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IB History Week of April 6.Pdf 2.6 The international response to Italian aggression (19351940) Conceptual understanding Key concepts Consequence Change Signifcance Key questions Discuss the reasons or the British and French policy o appeasement. Examine the response o the international community to Italian aggression. Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister of Britain 193537 The League o Nations ormally comes 1920 January into being Japanese invasion o Manchuria: 1931 September condemned by the League o Nations; weak sanctions are imposed World Disarmament Conerence 193234 Franklin D Roosevelt is elected 1932 November president in the USA Hitler becomes Chancellor o Germany 1933 January Italy sends troops to its border with 1934 July Austria to prevent Hitlers attempts at Anschluss The Stresa Conerence 1935 April The Neutrality Act passed (expires in August Italy invades Abyssinia six months) Roosevelt invokes the Neutrality Act, October preventing the supply o arms to either country 7 October The Council o the League declares Italy to be the aggressor in Abyssinia The Leagues Assembly votes to impose 11 October sanctions November Limited sanctions are applied The HoareLaval Pact December 192 C H AP T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N AL R E S P O N S E TO I TALI AN AG G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 19 4 0 ) 1936 January The French Popular Front wins the election. The USA passes new Neutrality Acts February May Italy conquers Abyssinia The League ends sanctions on Italy Italy and Germany intervene in the July Spanish Civil War Britain and France set up Non-Intervention August Committee The USA passes a joint resolution 1937 January outlawing the arms trade in Spain Neville Chamberlain becomes Prime May Minister of Britain Italy withdraws from the League of Nations December In an Italian and British agreement, Britain 1938 April recognizes Italian Abyssinia Mussolini now accepts Anschluss May The Munich Conference: Mussolini, Hitler, September Chamberlain and Daladier meet Hitler invades areas of Czechoslovakia, 1939 March breaking the Munich Agreement April Italy invades Albania Italy declares itself a non-belligerent when 1 September Germany invades Poland Mussolini attempts to set up a conference 3 September to avoid war Mussolini declares war on Britain and 1940 June France SeptemberOctober Italy invades Egypt and Greece USA passes the LendLease Act 1941 March 193 2 What was the policy of appeasement and why was it pursued by Britain in the 1930s? Appeasement, in this political and historical context, was a diplomatic policy o making concessions to nations in order to avoid conict. The policy is most closely associated with Britains oreign policy in the late 1 930s, in particular the Munich crisis o 1 938. Appeasement ailed to prevent the outbreak o war and came to be seen as a weak and dishonourable policy. It allowed both Mussolini and Hitler to get away with territorial demands, which encouraged Hitler to ask continuously or more, resulting in the outbreak o war in 1 939. However, or most o the inter-war years, appeasement was seen as a positive idea, and as part o a long-standing tradition o trying to settle disputes peaceully. In Britain, there were many reasons to ollow a policy o appeasement in the 1 930s: Neville Chamberlain, prime minister of Britain, 193740 1 Public opinion The Franchise Act o 1 91 8 had increased the number o voters in Britain rom 8 million to 21 million; or the frst time, women over the age o 30 were given the vote, and rom 1 928, this was lowered to the age o 21 . This huge increase in the electorate meant that politicians were more likely to take notice o public opinion, which was against war and in avour o collective security. The horror o the First World War had created a widespread eeling that this should be the war to end all wars. This anti-war eeling was seen clearly in February 1 933, when the Oxord Union debating society voted that This House would not fght or King and Country. The destruction by German bomber aircrat o Guernica in Spain in 1 937 showed the vulnerability o London to attack rom the air and highlighted the need to prevent another war that would clearly have a devastating eect on civilians on the British mainland. As Stanley Baldwin told the House o Commons in 1 932, I think it is as well for the man in the street to realise that no power on earth can protect him from being bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber will always get through. It was widely believed that there would be 1 50,000 casualties in London in the frst week o war. The British public put aith in the League o Nations to maintain peace through collective security. There was even a League o Nations Union in Britain, which had more than 400,000 supporters in 1 935. The Union carried out a peace ballot in 1 935, which appeared to show that the British public ully supported the League and its principles. 2 The demands o the dictators seen as justifed Many British politicians elt that the Treaty o Versailles was too harsh and that Hitler had genuine grievances relating to the First World War. Increasingly, there was a belie that the First World War had been caused by all the powers, not just by Germany and her allies, and thus there was support or the idea o revising the more punitive clauses o the treaty. In particular, Chamberlain believed, mistakenly, that it was possible to do business with Mussolini and Hitler, and to sort out the grievances o these countries rationally and without recourse to war. 194 C H AP T E R 2 . 6 : T H E I N T E R N AT I O N AL R E S P O N S E TO I TALI AN AG G R E S S I O N ( 19 3 5 19 4 0 ) In addition, many conservative politicians saw the threat o communism as more dangerous than the threat o ascism. 3 The lack of an alternative policy Support or appeasement was ound in all political parties and there was no clear anti-appeasement party to provide a coherent political alternative. The Labour Party, which was the political party in opposition, supported collective security but did not support rearmament. 4 Economic pressures There were also economic reasons or ollowing a policy o appeasement. Already weakened severely by the First World War, the Great Depression worsened Britains economic situation urther still. By the 1 930s, Britain was acing competition rom other countries that were overtaking its industrial production. It also aced high unemployment: 3 million people were unemployed in the early 1 930s. These economic difculties made it hard to spend money on armaments; no government would be able to maintain support i it cut welare benefts in order to fnance rearmament. It was also eared that rearming too quickly would cause a balance o payments crisis, with too many imports o machinery and raw materials. For these reasons, although rearmament started again in 1 932, it was not until 1 937 that deence spending increased dramatically. The Anti-Appeasers Some individuals did speak out against appeasement: Foreign Secretary Anthony Winston Churchill called Eden resigned in or rearmament to be February 1938 because stepped up and he disagreed with vehemently opposed Chamberlains policy concessions to Germany o appeasement o Italy. (though he did not oppose the appeasement o Mussolini over Abyssinia). He supported the idea o a Grand Alliance o the Anti-Fascist powers. Duf Cooper was You will have seen Secretary o State or plenty o David Lows War (19351937) and cartoons in this book. then First Lord o the These appeared Admiralty in Chamberlains in the Evening Standard government until he newspaper and were resigned in protest at consistently critical o the Munich Agreement appeasement throughout in September 1938. the 1930s. Low was attacked in the right-wing press as a war-monger and his cartoons were banned in Germany. 195 2 TOK Britain was in a weak military position and, by 1 937, with threats rom Japan, Italy and Germany, this position was becoming increasingly There have been many critics o dangerous. As a result, the British Chies o Sta concluded that, until the policy o appeasement as rearmament was urther advanced, it should be the main aim o oreign pursued by Britain and France policy to reduce the number o Britains enemies. This was reiterated in in the 1930s. As you have read January 1 938 in this statement: We cannot foresee the time when our defence here, those involved at the time forces will be strong enough to safeguard our territory, trade and vital interests seem to have had a dierent against Germany, Italy and Japan simultaneously. view and this perspective was supported by public opinion. 5 Global commitments In pairs discuss the extent to Britain had to consider its worldwide commitments alongside its which history looked dierent obligations to European countries and the League o Nations. Indeed, in the past. Create a poster: most politicians considered British interests to be more global than History itsel looked dierent European. Preservation and deence o the Empire was held to be in the past outlining your essential i Britain was to remain a great world power, which was its ideas. Include reerences to the priority. However, Britains imperial commitments were now so vast that material you have covered in they were becoming increasingly difcult to administer and deend.
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