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Will Cover Very Similar Topics (With One Or Two Substitutions) Though in a Different Order Here is last year’s reading list. This year’s course (Spring 2014) will cover very similar topics (with one or two substitutions) though in a different order. The overall shape of the course is to consider how values of various kinds—epistemic and ethical—imbue what we do and how we relate to each other as knowers, fellow inquirers, and quite generally as agents. In short, we will be exploring the overlap or border territory between ethics and epistemology. More specifically, we’ll be thinking about how some epistemic practices have an ethical aspect (especially our testimonial practices, which involve interpersonal trust or mistrust, justice or injustice), and how some ethical practices have an epistemic aspect (the limits of moral knowledge, the implications of non-culpable moral ignorance…). Most generally, we might think of agency—our power to act—as spanning not only moral but also epistemic practices. - MF Values: Ethical and Epistemic - PHI365 (Fricker 2012) Summary Reading list Week 1 Value of knowledge Lecture 1: EITHER (preferably) Linda Zagzebski ‘From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology’ Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 5. Epistemology, Richard Cobb- Stevens, ed. (Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1999). Reprinted in Knowledge, Belief and Character, Guy Axtell, ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000) OR, if the Zagzebski proves difficult to get hold of, then the alternative is: John Greco ‘The Value Problem’ The Value of Knowledge (OUP, 2009) eds. Haddock, Millar, & Pritchard; reprinted in Arguing About Knowledge, eds. Ram Neta & Duncan Pritchard (Routledge, 2008). Also available from his webpage https://sites.google.com/a/slu.edu/john-greco/ Lecture 2: Duncan Pritchard ‘Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value’ Epistemology (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures) ed. A. O’Hear, 19- 43 (CUP, 2009), also available on his web page at http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/full-academic/duncan- pritchard.html#publications Seminar: Jason Baehr ‘Is there a value problem?’ in Epistemic Value eds. A. Haddock, A. Millar, D. Pritchard. Also available from his webpage http://myweb.lmu.edu/jbaehr/research_f09.htm Week 2 A genealogy of knowledge—the value of ‘pooled’ resources? Lecture 3: Edward Craig ‘The Practical Explication of Knowledge’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1986/87); 211-226 Lecture 4: Bernard Williams Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton, 2002) ch. 2 ‘Genealogy’ Seminar: Martin Kusch ‘Testimony and the Value of Knowledge’ Epistemic Value eds. Haddock, Millar & Pritchard (OUP 2009) Week 3 A genealogy of the virtue of truthfulness Lecture 5: Bernard Williams Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton, 2002) ch. 3 ‘The State of Nature—A Rough Guide’ Lecture 6: NO LECTURE (Fri 12th Oct) Seminar: NO SEMINAR (Fri 12th Oct) Week 4 Hume: Naturalism and a precursor genealogy of justice Lecture 7: David Hume: Treatise Bk.II Part III §3; and (as argument for subjectivism) Bk.III Part I §1 (1739) Lecture 8: David Hume Treatise Bk. III Part III, and Enquiry Concerning The Principles of Morals sect. 2, and sects. 6-8 [on ‘natural virtues’]; AND Hume Treatise Bk. III Part II (esp. sects.1-2 on justice), and Enquiry Concerning The Principle of Morals sects. 3-5, Appendix 3 [on ‘artificial virtues’ incl justice] Seminar: David Wiggins ‘Natural and Artificial Virtues: A Vindication of Hume’s Scheme’ in How Should One Live?, ed. Roger Crisp (1996) Week 5 Ethical relativism Lecture 9: Gilbert Harman ‘Moral Relativism’, Part I in Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Blackwell, 1996) Lecture 10: Bernard Williams ‘The truth in relativism’ essay 11 in Moral Luck (CUP, 1981) ch. 11 (reprinted from Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (PAS) 75, 1974-5) Seminar: David B. Wong ‘Pluralistic Relativism’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy XX (1995); 378-399 Week 6 Moral luck, blameworthiness, blame Lecture 11: Tim Scanlon ‘Blame’ ch.4 of Moral Dimensions (Harvard, 2008) Lecture 12: Jay Wallace ‘Dispassionate Opprobium: On Blame and the Reactive Sentiments’ essay 15 in Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon eds. Freeman, Kumar, and Wallace (OUP, 2011) Seminar: Bernard Williams ‘Moral Luck’ essay 2 in Moral Luck (CUP, 1981) Week 7 – READING WEEK (Mon 5th – Fri 9th Nov) Week 8 Moral responses – an absolute conception of value – this week’s lectures and seminar to be given by Elianna Fetterolf Lecture 13: Raimond Gaita ‘Remorse and Its Lessons’ ch.4 in Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception (2nd Edition) (Routledge, 2004) Lecture 14: Gabrielle Taylor ‘Guilt and Remorse’ ch. 4 in Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (OUP, 1985); pp.97-107 Seminar: Miranda Fricker ‘Boundaries of Moral Philosophy’ section on Raimond Gaita Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception ch.6 in Reading Ethics: Selected Texts with Interactive Commentary, eds. Miranda Fricker and Samuel Guttenplan (Willey-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 301-322 Week 9 Forgiveness and Trust Lecture 15: Jeffrie Murphy ‘Forgiveness and Resentment’ and/or Jean Hampton ‘Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred’, chs.1&2 respectively, in Forgiveness and Mercy (CUP, 1988) Lecture 16: Karen Jones ‘Trust as an Affective Attitude’, Ethics Vol. 107, No. 1 (October, 1996); 4-25 Seminar: Lucy Allais ‘Wiping the Slate Clean: The Heart of Forgiveness’, Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 36, Issue 1, pp. 33-68 Week 10 Epistemic Trust—Telling as Inviting to Trust Lecture 17: Edward Hinchman, ‘Telling as Inviting to Trust’, Philosophy and Phenomenologial Research Vol. LXX, No. 3, May 2005, 562-87 Lecture 18: Paul Faulkner ‘What Is Wrong with Lying?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXV No. 3 (2007) Available on his webpage at http://www.shef.ac.uk/philosophy/research/publications/faulknerp Seminar: Jennifer Lackey ‘Trust and Assurance—The Interpersonal View of Testimony’ chapter 8 (pp. 221-248) in her Learning From Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) Week 11 Testimonial Injustice, Stereotypes and Prejudice Lecture 19: Miranda Fricker Chapter 1 of Epistemic Injustice: Power and The Ethics of Knowing (2007) esp section 1.3; and ch.2 sections 2.2 and 2.3 [available on screen through Oxford Scholarship Online at http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/9780198237907/to c.html ] Lecture 20: Laurence Blum ‘Stereotypes and Stereotyping: A Moral Analysis’ in W. Jones & T. Martin eds. Immoral Believing, Special Issue of Philosophical Papers, 33 no. 3 (Nov. 2004), 251-89 Seminar: José Medina ‘The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional View of Epistemic Injustice: Differential Epistemic Authority and the Social Imaginary’, Social Epistemology Vol. 25, No. 1, Jan 2011; 15-35 Week 12 Unfair Inequality of Interpretive Resources—A second kind of epistemic injustice (hermeneutical injustice) Lecture 21: Miranda Fricker Chapter 7 of Epistemic Injustice [available on screen through Oxford Scholarship Online at http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/philosophy/9780198237907/to c.html ] OR (slightly edited) as ‘Powerlessness and Social Interpretation’, Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology Vol. 3 Issue 1-2 (2006); 96-108 Lecture 22: Rebecca Mason ‘Two Kinds of Unknowing’, Hypatia Vol 26, Issue 2, pp. 294-307 (2011) Seminar: Elizabeth Anderson ‘Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions’, Social Epistemology Vol. 26, No. 2, April 2012; pp.163-173 Weeks 13-15 – examining weeks .
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