What Is This Thing Called Knowledge?

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What Is This Thing Called Knowledge? what is this thing called knowledge? What is knowledge? Where does it come from? What kinds of knowledge are there? Can we know anything at all? This lucid and engaging introduction grapples with these central questions in the theory of knowledge, offering a clear, non-partisan view of the main themes of epistemology. Both traditional issues and contemporary ideas are discussed in sixteen easily digestible chapters, each of which conclude with a useful summary of the main ideas discussed, study questions, annotated further reading, and a guide to internet resources. Each chapter also features text boxes providing bite-sized summaries of key concepts and major philosophers, and clear and interesting examples are used throughout. The book concludes with an annotated guide to general introductions to epistemology, a glossary of key terms, and a summary of the main examples used in epistemology.This is an ideal first textbook on the theory of knowledge for undergraduates coming to philosophy for the first time. The third edition has been revised and updated throughout and features two new chapters, on religious knowledge and scientific knowledge, as part of a whole new section on what kinds of knowledge there are. In addition, the text as a whole has been refreshed to keep it up to date with current developments. Duncan Pritchard FRSE is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, UK. His main research area is epistemology, and he has published widely in this field, including the books Epistemic Luck (2005), Knowledge (2009), The Nature and Value of Knowledge (with A.Millar and A.Haddock, 2010), and Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize for his research. In 2011 he was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. What is this thing called? The Routledge What is this thing called? series of concise textbooks has been designed for use by students coming to a core and important area of philosophy for the first time. Each volume explores the relevant central questions with clear explanations of complex ideas and engaging contemporary examples. Features to aid study include text boxes, chapter summaries, study questions, further reading and glossaries. What is this thing called Knowledge? third edition Duncan Pritchard What is this thing called Philosophy of Language? Gary Kemp What is this thing called Metaphysics? second edition Brian Garrett What is this thing called Ethics? Christopher Bennett BY DUNCAN PRITCHARD what is this thing called knowledge? Third edition O Routledge jjj^^ Taylor & Francis Group LONDON AND NEW YORK First published 2006 Second edition published 2010 This edition published 2014 By Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Ave., New York City, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,an informa business © 2006, 2010, 2014 Duncan Pritchard The right of Duncan Pritchard to be identified as the author of the editorial material has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice:Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Pritchard, Duncan. What is this thing called knowledge? / by Duncan Pritchard. – Third edition. pages cm. – (What is this thing called?) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Knowledge, Theory of. I. Title. BD161.P749 2013 121–dc23 2013010369 ISBN: 978-0-415-65721-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-415-65706-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-88944-3 (ebk) Typeset in Berling and Arial Rounded by Swales and Willis Ltd, Exeter, Devon For Mandi, Ethan, and Alexander This page intentionally left blank CONTENTS Preface to the third edition xi How to use this book xii PART I: WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 1 1 Some preliminaries 3 TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE 3 TWO BASIC REQUIREMENTS ON KNOWLEDGE: TRUTH AND BELIEF 4 KNOWING VERSUS MERELY ‘GETTING IT RIGHT’ 5 A BRIEF REMARK ON TRUTH 7 2 The value of knowledge 10 WHY CARE ABOUT KNOWLEDGE? 10 THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF TRUE BELIEF 10 THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE 12 THE STATUES OF DAEDALUS 14 IS SOME KNOWLEDGE NON-INSTRUMENTALLY VALUABLE? 15 3 Defining knowledge 20 THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION 20 METHODISM AND PARTICULARISM 21 KNOWLEDGE AS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF 23 GETTIER CASES 23 RESPONDING TO THE GETTIER CASES 26 BACK TO THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION 28 4 The structure of knowledge 31 KNOWLEDGE AND JUSTIFICATION 31 THE ENIGMATIC NATURE OF JUSTIFICATION 31 AGRIPPA’S TRILEMMA 33 INFINITISM 34 COHERENTISM 35 FOUNDATIONALISM 36 viii • contents 5 Rationality 42 RATIONALITY, JUSTIFICATION, AND KNOWLEDGE 42 EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY AND THE GOAL OF TRUTH 43 THE GOAL(S) OF EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY 45 THE (UN)IMPORTANCE OF EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY 46 RATIONALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 47 EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM/EXTERNALISM 49 6 Virtues and faculties 55 RELIABILISM 55 A ‘GETTIER’ PROBLEM FOR RELIABILISM 56 VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 57 VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE EXTERNALISM/INTERNALISM DISTINCTION 60 PART II: WHERE DOES KNOWLEDGE COME FROM? 67 7 Perception 69 THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE 69 INDIRECT REALISM 71 IDEALISM 73 TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM 74 DIRECT REALISM 76 8 Testimony and memory 80 THE PROBLEM OF TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE 80 REDUCTIONISM 82 CREDULISM 84 THE PROBLEM OF MEMORIAL KNOWLEDGE 86 9 A priority and inference 91 A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 91 THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF A PRIORI AND EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE 92 INTROSPECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 93 DEDUCTION 94 INDUCTION 95 ABDUCTION 96 10 The problem of induction 101 THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 101 RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 103 LIVING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION I: FALSIFICATION 103 LIVING WITH THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION II: PRAGMATISM 107 contents • ix PART III: WHAT KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE ARE THERE? 113 11 Scientific knowledge 115 WHAT IS SCIENCE? 115 SCIENCE VERSUS PSEUDO-SCIENCE 117 THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 123 CONCLUDING REMARKS 125 12 Religious knowledge 129 IS THERE ANY RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE? 129 THE EVIDENTIALIST CHALLENGE TO RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 130 NATURAL THEOLOGY 131 FIDEISM 135 REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY 136 13 Moral knowledge 144 THE PROBLEM OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE 144 SCEPTICISM ABOUT MORAL FACTS 144 SCEPTICISM ABOUT MORAL KNOWLEDGE 148 THE NATURE OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE I: CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONALISM 150 THE NATURE OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE II: ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS 152 PART IV: DO WE KNOW ANYTHING AT ALL? 159 14 Scepticism about other minds 161 THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS 161 THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY 162 A PROBLEM FOR THE ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY 163 TWO VERSIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS 164 PERCEIVING SOMEONE ELSE’S MIND 166 15 Radical scepticism 169 THE RADICAL SCEPTICAL PARADOX 169 SCEPTICISM AND CLOSURE 172 MOOREANISM 174 CONTEXTUALISM 177 16 Truth and objectivity 183 OBJECTIVITY, ANTI-REALISM, AND SCEPTICISM 183 TRUTH AS THE GOAL OF INQUIRY 184 x • contents AUTHENTICITY AND THE VALUE OF TRUTH 186 RELATIVISM 187 General further reading 191 Glossary of terms 195 Glossary of key examples 211 Index 214 PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION One of the main things that I wanted to achieve with What is this Thing Called Knowledge? was to offer a genuinely introductory textbook that nonetheless covered the very latest developments in contemporary epistemology. Given the fast-moving nature of the debate in epistemology, this meant that one couldn’t wait too long before producing a second edition, and now a third edition, for fear that this virtue of the book would be lost. A good example of the importance of keeping the book fresh is the tremendous growth in recent years in the range of free online materials in epistemology. Those working their way through this third edition are thus far better served when it comes to finding additional readings and research resources. The third edition also sees an important structural change, in that two completely new chapters have been introduced, as part of a new section on what kinds of knowledge there are. The new chapters are concerned with religious and scientific knowledge, and are combined with the chapter on moral knowledge that was introduced for the second edition to form this new section. The result is a much more comprehensive treatment of contemporary epistemology. Let me close by offering a particular thanks to all the students who have taken introductory courses in epistemology with me over the years. They have helped me to refine my ideas about what a good introductory text on this topic should cover, and how it should cover it (many of them appear in the text in terms of the names I have chosen for protagonists in certain examples). In a very real sense, they have helped to make – and as the book goes from edition to edition, continue to make – this book what it is. HOW TO USE THIS BOOK This book has been designed to make it as user-friendly as possible, so that it can guide you through the theory of knowledge with the minimum fuss. It is composed of sixteen short chapters, which fall into four main sections. The first part (Chapters 1–6) explores general topics in the theory of knowledge, particularly concerning the nature and value of knowledge. In Part I we look at such issues as the Gettier problem, the nature of rationality, and the relevance of epistemic virtues to knowledge.The second part (Chapters 7–10) looks at where our knowledge comes from, and considers the role of, for instance, perception and memory in helping us to acquire, and retain, knowledge.The third part (Chapters 11–13) asks what kinds of knowledge there are, and considers in this regard moral, religious, and scientific knowledge.
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