DOCSLIB.ORG

48 Moral Minimalism in the Political Realm ∗

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
48 Moral Minimalism in the Political Realm ∗ 48 Moral Minimalism in the Political Realm ∗ STELIOS VIRVIDAKIS There are various diverging answers to the traditional questions concerning the correct assessment of the relations between morality and politics. From Plato and Aristotle to Macchiavelli, Hobbes and Kant, philosophers have elab- orated different conceptions of these relations which could be interpreted as involving a form of subordination of politics to morality, or, on the contrary, of morality to politics. Contemporary liberal thinkers are usually suspicious of any talk about the need for a “moralization” of political life, to the extent that it may hide an objectionable commitment to the promotion of some substan- tive ideal of the good as a collective political goal. However, they often admit that they do respect and sustain a kind of political morality conforming to the values of liberal democracies1. The political morality they are ready to defend is sometimes associated with what is characterized as a minimalist approach to moral issues. The aim of this paper is to cast light on some aspects and versions of this approach, the interest of which goes beyond the concerns of liberal political philosophers, and to try to cast light on the more or less “thin” moral concepts which constitute its core. Minimalism here implies a substan- tial restriction or attenuation of the demands of morality and not a negative ∗Earlier versions of this paper were presented to different audiences in Herakleion, Tokyo, Nanjing and Athens. I am grateful to many friends and colleagues for their questions and sug- gestions and more particularly, to Dionyssis Anapolitanos, Georgia Apostolopoulou, Moon Such Byeon, Myrto Dragona-Monachou, Wolfgang Ertl, Anthony Hatzimoysis, Takashi Iida, Vasso Kindi, Patricia Kitcher, Philip Kitcher, Chrys Mantzavinos, Filimon Peonidis, Stathis Psillos, Pav- los Sourlas, Yannis Stephanou, and Gu Su. 1 I am not interested in dwelling on arguments supporting political liberalism. The issues that I intend to emphasize are related to discussions probably concerning metaethics and moral philosophy more than political philosophy or politics. 860 MORAL MINIMALISM IN THE POLITICAL REALM 861 stance of indifference or rejection of moral values or principles, which would amount to some form of thorough-going amoralism.2 It will be argued that the normative model to be adopted should include both deontological and consequentialist components, that we may want to ascribe a priority to the former, and that its minimalist character will depend mostly on the construal of its central principles and on the way they are supposed to be implemented. Let us begin with a few introductory remarks regarding the interpreta- tion of the concepts of ethics and politics on which we intend to concentrate. In fact, there are alternative construals of the notions of the moral and of the ethical, on the one hand, and of the political, on the other, which one should eventually take into account. Here, we will begin our discussion by seeking a preliminary specification of their content allowing us to get afirst picture of their complex relations. Thus, morality could be conceived as consisting of a set of norms for the assessment and the guidance of one’s actions, insofar as their outcomes affect not only oneself but also the lives of other persons and sentient creatures. It should be noted that, although the terms “moral- ity” and “ethics” are often taken to be coextensive, the word “ethical” is used by many philosophers to refer to broader issues regarding the good life and the values that constitute it, or are conducive to it, while the word “moral” is employed in the more narrow sense of what conforms to a set of abstract principles regulating one’s conduct.3 Morality, as we understand it in the modern era, comprises norms entailing duties and obligations, while ethics is interpreted as involving a richer set of concrete evaluative properties, includ- 2 For a conception of forms of ethical minimalism which involve egoism or even nihilism, see Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, 5-6. Of course, the term “minimalism” is widely used in many areas. The notion of minimalism is usually associated with styles of modernist visual art and music, but the idea has also become fashionable in philos- ophy, especially in the philosophy of language and in relation with a certain conception of truth, discussed by Pascal Engel in his Truth, Chesham: Acumen, 2002, 65-98. 3 This distinction between the “ethical”(ethisch) and the “moral” (moralisch) is elabo- rated in the writings of Jürgen Habermas. The notion of the moral is supposed to cap- ture the proper, other-regarding goals of right action. See the discussion in Rainer Forst, “Ethik und Moral”, in Lutz Wingert & Klaus Günther (Hrg.), Die Öffentlichkeit der Vernunft und die Vernunft der Öffentlichkeit, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2001. See also Stephen Darwall, Philosophical Ethics, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998 and Kieran Setiya, Reasons with- out Rationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, 2. More recently, Ronald Dworkin has proposed to use the terms “ethics” and “morality”, to refer respectively to “the study of how to live well” and to “the study of how to treat other people”. See his Justice for Hedgehogs, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2011, 19, 191 and passim. 862 STELIOS VIRVIDAKIS ing character traits, that is virtues and vices. This distinction is often sum- marized in the contrast between “thin” and “thick” concepts, such as, on the one hand, good, just or right, and on the other, generous, honest, courageous, magnanimous, jealous, cruel, etc.4 There is a clear analogy with the opposi- tion put forth by Hegel, between Moralität -a system of principles adopted by the moral agent-, and Sittlichkeit -morality embodied in social institutions-, although the two distinctions are not equivalent in meaning. In any case, we are not going to proceed by taking for granted the details of the distinction between the meanings of the terms “morality” and “ethics”, to which we may return in our concluding reflections. However, even if one is occasionally willing to speak more loosely, and use the two terms inter- changeably, one should not fail to take into consideration the deep going dif- ferences between modern and ancient philosophical conceptions of morality, the paradigms of which are, respectively, Kant’s deontology and utilitarian- ism, and Aristotle’s ethics.5 It is generally agreed that Greek philosophers, who lay emphasis on the thick ethical dimension, clearly espouse the prior- ity of the “good” over the “right”, and that the opposite is true in the case of modern thinkers who employ mostly thin notions. Actually, according to the analysis that has prevailed in contemporary moral theory, the priority of the good, construed in an abstract, thin sense, is also attributed to teleolog- ical and consequentialist accounts of moral norms, put forth in the modern era, and the clear priority of the right over the good is thought to characterize only those who defend deontological views. The rightness of an action, or of a rule of action, depends on the amount of non moral value (“goodness”) realized in the states of affairs brought about or aimed at by this action, or the rule to which it conforms.6 4 See the discussion in Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1985, 129, 140, 143-145, 162, 193, 200 and in Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1994, passim. 5 See Elizabeth Anscombe "Modern Moral Philosophy", Philosophy 33, reprinted in Collected Philosophical Papers, vol. III : Ethics, Religion and Politics, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981, Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed., Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1984, Williams, op.cit. 6 Charles Larmore criticizes philosophers who speak of a priority of the good over the right in modern teleological and consequentialist theories in his monograph The Morals of Modernity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 19-40, 22. A characteristic target of his criticism is William Frankena, (Ethics, 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1973, 14-17) and extends to John Rawls’, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971, 30-33. Although I agree with the main idea behind’s Larmore’s argument to the effect that such a priority is primarily found in ancient ethics, I think that there is a clear sense in which we may acknowledge MORAL MINIMALISM IN THE POLITICAL REALM 863 Now, politics can be taken to refer to a set of practices aiming at the effec- tive satisfaction of needs and at the prevention and the eventual adjudication of conflicts among the members of a society, or, at a higher level, among dif- ferent societies. Moreover, we often describe politics as an art, rather than as a science, of governing people and of managing the central institutions of organized, complex communities. Thus, it is generally accepted that, at least in Western liberal societies, politics is conceived as “primarily concerned with public order and safety and the protection of freedom”.7 Even in different cul- tures and in distant historical periods, which present us with ambitious and far reaching political ideals, deriving from religious, metaphysical and ethical accounts of social life –what Rawls describes as “comprehensive” doctrines or conceptions– the fundamental function of political activity in securing the peaceful coexistence of citizens seems to comefirst. Of course, such basic political activity may be complemented by much richer and more ambitious “policies” aspiring to the realization of different conceptions of the good. In fact, one may be interested in the moral appraisal, both of political activity in its more general form and of the particular policies designed and imple- mented by governments and political parties.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17, No. 2
    Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy Volume XVII · Number 2 April 2020 Articles 103 Social Reform in a Complex World Jacob Barrett 133 Freedom and Actual Interference Jonah Goldwater 159 Do We Have Reasons to Obey the Law? Edmund Tweedy Flanigan 198 The Ambitions of Consequentialism Brian McElwee Discussions 219 Error Theory, Unbelievability, and the Normative Objection Daniele Bruno 228 Does Initial Appropriation Create New Obligations? Jesse Spafford Journal of Ethics Social Philosophy http://www.jesp.org & TheJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (issn 1559-3061) is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal is founded on the principle of publisher-funded open access. There are no publication fees for authors, and public access to articles is free of charge and is available to all readers under the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 license. Funding for the journal has been made possible through the generous commitment of the Gould School of Law and the Dornsife College of Letters, Arts, and Sciences at the University of Southern California. TheJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and it is governed by a correspondingly high editorial standard. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest. It is the view of the associate editors that the journal’s high standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well- argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.
    [Show full text]
  • 5/20 Charles Larmore
    1 5/20 Charles Larmore: Curriculum Vitae W. Duncan MacMillan Family Professor in the Humanities Professor of Philosophy Brown University 45 Prospect Street Providence, Rhode Island 02912 Education: 1968-72 Harvard University (A.B. magna cum laude, Greek and philosophy; Phi Beta Kappa) 1972-73 Ecole normale supérieure, Paris, France 1976-77 Universität Münster, Germany 1973-78 Yale University (Ph.D., Philosophy) Positions held: 1978-97 Columbia University (1978-80 Society of Fellows; 1980-87 Assistant Professor of Philosophy; 1987-90 Associate Professor; 1990-97 Professor of Philosophy; 1992-97 Professor of German) 1991-92 Maître de recherche, CREA (Ecole polytechnique, Paris) 1992-95 Chairman, Department of Philosophy, Columbia University 1997-2006 Professor of Philosophy and Political Science, Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago 2001-5 Chester D. Tripp Professor in the Humanities, University of Chicago 2005-6 Raymond W. & Martha Hilpert Gruner Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago 2006- Professor of Philosophy, W. Duncan MacMillan Family Professor in the Humanities, Brown University Areas of specialization: Moral and political philosophy, History of philosophy (17th – 20th centuries) Professional Activities: Editorial board: Journal of Philosophy (1987-1996; 2008- ) Ethics, Book Review Editor (2000-2008) Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie 2 Filosofia e questioni pubbliche La Società degli individui Cahiers de philosophie de l'Université de Caen Comprendre European Journal of Political Theory Philosophiques
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Curriculum Vitae Judith Jarvis Thomson February 2016 Education
    1 Curriculum Vitae Judith Jarvis Thomson February 2016 Education: B.A. Barnard College, 1950 B.A. Cambridge University, 1952 M.A. Cambridge University, 1956 Ph.D. Columbia University, 1959 Awards: Phi Beta Kappa Fulbright Scholarship, 1950-51 Frances Dibblee Scholar (Columbia University), 1955-56 AAUW New York State Fellowship, 1962-63 NEH Fellowship, 1978-79 NEH Fellowship, 1986-87 Guggenheim Fellowship, 1986-87 (held in 1987-88) Member, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 1989- Fellow, Centre for Advanced Study, Oslo, Norway, spring 1996 Quinn Prize, APA, 2012 Honorary President, American Committee of the Philosophy Summer School in China, 2013 Honorary degree: Doctor of Letters, University of Cambridge, June 2015 Teaching Positions: Barnard College, 1956-62 Lecturer, 1956-59 Instructor, 1959-60 Assistant Professor, 1960-62 Boston University, 1963-64 Assistant Professor, 1963-64 MIT, 1964- Associate Professor, 1964-69 Professor, 1969-1991 Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy, 1991-96 Professor, 1996- (Professor Emerita, 2004-) Visiting Fellow, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, summer 1968 Visiting Professor, University of Pittsburgh, fall 1976 Visiting Professor, University of California, Berkeley, Law School, spring 1983 Visiting Professor, Yale Law School, fall 1982, fall 1984, fall 1985 Visiting Professor, UCLA, winter quarter 2003 Visiting Professor, Princeton, fall 2010 Professional Activities: American Philosophical Association: Chair, Board of Officers, 2002-2004 Eastern Division:
    [Show full text]
  • MP Concepts De L'été(1)Bis.Indd
    Les concepts de l’éthique MMPP CConceptsoncepts ddee ll'e'étteé(1)bis.ind1(1)bis.ind1 1 115/10/085/10/08 115:13:545:13:54 Collection « L’avocat du diable » dirigée par Charles Girard Des mêmes auteurs Ruwen Ogien a publié notamment : Le rasoir de Kant et autres essais de philosophie pratique, Paris-Tel-Aviv, l’Éclat, 2003. Penser la pornographie, Paris, PUF, 2003, 2e édition revue et corrigée, 2008. La panique morale, Paris, Grasset, 2004. La philosophie morale (avec Monique Canto-Sperber), Paris, PUF, 2004, 2e édition revue et corrigée, 2006. Pourquoi tant de honte ?, Nantes, Pleins Feux, 2006. La morale a-t-elle un avenir ?, Nantes, Pleins Feux, 2006. L’éthique aujourd’hui. Maximalistes et minimalistes, Paris, Gallimard, 2007. La liberté d’offenser. Le sexe, l’art et la morale, Paris, La Musadine, 2007. Christine Tappolet a publié : Émotions et valeurs, Paris, PUF, 2000. – avec Sarah Stroud, (dir.), Weakness of Will and Pratical Irrationality, Oxford, Clarendon Press d’Oxford University Press, 2003. – avec Luc Faucher, (dir.), The Modularity of Emotions, volume théma- tique du Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supp. vol. 32, Calgary, Calgary University Press, 2008. ISBN : 978 2 7056 6800 6 © 2008, HERMANN ÉDITEURS, 6 rue de la Sorbonne, 75005 PARIS Toute reproduction ou représentation de cet ouvrage, intégrale ou partielle, serait illicite sans l’autorisation de l’éditeur et constituerait une contrefaçon. Les cas stric- tement limités à l’usage privé ou de citation sont régis par la loi du 11 mars 1957. MMPP CConceptsoncepts ddee ll'e'étteé(1)bis.ind2(1)bis.ind2 2 115/10/085/10/08 115:13:545:13:54 RUWEN OGIEN CHRISTINE TAPPOLET Les concepts de l’éthique Faut-il être conséquentialiste ? HERMANN ÉDITEURS DES SCIENCES ET DES ARTS Depuis 1876 MMPP CConceptsoncepts ddee ll'e'étteé(1)bis.ind3(1)bis.ind3 3 115/10/085/10/08 115:13:555:13:55 Collection de philosophie normative contemporaine « Je suis l’adversaire, mon rôle est de contredire.
    [Show full text]
  • Critical Analysis of the Principle of Benefit and Harm Benefit and Harm Are Essential Elements in Any Consideration of Bioethical Nature
    Estudo crítico do princípio de benefício e dano Flávio Rocha Lima Paranhos 1, Volnei Garrafa 2, Rosana Leite de Melo 3 Resumo Benefício e dano são elementos essenciais em toda ponderação de natureza bioética. A prevenção de da- nos está presente no juramento de Hipócrates como preocupação central. O objetivo deste artigo é analisar criticamente o princípio de maximizar benefício e minimizar dano, tendo como ponto de partida o artigo da Declaração Universal sobre Bioética e Direitos Humanos (DUBDH) que trata do tema. Propomos, pri- meiramente, uma abordagem geral, filosófica, a partir de autores clássicos, como Kant e Mill, mas também contemporâneos, como Ruwen Ogien e Edgar Morin, entre outros. Seguimos com algumas abordagens da literatura bioética brasileira e internacional. Nesse ponto, pudemos observar um viés claramente equivocado, na medida em que é proposto um conceito bastante limitado de benefício, por parte de alguns autores norte- -americanos. Ao valer-se de argumentos tradicionalmente principialistas para defender suas posições, tais autores reforçam (involuntariamente) a necessidade de outra via de ponderação bioética, a DUBDH. Palavras-chave: Bioética. Beneficência. Avaliação do benefício-risco. Método do caminho crítico. Resumen Artigos de atualização Artigos Estudio crítico del principio de beneficio y daño Beneficios y daños son elementos esenciales de cualquier ponderación de carácter bioético. La prevención de daños ya está presente en el juramento hipocrático como una preocupación central. El propósito de este artículo es analizar críticamente el principio de maximizar el beneficio y minimizar el daño, tomando como punto de partida el artículo de la Declaración Universal sobre Bioética y Derechos Humanos (DUBDH) que se ocupa de la temática.
    [Show full text]
  • Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy's Attack
    THEORIA, 2017, 83, 185–205 doi:10.1111/theo.12117 Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy’s Attack on Propositionalism by MATTEO MORGANTI University of Rome ‘RomaTRE’ and ATTILA TANYI University of Liverpool Abstract: The topic of this article is the ontology of practical reasons. We draw a critical compari- son between two views. According to the first, practical reasons are states of affairs; according to the second, they are propositions. We first isolate and spell out in detail certain objections to the second view that can be found only in embryonic form in the literature – in particular, in the work of Jonathan Dancy. Next, we sketch possible ways in which one might respond to each one of these objections. A careful evaluation of these complaints and responses, we argue, shows that the first view is not as obviously compelling as it is thought by Dancy. Indeed, it turns out that the view that practical reasons are propositions is by no means unworkable and in fact, at least under certain assumptions, explicit considerations can be made in favour of a propositional construal of reasons. Keywords: reasons, propositions, states of affairs, unity of reasons, Jonathan Dancy 1. Introduction REASONS ARE NO DOUBT IMPORTANT. They are important in our everyday life: we customarily refer to reasons when we explain our actions as well as when we try to justify what we plan to do, or what we did. Reasons are also important in con- temporary analytic philosophy. In a recent book, Thomas Scanlon (2014, pp. 1–2) points out that reasons have become the focus of philosophical research in at least two ways.
    [Show full text]
  • The Moral Case for Sexbots
    Paladyn, Journal of Behavioral Robotics 2020; 11: 171–190 Review Article Marc Behrendt* The moral case for sexbots In our world, there will be no emotions except fear, rage, well-being and fulfilment of individuals in want of triumph, and self-abasement. The sex instinct will be eradi- intimacy and emotional connection, could be seen as a cated. We shall abolish the orgasm. There will be no loyalty tool for social progress and sexual justice. except loyalty to the Party. But always there will be the As Socrates brilliantly pointed out through Plato, most intoxication of power. Always, at every moment, there will be the ff thrill of victory, the sensation of trampling on an enemy who’s of human misery, su ering and wars, arise from our helpless. If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot unfulfilled bodily desires and frustrations (“Phaedo”, 66c). stamping on a human face, forever. The moral to be drawn from He of course advocated in favour of chastity and resisting this dangerous nightmare situation is a simple one: don’t let it sexual temptation, but his basic premise and insight are happen. It depends on you. still valid today. Finally, the underlying questions I will explore in George Orwell the following pages are: how come such vast swaths of https://doi.org/10.1515/pjbr-2020-0031 the progressive camp, adopt a conservative discourse, received February 28, 2020; accepted March 16, 2020 when it comes to sexual progress? Why is there such a Abstract: In this paper, I will try to examine the main staunch opposition to sexbots and the ensuing right to objections and moral qualms by some opponents to sexbots.
    [Show full text]
  • Ruwen Ogien Et John Dewey : Dialogue Pour Une Éthique Éducative De L’Hospitalité Christophe Point
    Document généré le 24 sept. 2021 12:47 Éthique en éducation et en formation Les Dossiers du GREE Ruwen Ogien et John Dewey : dialogue pour une éthique éducative de l’hospitalité Christophe Point Éthique minimale, individualisme et éducation à l’autonomie Résumé de l'article Numéro 10, hiver 2021 Notre travail cherche à faire dialoguer Ruwen Ogien et John Dewey sur le terrain de la philosophie de l’éducation, dans le but de construire avec eux une URI : https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1076819ar éthique éducative valable pour nos régimes démocratiques. Plus précisément, DOI : https://doi.org/10.7202/1076819ar nous nous intéressons au déploiement de l’éthique au sein des processus éducatifs que les points de convergences entre ces deux auteurs autorisent. Aller au sommaire du numéro Notre hypothèse de travail cherche à trouver, au-delà des différences de positions éthiques de ces deux auteurs, ce qui les rapproche et permettrait de tisser une éthique éducative commune. Cette dernière prend les traits d’une éthique de l’hospitalité, éthique où l’hospitalité sera envisagée dans un cadre Éditeur(s) démocratique, à la fois comme un mouvement envers les autres, mais Éthique en éducation et en formation - Les Dossiers du GREE également en direction de soi et du savoir. Ainsi, en distinguant l’hospitalité de l’appartenance, de la tolérance et de la bienveillance, nous faisons le pari qu’ensemble, Ogien et Dewey peuvent nous aider à construire cette éthique ISSN éducative de l’hospitalité dont nos démocraties actuelles ont tant besoin. 2561-1488 (numérique) Découvrir la revue Citer cet article Point, C.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Neutrality This Page Intentionally Left Blank Political Neutrality a Re-Evaluation
    Political Neutrality This page intentionally left blank Political Neutrality A Re-evaluation Edited by Roberto Merrill University of Minho, Portugal and Daniel Weinstock McGill University, Canada Selection, introduction and editorial matter © Roberto Merrill and Daniel Weinstock 2014 Chapters © Contributors 2014 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014 978-0-230-28510-1 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2014 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries ISBN 978-1-349-33019-5 ISBN 978-1-137-31920-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781137319203 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources.
    [Show full text]
  • Curriculum Vitae Peter Railton Current Title and Office Address
    Curriculum Vitae Peter Railton Current title and office address: Home address: Gregory S. Kavka Distinguished University Professor John Stephenson Perrin Professor Arthur F. Thurnau Professor 1106 Lincoln Avenue Department of Philosophy Ann Arbor, MI 48104 The University of Michigan USA Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1003 +1 734 995 0990 USA +1 734 395 1350 (cell) Tel. +1 734 764 6285 +1 734 763 2122 Fax +1 734 763 8071 [email protected] Education Harvard University, 1968-1971, A.B. in Philosophy (1971) Princeton University, 1974-l978, Ph.D. in Philosophy (1980) Thesis: Explaining Explanation: A Realist Account of Scientific Explanation and Understanding, David Lewis, advisor Academic employment Permanent: The University of Michigan, Assistant Professor (1979-83); Associate Professor (1983-90); Professor (1990- ) Visiting: Princeton University, 1990 The University of California, Berkeley, l984-85 Honors, awards, and special fellowships External Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, Member, Elected 2016 Institute of Philosophy Biennial Lectures, NYU, 2016 Center for the Study of Mind in Nature Lecture, University of Oslo, 2015 Dewey Lecture, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, 2015 President, American Philosophical Association, Central Division, 2011-2012 Invited Fellow, National Humanities Center, 2010-2011 American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Member, Elected 2004 Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship, 2001-02 American Council of Learned Societies Fellowship, 2000-01 National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship, 1999-2000
    [Show full text]
  • Unworking Animals 73
    Ecologocentrism: Unworking Animals 73 Ecologocentrism: Unworking Animals Timothy Morton . with a glance toward those who, in a society from which I do not exclude myself, turn their eyes away when faced by the as yet unnamable which is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in the offing, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity. — Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (293) Whoever is the wisest among you is also just a conflict and a cross between plant and ghost. — Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (6) Ecology without Nature1 One of the things that modernity has damaged in its appropriation of the Earth has been thinking. Unfortunately, one of the damaged ideas is that of Nature itself. (I shall be capitalizing this word where necessary, to highlight its metaphysical qualities.) How do we transition from seeing what we call “Nature” as an object “over yonder”? And how do we avoid “new and improved” versions that end up doing much the same thing (systems theory, Spinozan pantheism, or Deleuze-and-Guattari type worlds of interlocking machines, and so on), just in a “cooler,” more sophisticated way? What kinds of collectivity emerge when we think ecology without Nature? How do we coexist with nonhumans without what Dimitris Vardoulakis and Chris Danta in their introduction to this issue call the “social fantasies that create and sustain a collective ‘we’ in the name of whom violence is exercised”? By “unworking animals” I reference Jean-Luc Nancy’s idea of the “community of unworking” derived from Maurice Blanchot’s interpretation of the Romantic fragment poem.
    [Show full text]
  • Sarah Birley, 1973; 3 Children Born in 1975, 77, 80
    Curriculum Vitae JONATHAN DANCY Personal Born: 8 May 1946 Married: Sarah Birley, 1973; 3 children born in 1975, 77, 80. Home address: 40 Lonsdale Road, Oxford OX2 7EW, UK. Telephone nos: 01865 514998 (UK home); 07804 916196 (UK mobile) 1 512 998 3471 (USA cell); 1 512 471 2620 (UT Austin office). E-mail address: [email protected] Education Scholar, Winchester College, 1959-64 Voluntary Service Overseas in French Cameroon, 1964-65 Exhibitioner, then Scholar, Corpus Christi College, Oxford, 1965-71 1965-7: Classical Honour Moderations: First Class Honours 1967-9: Literae Humaniores: First Class Honours, BA 1969-71: B. Phil in Philosophy: Distinction for thesis (supervised by C. C. W. Taylor and Prof. Sir Peter Strawson) and for written papers (Plato, Metaphysics, Philosophical Logic) 1972: MA University of Oxford Posts Held 1970-1: Lecturer in Classical Philosophy; Pembroke College, Oxford. 1971-87: Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Keele. 1987-9: Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Keele. 1989-91: Reader in Philosophy, University of Keele. 1991-6: Professor of Philosophy, University of Keele. Curriculum Vitae: Jonathan Dancy 2 1992-6: Head of Philosophy Department, University of Keele. 1996-2004 Professor of Philosophy, University of Reading. 2004-11: Research Professor of Philosophy, University of Reading. 2005-11: Professor of Philosophy, The University of Texas at Austin (half- time). 2011-: Darrell K Royal Professor of Ethics and American Society at the University of Texas at Austin (half-time). 2013-6 Research Professor of Philosophy, University of Reading (part- time) Visiting Positions (and others) 1988-9: Visiting Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh.
    [Show full text]