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Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of the Humanitarian Law of War Matthew Lippman

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Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of the Humanitarian Law of War Matthew Lippman Penn State International Law Review Volume 15 Article 2 Number 1 Dickinson Journal of International Law 9-1-1996 Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of the Humanitarian Law of War Matthew Lippman Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr Part of the International Humanitarian Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons Recommended Citation Lippman, Matthew (1996) "Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of the Humanitarian Law of War," Penn State International Law Review: Vol. 15: No. 1, Article 2. Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol15/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International Law Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact [email protected]. I ARTICLESI Conundrums Of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses To Violations Of The Humanitarian Law of War Matthew Lippman* Following World War II the Allied Powers pledged to criminally prosecute those responsible for the commission of War Crimes.' The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were followed by a series of national and multinational prosecutions of German and Japanese civilian and military officials! These judgments estab- lished the foundation for the development of international criminal law and elaborated on the elements of criminal responsibility and proof.3 The most confused and contentious area of international * Ph.D. Northwestern; J.D., American; LL.M. Harvard; Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. A portion of this research was undertaken during the author's tenure as "of counsel" in Bosnia v. Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) before the International Court of Justice. This article is dedicated with love and devotion to Lidia Janus (June 8, 1958-January 24, 1991). 1. Declaration On German Atrocities (Oct. 30, 1943) VI DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, July 1943-June 1944. 231 (1945). 2. See Matthew Lippman, The Other Nuremberg: American Prosecutions Of Nazi War Criminals In Occupied Germany, 3 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1992). See also Matthew Lippman., Nuremberg: Forty Five Years Later. 7 CONN. J. INT'L. L.J. 1 (1991). 3. For background on post-World War II trials of alleged German war criminals, see Matthew Lippman, Fifty Years After Auschwitz: Prosecutions Of Nazi Death Camp Defendants, -CONN. J. INT'L._ (forthcoming); Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Prosecutions Of Nazi Health Professionals And The 2 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:1 criminal law concerns the character and scope of criminal defenses. Curiously, scant scholarly attention has been devoted to this topic which has been characterized as "a vast terra incognita."4 Government officials invariably claim to have acted out of altruism and to have lacked criminal intent. They portray them- selves as having been propelled by patriotic principle rather than self-promotion or uncontrolled passion. The vanquished also invariably claim to be the victims of "selective" or "victor's justice." The exiguous ethical distinction between legitimate acts of war and murder lends added weight to these claims.5 Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara published a volume in 1995 which outlined the flawed and deficient decisions which led to American involvement in Vietnam.6 McNamara was an early enthusiast of the effort and supported the insertion of combat troops and the initiation of bombing sorties. He feared that the defeat of South Vietnam would diminish American prestige and perceived power.7 His ardent advocacy8 resulted in Vietnam being labelled as "'McNamara's War."' 9 McNamara gradually began to shift his sentiments, arguing in 1965 for the initiation of negotiations concerning the construction of a neutral South Vietnam."0 He concluded two years later that Protection Of Human Rights, __T. MARSHAL L. REV. -. (forthcoming); Matthew Lippman, War Crimes: The Trial Of Nazi Military Leaders, 3 ToURO INT'L & COMp. L.J. 261 (1995); Matthew Lippman, War Crimes Trials Of German Industrialists: The 'Other Schindlers,' 9 TEMP. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 101 (1995); Matthew Lippman, The Nazi Doctors TrialAnd The InternationalProhibition On Medical Involvement In Torture, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 395 (1993); Matthew Lippman, They Shoot Lawyers Don't They?: Law In The Third Reich And The Global Threat To The Independence Of The Judiciary,23 CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 257 (1993); Matthew Lippman, Nuremberg, 6 LAW IN CONTEXT 28 (1988); Matthew Lippman, The Denaturalization Of Nazi War Criminals In The United States: Is Justice Being Served?, 7 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 169 (1985); Matthew Lippman, The Trial Of Adolf Eichmann And The Protection Of UniversalHuman Rights Under International Law, 5 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1982). See generally, Matthew Lippman, Towards An InternationalCriminal Court, 3 SAN DIEGO J. 1 (1995); Matthew Lippman, War Crimes: The My Lai Massacre And The Vietnam War, 1 SAN DIEGO J.J. 295 (1993). 4. Albin Eser, Defences in War Crimes Trials, 24 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 201, 202 (1984) (emphasis omitted). 5. See id. 6. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, IN RETROSPECT: THE TRAGEDY AND LESSONS OF VIETNAM 34 (1995) (McNamara discussed eleven seminal decisions). 7. See id. at 106-07. 8. See id. at 148, 180. 9. Id. at 118. McNamara's measuring success through the accumulation of "body counts" became a metaphor for America's misguided mission. Id. at 48. 10. McNAMARA, supra note 6, at 181, 204. 1996] CONUNDRUMS OF ARMED CONFLICT the United States was careening towards a "'major national disaster'." and called for the cessation of bombing 2 and the freezing of force levels. 3 McNamara was now convinced that a settlement would neither threaten United States military credibility nor undermine America's perceived commitment to its allies. 4 President Lyndon Johnson rejected this analysis and reassigned McNamara to the World Bank in 1968."5 McNamara's recent recantation was rejected by critics who considered the former Defense Secretary to be a war criminal. He was criticized for having muzzled his misgivings so as to maintain his Pentagon position. Others praised McNamara for placing patriotism over principle. What is the appropriate response of a high-ranking official who is confronted with illicit international conduct? Was McNamara justified in remaining in office in order to argue against escalation? Could he reasonably have believed that his muffled dissent would be effective? Should McNamara have intervened to halt the bombing of civilian targets? Would McNamara's resignation have had an impact on American policy? Did McNamara's dissent mitigate his earlier support for the war? What was the scope of McNamara's liability for criminal acts committed by American troops in Vietnam? Should a governmental official be held liable for acts which he or she believed were required in self-defense or in furtherance of the national interest? Are decision-makers immunized from international penal liability stemming from official acts? Underlying these questions is the conflict between principles and patriotism. At what point should the dictates of conscience take precedence over the claims of domestic doctrine? Is it realistic to require individuals to risk life and limb in order to avoid criminal culpability?16 These conundrums recur in the consideration of international criminal defenses. This Article outlines the elements, scope, and 11. Id. at 271. 12. Id. at 153. 13. Id. at 270-71. 14. Id. at 306-09. 15. MCNAMARA, supra note 6, at 311. President Johnson honored McNamara by awarding him the Medal of Freedom. Id. at 316. 16. See Ronald Steel, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam by Robert S. McNamara with Brian Van De Mark, THE NEW REPUBLIC 34 (1995) (book review). See generally James C. Thomson Jr., Getting Out And Speaking Out, 13 FOREIGN POLICY 49 (1973-1974). The debate over the international legality of the Vietnam conflict is discussed in Matthew Lippman, Vietnam: A Twenty Year Retrospective, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 325 (1993). 4 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:1 underlying philosophy of various core criminal defenses, including superior orders, necessity, vicarious liability, good motive and reprisals against hostages. Some summary comments on the contemporary code of conflict are offered in the concluding section. I. Superior Orders A. World War I During World War I, scholars debated whether German combatants should be permitted to rely on the superior orders defense. 7 Commander Sir Graham Bower of the Royal Navy argued in 1915 that submarine officers and crews sinking merchant vessels should not be held liable: "the blame does not rest with them, but with their superiors." s According to Bower, the military could not function under circumstances in which "every subordinate ... [was] permitted or required to constitute himself a judge of the legality or morality of the orders received from his superiors.... To make him responsible ... [would] strike at the9 foundations of discipline in every army or navy in the world.' Low-level combatants were ill-equipped to evaluate the context of a command. An order might appear invalid but in fact be legally justified as an act of reprisal.2' The extension of criminal culpabil- 17. The trial of Peter von Hagenbach is commonly viewed as the first international war crimes trial in which the superior orders defense was raised. Duke Charles of Burgundy appointed Hagenbach as Governor of Breisach in order to carry out a harsh and severe regime. Hagenbach was tried by a twenty- eight judge panel representing Alsatian and Upper Rhenanian towns, Berne from the Swiss Confederation and Austria. The panel rejected Hagenbach's superior orders defense. See GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, II INTERNATIONAL LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 462-66 (1968).
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