" FeE Rehabi Iitation IMPLEMENTATION PLAN CONTRACT PCE-I-809-99-000030, TO#809 USAID RAISE IQC SUBMITTED TO USAID/MADAGASCAR SUBMITTED BY CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL April 6, 2001 t Chemonics International FCE Rehab Chemonics International USAID RAISE lac No. PCE-I-809-99-000030, Task Order 809 Madagascar FCE Rehabilitation PROJECT WORK PLAN Submitted April 6, 2001 Table of Contents A. Preamble 1 B. Strategic Challenges and Responses 3 C. Program Plan 7 C.1. Fast Track Activities 7 C.2. Master Plan Study 9 D. Rehabilitation Schedule 9 D.1. Implementation Phase I 10 D.2. Implementation Phase II 10 E. Project Staff and Organization 10 F. Monitoring and Evaluation 11 F.1. Monitoring 11 F.2. Evaluation 12 G. Budget 12 Appendices 14 Fast Track Detailed Planning 15 Terms of Reference, Master Plan Study Team 18 " A. Preamble The FeE Rehabilitation team begins this project at once inspired by the immense possibilities to contribute in tangible ways to the economic life of Fianarantsoa and the protection of its threatened environment and humbled by the enormous challenges implied by the project. We recognize that we are facing ambitious objectives that must be accomplished with limited means, in a relatively short period of time, and under conditions that cannot always be predicted or controlled, The strategic challenges defined in the next section reflect our recognition of the opportunities and potential pitfalls in the path before us. The FeE is a vital infrastructure for the economy of the Fianarantsoa region and contributes significantly, as shown by last year's PAGE studies, to the conservation of highly threatened forest resources and, particularly, to the preservation of the Ranomafana-Andringitra forest corridor. Studies have shown that a functioning FeE will result in the preservation of some 100,000 hectares of natural forest that would otherwise be destroyed by tavy agriculture as farmers abandon sustainable production practices that currently depend on rail transport for the commercialization of the harvest. If the train runs, pressures to transform the forest into annual crops of rice and manioc will be substantially reduced. The future of the FeE was cast into doubt by the devastating cyclones that ravaged the Fianarantsoa region in February and March 2000. Eline and Gloria dumped massive amounts of rain on this mountainous zone in a brief two week period blocking the rail line with more than 280 landslides and washing out significant stretches of track. Initial observers found it hard to believe that the line would ever reopen again. But reopen it did, after heroic interventions by dedicated train workers funded by USAID and other emergency authorizations. The line was closed for only three months but when service resumed the system was still highly vulnerable as the train wend its way between unstabilized slopes and over temporary rail beds. Over the next nine months, a second round of investment contributed to further stabilization of the line but funds were still insufficient to fully repair damage to the line. The cyclone recovery funds available under this project will enable the completion of these emergency interventions but, equally important, will reinforce both infrastructure and management systems needed to reduce the impact of further cyclones (for Cyclone damage to the FCE in early 2000 threatened to example, better drainage permanently close the line with devastating effects on the infrastructures and the systems ecology and economy of the zone needed to maintain them). They will also be used to strengthen infrastructures including rails, bridges, and tunnels, thereby reducing the line's vulnerabilty to future cyclones. In addition to these more technical approaches, the project will also continue LDI's strategy of working with local populations to create partnerships supporting the rail system since these social systems are vital to reducing human activities (such as the cultivation of rice and manioc on steep slopes) that threaten the line with erosion. Wherever possible, proven low-cost technologies such as stabilization with vetiver grass will be used to reinforce infrastructures and slopes and ensure longer term stability of the line. In looking at the the impact of the train on the environment of Fianarantsoa , the PAGE studies adopted a twenty-year time frame. We know, however, that the train's impact on the economy and environment of the region also has a short term dimension. Farmers living in the region served by the FeE make decisions each year on whether to invest in new perennial tree crops, whether to replace 1 their current trees with hillside rice or manioc, and whether to clear new lands for annual crops in the forest corridor. The more that these farmers believe that the train is providing and will continue to provide reliable service, the more they are willing to invest in tree crops, reassured that they will be able to market the produce and buy rice to feed their families. Conversely, the more the train appears to them as a fragile and unreliable system, the more likely they are to take the risk averse strategy of producing subsistence crops, with all the pursuant environmental damage that implies. The mood along the FCE line is currently one of guarded optimism. Farmers follow the progress in rehabilitating the line with great interest. There are some clear indications that they are already beginning to calculate their agricultural production strategies as a function of expectations that the line will remain in operation. One of the best indicators of this relatively optimistic prognosis on their part is the number of farmers who have expressed a strong interest in participating in the community component that offers farmers fruit trees in return for their agreement to abandon rice and manioc production on unstable slopes. This interest has been expressed not only by those eligible (because their fields are immediately adjacent to the line) to participate in the community component but also to farmers further away who are requesting similar programs through LDI's Kolo Harena groups. Hence, there is both a short term and a medium/long term dimension to the FCE's impact on the environment and economy of the region. It is clear that if the FCE goes out of service, the long-term effects on the region will be disastrous (unless the FCE is replaced by alternative road service, which is highly unlikely for economic and technical reasons). The GoM's strategy, being developed with the support of LDI, to privatize the line within the next two years is an explicit commitment to addressing the longer-term viability of the line. The role of the FCE Rehabilitation project in this process is to ensure that the line is as attractive as possible to potential concessionaires and therefore to increase the chances that privatization will occur in a timely fashion and will be undertaken by serious economic actors who have sufficient assets to make a long term commitment to operations in Madagascar. This means that we must focus our investments on those infrastructures that are critical to ensuring the financial viability of the line. Previous financial analyses (Fivoarana) have clearly demonstrated that at least in the short term no private company will earn sufficient returns to enable it to invest in needed infrastructure rehabilitation. And furthermore, it is clear that no reputable company will take over the line without at least minimal assurances of its structural integrity. In the short term, the need to maintain train operations is driven by two issues: first, as noted above, the greater the perceived unreliability of train service, the higher the motivation for farmers to abandon sustainable agricultural practices The rehabilitation of drainage infrastructures and their based on tree crop production in favor of continued maintenance is critical to ensuring the resistance of unsustainable subsistence crops. the line to future cyclone damage. Farmers are generally understanding of short-term closures (such as those caused by cyclones and other natural disasters) as long as they see palpable progress toward reopening the line. Their agricultural decisions are more heavily influenced, however, by fears concerning the general degradation of service which they see as potentially leading to the permanent closure of the line ... or service so unreliable as to make the transport of fruit unacceptably risky. Hence any increase in unreliability over the next year, especially given all the local misapprehensions about privatization, will almost certainly result in increased tavy and annual crop production on already cleared fields. The second issue regarding train service over the next twenty months is project driven. This project cannot possibly attain its objectives if the trains needed to transport materials and people to work sites do not run with at least a modicum of efficiency and reliability. The nature of the infrastructure investments to be undertaken (tunnel, bridge, and track repair, for example) will require the transport 2 of massive quantities of construction materials such as ballast, rails, cement, and stone blocks. The time available to complete the work is so short that significant delays in deliveries will result in work not being completed by the end of project in December 2002. LDI suffered significant delays in implementation due to derailments caused by weakened rails that risked both lives and rOiling stock and disrupted service for several weeks at a time. This Work Plan is one that necessarily focuses particular attention on the next four months and sketches out only generally the outlines of anticipated project activities after that time. This is because detailed planning of activities in months 5-20 will only take place once the results of the Master Plan Study are available. This document does not presume to anticipate the results of that study, but instead describes how the study will be carried out, who will be involved, what type and form of results will be obtained, and what will done with the information.