Cold War Spy Fiction in Russian Popular Culture: From Suspi- cion to Acceptance via Seventeen Moments of Spring

Erik Jens

Introduction

In 1972, a classified CIA document (right) describing an episode of a novel that was serialized in Komsomolskaya Pravda during January and February 1969 was filed in CIA Headquarters. The episode involved a supposed Soviet intelligence operation early in 1945, in which a “Colonel Isayev” successfully “sabotaged” negotiations OSS officer Allen Dulles was then conducting with the Germans in Bern, Switzerland. Ac- cording to the report, Isayev also met two senior Germans, “Chancellor Bruening” and “Gestapo chief Mueller.” The report writer went on to conclude the account was “in all probability a fabrication”—although the Dulles negotiation was a fact— but in the interests of caution the report’s preparer recommended it be filed in Heinrich Muel- ler’s CIA file—where it remained at least until 2008, when it was declassified.1 As it turned out, the episode was neither a real operation nor a “fabrication,” but a synopsis of an episode in a Soviet spy thriller titled Seventeen Moments of Spring, which went on to become one of the USSR’s most pop- ular and enduring television miniseries.

That US intelligence analysts could mistake a work of Soviet-era spy fiction for reportable intelligence says much about the most famously, the 1973 television miniseries Seventeen opacity, to Western observers throughout the Cold War Moments of Spring.a, 2 The series, commissioned by then- and even afterward, of Soviet popular culture. The single KGB chief Yuri Andropov to burnish the reputation of most popular and venerable hero of Russian spy fiction, for nearly 50 years, has been Col. Maxim Maximovich Isaуev, known to every Russian of a certain age by his a. This essay will use the terms “Soviet” and “Russian” in- working cover name, Max Otto von Stierlitz, or simply terchangeably when discussing cultural attitudes, which had, as “Stierlitz,” the hero of several Soviet-era novels and, and retain, deep roots in the Russian motherland. The views, opinions, and findings should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government. © Erik Jens, 2017

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017) 31  Seventeen Moments of Spring

In the Soviet Union of the late 1940s and 1950s, espio- nage, as a genre of fiction, held little appeal for the Soviet The Russian literary world had reading and movie-going public. therefore, by the start of the Great War and later, abdicated the field the intelligence profession, was Soviet Espionage Fiction of espionage fiction to (primarily) hugely successful upon its broadcast Before the Cold War the English, with Rudyard Kipling premiere, and its annual broadcast leading the charge. Along with him thereafter until the 1990s remained In the Soviet Union of the late came the respective anti-German jer- a major pop culture event for Soviet 1940s and 1950s, espionage, as a emiads dressed up as popular fiction viewers. genre of fiction, held little appeal for of novelists Erskine Childers and the Soviet reading and movie-going William le Queux, who established Seventeen Moments of Spring public. This was partly a result of the spy thriller as a permanent fixture may even have played a role in the Tsarist Russia’s cultural affiliations in the English literary landscape.6 rise of Vladimir Putin. In his first job with European high society. Russian But, neither Kim, that pivotal novel following his 1991 resignation from political, cultural, and literary life of Great Game espionage, nor the the KGB, Putin, then a St. Petersburg had closely followed that of France later writings of T.E. Lawrence (who, city official, had himself featured in since the 17th century; the connec- if not the first British “political” to a local documentary reenacting, as tion strengthened throughout the don native garb, was surely the first “Stierlitz,” an iconic scene from the 19th century and persisted until the to lend a largely fictional glamour to miniseries. The episode, which also establishment of the Soviet Union the intelligence business by posing marked Putin’s “coming out” as a cut off, officially at least, most such in full regalia for the home newspa- former spy, helped launch his politi- Western influences.5 The 19th-cen- pers as “Lawrence of Arabia”) had cal career, and the subsequent decade tury European literary disdain for counterparts in or made any lasting of adoring media comparisons to fictional “spies” had therefore persist- impression on Russia or the Soviet Stierlitz helped him all the way to the ed in Russian literature and popular Union of the period. 3 Russian presidency in 2000. Vladi- attitudes far longer than it did in the The Soviet Union’s own early mir Putin, thus, like Schwarzenegger, West.a And, at the turn of the 20th history created a second, more imme- rode the coattails of a fictional perso- century, the decade-long machina- diate and visceral, source of Russian na to political leadership. tions of the sorry Dreyfus affair, cultural antipathy toward espionage perpetrated by mendacious French Yet Stierlitz, “one of the central as a genre of entertainment. By the intelligence officers, gripped Russian characters in Soviet [and present-day start of the Cold War, “intelligence” readers and helped to solidify their Russian] grassroots mythology,” in the collective Russian memory image of “intelligence” as, by defini- remains almost entirely unknown meant spies, informers, and secret tion, wicked and, at best, a necessary outside the former Soviet Union.4 For murder, from the revolution through evil.b the intelligence historian, the back- years of purges culminating in the ground and production of Seventeen Great Terror of the mid-1930s. Moments of Spring provide worth- a. One of the few 19th-century novels while glimpses into Russian popular dealing directly with spies was American: The Soviet intelligence services attitudes, informed by their national James Fenimore Cooper’s 1821 tale of also emerged from the Great Patri- history and temperament, toward Revolutionary War espionage, The Spy. otic War with few, if any, sweeping, Cooper took pains to assure the reader that ready-for-fiction espionage or coun- intelligence work as a subject of even though the hero is spying, he is still a fiction. worthy person, as good as a soldier.—Brett F. Woods, “Revolution and Literature: Cooper’s The Spy Revisited,” varsityturos. eventual exoneration amid revelations of com (accessed 3 February 2017). the French military’s anti-Semitism and other perfidy, the “Dreyfus affair” was per- b. In 1894, French intelligence officers—as haps the first media-friendly global (or at was eventually proved—framed Jewish least Europe-wide) scandal and, incidental- army captain Alfred Dreyfus for treason. ly, helped to launch the espionage genre, at Throughout his trial, conviction, and least in Western Europe, as an established imprisonment on Devil’s Island until his category of popular fiction.

(Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017  32  Seventeen Moments of Spring

A tipping point in overcoming Soviet popular disdain for terintelligence exploits. In contrast, fictional espionage was the 1961 elevation of Vladimir the wartime American and British Semichastny to the head of the KGB. intelligence and counterintelligence services had made critical, dramatic, Japanese fleet’s location and defeat it later Russian war films have ever had and well-publicized contributions at Midway. much use for happy endings. in breaking German and Japanese ciphers and otherwise helping to Yet another primary obstacle to What few spy-protagonists ap- militarily defeat the Axis powers on the emergence of fictional hero-spies peared on page or screen in postwar the ground and at sea. Soviet intelli- was the Russian obsession with de- settings had to be free from the taint gence could boast of no comparably fense. This long predated the USSR, of Stalin-era repression. One solu- dramatic contributions to their coun- but the Soviet Union could not be tion was to make the fictional spy a try’s grinding war of attrition against portrayed, even in fiction, as an NATO officer who sees the light and German invaders. Whether for lack aggressor; its mighty military and se- defects to the party, as in the popular of imagination or opportunity, the curity forces were wholly for the peo- 1968 spy film, Oshibka Rezidenta Soviet spymasters never executed ple’s protection. But espionage, by (The Resident’s Mistake). In the grad- operations with the inherent drama definition, is something that a state ually burgeoning field of Russian spy of such British operations as Double does primarily to other states, usually fiction of the mid- and late 1960s, the Cross or Mincemeat.a on their territory. Indeed, the very hero, if not a sympathetic Westerner, name of the Stalin-era counterintelli- was likely to be placed in the Great A noteworthy exception was the gence organization, Smert’ Shpionam Patriotic War—“the only time in So- Rote Kapelle (Red Orchestra) the (English acronym, SMERSH), meant viet history when the interests of the acclaimed, if ultimately smashed, So- “death to spies.” people coincided with the interests of viet HUMINT network in Europe in the state”—or else during the Bolshe- the early 1940s. The Red Orchestra, Given all the obstacles—histori- vik Revolution.10 however, was concerned mainly with cal disdain for spying, memories of incrementally damaging German the Terror, and a lack of inspiring A tipping point in overcoming military and industrial production.7 dramatics in actual Soviet espio- Soviet popular disdain for fictional No Soviet intelligence operation that nage history—Soviet “spy” fiction espionage was the 1961 elevation of we know of saved so many Allied in the early Cold War centered less Vladimir Semichastny to the head of lives or was so valuable to eventual on traditional clandestine espio- the KGB, a post he held until 1967. Allied victory as, for example, the nage and more on military scout or Only 37 upon his ascension to KGB Americans’ use in 1942 of decrypted reconnaissance units, which at least leadership, Semichastny had little Japanese naval traffic to divine the were incontrovertibly a part of the direct memory of the Terror and had Soviet military machine that had been just old enough to be drafted saved the motherland in the Great late in the Great Patriotic War. Jeal- Patriotic War.8 Most Soviet films ous for the reputation of his agency, a. As most intelligence historians will rec- and books involving intelligence Semichastny anonymously wrote an ognize, Mincemeat was a British deception were thus packaged as “historical” or article for Izvestia to assure readers operation involving a dead tramp dressed as “adventure” films, their spy-like plot that “many young Communist Party a British officer with false documents, left elements dressed up as Red Army and Communist Youth League work- at sea for the Spanish to find and hence con- scout patrols, or perhaps domestic ers have joined the KGB and none vince the Germans to prepare for invasion counterintelligence—all ideally set of the people who, during the time of at the wrong place. And British intelligence, in Operation Double Cross, used decrypt- during the Great Patriotic War. For the personality cult of Joseph Stalin, ed German Enigma traffic to capture and example, SMERSH’s operational took part in the repressions against then double the entire German HUMINT high point was working against the innocent Soviet people is now in the network in England back against the Ger- German military on Soviet soil.9 The Service [italics added].” Throughout mans throughout the war. For more on this, heroes in such stories also tended his tenure, Semichastny not only see Robert Cowden, “OSS Double-Agent to die tragically. Neither Soviet nor supported positive fictional portray- Operations in World War II,” Studies in Intelligence Vol 58, no. 2 (June 2014) als of the KGB, but also worked

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  33  Seventeen Moments of Spring

At Andropov’s urging, Semyonov produced from his novel a script for a television miniseries, which was pro- hands, its English translation has duced—again, with KGB approval and support. Zakhov throwing 07 off a cliff to his death—which may say more about to publicize the feats of formerly who might excite and inspire socialist the political or money-making agen- obscured, if not officially denied, readers.12 das of Cold War–era translators than Soviet intelligence officers.11 During about Gulyashki himself. and after Semichastny’s time in the Seeking a literary riposte to the KGB, the Kremlin came to lionize increasing global popularity of the such Soviet intelligence officers and Bond franchise, Soviet officials Beginning the Transformation assets as Rudolf Abel, Kim Philby, turned to Bulgarian author Andrei and Richard Sorge.a Gulyashki, whose 1963 novel The Zakhov Mission had brought him to In 1966, the Soviet author Julian the attention of Soviet authorities Semyonov, a longtime news reporter as the likeliest candidate to cre- and tracker of Nazi war criminals, Soviet Reactions to the ate a Soviet literary rival to James published a novel about a young So- Rise of James Bond Bond.13 Gulyashki, probably with viet intelligence officer, one Colonel KGB approval and support, visited Isayev, working against anti-Bol- On the other side of the Iron London in 1966 to ask the late Ian sheviks in 1921. His book attracted Curtain, Ian Fleming’s James Bond Fleming’s publisher for permission the favorable attention of KGB chief novels were gaining increasing pop- to use James Bond as a character Semichastny and his successor, Yuri ularity throughout the late 1950s and in his new book. His presence in Andropov. Also intent on rehabilitat- 1960s. The Bond film franchise, be- England created a minor splash in ing the KGB’s popular image, An- ginning in the early 1960s, launched Time magazine, which wondered dropov commissioned Semyonov to Agent 007 into the global cultural in print, “Who would that baggy write a follow-up novel about a Sovi- stratosphere alongside Coca-Cola Bulgarian be, prowling up Bond et agent in Germany during the Great and Mickey Mouse. The Kremlin Street, slipping into pubs all over Patriotic War. Semyonov accordingly made sure to have Bond blasted in town and quietly haunting the men’s wrote his next novel, Seventeen Mo- the pages of Komsomolskaya Pravda clubs?”14 Gulyashki failed. Fleming’s ments of Spring (1969) with substan- (not unjustly) as “liv[ing] in a night- publisher not only promptly denied tial KGB support, including access to 16 marish world where laws are written him permission to use Bond or his its secret archives. at the point of a gun, where coercion 007 prefix, it took immediate steps to While the perennial Soviet “book and rape are considered valour and protect its copyright by commission- drought” prevented most Soviet murder is a funny trick.” Privately, ing Kingsley Amis to write, under citizens from reading Seventeen however, Soviet leaders were well a pseudonym, the first of over 30 Moments before the miniseries aware of Bond’s propaganda value post-Fleming Bond novels.15 premiered in 1973, many had read at to the West and of the absence of any least some of the story in the install- equally charismatic Russian hero Gulyashki, undeterred, renamed his forthcoming book Zakhov vs. 07 ments noted above in the CIA report and saw it into print in 1968. While on the Komsomolskaya Pravda series as literature the novel has little to early in 1969. As printed, Seventeen a. Abel was arrested in the United States recommend it, it does illustrate a pe- Moments relied heavily on offi- and eventually traded for captured U-2 pilot rennial distinction between Western cial-looking “dossiers” to introduce Gary Francis Powers; Philby, one of the and Soviet-era fictional spies: Agent characters and move the plot along— “Cambridge Five,” did immense damage doubtless one reason the CIA analyst to the British and American services in his Zakhov is more of a detective than work for the KGB; and Sorge, one of the a superspy, a man of simple tastes took it seriously enough to have it most famous and venerated wartime Soviet who nonetheless is able to best the filed as possibly genuine intelligence. intelligence officers, was captured and brutal and misogynist “07.” Curious- At Andropov’s urging, Semyonov eventually executed by the Japanese when ly, while the original novel leaves Stalin refused to acknowledge him as nashi produced from his novel a script for (one of ours). 07 alive and chastened at Zakhov’s

(Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017  34  Seventeen Moments of Spring

The television premiere of Seventeen Moments, eagerly a television miniseries, which was anticipated by Russian viewers, was an immediate smash produced—again with KGB approval success. and support—during 1971–72. Upon completion of filming, a first edit of agents, and engages in a battle of Russian viewers largely accepted as the miniseries sparked a spat between wits with various high-level Nazis, fact, is that the supposed secret peace the KGB officials who had midwifed especially Gestapo chief Heinrich talks were designed to carve up the it and their military counterparts; the Mueller. As the Javert-like Mueller postwar world behind Stalin’s back, latter castigated Seventeen Moments comes closer and closer to identify- not for its more limited aims, about for ignoring the Red Army’s role in ing Stierlitz as the mole within his which Moscow was duly informed.18 actually winning the Great Patriotic organization, the latter must rely American journalist Hedrick Smith, War. To placate the generals, director almost entirely on his wits to avoid traveling in Russia during 1973–74, Tatyana Lioznova was forced to add detection. found that “ordinary Russians,” al- a number of “meanwhile, on the bat- most universally admirers of Seven- tlefield” interludes, mostly random To a Western viewer, the minise- teen Moments, routinely accepted as stock footage of Soviet ground forces ries is deliberately paced—even for a historic truth its depiction of Amer- in combat.17 Soviet film production— sometimes ican connivance with Nazis at the to the point of catatonia. Stierlitz Soviet Union’s expense.19 The television premiere of Seven- seems to spend as much time tak- teen Moments, eagerly anticipated by ing languid walks and engaging in Russian viewers, was an immediate conversations with people uncon- smash success. Viewed by an esti- nected to intelligence—or the plot of Seventeen Moments of Spring’s mated 30–50 million viewers nightly, the miniseries—as he does actually Uniqueness in Soviet Television the 12-part series was immediately thwarting the Nazi high command. heralded—and remains to this day—a And in contrast to the typically The series was very well-made by cultural touchstone of Russian lethal, kinetic climax of a Western Soviet standards, on par with theat- popular culture and the single most spy thriller, as the entire Gestapo rical films of the era. Among many transformative event in rehabilitating, appears to be rummaging Berlin to other cultural accolades, Mikael in the eyes of the Soviet citizenry, the find Stierlitz, we see him sleeping in Tariverdiev’s music, especially the image of the heroic Russian spy. It a car just outside of town. Yet this is theme song “Moments,” has entered continued to be annually rebroadcast part of the point of the story: Stierlitz the Russian pantheon of popular, fre- nationwide well into the 1990s. spends time and does things with quently performed film music.20 But people who have nothing to do with its production quality was only one The plot of Seventeen Moments his mission, simply because, while of several factors that ensured Seven- plays out in and around Berlin, an active intelligence officer, he teen Moments cultural immortality. during the war’s final months in remains a human being. He balances Firstly, and in sharp contrast to most 1945. Max Otto von Stierlitz (played the necessary hardness of clandestine genre films and books to that point by the popular actor Vyacheslav intelligence work with his need to in Soviet culture, the script almost Tikhonov) is a longtime mole high in remain a functioning social being never refers to “the Soviet Union” or the Nazi hierarchy. His primary mis- with meaningful relationships—even “the party.” Stierlitz works and fights sion is to disrupt secret peace talks if they are mostly with citizens of an for “Russia.” And, significantly, we between Germany and the United enemy state. learn that Stierlitz has spent “over a States, a scenario based very loosely decade” in deep cover in Germany on talks OSS officer Allen Dull- The show’s “documentary” style, and thus cannot have been involved es and SS commander Karl Wolff complete with portentous voiceovers in the Great Terror of the mid-1930s. had as part of Operation Sunrise, a and onscreen “dossiers” providing In Semyonov’s earlier books, Stierlitz negotiation to secure the surrender background on various characters, had been on duty at least since 1921, of German troops in Italy. Along the lends even its creative fabrications but that backstory was dropped from way Stierlitz disrupts a German nu- an authoritative air. Most notably, the Seventeen Moments. clear weapon project, recruits several central plot point of the series, which

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  35  Seventeen Moments of Spring

Among Russian citizens, the cultural legacy of Seventeen Moments was the lasting positive impression of espio- In any case, even under the nage it created. KGB’s scrutiny, Seventeen Moments of Spring director Tatyana Lioznova Casting was another factor lifting toward Stierlitz—the hero’s pre- made the most of her talents and Seventeen Moments far above the dicament as a deep-cover operative her opportunities to introduce many usual run of Soviet television produc- in Nazi Germany echoed for more layers of subtlety in realizing the ap- tions. In contrast to the usual Soviet discerning Soviet viewers their own proved shooting script on film—even depictions of wartime Germans as daily lives: an intelligent person sur- beyond the unusually long leash the unequivocally evil, most of the Ge- rounded by mostly sympathetic char- KGB provided. stapo high officials with whom Stier- acters, to whom they can never utter litz spars throughout the series were a word of their secret thoughts. In played by beloved Russian character informer-saturated Soviet Russia, this Lasting Cultural Impact: Who actors, whose mostly advanced ages was a compelling metaphor. Indeed, Is the “American Stierlitz”? in this KGB-assisted production also many critics identified the Nazi Party served as “a courteous bow to the of the television series as an allegory Among Russian citizens, the cul- vitality of Soviet gerontocracy.”21 for the Soviet Communist Party.22 tural legacy of Seventeen Moments In particular, Leonid Bronevoi, the In this reading of the miniseries, was the lasting positive impression of Jewish actor and survivor of the Stierlitz represents and speaks for the espionage it created. This emerging Great Terror, playing Gestapo chief Soviet intelligentsia, forced to live popular appreciation of the spy trade Mueller, pulls off the same trick that within a society hostile to much of became, as will be discussed below, Tommy Lee Jones famously achieved what they hold dear, prevented from first an inspiration and later a pow- in the 1993 American filmThe Fugi- ever speaking aloud what they truly erful political asset for an ascendant tive: making the antagonist at least as believe. Seventeen Moments thus Vladimir Putin. To fully appreciate sympathetic as the hero. works both as a typical espionage the miniseries’ impact on Russian thriller and as an unusually nuanced culture, we must first examine candi- The sympathetic portrayal of metaphor for Soviet daily life. many Germans throughout the dates, in the English-speaking world, series—including most lower-rank- Critics differ on whether the KGB for a similar position in our own ing and civilian Germans—not allowed or even encouraged such popular culture. only deepened the story’s depth and “dog whistles” to the Soviet educat- While Stierlitz is often called subtlety in contrast to decades of po- ed class. Given the extent to which “the Russian James Bond,” he is not litically orthodox hackwork in Soviet the KGB had involved itself in the nearly so cartoonish or formulaic a film and television but also served production of both the source novel figure as is Agent 007 or indeed the to assure the German audience of and the TV series, it seems likely majority of Western, and especially the 1970s that they were not held to that it licensed a calculated degree American, fictional spies. While blame for the evils of Nazi Germa- of subversive language and imagery of course Bond’s love of creature ny. This approach, in turn, reflected that would help the series’ bona fides comforts and use of high technolo- the long-running Soviet propaganda with cynical Soviet viewers.23 For gy reflect Western ideas (one might strategy that separated Western lead- example, Stierlitz, while certainly even say, the Western id), he also ers and their policies from Western never approaching “Bondian” levels springs from a society that, much as countries’ citizens, an approach that of ostentatious consumption, is not it suffered in World War II, for the was perhaps wiser than the West’s above enjoying black-market treats most part cannot begin to compre- less subtle approach to Cold War from America and France: cigarettes, hend the shadow the Great Patriotic propagandizing by railing against the cognac, and other items that Soviet War cast throughout the Cold War “commies.” orthodoxy disapproved of but many over the roughly 80 percent of Soviet ordinary Soviets of the 1970s craved citizens who survived the German Finally—and perhaps most and acquired whenever possible. critically for the continuing respect and affection Russians felt, and feel,

(Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017  36  Seventeen Moments of Spring

As a piece of technical filmmaking,Seventeen Moments onslaught.a No fictional Russian has had little discernible influence on other filmmakers spy, either approved by the Kremlin within or outside the former Soviet Union. or accepted by the Soviet citizenry, could take such a cartoonish view throughout Seventeen Moments but more than any other television series of life and death as do James Bond with never a whisper of seductive to recast science fiction as a genre and his countless Western imitations. intent. Handsome enough to garner garnering the attention of an intelli- Stierlitz’s strength lies rather in his the lasting adoration of millions of gent audience. Indeed, the Kremlin intellect, his ability to keep a secret, Russians, Stierlitz nonetheless re- evidently had its share of Trekkies. and, especially, his endless patience, mains the consummate father figure, Pravda allegedly complained after which, on film, occasionally tests no more romantically available than the first few episodes about the lack the patience of, at least, the Western Mr. Spock or Atticus Finch to those of any Russians in the otherwise viewer. More George Smiley than around him. overtly “liberal” and progressive James Bond, Stierlitz remains a step series, resulting in the last-minute ahead of the Gestapo “by cunning Indeed, Atticus Finch, as written assignment of Ensign Chekov to the and rhetoric, not an ejector seat.”24 by Harper Lee in To Kill a Mocking- Enterprise.c bird and played on-screen in 1962 by Comparisons of Stierlitz to Gregory Peck, may be the Western Imagine a Soviet-era intelligence Bond, or even to more cerebral and literary and screen character whose or propaganda service trying to well-written Western creations like impact most closely mirrors that understand American culture without George Smiley, fall short in another of Stierlitz in Russia. This lawyer ever having heard of either To Kill sense. Bond is a pop-culture icon, on of the Deep South is, like Stierlitz, a Mockingbird or Star Trek, and the the same plane as Superman, Tintin, a morally complex and admirable lesson for American intelligence and or Mickey Mouse. And however character, highlighting by sheer messaging professionals about the intricately and realistically John le force of character a national cultural value of keeping up, to some degree, Carré rendered him or how compel- attitude (in his case, awareness of with Russian popular culture be- lingly Gary Oldman and the late Alec the evil of racism). And Atticus, like comes clear. Guinness played him on-screen, Smi- Stierlitz, works to redeem an oft-dis- ley remains a creature of the shadowy dained profession.b Finally, again like As a piece of technical filmmak- intelligence world, known mainly to Stierlitz and emphatically unlike the ing, Seventeen Moments has had little fans of the genre and having little to ever-fungible James Bond, Atticus discernible influence on other film- say to the wider culture. was, and for most Americans could makers within or outside the former only be, played onscreen by a single Soviet Union. Though much admired Finally, Stierlitz’s quiet fidelity beloved actor, whose face and perso- in Russian culture, the veteran direc- to his wife throughout a decade of na have become inextricably linked tor Tatyana Lioznova’s­ masterpiece cover assignment contrasts strongly with the character he played. has never been emulated by her peers with James Bond’s famous readiness in the same way that, for example, to seduce seemingly any woman who Frivolous as it might initially Stanley Kubrick or the great Russian stops moving long enough. Stier- seem, Mr. Spock is nearly as apt litz spends time, and even dances a Western analog of Stierlitz as is and drinks, with attractive women Atticus Finch. The original run of Star Trek (1966–69) probably did c. This claim, which producer Gene Roddenberry first made in a 1968 book, a. The author’s wife recalls classroom di- The Making of Star Trek, has never been atribes, all through her Moscow childhood verified or disproved, though a 1996 book in the 1980s, about America’s pernicious b. The 2015 publication of the Mockingbird by the series’ original producers reproduces delay in opening a second front against the “sequel” Go Set a Watchman, featuring, a letter that Roddenberry wrote to Pravda, Germans during the Great Patriotic War. alas, a racist Atticus, does not change this apparently in response to its complaint, in- Like many former Soviet citizens, she cultural history, though the character’s im- forming the editors of Chekov’s addition to remains impatient with Western film depic- age has surely been tainted for those readers the cast—Herb Solow and Robert Justman, tions of the war as a gallant adventure, won (not including this author) who accept the Inside Star Trek: The Real Story (Pocket by the Western Allies as a matter of course. 2015 book as “canon.” Books, 1996).

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  37  Seventeen Moments of Spring

Vladimir Putin was 21 when he first sawSeventeen Mo- ments of Spring and has often credited the show as a Political Impact: Russian Re- primary influence in his joining the KGB. sentments and the Rise of Vladimir “Stierlitz” Putin director Andrei Tarkovsky continue within his fictional universe, but a to influence the language of film. hapless stooge outside of it. An entire Seventeen Moments of Spring academic subfield addresses the phe- cemented in Soviet popular culture That said, at least one Hollywood nomenon of Soviet-era anekdoty, and the lasting belief that America and spy thriller, Brad Bird’s Mission Im- Stierlitz and Gestapo chief Mueller, Germany had secretly bargained possible: Ghost Protocol (2011), paid his chief foil in the miniseries, loom for peace behind Stalin’s back—a homage to perhaps the most famous large in this literature. central, and fictional, plot point in the scene of the entire miniseries. Stier- miniseries. The Kremlin was nervous litz is allowed to see, from across Finally, there is a small irony in enough about the series’ depiction of a café, his wife, secretly smuggled the fact that starting in 1973, the this pernicious American scheme— into Berlin from Russia for the sole same year when Soviet intelligence, complete with a cartoonishly Machi- purpose of this one meeting after after decades of popular disdain, avellian Allen Dulles—to delay the a decade of being apart: they gaze acquired via Seventeen Moments series’ 1973 broadcast premiere until at one another for over six minutes of Spring new respect and esteem after Brezhnev’s visit to the United of screen time, allowed neither to at home, the American Intelligence States, that summer.26 They need not approach or even speak to the other. Community began suffering a series have worried. Other than a New York In the final scene ofGhost Protocol, of public blows—Watergate, Sey- Times article by Hedrick Smith in Ethan Hunt, still in deep cover like mour Hersch’s revelations of spying January 1974, almost no US media Stierlitz, is granted the chance to on domestic groups, and reports from outlets reported on the series, nor was share a long, silent, poignant gaze the Church and Pike Committees— any official notice taken on this side with his wife from a distance, before from which it would take decades of the Atlantic about the depiction resuming his mission. to recover in the public eye. Indeed, of a villainous Dulles scheming to most pre-1990s American scholarship betray his country’s wartime ally. Russian popular affection for Max on “intelligence ethics” proceeded Otto von Stierlitz has not prevented on the assumption that intelligence Vladimir Putin was 21 when the emergence of an entire genre of work is amoral and those who do he first saw Seventeen Moments of jokes (anekdoty) lampooning the it, by definition, morally compro- Spring and has often credited the often portentous and self-evident mised. To what extent was this badly show as a primary influence in his voiceovers throughout the series: mistaken stance influenced by the joining the KGB: “What amazed me contemporary depictions of spies in most of all,” he was quoted as saying, Stierlitz had a thought. He liked American culture as violent and/or “was how one man’s effort could it, so he had another one. evil? Not only James Bond’s objec- achieve what whole armies could A flower pot fell off the window tively poor behavior, but any number not.”27 Putin has also credited another sill of the secret apartment and of 1970s thrillers using the CIA as miniseries of the Andropov KGB era, smashed Stierlitz on the head. the plot’s default Big Bad, and even The Sword and the Shield (1968), This was the signal that his wife M*A*S*H’s paranoid counterintelli- which, however, seems to have left had just given birth to a son. gence officer, Colonel Flagg, come to very little impression on Soviet and Stierlitz shed a single manly mind—and all suffer in contrast with subsequent Russian culture—likely tear. He hadn’t been home for the virtuous, and virtuoso in espio- because of its strict party orthodoxy 25 seven years. nage, Stierlitz. and inferior overall quality. In these jokes, Stierlitz is affec- From the very beginning of his tionately conceived as a combination political career, Putin cultivated his of the American TV characters Joe media image as a “real-life Stier- Friday and Maxwell Smart: a compe- litz.” Indeed, Putin’s first television tent if self-important “straight man” appearance, when he was working

(Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017  38  Seventeen Moments of Spring

in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office the Fatherland, Third Class) to the four-decades-old miniseries is its the year after his resignation from 75-year-old Vyacheslav Tikhonov, artful blend of facts and propaganda, the KGB, was in a 1992 documenta- who had remained a pop-culture icon presented with little effort to dis- ry about the city government. Putin since the 1970s based on his portray- tinguish historic truth from creative himself urged the director to stage al of Max Otto von Stierlitz.31 fiction. As a result, even today many a famous scene from the miniseries Russians derive their understanding finale—Stierlitz’s long drive back An important lesson that Vlad- of the wartime US-Soviet relation- to Berlin after his final mission, as imir Putin—and indeed, any polit- ship largely from old memories of the iconic theme music plays—with ical leader who studies the role of watching Seventeen Moments of Putin himself as Stierlitz. This “hom- misinformation in consolidating Spring, cheering Stierlitz’s noble ef- age” to Russia’s most beloved fic- power—might have drawn from this tional spy both announced Vladimir Putin to the nation as a former KGB officer and helped launch his national political career.28

Throughout the 1990s, Putin would continue to benefit politically from the stream of media compari- sons to Stierlitz. The KGB veteran’s public image of quiet, reassuring professionalism played into popular angst about Russian political and social instability and the “public longing for a real-life Stierlitz who could deal with any crisis calmly and efficiently.”29 Indeed, the “Stierlitz phenomenon” had already become a cliché in Russian media commentary by early in Putin’s first presidency. The newspaper Vlast noted the polit- ical value to Putin of such compari- sons:

The only thing that puts any blood at all in the veins of the generally rather pallid image of Putin is his past as a spy. Work in Germany, devotion to the homeland, shedding a tear on Soviet holidays. Maxim Maxi- movich Isayev [Stierlitz’s true Russian name], the very one.30

In 2003, presumably in recogni- tion of his debt to the actor whose popularity and talent had helped launch his own career, Putin present- “President 2000: Portrait of the Future Head of State,” Vlast (Power) magazine, 14 March ed a medal (the Order for Service to 2000, The cover image of Stierlitz invoked the fictional spy’s popularity in coverage of Putin during the election that took him to Russia’s presidency a week later.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  39  Seventeen Moments of Spring

forts to thwart America and Germany Conclusion of Seventeen Moments of Spring from plotting against the motherland. in the Agency’s historical Nazi While both Western and Soviet/ files, given the book’s (and minise- In our era of rapidly increasing, Russian espionage fiction have his- ries’) highly permeable membrane politically driven, and often highly torically developed at least partially between historical accuracy and successful “fake news,” increasing- in response to their respective gov- creative fiction. Whether the endur- ly abetted by high-tech fakery, it is ernments’ agendas, as well as what ing Russian love for Max Otto von worth remembering that carefully their readership wanted, Seventeen Stierlitz is in spite of, or due to, the crafted, low-tech misinformation Moments of Spring represents the KGB’s involvement with its produc- can be at least as effective, even apotheosis of a high-quality, enduring tion, Seventeen Moments of Spring after several decades. The KGB has work of popular art—which nonethe- remains well worth watching, both as seldom enjoyed such lasting success less had its origins in, and was both entertainment and as a window into with any propaganda or disinforma- supported and vetted throughout by, Russian popular culture and its effect tion campaign as with its support the very government whose agents’ on recruiting for, and glamourizing of Julian Semyonov’s story about secret heroics it portrayed. The CIA that nation’s intelligence communi- a spy—nashi (one of ours)—in the analyst who wrote the report quoted ty—no less in recent years than four Great Patriotic War. at the beginning of this essay may decades ago. easily be forgiven for filing the plot

v v v

(Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017  40  Seventeen Moments of Spring

Endnotes

1. CIA website, Special Collection, document titled MUELLER, HEINRICH VOL. 2 0027. pdf, document num- ber 519b7f99993294098d5131d5, (accessed 30 January 2017), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/ 519b7f99993294098d5131d5. 2. “Seventeen Moments of Spring,” Sovlit.net website, 12 November 2014 (accessed 23 January 2017), http://www.sovlit.net/17moments. 3. Arkady Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia: From Gorbachev’s Freedom to Putin’s War (Viking, 2016), chapter 8. Clips from the 1992 documentary in question can be viewed in an online article on pbs.org, Tim Malloy, “Watch Part of a Film Commissioned by Vladimir Putin—About Himself,” published 12 January 2015 (accessed 2 March 2017), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/watch-part-of- a-film-commissioned-by-vladimir-putin-about-himself. 4. Ivan Zasoursky, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia (Routledge, 2004), 144. 5. Encyclopedia.com, “French Influence on Russia” (accessed 6 February 2017),http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-al - manacs-transcripts-and-maps/french-influence-russia. 6. Christopher R. Moran and Robert Johnson, “In the Service of Empire: Imperialism and the British Spy Thriller 1901–1914,” Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 2 (June 2010): 1–20. 7. Paul Brown, “Report on the IRR File on the Red Orchestra,” National Archives website (accessed 3 February 2017), https://www. archives.gov/iwg/research-papers/red-orchestra-irr-file.html. 8. Elena Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies: Soviet TV Mini-Series of the 1970s (doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2003), 33. 9. Ibid., 63. 10. Igor Pomoranzev, “The Case of the Missing Russian Crime Novel,” Radio Free Europe website, published 31 July 2009 (accessed 1 February 2017), http://ww”w.rferl.org/a/The_Case_Of_The_Missing_Russian_Crime_ Novel/1789846.html. 11. World Heritage Encyclopedia, reprinted on Project Gutenberg website (accessed 31 January 2017), http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/ vladimir_yefimovich_semichastny. 12. Yuri Zhukov, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 30 September 1965, reprinted in Jeremy Black’s The Politics of James Bond: From Fleming’s Novels to the Silver Screen (Praeger, 2000), 6. 13. Andrew Nette, “A Proletarian James Bond?”, Overlord 214 (Autumn 2014) (accessed 20 January 2017) https://overland.org.au/previ- ous-issues/issue-214/feature-andrew-nette/. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Cecile Vaissie, “False Nazis and True Chekists,” in The Cold War and Entertainment Television, ed. Lori Maguire (Cambridge Scholars, 2016), 107–20. 17. Ibid., 111. 18. “Office of Strategic Services: Secret Intelligence Branch,” CIA public website, published 19 November 2009 (accessed 6 February 2017), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/oss-secret-intelligence-branch.html. 19. Hedrick Smith, “Soviet Spy Thriller ‘Exposes’ U.S. Plot,” New York Times, 7 January 1974. 20. David MacFadyen, Red Stars: Personality and the Popular Soviet Song (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 115. 21. Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies, 103. 22. Ibid. 23. Vaissie, “False Nazis,” 112. 24. Greg Afinogeniov, “A Portrait of Bureaucracy in Twelve Parts:Seventeen Moments,” in Idiom, March 2010 (accessed 31 January 2017), http://idiommag.com/2010/03/a-portrait-of-bureaucracy-in-twelve-parts-seventeen-moments/. 25. “Vashatedil’s Blog” (accessed 30 January 2017), https://vahshatedil.wordpress.com/2010/02/01/Stierlitz-jokes-the-funniest-i-have-ever- read/ . 26. Hedrick Smith, The Russians (Ballantine, 1976), 432–34. 27. Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia’s Choice (Routledge, 2003), 6. 28. Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia, chapter 8. 29. Ibid. 30. Zasoursky, Media and Power, 136. 31. “Putin Decorates Beloved Screen Spy,” Moscow Times, 10 February 2003 (accessed 19 January 2017), http://old.themoscowtimes.com/ sitemap/free/2003/2/article/putin-decorates-beloved-screen-spy/240496.html.

v v v

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  41

James Mitchell’s Angry Apologia

A Review of Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds and Motives of the Islamic Terrorists Who Are Trying to Destroy America James E. Mitchell, with Bill Harlow (Crown Forum, 2016), 309 pp. Erik Jens Introduction program.a The December 2016 pub- lication of Enhanced Interrogation Former CIA contract psychol- seemed timed to reach the potential ogists James Mitchell and John jury pool for the then-pending lawsuit “Bruce” Jessen are well-known to by three former CIA detainees against Now, James Mitchell anyone familiar with the history Mitchell and Jessen.b That lawsuit, to . . . has produced his of CIA’s post-9/11 experiment with the surprise of some legal observers, own memoir of his par- enhanced interrogation techniques. remained alive until an out-of-court The accounts of numerous ex-intel- settlement was reached on 16 Au- ticipation in the CIA’s ligence officials and journalists have gust 2017 despite expectations that post-9/11 interrogation portrayed Mitchell as obsessed with the government, as it has with most program. repurposing various survival, eva- previous detainee lawsuits, would sion, resistance, and escape (SERE) invoke the state secrets privilege to torments to induce “learned helpless- quash the litigation.c ness” as a necessary prelude to the interrogations of hardened terrorists. a. Mitchell wrote this book with the as- Mitchell and Jessen figure in many sistance of former CIA spokesperson Bill such accounts as opportunists who al- Harlow, who has done similar service for legedly violated their ethical duties as a number of ex-CIA memoirists, including psychologists, then got rich at taxpay- CIA Director George Tenet (At the Center er expense assessing the very interro- of the Storm, HarperCollins, 2007); coun- gation program they had designed. terterrorism chief Jose Rodriguez (Hard Measures, Threshold Editions, 2012); and So run the depictions in popular former Deputy Director of CIA Michael Morell (The Great War of Our Time, culture of Mitchell and Jessen’s roles Twelve, 2015). Harlow also edited a volume in designing and helping to execute of essays and government documents titled the CIA’s detention and interroga- Rebuttal: The CIA Responds to the Senate tion program. Now, James Mitchell, Intelligence Committee’s Study of its De- who until after the December 2014 tention and Interrogation Program (Naval release of a portion of the Senate Institute Press, 2015). Select Intelligence Committee’s b. The case was Suleiman Abdullah Salim, report on the program was—much Mohamad Ahmed Ben Soud, and Obaid to his frustration—barred under his Ullah (as personal representative of Gul CIA nondisclosure agreement from Rahman) v. James Elmer Mitchell and John publicly commenting on his work as “Bruce” Jessen, filed 13 October 2015 in US District Court, for the Eastern District an agency contractor, has produced of Washington. his own memoir of his participation in the CIA’s post-9/11 interrogation c. Ellen Nakashima and Julie Tate, “Archi- tects of CIA interrogation program settle

The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author. They should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of the article’s factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any component of the United States government.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2017)  63  James Mitchell’s Angry Apologia

Mitchell’s account encompasses not only the legalistic and often highly politicized headquarters environment but But the majority of Enhanced the messy realities of field operations. Interrogation focuses on just that: the CIA’s use of SERE techniques to Mitchell relates the origins and personnel and offices or by senior question high-value terrorist detain- progress of his and Jessen’s involve- officials who might have visited field ees, as first designed by Mitchell ment with CIA’s nascent interroga- sites, if at all, as part of VIP dele- (and later by Jessen as well), based tion program by way of their expe- gations, announced in advance and on their experience as psychologists riences as psychologists supporting thoroughly anticipated by their hosts. with SERE programs. (Jessen, as de- the Joint Forces Recovery Agency’s tailed below, had separately pitched (JPRA) SERE training program. He But Enhanced Interrogation, SERE approaches to Department of stoutly defends their work as CIA while an informative and interesting Defense elements prior to formally contractors supporting interrogation read, suffers from Mitchell’s tenden- becoming a CIA contractor with operations, casting his critics—espe- cy to whitewash his own involvement Mitchell.) This book’s real raison cially Senator Dianne Feinstein, his in designing and executing CIA’s in- d’etre is defense of the CIA enhanced fulminations against whom are a re- terrogation program. More problem- interrogation program generally, and curring theme throughout the book— atic is his tendency to ascribe terrorist Mitchell’s participation specifically. as willfully, spitefully “cherry-pick- sympathies to those who question his Whether the enhanced interro- ing” evidence to unfairly portray him ethics and practices as an architect gation techniques the two allegedly and his partner as, in his words, “two of the program. It especially suffers designed were critical in eliciting greedy contractors who lacked the from his occasional flatly wrong useful intelligence, or whether there necessary skills and experience” to statements, which combine to under- were operational or ethical reasons to design or run the enhanced interroga- mine his generally valid argument. stick to less controversial, time-tested tion program. (277)a Many observers and reporters have indeed unfairly demonized Mitchell methods, is beyond the scope of this Mitchell’s book is notable in and Jessen for doing what their coun- review. Smart, dedicated patriots con- several respects. Some are positive: try had asked—in fact, formally con- tinue to argue both sides of this issue, His account vividly depicts the tracted—them to accomplish during a and Mitchell’s defense of enhanced interrogation program as he designed, difficult and dangerous time. interrogation techniques is unlikely experienced, and helped execute it, to convert anyone at this point. including extended interrogations of The full title of Mitchell’s book Ultimately, Mitchell makes a some of the most notorious al-Qae- certainly implies the need for ex- strong case that he has been mistreat- da detainees ever captured. His treme measures in response to the ed in the press and unfairly convicted account encompasses not only the “Islamic terrorists trying to destroy in the court of public opinion. But his legalistic and often highly politicized America.” But this title looks more book’s misleading descriptions of his headquarters environment but the like a marketing tactic than an actual participation in CIA interrogation op- messy realities of field operations. description of the content. Mitch- erations, combined with selective use This distinguishes his book from the ell does devote two chapters to his of facts and flat-out misstatements all many memoirs written either by field personal interrogations of Khalid call his overall account into question. operators railing against allegedly Sheikh Mohammed and his assess- Moreover, his repeated diatribes unresponsive or clueless headquarters ments of KSM’s psyche, world view, and motivations. That KSM proves against Senator Feinstein, the Demo- to be wily, vainglorious, fanatical- crats, and a mendacious press are as ly religious, and by most Western dogmatic and ideological as anything lawsuit brought on behalf of brutalized de- in the Senate reports he castigates. tainees,” Washington Post, 18 August 2017. standards thoroughly evil will come as no surprise to anyone with even a. Editor’s note: Numbers in parentheses general familiarity with al-Qaeda and in this review are references to the page or its leadership. pages in Mitchell’s book on which cited quotes or assertions appear. All other cites will appear in footnotes.

(Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2017  64  James Mitchell’s Angry Apologia

Mitchell describes himself as tormented by the question Events Covered of whether or not the application of his psychological and SERE training and experience to help design a coercive James Mitchell and Bruce Jes- interrogation program was appropriate. sen first came to the attention of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center with The book goes on to detail be examined—are (mostly) defensi- their December 2001 analysis of the Mitchell’s experiences with a range ble, albeit in the most narrowly tech- just-discovered “Manchester Manu- of Langley and White House of- nical sense (as when dubious asser- al,” an al-Qaeda training document ficials and with CIA officers at tions are cited merely to “a report”). that included instructions on resisting various “black sites.” He includes common interrogation approaches. vivid re-creations of his conversa- While some journalists such The main narrative of Enhanced tions—coercive and otherwise— as Jane Mayer have been heavily Interrogation begins soon afterward, with high-value detainees. Mitchell criticized within the Intelligence when Mitchell signed on with CIA as recounts his increasing frustration Community for alleged “liberal bias” a contract psychologist assigned to with what he sees as politicized, in their reporting, at least Mayer, in apply his experience in SERE train- ill-informed decisions concerning her history of the CIA’s interrogation ing to assess the resistance postures the program made by high officials. program The Dark Side, cites all her a of detainees. Soon afterward, he and He bitterly describes what he calls sources in a detailed bibliography. Jessen, would become instrumental a straightforward persecution of the Mitchell’s book—like many other in designing a set of coercive tech- CIA and its unthanked intelligence memoirs of former interrogators and niques to help extract intelligence operators around the globe in an intelligence officials—would be far from high-value al-Qaeda detainees. extended “witch hunt” led by Sen- more credible had he likewise cited ator Feinstein and her myrmidons, any sources beyond his vague allu- Mitchell and Jessen would go sions to “reports” or “sources.” on to help interrogate al-Qaeda cheered on by the media industry. leaders Abu Zubaydah, USS Cole Having added to the bookshelf bombing mastermind Abd al-Rahim of writings by former interrogators, al-Nashiri, and, most notably, Khalid Mitchell’s Memoir Compared to Mitchell echoes the observations Sheikh Mohammed. Initially they Others Covering Similar Ground of a number who have pointed out used a menu of coercive techniques how interrogation work can, over of their own design based on their The point of assessing Mitchell’s time, degauss the moral compasses SERE background. Eventually, they version of history is not to tarnish his of those who do it. For example, functioned under the terms of CIA’s and Jessen’s reputations or those of Chris Mackey’s The Interrogators: formally approved program. Mitchell the many CIA and other intelligence Inside the Secret War Against Al describes himself as tormented by officials and national leaders who Qaeda (Little, Brown, 2004) and the question of whether or not the made hard decisions during a time Tony Lagouranis’s Fear Up Harsh: application of his psychological and of national crisis and in response to An Army Interrogator’s Dark Journey SERE training and experience to unfamiliar threats and adversaries. Through Iraq (Caliber, 2007) both help design a coercive interrogation Mitchell has his version of how the detail the tendency of even trained program was appropriate. In the end, enhanced interrogation program and dedicated military interrogators, he tells us, he overcame his misgiv- played out. Many other memoirists in the absence of strong leadership, ings on the grounds that a) CIA had and countless intelligence officers in- to go beyond approved questioning “already decided to get rough” and volved in the program—almost all of methods until brutality becomes the Mitchell could at least mitigate and whom have written no books—have rule rather than the exception. channel that rough treatment into a their own. No one, or almost no one, safe, defensible, and effective pro- appears to have deliberately lied in gram, and b) the need to protect the print. Even Mitchell’s misstatements United States trumped “the interests a. Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside in Enhanced Interrogation—and of a handful of Islamic terrorists.” Story of How the War on Terror Turned there are some big ones, which will Into a War on American Ideals (Doubleday, (47–49) 2008).

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2017)  65  James Mitchell’s Angry Apologia

A comparison of his account with . . . Ali Soufan regard- ing their experiences in interrogating Abu Zubaydah in peratures clearly intended to keep the 2002 illustrates the highly subjective nature of personal detainees freezing and miserable. He memoirs. recounts his resulting confrontations with Mitchell, who he was convinced was experimenting with temperature A former CIA interrogator, Glenn onym “Boris”) as utterly, arrogantly manipulation in defiance of local Carle, in The Interrogator: An convinced of the rightness of his plan policy.b Education (Nation, 2004), does not to force Abu Zubaydah to see his in- allege the kinds of brutal or illegal terrogator (i.e., Mitchell) as a “god” behavior witnessed by the Army who would exercise absolute control memoirists above, but his book does through forced nudity, constant loud “Learned Helplessness” discuss the disconnect between CIA noise in his cell, and, especially, Headquarters and the field regarding sleep deprivation. Soufan depicts Media accounts of Mitchell’s interrogation operations. All of these Mitchell as unused to having his work with the CIA often highlight accounts “from the field” illustrate expertise questioned, ignorant of the his alleged single-minded pursuit of the principle—familiar to anyone cultural backgrounds of detainees, inducing “learned helplessness” as a with military or bureaucratic experi- and enjoying the chance to “experi- necessary precondition for effective ence—that rules promulgated from ment” on the detainees in ultimately interrogation. Indeed, this phrase headquarters may, in the absence of counterproductive and damaging has become a sort of shorthand for strong oversight and complicated by ways.a Mitchell and Jessen’s mission state- the secrecy inherent in most interro- ment as CIA contractors. It appears in For his part, Mitchell paints gation operations, be honored more almost every account of their work as Soufan as marginally competent, in the breach than in the observance. something they—especially Mitch- self-righteous about his virtuous Occasional interpersonal drama ell—constantly, even aggressively, FBI versus the sadistic CIA, and aside, then, Mitchell’s depiction of emphasized as a critical element short-tempered (including an episode his time working with CIA interroga- of breaking the will of detainees to in which Soufan allegedly physi- tion teams generally matches previ- resist questioning.c ous accounts by his colleagues and cally threatened Mitchell and later other CIA officials. apologized). (37) While the weight Yet Enhanced Interrogation con- of anecdote favors Soufan’s version tains not a single mention of learned In fairness, Mitchell has written of events, whose account is more helplessness (although Mitchell does a memoir of his own experiences objectively “accurate” cannot be de- cite, in passing, a fellow psychologist and perceptions, not an academic termined at this point. Certainly both as an expert on “learned optimism.”) paper or a New York Times exposé. A men seem sincere in their mutual One might infer from this omission comparison of his account with that professional disdain. Mitchell’s acute awareness of the of ex-FBI agent and interrogator Ali negative publicity associated with the The use of temperature manipula- Soufan regarding their experiences term “learned helplessness” and his tion (exposing detainees to extreme in interrogating Abu Zubaydah in determination to erase from popular 2002 illustrates the highly subjective cold in their cells) is recounted nature of personal memoirs. Here differently by these two as well. are two well-educated, dedicated Mitchell says the cells were chilly only because the guards were heavily interrogators, each wanting to do b. Ibid., 409. only the right thing and each appar- dressed in black uniforms and masks ently convinced of the nobility of his and would otherwise overheat. There c. For discussion of Mitchell as an aggres- cause. In his own interrogation mem- was no intent to make detainees un- sive booster of “learned helplessness,” oir The Black Banners: The Inside comfortable, he claims. (286) Soufan, see Jane Mayer, The Dark Side, 164; on the other hand, describes cell tem- Soufan, chapter 21; John Rizzo, Company Story of 9/11 and the War Against al Man (Scribner, 2014), 269; and Senate Qaeda (W.W. Norton, 2011), Soufan Intelligence Committee Report on Torture describes Mitchell (using the pseud- (Melville House, 2014) (hereafter, SSCI a. Soufan, Black Banners, chapters 21–22. Report), 30.

(Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2017  66  James Mitchell’s Angry Apologia

memory his promotion of the theory “observations” in post-interrogation The first misstatement relates to as applied to interrogation. “hot washes,” the better to prepare the 2002 death in CIA custody of Gul the team for the next day’s session. Rahman.d In late 2002, Mitchell and A related point is that in his May (23) In fairness, however, one of Jessen were interrogating USS Cole 2017 deposition for the pending law- Mitchell’s most vocal critics in this bombing mastermind Abd al-Rahim suit by former CIA detainees against respect is the aforementioned critic of al-Nashiri at an undisclosed facility himself and Jessen, Mitchell flatly Mitchell’s techniques, Ali Soufan. where terror suspect Gul Rahman denied having ever used the term in was also being held. During a break connection with interrogation. He from questioning al-Nashiri and stated, rather, that CIA officers often briefly talking with Gul Rahman, misused the term “learned helpless- Rewriting History: Omissions, Mitchell recalls noticing that he ness” in documents because they Evasions, and Whoppers looked “just not right” and asking a did not understand the distinction medic to see to Rahman’s abraded between helplessness to induce coop- Mitchell sometimes glosses over wrists and ankles (the medic refused). eration—as is utilized in SERE—and his specific actions as part of agency A few days later, Gul Rahman was “learned helplessness,” which would interrogation teams. For example, he found dead. inhibit cooperation.”a Yet Mitch- states that “after transfer to the black ell himself had included “learned site Abu Zubaydah was subjected to Mitchell’s explanation for Rah- helplessness” in his list of techniques sleep deprivation, nudity, loud noise, man’s death, in full: “Reports say he in his “pitch memo” to CIA in early and dietary manipulation, which pro- died of exposure after he had been 2003 and cited it elsewhere as well as duced intelligence of threats against mistreated by the indigenous guards.” a tool in his toolkit.b the United States [italics added].” (90) This is an absurd, provably false (28) Mitchell thus completely erases statement, contradicting—among This is an early clue that Mitchell himself from active design and exe- many other sources—CIA’s own, may have written Enhanced Interro- cution of these techniques, whereas exhaustive investigation of Rahman’s gation, as the saying goes in intelli- multiple other accounts show him as death, which highlights the local gence reporting, “to influence as well an insistent, driving force for the en- guard force’s professionalism and as inform.” From the first chapter, tire concept of coercively questioning specifies that they never physically Mitchell seems to downplay his own Zubaydah. Such blurring of his actual mistreated detainees at the site where hands-on role within the various role in interrogation operations casts Rahman was held. The same CIA interrogation teams he worked with. an early shadow over his book’s reli- report quotes an extended description For example, where multiple other ability.c Mitchell, here and elsewhere, by Jessen of a CIA team executing a memoirs depict Mitchell as aggres- goes well beyond mere papering over “rough takedown,” which involved sive and overbearing in his insis- his active design of, and participa- running a hooded Rahman up and tence on applying his own theories tion in, operations he would have the down a corridor while slapping and to break detainees’ resistance, he reader believe he merely witnessed. “forcefully” punching him—in order tells us that he merely provided his to, in Jessen’s words, “give them Nothing is more damaging to [sic] something to think about.”e The the overall credibility of Enhanced a. Salim v. Mitchell, “Defendants’ State- ment of Undisputed Facts,” quoting Mitch- Interrogation than the pair of “whop- ell’s statement, paragraph 57 (deposition pers”—hardly too strong a word d. Rahman’s family joined in the ACLU suit taken May 22, 2017). https://www.aclu. in this case—that Mitchell, and his against Mitchell and Jessen. org/legal-document/salim-v-mitchell- co-author have seen fit to insert into defendants-statement-undisputed-facts their book. e. Memorandum, “Death Investigation – (accessed 23 May 2017). Gul Rahman,” CIA investigative report, issued 28 January 2003, approved for b. James Mitchell, “Qualifications to release 30 September 2016, #c06555318), Provide Special Mission Interrogation A24-23, https://www.thetorturedatabase. Consultation,” memorandum to CIA dated c. See footnote c on preceding page for a org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/cia_production_ 1 February 2003, 3. Available in case mate- list of accounts of Mitchell’s proactive role c06555318_death_investigation-_gul_rah- rials for Salim v. Mitchell. in the interrogation program. man.pdf (accessed May 12, 2017).

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2017)  67  James Mitchell’s Angry Apologia

The point here is not to impugn the professional compe- tence and regard for law of CIA or its deployed officers contributed to a loss of ac- working in difficult conditions, facing dangerous adver- countability and abuse. . . . saries with often ambiguous or nonexistent legal guid- Local CIA officers convinced ance or support. military leaders that they should be allowed to operate outside the established local rules and report goes on to state that a junior, CIA’s operations around the globe, procedures. CIA detainees in newly deployed CIA officer ordered let it survive. Abu Ghraib, known locally as Rahman chained, naked from the “Ghost Detainees,” were not waist down, to the floor of his cell, In fact, multiple DoD investiga- accounted for in the deten- where he was found frozen to death tions have laid out in detail CIA’s tion system. [Following this the next day.a One wonders how extensive interrogation operation at statement in the Fay report’s Mitchell, or his co-writer Bill Har- Abu Ghraib, which led to “a loss of executive summary, the report low, could claim with a straight face accountability, abuse, reduced inter- goes on to detail, at length, that Rahman just happened to die of agency cooperation, and an unhealthy mystique that further poisoned the CIA activities at Abu Ghraib in “exposure,” somehow, and pin it all d b 2003–2004.] on “the locals.” atmosphere at Abu Ghraib.” Of special note were CIA interroga- The point here is not to impugn tors, described in these reports as the professional competence and “set[ting] physical and mental con- regard for law of CIA or its deployed Mitchell’s Self-absolution of ditions for favorable interrogations” officers working in difficult condi- the Events at Abu Ghraib of detainees, echoing—by chance or tions, facing dangerous adversaries otherwise—the approach advocated with often ambiguous or nonexistent An even more egregiously false by Mitchell and Jessen starting a year legal guidance or support. But the claim—one difficult to chalk up to or so earlier.c admirable work of the many should honest error—is Mitchell’s asser- not, in a democracy enshrining the tion—in a passage apparently in- Not only multiple civilian report- rule of law, excuse the misdeeds of tended to absolve CIA generally and ers such as Jane Mayer (The Dark the few. One of these misdeeds, and himself personally from any moral Side) and Tara McKelvey (Monster- perhaps the most notorious low point responsibility for the Abu Ghraib ing: Inside America’s Policy of Secret of the Abu Ghraib scandal, was the scandal—that “DoD investigations Interrogations and Torture in the accidental death by asphyxiation proved that the CIA was not involved Terror War), but several DoD inves- of Manadel al-Jamadi at the hands in Abu Ghraib.”(233) This claim is tigations have stated clearly that CIA of CIA personnel, widely reported simply false, and one wonders that was a major player in interrogations, in media accounts as well as sever- Mitchell would make such an easily detentions, and related mistreatment al government reports.e For James disproved claim—and that his co-au- at Abu Ghraib. To quote only one thor, who ought to be an expert on such source, Maj. Gen. George Fay’s this issue, having previously co-au- report: d. AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib thored four books addressing the Detention Facility and 205th Military Intel- The CIA conducted unilateral ligence Brigade, MG George R. Fay, Inves- and joint interrogation oper- tigating Officer, declassified Department of ations at Abu Ghraib [which] the Army report, published 23 August 2004, a. Death investigation—Rahman, A24-4; http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/ “CIA Comments on the Senate Select Com- fay82504rpt.pdf (accessed 12 May 2017), mittee on Intelligence Report on the Rendi- 9. The report contains multiple detailed tion, Detention, and Interrogation Pro- b. Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th descriptions of CIA personnel and activities gram,” issued 27 June 2013, approved for Military Police Brigade, report issued 23 conducting interrogation and related activi- release 8 December 2014, 42, https://www. August 2004, 53, http://www.washington- ties at Abu Ghraib in 2003–2004. cia.gov/library/reports/CIAs_June2013_Re- post.com/wp-srv/nationi/documents/fay_re- sponse_to_the_SSCI_Study_on_ the_For- port_8-25-04.pdf (accessed 19 May 2017). e. “Final Autopsy Report No. ME 03- mer_Detention_and_Interrogation_Pro- 504,” Armed Forces Institute of Pathology gram.pdf (accessed 12 May 2017). c. Ibid., 18. report dated 9 January 2004, https://thetor-

(Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2017  68  James Mitchell’s Angry Apologia

A reasonable argument could be made . . . that the prop- Mitchell to simply state that none of agation . . . of coercive techniques . . . intended to induce this ever happened, defies belief and “learned helplessness” . . . and the use of all those same raises serious questions about his techniques by both DoD and CIA personnel a year later at book’s overall credibility. Abu Ghraib share a causal link. Mitchell cites media reports “suggesting erroneously that we bore in February 2002 to JPRA leader- Ghraib a year later.e And maybe some responsibility for Abu Ghraib. ship.c The JPRA commander, in turn, Mitchell and Jessen’s work, in the We didn’t. I had never been to Iraq, sent Jessen’s paper to Joint Forces spring of 2002, designing a CIA and neither had Bruce.” (234) a Command, along with his suggestion interrogation program based on the Mitchell may well be blameless for that JPRA send a team to Guantana- same ideas Jessen had endorsed in anything that happened at Abu Ghra- mo Bay to “provide instruction on his memo to a DoD element a few ib, but his presentation of the facts, basic and advanced techniques and months earlier was indeed totally too artful by half, disguises a fairly methods” related to countering resis- unrelated to the emergence at Abu strong counterargument. tance. From there, as the SASC re- Ghraib of those same methods a year port details, word quickly got around later, reportedly at the direction of Mitchell cites the Senate Armed various combatant commands that CIA personnel. Services Committee’s November JPRA was available to “assist” inter- 2008 report as evidence that “the rogation efforts. Meanwhile, Jessen, True, Mitchell and Jessen never military” had contacted the Joint as early as February 2002, helped the set foot in Abu Ghraib. But their Personnel Recovery Agency—which Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) specific approach toward “setting the runs all DoD SERE training—for create a two-week, “ad hoc ‘crash’ conditions for interrogation” through advice on using SERE methods in course on interrogation.”d By August forced nudity and other humiliations interrogation, back in December 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was clearly in evidence among those 2001—months before Mitchell was had authorized a set of enhanced unnamed CIA and military intelli- summoned to Langley in April 2002 questioning techniques largely mir- gence officers whose instructions to to begin applying SERE techniques roring those developed by Mitchell the enlisted military reservists at Abu in Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation. and Jessen for the CIA. The Abu Ghraib helped create the whole sorry This, argues Mitchell, proves that he Ghraib scandal broke roughly a year episode. and Jessen could not have influenced later, in summer 2003. the military’s use of enhanced inter- A reasonable argument could be rogation techniques. (258) Perhaps the content of Jessen’s made (though this is not the place February 2002, SERE-derived in- to make it) that the propagation But that same SASC report also terrogation course for the DIA, and throughout CIA’s interrogation details how, in December 2001, Jes- his offers of interrogation advice and “community” of coercive techniques sen co-authored with Mitchell their assistance to other DoD elements, (nudity, sleep deprivation, loud music paper on al-Qaeda’s “Manchester played no part in the emergence of and other noise) intended to induce b Manual.” Jessen then sent that paper SERE questioning methods at Abu “learned helplessness” as a prelude to questioning and the use of all those same techniques by both DoD and turedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/ CIA personnel a year later at Abu dod003212_0.pdf (accessed 12 June 2017). Ghraib share a causal link. Given the a. Here, as elsewhere, Mitchell’s vague c. “Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees above timelines, and given also the allusion to “reports” make it impossible to in U.S. Custody,” Report of the Committee fact that physical absence is not nec- assess the reliability of his claim. on Armed Services, United States Senate, essarily a defense to accountability issued 20 November 2008, https://www. b. A partial translation of the manual is armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ available on the Justice Department web Detainee-Report-Final_April-22-2009.pdf site. See https://www.justice.gov/sites/ (accessed 13 June 2017), 6. e. “Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees default/files/ag/legacy/2002/10/08/manual- in U.S. Custody,” (accessed 13 June 2017), part1_1.pdf. d. SASC report, 20 November 2008, 8. 6.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2017)  69  James Mitchell’s Angry Apologia

The value of Mitchell’s account of the CIA’s program lies in its insights into the perennial tensions between Head- mishandling information, based on quarters policies and doctrines and the realities of field Mitchell having couriered an agen- operations. cy-owned laptop between locations at the request of a CIA chief of base. (108) (former Brigadier General Karpins- Mitchell’s Memoir as Contribu- ki’s demotion to colonel in the wake tion to the Interrogation Debate Mitchell’s account of over- of Abu Ghraib being a prominent the-top, sadistic, and incompetent example), Mitchell is far too glib in Much of Mitchell’s history of interrogations conducted by field excusing himself from any role in these interrogations is aimed at prov- officers seems calculated to help take setting the conditions that led to Abu ing his point that rough questioning the onus off himself, who presents Ghraib. was critical in producing intelligence himself as the sole reasonable man that stopped future attacks, and ulti- at a secret detention site run by Like the debate about whether mately in locating Osama bin Laden. vengeful, undisciplined cowboys. Yet torture “works” in interrogation, He also describes his experiences at Mitchell is careful to avoid sweeping the question of Mitchell and Jes- a number of secret detention facili- accusations, emphasizing that the sen’s moral responsibility for the ties, at least one of which he vividly misbehavior he observed was limited use of SERE questioning methods paints as run by CIA officers with to his secret location “down the in terrorist (suspected and actual) little regard for training or discipline rabbit hole . . . [and] out of character interrogations may be ultimately un- and with no use at all for “fucking for the carefully controlled program answerable. In the national security lawyers.” (115) I knew [CIA counterterrorism chief] environment of 2002–2003, it could Jose Rodriguez and the leadership at just as likely have been a case of Mitchell’s perspective here is CIA had in place.” (116) “cometh the hour, cometh the man.” valuable, in that too many otherwise Had Mitchell not gotten that call excellent and informative memoirs The value of Mitchell’s account from CIA in April 2002, some other by senior CIA officials lay out the of the CIA’s program lies in its reputed “interrogation expert” willing legal and operational rules at Head- insights—intended or not—into the to advise on “what really works” quarters, hammered out between perennial tensions between Head- in questioning America’s enemies, CIA, other IC agencies, and the quarters policies and doctrines and might well have been contacted White House—but have little to say the realities of field operations. instead. Would the interrogation about real-life compliance with those Senior CIA officials have written program really have proceeded so rules at remote, often secret loca- memoirs of their time at Headquar- differently? tions. For example, Mitchell quotes a ters, punctuated by occasional visits deployed CIA officer (he is, perhaps to the field, but they rarely address Mitchell often comes across as a deliberately, unclear whether it was whether a pre-announced VIP del- genuinely sympathetic figure in his the chief interrogator or the local egation is likely to witness or hear own book, willing to engage with the chief of station) as willing to lie to about the poor, if not illegal, behavior ethical as well as practical issues in- Langley about “communications” be- Mitchell ascribes to certain CIA of- herent in counterterrorism interroga- ing down, in order to prevent Mitch- ficers. Conversely, many field-inter- tions. But his book too often tests the ell from reporting illegal treatment of rogators-turned-memoirists, mostly reader’s sympathy in careless, often detainees on the scene. (118) military but including the occasional slanted, and occasionally simply false CIA veteran, have retailed their war history of the agency’s interrogation Furthermore, Mitchell describes stories into often compelling and program. the “flagrant disregard of both Justice well-written chronicles in which Department approvals and headquar- “headquarters” stands for a range of ters guidance” displayed by both the vices—bureaucratic cowardice or chief of station and the chief interro- cluelessness, or legal opinions that gator at one of the secret detention are seen as impeding or precluding sites. (116) He recounts the latter effective action in the field. officer’s attempt to frame him for

(Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2017  70  James Mitchell’s Angry Apologia

Why Didn’t the SSCI tribes against Feinstein and the SSCI fore was not, on reasonable legal Talk to Mitchell? process. In keeping several chapters grounds, a candidate for interviews. between his complaint about not be- Mitchell repeatedly dwells on the ing allowed to testify and the fact of SSCI’s allegedly arbitrary “refusal” the contemporaneous Justice investi- in its 2014 investigation of the CIA gation, he leaves the impression that Mitchell’s “Enemies List” interrogation program to interview only political malice or incompetence him or any of the other CIA officers could explain the lack of invitations In another example of Mitchell’s and contractors involved in the pro- to testify. personal animus swamping his ob- gram. (308) He appears to attribute jectivity, he accuses former Attorney this almost solely to Senator Fein- Many other CIA veterans share General Eric Holder of “stacking the stein’s personal malevolence, disre- this complaint. For example, Jose Justice Department with al-Qaeda’s gard for the truth, and determination Rodriguez, in his May 2017 depo- lawyers and looking for any excuse to slander the CIA, and he blames her sition for the pending detainees’ to file criminal charges against the directly for the eventual leaking, by lawsuit against Mitchell, called the men and women of CIA who had unnamed Senate staffers, of his and Senate report “an errant, one-sided been keeping Americans safe, includ- Bruce Jessen’s names to the media. assault on the CIA’s EIT program that ing me.” (270) His sole evidence, reaches numerous unsupportable and apparently, is that nine (out of well The intelligence committee’s baffling conclusions.”b While James over a hundred) Justice lawyers had failure to interview CIA officials has Mitchell and others involved with the done legal work defending terror indeed come in for heavy criticism. program may now angrily claim that suspects and that they therefore must But Mitchell elides the critical fact they ought to have been interviewed, love terrorists and so must their boss. that he, like many participants in the it seems disingenuous to pretend they enhanced interrogation program, was would have freely provided their Even apart from the fact that a the subject of a Department of Justice version of events to the SSCI without number of those nine lawyers had investigation even while the Senate regard to their own legal exposure in worked on habeas corpus and other was preparing its report.a That fact an ongoing criminal investigation. basic rights issues related to detain- complicated the issue of testifying to ees—as opposed to actually trying to Congress and suggests a reason for In fairness, as former acting gain their release—Mitchell’s argu- Mitchell’s not being invited to testify director of CIA John McLaughlin has ment here is simply silly. His claim that is far more plausible than claims noted, the Senate committee declined resurrects 2010’s “shoddy and dan- of personal spite on Senator Fein- to interview anyone at all, including gerous” accusations by fringe con- stein’s part. a number of CIA high officials and servatives that Guantanamo defense field officers, who had been involved lawyers were per se bad Americans, No CIA officer or contractor with in the program but were not the sub- who ought to be professionally ostra- any sense of self-preservation—or a jects of any Justice investigations.c cized—accusations strongly refuted competent lawyer—would discuss But McLaughlin’s fair criticism of by both Obama and Bush officials as with Senate investigators his or her the Senate committee’s stated reason a “shameful . . . undermin[ing of] the role in the enhanced interrogation for not conducting interviews is not justice system.”d program while they were being relevant to Mitchell—who was, in investigated by the Department of fact, under Justice scrutiny and there- As for Mitchell’s general charac- Justice and while any statements to terization of Holder as “out to get” Congress could be used against them the CIA workforce, Holder made in the event of criminal prosecution. b. Deposition of Jose Rodriguez, 22 May it clear in mid-2009 that Justice 2017, https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/ Mitchell acknowledges the existence salim-v-mitchell-declaration-jose-rodriguez of the Justice investigation, but never (accessed 23 May 2017). in connection with his several dia- d. Ari Shapiro, “’Al-Qaeda 7’ Controversy: c. John McLaughlin, “The Senate Majority Detainees and Politics,” National Public Report on Interrogation: An Opportunity Radio website, published 11 March 2010, a. SSCI Report, xii. Lost,” in Harlow, Rebuttal, 19. accessed 12 June 2017.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2017)  71  James Mitchell’s Angry Apologia

While self-serving in many respects, Enhanced Interro- gation constitutes useful testimony from one of the last to lie about him in print in order to major players in CIA’s post-9/11 enhanced interrogation get at “a larger truth.” As a previous experiment. reviewer of Enhanced Interrogation has pointed out, this anecdote does not ring true: why would any reputa- would not prosecute any CIA officers the officially reported mass suicides ble reporter tell an interview subject who had acted in good faith under at Guantanamo Bay in 2006 as proof she intended to lie about him, a firing then-approved interrogation guide- of a “lurid” press obsession with offense in most news organizations?c lines.a Those who had accidentally assuming the very worst of the US Wouldn’t his next phone call be to killed detainees and others who had government. But skepticism about her editor, and wouldn’t she know acted outside the approved limits on the official account of the reported that? coercive interrogation were put on 2006 suicides at Guantanamo was notice that they might be held to ac- widespread across a range of major count. In the end, no one was. Holder media outlets, a result largely of the dropped all detainee investigations in government’s ambiguous or arguably Conclusion 2012.b implausible explanations for the deaths. For all its problematic aspects, Mitchell is harshly critical of the Enhanced Interrogation is well worth media, which he accuses of gleefully In support of his thesis that the reading for the CIA interrogation his- trampling the truth in its quest for media routinely lies about him, tory “completist.” While self-serving profits, and especially of “los[ing] Mitchell quotes a “press account” in many respects, it constitutes useful all reason when they get the torture that on the night of the suicides, testimony from one of the last major bug.” Some of his examples seem “shrieks and wailings were heard players in CIA’s post-9/11 enhanced valid—for instance, the tendency coming out of [a Guantanamo facil- interrogation experiment who had of any allegation or appearance of ity] and one James Elmer Mitchell not yet penned their own account of sexual abuse to get disproportionate was seen entering it [italics in origi- the program. And Mitchell’s account, media attention. Others are less de- nal].” (289) But this quote, for which intentionally or not, serves as a fensible. For example, Mitchell cites Mitchell provides no source, appears dramatic reminder of how ethically widespread press skepticism about to exist nowhere on the Internet—ex- problematic measures, undertaken cept in the online version of Mitch- in extremis in the wake of 9/11 and ell’s own book. This “press account” a. “Attorney General Eric Holder Re- subsequent attacks, can take on lives thus appears to be either fabricated or garding a Preliminary Review into the of their own, making life difficult not Interrogation of Certain Detainees,” public appeared only in some media outlet only for those (of course) subjected statement dated 24 August 2009, US De- so desperately obscure as to not even to those measures, but to those who partment of Justice website, https//www. have a Web presence. Either way, must defend their use long after the justice.gov (accessed 12 June 2017). it does not help support Mitchell’s sense of crisis has passed. b. “Statement of Attorney General Eric claim that the press is out to get him. Holder on Closure of Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees,” public Another dubious claim is Mitch- c. Steve Hirsch, “Review of Enhanced In- statement dated 30 August 30, US Depart- ell’s account of a “female journalist” terrogation by James Mitchell,” published ment of Justice website, https//www.justice. telling him outright that she intended 17 March 2017, https///www.thecipherbrief. gov (accessed 12 June 2017). com (accessed 12 June 2017).

v v v

(Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2017  72  James Mitchell’s Angry Apologia

Annotated Bibliography of Previous Interrogation-related Memoirs

The following are some of the per his training, the pitfalls associ- War (Avalon, 2007). McKelvey’s more illuminating and/or influential ated with various approaches, and book focuses on the Abu Ghraib books about the CIA interrogation the frustrations of trying to “break” scandal, treating it as a microcosm of program. detainees to elicit usable intelligence the United States’ flawed approach make his account one of the best to the war on terror. Her clear (and Glenn L. Carle, The Interroga- overall depictions of day-to-day understandable) outrage over the tor: An Education (Nation, 2004). A interrogation in a military deployed episode is tempered in her account by former CIA clandestine officer and environment. meticulous citations for her facts and interrogator’s account of his personal allegations. It would be hard to find a experiences in CIA, focusing on his Chris Mackey and Greg Miller, more thorough account of the origins, extended interrogation of a single The Interrogators: Inside the Secret execution, and aftermath of what detainee and his gradual loss of faith War Against Al Qaeda (Little, Brown, passed for interrogation policy (or in his superiors’ willingness and abil- 2004). Mackey, a former senior even basic leadership) at Abu Ghraib. ity to reliably assess detainees and enlisted Army interrogator, covers related conditions in the field. much of the same ground as Lagoura- Jose A. Rodriguez, Jr., with Bill nis, albeit his account focuses less on Harlow, Hard Measures: How Ag- Bill Harlow, ed., Rebuttal: The bad behavior and more on deployed gressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved CIA Responds to the Senate Intel- military culture, as well as individual American Lives (Threshold Editions, ligence Committee’s Study of Its interrogators and their interrelation- 2012). Former CIA counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program ships. Less sensational than Fear Up chief Rodriguez, in this tough-mind- (Naval Institute Press, 2015). Mr. Harsh, The Interrogators may be ed account of his experience with Harlow, a former CIA spokesman more useful for the reader interested the interrogation program, does not and a frequent co-author of CIA in the intersection of interrogation conceal his support for enhanced memoirs, has gathered a number of work and enlisted military culture. methods as an ugly but indispens- short essays (about 40 pages’ worth) able component of the program. He by former CIA officials criticizing the Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: recalls the CIA’s pre-9/11 “Deutch Senate report and filled out the book The Inside Story of How the War rules,” perceived by the workforce with about 300 pages of govern- on Terror Turned Into a War on as limiting HUMINT recruitments to ment documents: the CIA’s formal American Ideals (Doubleday, 2008). politically palatable candidates, as a response to the Senate report, and Mayer’s book, while widely praised typical symptom—repeated after 9/11 the Senate Intelligence Committee’s as an authoritative chronicle of the in the aftermath of the interrogation minority report. interrogation program, has also come program—of clueless leaders under- under fire for its alleged “liberal cutting good intelligence practice in a Tony Lagouranis and Allen Mi- bias.” Without rendering a verdict on misguided quest for political approv- kaelian, Fear Up Harsh: An Army that issue, it is worth noting that her al. He shares with James Mitchell a Interrogator’s Dark Journey Through book—unlike any of the many “I was withering contempt for the Senate Iraq (Caliber, 2007). Lagouranis, a there” memoirs of the CIA interroga- intelligence committee’s 2014 report former Army interrogator, details his tion program—is impeccably cited, on the program. While the Rodri- interrogation training followed by with detailed endnotes, bibliography, guez and Mitchell accounts are often deployment to Iraq, where he unspar- and an afterword detailing Mayer’s redundant (a result of covering much ingly depicts his and his colleagues’ research methods. of the same ground and possibly gradual departure from adherence to of Harlow’s co-authorship of both approved interrogation methods. His Tara McKelvey, Monstering: memoirs), Rodriquez’s no-nonsense, detailed accounts of how he deployed Inside America’s Policy of Secret In- unapologetic defense of the CIA a range of psychological methods terrogations and Torture in the Terror program will appeal to many.

v v v

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2017)  73