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The Routledge Companion to

Bernecker Sven, Pritchard Duncan

Epistemic Justification

Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203839065.ch3 Jonathan L. Kvanvig Published online on: 02 Dec 2010

How to cite :- Jonathan L. Kvanvig. 02 Dec 2010, Epistemic Justification from: The Routledge Companion to Epistemology Routledge Accessed on: 28 Sep 2021 https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9780203839065.ch3

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Routledge isanimprintoftheTaylor&FrancisGroup,informabusiness This editionpublishedintheTaylor&Francise-Library,2011. 2 ParkSquare,MiltonPark,Abingdon,OxonOX144RN Library ofCongressCataloginginPublicationData p. cm.—(Routledgephilosophycompanions) 270 MadisonAvenue, NewYork, NY10016 ISBN 0-203-83906-4Mastere-book ISBN ISBN13: 978–0–415–96219–3(hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–83906–5(ebk) Simultaneously publishedintheUK Includes bibliographicalreferences. First published2011byRoutledge © 2011Taylor &Francis BD161.R69 2011 by Routledge 2010020537 121—dc22 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 11:24 28 Sep 2021; For: 9780203839065, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203839065.ch3 picture ofourcognitivelives. of socialepistemologythat viewinternalismastoocommittedtoanindividualistic andvirtueepistemology,externalist umbrella,including formsofmodal aswellforms entific inquiryalone.Other newapproachestojustificationalsofallunderthegeneral epistemological questionswith relatedempiricalquestionsthatcanbeaddressedby sci- The mostradicalformsofnaturalizedepistemologyrecommend replacingtraditional more concernforscientificinquiryrelevanttoepistemological questionsandissues. epistemology, anapproachrecommendinglessaprioritheorizinginepistemologyand has beenreliabilism,whichcanalsobeseenasalessradical approachtonaturalizing sions ofexternalismhavearisenincontrasttosuchan internalism.Themostpopular accessible byreflectiontotheindividualholdingbelief. Inrecenttimes,variousver- is afeatureofbeliefthatdependsonfeaturesinternal tothebelieverandistypically in question. ter ofcoherencewithanappropriatesysteminformation availabletotheindividual deny theexistenceofsuchself-justifyingbeliefs,maintaining thatjustificationisamat- a foundationofself-justifyingbeliefswhichsupporttheremainingbeliefs.Coherentists reasons mustalwaysbeavailablebyinsistingthatjustificationhasatieredstructure,with that justifiedbeliefsareimpossible,andfoundationalistsblocktheclaimfurther coherentist responsestotheregressargument.Theargumentpurportsshow avoiding error. to knowledgeorintermsofmeansappropriatethegoalgettingtruthand Epistemologists typicallydistinguishtheepistemicusesbytyingnotionsinquestion actions andtheintentionsthatsometimesunderliethem,canbewarrantedornot. and fears,canberationalorirrational;itemsfromthepracticalsphere,including than justtoitemsofepistemicappraisal,suchasbeliefs.Affectivestates,hopes among them.Allsuchterms,however, havebroaderapplicationinordinarylanguage some ofthesenormativetermsassynonymous,whileothersdrawvariousdistinctions terms suchas‘rational,’‘warranted,’‘entitled,’and‘reasonable.’Sometheoriststreat aspects oftheworld.Othertermsthissortwithincontemporaryepistemologyare falling onthenormativesideofdistinctionbetweenanddescriptive The term‘justification’anditscognatesaretermsofartincontemporaryepistemology, Common tobothpositions,historically, isaninternalistassumption,thatjustification Historically, themostimportantcontroversyhasbeenbetween foundationalistand JUSTIFICATION Jonathan L.Kvanvig EPISTEMIC 3 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 11:24 28 Sep 2021; For: 9780203839065, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203839065.ch3 The infinitistresponseisusually rejectedjustasquickly, butithasseenasubstantial (1969), wherethenotionof a“hingeproposition”playsthecrucialtheoreticalrole). the cognitiveattitudesthat wetake(aclassicsourceofsuchaviewisWittgenstein arbitrary points,itishardto seewhywetheneedfordefensesofanysortregarding are needed,butcanbearbitrary. hence doesn’t blockbeliefsfrombeingjustified.Afurtheroptionisthatstopping points Infinitists insistthattheregresscannotbestopped,but theregressisn’t viciousand whether bybeingbasedonotherattitudesorintermsof foundationalist stoppingpoints. ist stoppingpoints.Skepticsendorsetheconclusionthat noattitudesareeverjustified, points. Coherentists,however, arenottheonlytheoristswhotrytoresistfoundational- ping pointsfortheregress,andcoherentistsresisturge forsuchlegitimatestopping to thisregressargument.Afoundationalistresponseattempts tofindlegitimatestop- further attitude,regressensues. the supportingattitudeisitselfjustified.Ifitsjustification requiressupportfromsome an attitudecannotsupportanotherinthewayrequiredforjustificationunless or unjustified.Oncesucharequirementisnoted,regressthreatens.Itappearsthat an adequatebasisforthesupportedbelief,however, itcannotitselfbebaseless,arbitrary, source ofinformationaboutsuchmatters.Inorderforthissupportingbelieftoprovide on ourbeliefthatthe attitude. Forexample,wemightbaseourbeliefthatObamawontheelectionin2008 toward agivenclaim,weareoftensojustifiedbybasingthatattitudeonsomeother regress argumentforskepticism.Whenwearejustifiedintakingsomecognitiveattitude The standardapproachtotheorizingaboutjustificationbeginswithresponsesthe ment ofthesamplemightunderminethisconclusion. evidence thatmostpeopleinagivenlocalewillvoteforcandidateX,andanenlarge- reasoning providesexamplesofsuch:agivensample,properlyobtained,maygiveone have epistemicreasonsforbeliefthatareunderminedbyfurtherlearning.Statistical a ,eventhoughsuchbeliefwouldbeepistemicallyunjustified.Second,onecan no evidenceatall.Insuchasituation,thepreponderanceofreasonsfavorsholding arise inwhichacatastrophecanonlybeavoidedbyholdingbeliefforonehas epistemic concernsandalsobyacquiringfurtherinformation.First,asituationmight intellectual goalofgettingtothetruthandavoidingerror. an epistemicreasonistoclarifyreasonsintermsofmeansappropriatethe reason toholdthebelief.Theusualapproachexplainingwhysuchaisnot in exchangeforbeliefwillgiveoneareasontoholdthatbelief,butitisnotanepistemic counts towardtheepistemicjustificationofthatbelief.Forexample,offermoney fication isasitappliestobeliefs(ordegreesofbelief),butnotjustanyreasonforbelief and manyotherthings.Theprimaryepistemologicalinterestinthelanguageofjusti- to plans,decisions,actions,hopes,wishes,fears,policies,judgmentsinacourtoflaw, The languageofjustificationiswidespreadinordinarythoughtandlanguage,applying Of theseoptions,thelastis theroadleasttraveled.Ifjustificationcanbestoppedat The standardmetatheoryconcerningjustificationfocuses ontwoprimaryresponses Such reasonsareassumedtobedoublydefeasible:theycanoverriddenbynon- I ,, andCoherentism II. New York Times . TheConceptoftheEpistemic I. FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS reportedthisresultandthatitisatrustworthy 26 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 11:24 28 Sep 2021; For: 9780203839065, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203839065.ch3 of, orbecausetheevidence forit.Forexample,onemightbelievethatBush is a evidenceandbelievingonthe basis between holdingabelieffor whichonehasgood problem ofthebasingrelation. Thelatterproblemarisesbecauseofthedistinction say whattherelationofcoherence involves,andthesecondisneedtoaddress the sort, coherentistsresistcommitment toanysuchrequirementonjustification. assumption oftheregressargumentthatjustificationrequires achainofreasonssome parative fitwithanentirepictureoftheworld.So,whereas foundationalistsendorsethe that playacentralroleinthepsychologyofbeliefformation, butratherbyoverallcom- tion. Beliefsarethusnotjustifiedbyanythingcomparable toinferentialconnections of fitbetweenanindividualbelieforattitudeandentire systemofbeliefsorinforma- tents. Theyviewjustificationinaholisticfashion,holding thatjustificationisamatter that justificationinvolveslinearrelationshipsbetween individualpropositionalcon- objecting totheregressargumentatadifferentpoint, pointatwhichitisassumed there arenodefendersofsuchaview. as Instead,coherentistsarebetter understood ing fromcircularreasoning.Suchaviewwouldcountas aversionofcoherentism,but with ,coherentismmightappeartorequirethepossibilityofjustificationaris- the dissatisfactioninhistoryofepistemologywitharbitrarystoppingpointsand native tofoundationalism. Chisholm 1966).Instead,thefashionablepositionwascoherentism,primaryalter- Chisholmanimportantandnotableexceptiontothistrend(see gists, withRoderick so, foundationalismhadallbutdisappearedasatheoryendorsedbyleadingepistemolo- that canjustifyabeliefisanother(seeSellars1963).Overthenext25yearsor argued againstwhathecalled“themythofthegiven,”insistingthatonlything cisms offoundationalismbyWilfrid Sellarsareespeciallyimportantinthisregard,who the twentiethcentury, however, foundationalismcameundersevereattack.Thecriti- dard non-skepticalviewinepistemologyhasbeenfoundationalism.Atthemiddleof Berkeley) andthefirsthalfoftwentiethcentury(Russell,Ayers, Carnap),thestan- to includecoherenceitselfasajustification-enhancingfeature(seeChisholm1966). tionalism evenembracecoherentistelements,requiringorallowingthesupportrelation best explanationorprobabilisticsupport(seeAlston1989).Someversionsoffounda- weaker versionsallowconnections,suchasinductivesupportorinferencetothe ing inferentiallinksbetweenthefoundationsandwhatsupport,while attitudes supportedbythefoundations.Strongfoundationalistsrequiretruth-preserv- tudes. Variation occursaswellregardingtheconnectionbetweenfoundationsand degree ofjustificationnotderivedfromrelationshipstootherbeliefsorcognitiveatti- certain. Weaker versionsrequire somethingless,perhapsasweakonlyhavingsome versions offoundationalismrequirethatthefoundationsbeinfallibleormetaphysically of theview. Thefirstisthenatureoffoundationalattitudesthemselves.strongest reason ordeliverancesofthesenses. roots ofanyjustifiedattitudetoalegitimatestoppingpoint,eitherindeliverances Descartes andtheempiricists,mostcommonviewhasbeenthatwecantrace have beenintheformofdefendingsomefoundationalism.FromAristotleto however, mostattemptstoevadetheskepticalconclusionofregressargument defense byPeterKleininrecentyears(see1999).Fromahistoricalperspective, incurstwoimportant burdenshere.Themostobviousistheneedto intermsofadesiretoavoidfoundationalism.Given Coherentism canbeunderstood (Descartes,Locke,Hume,and From Aristotletomajorfiguresinmodern Foundationalists disagreeamongthemselves,however, aboutthetwo crucialaspects EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION 27 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 11:24 28 Sep 2021; For: 9780203839065, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203839065.ch3 we refertothefirstcategoryintermsof role inthestoryofwhybeliefquestionisjustifiedbysystemquestion.If sufficient forthejustificationofbeliefbutstillplayanessentialandnon-redundant belief (thesysteminquestion)andcentralpartsofthethatarenotthemselves One alternativehereistodistinguishbetweenthatwhichjustifiesthecontentof refuse toendorsetheideathatjustificationcanbedefinedintermsofchainsreasons. the verychainofreasonsinquestion. orsustainedby tional justificationpluscausation,sothatthebelievingitselfisproduced nating infoundationalstoppingpoints,anddoxasticjustificationtermsofproposi- propositional justificationintermsofexistenceanadequatechainreasons,termi- tic justificationintermsofthesamechainreasons.Onesuchaccountunderstands reasons, thefoundationalistcanunderstandbothpropositionaljustificationanddoxas- case onlypropositionaljustificationispresent. justified; intheformercase,itissaid,doxasticjustificationpresentandlatter the believingitselfisjustified,andinlattercaseonlycontentofbelief lack ofrespectfortheConstitution)orbecauseonehatesTexans. Intheformercase, terrible Presidentbecauseoftheevidenceforit(e.g.,factsaboutwarinIraqand if Mary’s doesnotexist” exists” is.3,andherprobabilityfor“God probabilityfor“God ity ofthedisjunctiontwo suchclaimsisthesumoftheirindividualprobabilities. So two claimscannotbothbetrue, thentheprobabilitycalculustellsusthatprobabil- unmarried” is.95,Joe’s degreesofbeliefareincoherent andthusunjustified.Similarly, if (degree ofbelief)in“Billyis abachelor”is.9,andhissubjectiveprobabilityin“Billy is cannot bemoreprobablethan anyclaimitentails.So,ifJoe’s subjective probability bilistically coherent. belief isjustifiedonlyifitpartofasystemdegrees of beliefwithwhichitisproba- the axiomsofprobabilitycalculus.Onthisaccount ofcoherence,agivendegree probabilities, anelegantaccountofcoherencecanbedeveloped intermsofsatisfying belief ratherthanbeliefsthemselves,andbyidentifying degrees ofbeliefwithsubjective probabilism. Probabiliststaketheprimaryitemofepistemic evaluationtobedegreesof itself inneedofclarification. notion intermsofinferencetothebestexplanation(Harman 1973),butthisnotionis coherence isnotfullyprecise.Othersinclinedtowardcoherentismthinkofitscentral the degreeofcoherenceinsystem.BonJouradmits,however, thathisaccountof degree ofcoherenceandthenumbervarietyunexplainedanomaliesdiminishes in degrees,wherethenumberofinferentialconnectionswithinsystemenhances less stringent(andmuchmoreplausible)requirements,claimingthatcoherencecomes the elementsofsystem,butrecentcoherentistssuchasLaurenceBonJourpropose claimed thatacoherentsystemwasonecharacterizedbymutualentailmentbetweenall of suggestionscanbefoundamongcoherentistsonthispoint.F.H. Bradley, forexample, it isforabelieforattitudetocoherewithsystemofbeliefsinformation.Avariety 1995). enablers ofjustification,ratherthanintermsconferrersjustification(seeKvanvig terms of Holistic coherentists,however, cannotendorsethisaccountofbasing,sincethey intermsofchains By endorsingtheideathatjustificationshouldbeunderstood Consider somesimpleexamples.Accordingtotheprobability calculus,agivenclaim One promisingapproachtothisdifficultyofexplaining thenatureofcoherenceis The othermajordifficultyfacingcoherentismistheburdenofsayingpreciselywhat enablers ofjustification,coherentistscanunderstandproperbasinginterms FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS 28 conferrers ofjustificationandthesecondin Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 11:24 28 Sep 2021; For: 9780203839065, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203839065.ch3 dence is(only) unconditional probabilitiesbasedonfurtherlearning.So,forexample,ifyournewevi- to Bayes’theorem,usingone’s priorconditional probabilitiestodetermineone’s new justified. ThisversionofBayesianismrequiresupdatingprobabilitiesinawaytied requirement concerninghowone’s degreesof beliefchangeovertimeinordertobe plementing thissynchronicrequirementofprobabilisticconsistencywithadiachronic doesn’t, Mary’s attitudesareprobabilistically incoherentandthusunjustified. existsor is .7,andyetsheuncertaintosomedegreeabouttheclaimthateitherGod to the combined with a growing interest in developing to theregressargumentcombined withagrowinginterestindevelopingepistemologies internal tothecognizerinquestion. intermsofinformationthatis coherentists isthatjustification shouldbeunderstood of knowledge.)Inparticular, astandardassumptionsharedbybothfoundationalists and dition toaddjustification, belief,andtruththatwouldfullyaccountforthenature true belief,andtheusualapproachestoproblemattempted tofindsomefourthcon- (The Gettierprobleminvolvescounterexamplestotheclaim thatknowledgeisjustified assumptions bothaboutthenatureofknowledgeand thenatureofjustification. by manyasaprobleminthetheoryofknowledgecalling formorecarefulscrutinyof able. OnesourceofsuchquestioningwastheGettierproblem, whichcametobeseen presuppositions sharedbybothcoherentistsandfoundationalists areequallyquestion- presupposition oftheregressargumentcanbelegitimately questioned,perhapsother of possibilitiesexploredbyepistemologistsoverthepast halfcentury. Ifafundamental no ticketwillwin. will havequitelowprobability, perhapsblockingtheinferencetoconclusion that win &ticket2willnot. conjoining eachoftheclaimsinquestiontoformlargeconjunction ticket willwin,wehavetocombinetheseprobabilitiesinsomeway, perhapsby those probabilitiesareconsistent.Ifwetrytousethisinformationconcludethatno assigns asubjectivewinningprobabilityof1 according toprobabilists,isdegreeofbelief,andifacognizerinthelotterysituation probabilistic coherenceratherthanonbeliefsthemselves.Thefundamentalreality, being justifiedinbelievingthewarningofprefacethaterrorsremain. information putsoneinapositiontodeducethatthebookcontainsnoerrors,while errors remaininspiteofyourbestefforts.Onceagain,contradictionlooms,sinceone’s however, youarealsojustifiedwhencautioninthepreface thatyouareconfident you arejustifiedinbelievingthateachclaimmadeistrue.Sincethebookcomplex, paradox beginswithabookyou’vewritten,onethatislongandinvolved,butwhere full wellthatthelotteryisfairandawinnerwillsoonbeannounced.Thepreface appears thatoneisinapositiontoconcludenoticketwillwin,spiteofknowing this sameevidencejustifiesasimilarconclusionabouteachotherticketaswell.Itthus paradox, onehassufficientevidencetoconcludethatone’s lotteryticketisaloser, but ence, suchviewsoffersomepromiseofavoidingepistemicparadoxes.Inthelottery justified. Thisupdatingruleiscalled“conditionalization.” terday, thenyournewprobabilityfor One quitepopularversionofprobabilismisavariantBayesianism,derivedbysup- Recognition of this internalist presupposition involved in the most common responses Recognition ofthisinternalist presuppositioninvolvedinthemostcommonresponses The popularityofholisticcoherentismplayedacrucial roleinenlargingthespace Probabilist accountsoffersomehopeherebyfocusingondegreesofbeliefandtheir Besides theattractiveformalnatureoftheseprobabilisticcharacterizationscoher- e , andyourconditionalprobabilityfor EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION p , afterlearning(just) 29 n willnotwin /n toeachticketinan p . Suchaconjunction,however, on e e , mustbe wassomenumber n -ticket fairlottery, n inordertobe ticket 1willnot n yes- Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 11:24 28 Sep 2021; For: 9780203839065, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203839065.ch3 adequate justification.Such deontologyprovidesastrongmotivationfortheidea that justified beliefs,thatweare epistemicallyblameworthywhenweholdbeliefswithout Locke, Chisholm,andBonJour) endorsedtheideathatwehaveacognitivedutytohold foundationalists andcoherentists. Inthatdebate,manytheorists(includingDescartes, preferable fromapurelyepistemic pointofview. the epistemologicalprojectofassessingwhichways forming andholdingbeliefsare andsustained,itdoessowithouteliminating description ofhowtheyareproduced approach doesnotsubstitutesomerationalreconstruction ofourbeliefsforanaccurate thatarereliableintermsofgettingonetothetruthandavoidingerror.ods Suchan or sustainedbyprocessesormeth- justification isamatterofholdingbeliefsproduced normative supervenesordepends.Accordingtoreliabilists suchasGoldman,epistemic normative conceptintermsofthenon-normativefeatures oftheworldonwhich about justificationinfavorofpsychologicalquestions,one mayattempttoexplainthis the Quineanconcernsaboutrationalreconstruction.Instead ofeliminatingquestions tivity, waytoembrace butasGoldman(1986)pointsout,thereisamoremoderate between sensorystimuliandtheviewsthatresult(Quine1969). for beliefintermsofempiricalquestionsaboutthecausalandexplanatoryrelationship ing epistemologyintoasubdisciplineofpsychology, treatingquestionsaboutreasons in generatingthatpicture.Inhismosttrenchantmoments,Quinerecommendedturn- conception oftheworld,withoutconcernforactualpsychologicalrealitiesinvolved that theepistemologicalprojectcouldbecarriedoutbyrationallyreconstructingour lytic/synthetic distinctioninthephilosophyoflanguage,butalsoanattackonidea attack onstandardempiricisminvolvednotonlythewell-knownana- source questioningthispresuppositionisfoundintheworkofW.V.O. Quine.Quine’s alism andcoherentismuntilthemiddlepartoftwentiethcentury. Amajorhistorical we haveaccessbyreflectionwaspresupposedinnearlyallthedebatesoverfoundation- normative dimensionsofreality. of howthenormativeaspectsjustificationultimatelytraceto,orsuperveneon,non- requires reflectiveaccesstothefeaturesthatgeneratejustification,and(ii)question philosophical inquiry. Thesetwoaspectsare(i)thequestionofwhetherinternalism tification focusedontwoaspectsthatcontinuetohavestronginfluencescurrent Initial discussionofthedistinctionbetweeninternalistandexternalisttheoriesjus- in question. question, andthosethatclarifyjustificationintermsofelementsexternaltothecognizer between theoriesthatclarifyjustificationintermsofelementsinternaltothecognizer ory concerningthenatureofjustification,ametatheoryfocusingondistinction waning offoundationalisminepistemology, butalsototheriseofanalternativemetathe- of justificationandknowledge.Theriseholisticcoherentismthuslednotonlytothe 1986), whichhasbecomethemostpopulartheoryinrecentapproachestonature nalism. Mostnotableamongtheseexternalistalternativesisreliabilism(seeGoldman mology (seeQuine1969,1990)andvariousformsofexternalistalternativestosuchinter- that fitwellwithanaturalisticmetaphysics,leadingtoaninterestinnaturalizedepiste- Such approachesbreakwith theinternalisttraditionfoundindebatesbetween Such strongproposalsthreatentoeliminateratherthanexplainepistemicnorma- As notedalready, theideathatthingsgeneratejustificationaretowhich III. Internalism and FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS 30 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 11:24 28 Sep 2021; For: 9780203839065, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203839065.ch3 notion ofproprietythatcan alsobeexpressedusingthelanguageofjustification. The and actionincontrasttothe endlessdisputesoverthestatusofacademicskepticism, a is thepragmatisttraditionthat focusesonafundamentalnotionofproprietyinbelief tive notionthatcanbeexpressed usingthelanguageofjustification.Theothersource understand thedifferencebetween knowledgeandtruebeliefintermsofsomenorma- of justification.Onesource is theancienttraditiontracingtoPlatowhichattempts to traced totwodifferenthistoricaltraditionsunderlying currentinterestinthenature of terminologicaldifferences.Amoreaccurateunderstanding ofthedisputecanbe certain disputesbetweeninternalistsandexternalistsare merelyterminological. This differenceinassumptionsaboutthetargetoftheorizing maybesomeevidencethat this regard,distancinghimselffromtheideathatjustification isneededforknowledge. internalists donotalwaysthinkofjustificationinsuchterms. Foley(1993)isexplicitin ous candidateforknowledgeinthisway(Zagzebski(1996) isanexceptionhere),but typically offertheoriesofjustificationonwhich turnstruebeliefintoaseri- conditions whicharejointlysufficienttoturntruebelief intoknowledge.Externalists norm. Onweakerproposals,epistemicjustificationisoftenthoughtofasonetwo examples totheclaimthatknowledgeisjustifiedtruebelief,weakerproposalsare tion asthatwhichturnstruebeliefintoknowledge,buteversinceGettier’s counter- knowledge. Thesimplestwaytoendorsesuchanideaisthinkofepistemicjustifica- temic justificationisthekindofthingneededforabelieftobeseriouscandidate these conditionscanbeusedtoclarifythenatureofepistemicjustification,thatepis- tend toofferconditionsrelevantanaccountofknowledge,andthusassumethatif nalism aswell. proponent ofwhichisAlvinPlantinga(Plantinga1993),sharethisrejectioninter- false, youwouldn’t believeit”).Properfunctionalistviewpoints,themostinfluential mistaken,” andasensitivitycounterfactualisoftheform“ifclaiminquestionwere terfactual isoftheform“wheneveryouwouldholdbelief,noteasilybe sensitivity counterfactualsinclarifyingthenatureofknowledge(whereasafetycoun- epistemologies,whichappealtoeithersafetyor introspectively accessible,andmodal involves excellencesorvirtuesoftheintellectthatareneitherpsychologicalstatesnor 1991; Zagzebski1996)arguethatthenormativityinvolvedinnatureofknowledge externalism joinreliabilisminobjectingtointernalism.Virtue epistemologies(Sosa sible norapsychologicalfeatureoftheindividualinquestion.Otherrecentforms determining epistemicstatus,andthatsuchreliabilityisneitherintrospectivelyacces- isthecentralfactorin for example,arguethatthereliabilityofaprocessormethod the individualinquestion(FeldmanandConee2004). features onwhichjustificationsupervenesmustthemselvesbepsychologicalof cerns, manyadoptedaweakerformofinternalism,called“mentalism,”onwhichthe ascertain byintrospectionalonewhetherthesefeaturesobtain.Inthefaceofsuchcon- involve suchcomplicatedfeaturesthatitisimplausibletomaintainwecanalways that thetheoristswhofavorsuchversionstypicallyofferaccountsofjustification restricting ourbeliefsonthebasisofanundetectablefeaturebelief. belief, sinceitisdifficulttodefendtheideathatwecanlegitimatelybeblamedfornot whether ornotabeliefisjustifiedmustitselfbeaccessibletothepersonholding It wouldbeamistake,however, totryexplainawaytheentiredebateinterms Here thereisadangerofterminologicaldispute,however. Versions ofexternalism Reliabilists andotherexternalistsdisagreewithbothformsofinternalism.Reliabilists, The difficultyforsuchstrongversionsofinternalism,called“accessinternalism,”is EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION 31 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 11:24 28 Sep 2021; For: 9780203839065, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203839065.ch3 Responses tothisswamping problemrangefromdenialsoftheideathattruthis the such conceptions,thusthreatens toaddnovalueabeliefinthepresenceoftruth. oftruthisswampedbythevalue itself.Justification,on ing fromlikelihood swamping problem;thatonce truthisinthepicture,itappearsthatanyvaluederiv- of .Thedifficultyhereisthe tification withsomethinglike objectivelikelihood justification adds,especially fortheoriesthatfocusonidentifyingthepropertyof jus- the Socraticconcernsfrom of justification,especiallytypicalexternalistones.Once weassumethatabeliefistrue, epistemological theorizingraisesdifficultquestionsfor many approachestothenature is betterthanmeretrueopinion(seeKvanvig2003).Such avalue-drivenapproachto answertothequestionfirstraisedbySocratesin good Greco 2000),inpartbecauseofthehopethatsuch epistemologiescanbefounda in termsofaheightenedinterestvirtueepistemologies (Sosa1991;Zagzebski1996; and skepticism.Value-driven approacheshavedeveloped inseveralways.Onewayis thus illustratingtheapproachtojustificationthatstresses itsconnectiontoknowledge the crucialnotionsofjustificationandevidenceinterms ofapriornotionknowledge, value-driven conceptionofepistemologicaltheorizing.Theformerapproachclarifies enormously influentialbookbyWilliamson, in therecentdevelopmentsof“knowledge-first”epistemology, aschampionedinthe against academicskepticism.Thedistancebetweenthesetwoapproachesishighlighted the natureofjustificationandtolessconcernaboutintricaciesargumentsfor pragmatic concernaboutwhattodoandbelieveleadsdirectly derives. Whileacademicskepticismdominatesmuchofthehistoryepistemology, a concern foundinthepragmaticheritagefromwhichpresentinterestjustification justification andknowledgebetweentruthraiseanewacentral These differencesbetweenexternalistsandinternalistsontheconnection us, anditisamistaketothinkthatallormostofourbeliefsareunjustified. tion isamistakeaccordingtomanyinternalistssince,afterall,thesedenizenscouldbe most beliefsofdenizensDescartes’evildemonworldasunjustified.Suchaclassifica- That objectionclaimsthatstronglyobjectiveexternalisttheoriesmistakenlyclassify in theformofnewevildemonobjectiontostronglyobjectiveexternalisttheories. claims toobjectivityforjustification.Thisproblemofthetruthconnectioncrystallizes any viewoftheworldthatisjustified,whereasinternalistsarelesssanguineaboutsuch interdependence ofthesenotionsthatyieldquitestrongclaimsabouttheobjectivity connection betweenjustificationandtruth.Externaliststendtofavoraccountsofthe the importantdividebetweenexternalistsandinternalistsonproperaccountof brain-in-the-vat hypotheses.Considerationofsuchscenariosfocusesourattentionon in whichnearlyallofourbeliefsarefalse,asoccursevildemonworlds,andcertain suppositions playoutinimportantwayswhenconsideringskepticalscenarios,scenarios positions oftheothercamp,anddifferencesbetweendifferingplatitudespre- camp whofindnoappealwhatsoeverintheguidingplatitudesandunderlyingpresup- independently ofhowwethinkaboutit.Itisrare,however, tofind membersofeither the othercampfavoringaccountsthatgenerateobjectivetiestowayworldis, of justificationthatcenteronnotionssuchasresponsibleandblamelessbelief, differences betweenthecampsaredeepandbroad,withonecampfavoringaccounts IV. Recent Developments FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS Meno shouldmakeuswonderwhatadditionalvalue 32 Knowledge anditsLimits Meno astowhyknowledge (2000),andthe Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 11:24 28 Sep 2021; For: 9780203839065, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203839065.ch3 beliefs relevanttothataction arelostwhenthestakesraised.Onewaytoexpress the ment theoristsholdthatboth thejustificationofactionand the tion ofactionisdirectlyaffected bythepracticalstakesinvolved,pragmaticencroach- hold somethingstronger. Insteadofendorsingthe traditionalideathatthejustifica- something todowithepistemic justification.Thosedefendingpragmaticencroachment function oftheformerplus the relevantprobabilities—theveryprobabilitiesthathave theory: thepracticalstakesplayaroleinstoryofrational actionsincethelatterisa for suchtheorists,tobesure,butinawayakintheconnection instandarddecision avoiding error. Theconnectionbetweenjustifiedbelief andrationalactionispresent is whatresultsfromfollowingmeansappropriatetothe goalofgettingtothetruthand justification andtruth,typicalinternalistsusuallyendorse theideathatjustification connectionbetween practical stakes.Externaliststypicallywantanobjective likelihood cal breakenvisagedbythosewhothinkjustificationcomes andgoesdependingonthe of justificationeschewssuchastrongconnectiontotruth, butnotinfavoroftheradi- guaranteeing evidence.Thevalue-driven,pragmaticsource ofconcernaboutthenature answer theskepticcanleadonetoadoptaviewonwhich justificationrequirestruth- more complicatedthananyoftheapproachescommoninliterature.Aconcernto knowledge andjustification,thentheconnectionbetweenjustificationtruthis rect, andifthereisaconnectionbetweensuchpatternsofassentthenature 1992; Hawthorne2004;Stanley2005;andFantlMcGrath2002).Iftheyarecor- matic encroachmentintomattersepistemiciscommonplace(seeCohen1999;DeRose it isclaimed,peopleresist.Typical contextualistsandinvariantistsagreethatsuchprag- bank isn’t opentomorrow, andthatwillpromptaforeclosureonone’s property—then, bank willbeopentomorrow.” Butifthestakesincrease—say, acheckwillbounceifthe matter, speakersagree,itisclaimed,withaknowledgeattribution: “Sueknowsthatthe the stakesincrease.Forexample,ifgettingtobankdepositacheckdoesn’t much when nothingofpracticalsignificanceisatstake,butresistaknowledgeclaim that totalevidenceisunchanged,itclaimedspeakersassenttoaknowledgeclaim seems tobewhatisatstakeifonewrong.Thus,evenwhenspeakersacknowledge Among themechanismsthataffectwhetherspeakersassenttoaclaimofknowledge directly onthefundamentalissueofconnectionbetweenjustificationandtruth. relevant tothetheoryofjustification,butdatainvolvedindebateimpinges temic vocabularyinvariantlyyieldsthesamepropositionalcontent. textualism isinvariantism,whichclaimsthatregardlessofconversationalcontext,epis- standards thatareconversationallyrelevantinthespeaker’s context.Opposedtocon- the propositionexpressedbyanepistemicsentencevariesdependingon ‘now’ function.Inthisway, contextualismaroseinepistemology, accordingtowhich functions inEnglishacontextualway, perhapsinthewaydeicticitemssuchas‘I,’and attributions. Earlyinvestigationofsuchattributionssuggestedthattheword‘knows’ between contextualistsandinvariantistsregardingthetruthconditionsforknowledge debate attheintersectionoftheoryknowledgeandphilosophylanguage by practicalconcerns.Thisinterestcomesintothetheoryofjustificationthrough to aheightenedinterestinthedegreewhichjustificationitselfmightbeaffected additive eveninthepresenceoftruebelief. attempts todefendapreferredconceptionofjustificationinwaythatmakesitsvalue only intrinsicepistemicvalue(perhapsjustificationisitselfintrinsicallyvaluable)to The debatebetweencontextualistsandinvariantists,itself,maybeonlyindirectly The pragmaticsourceofinterestinthetheoryjustificationhasledrecentyears EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION 33 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 11:24 28 Sep 2021; For: 9780203839065, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203839065.ch3 justification inthefirstplace. justification andthepragmatic elementsthatleadtotheorizingaboutthenotion of lectual relationshipbetween truthandkeyepistemicnotionssuchasknowledge and source, sometensionshould beexpectedbetweenassumptionsaboutthepurelyintel- and whattothinkthatgo beyond disputesaboutacademicskepticism.Givensuch a within epistemologytraces to apragmaticconcernaddressquestionsofwhat do in thetheoryofjustification,sincesourceinterest inthetheoryofjustification ogy describedabove,buttheissuesinvolvedharkbackto theoriginalsourceofinterest encroachment theoriesismuchlessforthosewhoreject thephilosophicalmethodol- inphilosophy.tal questionsconcerningappropriatemethods Theappealofpragmatic which pragmaticfactorsencroachintothisarena,isthus deeplyinvolvedinfundamen- of it(seeWilliamson 2007). port oftheconceptionphilosophyjustoutlinedorin termsofacontrastingaccount become afocusofcontinuedresearchoverthepastcouple ofdecades,whetherinsup- their epistemicstanding,whetherlinguisticintuitionsor otherkindsofintuitions,has ing aspartofthetheoreticalenterprise.Second,issueroleintuitionsand theory dependsonlinguisticdata,oneshouldexpecttheneedforempiricaldata-gather- in experimentalphilosophy, since,tothedegreethataphilosophicalorepistemological epistemology andphilosophymoregenerally. First,thereisalargeandgrowinginterest The underlyingassumptionsherehaveledtotwoadditionalrecentdevelopmentsin knowledge, suchresultswouldhaveimplicationsforthetheoryofjustificationaswell. language acrosssomerangeofscenarios,andtotheextentthatjustificationisrelated sentences oftheform“Sknowsthatp”wouldbejudgedtruebyordinaryspeakers that theory. Thetheoryofknowledgecouldthusbeinformedbyconsideringwhether ditions underwhichassentordissentoccurstosentencesinvolvingtermsinvolvedin of agivenepistemologycouldbetestedbyelicitinglinguisticintuitionsaboutthecon- explication, andbyadoptingthisperspectiveonphilosophicaltheorizing,theadequacy istiedtoconceptclarificationandmeaning appropriate philosophicalmethodology they wishtodoso.Within thetraditionoflogicalpositivismandempiricism, to epistemologywillfindmanyopportunitiesavoidpragmaticencroachmentshould mayfindthesecommitmentscongenial,butmoretraditionalapproaches working undertheremaininginfluenceoftraditionslogicalpositivismand tion towhatordinarypeoplewouldassentwhenpromptedappropriately. Theorists such as‘rational’or‘reasonable’‘warranted’),andthentyingthemeaninginques- of justificationandthustothemeaningterm‘justified’(orsomerelated commitments, however—commitmentstyingthetheoryofjustificationtoconcept as well. in thepracticalstakesandepistemicconditionunderlyingrationality a changeinpracticalrationalitycasessuchasthebankcaserevealsboth ing forpragmaticencroachmentintotheepistemicdomainofjustifiedbeliefholdthat is allthatneedstobenotedexplainthevariationinpracticalrationality. Thoseargu- is rationaltodotracesbackachangeinthepracticalstakesinvolved,andthis that incaseslikethebankcaseabove,changepracticalrationalityregardingwhat reasonably believe.Traditional approachesthateschewpragmaticencroachmentagree can grantthatrationalactionisafunctionofwhatatstakeandyouknowor difference inperspectivehereonpragmaticencroachmentisasfollows.Bothapproaches This issueoftheconnectionbetweenjustificationand truth,andthedegreeto Such aconclusioninthetheoryofjustificationrequiressignificantmethodological FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS 34 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 11:24 28 Sep 2021; For: 9780203839065, chapter3, 10.4324/9780203839065.ch3 Stanley, J.(2005) Sosa, E.(1991) Sellars, W. (1963) Schmitt, F. (ed.)(1994) Quine, W.V.O. (1990)“Norms andAims,”in Kvanvig, J.(2003) Kvanvig, J.(1995)“Coherentists’Distractions,” Hawthorne, J.(2004) Klein, P. (1999)“HumanKnowledgeandtheInfiniteRegressofReasons,” Quine, W.V.O. (1969)“EpistemologyNaturalized,”in Plantinga, A.(1993) Kornblith, H.(ed.)(1994) Greco, J.(2000) Goldman, A.(1986) Foley, R.(1993) Feldman, R.andConee,E.(2004) Fantl, J.andMcGrath,M.(2002)“Evidence,Pragmatics,Justification,” DeRose, K.(1992)“ContextualismandKnowledgeAttributions,” Cohen, S.(1999)“,Skepticism,andtheStructureofReasons,” Alston, W. (1989) from, anddependenton,thesocialrealitiesinquestion. attitudes andpositions,treatingindividualjustificationknowledgeasderivative radical approachesrecommendbeginningwithsocialknowledgeandsociallyjustified to beliefsarrivedatinwaysfoundacceptablewithinone’s socialcommunity. Evenmore views, forexample,andonetypeofpositionalongtheselineswouldlimitjustification damental waythaneitheroftheseapproachesallows.Wittgenstein andRortyholdsuch vidualistic andthatsocialconditionsenterintothestoryofjustificationinamorefun- doubt thewordofothers.Othertheorists,however, viewthesealternativesastooindi- of ThomasReidthatdefaultcredulityiswarrantedintheabsencespecificreasonsto long beforeanysuchinductivebasisisavailable.Inresponse,onemightadopttheview face oftheobviousfactthatwelearnaschildrenfromourparentsandotherteachers on aninductivebasisthatwarrantstrustingoursources,isdifficulttomaintaininthe ception oftestimonial,associatedwithHumeandonwhichwelearnfromtestimony tions builtintointernalistconceptionsofjustification.Thehistoricallyimportantcon- ontheindividualisticassump- of whetherthisdimensionis,itself,properlyunderstood of theepistemicsignificancedisagreementbetweenintellectualpeersandinterms to wonderwhetherthesocialdimensionofknowledgeandjustification,bothinterms testimony, andoncethequestioningofinternalistassumptionsbegan,theoristsbegan is deeplysocial.Mostofwhatweknownotlearnedbyfirst-handexperience,but are questioned,itisnaturaltonoticethewayinwhichourunderstandingofworld of theorizinginadditiontothevalue-drivenapproach.Onceinternalistassumptions Chisholm, R.(1966) Columbia UniversityPress. Press. J. Tomberlin (ed.),pp.297–325. pp. 67–94. 52, pp.913–29. Epistemology The disputebetweeninternalistsandexternalistshasledtoanothernewdirection ,

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