Botsl#5 2013 Jun 10 12:30 PM Mike Sperlinger: Seventeen Types of Ambiguity

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Botsl#5 2013 Jun 10 12:30 PM Mike Sperlinger: Seventeen Types of Ambiguity BoTSL#5 2013 JUN 10 12:30 PM Mike Sperlinger: SEVENTEEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY This bulletin would like to grow up to be a New Yorker article. It was researched in complete ignorance of the Russian language, and relied on the generosity of a number of people including Sergei Kostin, Alexander Ostrogorsky, Olga Semyonova, Sergei Stafeev, and, in particular, Sophio Medoidze. All photographs of Julian Semyonov are courtesy of his daughter, Olga Semyonova. With apologies to William Empson Cover image: poster design for Seventeen Moments of Spring by Alexander Zhuravskiy. Reproduced with kind permission BoTSL#5 2013 JUN 10 12:30 PM 2 Mike Sperlinger: SEVENTEEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY The Gestapo intercepted an encrypted message which read: “Justas, you asshole. Alex.” Only Stirlitz could figure out that he had been conferred the rank of the Hero of the Soviet Union. On February 8, 2003, Vladimir Putin awarded the Order for Merit to the Fatherland, Class III, to the actor Vyacheslav Tikhonov. It was Tikhonov’s 75th birthday. Tikhonov had enjoyed a long career on stage and in film, but no one was under any illusions for what role he was receiving this honor — the same one, in fact, for which he had received a medal as a Hero of Socialist Labor from the Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev in 1982, which was already nine years after the fact. Tikhonov was synonymous with the role of Max Otto von Stirlitz — a.k.a.“Justas,” a.k.a. Maxim Maximovich Isaev, secret agent of Moscow Center — in the television series Seventeen Moments of Spring. Putin, a former KGB officer in East Germany, was honoring an actor most famous for playing a Soviet spy oper ating in deep cover in Nazi Germany. The 12 black-and-white episodes of Seventeen Moments of Spring have been running almost constantly on Russian television since they were first broadcast in August 1973, particularly around the May 9 “Victory Day” commemoration of the capitulation of Nazi Germany when they are sometimes screened back-to-back. (A new “colorized” and abridged version of the series was aired in 2009, to general disgust.) The “seven- teen moments” in question occur between February 12 and March 18, 1945, in the final days of World War II — or the “Great Patriotic War,” BoTSL#5 2013 JUN 10 12:30 PM 3 Mike Sperlinger: SEVENTEEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY as the Russians call it — as Stirlitz endeavors to use his position as a high- ranking SS officer to uncover and disrupt the attempts of various Nazi leaders to broker a separate peace treaty with the Americans, potentially forming a new bloc against the Soviet Union. Stirlitz is often referred to as the “Russian James Bond,” but the com- parison only holds as far as the two characters’ saturation of the popular consciousness. Seventeen Moments, in content and style, is much closer on the spectrum of spy fiction to the work of John le Carre´: slow, laby rinthine, paranoid, and calibrated to the micro-tensions of bureaucratic intrigue. Across its 14 hours, the action, such as it is, is more or less limited to two discharges of pistols and one somewhat staid car chase through Berlin. Most of the drama is played out instead as a series of duels in the form of dialogue, in which pairs of characters try to outmaneuver one another on the slippery slope which leads, as both they and we are fully aware, to the Third Reich’s total collapse. Almost every leading character in Seventeen Moments is a Nazi. Many are drawn from the historical record: Heinrich Himmler, Reichsfu¨hrer of the SS; Walter Schellenberg, head of foreign intelligence; Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of the Reich Main Security Office (RHSA); Martin Bormann, Chancellor of the Nazi Party; Hermann Go¨ring, commander- in-chief of the Luftwaffe; and in particular Heinrich Mu¨ller, head of the Gestapo. (Goebbels features only in documentary footage; Hitler, like Stalin, has a walk-on part, but is largely a figure invoked by others.) Familiarity with the leading Nazis is not assumed — and in fact, the series has a pedagogical streak, in which each of these characters is introduced to us as they first appear by the series’ intrusive voice-over, which reads the rote summary assessments from the Gestapo’s own dossiers, or offers us “information to be considered.” Stirlitz himself, while contemplating which of the Nazi leaders might be attempting to contact the Americans, draws caricatures of them — a device which doubles as a doodling form of meditation for Stirlitz and a mnemonic primer for a younger Soviet audience. Although the pains taken to inform and instruct the audience add to the series’ ponderousness, especially in the early episodes, one of Seventeen Moments’ strengths is the vividness with which it evokes a Third Reich which is not a monolithic and orderly pyramid of authority, but instead a Venn diagram of overlapping bureaucracies (the SS, the RHSA, BoTSL#5 2013 JUN 10 12:30 PM 4 Mike Sperlinger: SEVENTEEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY Stirlitz’s sketches of Göring, Himmler, Goebbels, and Bormann the Gestapo, the party, military intelligence, the police, the army, and so on) enmeshed in viperous internecine rivalry. Mutual surveillance is the great constant in Seventeen Moments: everyone is constantly being recorded, or in fear of it. When Himmler, in an early scene, approaches Go¨ring to suggest that the latter replace Hitler in order to avert disaster, Go¨ring wants to go along with the plan, but is too frightened that the black folder Himmler is holding contains a secret micro- phone and that this proposal is just an elaborate trap. (We never learn the truth.) Offices, cells, homes, bars, cars, telephone lines — all are potentially bugged. In fact, we often learn of conversations between the characters after the fact from recordings or transcripts. The entire visual grammar of the series, meanwhile, is forensic: fingerprints, photographs, dossiers, reel-to-reel recorders. Every conversation in Seventeen Moments is coded, and every propo- sal has to be parsed, like Go¨ring parses Himmler’s, as the bait of a provocateur. As Gestapo chief Mu¨ller puts it: “Clarity is one of the forms of complete fog.” In the same way, the most valuable commodity in the series is the alibi: the cover story which will keep you from the Gestapo’s interrogation cells, or a euphemistic death by “car accident.” When Himmler gives Schellenberg responsibility for devising a way of making overtures to the Americans, Schellenberg’s plan to provide them with a BoTSL#5 2013 JUN 10 12:30 PM 5 Mike Sperlinger: SEVENTEEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY tripartite alibi has something of Freud’s self-contradictory “kettle logic,” a triple hedge of mutually incompatible lies. Importantly, however, none of the leading Nazis’ machinations seem to be born of ideology; there is very little ranting about race, the Fu¨hrer, or Lebensraum. This is a game of pure self-interest, played out against a backdrop of blackest paranoia. Some secret documents were missing from Hitler’s safe. Five days passed, but they were not found. Finally Hitler sent a wire to Stalin: “Did your men take my dox?” On the same day Stirlitz got an encrypted message from the Center: “Justas, if you took documents from Comrade Hitler’s safe, please put them back, people worry.” Stirlitz, as played by Tikhonov, is a peculiar protagonist, even if we disre- gard the fact that he spends much of the series in full SS regalia. (Let us not linger among the pedants who have pointed out that his uniform should, by 1945, have been grey rather than black.) The Russian film critic Viktor Demin characterized him acutely: “Up to a certain moment the hero remains a mysterious ‘black box’ out of which there is simply no response to the signals of the world. He is a sort of superdense star, whose gravity only attracts light waves but itself does not emit any.” Stirlitz is precisely a black hole, whose enigmatic passivity warps reality around him. He is played by the luminously beautiful Tikhonov as a kind of inverted Buster Keaton: his face is an impassive mask most of the time, but rather than resembling that of a child too ingenuous even to clown, like Keaton’s, it be comes the poker face of someone playing for his life, that we scrutinize for every tell or tic. The omniscient voice-over provides the cues, with its insistent interior monologues —“Stirlitz thought...”— while Tikhonov essays every variety of pensiveness in close-up (his actorly method, apparently, being to rehearse times tables in his head). Stirlitz’s great antagonist is the Gestapo chief, Müller. The latter part of the series unfolds as a cat-and-mouse game between them — a battle of wits staged by two arch sophists, in which Stirlitz’s identity as the Soviet “resident” inches ever-closer to incontrovertible revelation. There is a kind of limbo-dance logic to the way Stirlitz must squeeze himself into a decreasing margin of plausibility as he explains, for example, why his BoTSL#5 2013 JUN 10 12:30 PM 6 Mike Sperlinger: SEVENTEEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY Leonid Bronevoy as Heinrich Mu¨ller, head of the Gestapo, and Vyacheslav Tikhonov as Max Otto von Stirlitz, a.k.a.“Justas,” a.k.a. Maxim Maximovich Isaev BoTSL#5 2013 JUN 10 12:30 PM 7 Mike Sperlinger: SEVENTEEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY fingerprints were found on a Russian radio transmitter. Strangely, how- ever, Müller grows more sympathetic over the course of this duel. And in the realm of Russian fandom, his character is almost as iconic as Stirlitz’s.
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