1 Curriculum Vitae Judith Jarvis Thomson February 2016 Education
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Curriculum Vitae (Short) Alex Byrne Professor of Philosophy and Head, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT ______
July 2020 Curriculum Vitae (short) Alex Byrne Professor of Philosophy and Head, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT ___________________________________________________________________ Contact Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy 32-D808, Cambridge MA 02139-4307, USA +1 617.258.6106 (ph); +1 617.253.5017 (fax) [email protected]; web.mit.edu/abyrne/www/; orcid: 0000-0003-3652-1492 Employment 2006- Professor of Philosophy, MIT 2002-2006 Associate Professor of Philosophy, MIT (tenured) 1999-2002 Associate Professor of Philosophy, MIT (untenured) 1995-1999 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, MIT 1994-1995 Instructor in Philosophy, MIT 1993-1994 Mellon Postdoctoral Instructor in Philosophy, Caltech Education 1994 Ph.D., Princeton University 1989 M.A., King’s College London 1988 B.A., Birkbeck College London Research Areas Primary: philosophy of mind; metaphysics and epistemology Secondary: philosophy of language; twentieth century analytic philosophy; philosophy of sex and gender; philosophical logic; ethics Publications Papers and Commentaries Forthcoming “Comment on Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne,” Narrow Content, Philosophical Studies. Forthcoming “Concepts, Belief, and Perception,” Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays, ed. Christoph Demmerling and Dirk Schröder, Routledge. Forthcoming “Objectivist Reductionism” (with David Hilbert), in Fiona Macpherson & Derek Brown (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, 2 Routledge. Forthcoming “The Science of Color and Color Vision” (with David Hilbert), in Fiona Macpherson & Derek Brown (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, Routledge. 2020 “Are Women Adult Human Females?,” Philosophical Studies. 2019 “Schellenberg’s Capacitism,” Analysis 79: 713-9. 2019 “Perception and Ordinary Objects,” The Nature of Ordinary Objects, ed. J. Cumpa and B. Brewer, Oxford. -
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17, No. 2
Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy Volume XVII · Number 2 April 2020 Articles 103 Social Reform in a Complex World Jacob Barrett 133 Freedom and Actual Interference Jonah Goldwater 159 Do We Have Reasons to Obey the Law? Edmund Tweedy Flanigan 198 The Ambitions of Consequentialism Brian McElwee Discussions 219 Error Theory, Unbelievability, and the Normative Objection Daniele Bruno 228 Does Initial Appropriation Create New Obligations? Jesse Spafford Journal of Ethics Social Philosophy http://www.jesp.org & TheJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (issn 1559-3061) is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal is founded on the principle of publisher-funded open access. There are no publication fees for authors, and public access to articles is free of charge and is available to all readers under the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 license. Funding for the journal has been made possible through the generous commitment of the Gould School of Law and the Dornsife College of Letters, Arts, and Sciences at the University of Southern California. TheJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and it is governed by a correspondingly high editorial standard. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest. It is the view of the associate editors that the journal’s high standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well- argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest. -
Life and Learning Xix
LIFE AND LEARNING XIX PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE CONFERENCE at THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS SCHOOL OF LAW MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA 2009 edited by Joseph W. Koterski, S.J. KOTERSKI LIFE AND LEARNING XIX UFL University Faculty for Life University Faculty for Life was founded in 1989 to promote research, dialogue, and publication among faculty members who respect the value of human life from its inception to natural death, and to provide academic support for the pro-life position. Respect for life is especially endangered by the current cultural forces seeking to legitimize such practices as abortion, infanticide, euthanasia, and physician-assisted suicide. These topics are controversial, but we believe that they are too important to be resolved by the shouting, the news-bites, and the slogans that often dominate popular presentation of these issues. Because we believe that the evidence is on our side, we would like to assure a hearing for these views in the academic community. The issues of abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia have many dimensions–political, social, legal, medical, biological, psychological, ethical, and religious. Accordingly, we hope to promote an inter-disciplinary forum in which such issues can be discussed among scholars. We believe that by talking with one another we may better understand the values we share and become better informed in our expression and defense of them. We are distressed that the media often portray those favoring the value of human life as mindless zealots acting out of sectarian bias. We hope that our presence will change that image. We also believe that academicians united on these issues can encourage others to speak out for human life in their own schools and communities. -
Judith Jarvis Thomson on Abortion; a Libertarian Perspective
DePaul Journal of Health Care Law Volume 19 Issue 1 Fall 2017 Article 3 April 2018 Judith Jarvis Thomson on Abortion; a Libertarian Perspective Walter E. Block Loyola University New Orleans, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons Recommended Citation Walter E. Block, Judith Jarvis Thomson on Abortion; a Libertarian Perspective, 19 DePaul J. Health Care L. (2018) Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl/vol19/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Health Care Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Judith Jarvis Thomson on abortion; a libertarian perspective1 I. Introduction Abortion is one of the most vexing issues faced by society. On the one hand, there are those who favor the pro-choice position. In their view, the woman, and she alone (along with the advice of her doctor – but the final decision must be hers), should be able to legally determine on what basis, and whether, her pregnancy should be conducted. She should be as free to end her pregnancy at any stage of the development of her fetus, or give birth to it after the usual term of nine months. On the other hand, there are those who favor what is called the pro-life position. In this perspective, the fetus, from the moment of conception, is a full rights-bearing human being. -
Judith Jarvis Thomson's Normativity
Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Normativity Gilbert Harman June 28, 2010 Normativity is a careful, rigorous account of the meanings of basic normative terms like good, virtue, correct, ought, should, and must. Along the way Thomson refutes almost everything other philosophers have said about these topics. It is a very important book.1 Since I am going first in this symposium, I am mainly going to summarize this excellent book. At the end, I will try to indicate briefly I think why it refutes the sort of theory I and others have previously favored. Good Thomson begins by discussing evaluations using the word good. She notes as many others have that good is always used as an attributive adjective. 1This book discusses meta-ethics. She also plans a companion work of normative theory. 1 Something may be a good K or good in a certain respect, but nothing is good period. Thomson goes on to argue this means that emotivism, expressivism, pre- scriptivism and related accounts of the meaning of good cannot be generally correct. Nor does it make sense to suppose that there is no objective test for whether something is a good K or good for such and such a purpose. She argues persuasively that there is such a property as being a good K if and only if K is a goodness fixing kind. So there is no such property as being a good pebble, good act, a good fact, a good state of affairs, a good possible world, and so on, unless what is meant is, for example, a good pebble to use as a paperweight, a morally good act, a state of affairs that is good for Jones, a possible world that is a good example in a certain discussion, and so on. -
Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy's Attack
THEORIA, 2017, 83, 185–205 doi:10.1111/theo.12117 Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy’s Attack on Propositionalism by MATTEO MORGANTI University of Rome ‘RomaTRE’ and ATTILA TANYI University of Liverpool Abstract: The topic of this article is the ontology of practical reasons. We draw a critical compari- son between two views. According to the first, practical reasons are states of affairs; according to the second, they are propositions. We first isolate and spell out in detail certain objections to the second view that can be found only in embryonic form in the literature – in particular, in the work of Jonathan Dancy. Next, we sketch possible ways in which one might respond to each one of these objections. A careful evaluation of these complaints and responses, we argue, shows that the first view is not as obviously compelling as it is thought by Dancy. Indeed, it turns out that the view that practical reasons are propositions is by no means unworkable and in fact, at least under certain assumptions, explicit considerations can be made in favour of a propositional construal of reasons. Keywords: reasons, propositions, states of affairs, unity of reasons, Jonathan Dancy 1. Introduction REASONS ARE NO DOUBT IMPORTANT. They are important in our everyday life: we customarily refer to reasons when we explain our actions as well as when we try to justify what we plan to do, or what we did. Reasons are also important in con- temporary analytic philosophy. In a recent book, Thomas Scanlon (2014, pp. 1–2) points out that reasons have become the focus of philosophical research in at least two ways. -
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Goodness and Advice
Judith Jarvis Thomson, Goodness and Advice Reviewed by Michael J. Zimmerman This is the accepted version of the following article: Zimmerman, Michael. “Judith Jarvis Thomson, Goodness and Advice”, Noûs, 38.3 (2004): 534- 552. which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0029-4624.2004.00482.x ***© Wiley. Reprinted with permission. No further reproduction is authorized without written permission from Wiley. This version of the document is not the version of record. Figures and/or pictures may be missing from this format of the document. *** Abstract: This article is a review of the book “Goodness and Advice” by Judith Jarvis Thomson. Keywords: Book Review | Philosophy | Judith Jarvis Thomson | Goodness and Advice Article: Judith Jarvis Thomson, Goodness and Advice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), xvi+188 pp. This is an interesting, uneven book. Its core consists of the 1999–2000 Tanner Lectures on Human Values that Thomson delivered at Princeton University and subsequently revised. Part I of these lectures is entitled ‘‘Goodness’’ (39 pages long), Part II ‘‘Advice’’ (40 pages). These lectures are preceded by an introduction by Amy Gutmann (10 pages) and succeeded by comments by Philip Fisher (12 pages), Martha Nussbaum (29 pages), Jerome Schneewind (6 pages), and Barbara Herrnstein Smith (13 pages). The book ends with Thomson’s reply to these comments (33 pages). The interest is due entirely to Thomson, the unevenness to the other contributors. In her lectures, Thomson proves herself still to be at the top of her game: as insightful, incisive, and pithy as ever. Neither the introduction nor the comments do her justice, but an unabashed fan of Thomson such as myself can gain a perverse pleasure (on which Thomson might herself frown) from the decisive manner in which she dispatches her critics. -
Complete Teaching Dossier
TEACHING DOSSIER BENJAMIN IAN WINOKUR Table of Contents Teaching statement………………………………………………………………………………1 Diversity statement………………………………………………………………………………2 Notes on Syllabi ………………………………………………………………………………….3 Syllabi…………………………………………………………………………………………4-32 Previously Used PHIL 4040—Varieties of Skepticism (Fall 2018)………………………………………...4-9 Sample Syllabi……………………………………………………………………………..10-31 Sample Syllabus—Knowledge, Mind and Reality (200-Level)………………………..10-13 Sample Syllabus—Introduction to Formal Logic (200-Level)…………………………14-16 Sample Syllabus—Information Ethics (200-Level)……………………………………17-19 Sample Syllabus—Epistemology (300-Level)…………………………………………20-23 Sample Syllabus—Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (300-Level)……………24-27 Sample Syllabus—Trust in the Digital Age (400-Level)………………………………28-30 Sample Syllabus—The Epistemology of Self-Knowledge (Graduate)………………...31-32 Teaching Evaluations……………………………………………………………………….33-36 As Course Director PHIL 4040—Seminar in Contemporary Philosophy (Fall 2018)……………………33 As Tutorial Instructor PHIL 1100—The Meaning of Life (Fall 2014, Fall 2016) ………………………….34 PHIL 2100—Introduction to Formal Logic (Winter 2016, Fall 2017)…….………...35 Solicited Anonymous Feedback For PHIL 4040……………………………………………………………………….36 Teaching Statement New students of philosophy often express worry about how abstract philosophical inquiry and argumentation can be. Sympathetic as I can be to this worry, I respond that our discipline’s frequent abstractness emerges, ideally, from its breadth of aspiration. Here I take a page from Wilfrid Sellars, who once wrote that our project “is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term”. The philosopher’s penchant for abstraction, then, often expresses a desire for far-reaching syntheses of understanding. My pedagogy reflects this desire, even as I acknowledge that philosophical progress is made—and philosophy learned—slowly, and in small increments. -
Dissertation Final Draft
UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Political Thought and Political Action: Michael Walzer's Engagement with American Radicalism Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4x10110b Author Reiner, Jason Toby David Publication Date 2011 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Political Thought and Political Action: Michael Walzer’s Engagement with American Radicalism By Jason Toby David Reiner A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Mark Bevir, Chair Professor Shannon Stimson Professor Sarah Song Professor David Hollinger Spring 2011 Abstract Political Thought and Political Action: Michael Walzer’s Engagement with American Radicalism by Jason Toby David Reiner Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Mark Bevir, Chair This dissertation provides an account of the historical development of the political thought of Michael Walzer from the 1950s to the present day. It situates Walzer within an American tradition of social democratic thought and argues that only when he is so situated can his thought be understood fully. Walzer’s engagement with that tradition, most notably through his work on Dissent magazine, has structured how he has responded to many of the major developments in political life over the course of his career, including the decline of movement politics, the rise of neoliberalism, the recent waves of immigration to the USA, and the increased salience of civil society following the demise of the Soviet Union. -
The Demands of Partnership: a Normative Foundation for Shared Medical Decision-Making Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfil
The Demands of Partnership: A Normative Foundation for Shared Medical Decision-Making Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Allison Emily Massof, M.A. Graduate Program in Philosophy The Ohio State University 2018 Dissertation Committee: Piers Norris Turner, Adviser Dana Howard Tristram McPherson Abe Roth Copyright by Allison Emily Massof 2018 ii Abstract The contemporary vision of the doctor-patient relationship is a partnership. With the rejection of medical paternalism, ethicists and medical professionals recognized the importance of ensuring that patients were active participants in decisions regarding their care. In place of granting doctors authority to make medical decisions, doctors and patients are now expected to share authority over treatment decisions. However, this expectation is not supported by the current normative foundation for the doctor-patient partnership; specifically, its commitment to respect the patient’s right of self-determination. Therefore, the contemporary ideal of the doctor- patient relationship is at odds with the normative foundation upon which it rests. The aim of this dissertation is to offer a revision to the normative foundation for the doctor-patient partnership, in order to do justice to the ideal of a shared decision-making process. In Chapter 1, I detail the theoretical development of the ideal of the doctor-patient partnership and I identify a tension between the envisioned partnership and the commitment to respect the patient’s right of self-determination. In Chapter 2, I show that this tension is deeper than has been appreciated. -
Unworking Animals 73
Ecologocentrism: Unworking Animals 73 Ecologocentrism: Unworking Animals Timothy Morton . with a glance toward those who, in a society from which I do not exclude myself, turn their eyes away when faced by the as yet unnamable which is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in the offing, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity. — Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (293) Whoever is the wisest among you is also just a conflict and a cross between plant and ghost. — Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (6) Ecology without Nature1 One of the things that modernity has damaged in its appropriation of the Earth has been thinking. Unfortunately, one of the damaged ideas is that of Nature itself. (I shall be capitalizing this word where necessary, to highlight its metaphysical qualities.) How do we transition from seeing what we call “Nature” as an object “over yonder”? And how do we avoid “new and improved” versions that end up doing much the same thing (systems theory, Spinozan pantheism, or Deleuze-and-Guattari type worlds of interlocking machines, and so on), just in a “cooler,” more sophisticated way? What kinds of collectivity emerge when we think ecology without Nature? How do we coexist with nonhumans without what Dimitris Vardoulakis and Chris Danta in their introduction to this issue call the “social fantasies that create and sustain a collective ‘we’ in the name of whom violence is exercised”? By “unworking animals” I reference Jean-Luc Nancy’s idea of the “community of unworking” derived from Maurice Blanchot’s interpretation of the Romantic fragment poem. -
48 Moral Minimalism in the Political Realm ∗
48 Moral Minimalism in the Political Realm ∗ STELIOS VIRVIDAKIS There are various diverging answers to the traditional questions concerning the correct assessment of the relations between morality and politics. From Plato and Aristotle to Macchiavelli, Hobbes and Kant, philosophers have elab- orated different conceptions of these relations which could be interpreted as involving a form of subordination of politics to morality, or, on the contrary, of morality to politics. Contemporary liberal thinkers are usually suspicious of any talk about the need for a “moralization” of political life, to the extent that it may hide an objectionable commitment to the promotion of some substan- tive ideal of the good as a collective political goal. However, they often admit that they do respect and sustain a kind of political morality conforming to the values of liberal democracies1. The political morality they are ready to defend is sometimes associated with what is characterized as a minimalist approach to moral issues. The aim of this paper is to cast light on some aspects and versions of this approach, the interest of which goes beyond the concerns of liberal political philosophers, and to try to cast light on the more or less “thin” moral concepts which constitute its core. Minimalism here implies a substan- tial restriction or attenuation of the demands of morality and not a negative ∗Earlier versions of this paper were presented to different audiences in Herakleion, Tokyo, Nanjing and Athens. I am grateful to many friends and colleagues for their questions and sug- gestions and more particularly, to Dionyssis Anapolitanos, Georgia Apostolopoulou, Moon Such Byeon, Myrto Dragona-Monachou, Wolfgang Ertl, Anthony Hatzimoysis, Takashi Iida, Vasso Kindi, Patricia Kitcher, Philip Kitcher, Chrys Mantzavinos, Filimon Peonidis, Stathis Psillos, Pav- los Sourlas, Yannis Stephanou, and Gu Su.