2.6 The international response to Italian aggression (19351940)
Conceptual understanding Key concepts Consequence Change Signifcance Key questions Discuss the reasons or the British and French policy o appeasement. Examine the response o the international community to Italian aggression.
Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister of Britain 193537
The League o Nations ormally comes 1920 January into being Japanese invasion o Manchuria: 1931 September condemned by the League o Nations; weak sanctions are imposed World Disarmament Conerence 193234 Franklin D Roosevelt is elected 1932 November president in the USA Hitler becomes Chancellor o Germany 1933 January Italy sends troops to its border with 1934 July Austria to prevent Hitlers attempts at Anschluss The Stresa Conerence 1935 April The Neutrality Act passed (expires in August Italy invades Abyssinia six months) Roosevelt invokes the Neutrality Act, October preventing the supply o arms to either country 7 October The Council o the League declares Italy to be the aggressor in Abyssinia The Leagues Assembly votes to impose 11 October sanctions November Limited sanctions are applied
The HoareLaval Pact December
192
C H AP T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N AL R E S P O N S E TO I TALI AN AG G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 19 4 0 )
1936 January The French Popular Front wins the election.
The USA passes new Neutrality Acts February
May Italy conquers Abyssinia The League ends sanctions on Italy Italy and Germany intervene in the July Spanish Civil War Britain and France set up Non-Intervention August Committee The USA passes a joint resolution 1937 January outlawing the arms trade in Spain Neville Chamberlain becomes Prime May Minister of Britain Italy withdraws from the League of Nations December
In an Italian and British agreement, Britain 1938 April recognizes Italian Abyssinia
Mussolini now accepts Anschluss May
The Munich Conference: Mussolini, Hitler, September Chamberlain and Daladier meet Hitler invades areas of Czechoslovakia, 1939 March breaking the Munich Agreement
April Italy invades Albania
Italy declares itself a non-belligerent when 1 September Germany invades Poland Mussolini attempts to set up a conference 3 September to avoid war Mussolini declares war on Britain and 1940 June France
SeptemberOctober Italy invades Egypt and Greece
USA passes the LendLease Act 1941 March
193
2
What was the policy of appeasement and why was it pursued by Britain in the 1930s? Appeasement, in this political and historical context, was a diplomatic policy o making concessions to nations in order to avoid conict. The policy is most closely associated with Britains oreign policy in the late 1 930s, in particular the Munich crisis o 1 938. Appeasement ailed to prevent the outbreak o war and came to be seen as a weak and dishonourable policy. It allowed both Mussolini and Hitler to get away with territorial demands, which encouraged Hitler to ask continuously or more, resulting in the outbreak o war in 1 939. However, or most o the inter-war years, appeasement was seen as a positive idea, and as part o a long-standing tradition o trying to settle disputes peaceully. In Britain, there were many reasons to ollow a policy o appeasement in the 1 930s: Neville Chamberlain, prime minister of Britain, 193740 1 Public opinion The Franchise Act o 1 91 8 had increased the number o voters in Britain rom 8 million to 21 million; or the frst time, women over the age o 30 were given the vote, and rom 1 928, this was lowered to the age o 21 . This huge increase in the electorate meant that politicians were more likely to take notice o public opinion, which was against war and in avour o collective security. The horror o the First World War had created a widespread eeling that this should be the war to end all wars. This anti-war eeling was seen clearly in February 1 933, when the Oxord Union debating society voted that This House would not fght or King and Country. The destruction by German bomber aircrat o Guernica in Spain in 1 937 showed the vulnerability o London to attack rom the air and highlighted the need to prevent another war that would clearly have a devastating eect on civilians on the British mainland. As Stanley Baldwin told the House o Commons in 1 932, I think it is as well for the man in the street to realise that no power on earth can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through. It was widely believed that there would be 1 50,000 casualties in London in the frst week o war. The British public put aith in the League o Nations to maintain peace through collective security. There was even a League o Nations Union in Britain, which had more than 400,000 supporters in 1 935. The Union carried out a peace ballot in 1 935, which appeared to show that the British public ully supported the League and its principles. 2 The demands o the dictators seen as justifed Many British politicians elt that the Treaty o Versailles was too harsh and that Hitler had genuine grievances relating to the First World War. Increasingly, there was a belie that the First World War had been caused by all the powers, not just by Germany and her allies, and thus there was support or the idea o revising the more punitive clauses o the treaty. In particular, Chamberlain believed, mistakenly, that it was possible to do business with Mussolini and Hitler, and to sort out the grievances o these countries rationally and without recourse to war.
194
C H AP T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N AL R E S P O N S E TO I TALI AN AG G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 19 4 0 )
In addition, many conservative politicians saw the threat o communism as more dangerous than the threat o ascism. 3 The lack of an alternative policy Support or appeasement was ound in all political parties and there was no clear anti-appeasement party to provide a coherent political alternative. The Labour Party, which was the political party in opposition, supported collective security but did not support rearmament. 4 Economic pressures There were also economic reasons or ollowing a policy o appeasement. Already weakened severely by the First World War, the Great Depression worsened Britains economic situation urther still. By the 1 930s, Britain was acing competition rom other countries that were overtaking its industrial production. It also aced high unemployment: 3 million people were unemployed in the early 1 930s. These economic difculties made it hard to spend money on armaments; no government would be able to maintain support i it cut welare benefts in order to fnance rearmament. It was also eared that rearming too quickly would cause a balance o payments crisis, with too many imports o machinery and raw materials. For these reasons, although rearmament started again in 1 932, it was not until 1 937 that deence spending increased dramatically.
The Anti-Appeasers Some individuals did speak out against appeasement: Foreign Secretary Anthony Winston Churchill called Eden resigned in or rearmament to be February 1938 because stepped up and he disagreed with vehemently opposed Chamberlains policy concessions to Germany o appeasement o Italy. (though he did not oppose the appeasement o Mussolini over Abyssinia). He supported the idea o a Grand Alliance o the Anti-Fascist powers.
Duf Cooper was You will have seen Secretary o State or plenty o David Lows War (19351937) and cartoons in this book. then First Lord o the These appeared Admiralty in Chamberlains in the Evening Standard government until he newspaper and were resigned in protest at consistently critical o the Munich Agreement appeasement throughout in September 1938. the 1930s. Low was attacked in the right-wing press as a war-monger and his cartoons were banned in Germany.
195
2
TOK Britain was in a weak military position and, by 1 937, with threats rom Japan, Italy and Germany, this position was becoming increasingly There have been many critics o dangerous. As a result, the British Chies o Sta concluded that, until the policy o appeasement as rearmament was urther advanced, it should be the main aim o oreign pursued by Britain and France policy to reduce the number o Britains enemies. This was reiterated in in the 1930s. As you have read January 1 938 in this statement: We cannot foresee the time when our defence here, those involved at the time forces will be strong enough to safeguard our territory, trade and vital interests seem to have had a dierent against Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously. view and this perspective was supported by public opinion. 5 Global commitments In pairs discuss the extent to Britain had to consider its worldwide commitments alongside its which history looked dierent obligations to European countries and the League o Nations. Indeed, in the past. Create a poster: most politicians considered British interests to be more global than History itsel looked dierent European. Preservation and deence o the Empire was held to be in the past outlining your essential i Britain was to remain a great world power, which was its ideas. Include reerences to the priority. However, Britains imperial commitments were now so vast that material you have covered in they were becoming increasingly difcult to administer and deend. this book. In addition, the Dominions (the sel-governing parts o the British Empire, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand) made it clear at the 1 937 Imperial Conerence that they were not prepared to help Britain in another European war. 6 Defence priorities L T
A Thinking skills Worried about the cost o its expenditure, the Treasury was also putting What does the oreign pressure on the Foreign Ofce. In 1 937, the Treasury put orward a report ofce report on deence on deence expenditure in which the priorities or deence were to be, in expenditure show about order o importance: Britains expectations or a military preparation sufcient to repulse air attacks uture war? How might France the preservation o trade routes or the supply o ood and react to this report? raw materials
the deence o the Empire
the deence o Britains allies. 7 The impact of Neville Chamberlain Clearly, the fnancial pressures, the commitments o Empire and the comments rom the Chies o Sta meant that Chamberlain, when he became Prime Minister in 1 937, would have little choice but to ollow a policy that looked or conciliation rather than conrontation with Germany and Italy. However, Chamberlains own personal views also had an impact. He detested war and was determined to resolve international tension and to use negotiation and diplomacy to bring about a peaceul settlement o Europe. Chamberlain ran oreign policy very much alone, with the aid o his chie adviser, Sir Horace Wilson, but without consulting his Cabinet. He had little aith in the League or in Britains allies, France and the USA; he distrusted the Soviet Union, and he believed that Britain should take the lead in negotiating with Hitler. Right up to the moment that war broke out, Chamberlain continued to hope that he could achieve a general settlement o Europe to maintain peace.
196
W w i j w t T s t w c a 1 T G F o W r E e I i a u i H P k F w a Y R I o n m n o r a r o h n n h e o n g l G W o A h l r h 9 r n u C n d o o a e o ATL l a e a t i i i a r o v p
e
a a o l h a d h n i o C s n
l t d 2 e e H e o p F o g n d r 1 m a a c l m w n n a s e a u
n a h t n l d i
a
w e m k r
e o
0 e o t
h t t t a u a r w n y e
9 n k A c s F
t d h t
o c r h p c e
p
t c n e a a n d
i o m s c c
s r e
h a t B 3
a e P e e h s h t
w l r h e
e a e a , h n u s v a w
n n o
l h e t
l d p d h t r
d r e n
t 2 e F a
T e i t
d e e n
s n
t m w a t
e a t
f g d s h d c i w n h e
c o h
1 n t e e
G v a E t
, o i e e o l
a
h
t y d r d s L e e r r o e
s
g e F
d s t a
w e 9
e h o s c i s u , d
R b a r o F
o H d e i
w l
a
u
e r a
i m ( r
r t n h e
t 2 t . m a t y l i s
b
i t
y u n
m i t o t r y
e U 1
o m a e e o n
p h F e c c t i t s h 1 r i 2 n h i a
i 4
m h e
o g g p
o m i p h g d n t t o 9 a c h s s s r p t r
E e S r 0 c i m e e e . e , e d e h
u h t a n u n t s r e u s e
n t t r e a 2
a c 6 w
a
a a
A a h
d
p
n
i t t e
m d h G e e
m a v e s b
W
h l e ( V l t o o 6 u c t h n : t b t n M o A
r i e r y y
y o s r o r
h 1 p d e a L
s
t b t i i r
t ) e o e e s y e y y o s T o
n u o m
e p i
o o
u a c
n d n e 9
e e e i 1 i o r v o d
o o q i
. v
l s w
H a a u m t g o q i n a i t o n
L i r a . s
G l 2 t g e n 9 t r
t e c l n i c n e u G p h
n a t d T n l a
N r u E r e
d t l p
o a i s t l e e 0
o d c 3 a n
r e e F
a n t d t r
s e
e s o
e i d t e e e t d
e a
s u s c , h u m D o v a h l )
t
e 0 r
I t h t n r n n
l
a d r
r r o W a
n e E , e t h i N
D a m e a l i e p o a a i l Y e s f e
/ i m e A b e a o n i a t g m n
r
l r i
P w e t n c l n
s n t o y
i r T s
a l u p s a g o n
r
n u a
t l t m t e f e a y c , o o i m s t o o R
A a y a u d
E n t s h i
c
v
p l r t h g r t o h
d a y w n n e o m
a e t g a w n t t i c l e n
e e o
h
R e h r o s r e a o i h c s
e a a a
d
t g n a n a h d s y i
g , t
s o i A t i a
h n o c h i o a N u
s r l n a t
i e s o e
r , n t n r u s h
i n t
a
t e l v t m n t t t i l ? n
n h t l b b e e n
w V e e g
y i e t i A d h
c a e e
d i i
g n i s e t
i e F o n v
u r s d t o r i e s e p r p t
d
1 t a
u e d T v x
m i e e l
,
a = h l r t . a t r e
t n s e
e ( g
c . t a n R a
n t a o e a
r I h
i
e r s p
s e
w t
e g 9 o n u 1 w l D e h o w
O a G
F s , l t p F n p
o r e
i
l
e
u s i e n o
R
o
r B e a a 9
m o i i r t n g
a s a r t N d c 3 u i a
t
r o c e d c y e e n
a ( e 8 B r h n r c t r G i s n h e e u 2 t a v r l t l l t e y 1 a e l s e r l h
t
A s i a d u
e h l d i r i 0
a i r n
d e l p t i t e n d 0 S i a s g i m o i e k s
i n a
9 i e l n L n
e
a t h
t u d
e i t d o
e .
t o
c r
o i
o
m a r G c s n
n w e i o g s t
2
F w s
n a n r a
t s a e i n z o h a s
m n w e 1 e o i R , v 1
s
e a l s P d ?
n 7
g e r n t E n
n
t
B e n l a s l n l h
c
a 8
e a 9 T r 1 r E d e a
o ; r l r r a s b o ) t a u s e
d r n e t t
y i
p b r
, e r 7 n e r i h e m n u 3 . 9 n i S c s w e e
t r a a d p n
n m p
i
p n c e e y
l p
h F
e 0
s a t d a 0 1 C 2 a c p
e P l d n a t i w 1
u a o d h h a o a a a
e
m , e d m
r u a h
i g t
.
9 3 e p
t o ; a O z d l l a 9 i t s a o e p o n n i t a
d o
a i
n a
t s r l m
y
n 2 . G e n
o c h a b a r e N n
n 2 d e t i n p M e e
l c s y a d s
u y
c a c H w 5
b d b s r , l a d n e B n e e 5 a
o d c e o S a
b t c
a
l h
B t a e n c y )
o n p h r h o
y
i m o r n t o m
e l t t
r e E o
o l t c a n k a , r n e a l o
m 1
t e s
e u u h i d e n a
i
w d e
a a o r V
b n
r o g t t
. n
C a e i a b s d m 9 e t T c
a d o t c n t e
w a d s n o
t s r r a e l p
l p n o F e
h e d p h t n O , i 1 z e o t o F
t i n
s t i i
1 i n m n
d r h p p o t e n s v n
c a h
a r e s s
t e o d c r t 4
v r s e s e 0 t u s
. a B e . y I h u t o r l i
s s e o t c o r g a e e
e
h i
y o i s a r a , d T
s
t %
a n r t t i d I p a
h r n e l
u t
i u n
m e n
r
- o
h k A e r o k t y , t . b s l s g a h o n v s e c d w o
e
i
n l i u g W c p
d t o L i e
m e a t
u W t e w l l e e t e i o s e i d a r r a
i s h h h h l a a
r l e m s
c I d a
h a a n
s d
i e e t i v l e l o , b a i
a o
A e c g h h a y a
w n
e
o
o
y h r
n n t a
d s e i e a s d t a d n i R b e l n n N
h n
t d
n a
a v i
g h o l
o p e d d r n A s
c
n o o s
d g u t e i a r y t o
e t a t e d c
a w i a e n t u h
p p c e t
i b c e h
A
n d c
e p
s r e
e a y c . p t c
m l k
t f i b i p h
a a c
a e s a e F e n e
b G n i M
e t e p p
o , a 1 . B
e e i e t u t e o r a t c n
l t
u l e p g d r e t
a p a
t e G h h n h c e 9 D o a r
i e a l t c r t n t y u e p i n d a c o g e . e e
n r m a i m r k o r s i o 2 R e n a
o o
( , a n o o a e t r d r a e h t
e n n c
e T s
e e i 1 n m n 0 a o m w l t E d h l c w m t s a a n a e n t c e a
a
m a i
h
i i 9 n i d w e i s
t
e i s o S h
s e m n n t c o t n
t o i e e i e n h i
a e e o
s 2 y e m e e e d o n
c S
n e t a v
y n
s . i n
t
a e g n d e b
d 4 a a .
c I
e
e n s b e
t . n r
t t d n O
t . l l
t )
s n
o ?
h r y
l s t s s , t
t
y N , t l o
e
y .
( 1 9 3 C H e a 5
p x l o a P E p p w d r s a 1 e i o
m m n s a 9 u s s e
a 4 i d i g
e r M o 0 d i h m n s i
) t n D i c e
s t i a s h n u t l t a
e t e s s
d e
r t s p i
a n i e o n i t r o c e , l
1
i o t n s c 9 h u y ? 3 e r
8 a o F g r
e e n
c h
1 9 7
2
1 9 8 w A R R I 1 M p t w a m a M o n o ATL h ATL g p r a e 9 e S T h o u u
r o e
e g p p t g h v
3 u e i s s p r
h
e c r a t i B e e
e 0 i l s s l
e e h u e h r
d n i f a
r
o o
s r 6 w s d e r
i - b
s s L k a t s h . l l s m 2 i r
i i i a
e f e C
C u e s n n a i c o p , c n m o a
h h
e i v o a i i r o t m n k
s s g n g e o r a m
s n e l a
g e
i u t s o
p
t e a c n e n r
a a o n p a a i r e e t g x y n d t d e
e t a c g n
C . v p g e p
t e c
e r r o e F o s i d h r a
s e o o r e s 2 e r i w
m n a
l u m e t w ? i a a s s . i h n p 3 s c a n r s p n o
e i a e i
y t
r t l c t i o o p d e d h a n g o c
h
h e n o n e
r r s e e n i c e t
x i a
a
r
1 t d
i o
.
t t a e n s
i 1 s h l e . e
n i
a 3
e k 9 s e m t n s t s h , m r 3 i
k t a o o l s e
0 l t i e s r n
s
o l
s t n l s
s . t
i L i I E i s a c d a M i a f L h v s s T w p a u e H M f d B W t n n o o o n e h o n o
p n s n m i h e e r e s a r a n r r e c i c r r r c
m i o u o i
n m s o p o c i n s d v d e h h a n i c t
t m t u r t e u t t t b u i t e s r h o e a t n
t a T I T T I I t F e
a
e d e g , o e s e e w i y n r i
m s i t h t t t h e
l x l h a l s n r n i r i s i
h h r o a
n
i d w
h a s r
e o w d
g l b o n w s s p t B e t y t m e w l r a s o p a
i n s d t u t e e i o m y u e s a i
a l e
e k e t e e n a a e
n
t i h e v w
e n h i l u e a a
r a c U : n t i s a n r i t n a o u e e m t e r r e L S E
s d n e n o c
i s
s
t a o e s d e r k n y t s n t l g
t n l 1 i v . c y i m e S a
e o e . y
u h a
n c v
n e i s
n
h
e c e a
i d e M l a c t e e i
s H w c
l d A a , i o v o n T o
y
e e r l m o , d n r h s l
e
9
e v h
.
p t s
h F d s e
g o o e o M I i a I
u h
i e s
o F e i . d e r t u
. t e e e H b t v L l d
a a t o
r
u t a t e n
h p p g a
g
a 3 V w r a i n t r a t
e
a I t s h t e e r n i e e n a s l c o t a a o i e r d g e e o a n g e n n
l s l e e
l t r
n
e m o
a h p U y e y o m e y g a w y 0 i n N e
, n w w o r
o r c t e n r c
s n n g
t s t c
e
v e
e l i n e
t J
n a s w n c l t
m d h t
h e c e 1 i
a e o i s u i i h e
a e s i s n s a n o s u a
e r h x a p n e o n t r d e e n
i n s w 9 e t e t r
e s v e h h e n i i r t
o d e e
t
a a h e i
r m r
g e e g
t l
i
t
i , h
3 d d s t
n i w e
a H i d i l u
a s r u F a l n e
b
p
o a . i n n n o 1 . p a c s n e H i
B 8 i
r e t
i n
i l s n i a r i c l o a a J
o D i d g o e h f
9 B o , i
g t s c b l t
w F a t t u i r
c i
t e n a e i r t i c . g w a
a h r N
r
o n 3 e t B n l
t i u l i e t l
w n
a n a y l e l e w e p o r p l m l h t u r
d e n e r y a o r i t v 0 e s e s
a i l c n s r e n a
o c r t
e
n a h e t , d t u e s i e p m n d r 1 c s e s c e o o r t t a
c r i i o h a t y a d w
n n s
i . i l t
o t n t r h i i m n r
9
n n o u n t o t t e F t
r
? l s t s e i m a w
B e n t , t o l s i a a G o
o
t e d w 3 a r t
n o d
l G r d
o F n w t a v
a h e w d s
r n c m b m C
s n s a a h m i 6 a t e
a s a i
n a a a . i i r a e d p e t s
u c t n d t . s a
t s n a s , c r r d i g i m h o
a
c s
e u h r s s R
a
l
t
i t i t t
o m s s t H
i i b o c o c o o o t a t t m l
o
u h h n a o l e i s e p
e o
i a w i h m b
h u e y
i d i n g i r m v
b t o g n v e c r s
n
r t a n
p l
n
o
e a a g
e e i g i i G e L
. i t s e t h t n i o w h h e l i e n t n n d m o
e g t e r n y
c h h a a
h
o i s d s e r W
n t t w P e m e C a m e y y t h l g s
e t r e r e n t a
n
h
e - e
a i t s r o e n d
c
i o o b t . e c t
t
r v x o n w t h e t
o
i c
g p m h b m e h i o r
o t a l r
- q P o a z p m
i t e p p u
e e e i t h t u e d t n l i e
w e e n
e i a p v g u r o h u
e o r a t r h e a
a n o e n a d n
r g
e
n i , d
d i t t g o t e L n n e p e
a i m n n
e l i n c s l t c
w e
i h
g u
c r t a n . e e
r u l s t o F w t s e
t
i u
s n o
s h y t B y e
y i o e e
p s h a . z a l r h r s
A e e i g a l
n r i n a w
e l r l
d i .
v e
s , o e e w s b
r r o D a c u l a r b
n a
c j g F i
M e p l t
s a
s o i
a
l F e r d o t n h w s l n o w w t t r i t L t e
F u e g s i g r a a e i d
n l i w
h a u
a
v i o s
l a o o o o a c l
w e a a v e r
t s l F n e h a e o a e
i S h i t i a e a n r h a o e a
g k l a n g c
r e
i n n n e r r n s r i s i c u t i
h e i s t n
d
e n t i r g i n u e c v
o s n t
h t
t t s e m s y
r k
d n s i a p
i t o h s o i s d h
u
h
t a
r s c o o i e n g m e s h n
e
i e w m t
u
h o t t e a e
o g n e b
e i a e i
d w s o
n m s t i r r t e i
w e e t l p w i t
l e r c t e
a c , g s i
i n o , i m
o o
r n t w
m
t t
h r U t l
e m t r
o i F
i r i l L g e , e o s a f o
i n a s s a
o r o 1 a z a d n e v
t
t a t
o r o r a
S i
i 1 t e n n
b
e i s s c t r y
y n 9 s e t h p g a a n e a
d h o d t a s m r t
A y u 9 o i
d t e a t
s d e 3 n n n P l s o g a e n e
s e e
s e e h e
a e t e
r c 2 l m u
r s a r p ,
e 0 u m o
r l e , n
i o , d m i a b c
l d
i e o
i n d s e e i
p z
a 6 t F i r l n 1 l s o e i s
e
t F t a w
y t t a m i t
i n t e s s
o c e t s o p g e .
i h r a o 1 . t t a n 9 n l d
b s
r n
o . w
c c o d e a o e s d
c w n l n t a t n T t n a 9 o 3 e i d
y a a
i i g h u E y s t h
e h n n
n
i
l w c s a n h
c 2 c r e l o 4 s n
l r
i a a l
s i o o M n c t e y e p
a c B t n t i g s y t r e o l e
n c 0 e . s
s s
t a o h o i r c h
r u
i
d s o o
t e
v g m e
n t
y r
e r s n t t a a s n i c o i o h
P n t u o l a
i l l i - e n . . , n i i t
n a t a n t t e b t s d i
n l s
g s a e r l b w i a m o p i r e c o l a T
i i t t t
e t h e i n d
e h t
g e a k l n i s i y a m e t
s m i i 1 h i e l i
c t t c
r t e
n
u s i
t o t e i n s t
e e s o e 9 r a e t e t
i o t i r h i , e ,
i t n . o i
y g s r c
m 3 o l
s a t v -
e y
n
y , e
0
e
n
e
s s
:
C H AP T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N AL R E S P O N S E TO I TALI AN AG G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 19 4 0 )
What was the impact of US foreign policy on the international response to the expansionist powers? As has been discussed in Chapter 1 .3, the USA did not join the League o Nations in 1 91 9 and it pursued a policy o isolationism in the inter-war period. The USA wanted to be ree to engage in trade and investment globally and wished to avoid being drawn into conicts that were not in its own interests. This policy continued during the 1 930s and was strengthened by the impact o the Great Depression and by public opinion, which was staunchly anti-war. Memories o the First World War also remained resh in the minds o Americans. US isolationists advocated a policy o non-involvement in the aairs o both Europe and Asia. In 1 935, the USA passed the Neutrality Act designed to keep the USA out o a possible European war by banning the sale o armaments Franklin D Roosevelt, US president from 1933 to belligerents.
Source skills A.J.P. Taylor. The Origins of the Second World supply. President Roosevelt could provide only War (1961). moral exhortation; and this was the very thing which Western statesmen eared. It would tie American isolationism completed the isolation their hands in dealing with Hitler and Mussolini; o Europe. Academic commentators observed, it would work against the concessions which rightly, that the problem o the two dictators they were ready to make. Great Britain and would be solved, i the two World Powers, France had already too much moral capital; Soviet Russia and the United States, were what they lacked was material strength. None drawn into European aairs. This observation was orthcoming rom the United States. was a desire, not a policy. Western statesmen would have grasped eagerly at material backing First question, part a 3 marks rom across the Atlantic. This was not on oer. What, according to AJP Taylor, was the impact o The United States were unarmed except in the USAs policy o isolationism? the Pacifc; and neutrality legislation made it impossible or them to act even as a base o
What was the impact of Soviet foreign policy on the international response to the expansionist powers? Western hostility towards the Soviet Union also aected its response to Italian and German aggression. The Western democracies had cut o all diplomatic and economic ties with the Bolshevik government in 1 91 7 and had invaded Russia in an attempt to overthrow the new regime. This ailed, but the USSR was not included in the Paris Peace talks and the Russian Bolshevik leader, Vladimir Lenin, had called the League o Nations, on its oundation, a band o robbers. Relations remained hostile until the end o the 1 920s when some diplomatic links and economic agreements were made. Britain remained particularly concerned with the potential threat rom communism and, ollowing a red scare in 1 927, did not restore diplomatic links until 1 930.
199
2
Source skills A Soviet poster by D. Melnikova, produced in Moscow, in the Soviet Union, June 1930. The text reads Proletarians of all countries, Unite! . First question, part b 2 marks What is the message o the artist in this poster? L T
A Thinking and social skills Look at the details o this Soviet poster. In pairs or groups, discuss how the Western democracies o the 1930s might have reacted to this Soviet propaganda.
The Soviet Union under Stalin (rom 1 929) wanted to build socialism in one
L Communication T country, which meant that it would not commit to exporting the revolution A and social skills until the process was complete in the USSR. Nevertheless, the activities o Work in pairs. Create a diagram the Communist International in Europe and Asia alarmed the democracies. to show the actors infuencing Stalins oreign policy began to shit away rom hostility towards the West the policy o appeasement that when the Soviet Union became threatened by the expansionist policies o France and Britain took towards Japan in Asia, and by Hitlers stated aim o acquiring Lebensraum in the East Mussolini and Hitler in the 1930s. o Europe at the expense o the Soviet Union. Between 1 931 and 1 932, Stalin signed non-aggression pacts with Aghanistan, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and France. There was a tangible shit in Soviet oreign policy towards the pursuit o a Popular Front against ascism. To this end, the Soviet Union joined the League o Nations in 1 934 and signed mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia in 1 935. Class discussion However, the aim o orming a Popular Front against ascism ailed Should the Western because Britain and France were ollowing a policy o appeasement. democracies have worked with It was clear to the Soviet Union during the Spanish Civil War that the USSR to orm a Popular Britain in particular eared communism more than ascism. The fnal Front against Fascism? What catalyst or the Soviet Union to abandon its attempts to work with the advantages would this have British and French in order to contain the ascist aggressors came at the had? Why were the Western Munich Conerence in September 1 938. Despite its assistance pact with democracies reluctant to ally Czechoslovakia and the territorially strategic importance o that country with the USSR? to the Soviet Union, Stalin was not invited to the Munich Conerence.
200
C H AP T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N AL R E S P O N S E TO I TALI AN AG G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 19 4 0 )
What was the international response to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 193536? Both the French and the British had attempted to keep Mussolini on side as a key guarantor o the post-war settlement, specifcally to contain German ambitions to unite with Austria. As previous chapters have described, the three countries had come together to orm the Stresa Front in March 1 935. At this meeting, the French gave Mussolini the impression that they would tolerate an Italian expansion in East Arica. French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval had suggested that Italy could go ahead and acquire political inuence in Abyssinia, as the French interests there were only economic. Although the French had not condoned a military takeover o the country, Mussolini believed at this point that they would not resist. Britain had been silent on the matter o Abyssinia when Mussolini mentioned his plans during the Stresa Conerence. Mussolini hoped this meant Britain would have the same attitude as the French. The Italians were concerned about the potential British response to military action, particularly as the British could threaten to attack the Italian navy. The British demonstrated that they wanted to appease Italian expansionist plans when Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden went to Rome in June 1 935, with a plan that would give Italy the Ogaden region o Abyssinia and compensate Emperor Haile Selassies Abyssinia with access to the sea via British Somaliland. The Italians now saw that Britain wanted to accommodate them, and so they rejected the plan. This perception was urther reinorced by a report Italy had acquired rom the British oreign ofce, stating that Britain would not resist an Italian invasion o Abyssinia. When Mussolini invaded Abyssinia in October 1 935, there was widespread international public outrage and condemnation rom the League o Nations. British public opinion was against the invasion and in avour o action by the League. As there was a general election in Britain in November 1 935, public opinion at the time was all the more important; a pro-League stance had helped the National government to secure power in November 1 935. However, as you will see rom the sequence o events below, the League proved ineective in dealing with the crisis.
Source skills
Source A convey a warning to Mussolini, as he recalls Laura Fermi, Jewish-Italian writer and in The Gathering Storm: To cast an army o political activist, who emigrated to the USA nearly a quarter-million men, embodying the in 1938 to escape from Mussolinis Italy, in ower o Italian manhood, upon a barren Mussolini (1966). shore two thousand miles rom home, against the goodwill o the whole world and without In England, in view o the coming elections, command o the sea, and then in this position the peace ballot, and public opinion, the embark upon what may well be a series o government embraced an all-out policy campaigns against a people and in regions in avor o the League o Nations and the which no conqueror in our thousand years imposition o economic sanctions on aggressor ever thought it worthwhile to subdue, is to nations. At the end o September Winston give hostages to ortune unparalleled in all Churchill spoke in London and tried to history.
201
2
It is tempting to speculate what eect While taking up a position against the these words may have had on Mussolini, Ethiopian war and or the Leagues policies, i he read them, as C hurchill believed he Great Britain was unofcially assuring France did. The chance seems negligible that at that she would try to water down the sanctions this late date, committed as he was to the on Italy, i imposed, and connived with France Ethiopian war by both the atalistic drive in an embargo on arms to Ethiopia through o his own determination and the amount the control o the port o Djibouti, the only o money he had spent in the undertaking, access to Abyssinia rom the sea. It is said that Mussolini would have allowed this warning Haile Selassie, placing pathetic confdence in to dissuade him. (To an interviewer rom traditional British justice, could not understand the Morning Post, he said that the cost o why it was so difcult to procure the modern preparation was already 2 billion lire 1 00 arms and equipment he needed and was trying million pre-war dollars and asked C an so desperately to buy. But then, during the you believe that we have spent this sum war, the unofcial embargo was lited, in part or nothing?) at least. Source B A cartoon by David Low, published in the UK newspaper, the Evening Standard, on 24 July 1935.
The text reads On the throne of justice. See no Abyssinia; Hear no Abyssinia; Speak no Abyssinia. First question, part b 2 marks Second question 4 marks What is the message o the cartoonist in With reerence to its origin, purpose and content Source B? assess the values and limitations o Source A or historians studying the international response to the Abyssinian crisis in 1 93536.
202
T M t t c s r N p r s t c s O A p o o A o M a t d b D v h h h o e a a h o o
o s I p e i r r h u n e C e b t e
n ATL n a l n n
e e o u e e u e a m i o g
c T a s H t
M v s y
p e
t
s r 2 d c l c c p d l l h u i s t A 7 t u s p T a o a T o S A m O A O O O L h , p i e s a s n A e p t t e p e i o s c a
i 8 i a a u n r i u
p i h n n o o s i e i n s r r e r t r d n o b P s n n n n
i y O n n i l t o o r b e t
i l t e o t r r e e n e a p e n s d m r s
e e
S e n k y
l e
e t T s h o
n n m k i i i e 1 1 i e
r s
c r I i v g d r t l h 2 1 7 6
g
n n s t c
s o d e
e s E s n i t r o r i i e n A H t i o t e e s s r 1 9 a u r
i
a a . s
e e a 0 7
n t o o p a l b a
g
w
o t a R e p a r i l
l , l b J D l
d o
i M
a a w
e , h n a n s l . y i A
e
n c i g a
n b e t M J n i n s o g u t
a i
n
e d M M l o
s r
. m o i e e g . E e i s e a g p u n 2 d r e a u r t
o e t e y n u
n
i m
t t s u i a i T
s o m u o
c h B T a ; n a l a r n m l l o n w d l d a . n r
p
s a a p ,
u e o s
s y u , s i e h n c 6 J E n
e r e y h
h 3 t
r y n
n n
t d y r h
e a o s S E b s M B p h
s a m t m e u o l a p i
d r e a . :
. d
c e
o a o , i h d , s , t l e u s e e o S F s
E a
r i e O t e i
a r
t e
s i S l h a
i
W e l T a i l
l w u t B s m e y b a s i s y e , p r t l i s e p u s r b n U n l m , p i r
i m e h d n
t s l H
, c
d
o
n t , n e e
e n s o
t l o p r o e p 1 l e
a h a
g e t
L l 1 i
t t S i
a e i s e e H
i w r n o r E a p e i t A
c t
s t
r o m h p i
n o 9
t v t o t e f e o 9 s w a t
A
t h m . e h n t s
s i o o c r s
c i e u L 1
b i r o s r 3 a e a d e
o H l s a a f I c r 3 d , s t
o u o
e b h i
a o
r
r i t a
h N e t 9 t e g n t r
d
b 5 t
i n n d w h a f e l . 5 t
c h i s o
a n i i r u l a t
e
n
v
a r u t
c a 3 h e
t T m s , g I c h e
i s i w e c t s o T n e , i g r . r o e
M
a s t . a e a t g a o t u h
l t r e E 5
t a r
e c t
g k
e h
o o a e
a e t d
A u , r i l d p u H . H o p h h e
a
s i t h r e , y R c o
o s
i l d d o L v u
b p d
e d b
h S u s p
y q a l l e
y e F i
S o e a
o
a a n
t N l l d e y e s r a u c s y L s e i e o o l e d
o e
u s p o
t
h t r e n
r i w n
t
k l s r s a h n h
g w e s o A d
e l p l l I a a a r l y s o n e d p w l a e n ; o e y s e e t a n s l
a t c i
c a T
a e
e e n n l
a
a o m i s a t a o e
y r h
t l
n i m s l e g n t t i d d s I a g l i b v o n y a i S t o e a i l c d n w i n s l n h
d n r O o o n d s o n e p e c o
u
y
i e u o c
v i e o r
t e
n i a t N c o
t I e a w u g e f
o t s N d a i . t e . n a r
e i e a o t l i e n t t n
r
e
H n
o , o
b
v
a i h p n
t a c a t I
o r T t A o
s n I e a
a d I e
t L a u s o i t t s t l r s e o c g a t m i t ,
p l t z i
d
h L o t a
v g e h
a h w p
y s a t p e s a h r t
s
l l l i a
e
a a B e s
l i s t a d
d i e n t h l
a i l e
c a e l
e a o e l
s p I e a u m R e l h i r r d
G h e m e a i a i i r l t r
o
s r e
w s
e i
r c g a e b b a r e d n
o , M a I B s r d e s p e E o L n g o m e t a i e
, d i
a
b u t n s n e i a i e
. l a t s
a
s t a L a
e p e
S r a
t l d n s r y d o F S
h a a e
e l W e u
r a i t
s r l i s r I
a k m e n l l e P w o M w e z
a t l o
r s u t e r x b
a i t
i i
t A s g u s i a i r e t s t d g e o k e
h a o a o a n O g h m t a s i t u p s s n e a h o a e a
u n g u d
o
t s n i n
l h b b e t r p o
e l
N w e o h s n s o d i i r i r
o
e
u
2 e e
o d s y s l a o S
A
r c c , s l t a c W
a k t S r n d i i m g p y
. i s e a e e 5 o o a e i a v e n o
s h o r s n
S t I n
e o o b E o F - n
g m l
r n s
e s t
I r c
u
e a n
o i e e u c , y o a u p i J E v g a t n y l i
v r g
r e d g c
r t
d o l d i n o t a T a
r u q i
g i o b e e c a l o t e e r
p s e n a s t
n L o o e w t i
r i O l o s m t i e e a l s s n z u v n i
l d r a r o n
i s n
i d i a e t y m
o o e F l y i w
t o a s
s
n i
t a I e
n i
t A e t w n r e s h
a C
n c I a d
, m s
r
a t t z r n
b o r l m
t
d
A T b s e o a o i a
u a e w g i n r
y a a a I
n p . w
o a a d t a r s u I e A i
s m e i t s i n l d
r u o t t v .
d n t n e s e o
s
d t y i a n e t
a g
e L t r r i
a l t a m
d
t w c e r c a i e T r n o s .
k i a l
, a a n a i s t s h q e c I r
B b l c c v u y A
h l c e
n
h l
h r n T t t A i l l e a e
s t p o o e t e e o u m y d a a , i
e n s s e r o a d r
h e b
h N s
e a n w o
p
l
s u w i ( u ,
s i n i r d a e c p e t
L
n
a
y t
p
r i a s b a
e i g
m o d b N
s l t o
i e B p p o a i
m t a s
g A e l
e t d s d n s p o r
a s s
e h l u a i
s n o p s l
w s i s a o a i r G e
t r h s e a B m
i e n s e
v
g n e n g m
a i s e n b n i
o c o I t t a g
r , i r G n r .
t d t a n n
c a n p t i i
n n
d
u r
i c e a v l m d u o i
r h o s n o T a t c e I n t R
i s d o s r t
a e i
t t i c
t u e s a a n i
v r u e o a l m s n e t
f h e u s a
t
o e n m E g s t
s
i h h i r n . b c t h e e e , t
t s F a i i n s s
e c
e d e n h s
u r r S e
h n o h a b i e p e m
e m d
i a n a
r , d d e e n i
t s i e S s r t n e n
h
n e s o e 1 s
t n o
t g
b a g h
s
e p i r I h
a
d i n a u s i n 3 E
h a s o
i a t u O n s n e n , t o n n e e
c 7 r
s a
o s
t N
o d t r n n r e h d d
)
s d
, t
.
(
1 9 3 5 1 9 4 0 ) 2 0 3
2
Even when the Italians used chemical weapons in Abyssinia, the League ailed to take urther action. The HoareLaval Pact In their attempt to maintain the Stresa Front against a resurgent Germany, the French and British came up with an appeasing plan to end the confict and the tension it had caused. In December 1 935, French oreign secretary, Pierre Laval and British counterpart, Samuel Hoare drew up the HoareLaval Pact, which sought to paciy Mussolini by giving him most o Abyssinia. Selassie would receive access to the sea. However, the plan was leaked in the French press. Public opinion in both Britain and France was outraged by this apparent duplicity and demanded support or the Leagues policy. The British and French governments were orced to denounce the pact and sanctions continued. Laval and Hoare resigned.
Abyssinia (1 935) and bordering countries The Hoare Laval proposal
R E e D at ANGLO- S or te E ct EGYPTIAN a A e ) or ot H ct r IS SUDAN e P IT IT ot ITA en R AL r L YEMEN d (B IA YEMEN P IA A N en N E d ER RIT A ITR RE Adowa EA A Aden Adowa Asab Aden FRENCH Djibouti (French) SOMALILAND Djibouti BRITISH BRITISH Addis Ababa Addis Ababa SOMALILAND SOMALILAND ABYSSINIA Ogaden ABYSSINIA Desert
D D INDIAN N INDIAN N LA LA OCEAN LI LI A OCEAN A M M O O S S N A N LI IA A L Mogadishu IT TA UGANDA Mogadishu I KENYA KENYA Lake Victoria 0 300 km
TANGANYIKA TANGANYIKA
BRITISH FRENCH ITALIAN Assigned Italian sphere of to Italy economic inuence
204
C H AP T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N AL R E S P O N S E TO I TALI AN AG G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 19 4 0 ) L T
A Thinking and communication skills Read this source. Discuss the key impact o the HoareLaval Pact on domestic politics in Britain and France. Using this source, identiy political opposition to appeasing Mussolini that existed in Britain and France. A.J.P. Taylor. 1961. The Origins of the Second World War (1961) pages 126127. Early in December Hoare took the plan to Paris. Laval welcomed it. Mussolini, warned by his equally erring experts that the war was going badly, was ready to accept it. The next step was to present it at Geneva; then, with the Leagues concurrence, to impose it on the Emperor o Abyssinia a beautiul example, repeated at Munich, o using the machinery o peace against the victim o aggression. But something went wrong. Hardly had Hoare let Paris on his way to Geneva than the so-called Hoare-Laval plan appeared in the French press. No one knows how this happened. Perhaps Laval doubted whether the National government were solidly behind Hoare and thereore leaked the plan in order to commit Baldwin and the rest beyond redemption. Perhaps Herriot, or some other enemy o Lavals, revealed the plan in order to ruin it, believing that, i the League were efective against Mussolini, it could then be turned against Hitler. Maybe there was no design at all, merely the incorrigible zest o French journalists At any rate the revelation produced an explosion in British public opinion. The high-minded supporters o the league who had helped to return the National government elt cheated and indignant Baldwin rst admitted that the plan had been endorsed by the government; then repudiated both the plan and Sir Samuel Hoare. Eden took Hoares place as Foreign Secretary. The Hoare-Laval plan disappeared. Otherwise nothing was changed. The British government were still resolved not to risk war. The results o the international response to the Abyssinian crisis The HoareLaval pact sealed the fate of the League of Nations in 1 935. It had been exposed as a sham. The attention of Britain and France was drawn away from East Africa and closer to home when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland in March 1 936. France was prepared to let Mussolini complete his conquest in return for his support against Hitler, and the French would not support any further action regarding sanctions.
Source skills Telegram from Haile Selassie to the League its efforts to secure respect for the covenant, of Nations, 6 May 1936. and that it should decide not to recognize territorial extensions, or the exercise of an We have decided to bring to an end the most assumed sovereignty, resulting from the illegal unequal, most unjust, most barbarous war of recourse to armed force and to numerous our age, and have chosen the road to exile in other violations of international agreements. order that our people will not be exterminated and in order to consecrate ourselves wholly First question, part a 3 marks and in peace to the preservation of our What, according to Haile Selassie, should the empires independence ... we now demand League of Nations do in response to Italian that the League of Nations should continue aggression in Abyssinia?
205
2
2 0 6 w G A G s S S L W J a S ATL u e e t e o s T o a o a u
r a n t a l h
o t t t a h u u t a c r g c e o
i a c o d t T h b 1 a i E T C a M t h s s I v E c t A M c
s c i e h
r u n r h n r
r
t e h h c t c l h o 1 s d h
g w y i a 2 e h
e m a r c c a o o ? d a r b e
L a h l e k c
l H i u e o u e i
9 n v l n
e l
e n i w t e l e e f v e e i
u m e y i t l l G n l d m o k o i
i o i h m d u a 3 s e s a u e a g r i
= o
n a b d a l w s
o n s f g
r s A s e i s i e i A e s n
r 6 f e y
r s n
g o u d s l n u n
i g o s o f p 1 o o N . I h k
e t
i r a a a l n y i
.
u s k y c t b
t E i o n E , p e
m
n g n L l l i 8
o a i o t n h p
n a .
a G o S i d b e e X t i i m y l i t s a
3
g n t e c n , n i l a l h m l u h t e b g
a f d r n 2
e o i b
s a s i a n o
l
I
o i h o a p g a l w i t a i i l
t t a s y s
O k n e s t m d r e
o f
l a u E n d B g h e
l e i b
n a e
b s s X s s
d N o t p r s
g n
t h b o s r r u r
c t
G A l e h a e o e e b s
s o i
s b l h I n
t a a y e i
i S i a t t o
e
t z g F t a t n o a h . i i e r a l
r d e t i . w A h
e h a e
n o r o
e y c z U i
n a n s a r a t a H
n n o e g o o e C l o f e o
s
i
m e g b o b n d l z e
- i g y t a U n h
a n a s o a
w 4
m a
o
a s i d r h M y u s r e ,
- i L s
n
, n I C p a u g a o n l 0 s a
e K n c p v t r e t s e a o / e n r , V e n e t l l
h
a i t a m - r s
i e x e
d
. a
i r s t t
a a r
n g s
i m o i i
l 1
b l k b h i h e o d n o p n n t
, A a e n i n s r g
i i n s
9 t o o e c a l I e e a r l d n p e a s i e i e u i e o s d o n i t h s d n l c 3 u m r a t
w c s n a
e o s a d e
w r R h i e , r d
e o h
n 5
m t m
e
t d l i
r t t y , a
r b n , a e e e i o i t e
a r . . r o s t
s n o a
r b h g
s d s u r a a o e b s d t
, d o T p o n y
i
a u
h g , g e c v d
e u
n
p n o a t
h n i N r e C a r
k h i r t
o e r y
n g n i d n d i s
e F e
t e s t i p l s n
1 r a i w n L D p
i r B c s j a U I S i
a e n o v
e o t e d t b s
o s n s o s
r
t o e u a o t
8 i A r e e e r e A d e s
a r r a
l e g e S t o
n g n i r u a
n c m r s s o b o i e m p o r
a i l . 9 o w r
r s p l
e s d A u o b e G r t s o o a n g
d 1 r i 1 e d , a p g e g i p v p 6 a n o d . i o a
y p o o n n s y
n m g e
t a 9
g
t
e 0 t u
T h o e a i i . n s , e a r s p M u r t
o u w s n n r n t a
y n -
n ,
0 i a r I
o e t
h e r y a T e r n s c u r
i
A i r p e d i , t l r e
i h
t a
l e , t
i n a t i
w o m u n
s i
t a o e t a n d A o 0 n
v o n r b l d
w S i s d n e r i
e
t l t r m l - n c s
i a o t
0 o t
s e a r r
i a o i i e h h d v G e o a o
l U d s
s t e t e a i a t o c d
a n
l 0 t s
o l
t o n o y , e d m
r e b w e m a w
d w d n e a e n e o S t t
h
m w
B u
r
l
h
, F r
o a i m d s s n
o
n
b s S i
a r a
i
e a b o c E , s r . n
r t o r
e t
s e e
o
R , n b e i u a r t e k t h a y e n
H
m
r i e v
h o t
r e m m h c c d
n
n
n i c
h t r i a o n
o h e s
2 e p a o h c t , e e o e
e a ,
w s g
d
e s i i
n n L
, M
n d
m r
n u
I i e e d t e r e n t t i s i e a p v a a ,
t n
e a i i a
c y l g e a t o w d S S 1 F u I c i o s
, u r s a t p t
n
1
p o o e ,
s g a a t i n s e
i o i o
d o n t u r a s n s e o o S
h w I s a m h t F I w r w c s t V A I a m m l c m i s g
n e
a
n c i e r d n a n u r r
t n o a r o e a a a e o a z c o n e o r n e i d o
c .
e c o e s c y e i
i g e i i e a y t o y u i r
s
g p t p e i u r v t n t t n s d t t s d b d o u u c e H c e L s m h s r v
s a d d i e h
h h m n i s n e a s e t e t l o
o n
c r e
t q
n .
o r o p
i i
d t o
b
e
o i u u
o n m c e B
h e d
c e r n c o
o
g
w s g I z b
n T u t n a e t I n s t
S
i e d m n h b t
n e p m a p l
o e i a n i t n w m u t n s e h
A
y n h a
e s b t a o i d a a a e y e
s k u m t n e
t s o t
t h n t i , i n o l c e e s
a , l e
t 3 p
h n s
n y , l o z p b
s
b o
c i e
S y
n n a t t t s
y h w e c g e
t a t
i t r
e e i . e 0 e h t y h n e e
r . c
b v n u e n h n
w
n
r . o i p
e
o t o n
t h i
d n b t I e e h
t e
c s h r y s H e e a e e i , t o r o p
c e J h o t
r a c h r
n
s
e h c e h t u
t t c t s R ,
d
l
y i c o t e
b u
p
c S r e i r h
I c s e 1 w h c a
s a
h e a g o h a e e r n h o o t
e t
u o s o y v d t u
n o o
h r a y w 9 e m e t o r
a
c
e
c a w t e n s i i i o
e o b s o m i a o p I c s n f l e m y o
i r a s c l
3 o l J l n s n t
f p w h n e i t l
t r i r i l k n .
n
a n , B e o , a a n e y p c l
w 5 n n a r i h t o
r e i a
d e
l l b i t g g e T r u h
t i p o l a d o
d r t e
t e p l n
r . s . i
c t e W a e i s t i o e
e h a a b c
d d o
o h o
i t a a s l r e e o
c e h e e w l t
s
l c r t
a t o
t s o e e u w
a U h n n n i
n s d
o e a . n i d c y e l h e A h i a e t
z s p t C
r
s p i l h o t
d e
a h t
e
s S l d o s . u g t n u
i i h H
a y h
L i E o o w
h e
i i k o n c o t n v h i e l e i y t s A e e g n u t r t t i
s h n l e
n e r a m t i e o v e c d l e o t o g
s e i
i r l c y h i r
s
e e i u a b a o e n w
a l
t o M o
e r
y
e e t l
s
a d
a
, i t L 1 a w h d O s p t e o t g w n y d
n A
t s r t
i
n n h s n
b h
d h a o i r d i A s t m 8 s , f
m m u i e e
a s
s t y l
o n h
o h d d r i e
a e F i
i K a u e l o s e
i
c n n a i c r t e m e d e
o b n a o N
n n
i o i
e e n , i y r n
h
a e n
i r e h i b n
c t
c g .
r n j d e i i c D e a n r
n r s
m
t
B o c e n o
n o l
r
h h o t e m t i t i u a a
i , h
t g t e i n i t t . o o s e a g
a b o h s
v r t s n t a t h h r h
t u n i d u n a e h t e w o h c
l t e e t r , d t
t
o y e w e i n e o A
y e
a e h d r d d e s ;
h e e i n o
t e u
r t e a a o m
n
a
n i a p d d
l r
r h n o r e e . A i o 1 n e b l a e n l
m r s . r o m d y
s s
d n g t e t c i t s
n
n B u e 5 e .
b r a a b i e b
h m o o p h v
, C
a
i o
c n
l o f a o
a t b o
G y e
I , s
o r y
a u a y
l n o e P i a J
l i 4 n
o i n
g o e c t r e r a c
a i
I o l
n n s a u n t n e u a t n u y
e
t B
n h v
u
n a l , d s
h t J n 1 c b I 1 S w o d
l l
l n t t c d t g r o i h e s i t t e r a y l u
y
a u 9 h h o n e 9 a t n t , n t h a h
e
n i u e o d . z e
r n i
l
t 3 l r u 3 e
i i l t t l g
v y o e
z e
v
a a s T
- n a i l e a o h
t 6 h
8 t , , a
e o
i e r n h i
h a
n t
g a r
e
n , a e
n t
t a o
t
e ,
e n h d i . n
l r
l d
e
d
C H AP T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N AL R E S P O N S E TO I TALI AN AG G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 19 4 0 )
Source C Article 1 6 o the Covenant and o collective Extract from speech by Haile Selassie to the security? It is collective security: it is the very League of Nations, June 1936. existence o the League o Nations. It is the value o promises made to small states that their I, Haile Selassie, Emperor o Abyssinia, am here integrity and independence be respected and today to claim that justice which is due to my ensured it is the principle o the equality o people and the assistance promised to it eight states In a word, it is international morality months ago when fty nations asserted that that is at stake. aggression had been committed in violation o international treaties What real assistance First question, part a 3 marks was given to Ethiopia by the fty-two nations What key criticisms o the Leagues response to the who had declared the Rome Government guilty Abyssinian Crisis are made in Source C? o breach o the Covenant and had undertaken to prevent the triumph o the aggressor? Second question 4 marks I noted with grie, but without surprise that With reerence to its origin, purpose and content, three powers considered their undertakings assess the values and limitations o Source B or under the Covenant as absolutely o no value historians studying the international reaction to What, then, in practice, is the meaning o the Abyssinian crisis.
Without doubt, the international response to the Abyssinian crisis had a L T
A Thinking and social skills proound eect on European diplomacy. It had atally undermined the League o Nations as a credible body or dealing with aggressor states. It In pairs or small groups, read also ended the Stresa Front. Both France and Britain believed ater this Source A and discuss the key conict that appeasement was the only route they could take to avoid a points it makes. Discuss the conict with Hitlers Germany. Thus the crisis had shited the balance o reasons it gives for British power to Germanys advantage. Mussolini would now move towards a hesitation. To what extent do ull alliance with Hitler. you agree that Frances position held Britain back? Source skills A cartoon by David Low, published on 4 October 1935, Research and L T The man who took the lid off. A communication skills In pairs, research headlines and press reports on the invasion of Abyssinia from around the world in October 1935. Make sure you reference your sources appropriately and include a correctly formatted works cited list. Present your headlines and press reports to the class and assess whether there was international consensus against the Italian action.
First question, part b 2 marks What is the message o the cartoon?
207
2
TOK How did the USA respond to the invasion of In small groups explore a range of Abyssinia? historians accounts on the Abyssinian President Roosevelt sent Mussolini a personal message on 1 8 August Crisis. Discuss what distinguishes a 1 935. He stated that the US government and people believed that better account from a more limited one. the ailure to arrive at a peaceul settlement in East Arica would be Is it the range and quality of the sources a calamity and would lead to adverse eects or all nations. used in the account and the depth of However, the United States would not take any direct action, as supporting evidence? Is it the time was made clear in a radio address by Secretary o State Hull on 6 and context it was written in? Is it the November 1 935. In this broadcast, he said it was the USAs duty language and expression used by the to remain aloo rom disputes and conicts with which it had no historian? Does your group agree on direct concern. which accounts are better?
Source skills The Secretary of State to the United peace, whereas ater hostilities began our chie States Delegation at Geneva, by telegram, object is and will be to avoid being drawn into Washington, October 17 1935, 6.00pm. the war October 1 5, 8 p.m. It is important that, i First question b 3 marks possible, daily newspaper rumors and reports What key points are made in this source with rom Europe about the attitude or policy o regards to the US response to the Italian invasion this Government toward some phase o the o Abyssinia? Italo-Ethiopian controversy, and especially reports that oreign governments or agencies Second question 4 marks are just about to inquire o this Government With reerence to its origin, purpose and content, whether it can or will cooperate with oreign assess the values and limitations o this source or Governments or peace agencies in one way historians studying the international response to or another, shall be minimized to the greatest the Italian invasion o Abyssinia. possible extent Every leading ofcial abroad knows that prior to the outbreak o the war our chie purpose was to aid in preserving
The end of the appeasement of Mussolinis Italy How did Britain and France respond to the Italian invasion of Albania, 7 April 1939? Britain, along with France, condemned the Italian invasion o Albania and, as Italy had previously guaranteed the sovereignty o the Balkans, this was a turning point or Chamberlain. He no longer trusted the dictators and now went as ar as to guarantee Greek borders with British military support. Churchill had urged a more direct response by sending in the Royal Navy, but Chamberlain did not agree. Mussolini was, however, surprised at the appeasers commitment to Greece.
208
C H AP T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N AL R E S P O N S E TO I TALI AN AG G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 19 4 0 ) L T
A Thinking skills G. Bruce Strang. On the Fiery March: Mussolini Prepares Axis aggression was eroding. Chamberlain wrote to For War, page 247 (2003). his sister, Mussolini has behaved like a snake and Italian leaders were ignorant o the real British a cad. Chamberlain thought the invasion showed reaction. Despite the comparatively muted protests, Mussolinis complete cynicism. The Prime Minister the aggressive nature o Italian policy did provoke a had reached the conclusion that any chance o response. The oreign policy committee decided on uture rapprochement with Italy has been blocked 10 and 11 April to issue a guarantee to Greece, and, by Mussolini just as Hitler has blocked any German under intense French pressure, agreed to extend rapprochement. Mussolinis decision to invade one to Romania, while making a concerted eort to Albania may have brought potential gains in Italys bring Turkey into an eastern Mediterranean security strategic situation but at the cost o urther alienating arrangement. Greece accepted its guarantee, although the Chamberlain cabinet and urthering the division it reused in the rst instance to join in guaranteeing o Europe into two competing blocks. By the middle o other countries independence. In Turkey, the Inonii April, British strategic intelligence listed Italy amongst government cited constitutional diculties, and, Britains likely enemies. British planners also shited more seriously, concerns about its own security in the emphasis in war planning to concentrate the British the absence o a British guarantee. Nevertheless, on feet in the eastern Mediterranean at the expense o 13 April both Chamberlain and Daladier issued public the commitment to the Far East, a clear signal that statements in their respective parliamentary chambers resistance to Axis aggression had assumed a higher guaranteeing Greece and Romania against aggression. priority ater Mussolinis attack. Although the issuing o guarantees would in the end Question be signicantly less than an ironclad, interlocking In pairs, and with reerence to the source above, discuss security system against Axis aggression, it did signal the extent to which the invasion o Albania in 1939 that the patience o the Western democracies with marked a turning point in British policy towards Italy.
What was the reaction o Britain to Italian expansion in 1940? As you have read in Chapter 2.3, when Italy joined the war in June 1 940 Mussolinis orces invaded Egypt and invaded Greece rom Albania. The British then counter-attacked Italian orces in North Arica in Operation Compass and pushed them out o Egypt, deeating them at Beda Fomm in Libya in February 1 941 . The British Navy, which had been eared by the Italian navy (as you have read earlier) , had sunk hal the Italian feet in harbour at Taranto on the 1 1 th November, 1 940. The British then occupied Crete. L T
A Communication and thinking skills From Andrew Roberts. The Storm of War: A new History of against a orce our times his size, concentrating on the Second World War, (2009) page 120121. each ortied area in turn. Operation Compass had In mid-September Mussolini, ancying himsel a second close support rom the Navy and RAF, and, aided Caesar, sent [his] Tenth Army to invade Egypt with by a collapse in Italian morale, by mid-December ve divisions along the coast, taking Sidi Barraini. He OConnor had cleared Egypt o Italians and 38,000 stopped 75 miles short o the British in Mersa Matruh, prisoners were taken. while both sides were reinorced. It was a nerve-wracking Question time or the British in Egypt On 8th December 1940, In pairs discuss what this source suggests about how Lieutenant-General Richard OConnor, commander o the the Italians were pushed back in North Arica in 1940. Western Desert Force [numbering only 31,000 men, 120 guns and 275 tanks], counter-attacked ercely
209
2
Thereore, the initial military response by the British led to reversals or the Italians. However, the British were in turn pushed back when German orces arrived. The British evacuated Greece in May 1 941 and had been pushed back by German orces to El Alamein in Egypt by June 1 942.
Full document question: The international response to Italian aggression, 193536 Source A Source C Extract from the Covenant of the League of Sir Samuel Hoares resignation speech, Nations, 1919. delivered in the House of Commons in London, 19 December 1935. Article 1 6 Should any member o the League resort to war in disregard o its covenants It was clear that Italy would regard the under Articles 1 2, 1 3 or 1 5, it shall be deemed oil embargo as a military sanction or an act to have committed an act o war against all involving war against her. Let me make other members o the League, which hereby our position quite clear. We had no ear undertake immediately to subject it to the whatever, as a nation, o any Italian threats. severance o all trade or fnancial relations, I the Italians attacked us we should the prohibition o all exchange between their retaliate with ull success. What was in our nationals and the nationals o the covenant- mind was something very dierent, that an breaking state, and the prevention o all isolated attack o this kind launched upon fnancial, commercial or personal business one Power would almost inevitably lead to between the nationals o covenant-breaking the dissolution o the League. state and the nationals o any other state, It was in an atmosphere o threatened whether a member o the League or not. war that the conversations began, and the It shall be the duty o the Council in totality o the member States appeared to be such cases to recommend to the several opposed to military action. governments concerned what eective [It] seemed to me that Anglo-French military, naval or air orce the members o co-operation was essential i there was to the League shall contribute to the armed be no breach at Geneva. For two days M. orces to be used to protect the covenants o Laval and I discussed the basis o a possible the League. negotiation Source B These proposals are immensely less A photograph of US protesters, 1936. avourable to Italy than the demand that Mussolini made last summer. I believe that unless these acts are aced either the League will break up, or a most unsatisactory peace will result rom the conict that is now taking place. It is a choice between the ull co-operation o all the member States and the kind o unsatisactory compromise that was contemplated in the suggestions which M. Laval and I put up.
210
C H AP T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N AL R E S P O N S E TO I TALI AN AG G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 19 4 0 )
Source D amongst other weapons, and proclaim the Ruth Henig, a British academic historian, in Italian conquest o a League member state. an academic book The Origins of the Second The League o Nations had suered its second World War (1985). serious setback in fve years, and this time had ailed to prevent aggression much nearer The bargain they tentatively struck was to Europe. immediately leaked in the French press, and reports o the Hoare-Laval pact caused an Once again, the great powers had shown their uproar in Britain. The government was orced inability to work together to resolve serious to repudiate Hoares negotiations in Paris, threats to peace or to protect the interests o and Hoare himsel resigned, to be replaced by weaker League members. These lessons were Anthony Eden, who was perceived as a strong not lost on Hitler. League supporter. The British government First question, part a 3 marks now led the way at Geneva in calling or In Source A, what key points are made about the economic sanctions against Mussolini, and League regarding its response to a member state dragged a reluctant French government resorting to war? behind it. But the French would not support oil sanctions, whilst the British were reluctant First question, part b 2 marks to agree to the closure o the Suez Canal, What is the message o the photograph in Source B? both measures which would have caused major problems or the Italian war eort. Second question 4 marks The French had not abandoned hopes o With reerence to its origin, purpose and content, restoring the Stresa ront, and the British did assess the values and limitations o Source C or not want to run a serious risk o unleashing historians studying the international response to a naval war in the Mediterranean even the Abyssinian crisis. though British naval commanders there were confdent that the outcome would be a British Third question 6 marks victory. For such a war would threaten vital Compare and contrast the views expressed in imperial communications, and Japan would Source C and D regarding the HoareLaval Pact. not be slow to exploit the situation to urther its own expansionist ambitions in China. So Fourth question 9 marks League action was muted, with the result that Using the sources and your own knowledge, Italian troops were able to overrun Abyssinia, examine the impact o the AngloFrench response crush resistance by the use o poison gas to the Abyssinian crisis.
211
2
References Fermi, L. 1 966. Mussolini. University o Chicago Press. Chicago, USA Henig R. 1 985. The Origins of the Second World War. Routledge. London, UK Roberts, A. 2009. The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War. Allen Lane, UK. Strang, GB. 2003. On the Fiery March: Mussolini Prepares for War. Praeger. Westport CT, USA Taylor, AJP. 1 961 . The Origins of the Second World War. Penguin. Harmondsworth, UK US Department o State. 1 943. Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 19311941. Government Printing Ofce. Washington DC, USA Warner, G. 1 968. Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France. Eyre and Spottiswoode. London, UK
212