Washington University Jurisprudence Review Volume 6 | Issue 1 2013 The Regress Argument in Kant, Wittgenstein, and the Pittsburgh "Pragmatists" Joseph Margolis Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence Part of the Epistemology Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Theory Commons, Logic and Foundations of Mathematics Commons, Metaphysics Commons, Other Philosophy Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons Recommended Citation Joseph Margolis, The Regress Argument in Kant, Wittgenstein, and the Pittsburgh "Pragmatists", 6 Wash. U. Jur. Rev. 121 (2013). Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss1/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Jurisprudence Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. THE REGRESS ARGUMENT IN KANT, WITTGENSTEIN, AND THE PITTSBURGH “PRAGMATISTS” JOSEPH MARGOLIS Behind the argument that follows, I insert obliquely, in an informal and unsustained way, the hint of a legitimative rationale favoring ―genealogical‖ readings over ―textualist‖ readings of certain philosophical statements: specifically, for present purposes, statements by Kant and ―Kantians‖ of diverse stripes, some self-styled (aptly or not), some so interpreted by others, all bent on improving, dismissing, or displacing particular doctrines for cause. Genealogists, I take it, begin with the conviction that a philosophical problem of any importance is bound to be shared, however contentiously, by the authors and critics of compared texts. At their most inflexible, textualists tend to treat the work of the most seminal figures rather piously, so as to disallow anything but an entirely internalist critique (as in reading figures like Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant).