealing formal or representational problems dead philosophers are resurrected to take and managing them by realising immanent pos- shape of our own interest. Using apparently sibilities to improve precision and consistency Kuhnian terms Rorty agrees with the charge, of the object of reconstruction.9 saying that such enterprises in commensu- This kind of reconstruction has a presc- ration are, of course, anachronistic. But if riptive character. Finally, extreme case of they are conducted in full knowledge of their anachronism, they are unobjectionable.12 rational reconstruction as rational new-const- Thus, in order to serve the purpose, anach- ruction (re- as new-) is interested in a material correction resp. improvement be ex- ronistic behavior should be conscious. ternal formal criteria. The descriptive compo- The other way of reading the texts of the nent reduces in the extreme case to the mere past is a historical reconstruction which factuality of initial material, exactly the object seeks to link up an author of the text in of reconstruction, which is subjected to the instruments of precision and consistency im- question to a particular socio-historical con- provement.10 text of his times, where and when, in the ironical Rortys words, their falsehoods Such a reconstruction requires a mini- look less silly.13 However, this kind of mum similarity between an object and a reconstruction appears to be only an initial product of reconstruction, it can contain rein- stage of reading a text. Rorty argues that terpretations of essential concepts and aban- don original intention of its object. there is indeed a sense in which we can understand what a philosopher says in his own terms before relating his thought to ours, but that this minimal sort of understanding is like Rational Reconstruction as a Method being able to exchange courtesies in a foreign of a History of Philosophy tongue without being able to translate what one is saying into our native language. (...) Translating an utterance means fitting it into Trying to show a scientific nature of the our practices. (...) Successful historical reconst- reconstructional method Davias analysis of ruction can be performed only by people who the notion of reconstruction is quite fruitful, have some idea of what they themselves think about the issues under discussion.14 althought the author does not mention Ri- chard Rorty and his critique of the traditio- In the field of history, the aim of any nal interpretation of a history of philosophy. reconstruction is an understanding of a text According to Rorty, there are two kinds and it can be achieved only with a help of of reconstruction available at the field: a appropriate context. For historians the text rational and a historical. The first is exists as a function, or articulation, of con- practiced by analytical philosophers reading text. In this sense historians work at the philosophers of the past in the hope of juncture of the symbiosis between text and treating these philosophers as contempora- context, with context understood to mean ries, as colleagues with whom they can ex- the very conditions of textual production change views.11 The practicioners of a ra- and dissemination.15 In a historical reconst- tional reconstruction try to involve the past ruction a context in question is the proxi- 246 Marija ONIÐÈIK

mate context that a text is immediately con- philosoper, Ian Hacking, reminds us that cerned with. In a rational reconstruction the anachronistic reading of some canonical need of the proximate context is not denied, old texts can be a fundamental value in its conversely, it is a matter of necessity, espe- own right.21 History itself is always in a cially if one wants to avoid saying that the sense anachronistic and by reflecting on great dead philosopher had some excellent its own history philosophy reflects and vin- ideas, but unfortunately couldnt get them dicates itself. Rorty himself manages to re- straight because of the limitations of his fashion philosophers to his own image, or time.16 Nevertheless, another, indirect and to co-opt the thinkers of the past for his collateral context is required in addition to own philosophical project. As a student of it. A choice of a con-text, that is, of an Rorty Alan Malachovski puts it, the pro- attendant text becomes a crucial task. To cess confers dual philosophical favours. Rorty understand the text just is to relate it help- ostensibly does the thinkers a favour by fully to something else. The only question reformulating their position so that it ends is what that something else will be.17 up in better overall shape, and he does him- There is a danger that in seeking to estab- self a favour ir thereby creating new al- lish or to imagine some sort of a dialogue lies.22 What are the other favours that or a conversation between ourselves and a this new approach to a history of philosop- thinker of the past we are tempted to re- hy and theology can offer? educate him according to our own view, so A traditional concept of history looks li- he would have been driven back on a premi- ke a certain sequence of causes and effects, se he never formulated, dealing with a topic which constitutes some kind of an obligatory he never considered a premise that may scheme, an objective order, so that have to be suggested to him by a friendly those who do not understand that what is pos- rational reconstructor.18 This warning is ta- sible in one age and situation may be wholly ken very seriously by Rorty whose aim is at inconceivable in another, fail to understand the same time to engage into conversational something universal and fundamental about the activity of a solidary community of thinkers only way in which social life, or the human mind, or economic growth, or some other sequ- and to avoid asking them untimely questions. ence, not merely does, but can, or perhaps must, develop.23

Relevance of the Rational There supposed to be some historical Reconstruction for Historical Studies (and may be philosophical) truth, described in terms of neccessity, eternity and im- The opponents of the method of rational mortality. A whole historical context is vie- reconstruction are those intellectual histo- wed as being of necessity, as non-contin- rians who should see analytic philosop- gent. Nevertheless it belongs to the past hers as anachronistically reading current and as such cannot be described by using a interests back into the past.19 Rorty argues vocabulary of ours. The very vocabulary of that if to be anachronistic is to link a past history is changing. That is why a reconst- X to a present Y rather than studying it in ruction is necessary. Rorty points out that isolation, then every historian is always the emphasis on the mortality of the voca- anachronistic. (...) It is always a matter of bularies in which such supposedly immor- selecting among contemporary concerns with tal truth are expressed24 creates an internal which to associate X, not a matter of abju- discomfort of the situation, inspiring fear ring such concerns.20 Another analytical and distrust in history. RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION: AN APPROACH TO A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 247

Philosophical problems and their solu- Descartes and Locke did not have a theory of tions also have been treated by history as meaning. Aristotles remarks about knowing do not offer answers, good or bad, to Lockes philosophia perennis, non-contingent, a-his- questions, any more than Lockes remarks about torical truth, as considerations that trans- language offer answers to Freges.26 cend time and chance. Philosophy has clai- med to be the foundation of all spheres of Here a threefold division is proposed, culture, which in their turn has been see- where, in Kuhnian words, at least an older king for the true philosophy to base them- paradigme is replaced in whole or in part by selves on. While proper historical reflec- an incompatible new one.27 Rorty himself tion as retrospection should impose on phi- would like to make friends with such 20th losophy a call and responsibility of intro- century thinkers as later Wittgenstein, Hei- spection resulted in a strong feeling that degger and Dewey, who set aside the tra- such metaphysical claim had alredy lost ditional stages of metaphysics or epistemo- its ground and gravity. I guess that the cri- logy. According to Rorty, sis of historism in philosophy at least in Their attitude toward the traditional problema- part has arisen out of this frustration. tic is like the attitude of seventeenth-century philosophers toward the scholastic problema- tic. (...) They glimpse the possibility of a form of intellectual life in which the vocabulary of Evolutional vs. Revolutional View of philosophical reflection inherited from the se- History venteenth century would seem as pointless as the thirteenth-century philosophical vocabulary had seemed to the Enlightenment.28 The principal contingency of history is no- tably seen in a triadic scheme consisting of Such an attitude could seem to be not the three stages or turns, frequently ap- merely revolutional but a-historical. Still if plied to a history of philosophy: the ontolo- because of vacabulary change Frege purpor- gical, the epistemological and the linguistic tedly didnt have the same view of reality as turn. This familiar scheme can be given a Descartes or Locke, and so did the scholas- twofold interpretation. According to the evo- tics or Aristotle, our only way to deal with lutional approach to history, each stage in each of these thinkers would be a historical turn is grown out of the one before. Such a reconstruction. And what is more, Rortys process of cumulation presupposes some no- admonition not to ask past thinkers impro- tion of maturity: if we conceive of histo- per philosophical questions exhibits some rical succession as being akin to that of the evolutional views of history of thought. Could growth of the individual personality, than it not be understood Aristotle having had no analogously, each one of the stages of his- proper notion of knowledge, and Locke ha- torical development represents a more ma- ving had no proper notion of meaning until ture phase of human growth.25 time has come for someone to grasp these The revolutional approach describes all notions and for a historian to recognize the history of thought in Kuhnian terms as a very significance of the process? change of incompatible and even incom- However, Rortys remarks has serious mensurable states. There seems to be Ror- merits in changing our vision of philosop- tys point to show feasibility of the revolu- hy. The discovery that our philosophical tional approach to a history of philosophy vocabulary as everything is a product of when he says time and chance29 encourages him to sup- that Aristotle did not have did not feel the port the strategy against metaphysical need of a theory of knowledge, and that 248 Marija ONIÐÈIK

claims of any philosophy: it is enough to of using new words as well as of arguing show its rooting in history, because histori- from premises phrased in old words.31 One cal events are contingent. It has already can remember St.Thomas Aquinas saying been suggested by Nietzcshe that such ex- that we need new words for doing theology. treem historism could be dangerous for Aquinas was dealing with the texts of St.Au- the future. Alan Malachovski asks quite re- gustin who was definitely a past teologian asonably: and philosopher for him, but not dead. It is But what if the discovery of contingency in- a Kuhnian position (and as such it forbids volves not just a small adjustment to our stock the terminology of progress), according of matters of fact, but the destruction of so- to that one cannot consider one vocabulary mething large and intellectually important like better than another, or decide which desc- the belief that certain longstanding philosophical problems are inevitable, that there is no ription is true. The criteria in question are way of thinking adequately about the human only conversational, serving for better com- condition without encountering such problems? munication between a whole community of Then, surely, the realization that such problems philosophical or theological inquiry, inclu- are contingent, in the sense of historically optional, has radical implications will we ding our contemporaries as well as our pre- not wish to give up on our attempts to tackle decessors treated as living as we are. As such problems?30 Malachovski puts it, we only can ask and be asked questions like: Is the redescription The result can be the end of philosophy, interesting? or Does it serve any good because nobody would be willing to do it. purpose to put things like that? Such redescription should not correspond to reality like the real, o intended, meaning of so- Conclusion: Recontruction as meones text.32 What redescription actual- Redescription ly requires is getting intimately acquain- ted with more and more texts and authors, Trying to find a kind of compromise betwe- with their socio-historical contexts, as well en extreem historism and a-historical view as their possible thematic interconnections.33 of apparent changes in philosophy in theo- I hope it will be the proper job of our logy, reconstruction can be viewed as re- present and future students to read and redescription of some historical process by describe more and more philosophical texts using new words. Historical development of the past in order to make friends with (frequently called progress) is a matter their authors.

NOTES

1 Rorty R. The Historiography of Philosophy: Four 4 Cf. Ibid. 49. P. 82; 100. P. 158. Genres // Truth and Progress. Philosophical Pa- 5 Ibid. 100. P. 158. pers. Vol. 3. Cambridge, Cambridge University 6 Cf. Ibid. 92. P. 146. Press. 1998. P. 247. 7 Cf. Ibid. 9598. P. 152156. 2 Rorty R. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. 8 Cf. Ibid. 49. P. 82. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1979. P. 33. 9 Davia G. A. Thoughts on a Possible Rational 3 Carnap R. The Logical Structure of the World. Reconstruction of the Method of Rational Re- Trans. by Rolf A. George. Berkeley and Los construction // http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/ Angeles: University of Californija Press. 1969. Scie/ScieDavi.htm 12/13/2004. P. 2. 100. P. 158. 10 Ibid. P. 5. RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION: AN APPROACH TO A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 249

11 Rorty R. The Historiography. P. 247. 23 Berlin I. The Concept of Scientific History // 12 Ibid. P. 251. Philosophical Analysis and History. Ed. W. H. 13 Ibid. P. 247. Dray. New York and London: Harper and Row. 1966. P. 1011. 14 Ibid. P. 251. Cf. Ayers M. Analytic Philosophy and the History of Philosophy // Philosophy and 24 Rorty R. Introduction: Pragmatism and Philoso- Its Past. Eds. J. Rée, M. Ayers, and A. Westoby. phy // Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapo- Brighton: Harvester Press. 1978. P. 46. lis: University of Minnesota Press. 1982. P. xiii xlvii. P. xli. 15 Fox-Genovese E. Cit. Jenkins K. On What is 25 History?. London: Routledge. 1995. P. 28. Berlin. I. Op. cit. P. 42. 26 16 Rorty R. The Historiography. P. 256. Rorty R. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. P. 263. Cf. Hacking I Why Does Language Matter to 17 Editors Introduction. Philosophy in History. Es- Philosophy? Cambridge: Cambridge University says in the Historiography of Philosophy. Eds. R. Press. 1975. P. 43. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner. Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984. P. 11. 27 Kuhn Th. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolu- tions. 2nd ed. Chicaga: The University of Chica- 18 Rorty R. The Historiography. P. 252. ga Press. 1970. P. 92. 19 Ibid. P. 10. 28 Rorty R. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. P. 6. 20 Ibid. P. 12. 29 Rorty R. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. 21 Hacking I. Five Parables // Philosophy in History: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1989. Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy. Eds. P. 22. R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner. Cam- 30 Malachowski A. Op. cit. P. 111. bridge: Cambridge University Press. 1984. P. 104. 31 Rorty R. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. P. 48. 22 Malachowski A. Richard Rorty. Princeton and 32 Oxford: Princeton University Press. 2002. P. 182. Malachowski A. Op. cit. P. 181. 33 Ibid. 183.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ayers M. Analytic Philosophy and the History Skinner. Cambridge: Cambridge University of Philosophy // Philosophy and Its Past. Eds. J. Press. 1984. Rée, M. Ayers, and A. Westoby. Brighton: Har- 8. Kuhn Th. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolu- vester Press. 1978. tions. 2nd ed. Chicaga: The University of Chi- 2. Berlin I. The Concept of Scientific History // Phi- caga Press. 1970. losophical Analysis and History. Ed. W. H. Dray. 9. Malachowski A. Richard Rorty. Princeton and New York and London: Harper and Row. 1966. Oxford: Princeton University Press. 2002. 3. Carnap R. The Logical Structure of the World. 10.Rorty R. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Trans. by Rolf A. George. Berkeley and Los Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1979. Angeles: University of Californija Press. 1969. 11.Rorty R. Introduction: Pragmatism and Philos- 4. Davia G. A. Thoughts on a Possible Rational ophy // Consequences of Pragmatism. Minne- Reconstruction of the Method of Rational Re- apolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1982. construction // http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/ 12.Rorty R. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Scie/ScieDavi.htm 12/13/2004. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1989. 5. Jenkins K. On What is History?. London: 13.Rorty R. The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Routledge. 1995. Genres // Truth and Progress. Philosophical 6. Hacking I Why Does Language Matter to Phi- Papers. Vol. 3. Cambridge, Cambridge Univer- losophy? Cambridge: Cambridge University sity Press. 1998. Press. 1975. 14.Rorty R., Schneewind J. B., Skinner Q. Editors 7. Hacking I. Five Parables // Philosophy in His- Introduction // Philosophy in History. Essays in tory: Essays in the Historiography of Philoso- the Historiography of Philosophy. Cambridge: phy. Eds. R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Q. Cambridge University Press. 1984.

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Marija ONIÐÈIK RACIONALIOJI REKONSTRUKCIJA: POÞIÛRIS Á FILOSOFIJOS ISTORIJÀ

Santrauka

Straipsnyje nagrinëjamos istorijos filosofijos ir fi- nio konteksto svarbos, stengiasi susieti praeities filo- losofijos istorijos sàsajos ðiuolaikinio filosofavimo sofijos bei teologijos mintá su ðiø laikø filosofijos kontekste. Filosofijos istorijos kaip akademinës dis- aktualijomis, naujomis filosofijos áþvalgomis. Nors ciplinos krizë verèia ieðkoti naujø veiksmingø me- racionaliosios rekonstrukcijos skaitymo metodà jo kri- todø, kuriuos bûtø galima taikyti skaitant tiek se- tikai kaltina anachronizmu, nes esà jis primeta pra- nuosius filosofinius, tiek teologinius tekstus. Straips- eities màstytojams mûsø dienø problematikà, ið tik- nyje pristatomi du ið Richardo Rorty aptariamø pra- røjø ðis metodas traktuoja ðiuos màstytojus kaip dia- eities filosofø tekstø nagrinëjimo metodø istorinë logo partnerius, siekdamas átraukti juos á vieningà ir racionalioji rekonstrukcija, jø tarpusavio santy- filosofiniø tyrinëjimø bendruomenæ. kis ir reikðmë minties istorijos studijoms. Istorinë Straipsnyje bandoma Richardo Rorty siûlomà fi- rekonstrukcija nagrinëja senøjø màstytojø tekstus, losofijos istorijos metodologijà interpretuoti remian- susiedama juos su jø laikotarpio istoriniu kontekstu. tis Thomo Khuno moksliniø revoliucijø teorija, kuri Racionalioji rekonstrukcija, nepalikdama nuoðalyje istorijà apraðo ne kaip kumuliatyvø evoliuciná proce- istorinio konteksto, interpretuoja senuosius tekstus sà, bet kaip revoliucinæ tarpusavyje nebendramaèiø ðiuolaikinës filosofinës minties kontekste. Straips- paradigmø kaità. Tokià istorijos sampratà galima sek- nyje trumpai pristatomas racionaliosios rekonstruk- mingai taikyti ne tik mokslo istorijai, bet ir bendrai cijos sampratos atsiradimas XX a. pradþios loginio minties tiek filosofinës, tiek teologinës istorijai. pozytivizmo filosofijoje. Termino racionalioji re- Prieðprieðinant Khuno istorijos filosofijà tradicinei kontrukcija iðtakø galima ieðkoti Rudolfo Carnapo istorijos sampratai, Rorty áþvalgas galima traktuoti konstrukcijos teorijos siekyje parodyti realybæ tam nevienareikðmiðkai. Pabrëþdamas esminæ istoriniø þo- tikros loginës struktûros pavidalu, kiekvienà tikrovës dynø kontingentiðkumà, Rorty siûlo racionaliosios sritá konvertuojant á vadinamàjà konstrukcinæ siste- rekonstrukcijos metodà taikyti terapeutiniais tiks- mà, kitaip sakant, jà re-konstruojant. Toks termi- lais, siekiant iðlaisvinti filosofijà nuo nepagrástø fun- no vartojimas yra siejamas su aktualiaja mokslo kal- damentalistiniø pretenzijø. Taip suprasta racionalioji ba ir apibûdina tikrovës teksto skaitymo metodà. rekonstrukcija gali bûti matoma kaip redeskripcija, Tolesnis ðios sampratos kelias veda per mokslo filo- naujais þodþiais apraðanti senas filosofines bei teolo- sofijà á istorijos filosofijà, kur ji uþëmë deramà vietà ginias problemas ir jø sprendimus. Filosofijos atsig- kaip analitinës filosofijos atstovø taikomas istoriniø ræþimas á savo paèios praeitá ne tik pabrëþia bûdingus tekstø skaitymo metodas. þmogaus istoriðkumo suvokimo aspektus, bet ir yra Racionalioji rekonstrukcija, neatmesdama istori- bûtina paèios filosofijos tæstinumo sàlyga.

PAGRINDINIAI ÞODÞIAI: racionalioji rekonstruk- KEY WORDS: rational reconstruction, historical re- cija, istorinë rekonstrukcija, filosofijos istorija, isto- construction, a history of philosophy, the philosophy rijos filosofija, kontingentiðkumas, revoliucinis vs. of history, contingency, revolutional vs. evolutional evoliucinis istorijos modelis, redeskripcija. model of history, redescription.

Marija ONIÐÈIK Bachelor in theology; PhD in philosophy. Assistant at the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, VMU. Home address: M. Riomerio g. 426, Kaunas. Phone: 37 352491. Email: [email protected]. Marija ONIÐÈIK teologijos bakalaurë, filosofijos daktarë, VDU Humanitariniø mokslø fakulteto Filosofijos katedros asistentë. Adresas: M. Riomerio g. 426, Kaunas. Tel. 37 352491. El. paðtas: [email protected].