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Concerning Consequences STUDIES IN , DESTRUCTION, AND TRAUMA

Kristine Stiles

The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London KRISTINE STILES is the France Family Professor of Art, Art Flistory, and Visual Studies at Duke University.

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 2016 by Kristine Stiles All rights reserved. Published 2016. Printed in the United States of America

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ISBN-13: 978-0-226-77451-0 (cloth) ISBN-13: 978-0-226-77453-4 (paper) ISBN-13: 978-0-226-30440-3 (e-book)

DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226304403.001.0001

Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Stiles, Kristine, author. Concerning consequences : studies in art, destruction, and trauma / Kristine Stiles, pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-226-77451-0 (cloth : alkaline paper) — ISBN 978-0-226-77453-4 (paperback : alkaline paper) — ISBN 978-0-226-30440-3 (e-book) 1. Art, Modern — 20th century. 2. Psychic trauma in art. 3. Violence in art. I. Title. N6490.S767 2016 709.04'075 —dc23

2015025618

© This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

In conversation with Susan Swenson, Kim Jones explained that the drawing on the cover of this book depicts directional forces in "an X-man, dot-man war game." The rectangles represent tanks and fortresses, and the lines are for tank movement, combat, and containment: "They're symbols. They're erased to show movement. 111 draw a tank, or I'll draw an X, and erase it, then re-draw it in a different posmon.... But when they're killed they're erased and

fl A gh0St image- 80 the erasing is 3 vefy 'mPortant elemen of the war drawings.... The important thing is that it's always

2005^ (SUSan Swenson' conversation with Kim Jones: April 25 0 1 4 W"°rkC'ty; WarP™<*™^ NY: Pierogi 2005], 4). Two years earl.er, Jones described his "war drawings" as mages 0 •, hat ^ ends„ ^ q ^ ^ ^

A Studio Vuit wuh Km Jones, a fifteen-minute video codirected bv ' David Schmidlapp and Steve Staso (2003). Franz West's Dialogic Pafistiicke (2003)

You begin. "I want to talk about Franz West's Pafistiicke, a word that means 'adaptives' in English. (The German singular is Pafistiick.) These odd objects call to mind the one in the double, or the one in the many [fig. 10], They suggest both Louis Lavelle's philosophical considerations of the similarities between Narcis­ sus and Pygmalion (in his 1939 The Dilemma of Narcissus), and Paul Ricoeur's meditations in his 1990..." "Hold on," I break in, arresting your rush to discuss West's work in relation to these two French philosophers. "Why bother with 'the one' in a postmodern age of rhizomes, autopoesis, epigenetics, string theory, and other system ap­ proaches to the entanglement of life? And let's not forget the large number of multiple personalities flooding psychiatric offices these days—a veritable 'epi­ demic in the United States and Holland, if one is to believe Ian Hacking," I laugh (but not at the multiples).2 'tou laugh too. Because West's objects begin with the body, that singular center..."

Wait, 1 interrupt again. "Before you proceed, please describe a Pafistiick." But of course." You take a deep breath. "West began making the Pafistiicke in 1973. They are curious semiabstract forms that suggest vaguely identifiable objects, but whose identity is undecipherable. They have a strong surrealistic character, something like a wrapped object by Christo or Man Ray, or like a d object that Miro might have assembled into a . West made the / icke predominantly in wire, plaster, papier-mache, and polyester. He con- strutted the earliest Pafistiicke with bandages he had found in his mother's den- R an^ tlleSC Particu'ar Pafistiicke might suggest wounding and healing. t want to overstate this, as the Pafistiicke seem more whimsical and

on rh n th\n traumat'c'in ^'s exhibitions, West often installs the Pafistiicke tak h' Rr°r 3ngS them fr°m the Wa"' Sometirr>es he places them on pedes- hI!TS3diStinCtly SCU 'Ptural Presence.All arewhite. While some a, TJ ShaPCS' °thCrS 3re qUitC SimP'e" importantly, he encour­ ages viewers to wear them." "Wear them?" I wonder. FIGURE 10. Franz West, Pafistiicke, ca. late 1970s. Performed by Johann Szeni (aka Jane Szeni and Jane Sceniczei) at the Wittgenstein House, Vienna. Bandage, wire, plaster, papier-mache, and polyester. Photographer unknown. Courtesy of Archiv Franz West, Vienna.

Yes, you answer. "For example, one rectangular Pafistiick is rather flat, about sixteen by six inches with a protruding wire used to attach it to one's body. Photographs show people wearing it in front of their eyes as a mask or a kind of screen. Another Pafistiick resembles a large oar. It is well over five feet in length, with protrusions on each end. I have seen someone carry this Pafistiick over his shoulder like a very large tool, while another person relates to it quite differently, hugging it close to her body like a beloved person." When you pause, I encourage: "Please continue." West wants viewers to handle the Pafistiicke, to move them around, to carry them, or to wear them like prostheses. Critic Achim Hochdorfer offers an excel­ lent description of this process: 'The visitor is invited to place a Pafistiick in any desired relationship to his or her own body. These fragile, rather awkward ob­ jects do not fit the body in any organic way that would engender a relaxed atmo-

101 | FRANZ WEST'S DIALOGIC PASSSTUCKE sphere. On the contrary: the "actor" is actually compelled to assume a pose that robs him or her of any natural poise and not infrequently leads to comical con­ tortions. The piece inhibits, disrupts and caricatures the natural movements of the body. Handling West's Pafistiicke has some of the paradoxical of being told to "be spontaneous".'"3 "Oh yes!" 1 exclaim with gusto. "I once saw a photograph from 1975 of West standing on a very low plinth, a kind of pedestal. He was holding an arc-shaped Pafistiick over his head like a halo by inserting the index and little finder on both hands into holes positioned at either side of the arc's midpoint. He then bal­ anced the Pafistiick in the middle of his forehead, from a hornlike protrusion that extended from its back. The image is memorable. West looks like a devilish angel, distinctly impish and almost childlike in his delight both in his object and in its use. It is the way that he appeared in relationship to the Pafitiick that convinced me that I would like him as a person." "In fact, you have touched on a key aspect of the Pafistiicke." You suddenly become all business. "Pafistiicke communicate something of the nature of a per­ sonality. West himself observed that 'if one could visually perceive neuroses they might look somewhat like Pafistiicke. In other words, the Pafistiicke are anthro­ pomorphic representations of neuroses, capable of motivating a person to per­ form certain types of movements.'"4 "Neuroses? Certain types of movements?" I ask. Your patience seems to be wearing thin with my interruptions, but you continue to explain. "In psychology, the word 'neurotic' has come to be asso­ ciated with anxiety disorders.5 For West, the Pafistiicke can visualize aspects of a wearers anxiety, stress, and phobias, all of which distort the patterns of so- called normative behavior. Hochdorfer considers the Pafistiicke to be 'deeply unsettling presentations of the individual's own attitudes, habits and desires. revealfing] the unbridgeable divide between an inner state of mind and a socialized behavior pattern.6 In addition, neurotic (or anxiety) symptoms may be characterized bv a wide variety of somatic and mental symptoms, many of which evolve from dissociation. In dissociation, specific mental processes mories, ideas, feelings, and ) are lost to conscious awareness become unavailable to voluntary recall. Dissociation provides a mechanism ^splacing unpleasant, painful, and anxiety-provoking concepts and memo- m consciousness. Such lost memories, feelings, and perceptions may re­ turn symptomatically in one's interaction with the many in the one revealed by the Pafistiicke."

I am suddenly reminded of the lifesize doll of Alma Mahler that Oskar Ko-

aronnH in 1919- AftCr the end of their love affair, he carried the doll the Par rT m h'S Carnage and took il everywhere with him. So I note, "While doll he m d C T ?0t eXpl'Clt in the same way as Kokoschka's ersatz lover, the wlMahler revealed neurotic obsession with her. Thus, WestsPcfistucke analogously function as that kind of surrogate object." ou appear hesitant to agree. Nevertheless, you tolerate my point

102 ' FRANZ WEST'S DIALOGIC PASSSTUCKE and caution: "But the Pafistiicke have another function, that of adapting wearers to their internal psychological conditions. Remember, Pafistuck means 'adap­ tive' in English. As a tool for adaptation, the Pafistuck may express neuroses and simultaneously accommodate wearers to their anxieties by externalizing stress and phobia in the form of this odd material alternative for invisible suffering. Or, as you pointed out about the picture of West wearing one of his Pafistiicke, they might help to exhibit one's sense of humor, one's appetite for play, the qualities of one's imagination, etc., etc. In short, wearing the object, I could confront mul­ tiple aspects of myself." "While it is obvious that clothing expresses one's personality, how does inter­ action with objects do the same?" I ask. "The use of any everyday object can, but does not necessarily, reveal aspects of identity. The very enigmatic qualities of the Pafistiicke emphasize personality traits not otherwise readily apparent in our use and manipulations of normal objects. What I mean is that because of their special status as art objects (which traditionally have been, by definition, without utilitarian use), the Pafistiicke can operate without reference to everyday objects. Their significance resides in how they visualize what we already know about the interrelationship between the psyche and its objects. Moreover, the meaning of any particular Pafistuck de­ pends on how it is perceived and potentially changes each individual user. Such use may exaggerate the unconscious relationships and interactions that she or he has with all objects." "For Wittgenstein," I reply, "meaning and use must not be conflated but are determined in some sense by each other. In this regard, West's objects might be understood as visual corollaries to Wittgenstein's argument that the rules of ordinary language are neither right nor wrong, nor true or false, because mean­ ing derives from use." Correspondingly," you echo, "as language is a game for Wittgenstein, the Pafistiicke suggest a form of play in which a wearer's idiosyncratic interaction with it individually determines meaning." You seem relieved by the sudden turn of our conversational direction. "Desire to use a Pafistiick clearly motivates action, and action tautologically determines use." This last point concerns me, and I reply, "Then use of the Pafistiicke expose wearers by visualizing their neuroses?" Vou confirm that this is true in a certain sense, and add, "But 'expose' may be too strong a word. One could argue that the psychological function of the Pafistiicke is to provide a corporeal representation of an individual's inner life. Speaking linguistically, Pafistiicke are to objects what the pronoun 'I' is to 'my­ self. They are the same but different, and they offer not a mirroring relationship, but a more substantive reflective distance. One sees 'the one' in its multiplicity, und that multiplicity throws doubt on the 'one.' This brings me back to Ricoeur, whom I cited at the beginning of our dialogue. Among other things, Ricoeur's project—succinctly expressed in the title of his book,Oneself as Another—was to examine the opposition implied in the concepts of 'self and 'I,' to demonstrate

103 | FRANZ WEST'S DIALOGIC PASSSTUCKE the presence of the one in the double (or many), and to raise the existential di­ lemma inherent in the conception of God." I am flabbergasted that we could have moved from the curious Pafistiicke to God, "God!?" "God." Your certainty piques my interest. You proceed: "Pondering Descartes, Ricoeur points out that it is our cogni­ tion that invents God for itself. Ricoeur writes: 'By a sort of rebound effect of the new certainty (namely that of the existence of God) on that of the cogito, the idea of myself appears profoundly transformed, due solely to my recognizing this Other, who causes the presence in me of its own representation."'7 "The recognition of its creation of God," you continue, "forces conscious­ ness, according to Descartes, to assume 'the second ontological rank' below God, since cogito, being finite, understands itself to be less than its own cre­ ation/awareness of the infinite God."8 You pause in excitement. I, too, find these ideas stimulating, especially since the implication is that a mere object—a Pafistiick, which is the extension of human creation, produc­ tion, and cognition—may be understood to contain qualities of the infinite. This brings the concept of "God" closer to a kind of universal energy with which I feel more comfortable. But I keep the conversation centered on the Pafistiicke. 1 understand why you raise Ricoeur in relation to West's Pafistiicke, because although he began as an existentialist philosopher, Ricoeur now consistently rejects it, as well as Cartesian claims for an absolute transparency of the self to itself that would render self-knowledge independent of any kind of knowledge of the world. Moreover, the Pafistiicke throw into question any stable identity by constantly altering one s relationship to notions of 'self through changing inter­ actions with the object."

You ignore me and return to God. "Ricoeur explains human self-doubt when faced with its consciousness of God by quoting Descartes: 'Thus the [notion] of nite somehow exists in me prior to the [notion] of the finite, that is, the on of God exists prior to the [notion] of myself.'9 The result, according to , is that I (or anyone, for that matter) perceive my likeness to God 'by the same faculty through which I perceive myself.'"

atinn • n' a^a'n' W^at in'tially appears to be a linear, logical chain of cre­ ation, is really a loop of logic."

tence it/r a R'coeur argues that because God maintains me in exis­

ts « hold° intsdfThrd0" ^ °f ^ permanence * upon his work I God 1S ln me as the very mark of the author turns to Desca'rtTtod^1 T™ ^ rCSemblance between us*10 Ricoeur rC' - this likeness -by the

the Pafistiicke. But th' ^ 1 Wi" tFy t0 address the issue of God and elude that West's Palist inapproPriate-1 respond: "May we con- the'other'? in othpr A 'S t00ur neuroses what God is to our sense of being W°r S'We may i?nore the problem, but we must find some

104 | FRANZ WEST'S r.,.. T S D1ALOGlC PASSSTUCKE relation to it—the 'problem' being that being is simultaneously oneself, 'other,' and God along a scale that ranges from apathy to agnostic to atheist to believer. In whatever way we react, we reveal ourselves." You plunge on without commenting on my point. "Ricoeur does not leave the matter with Descartes. He draws on Malebranche, Spinoza, and the entire move­ ment of idealism (through Kant, Fichte, and Husserl) and then moves on to Nietzsche and what he calls 'the shattered cogito,' namely, Nietzsche's attack on Cartesian thought and the idealists' notion of'I think.' For Nietzsche, language is deceitful and paradoxical, an unreliable 'illusion' serving as an 'expedient' on behalf of preserving life.11 Everything that reaches our consciousness is utterly and completely adjusted, simplified, schematized, and interpreted; the actual process of inner '' the relation of causes between thoughts, feelings, desires, between subject and object, is absolutely concealed from us, and may be purely imaginary."12 I drop God and move on to Nietzsche, not missing the irony of my swift pas­ sage from one to the other: "This is how Nietzsche argued against positivism, which says, 'There are only facts,' whereas Nietzsche says, 'There are no facts, only interpretations.' "13 You finally answer me directly. "Right, and there is no 'I,' only an interpreta­ tion of causes .. This brings us right back to West's Pafistucke. I try again. "On the one hand, we might conclude that these objects concretize the complex interrelation­ ship between the linguistic multiplicity of 'me, myself, and I,' and that which is always already the intricate condition of consciousness responsible for a sense of God (the 'other') against which we judge ourselves 'the other.' On the other hand, the Pafistucke equally exhibit how one might imagine an 'I' and a 'myself only through interaction with an object." ^ ou pause for a moment to think. "In which case, West's Pafistucke confront the wearer unpretentiously with an aspect of the Western philosophical tradi­ tion of subjectivity, but without the Nietzschean 'lies' of language, and in the de­ constructed phenomenological context of Nietzsche's 'hyperbolic doubt' about the truth of object relations. Through this process of thought, we arrive at the inherent multiplicity of the subject as an hermeneutics of the self." You relax now, as you imagine that you have worked this teaser out. So what are you proposing?" I ask. "That West's Pafistucke thrust the user into an hermeneutic circle, in which it becomes impossible to understand the work until one grasps its relationship to oneself and vice versa? Or that the un­ identifiable, elusive shapes of the Pafistucke and our interactions with them are somehow metaphors for our relation to the concept of God? Or, that this con­ versation is as ridiculous as the Pafistucke themselves are as objects? Or ..." "Yes." I become tense and retort, "I feel suspended in the ekphrastic gap between language and object (or image), that verbal representation of visual represen­ tation.14 Philosophical discourse may be a means of representing the meaning and function of the Pafistucke, but it is also simultaneously inadequate and over-

105 | FRANZ WEST'S DIALOGIC PASSSTUCKE bearing because the objects are so unassuming, even humble, like the objects associated with Arte Povera ..." "That's true," you add. "In addition to bearing a remote similarity to the ob­ jects of Arte Povera (in being of common materials and unassuming forms), the Pafistiicke exhibit the legacy of what Lucy Lippard in 1966 called 'eccentric ab­ straction,' a term she used to describe post-minimalist, process-oriented art like that of Eva Hesse .. .nis "Well they certainly are eccentric," I agree. "What about Pistoletto's 'Minus Objects'?" I leap at the opportunity to mention those brilliant amusing works that Pistoletto began to produce in the early 1960s. "The 'Minus Objects' are idiosyncratic products of Pistoletto's imagination and his paradoxical strategy to rid the world of one less (minus) object by making another one!" "Many of Pistoletto's 'Minus Objects' were performative," you add. Yes, I confirm. "If we think about the function of the Pafistiicke mandat­ ing performative conditions of art, then they require interaction that ultimately displays the spectator as the work-of-art-in-process. In this sense, the objects are props, like those that appear in happenings or Fluxus events. The Pafistiicke testify to the continuation and permutation of the long pedigree of the goal of interactivity in art."

'iou become playful. Think of Marinetti's challenge to Futurists' audiences: Throw an idea instead of potatoes, idiots.' There is continuity here, speaking of interactivity, between the Futurists and the provocative actions of the Vien­ nese Action artists in whose context West matured. In 1963, at the age of six­ teen, West witnessed Hermann Nitsch's infamous 'Festival of Psycho-physical turalism in Nitschs Perintegasse studio in Vienna. Art historians have fre­ quently noted that the disemboweled lamb and blood that Nitsch used in this well as the physical violence of the performance, left West in such

a kind of postadolescent rebellion." ust be considered in light of this history. In con-

106 I FRANZ WEST S D1AL°G'C PASSSTUCKE trast to the kinds of materials used by the Viennese Actionists-blood, animal viscera, everyday objects that could be sadistic and masochistic (razor blades, knives, pins, etc.)—West produced objects that more ambiguously conjured the fetish and 'provoke psycho-physical gesticulations and poses in the user.'18 Moreover, as West wrote (with poet Reinhard Priessnitz), the Pafistiicke had 'a certain similarity to the cult objects people wear in Africa, a typical material from here, and it's not an art-object but a neurosis that you get here, which has much the same origins.'"19 I become lost in thought, comparing the Pafistiicke with cargo cult-type fe­ tishes. By drawing this analogy, West implies that the fetish, although made from First World materials, becomes an object of art in Third World countries even as it remains merely utilitarian in Western society. In addition, in terms of their everyday use,Western objects function as tools that disclose our anxieties. The question then remains whether West's Pafistiicke would be valued as cargo cult fetishes or as works of art in a Third World context. You break in on my silent ruminations. "No wonder that in 1982, West began to make Pafistiicke in the form of furniture pieces for the public to sit or recline on in his exhibitions." "What do you mean?" I am startled back to an awareness of you. You answer, "He staged viewers within his exhibitions by inviting them to sit or recline on his objects, a strategy consistent with the disciplined humor he displayed in facing the Viennese Actionists' 1968 performance Art 8c Revolution, which we have just discussed." "I see. With the furniture (Pafistiicke), West can transfer the psychological dimension from the artist-as-maker to the spectator as wearer-performer, con­ verting viewers into works of art. In other words, he transmogrifies the narcis­ sistic aspect of art into the Pygmalian complex!" "Well," you say, "finally we come full circle to Louis Lavelle and the point with which I opened this conversation. In The Dilemma of Narcissus, Lavelle sug­ gests that the opposite of narcissistic self-love is the Pygmalion dream of giving life to an image by willing or desiring it. Their 'tragic similarity,' Lavelle argues, resides in the fact that while 'Narcissus sees nothing but his own image,' Pyg­ malion can only love a life that 'is one which must first give itself being, before it can give itself to him.' "20 I understand your point immediately. "In the Pafistiicke, West makes art about the self making itself, with shades of Narcissus and Pygmalion insofar as all objects reflect their maker. But the Pafistiicke remake viewers by exter­ nalizing representations of their internal mechanisms. The Pafistiicke bring an aspect of the viewer to life, Pygmalion-like. Does this mean, then, that West can only enjoy his works —they can only 'give' themselves to him —if the internal personality characteristics of a viewer are animated? If so, the Pafistiicke are a generous gift and, at the same time, the wearer of a Pafistiick functions as the nymph Echo to West's narcissistic impulses." That is what I was thinking," you declare. "But the issue is again more com-

107 | FRANZ WEST'S DIALOGIC PASSSTUCKE plicated. Lavelle theorized a 'doctrine of participation,' which suggests that while God is the absolute, or pure act, we are a 'participant' of that divine act; God is and we are from the act. Human essence is in God, while existence is from God. Participation occurs across the 'interval' between essence and existence." "I wonder if West's requirement that viewers participate with the Pafistucke makes the Pafestiick an 'interval' between artist (essence) and viewer (exis­ tence)?" I query, with some sarcasm prompted by the return of God. "Perhaps." You consider the point. "But let me finish. For Lavelle, to know what we are means to know what we must do to make our existence worthy of its essence. Ego can glimpse the spiritual conditions of being only fleetingly and always beyond the self, leaving the human longing for more ..." "But ego is also the source of neuroses and desire, and is exacerbated by ma­ terialism. We are back to the cargo cult, wherein the market for objects (the 'art world') is a fetish that West seems to mock in the Pafistucke." Yet, you conclude, again summoning Lavelle, whose ideas are beginning to try my patience. "Without ego there would be no appearance at all, nothing to awaken us to the of our own unknown selfhood beyond the self we take ourselves to be." "Which self?" "The you, me, myself and I we experience in Franz West's Pafistucke."

108 FRanz WEST'S ni». ^ 1ALOGIC PASSSTUCKE 47. Georges Bataille, : Death & Sensuality (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1986), 256. First published as L'Erotisme (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1957). 48. Ibid., 140. 49. Kantor is heir to Viennese Actionism, especially the psychophysical extremes of Otto Muhl's AA Commune's selbstdarstellung (self-realization actions), and Hermann Nitsch's "Orgies Mysteries Theater," which condenses Dionysian orgiastic celebration, Greek (especially Sophocles' Oedipus Rex and Euripides' Bacchae), and Christian notions of guilt and redemption with destructive aspects of Western , episte- mology, and technology. 50. Kantor's work developed in parallel with the technorobotic performances of de­ struction created by Survival Research Laboratories in San Francisco in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Kantor's blood actions anticipate the performances of Uri Katzenstein, Franko B, Balint Szombathy, and Ron Athey. 51. The highly celebrated gr°uP Laibach established itself in Trbovlje, an industrial and coal mining town in what is now Slovenia, not far from Budapest. In 1984, Laibach founded the aesthetic movement Neue Slowenische Kunst (NSK), which, like Kantor, em phasized the ambiguity of visual signifiers. 52. Istvan Kantor, e-mail to the author, December 21, 2008. 53. Eagleton, 250. 54. Kantor, e-mail to the author, December 21, 2008. 55. Eagleton, ix. Eagleton's reference here is to the English translation of Milan Kun dera's political novel The Unbearable Lightness of Being (New York: Harper 8i Row, 1984).

FRANZ WEST'S DIALOGIC PASSSTUCKE

1. This essay was first published in the exhibition catalogue Fran<. West (London. riiitechapel Gallery, 2003), 104-21. 2. Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 18, 19,110-11. 3. Achim Hochdorfer, "Allegorizing Actionism: West s Doubts, in Inside Fra London: Gogosian Gallery, 2001), 8. 4. Franz West, "From a Talk over Lunch between Franz West, Marianne Br , nd Peter Pakesch," in Franz West: Proforma, Museum Modemer Kunst Stitftung Lu wig Vienna: Oktagon, 1996), 285. . . 5. See Robert C. Carson, James N. Butcher, and Susan Mineka, Abnorma D,a S nd Modem Life, Tenth Edition (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 15/. See also ^° 'nd Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM-IV-TR (Washington. America issociation, 2000).

6. Hochdorfer, 8. , , „njnn. 7. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself As Another, trans. Kathleen Blarney (Chicago a Jniversity of Chicago Press, 1992), 9.

9. Rene Descartes, "Third Meditation," from Meditations on First Philos p V Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), 30. 10. Ricoeur, 9.

12. , Will to Power, trans. Anthony M. Ludovici (Edinb g Powlis, 1910), p. 7; quoted in Ricoeur, 14. 13. Ricoeur, 15.

389 | NOTES TO PAGES 98-105 14. See W. J. T. Mitchell, "Ekphrasis and the Other," in Picture Theory (Chicago: Uni­ versity of Chicago Press, 1995), 151-81. 15. Lucy Lippard, "Eccentric Abstraction," Art International 10, no. 9 (November 1966): 284. 16. Robert Fleck, "Sex and the Modern Sculptor," in Robert Fleck, Bice Curiger, and Neal Benezra, Franz West (London: Phaidon, 1999), 39. 17. Hochdorfer, 3. 18. Hubert Klocker, "Gesture and the Object, Liberation as Action: A European Com­ ponent of Performative Art," in Paul Schimmel, ed., Out of Actions: Between Performance and the Object 1949-1979 (Los Angeles: Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art), 172. 19. Fleck, 48. 20. Louis Lavelle, The Dilemma of Narcissus, trans. W. T. Gairdner (London and New York: George Allen & Unwin, and Humanities Press, 1973), reprinted from LErreurde Nar- cisse (Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset, 1939).

1.1.78-2.2.78: LYNN HERSHMAN'S ROBERTA BREITMORE

1.This essay first appeared in Roberta Breitmore Is Not Lynn Hershman (San Francisco: De Young Memorial Museum, 1978), 5-14. 2. From an unidentified psychology textbook that I read over the shoulder of a pas­ senger on a bus. 3. Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), 245. 4. Christian Metz, "The Imaginary Signifier," Screen 15, no. 2 (1977): 59-60. 5. Christian Metz, "History/Discourse: Note on Two Voyeurisms," Edinburg Maga­ zine 1, no. 1 (1976): 24. 6. Rolfe Bari, Behind the Mask (San Francisco: Persona Products, 1977), 10. 7. Definitions of the metaphorical metonymical processes of condensation and dis­ placement come from Serge Leclaire, Psychoanalyser: Un essai sur I'ordre de Vinconscient et la pratique de la lettre (Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1975), 149-50. See also Roman Jakob- son, "Linguistic Types of Aphasia" in Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, Fundamentals of Language (The Hague: Mouton, 1956) and Jacques Lacan, The Language of the Self: Ihe Function of Language in Psychoanalysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968). 8. Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), 110. 9. Marshall Sahlins, "Colors and Culture," Semiotica 6, no. 1 (1976): 5. 10. All quotations are taken from Roberta Breitmore's journal-diaries. 11. See Otto Rank, The Double: A Psychoanalytic Study, trans, and ed. by Harry Tucker Jr., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971. 12. R. D. Laing, The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), 143. 13. Friedrich Nietzsche, quoted in Rank, The Double, 49. 14. Roland Barthes, "Rhetoric of the Image," Working Papers In Cultural Studies 1, no. 1 (1971): 45. 15. Taken from Roberta Breitmore's journal-diaries. 16. Umberto Eco, "Semiotics of Theatrical Performance," Drama Review 21, no. 1 (March 1977): 42. 17. Richard Sennett, "Narcissism and Modern Culture," October 1, no. 4 (Fall 1977). 73.

390 | NOTES TO PAGES 10 5-119 14. See W. J. T. Mitchell, "Ekphrasis and the Other," in Picture Theory (Chicago: Uni­ versity of Chicago Press, 1995), 151-81. 15. Lucy Lippard, "Eccentric Abstraction," Art International 10, no. 9 (November 1966): 284. 16. Robert Fleck, "Sex and the Modern Sculptor," in Robert Fleck, Bice Curiger, and Neal Benezra, Franz West (London: Phaidon, 1999), 39. 17. Hochdorfer, 3. 18. Hubert Klocker, "Gesture and the Object, Liberation as Action: A European Com­ ponent of Performative Art," in Paul Schimmel, ed., Out of Actions: Between Performance and the Object 1949-1979 (Los Angeles: Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art), 172. 19. Fleck, 48. 20. Louis Lavelle, The Dilemma of Narcissus, trans. W. T. Gairdner (London and New York: George Allen & Unwin, and Humanities Press, 1973), reprinted from L'Erreur de Nar- cisse (Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset, 1939).

1.1.78-2.2.78: LYNN HERSHMAN'S ROBERTA BREITMORE

1. This essay first appeared in Roberta Breitmore Is Not Lynn Hershman (San Francisco: De Young Memorial Museum, 1978), 5-14. 2. From an unidentified psychology textbook that I read over the shoulder of a pas­ senger on a bus. 3. Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), 245. 4. Christian Metz, "The Imaginary Signifier," Screen 15, no. 2 (1977): 59-60. 5. Christian Metz, "History/Discourse: Note on Two Voyeurisms," Edinburg Maga­ zine 1, no. 1 (1976): 24. 6. Rolfe Bari, Behind the Mask (San Francisco: Persona Products, 1977), 10. 7. Definitions of the metaphorical metonymical processes of condensation and dis­ placement come from Serge Leclaire, Psychoanalyser: Un essai sur I'ordre de I'inconscient et la pratique de la lettre (Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1975), 149-50. See also Roman Jakob- son, "Linguistic Types of Aphasia" in Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, Fundamentals of Language (The Hague: Mouton, 1956) and Jacques Lacan, The Language of the Self: The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968). 8. Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), 110. 9. Marshall Sahlins, "Colors and Culture," Semiotica 6, no. 1 (1976): 5. 10. All quotations are taken from Roberta Breitmore's journal-diaries. 11. See Otto Rank, The Double: A Psychoanalytic Study, trans, and ed. by Harry Tucker Jr., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971. 12. R. D. Laing, The Divided Self': An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), 143. 13. Friedrich Nietzsche, quoted in Rank, The Double, 49. 14. Roland Barthes, "Rhetoric of the Image," Working Papers In Cultural Studies 1, no. 1 (1971): 45. 15. Taken from Roberta Breitmore s journal-diaries. 16. Umberto Eco, Semiotics of Theatrical Performance," Drama Review 21, no. 1 (March 1977): 42. 17. Richard Sennett, "Narcissism and Modern Culture," October 1, no. 4 (Fall 1977): 73.

390 I NOTES TO PAGES 105-119