(7) During the operations 14-17 April, enemy retired toward the FRIANKISCHE the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, advanced RIVER and there assumed new defensive 43 kms against enemy resistance ranging positions. After a hard fight the Squadron from scattered to fierce, destroyed all crossed at IMMELDORF, and pushed enemy formations in a zone 25 kms wide, south against a series of delaying actions inflicted severe personnel and equipment through WATTENBACH and BAM losses on the enemy and. captured 332 MERSDORF. At 20008, Troop C, 92nd prisoners of war. Our losses for the period Cay -Ren Sq, Mecz, reached LEIDEN were 4 killed 12 wounded. None was DORF and intercepted an enemy column missing. moving northwest toward ANSBACH. Assault gun and artillery fire were placed f. (1) At 04308, 18 April 1945, Opns on it with excellent results. By dark, Instns No. 40, Headquarters 12th Armor Troop C, 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, had ed Division, issued. The direction of the occupied LEIDENDORF and Troop D, 1 attack division was turned- southwest 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, had entered along the axis- ANSBACH FEUCHT WOLFRAMS-ESCHENBACH. Elements WANGEN CRAILSHEIM. OC-B was of Troop B, 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, after directed to move to the southwest and having been repulsed at WINSBACH, seize and secure FEUCHTWANGEN. assembled for the night at PETERS CC-A was ordered to follow OC-B on its AURACH. axis and occupy ANSBACH. The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, received the mis (4) The 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, sion of moving on all available routes to operating on the southeasterly axis, protect the south flank of CC-B and assist moved at first light 18 April,and passed it in its attack on FEUCHTWANGEN. through PETERSAURACH and ZIEGEN DORF against light enemy resistance. (2) Squadron axes were prescribed The bridge over the FRANKISCHE by CO, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, as RIVER at SCHLAUERSBACH was seized follows: intact by Troop A, 116 th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, 92nd Cay — at 1400B'. Troop A, followed by Ren Sq, Mecz GLEIZEN- Troop C Squadron, DORF - - of the same moved LANGENLOE LICHTENAU rapidly south until vicinity ZANDT - NIEDEROBERACH - SACHS it reached the of WOLFRAMS-ESCHENBACH where - - enemy resistance was encoun BACH BURK DURRWANGEN.— determined 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz PETERS tered. Troop A, 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, AURACH - ZIEGENDORF - SCHLAU engaged the enemy at that town while ERSBACH - WOLFRAMS-ESCHEN Troop C, 116 th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, by BACH - MERKENDORF WEIDEN passed to the west and moved on MER BACH-- BEHHOFEN UNTER-KONIGS KENDORF. After a prolonged and bitter HOFEN - BEYERBERG - AMMEL battle, the troop forced its way into the BRUCH - KEMMATHENDORF. town, driving elements of both the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division and the SS (3) The 92nd Cay Ron Sq, Mecz, opera Totenkopf Division to the east and south ting on the northwesterly axis, moved east where they assumed new defensive out early 18 April and at 08008 met positions approximately one kilometer determined enemy resistance at WICK from the town. Troop A, 116 th Cay Ren LESGREUTH on the HEILBRONN-ANS Sq, Mecz, cleared the enemy from WOLF BACH road. A fire fight ensued and the RAMS-ESOHENBACH and moved to the 55 Showing Area of Opns 101st Cay Gp (Mecz) 92d Cay—Ren Sq attadied 20 Apr 22Apr IMS 56 sciuthwesit, by-passing MERKENDORF by civilians who pointed out buildings in and entering TRIESDORF without oppo Which our 'troops had been billeted. In sition. Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry anticipation of such a possibility, troop Group, Mecz, and 92nd Cay Ren Sq Mecz, billets had been changed after dark and moved their CPs to PETERS AURACH. the effect ivness of this phase of the The 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, established enemy plan was in a Large measure its CP at WGLFRAMS-ESCHENBACH. frustrated. The troop CP was attacked by panzerfaust fire and four SS troopers (5) The boundary between XV and were killed as they attempted to enter XXI Corps was changed 18 April 1945 through the windows. Under the condi and NURNBERG became the responsibi tions; organization for battle was impos lity of the XV Corps. OI 41, Headquarters 1 sible, but the entire personnel of the 12th Armored Division. 1814008 was troop and attached units seized their received by Headquarters 101st Cavalry weapons and entered the fight without Group, Mecz, during the night 18-19 hesitation. For over two hours a series of April. The 'direction of the division attack bloody hand to hand engagements were as prescribed in OI 40 (see par f(1) above) fought throughout the town. Attackers was changed to turn south at FEUCHT- were repelled by small arms, knives and WANGEN along the axis WORT furniture thrown from windows. At day LAUCHHEIM. The 101st Cavalry Group, light, enemy reinforcements were observ Mecz, was directed to establish a protec ed approaching from the southeast. By tive screen,- blocking along the -lineHEIL-- this time, the situation within the town BRONN BERGOBERBACH ZANDT was under control and a defense against HEILSBRONN and to maintain contact the new threat was hastily organized. between 12th Armored Division and 42nd Machine gun and small arms fire were Infantry Division (XV Corps). brought to bear upon the enemy and the broken up before it reached (6) 04208, 19 April, attack was At approximately Eighty of the SS troopers who 150 SS troopers Troop C, the town. counterattacked participated in the initial attack were 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, attached First killed, sixteen were captured and an Platoon Co F and Third Platoon Troop E, number were wounded. both of 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, Gapt undetermined Troop C attached units suffered losses Louis Bcssert, commanding, MERKEN and at of killed,ten wounded, seven missing. DORF, striking simultaneously from the two south, the east, and the northeast* Two (7) (a) 1 Plat Tr B, 92nd Cay Ren Sq, outposts oni the east side of the town Mecz, was dispatched early 19 April to were surrounded and overwhelmed after gain and 'maintain contact with CC-A at a savage fight in which the entire security HEILBRONN and, upon the latter s de detachment 'became 'casualties. Before parture, to relieve it of responsibility for succumbing, they killed11 and wounded maintaining contact with the 42nd Infan an undetermined number of the enemy. try Division. The 'balance of the Squadron The outpost at the south end of town was directed to block the line ZANDT killed one officer, one master sergeant, (excl.) - HEILBRONN. and six enemy privates before its tanks were destroyed by panzerfaust fire. The (b) The 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was attack from the northeast was repelled. relieved of attachment to the 4th Infan The enemy succeeded in entering the try Division and reverted to the control town an force before dawn and were aided of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, at 57 1914008 April. It was ordered to block (3) (a) The 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, along the line HEILSBRONN - BURG being in position at the northern end of OBERBAOH (axel.). the new zone of the division at the time mission (c) Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was the Group was received, moved The 116 th assigned assigned center portion of the line out promptly, covering the zone the 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, as fromBURGOBERBACH !to ZANDT,both to the as well mcl. its own until such time as the latter Squadron could move west from its posi (d) By dark, all elements had assumed tions south of HEILBRONN. The prin their blocking positions or were en route cipal effort of the 101st CavßcmSq, Mecz, thereto. The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was directed along the FEUCHTWAN moved its CP from PETERS AURAOH to GEN - DINKELSBUHLroad. Determined ANSBACH. enemy resistance was encountered along (8) During operations for the period the line ZWERNBERG - SCHOPFLOOH. 18 and 19 April, the 101st Cavalry Group, Troop C, 101st Cay Hen Sq, Mecz, was Mecz, protected the south flank of the unable to overcome the resistance at 12th Armored Division during its opera SCHOPFLOCH and, after a strong effort, tions at HEILKRONN, ANSBACH, and withdrew at 18008 to a position in obser FEUCHTWANGEN, inflicted severe ca vation about one kilometer north. At sualties on the enemy and captured 777 19008, OC-A moved into SCHOPFLOCH, prisoners of war. Losses sustained were destroyed the enemy forces therein and 2 killed, 12 wounded and 5 missing. continued to the northern outskirts of DINKELSBUHL where further progress (Note: 2 of those reported missing in for that day was ended by a destroyed par if (6) above later escaped and rejoined bridge. their unit.) g. (1) lAt 09308, 20 April 1945, VOCG (b) The 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, moved 12th Armored Division, were received west from its positions south of HEIL relieving the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, BRONN against enemy rear guard actions of its blocking mission, and directing it and road blocks. At dark 20 April the to reconnoiter south in the division zone - Squadron assembled at TURNHOFEN. left (east) boundary: main highway - Cay FEUOHTWANGEN DINKELSBUHL - (c) The 116 th Ren Sq, Mecz, MARKTOFFINGEN - NORDLINGEN; moved west through ANSBACH and right (west) boundary: MARKTHUSTE assembled at HERRIEDEN. NAU _ WILDENSTEIN - WESTHAUSEN. Troop B, 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was (d) Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry relieved of attachment to CC-R and Group, Mecz, moved forward to ZUM reverted to Squadron control. BERG. (2) The 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was (4) (a) Late 20 April, the 12th Armor assigned the right (west) portion of the ed Division plan of operations was modi- zone and the 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, the fled. CC-A was directed to move in two left (east). The 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, columns, one task force moving south was held in reserve and directed to east on the DINKELSBUHL - MARKT assemble at HERRIEDEN. Hq and Hq Tr, OFFINGEN - NORDLINGEN road and 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved from the other by secondary roads inthe direc ANSBACH to HERRIEDEN. tion DINKELSBUHL - BOPFINGEN.
58 Sq, Mecz, to move south between the two 21 April, the Squadron -had advanced ito columns of CC-iA and to destroy all the line MATZENBACH UNTER-DEUF enemy encountered in the zone. The 101st STATTEN. Contact was maintained with Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was directed to con the enemy occupying the wood areas to tinue -reconnaissance to the south in the the south throughout the night. zone right --'boundary (west): MARKT (c) The 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, (less HUSTENAU WILDENSTEIN WEST Tr B), remained at DINKELSBUHL in HAUSEN; left boundary (east): axis of Group reserve throughout the day and, the western task force of CC-A, exol. The at 2117008, was ordered to move into the 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was continued 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, zone. The Squa in Group reserve and directed to move dron, closed at UNTER-DEUFSTETTEN to DINKELSBUHL. before dark. (5) (a) CC-A and 92nd Cay Ren Sq, (d) The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, Mecz, moved rapidly south during the moved its OP to STEINWEILER. early hours of the day against light enemy (6) (a) At dark 21 April1945, elements resistance. However, in the late afternoon of 12th Armored Division were disposed stronger enemy positions were developed as follows: and the Squadron was forced to halt for vicinity KIRCHHEIM, CC-A assembled KIRKINGEN the night at about three CC-B assembled vicinity DINKELS kilometers short of the objective line. BUHL (b) The advance of the 101st Cay Ren CC-R assembled vicinity DINKELS Sq, Mecz, was resisted with great deter BUHL. mination from the moment it passed south of the east-west road NEUSTADT LEIN - DINKELSBUHL. Sharp figths were had at ROTTEIN, BERNHARDS WEILER, KETSCHENWEILER and ES BACH, and the Squadron was unable to penetrate the enemy defenses at WIL DENSTEIN and LAUTERBACH. Troop C, 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, side slipped to the west and then turned southeast to UNTER-DREFSTATTEN in rear of the enemy line. Task Force Brock was formed and given the mission of eliminating enemy resistance inthe pocket formed by the maneuver of Troop C, 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz. This force inohided Troop B, 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, and Troop B, 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, the latter having been drawn from Group reserve for the purpose. After a prolonged battle, the combined pressure of Task Force Brock on the north and Troop C, 101st Cay Ren 59 MAPXIII
Sale
Offlng«i Showing AmatOpns 1«l»t C.v Qp (Maet) «>d CayRen S*-.tUcW SAfr-aApMMS
60 Elements of the 101st Cavalry Group, the south were defended stubbornly but Mecz, were disposed as noted inporeceed- by 2220008, rthe Squadron had reached ingparagraphs. the EGER RIVER. Fierce enemy 'resi bank prevented (b) Opns Instns No. 42, Headquarters stance from the south crossing night 12th Armored Division issued 2123008, a and a halt for the was at The 'town April 1945, verbal made at TROCHTELFINGEN. and confirmed orders kilometers east giiven one hour earlier. The division was of PFLAUMBACH two strongly held by the enemy. ordered to attack to the south in the was zone - right (west) boundary: MARKT (fo) The 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was HUSTENAU - WILDENSTEIN - WEST relieved of its mission to clear enemy HAUSEN - GROSSKUCHEN - GUNDEL resistance from the woods south of UN FINGEN; left (east) boundary: main high- TER-DEUFSTETTEN and directed to - LAUCHHEIM, mop way FEUCHTWANGEN- DINKELS- move south through BUHL MARKTOFFINGEN NORD up enemy- resistance along the LAUCH LINGEN --HARDBURG DONAU HEIM BOPFINGEN road and then con WORTH (excl.), to seize and secure cros tinue south to the DANUBE RIVER and sings over the DANUBE RIVER. CC-A seize crossings in the vineinity of LAU CC-R, was diree'ed to continue its advance tothe INGEN. The Squadron, assisted by south and secure crossings over ithe DA overcame initial- enemy resistance in the NUBE RIVER in the DILLINGEN area. LAUCHHEIM BOPFINGEN area by CC-B was ordered to move at daylight, dark 22 April. A bold night march was Squadron assist 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, to clear executed and by 2223308, the centers of resistance east ofBOPFINGEN, had occupied the town of LAUINGEN. continue advance to the south and seize However, the enemy had destroyed all in crossings over the DANUBERIVER vici bridges over the DANUBERIVER that nity of HOCKSTADT. CC-R was given vicinity before they could foe seized. the mission of blocking the main- east- (c) The 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, clear west highway (LAUCHHEIM NORD ed the enemy from the wooded areas LINGEN) through the division zone and south of UNTER-DEUFSTETTEN and was to foe prepared to move south or late 22 Aprilwas directed to assemble in southeast on division order. The 101st Group reserve at KIRCHHEIM. Cavalry Group, Mecz, was directed to (d) Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry continue to the south on the division Group, Mecz, moved fromSTEINWEILER left withone Squadron, and seize crossings in the early afternoon and closed at over the DANUBE RIVER in the TAPF TROCHTELFINGEN by dark 22 April. HEIM - ERLINGSHOFEN area. The (8) (a) The 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, other Squadrons were to follow the CCs moved out before dawn 23 April. Enemy 'Squadron, to mop up and the advance and resistance to its immediate front had with by-passed centers of resistance in the drawn during the night, and the Squadron division zone. moved rapidly southeast via secon (7) (a) C. O. 101st Cavalry Group, dary roads to OPPERTSHOFEN, its pro Mecz, assigned the mission of seizing gress being impeded only by undefended crossings over the DANUBE RIVER to road blocks and demolitions. iAll efforts the 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz. After resup to reach the DANUBE RIVER plain were plying during the hours of darkness, the sternly resisted by enemy rear guards Squadron moved forward 'early 22 April. covering the withdrawal of their main The enemy reacted strongly. Allroads to body across the river at ERLINGSHO 61 FEN. Artillery fire was directed at the throughout the night. retreating German columns with good (b) The 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, con effect and after a prolonged fight, the tinued to garrison LAUINGEN through Squadron forced its way into TAPFHEIM out 23 April. At 10008, a strong force and ERLINGSHOFEN. The enemy de from that Squadron was despatched with stroyed all bridges over the DANUBE the mission of seizing the bridge at OF RIVER as their last elements rto escape FINGEN, about ten kilometers 1 to the crossed. Combat patrols from the 92nd southwest. The force moved rapidly on Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, met fierce resistance its objective by secondary roads but the from the high ground west of REIDLIN bridge was destroyed by alert enemy GEN and all attempts 'to cross the EGER bridge guards as it approached. RIVER vicinity of DONAUWORTH were (c) The 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, mop repulsed. The Squadron established its ped up the remaining enemy resistance CP at ERLINGSHOFEN and was sub in the vicinity of KIRCHHEIMand then jected to harrassing fire from enemy ar assembled at TAPFHEIM at 2320008. tillery on south the bank of the DANUBE (d) Hq and Hq Tr, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved early 23 April and maintained close contact with 92nd Cay Ron Sq, Mecz, throughout the day. The Group CP was opened at TAPFHEIM at 2317008. (9) CC-A had seized the bridge over the DANUBE RIVER at DILLENGEN intact and secured! a limited bridgehead in that vicinity. (10) During operations for the period 20—23 April 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, in conjunction with the CCs of the 12th Armored Division, advanced a total of 65 kilometers against varying degrees of enemy resistance, reconnoiter ing a zone up to 30 kilometers in width and destroying all organized resistance encountered therein. The north bank of the DANUBE RIVER was reached on a broad front. Many casualties were inflicted upon the enemy and a total of 867 prisoners of war were taken. The Group suffered casualties of 8 wounded. None was killed or missing. h. (1) (a) Opns Instns No. 43 issued from Headquarters 12th Armored Divi sion at 01008, 24 April 1945. The plan contemplated the reinforcemenlt of the DILLJNGEN bridgehead over ithe DAN UBE RIVER and the seizure of any bridges remaining intact in the Corps 62 zone. (ULM, excl. - DONAUWORTH, made maneuver of armored vehicles ex excl.) tremely difficult and little progress was (b) CC-A, attached 15th RCT, 3rd In made on the 24th. fantry Division, received the mission of (b) The 92nid Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was securing the captured DILLENGEN brid relieved at ERLINGSHOFEN on 24 April ge and reinforcing the bridgehead. CC-B and crossed to the south bank of the was directed to be prepared to move on DANUBE RIVER via the DILLINGEN division order southwest along the south bridge at about 16008. The Squadron bank of the river and to secure any brid moved rapidly southwest through the ges remaining intact in the Corps zone. division bridgehead. Troop C attacked CC-Rs mission was to execute a similar and neutralized enemy resistance at maneuver on' division order along the BURGAU and 1 seized and held the cause north bank of the DANUBE. CC-B and way and bridges over the MINDEL OC-R were each to be preceded by one RIVER at that point. Troop A continued Squadron of Cavalry. (c) The 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was relieved of its mission* on the Corps left flank and ordered to move without de lay to an assembly area south of the DANUBE RIVER vicinity of GLOTT, and to be prepared to precede CC-B on the south bank of the river, or to move south to seize crossings over the MINDEL and GUNZ RIVERS. The 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was 1 alerted! for movement to the southwest along the north bank of the DANUBE in advance of CC-R. The 116 th Cay Ren Sq, Miecz, was directed to relieve the 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, at ERLINGSHOFEN and to protect the corps left flank from positions north of the DANUBE. (2) (a) During the morning 24 April, prior to the start of the new mission, elements of the 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, which were securing the right (west) flank of the 12th Armored Division from positions vicinity of GUNDELFINGEN received and defeated a counter attack from enemy troops attempting to move couth across the DANUBE ina contiguous zone. At 16008, the 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, followed by CC-R, moved south west on the north bank cf the river. De termined enemy resistance was met west and southwest of GUNDELFINGEN. The flat and marshy nature of the terrain 63 MAPXIV
64 south and seized the autobahnn crossings throughout the 25th of April and main over (the river about one kilometer distant. tained pressure on 'the enemy vicinity Both units held their respective crossings of RIEDLINGEN. Combat patrols swept throughout the night against enemy the wooded areas north and northwest attempts 'to infiltrate demolition parties of TAPFHEIM capturing more than 100 through their lines. prisoners of war. In the late afternoon, (c) The 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, re elements of the 42nd Infantry Division lieved the 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, at moved south along the 12th Armored ERLTNGSHOFEN and asumed responsi Division left boundary and entered bility for the division left flank. Con DONAUWORTH after a terrific fight. tact with enemy forces was maintained (d) During the night 25—26 April, the west and southwest of RIEDLINGEN. enemy launched a strong counterattack Observed artillery fire was placed on against the 63rd Division bridgehead at enemy columns between RIEDLINGEN LBIPHEIMand GUNZBURG. DONAUWORTH with excellent re and (4) At 2605458, the 116 th Cay Ren sults, proibing of but continued his lines Sq, Mecz, was relieved of responsibility no disposition to abandon his indicated for the 12th Armored Division left flank strong defensive positions vicinity of and moved promptly to MONSTETTEN RIEDLINGEN. south of the DANUBE RIVER. Hq and (d) Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, Group, Mecz, moved from TAPFHEIM to preceded the Squadron and closed in the DILLENGEN. same general area at 2606008. (3) (a) The 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, (5) (a) Early 26 Aprilthe 101st Cavalry continued to hold the bridges over the Group, Mecz, was directed to continue MINDELRIVER throughout 25 Apriland reconnaissance to the southeast in the pushed combat patrols south to SCHEP 12th Armored Division zone, the 92nd Cay PACH. Much enemy activity was observ Ren Sq, Mecz, on the right and the 101st ed in the wooded areas south of the Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, on the left.The 116 th west of MINDEL autobahnn and RIVER. Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was directed to relieve Two air strikes were requested and flown elements of the 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, good Cay with effect. Troop C, 92nd Ren of responsibility for the bridges at BUR Sq, Mecz, sustained a counterattack at GAU and on the autobahnn one kilometer BURGAU during the night and the fight to the south. The relief was completed by ing continued through daylight. 07308 and the 92nd and 101st Cay Ren (b) Elements of the 63rd Infantry Div Sqs, Mecz, moved forward in their re ision had moved down on the right of the spective zones. 12th Armored Division and established (b) As was later developed, the enemy bridgeheads over the DANUBE RIVER held strong defensive positions north of at LEIPHEIM and GUNZBURG. The the autobahnn from SCHEPPACH to 101st Oav Ren Sq, Mecz, was relieved of depended upon his 1 HIRIBLINGEN and its mission with CC-R north of the position at BURGAU, and artillery on DANUBE April on 25 and crossed to the west bank, to block the MINDEL at DILLINGEN, the south bank assembling RIVER corridor. The counterattack vicinity of WEISENGEN at 17008. against the 63rd Infantry Divisionbridge (c) The 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, con head west of the MINDELRIVER con tinued to protect the division left tinued throughout the day, and the 65 enemy force at BURGAU was contained area defenses at ALCHEN and capturing by friendly troops. 60 prisoners of war and 6 nebelwerfers. (c) Elements of the 92nd Cay Ren Sq, The race for the WERTACH RIVER was bridge Mecz, moved the bank of resumed and at 20008- the near south on east seized intact. The MINDELRIVER to HILTENFINGEN was the THANNHAUSEN Squadron pushed into the town, against opposition, and then on without serious disorganized and by 2621208, turned east in of enemy MLR to resistance it rear the bridges ZIEMETSHAUSEN. Other had secured two additional over elements of and captured the town. the Squadron which had attempted to smaller streams move south by routes east of MINDEL (d) The 101st Cay Ren- Sq, Mecz, RIVER corridor were unable to penetrate moved forward- in its zone central axis the enemy defensive positions north of GLOTT ZUSMARSHAUSEN - and at the autobahnn. As soon as the enemy 2608008, forward elements encountered strength in that area had been fully de determined enemy resistance along the veloped, such elements were disengaged ZUSAM RIVER at BAIERSHOFEN and and diverted to the open route on the ELLERBACH. After a long fight, the east bank of the MINDEL.The Squadron enemy positions were reduced and the reassembled in the ZIEMETSHAUSEN Squadron side slipped to the east bank area. At 14008, a courier from the 17ih
68 DIEDORF line and moved forward, was given the responsibility for blocking seizing ithe bridge over the WERTACH the passes south of WEILJHEIM and RIVER at GROSS AITINGEN at 13158. PENZBURG. CC-B was directed to block pass of BAD TOLZ. CC-R was (d) 101st Cavalry thle south The Group, Mecz, ordered to assemble vicinity of WEIL- and the 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, esta HEIMand await orders. blished command posts at SCHWAB MUNCHEN. The 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, (b) The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, closed! at GROSS AITINGEN. less the Squadron preceding CC-A, was directed to.advance to the east and south (7) During operations for the period east and protect the division east flank 24-27 April1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, by blocking thie southwestern exits from Mecz, furnished security for both flanks MUNICHalong the line ARGET -GRUN of the 12th Armored Division, crossed WALD - FURSTENFELD-BRUCK. the DANUBERIVER, probed the enemy's (c) MLR south of that river until a weak The partially destroyed railroad spot was found and then poured through bridge vicinity of LANDSBERG was selected the quick the gap, advancing about 40 kms deep as most suitable for into 'the rear of the enemy defenses and repair. 12th Armored Division engineers seizing two bridges over the next major worked throughout thle night and by water ofostaclie. The collapse of enemy 2806008, the bridge was ready for 'traffic. defenses in the 12th Armored Division (2) (a) The 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, zone between the DANUBE and the was assigned the mission of preceding WERTACH RIVERS imay 'be attributed CC-A on its attack to southeast. Forward in a large measure to the success of the elements of the Squadron moved across lOl'st Cavalry Group's maneuver. In the the bridge at 06008 in the face of scatter course of these operations several hund ed small arms fire from the east bank and red grounded enemy planes were cap> unobserved artillery fire, and preceeded tured, innumerable vehicles were cap south throughi LANDSBERG, thence tured or destroyed, immense quantities southeast via the main road to WEIL of materiel and 2801 prisoners of war HEIM. Only scattered resistance was were taken. The Group exclusive of the encountered until the town of ROTT was 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, suffered casual reached. Atthis point, the enemy defend ties of 4 killedand 9 wounded. ed stubbornly and further progress was Troop Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, i. (1) (a) Opus Instns No. 44, 12th Ar halted. B> 116th at 2803008, April maintained contact with the enemy mored Division issued throughout the night. During the 1945. Large concentrations of enemy hours of darkness, Troops A C, Cay troops had be n reported in MUNICH, and 116 th Sq, and ROTHWALD. Ren Mecz, attempted to by-passi the SACHSENRIEDER enemy at The division received the mission to cross center of resistance ROTT and by secondary positions in the LECH RIVERby allavailable bridges moved roads to vicinity of on the morning 28 April and to attack to the DIESSEN. the southeast to seize and hold the towns (b) The 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was of WEILHEIMand BAD TOLZ, and deny assigned the northwestern half of the the enemy the use of the passes into the blocking line, and followed the 116th Cay Bavarian Alpsi south of WEILHEIM, Ren Sq, Mecz, across the bridge. The PENZBURIG and BAD TOLZ. CC-A, Squadron moved due east with the initial preceded by one Squadron of Cavalry, objective of seizing the causeway over 69 the northern tip of AMMER SEE vicinity Ren Sq, Mecz, moved into DIESSEN and of ECHING. Progress was delayed by captured the town and a military hospital enemy demolitions, and the Squadron was containing about 400 convalescent enemy forced to detour south through UNTER soldiers. Troop B, 116th Cay Ren Sq, FINNING and thence north by the main Mecz, renewed the attack vicinity of road parallelling the west shore of ROTT at first light and by 10008 had AMMER SEE. The enemy launched an overcome the resistance and moved for attack from the woods; southeast of ward to the western outskirts of WEIL GREIFENBERG against the head of the HEIM, capturing the bridge over the Squadron column, employing four (4) AMMER RIVER intact. The troop pushed tiger tanks and -a substantial number of ahead against sporadic sniper fire, and infantry. After a short sharp fight, the by 11008 had secured the 'town. CC-A enemy retreated to the northeast with the had crossed the LECH RIVER during the forward elements of the Squadron in night 28 -29 April and reached WEIL close pursuit. However, as the last ele HEIM at about 11308. The mission of the ments cf the enemy crossed the causeway, 116 4 h Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, and CC-A had prepared demolition charges were set off been changed from that given above, to and the roadway was rendered unusable. one of moving through the mountain As further progress was impossible, the passes ;and capturing INNSBRUCK. Thie Squadron halted for the night and out 116 th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, less Troop Bf pos'ted the AMPER RIVER line. moved south on WEILHEIM to rejoin (c) The 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was CC-A but met determined resistance assigned the southwestern half of the vicinity of PAHL.Inordeir to avoid delay blocking line and followed Hq and Hq in the movement of CC-A, Troop B, 116th Troop, 101st Cay Gp, Mecz, across the Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was withdrawn from CC-A, railroad bridge. Due to initial delays Squadron control and attached to in the crossing of the 116 th Cay Ren Sq, (for account of Troop Bs 116th Cay Ren Mecz, caused by enemy resistance and to Sq, Mecz, in that operation, see Inclosure continuous delays throughout the day for No. 3). After overcoming the enemy oppo bridges repairs, the crossing of the 92nd sition at PAHL, the 116th Cay Ren Sq, Squadron was not completed until late Mecz, less Troop B, assembled in WEIL 28 April. The Squadron moved east to HEIM to await further orders. ERESING and there halted for the night (b) Upon receipt of information regar in support of the 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz. ding the capture of the bridges vicinity (d) Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry of MITTERFISCHEN by elements of the Group, Mecz, crossed between the 101st 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, CO. 101st Ca and 92nd Cay Ren Sqs, Mecz, and estab valry Group, Mecz, directed the 92nd Cay lished its command posit at LANDSBERG. Ren Sq, Mecz, to relieve the 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, at the north end of AM (3) (a) Troop A, 116 th Cay Ren Sq, MER SEE, and ordered the 101st Cay Ren Mecz, moved forward prior to daylight Sq, Mecz, to move south to the bridges 29 April .and at dawn had reached the at the southern end and relieve 'the 116 th main highway between DIESSEN and Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, of its responsibility MITTERFISHEN. The troop raced east, for the vital bridges. The 101st Gay Ren surprised the enemy defending the brid Sq, Mecz, moved down the west shone of ges over the AMMER RIVER and cap AMMER SEE, mopping up scattered resi tured them intact. Troop C, 116th Cay stance en route, and entered DIESSEN at 70 tatives of a revolutionary party in against scattered enemy resistance to the MUNICH appeared at the Group CP at outskirts of PENNZBERG. The enemy DISSEN, reported that Nazi authority resisted with the greatest stulbborneas within the city had been overthrown by and an .all day battle took place. The the people, and requested that American Squadron finally entered the town at troops enter without delay. They stated 20008 and pushed combat patrols east to that no enemy resistance would be en seize crossings over the LOISACH RIVER. countered en route. The 101st Cay Ren Allapproaches to the river were heavily Sq, Mecz, was directed to move on defended and the patrols withdrew to MUNICH via the axis MITTERFISCHEN PENNZBERG at dark. --HERRSCHING OBER-PFAFFENHO FEN, thence Highway 12 to MUNICH. (b) Early 30 April, CO. 101st Cavalry At 19308, the Squadron encountered a Group, Mecz, cancelled the 101st Cay Ren strongly defended road block at OBER Sq's mission to MUNICH and directed it SEEFELD. All attempts to by-pass were to block along "the line MITTERFISCHEN blocked by fiercely resisting enemy. It -ISEESHAUPT. By midday, the Squadron was determined that a strong enemy force had completed its deployment along 'the was moving to the wooded -heights domi prescribed line. In the late afternoon it nating the HERRSCHING OBER-SEE was ordered to assemble at SEESHAUPT FELD road with the purpose of attacking in anticipataion of a new mission. the Squadron column on the flank. The information regarding the revolution in (c) The 116'th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, less MUNICH having been proven to be false Troop B, moved at first light 30 April to in part at least, the Squadron withdraw reconnoiter for crossings over the LOI to HERRSCHING for the night. SACH RIVER in a zone to the south of that covered by the 92nd Cay Ren Sq, (c) The 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was Mecz. The Squadron advanced against relieved of its blocking mission at the sporadic enemy resistance and reached north end of AMMER SEE and moved the river in the late afternoon. Bridges south to assembly positions vicinity of at RiAIN and SINDELSDORF had been WILZHOFEN. destroyed. (d) Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, cleared LANDSBERG early 29 April, moved to DISSEN and operated a mobile CIP there during the day. Inthe late afternoon, the CP moved to WEIL HEIM.
(4) (a) At 3006008, CG 12th Armored Division directed CO. 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, to send one Squadron via BAD TOLZ - CR D870943 -CR D930945 CR 985903, thence south to the INN RIVER valley to intercept enemy ele ments moving to the southwest. The mis
71 72 (di) The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, 1-30 Total to 30 moved its command post from WEIL April45 April45 HEIM to HOCHSCHLOSS. Killedin action 28 44 Wounded in action 93 160 11 (5) For a summary of this operation, Missing in action 5 Prisoners see unit history for May 1945. c. of War 17,042 18,241 6. Miscellaneous: Casualties include only those suffered by Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Mecz, Cay a. The 342nd Armored Field Artillery Group, and 101st and 116th Ren Sqs, Mecz. was attached 1 to or in direct support of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, from 14 April through the* close of the period covered by this! report. The excellent fire support rendered toy that Battalion on all occasions contributed materially to the successful operations ctf the Group. to. Total casualties of the 101st Cavalry CHARLES B. McCLELLAND Colonel, Cavalry Group, Mecz, are: Commanding.
APRIL INCLOSURE No. 1 (Operations 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Sqadron, Mechanized 14-19 April1945 — period attached to 4th Infantry Division.) The 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was attacking to the southeast along the axis relieved of attachment to the 101st Ca SCHWEBHEIM - ANSBACH, the Squa valry Group, Mecz, and attached to the dron to reconnoiter in its zone. Troop A, 4th Infantry Division, effective 1406008 reinforced with 1platoon of light tanks April. The Squadlron moved to positions (Co F), was- ordered to reconnoiter for vicinity of BUCHEIM, and covered the crossings over the railroad running east assembly of the 4th Infantry Division on and west along the high groundlsouth of 14 - 15 April. BERGEL, and to proceed to an initial objective at POFPENBAOH. Troop B, Troop A, which had been on Detached with 1platoon of assault guns (Troop E) Service with Sixth Army Group Head attached, was ordered to reconnoiter a quarters, returned to Squadron control route along the general axis HABELSEE on 15 April. BINZWANGEN. The balance of Company Pursuant to orders of the OG, 4th F was attached to the Bth Infantry, being Division, the Squadron was attached to further attached on the basis of 1platoon the Bth Infantry Regiment on 16 April. to each assault battalion (Ist and) 3rd). The Regiment was given the mission of During 16 April the Squadron moved 73 forward against scattered resistance. All On 18 April, the Squadron continued railroad crossings in Troop A zone had its reconnaissance to the front of the Bth been demolished but a number of by Infantry against stiffening resistance. By passes were reconnoitered and reported nightfall they had developed a strong to the Regiment. Troop B patrols con enemy line of resistance along the high tinued southeast on extremely poor roads ground north of BERBERSBACH- in the in their zone, which were not suitable for vicinity of BUCH a WALD JOCHS Division loads. They were recalled and BERG. Contact was maintained with the ordered to follow Troop A on the dis enemy during the night and on the covered by-passes. morning 19 April, the positions were assaulted by 'the Bth Infantry. Troop A On 17 April, Troop A was shifted to and C by-passed the eneimy resistance the right of the zone, and given the mis and continued to the southeast. They sion of clearing towns- in the general w.ere stopped along the line of the rail area BURGHAUSEN DORNHAUSEN road, from ANSBACH to CRAILSHEIM OBERSULZBACH. Troop Breconnoitered in their zone, by defensive positions of along the main axis toward ANSBACH. the enemy supported by mortar and artil Troop C was ordered to establish a block lery fire. Pressure against the enemy was ing line along the south edge of the continued until the attack was taken up wooded area from ANFELDEN to by the infantry. HORNDU. This screen was established to cut off the retreat of enemy forces At 14008, the Squadron reverted to driven south by the attack of the infantry control of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, through the woods. At the conclusion of and was ordered to move south and east the coordinated attack and screening of FEUCHTWANGEN to establish a mission, Troop C moved to the right flank counter-reconnaissance screen along the of the Bth Infantry Regiment to establish line HEILSBRONN - BURGOBERBACH a protective line. (excl.).
APRIL INCLOSURE No. 2 (Operations Troop B, 116 th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, for period 14-20 April 1945.) This Troop was detached from the following generally the main highway Squadron on 14th April1945. The Troop from UFFENHEIM, GERMANY, to ANS had been moving on a zone reconnais BACH, GERMANY, as an axis, and its sance mission with the Squadron up until advanced elements were operating south this time, and had revealed the MLR of ward on said highway about 6 miles east enemy in its zone. Orders were received and slightly south of HABELSEE, GER on 14th April, relieving Troop from MANY. Squadron, and attaching it to Combat The Troop Executive Officer was sent Command "R", 12th Armored Division. as liaison officer to CCR Headquarters, This CC, on the date of attachment, was where he remained throughout the period moving toward ANSBACH, GERMANY, of attachment. Instructions were to 74 remain in observation of the enemy, mission for the CO, OCR. On short notice, which we had located, pending further the Ist Ren Platoon was dispatched by orders. Observation posts were set up by itself, on 18th April, with the mission of day (and listening posts by night) through road reconnaissance in order to find a which enemy,- along the line STEINACH, short cut around ANSBACH, GERMANY, GERMANY ENDSEE, GERMANY, were to the west. This mission was performed, kept in observation. This situation held and a 10 kilometer strip of road was until the Troop received order on 16 April reconnoiteredl and accurately reported, to move vie ILLESHEIM, GERMANY, from vie LEHRBER'G to vie COLMBERG. and secure the flanks and rear of both The platoon was unable to advance fur advancing columns of the CC. The CC ther after encountering an estimated had then departed from the highway and company of enemy Infantry, which units was advancing southward on ANSBACH of the OC Later disposed of. This operation from the north, parallel to the main north was thoroughly and efficiently carried south highway, a few kilometers to the out, eliciting the verbal commendation of east of same. The bulk of the Troop fol the CO, CCR. The platoon was under the lowed the axis of the 17 AT Bn, while the command of S/Sgt. John A. Hopkins. Ist Ren 'assigned the of Platoon was axis As the 12 AD was assembling in the 23rd Tank Bn, to the east. The same FEUCHTWANGEN, GERMANY, the the mission clarified and afternoon was Troop was relieved of its original security to be specifically modified "the flanks and mission, and ordered to assemble just rear of the CC Artillery". With this as north of FEUCHTWANGEN, GERMANY, its mission, the Troop continued until and to deny entrance into the said town 20th Aprilwhen the 12 AD assembled in from the north. The evening, 20 FEUCHTWANGEN, same GERMANY. April 1945, the Troop received orders However, in addition to the security relieving it from attachment to the 12 AD, mission, the Ist Ren Platoon was called CCR, releasing it back to Squadron on to perform a special reconnaissance control.
APRIL INCLOSURE No. 3 (Operations Troop B, 116th Cavalry Reconnaissance— Squadron, Mechanized, for period 29 April 1945 2 May 1945.) On 29th April 1945 this troop was as the objective for the day, a distance of attached to Combat Command "A",12th some 80 road miles. The Troop had one Armored Division, at WEILHEIM, GER Platoon Co F, one Platoon Medium Tanks, MANY. It was assigned the mission of one Platoon Troop E attached. Movement route reconnaissance along the main started about 1315. The troop had gone highway from WEILHEIM, GERMANY, about 5 amiles when the leading platoon 'through OBERAU, GERMANY, to INNS was taken— by fire from both flanks and BRUCK, AUSTRIA. The mission was front one platoon of Infantry with assigned at 1230 in the afternoon, and organic weapons and (Panzerfaust. After INNSBRUCK, AUSTRIA, was designated a thirty minute engagement, the enemy 75 force on the left withdrew from action, road block was encountered, undefended, and the force to the front and right was requiring at>out 35 minutes to reduce. The driven into the open where it suffered column continued. heavy losses while fleeing. The column proceeded. About 1730, the point platoon, then the Platoon, enemy and (A few axis, 2nd came under rifle miles further on the panzerfaust fire from both flanks, the rifle another enemy similar size force of and medium-Long range. composition encountered defending fire being at This fire was 2 below up-right-log-type road This was first encountered about miles an block. MURNAU. The panzerfaust men enemy was by fire from their four force driven were killedoutright. After an attempt to positions and from action withdrew after neutralize enemy by fire, short fight. An engineer bulldozer- the riflemen a fire extremely to see, it tank required 40 minutes to reduce the who were difficult became apparent that complete neutrali Progress was resumed. roadblock. zation would require time-consuming dis As the troop approached MURNAU, mounted operations. Therefore it was GERMANY, it came around a bend in the decided *o "run the gauntlet". Casualties road, revealing to the immediate front an were sustained in this process, this troop enemy Concentration Camp, still under sustaining one killed and one wounded, fullguard, with sentries in itheir elevated and the Combat Command sustaining box-houses, others walking guard. The some wounded. The rifle unit was 1 in leading vehicles opened fire immediately larger strength than estimated at first, as killing and wounding many. Two auto they kept the entire column under con- mobiles loaded with SS personnel trying s'ant fire along a 3 mile stretch of road to escape had 'their contents scattered by all the way into the town of ESCHEN direct hits with 76 mm guns front the DOHE, GERMANY. Just on the far end medium tank platoon. As the trocp ad of this town another road block of the vanced past this camp, to the outskirts of type mentioned before was encountered, MURNAU, a small detachment with Sgt. covered by sniper fire of small volume. Feist in charge was sent to check what Again the reduction of the block took was apparently a hospital of considerable about 40 minutes>, after which the column size, to the right of the road. This Sgt. proceeded to OBERAU, GERMANY, unexpectedly, upon his arrival at this uneventfully. Continuation off the mission "hospital", received ;the surrender of a of the CC was cancelled' the next morn general officer and his staff and several ing, and the command awaited orders hundred men. However, owing to the until the following evening, when the rapid rate of movement, this information troop was ordered to precede the CC did not reach the Troop Hq until it was rapidly to the north getting on the trail some miles past the spot, and engaged in cf CC "R", 12 AD. The troop moved at another fight. daylight the following morning, first to As the head of the troop had passed WEILHEIM, GERMANY, and then on to the southwestern edge of MURNAU about STARNBERG, GERMANY, without en 1500 yard's, it encountered a force of some countering any resistance. The troop was 20 enemy infantrymen, who held the ordered to assemble in STARNBERG, column up with Panzerfaust fire for about GERMANY, and await further orders. 10 minutes. Three or four were killedand Orders were received relieving troop from the remainder withdrew from action. 400 CC A, 12 AD, releasing it to Squadron yards further another upright-log-type control on 2 May 1945. 76 M«y
Zrlay found these Cavalry units partly in the foothills of the Bavarian Alps and partly in the plains adjacent to the Chiem See where one of the many castles of "Mad" King Ludwig still stands in all its beauty on an island just offshore. The units were reassembled and made ready to pursue the remaining elements of the SS known to be "holing-up" in the mountains ito the south. "Hitler's Redoubt" certainly looked formidable but it turned out to be just another myth produced by Nazi propaganda.
"Epic Of The Autobahn" The next episode rightfully should be called the "Epic of the Autobahn". Abranch of that wonderfully constructed six (6) lane highway runs from Munich to the south and southeast just above the Austrian border. Itseemed that every unit of the Ameri can Army, including the 2nd French Armored Division were all boiling down this highway at one and the same time and all headed for BERCHTESGADEN! The 101st Airborne Division, of Ardennes Bulge fame, to which the Group was now attached, had commandeered every type of German civilian and army vehicle imaginable for transportation. It was a sight never to be forgotten. A few days later an equally impressive spectacle took place along this same highway when an unending grey- brown horde of dejected humanity, once the proud legions of Adolf Hitler, flowed slowly to the rear.
"Shooting War" Ends The Group's mission took its different units down the valleys to the west of BERCHTESGADEN and into the Austrian Tyrol where, war or no war, sheer scenic beauty remained supreme. Fighting was only sporadic as the columns penetrated the mountain passes. In one last encounter, however, approximately 100 SS Troopers were killed outright. Our losses were only two slightly wounded. Yes, the battle "know how" of these cavalrymen had come a long way since that first night in February on the SAAR RIVER FRONT. On May sth the shooting war on the Group's front was ovier'but they were still to have one of the strangest experiences encountered throughout the entire conflict. 77
"Disarm The SS!" The war was over, yes, but because of disrupted communications within the remnants of the German lArmy there were a number of enemy units which were not aware oif that fact. The Group was 'given the jab of moving ahead for the purpose of informing said enemy units. In the process of doing just that the emissaries of Obergruppenfuhrer and General Waffen SS, Gottlob Berger (Second only to Himmler in the SS) came forward seeking terms of surrender. This was accomplished. Among the terms given was permission for all SS officers and guards to retain their sidearms for the purpose of maintaining order prior to and during the period of disarmament generally. The Cavalry was given the job of going in and taking over. Thus, for a period of several days this handful of men, relatively speaking, found themselves living in the same towns with thousands of men who only a day or two before had been their mortal enemies. Guards in OD and other armed guards in field grey with SS ©nsignia on their collar tabs paced their posts on opposite sides of the street There was perfect discipline on both sides.
Nazis And Japs Are Taken During this period "flying" detachments of the Cavalry "took" Field Marshal Kesselring with his entire staff who had been making their headquarters in Hitler's private railroad train. The train was modern in every detail and its appointments equalled the best to be found in America. Another Cavalry detachment "bagged" the Japanese Ambassador to Germany and his entire entourage at BADGASTEIN, a beautiful Austrian mountain resort. A number of high Nazi officials also were taken at that place. Just to make things more interesting a woman who claimed to be a Hungarian Baroness appeared 1 on the sicene with a strange and unbelievable tale about a train hidden in a nearby tunnel which she said contained jewels, paintings and other art objects valued at a total of twenty-five million dollars ... and even more strange was the fact that her story turned out be true.
2Vo record of the IClst Cavalry in World Wax 11 would be complete without a page of Bltred Hopkins* original "characters" which became the ballmarb of IClst humor bacb intraining camp days. "Remember "What's Coobin*"? (The ffermans who made the reproduction on the page opposite were impressed by the fact that Hmerican humor is"without pain*.} Gd.
79 HEADQUARTERS 101 st Cavalry Group, Mecz APO 758, U. S. Army
23 June 1945.
SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After TO: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C THRU: Command Channels.
1. In accordance with the provisions of AR 345 -105, dated 18 Novem ber 1929, and Change 4, dated 10 August 1944; letter Hq ETOUSA, subj: "Handling of Historical Documents in the European Theater of Operations", file AG 312.1 Op History, dated 14 July 1944, and Section IV, Circular No. 34, Headquarters Seventh Army, dated 28 November 1944 r the following report is submitted. 2.* The inclosed reports and journals with supporting documents constitute the historical— records of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., for the period 1May 1945 10 May 1945. 3. During the period covered by this report, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., was commanded by Colonel Charles B. McClelland, with Lt Col Leo W. Mortenson as Executive Officer. 4. Composition: a. There was no permanent change in the composition of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., from that noted in the unit history for the period 1 January 1945 —2 February 1945. Certain attachments and detachments were made during the period covered by this report. These are noted in the order in which they occurred. b. At the close of operations 30 April1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz., was attached to the 12th Armored Division. The 101st, 116 th, and 92nd Cay Ren Sqs, Mecz., were attached to the Group. The 342nd Armored Field Artillery (105 SP) and 1 Plat Co A, 119th Engr (C) Bn were in direct support.
* Not included herein.
80 5. Narrative History: all bridges in the Group zone bad been a. At 2359, 30 April 1945, elements of destroyed. At 13008, permission for the the Group were disposed as follows and Group to use the 36th Infantry Division were engaiged on the missions indicated: bridge at RAIN was obtained, and the (1) 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was as 92nd Cay Ren Siq, Mecz, followedby Hq sembled at PENZBERG with the mission and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Cay to preceed via BAD TOLZ - CR D870943 Mecz, and the 116th Ren Sq, Mecz, - CR D930945 - CR 985903, and thence crossed in that order. south to the INNRIVER valley to inter (3) The 92nd Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, con cept enemy elements moving to the south tinued to the east on its mission and, west. The bridge over the LOISACH in conjunction with elements of the 36th RIVER at RAINhad been destroyed. Infantry Division, attacked the enemy defenses west of BAD TOLZ. Slow pro (2) Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was as 101st gress at 23008, enemy awaiting the was made .and the sembled at SEEHAUPT destroyed the bridge over the ISIAR assignment of a new mission. RIVER vicinity of BAD TOLZ. (3) 116th Cay Rcm Sq, Mecz, had de (4) At 16008, the 116 th Cay Ren Sq, termined that the bridge over the LOI Mecz, turned north with the mission to SACH RIVER vicinity of SINDELSDORF seize all bridges over the LOISACH - had been destroyed, and was assembled ISAR CANAL which remained intact in that vicinity prepared to continue its in the zone KONIGSDORF - WOLF reconnaissance for crossings 1 the next day. RATSHAUSEN (exel). The reconnaissance (4) Hqand Hq Troop, 101sit Cay Group, continued throughout the night 1-2 May Mecz, had established its CP at HOCH and isolated pockets of enemy resistance SCHLOSS. were met and overcome. Allbridges were b. The results of the bridge reconnais found to have been destroyed. sance had been reported to the 12th Ar (5) The 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, mored Division and repairs to the bridge OP was established at BADHEILBRONN. 'at -SINDELSDORF were begun at once d. (1) Time estimates for the construc by CC-B. The 36th Infantry Division, tion of a new bridge at BAD TOLZ in which had zone, moved into the Group dicated a long delay and at 01408, 2 May, repaired bridge at RAIN during the the - CO 101-st Cavalry Group, Mecz, ordered night 30 April 1 May. all elements of the Group to move north c. (1) At 010007, orders were received via routes east of WURM SEE and cross through Headquarters 12th Armored Di the ISAR RIVER through the 4th In vision detaching the 101st Cay Ren Sq, fantry Division bridgehead at WOLF Mecz, from the Group and attaching it RATSHAUSEN. CC-A, 12th Armored to the 4th Infantry Division. The Squa Division, had crossed at that point during dron was ordered to assemble at STARN the night 1-2 May with orders to BERG at the north end of WURM SEE. proceed to ROiSENHEIM and thence (For account of 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, south through the INNRIVER valley. for the period 1-4 May, see Inclosure (2) At 06458, 2 May, VOCG 12th Ar No. 1). mored Division directed the 101st Cavalry (2) The 92nd and 116th Cay Ren Sqs, Group, Mecz, to followthe route of CC-A, Mecz, continued reconnaissance for cros entering the autobahnn at HOLZKIR sings over the LOISACH RIVER during CHEN and proceding to the bridge over the morning 1May, and determined that the INNRIVER. The mission of the 92nd 81 Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was cancelled and the Mecz, witnessed at first hand Ihe resulls Group was further ordered ito screen of some of the most horrible crimes the left flank and rear of CC-A along the perpetrated by the Nazi regieme, inclu line ROSENHEIM - OSTERMUNCHEN ding the body strewn concentration camp and to patrol the autobahnn from HOLZ northwest of LANDSBERG which was KIRCHEN to the INNRIVER bridge. CO still smoking when our troops arrived, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, assigned the \u25a0the trainload of murdered political pri screening mission to the 116th Cay Ren soners near PENZBERG and the pitable Sq, Mecz, and directed the 92nd Cay Ren condition of the few prisoners who es Sq, Mecz, to patrol the autobahnn within caped. the limits noted above. g. (1) At 0405008, the 101st Cavalry (3) The Group crossed at WOLFRATS Group, Mecz, was relieved of attachment HAUSEN at 12008, and moved rapidly to the 12th Armored Division 'and rever east. The auitobahnn bridge over the ted to XXICorps control. The 92nd Cay SCHLIERBACH RIVER vicinity ofMUH- Ren Sq, Mecz, was relieved of atiachmenl THAL had been demolished. Troop A, to the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz. Cay 116 th Ren Sq, Mecz, moved north (2) The Group was directed to proceed through GRUB thence east and south to east via the autobahnn until contact was 17258, the the autobahnn and at secured gained wi>th elements of the French 2nd INNRIVER bridge. The balance of the Armored Division, and then to turn south Group, less elements of the 92nd Cay into the Bavarian Alps. Troop C, 116th Sq, Mecz, dropped Ren which had been Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, assembled at first off to patrol the autobahmn, moved to light 4 May and moved rapidly east, Troop C, Cay Ren BAD AIBLING. 116th gaining contact with the French at 06308, Sq, Mecz, extended the screen north to 1 kilometer west of the TRAUN RIVER OSTERMUNCHEN. The Group CP was vicinity of OBER SIEGSDORF, who re established at BAD AIBLING. ported that the bridge had been destroyed c. The security missions diescribed in and that the enemy were defending from paragraph d above, continued through the east 'bank. Troop A, 116th Cay Ren 3 May 1945. Sq, Mecz, attached 1 Plat Troop E and f. (1) During operations 28 April - 1 Plat Company F, 116th Cay Ren Sq, 3 May 1945, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, turned south into the defile along Mecz, advanced .approximately 90 kilo the west bank of the TRAUN RIVER, me'ers in the face off variable degrees of overcoming a defended road block at enemy resistance, protected the left flank NEUSTADL and pursuing the enemy to of the 12th Armored Division during its SEEHAUS where forward! movement was operations south of AMMER and WURM halted by a destroyed bridge and a de SEES, cleared the road for CC-A through fended! road block. Other elements of the WEILHETM, protected the flank and rear 116 th Cay Ren Sq Mecz, followed and of OC-A as it turned south into the INN assembled in RUHPOLDING. The Group RIVER valley, made extensive reconnais CP was established in that .town,. sances of interveining water obstacles, h. (1) Early 5 May 1945, CO 101st inflictedmany casualties upon Ihe enemy Cavalry Group, Mecz, directed the 116th and captured 5136 prisoners of war. Our Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, to continue it® attack losses were 1 killed and 7 wounded. south to the Austrian border, initial ob (2) During this period many officers jective REIT im WINKL. Troop A, 116th and men of the 101st Cavalry Group, Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, attached 1 Plat Troop 82 at 13008, entered the town of MAR QUARTSTEIN. The southern exit from the town was held in strength by the enemy and a sharp battle was had before forward movement could be resumed. The troop proceeded about 1 kilometer south and was1 again halted by an impas sable road crateir which was strongly de fended by small arms, automatic weapon and mortar fire. Reconnaissance for a by-pass was begun at once. (4) At 11008, 5 May, the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, was attached to the 101st Airborne Division and directed to con tinue on its mission. The 101st Oav Ren Sq, Mecz, had been previously relieved of attachment 'to the 4th Infantry Divi sion and attached to the 101st Airborne E, and 1Plat Company F, 116 th Cay Ren Division, By order of the latter division, Sq, Mecz, and 1 Battery, 342nd AFA Bn, the Squadron reverted to Group control was ordered to continue on its axis and at 0511008. attack REIT im WINKL from the east. (5) At the time the 101st Cay Ren Sq, Troop B, 116th Cay Ren Sq Mecz, atta Mecz, reverted 1 to Group control, it was ched 1Plat Troop E, and 1 Plat Company engaged inreconnaissance of the OROSSE F, 116 th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, and 1Battery, ACHE RIVER valley. Contact had been 342nd AFA Bn.,- was directed to move via established with Troop B, 116 th Oav Ren UNTER AICH EGERNDACH - UNTER Sq, Mecz. In order to coordinate the ef WOSSEN and attack REIT im WINKEL fort of all units in the valley, the 101st from the north. Troop C, 116th Cay Ren Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, was- assigned the axis Sq, Mecz, was held in reserve. GRASSAU - RAITEN SCHLECHING - (2) Both units moved -out at first light KOSSEN. 5 May, Troop A, reinforced, fought its (6) At 0516158, May 1945, the following way south against strongly defended road message was received from the 101st blocks and abatis, reaching SEEGATIERL Airborne Division: "German Army this at 12008 where it was again halted by sector has surrendered. All units remain fanatical enemy resistance. Enemy dead in place." Forward elements halted and were identified as personnel of SS Junker the shooting war in (the European The Schule Tolz. After a hot fighit, /the town ater of operations was at an end for the was cleared at 14308. Troop A turned 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz. east and moved forward against an al i. During operations on 4 - 5 May 1945, most unbroken series of obstacles all of the 101'st Cavalry Group, Mecz, advanced which were defended by small arms and to the east a distance of approximately automatic weapons fire from the heights 50 kilometers, turned south into the Ba on each side of the defile. Progress was varian alps and penetrated two mountain very continuous but slow. passes against stubborn enemy resistance (3) Troop B, reinforced, encountered a to a maximum depth of 28 kilometers, number of undefended road blocks and killedmore than 100 enemy soldiers, most 83 of whom were SS troopers, and captured materiel. 3122 prisoners of war. It is a source of b. Upon completion of above instruc gratification to the "Group that, in this tions, move sufficient 'troops to garrison final operation of the European war, our all large 'towns and villages in sector, casualties were limited to 2 slightly establish military government and main wounded, neither of whom was evacuated. tain law and order. j. The total number of prisoners of c. Occupy sector as prescribed inover war itaken by the 101st Cavalry Group, lay issued 5 May 1945." Mecz, from first contact with the enemy (3) (a) The sector assigned to the 101st on 11 February 1945 to the surrender of Cavalry Group, Mecz, was bounded as the German army in the Group zone on follows: 5 May 1945, was p7346, exclusive of those North: the autobahnn Cay taken by 'the 101st Ren Sq, Mecz, West: The INNRIVER periods - during the it was detached from South: WINDSHAUSEN - KOSSEN the group. SEEGATIERL k. (1) Pursant to VOOG 101sit Airborne East: - SEEGA strength OBER-SIEGSDORF Division, road blocks of platoon TIERL along the autobahnn were established (b) Group sector was sub-divided SIEGSDORF and ROHR The between OBER into sub-sectors each under control DORF at for the purpose of 4hree 0606008^ of the unit noted: collecting prisoners of war and concen trating :ait FRAUN Western sub-sector, INNRIVER to the them inthe enclosure - SACHRANG, DORF. Three such blocks were 'esta mountain pass BERNAU — Troop blished by the 101st and twoby the 116 th mcl 342nd AFA Bn (-), attached 116 th Cay Ren Cay Ren Sq, Mecz. Thousandls of enemy A, 101st and Troop A, soldiers were processed. Sqs, Mecz. boundary of (2) In late eveninig 6 May 1945, Central sub-sector, east the mcl., Opns Instns No. Headquarters 101st western sub-sector, to the mountain 12. - KOSSEN, Airborne Division was Instruc pass MARQUARTSTEIN received. - Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, (-) atta tions to the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, mcl 101st 1btry, AFA Bn. were as follows: ched 342nd "a. Upon receipt of these instruction?, Eastern sub-sector, eastern boundary send reconnaissance parties under officer of central sub-sector, excl., to the -eastern control and with interpreters operating boundary of the Group sector 116 th Cay 1 btry, under a flag of truce to contact all Ger Ren Sq, Mecz, (-), attached man troops in zone. 342nd AFA Bn. (1) Reconnaissance parties will (4) Allelements moved south in their assigned 0707008, May. Repairs a) Inform German commanders of sectors at begun by the 116 th Cay Ren Sq, surrender of Army Group "G". were Mecz, on the destroyed bridge at SEE (b) Acquaint German commanders GATIERL. At 09008, elements! ofi the with terms of surrender. 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, were halted! one (c) Allow sufficient time for German mile south of MARQUARTSTEIN on the commanders to verify surrender. main highway by an officer of the 13 SS (d) Designate to German commanders Corps bearing a flag of truce who stated assembly areas for troops and locations that the SS was not under command of of dumps for surrendered arms and German Army Group "G" and therefore 84 not bound by the terms of surrender. He said that Obergruppenfuhrer and General Waffen SS Got!lob Berger, second only to Heinrich Himmler in SS rank, wished to negotiate with our higher headquarters for the surrender of his troops. Further movement of our units was halted while General Berger was escorted to Head quarters 101st Airborne Division. The principal component of his force was ithe 13th SS Army Corps, commanded by SS General Max Simon and comprised of the 2nd Mountain Division, Division yon DONAT,end the SS Nebelungen Division It is of particular satisfaction to 'the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, to have been instrumental in the surrender of these troops in as much as they had been its principal opponents ever since the Group crossed the RHINE RIVER on March 29!h. (5) In accordance with the terms ar ranged wilh General Berger, the 101st and 116 In Cay Ren Sqs, Mecz, and Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, lOlsit Airborne Division, one platoon of forward their assigned Mecz, moved in the 116 th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, under the sectors at 0811008, and by late afternoon, command of Major Edward French, was enemy 1 had occupied all installations and dispatched in the early afternoon 8 May disarmed all enemy troops therein. The to apprehend them. When the platoon 342nd AFA Bn was relieved of its occu reached its objective, it was learned that pation mission and directed to assume Marshal GORING had already been along responsibility for the road blacks taken into custody. Upon the strength of droops the autobahnn. The Cavalry pre information gained locally, the platoon viously to that reverted attached 'battalion then proceeded to SAALFELDEN and \u25a0to 'the control of their respective Squa captured Marshall KESSELRING and his drons. Command posts were established entire entourage of 60 officers and ap as follows: proximately 250 enlisted men and women, Hqand Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, together with ADOLF HITLER'S perso Mecz: KOSSEN, f nal railroad train. (A copy of Major 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz: KAPPEL, French's informal report to C.^O. 116 th 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz: REIT im Oav Ren Sq, Mecz, is appended as Section WINKL. Iof Inclosure No. 2). (6) Information had been received by 1. Pursuant to the instructions con higher headquarters indicating the pre tained in Opns Instns No. 14, Headquar sence of Marshall® GORING and KES ters 101st Airborne Division, elements of SELRING in the vicinity of ZELLER th 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, displaced SEE. In compliance with orders of CG and regrouped early 9 May 1945. The 85 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, assumed respon sibility for the enemy personnel and installations in the KOSSEN - WINKL area. The 116th Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, moved south, established its CP at ST ULRICH, and took over all elements and materiel of SS Division yon Donatz in the general area LEOGANG to FIEBERBRUNN and the pass from HOCHFILZEN north to WAIDRING. No change was made in the location of the Group and 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, command post®. m. (1) Upon completion of the relief of the balance of the 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, by elements of the 502nd Parachute Infantry, Hq and Hq Troop, 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, moved southeast early 10 May in the SALLACH RIVER valley to SAALFELDEN and there established its CP. The 101st Cay Ren Sq, Mecz, followed, and assumed responsibility for the SALLACH RIVER valley from ST MARTIN \o MITTERHOFEN and the SONNBERG valley from ROSENTHALL GASTEIN at 12308 and arrangements ito MUSSBAOH. The Sqadron established were made through the Swiss Counsel for its command post in SAALFELDEN. a meeting withHerr YonDornberg, Chief (2) Read1 blocks were established 1 'by of Protocol of the German Foreign Office both Squadrons throughout the Group and Mr. Uchida, First Secretary ,of the area. Movement of German prisoners Japanese Embassy. Both officials were numbered in ithe tens of itihousands was ordered to provide complete rosters of controlled, stock piles of enemy vehicles, personnel and to instruct all members
87 MAY INCLOSURE No. 1 (Operation 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized for the period the Squadron was attached to the 4th Infantry Division.)
On 1 May 1945, 'the Squadron was relieved of attachment to 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz, and attached to 4th Infan try Division at 0645, and ordered into assembly area at STARNBERG. Troop A was dispatched on route reconnaissance across the LOISACH and ISAR RIVER. A basis ofinformation obtained, Squadron was ordered 'to cross the. rivers at WOLF RATSHAUSEN and establish a counter- reconnaissance screen along the line STRASSLACH - BERGHAM. The screen was established at 20008, after some delay caused by 'the almost impassible condition of secondary roads. relieved of attachment to 4th Infantry On 2 May 1945, the screen was held Division and attached 101st Airborne without incident until 16158. Squadron Division effective 12008. Ordered "When we received our mission, Iwas The platoon formed their vehicles in unable to locate anyone with knowledge an open area near the town square and of the best route. Therefore we took off Captain Hellman and Iwent to the hotel. in ithe direction of BERCHTESGADEN At the hotel we were met by a Captain and then headed due south. Progress was from ithe 36th Infantry Division who said slow because of 'the mountainous (terrain, he was acting as> Liaison officer with the and upon reaching a bridge approximat German staff who were in contact with ely 10 miles south, of BERCHTESiGADEN, Field Marshal Kesselring. The Captain we found that it was blown and that was questioned as to 'the whereabouts of there were no by-passes. Fortunately ithe Kesselring and Goering but his reply was enemy did a poor job and after about an in the negative. We questioned him hour's work reconstructing the bridge the further about the location of other high platoon continued on, only to toe stopped ranking officials, but the only information by another blown bridge further on. The we obtained was that he was liaison and enemy did a good job of this one but that his headquarters was negotiating for upon inspection the stream was found ito the surrender of Kesselring and Goering be wide but not deep and 'to have a good through the German staff at the hotel. bottom. The men went to work with We were making no progress so it was shovels preparing the banks, and after decided to check the three hospitals and removing 'the fan belts from the vehicles secure a list of the hospital staffs and the entire platoon succeeded in getting patients. This only brought out the fact across. that there were almost 3000 soldiers The platoon reached ZELL AM SEE hospitalized in the town plus the normal at approximately 1500 to find everything garrison. We stillhad no information on quiet. But there were an awful lot of Kesselring or Goering. Further question German soldiers walking around and the ing of the Burgermeister brought no majority of them were SIS. Captain Hell- results. Sgt. Schnalzer, platoon leader man (interpreter from IPW Team 164) from Troop "A", while speaking to an and Icontacted the Burgermeister and escaped Belgian prisoner of war, learned upon questioning him learned that the of a large castle located at BRUCK, a town contained 'three large hospitals,, one village about three miles SE of ZELL AM of them SS, and many soldiers who had SEE. Part of ths 1 patrol proceeded to the come to ithe vicinity recently. We learned castle and upon arrival found the castle also ithat at (the main hotel a German was being protected by a reconnaissance Military Staff was billeted. platoon of a TD Company of the Third 89 90 Army. An officer was questioned but the ered to the Commanding General, 36th only information he would give was the Infantry Division in the castle at 2200 the fact that the castle contained SS per previous night. We understood 1 then ithat sonnel and that the Commanding General the 36th Division knew where Goering of the 36t'h Infantry Division had just left was all the time and had made negotiat and had given the platoon leader instruc ions lor the surrender. tions to keep all allied personnel out of the area. The whole affair seemed The patrol returned to ZEiLL AMSEE suspicious! and checked in at the hotel and! then I met a Captain from the 50©th Infantry It was getting late so we decided to Parachute Battalion who was a member go back to the hotel at ZELL AM SEE of an advance party to locate billets far to try our luck again on getting inform the battalion in the vicinity. Information ation. After further questioning we learn and hospital lists were turned over to the ed from a German officer that a train Captain as they were of no value to the which contained FieldMarshal Kesselring Squadron, and might assist them when and 'his staff plus accompanying troops, they set up military government in the was at SAALFELDEN RR Station. The area. We went to SIAALFELDEN at 1130. patrol immediately went to SAALFEL While making a check of the train, Major DEN, located the train, and Captain Hell- Peiper of the Field Marshal's staff again reported Adjutant man and I to the and requested information as to when an explained that to that the we were see American officer of "rank" would arrive Field iMarshal and his staff were held in to discuss the meeting place for negot protective custody. The Adjutant brought iations. us to the car of Field Marshal Kesselring and! explained our mission to the Field At 1330 a Colonel from XXI Corps Marshal and General Winters, Chief of arrived and spoke to General) Winters; Staff, and they agreed that no attempt to German Chief of Staff. After the con leave the train would be made by the ference with him the Colonel informed Field Marshal or any of his staff. Aguard me he would probably return later that was organized in the vicinity of the train afternoon and instructed me to continue and the balance of the platoon used the on my mission of guarding the train. At hotel across the street from the RR station about 1430 a Major from the 101st Air as quarters. AH went well during the borne Infantry Division arrived and said night. he had instructions from Commanding General 101st Airborne Division to make 0900 the next morning, three At about arrangements Kesselring and certain members of press for the arrived and of to be taken to 101st requested interview members his staff an with the Field Airborne Headiquarters at Marshal, which was denied They BERCHTES them. GADEN. However, the Major didn't make waited At approximately 0930 a around. much progress. General Winters, speaking small patrol was dispatched to the castle for the Field Marshal, insisted that Mar at BRUCK to see what was happening Kesselring Upon arrival patrol noticed shal was entitled toconference there. the with about large (Ger an American official other than a there were four sedans local commander. man markings) and about three German staff cars. An American officer was con At the end of the day no one knew tacted and it was1 learned that Goering what was to be done with the Field Mar and family with Goering's staff surrend shal. The three members of the press 91 were still there and had not had an come to see us. Yon Dorniberg arrived interview! The next morning at 0300 a at 1400. Iinstructed 'him lo give us a list liaison officer from the 101st Airborne of all men who had anything to do with Division woke me up and gave me the the German Government, civilian or following instructions: "General Taylor military, and that, furthermore, none of willarrive at SAALFELDEN at 0900 for these people including their staffs would a conference withField Marshal Kessel leave their hotels. ring. Please make 'the necessary arrange ments to see that everything is prepared Mr. Uchida, First Secretary of the for the General." Japanese Embassy, arrived at 1430 and explained he was very sorry that the Ambassador was not present, but he was not feeling well.Mr. Uchida was inform ed he would secure a list showing all members of the Embassy, down to the last child, and that no one was to leave SECTION II their hotels. Arrangements were made with the Burgermeisiter for a meeting at General Taylor, accompanied by his 1530 to include the local Commandant of G 3 and interpreter, arrived at 0920 and all the hospitals in the vicinity, of which were shown to the Field Marshal's car. there were eight. On ithe way «to the Bur Shortly thereafter the G 3 gave me the germeister's office we were stopped by following instructions: "You and your an elderly lady and a young man. The platoon will move to BADGASTEIN lady was' Baroness Adele Bornemisza of immediately. Wie have information that Hungary. The man was a Hungarian the Japanese Embassy, German Secretary Count. The baroness called us aside and of Economics, Secretary of Agriculture told us, secretly, she needed our assistance and other German officials are located - that there was a 'train in the vicinity there." which contained valuables belonging to the Hungarian government valued at At 1000 the platoon was organized and approximately 25 milliondollars and that on the road for BADGASTEIN. The itrip Nazi soldiers had made several attempts was uneventful and the surrounding \u25a0to loot the train. Things were getting country was beautiful. We arrived at (awfully) complicated! BADGASTEIN at approximately 1230 and immediately established two blocks on We took the Baronesses' name and the entrances to the town from the south. hotel and told her we would see her Captain Hellman, Sgt. Stutzman and I later! When we met the Burgermeister immediately went to the Swiss Embassy we gave him the usual instructions on to secure information as to who was in curfew, weapons, etc (weapons had al the town and in the vicinity. The Ambas ready been collected). He would issue sador and his wife and Mr. Buchmuller, instructions that no one would leave the a member of the staff who spoke English, town. A list would be furnished giving were very happy to see us and very names of all prominent people in the hospitable. Mr. Buchmuller arranged for town. (The commandant of hospitals had the Japanese Ambassador to come to the a list of high-ranking officers inhospitals hotel and also for the Chief of the Ger in vicinity which included twelve gene man Foreign Office, Yon Dornberg, to rals.) 92 After more conversation we learned hotel and asked me ito be seated. The that Mr.Franz Wagenleitner, the Burger man, who spoke a little English, intro meister, and others in the 'town were duced himself as Neme'th Sander, the instigating a movement in Austria .to free Austrian— wrestler. ((He had wrestled in Austria of German rule and set up a free the US Iremember seeing a match.) Austrian government. Things were really He said he was at present acting as getting complicated! Secretary to Dr. Tobias Kornel, official of government. they When we the lists 'from the Hungarian He said secured 'the of train and Japanese Embassy we found that the knew the location this were Embassy consisted of the Japanese Am very much interested in seeing that it Mr. Oshima, family was taken over by the American forces, bassador and memb Nazi trying to ers of his staff and their families - a since officials were confis grand total of 137. Lists of 'the German cate the valuables. Things were getting complicated! Icouldn't officials revealed the following prominent more and more people: figure out the relationship between the Baroness and Kornel. It seemed to me Secretary of State in the Reichs that both of them had their own fish to ministry of Agriculture: Willekens, fry! Reichsminister and Chief of the get Reichschancellery :Harnaike, Iwent to 'the Swiss Embassy to further information from them on the Chief of the Reichschancellery: situation but they knew very little about Dr. Lammers, it and could not enlighten me at all. A Reichsminister of Economics and Pre small patrol was sent to the village of sident of Reichsbank: Dr. Funk, BROCKSTEIN to search for the train. Postmaster General: Dr. Ohnesorge, When we contacted the station master he said there was a tunnel nearby but Chief of the German Foreign Office: that there were only six locomotives and Yon Dornberg. nine coal cars in it and that the loco Complete papers, listing officials and motives were inoperative. Soon thereafter staffs were immediately dispatched to we located a Hungarian who spoke a Squadron. littleEnglish. He was questioned and he the train Road were set up all said he knew location of the blocks on exits and its contents. from the town to prevent unauthorized people from leaving. Until additional men A Dr. Avar was had only way to contacted and he could arrive this was the papers showing exactly what the train handle the situation. contained. The contents of the train as The night was quiet with no trouble reported by Dr. Avar were jewelry in of any kind. The following morning the form of gold rings, bracelets, dia at approximately 0800 Iwas walking monds, ornaments, eitc. Also large quan through the streets to go the Swiss Em tities of silverware, rugs, tapestry, oil bassy to try and get further information paintings, and other materials were listed. on the story Baroness Bomemisza gave The Austrian went with us into the me about the 25 million dollar train, tunnel and we walked for approximately when suddenly Iwas approached by a 3% miles before locating 'the cars. Allof man of large frame who took my arm the cars were sealed and three loco and quickly whisked me into a nearby motives 1 were deadheaded on each end. 93 One car was opened to verify the fact wanted definite proof that the RR cars that 'they did contain something of value. contained valuables. Therefore it was Iinspected the contents of this one car decided .to investigate the train further. and it contained oil paintings, tapestries, At 2030 one platoon from Company "A", and rug.. As little as Iknew about such 506 th Parachute Infantry Battalion, values Iwas satisfied ithat the remainder arrived to relieve the platoon of Troop of the cars were as reported by Dr.Avar. "A".The company commander and pla We didnot feel ithat we had the authority toon leader were oriented on the entire to open any more cars. The paitrol, wet situation and the company commander and cold, headed for lhe exit and upon agreed with Col. Mon'enson that for the reaching the outside immediately con jab to be performed satisfactorily it tacted the station master and gave him would take additional men. Col. Morten till1600 that afternoon ito get those loco son, Major French, and Capt. Wood went motives and all cars out of the tunnel. to the train to verify the content®. Dr. A Sgt. and one team of Troop "A" were Avar produced his papers for Col. Mor left 'to see ithat these instructions were tenson explaining what the train con carried out to the letter and also to guard tained. Four cars were opened and Col. Ihd cars upon their removal from the Mortenson checked two cars which con tunnel. At approximately 1500 two offi tained silverware, jewelry etc. and Capt. cers from CIC of XXICorps arrived and Wood checked two cars which contained began ithe 'task of collecting those officials rugs, tapestry and oil paintings. Both who might be wanted by the Allied were satisfied that the train contained Government. articles of great value. Dr. Avar valued the contents of the train at 25 million A patrol was dispatched to on check dollars. the train and by 1700 the locomotives and 25 cars containing the valuables The platoon of Company "A"complet were on "A" a siding. The team of Troop "A" was ed the relief of Troop and also post at informed of the contents and given the established an additional the the Japanese mission of protecting the oars. By 1900 hotel which contained Embassy. At 0400 platoon the QIC had gathered the Japanese another of 506th Ambassador, Mr. Oshima and his Parachute Infantry arrived and at 0630 Secre team of Troop "A" at the train was tary Mr. Uchida; Mr. Willeckers, Mr. the by platoon. Col. Mortenson Harnaike; Dr. Lammers and his Secre relieved this left a 0730 to rejoin Group Headquarters. tary Capt. Priet; Dr. Funk and his Secre A 0820 platoon Troop "A" tary Cap Mahrwald and Dr. Ohnesorge. At the of left A guard was furnished by Troop "A" BADGASTEIN to rejoin the Squadron at ULRICH, thus' ending a most inter and the CIC men proceeded for Corps ST. Hqs. esting experience for all. The platoon of Troop"A",commanded by St. Sgt. Schnal At 2000 the EO of the 101st Cavalry zer, is to be commended on 'the excellent Group, Lt. Col. Mortenson, arrived and manner in which it handled a difficult explained we were to be relieved that assignment and the soldierly manner in night but that he wanted additional which all personnel conducted them information on the situation; also he selves." 94 £fc final wcvd 27mcknowledgement of the aid given to the 101st Cavalry Group and its regularly attached units in turning in a superb combat performance is made here with the knowledge that the appreciation of each and every man in the original Group is wholehearted and sincere ... to the Combat Engineers, Field Artillerymen, Medium Tankers, Tank Destroyers, IPW Team, Air Liasion Units and those unknown pilots, Ground Liasion Officers and Military Government Officers ... to the bold and fast moving 92nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mecz.) which worked with the Group during the latter's attachment to the 12th Armored Division ... What men! What units! What a TEAM! Allin all the regular units of the Group, including the Group Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 101st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mecz,) and 116th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mecz.) were in continueous combat operations against the enemy from February 9th, 1945 to May sth, 1945 or for 85 consecutive days. During that period the Group captured more than fifteen (15) times its own strength in Prisoners of War or a total of 27,346. Itmoved forward through several hundred miles of contested territory, often sticking out into that territory like the proverbial "sore ithumib". Th'ite boldness paid dividends in both missions accomplisihed and in an exceptionally low ratio of lasses. A total of forty-four officers and men were killed in action or died of their wounds and a total of one hundred and sixty-two were wounded. There is no way to balance out the personal loss and suffering of these fine young men. The price would be high under any circumstances but on a purely comparative basis and all things considered, including the actual accomplishments, these low losses speak volumes for things which can not be found in the book of "luck". In addition thetre were eleven men reported missing in action which brought the total casualties to 217 or a fraction under 14 per cent. Only three men were known to be taken prisoner unwounded and on their feet. In each of these cases the circum stances were verified and inno instance was the honor of the individual compromised. Fights and wars are not won withfine mottos but these men are proud to record the fact that each and every man lived up to the old regimental motto and gave ... "TO THE UTMOST!" 95 RECORD of EVENTS Prior to January 4, 1945 — 27 JANUARY 1941 101st Cavalry Regiment (H-M), inducted into Federal Ser vice at Brooklyn, N. V., New York, N. Y. and Geneseo, N. Y. Ackerman, commanding. Colonel Gilbeit E. - 2 FEBRUARY 1941 to 28 SEPTEMBER 1941 Training at Fort Devens, Mass. - 29 SEPTEMBER 1941 to 6 DECEMBER 1941 First Army Carolina Maneuvers. 7 DECEMBER 1941 to 3 SEPTEMBER 1942 — Training at Fort Devens, Mass. — Detachments maintained security for Dow Field, Bangor, Me. (APRIL 1942 101st Cavalry Regiment (H-M) reorganized and redesignated 101 st Cavalry Regiment, Mecz.)— 4 SEPTEMBER 1942 to 25 OCTOBER 1942 Field Training at Pine Camp, N. Y. 26 OCTOBER 1942 to 10 MARCH 1943 — Training at Fort Devens, Mass. 11 MARCH 1943 to 10 OCTOBER 1943 — Mobile Reserve, Eastern Defense Com mand,— Fort George G. Meade, Md. (20 AUGUST 1943 Colonel Charles B. McClelland assumed command of the Regiment.) 11 OCTOBER 1943 to 28 FEBRUARY 1944 — Mobile Force, Chesapeake Bay Sec tor, Eastern Defense Command with elements stationed at Camp— Somerset, Md., Cemp Ashby, Va., and Camp Branch, N. C. (21 DECEMBER 1943 Reorganized and redesignated 101st Cavalry Group, Mecz,, comprised of Hq. & Hq. Troop, 101 st Cay. Gp., Mecz., 101st Cay. Ren Sg., Mecz.,— and 116 th Cay. Ren Sq., Mecz. 1 MARCH 1944 to 30 JUNE 1944 Mobile Force, Southeastern Sector, Eastern Defense Command, with elements stationed at Eatontown, N. J., Port Republic, N. J., Georgetown, Del., Camp Somerset, Md., Fort Story, Va., Camp Branch, N. C, Carolina Beach, N. C, — and Myrtle Beach, S. C. (JANUARY 1944 34th Cay. Ren Sq.,— attached.) 1 JULY 1944 to 25 OCTOBER 1944 Training and preparation for overseas — movement at Camp Campbell, Ky. (AUGUST 1944 34 th Cay. Ren Sq., detached.) 26 OCTOBER 1944 to 30 OCTOBER 1944 — Siaging for overseas movement at Camp Kilmer, N. J. 31 OCTOBER 1944 to 12 NOVEMBER 1944 — At sea enroute from New York Port of Embarkation to Liverpool,— England. 13 NOVEMBER 1944 to 3 JANUARY 1945 Training and preparing equipment for combat at Camp Aniy Cross, Furness,_England 97 What about YOUR story? Every one has his own story to tell. A number of blank pages have been provided in the back of this booklet in order that you may make a permanent record of YOUR story. One good way to approach the work of writing your story is to make notes and then to rewrite them several times until they are exact and to your liking. Itis best not to try to do this in one sitting. Take the time necessary to do a good job but do not worry about style or fancy construct ion. The most important consideration is to keep your writing down to a simple statement of facts. You will be aided in making a choice of material for your story by reading the Official History and studying the maps herein. Photographs are excellent reminders and can be used also to illustrate your story. Letters which you have written home and which have been saved form another good source of material. You may tell your story as a narrative, highlighting outstanding experiences in much the same manner as in the outline history herein. If you are recounting an incident in which you are the only individual invol ved write in the "first person." Incidents involving yourself with others can be written in the "second person." You willfind, however, that most of your story can be written best in the "third person." Should you prefer not to write a running, account you can jot down your experiences, observations, reactions and any other thoughts you have in connection with your combat service ina manner similar to that shown on the pages of "Random Shots" which follow. Write YOUR story while itis fresh inyour mind. It willbe among your most prized posessions in the years to come. Send a copy of your story with any duplicate photographs which you may have to the 101st Cavalry Historical Board, 1579 Bedford Avenue, Brooklyn, New York. 98 Random SUots We bumped across a railroad bridge just be low itfae city of Lands- burg. Later we passed through the city itself and past the old castle prison where Hitler had been imprisonediafter the "Munich Beer Putsch". It was there he wrote "Mem K'ampf". Two rifle shots greet ed us as we entered Landsburg. Snipers? No, just the climax for a two-timing gal whom we found very much dead on ithe second floor of a particularly disrepu table Gasthaus. She was a DP and so was her four foot nine murder er who had used a saw ed-off Mauser rifle. The only mystery about 'the case was the 12 — count 'em — 12 pairs of brand new real silk hose found in her packed suitcase. A German general riding rapidly to the rear in a sporty Little Opel sedan was overtaken by a couple of our point vehicles. After ithe Luger and other legal matters were settled the boys opened his suitcase which, believe it or not, was full of men's pure silk underwear. The column had halted in the main street of Lauda. Ihad been 'talking to 'the boys in ithe CP half- track and was just about back to my own vehicle when the screaming 99 Random Shots One of 'the first things -to strike youir attention after crossing the Danube is the "onion" type steeple seen on eadh village church. "Early Byzantine influence", thevFadre explained. We looked ait 'them with interest ... and for snip ers! We had been travelling 'through some of ithe most beautiful and productive coun try in the world 'and we could not especially abundant; pictures of men help but wonder why these people relatives in uniform covering Both should ever feel the need for some past and present generations vie with thing more; why they should want small deer antlers for wall space, to leave itheir homes time and time that is, after the inevitable picture again to inflict so much suffering of Adolf; knick-knacks stand in and misery on their neighbors ... gireat profusion on every shelf ... who have so much less! and over aill, in the small town and Village homes, is the odor of urine and of decaying vegetables stored in the "keller". We were amazed to find so much fine modem furniture in homes of modest size. Itlooked like the payoff goods of Nazi-Socialism. Many other Germany must be the home of items were in more than ample that old joke about long 'beds and supply. It seemed that about the short sheets only the correct version only .thing we could not find in should be "short beds and even Germany was a Nazi. shorter sheets". We are still'trying to find a G Iwho mastered the problem of sleeping under one of those kraut feather comforters. What Germany needs most is a good interior decorator. Bavarian homes especialily are cluttered with too much of everything. We should Another myth which was defi know because we saw more and nitely exploded was that one about different homes than even most Ger all German women being such fine mans ever see, but if you see one housekeepers. Many of them could you see them all. Trophies of the take a few lessons from the gals hunt and of shooting matches are back home. 100 % Stety 101 102 103 <^M^ 104 105 m^ 106 107 108 109 '^M^^' 110 m^ 111 COMBINED ARMSRESEARCH LIBRARY FORT LEAVENWORTH,KS 112 3 1695 00602 7882 Joseph H. Atkinson Nevin I.Harnm Charles N. Pierce John Bartole Harvey Hayes Wilfred A. Poulin Henry C. Bass Johann D. Hinck Charles M.Price William A. Becker LewisA.R, Innerarity, Jr. Morton S. Rodgers Darius M.Blinson Anthony Ivinski John F. RothengaslRothengast James C. Bobo William A.Kornblum Robert K.Schafer Donald S. Brumfield Alfred Kupterschmidt Joseph F. Tedesco Grady L.Collins Preston H. Kurth Everette G. Simoneaux Louis Cowen Dale A. Lackey John F. Sturz William B. Elliott George P. Langton, Jr. Jack L.Swanson Theodore E. Evanko Barzilliai M.Lanning, Jr. Thurman A. Swim Bernard Fabian Marcus L.Lee Harold L.Turk Carmine J.C.Garafano Bernard J. Lolos Charles F. Vacek George T. Gardner Olaf D. Lupardus Louis A.Vozzo Stanley T. Gawlak Ira J. McCarty James W. Walton Robert D. Gillan Walter H. Mennel Norman J. Wenger Bennie Gonzales Harvey H. Miller Nolan D. Yeomans George W. Griffith Carl H. Moore Edward B. Young Gilbert Hack Thomas F.Niejadlik Edwin M.Zajonczkoski Raymond R. Paquette that ofhers may be free Jo I meeh fhe challenge of peace I •• PORTO RICO 1898 •• LORRAINE 1918 •• MEUSE ARGONNE 1918 1918 •• yPRES-LYS 1918 1918 •• SOMME OFFENSIVE 1918 1918 •• FLANDERS 1918 1918 • RHINELA^D 19A5( 19A5( ••central mjkPEVwf \u25a0I\u25a0I