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an independent publication which promotes insight into the process of change in Africa.

Cover by William Steyn

Comment A milepost on Africa's road to democracy - Erich Leistner 212

Political economy The political economy of informal economies - Dr Rene Lemarchand 214 Policy impact of democracy in South Africa - Prof Fanie Cloete 222 Madagascar: Change and continuity - Eduardo Serpa 233

Administration Inertia in African public administration: An examination of some causes and remedies - Dr S K Asibuo 246 ) 0 1 0 2 Development d e t

a Training for development: At the crossroads - Prof Hennie Swanepoel 252 d ( West Africa's river basin organizations - Denis Fair 257 r e h s i l

b Security u P Geopolitics, glasnost and Africa:s second liberation: Political and security implications for the continent e h t

- Dr Simon Baynham 263 y b

d e t Land policy n a

r The dilemmas of land policy in Zimbabwe - Jeffrey Herbst 269 g

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A milepost on Africa's road to democracy

Erich Leistner, Director of the Africa Institute

President Kaunda's spectacular elect­ role and violence was minimal. Re­ The incoming government - and with oral defeat at the hands of Frederick gardless of how the country's party­ it the tender flower of Zambian demo­ Chiluba and the MMD on 31 October political life may develop in future, the cracy - face an awesome task of eco­ 1991 not only reflected the Zambian two presidential candidates have set an nomic reconstruction and development. people's exasperation over increasingly example of magnanimity and maturity By comparison, the rebuilding of the intolerable) living conditions. It also that puts many leaders of old-estab­ war-shattered German and Japanese 0

illustrated1 black Africa's growing disil­ lished democracies to shame. economies after 1945 was child's play 0 2

lusionment with political leaders who Of Kaunda it has been said that noth­ because these two countries disposed of d hade gained power by mobilizing the ing ever became him as the manner of well-qualified and motivated - if numer­ t

masses'a desire for freedom and pros­ his leaving his job, bowing to the will ically depleted - labour forces with d (

perity, but who had effectively brought of the people; while Chiluba has called capable managers and administrators r

theme greater poverty and oppression upon his countrymen to practise for­ anxious to repair the badly damaged h

thans that experienced under colonial giveness, reconciliation and unity, and transport, power and other infrastruc­ i l

domination.b to respect Kaunda: "He is the founding tures and to rebuild bombed-out factor­ u Similar to peoples elsewhere in Afri­ father of our nation and he must remain ies, offices and dwellings. P

ca,e Zambians have long lost the naive in our hearts ... we must ensure nothing By contrast, the Zambian economy is h

belieft that the leaders who had once is done to harass him." not only disastrously run-down and bur­

effectivelyy expressed their yearnings, The Zambian leaders' manifestations dened by impossible debt obligations b

actuallyd work for the public good once of political maturity and sophistication (the foreign debt is US$7,8 bn and e theyt are in control. They have learned encourage hopes of similar advances in amounts to $1 000 per head) it is also n

thata power inevitably corrupts unless the sphere of economic policy and pub­ severely distorted structurally: it is over­ r checkedg by democratic processes and lic administration. The Kaunda govern­ whelming dependent on the declining

e

publicc accountability. Twenty-seven ment's nepotism and gross mismanage­ copper mines; about 130 poorly man­ n

yearse of listening to Kaunda preaching ment have devastated the productive aged and generally ill-designed para­ c i

Humanisml have taught them that high­ sectors, the physical infrastructure, edu­ statal corporations (including the mines)

soundingr phrases are no substitute for cation, health and other social services. account for four-fifths of the country's e goodd government. The economy is still as overwhelmingly modem economy; the agricultural poten­ n

u The Zambian masses' greater aware­ dependent on rapidly dwindling copper tial is unusually good but grossly

nessy and sophistication is also demon­ reserves as it was 27 years ago. Ac­ neglected, and increasing quantities of a

stratedw by the fact that, notwithstanding cording to current estimates, the copper food have to be imported; the civil e oftent vicious campaigning before the mines will be practically worked out by service and the parastatals are demoral­ a

election,G tribalism played no significant the year 2010. ized, vastly overstaffed, inefficient and

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d e c u d o 212r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R ------Comment

corrupt; education, training and health the two Washington organizations is government will be sufficiently strong service have been reduced to a shambles resumed. With Chiluba in power, they and courageous politically. One is, for (seven out of nine provinces have been will be more favourably disposed, but instance, reminded that Chiluba had afflicted by severe outbreaks of cholera); ultimately outside assistance will hinge long been the leader of the powerful housing in urban areas, where about half on the effectiveness of the domestic 300 000 - strong mineworkers' union,

the) population lives, has been badly reform programme. whose militancy played quite a role in 0

neglected;1 inflation is running at around Effective economic reform, however, appreciably raising the wage costs of lOOper0 cent a year; foreign exchange will entail considerable hardship for the the vital copper industry. Will he be 2

is d in extremely limited supply; and Zambian people: public sector employ­ prepared to antagonize this important e thet population is doubling about every ment must be vigorously reduced; the constituency? a

20d years. slashing of subsidies on maize-meal The Zambian election was a triumph (

r In September 1991, the IMF and will result in a higher cost of living, for democracy in Africa and a resound­ e

Worldh Bank suspended their financial and the prices of basic foodstuffs must ing setback for one-man or one-party s i helpl because Kaunda was not prepared also rise in order to promote domestic rule. However, considering the daunt­ b

to u reduce the high subsidy on maize­ production; users will increasingly ing economic hurdles facing the coun­ P meal (costing about $100 million a have to pay for social services; and so try, it is clear that Chiluba's victory at e year)h shortly before the elections. forth. Chiluba has repeatedly warned the polls is by no means a guarantee t

Zambia'sy chances of obtaining foreign people not to expect an easy ride, but it that Zambia will be democratic and b funding are virtually nil until help from remains to be seen whether the new prosperous ten years hence. d e t n a r g

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The political economy of informal economies

Dr Rene Lemarchand, Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, looks at the relationship between the informal sector and market economies, with special reference to their roles in the political economy ofAfrica. *

After decades of sustained and more or push" under way where the state is it­ scope of the informal sectors and there­ less deliberate neglect the state is now self the most privatized sector of soci­ fore as the first step towards the re­ recognized by the World Bank as a crit­ ety. Privatization of the state reaches its structuring of African economies; de­ ical variable in any strategy aimed at highest stage of development in the votees of the economy of affection, by fostering "sustainable growth". Moving form of what Callaghy calls "crony contrast, would argue for strategies away from its earlier, stubbornly eco­ capitalism", which translates into a aimed at effectively tapping the poten­ nomistic bent, its report Sub-Saharan drastic shrinkage of indigenous pro­ tial for co-operation inherent in tradi­ Africa, From crisis to sustainable ductive sectors and the massive chan­ tional modes of production. growth, explicitly admits the need for nelling of entrepreneurial energies into What follows is an attempt to rethink )

"not0 just less government but better the informal sectors. In such cases the some of the postulates underlying each 1 government0 - government that concen­ logic of the Bank runs against the logic school of thought. Rather than to offer 2

tratesd its efforts less on direct interven­ "crony capitalism and crony statism", an alternative explanatory model, the e tionst and more on enabling others to be leaving much of the continent "lost aim is to suggest new perspectives from a

productive".ld "Underlying the litany of between state and market".5 which to analyse the nature and opera­ (

Africa'sr development problems", the Between state and market lies the tion of informal economies, in the hope e

reporth goes on to note, "is a crisis of ),hadowy space of the informal econ­ that this may yield fresh insights into s i

governance,l a failure of the exercise of omy. Precisely because its boundaries their significance as a potential source politicalb power to manage a nation's are notoriously ill-defined, rational­ of economic regeneration. u P

affairs".2 Only through "a systematic choice theorists and proponents of the e economy of affection have staked out efforth to build a pluralistic institutional t structure, a determination to respect the conflicting claims to this contested ter­ The convivialist and other y

b fallacies rule of law, and vigorous protection of rain. While the former tend to view the d

thee freedom of the press and human informal economy as a rational re­ The growth of informal sectors is per­ t

rights"n can the foundation be laid for sponse to declining market incentives, haps best understood, in Naomi

a 3 fosteringr private sector capacities. the latter insist that it is embedded in Chazan's words, as "a complex response g Laudable though these aims are, the normative dispositions of African e to either opportunities presented by state exactlyc how they are to be implemented societies. Since the economy of affec­ engagement in the market or the inade­ n e

remainsc unclear. While some would tion "has not been effectively pushed quacies and frailties of state economic i l dispute the merits of the "minimalist back by feudal or other economic structures".7 Depending on the extent of r state"e advocated by the Bank, by in­ forces",6 it is both normal and pre­ state involvement, then, a distinction d vokingn the conventional wisdom of the dictable that it should occupy the must be drawn at the outset between u 1950s and 1960s, with its emphasis on vacant space left by the breakdown of "activities which are supposedly con­ y state-centred,a "big push" strategies,4 the state. Uncaptured by the state, trolled by the state but either evade this w otherse might properly stress the diffi­ African peasants fall back upon the control or involve illegal use of state t cultiesa involved in getting the "big economy of affection as a solution of position" on the one hand, and "activ­ G

t last resort. That each school of thought ities which ignore the state and operate e holds very different implications for beyond its reach".8 The former trans­ n

*Thisi article was first published as an Occasionalb Paper by The Institute for the policy makers is plain enough. form the state into a market; the latter a

S Rational-choice theorists see the intro­ are the economic manifestation of with­

Study of Geopolitics at Valdosta State College,y Georgia, and is reproduced here with duction of appropriate market incent­ drawal from both state and market. b their kind permission. ives as the quickest way to reduce the d There is an obvious and fundamental e c u d o

214r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R ------Political economy

difference between survival through a transitional phenomenon, destined to norms embedded in African tradition what Chazan refers to as "self-encap­ disappear at the speed of capitalist de­ grossly oversimplifies the "mixed" char­ sulation", which in many instances is velopment, and on the terms dictated by acter of the normative tissue surrounding little more than a euphemism for the most the state. The evidence, however, is informal arrangements. New social precarious forms of existence, and self­ precisely the opposite. Not only are the formations, strategies and forms of beha­ enrichment through corruption, embezzle­ informal sectors expanding in propor­ viour have come into existence in the ment, theft or land speculation, all of tion to capitalist development; the pro­ wake of the dislocations engendered by which normally take place on the fringes cesses of social reproduction at work in capitalist economies, but these are in­ of the formal economy with the active or the informal sectors suggest that they corporated into the cultural idiom of tacit co-operation of state officials. have now reached a degree of institu­ African societies, and thus codified in Failure to distinguish between each tionalization that makes their anticip­ accordance with traditional norms. What type of phenomenon can only obscure ated demise highly unlikely. is emerging is an "invented tradition", to the complex ways in which one may Finally, we must categorically reject borrow Terence Ranger's phrase,14 that interact with the other - how corruption the notion of an undifferentiated social distorts the past and is at the same time at the centre creates those very condi­ universe, in which marginalization be­ validated through symbolic referents tions of neglect, social dislocation or comes a convenient label to describe an borrowed from the past, or, in some political violence that make "self­ extraordinarily diverse spectrum of instances, by linguistic labels borrowed encapsulation" or secession from the economic activities - ranging from ser­ from the West but traditionalized state the only meaningful option, and vices (shoeshine boys, scribes, porters) through local usage. how this in turn further restricts state to manufacturing (anything from ivory There are, of course, almost endless capabilities. Before spelling out the toothpicks to palm-leaf roofing and variations on this theme; no single case argument in more detail, several falla­ sandals made out of cannibalized tyres) can possibly capture the full range of cies ought to be dispelled about the and food-processing - modes of social behavioural norms and practices in­ nature and implications of informal exchange and social categories. Some volved in the operation of informal eco­ sectors (it being understood that the types of social exchange are deeply nomies. Sometimes the emergent divi­ phrase itself carries misleading conno­ rooted in the social organization and sion of labour replicates traditional tations in that it suggests a sectoral dis­ "moral economy" of rural communities. modes of stratification, as in Senegal creteness that exists only in the mind of Some are clientelistic in character; where caste-like differentiations, as be­ the analyst). others are embedded in community or tween superior geer and inferior neno

) One such fallacy is what might be kinship ties; others still are largely im­ castes, have reconfigured themselves in called0 the "convivialist" view of eco­ 1 provised, such as the countless forms of the context of various metal-working nomic0 informality, the essence of which black marketing activities associated activities: jewellery, aluminium smelting 2

isd aptly summed up in A Toure's work, with magendo in Uganda or the second or car-repair shops. As one observer puts e

L'imaginationt au service de la conjonc­ economy in Zaire. Again the infinite it, "it is through the play of caste-cen­ a 9 ture.d The emphasis is on the capacity of variety of social categories that have tered endogamy that such redeployment (

individualsr to "beat the system" through sprung up in the nooks and crevices of of traditional activities has occurred".15 e

endlessh displays of imagination and the informal sectors defy generaliza­ While many of these informal activities s i resourcefulness.l In Latin America this tion. Where Westerners often see an articulate the cultural imperatives of the b

viewu has been popularized by Hernando undifferentiated mass of marginalized wider social environment, not all such P de Soto's The other path,1O in which elements, Africans can readily identify imperatives are equally supportive of the e

theh informal economy is conceptualized its many components - talaka and me­ informal economy, Resistance to the t

asy a major escape hatch from the con­ kunnu in Ibadan, gardawa and mallams growing dysfunctions and inequalities b straints of underdevelopment. Unre­ in Kano, mafutamingi and bayaye in generated by the spread of urban or rural d cordede growth through economic im­ Uganda, haratines and batrounes in capitalism may suddenly activate the t provizationn and self-employment is a Mauritania, bakonde and bagererwa in energies of traditional social formations a keyr characteristic of informal econom­ Rwanda. Only if we appreciate the in the name of a pre-capitalist "moral g

ies.e Echoes of De Soto can be found in complexity of the social landscape of economy". The moral universe of Af­ c

severaln analyses of the African situation, the informal sectors can we begin to rican societies is not a one-way street; it e mostc notably in Hyden's writings on the understand their inner dynamics, not can both legitimize and discredit informal i l merits of the economy of affection, and only their capacity to reproduce them­ economies, and through them the state r Chazan'se fascinating inquest into the selves, but also to generate violent system in which they operate. d dynamicsn of kalabule in Ghana. II Closer eruptions when the dysfunctions of cap­ As a point of entry into this discus­ u scrutiny of the record suggests the need italist development run counter to the sion, consider for a moment the follow­ y fora a more balanced estimate, however. basic norms of their moral economy, ing terms currently in use in the in­ w

Manye observers would probably share including the minimum subsistence for­ formal sectors of Mauritania: batroune, t

Reginalda Green's depressing view of mulas analysed by Scott. 13 tieb-tyib, lehasse, gazra. The first is G Uganda's economy, which he a deformation of the French word t magendo describese as "a brutally and nakedly "patron", but bears only a distant rela­ n

i The cultural underpinnings exploitativeb system which degrades, cor­ tion to traditional patron roles. As one

a of informal economies rupts,S deprives and routinely kills".12 Mauritanian commentator noted

y Closely related to the foregoing is To view the flowering of informal ... the batroune is this dynamic entre­ b the notion that informal economies are economies as evidence of the affective preneur who seeks to reap maximum d e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 215 p e R Political economy------

profits, and who is far more concerned cultural context in which it is likely to even anticipate additional political clout about his business in Las Palmas or the find a measure of social support. (Just in their local communities. The main health of his cattle than about the long to what extent, at what level and for losers, of course, were the landless line of beggars which each day is block­ peasants. Exclusion from the clientelis­ ing access to his office. The traditionally how long this support is likely to exist wealthy were hardly distinguishable from is an empirical question.) tic nets built around the paysannats left the poor. .. but the batroune can be easily The same holds true of other soci­ them with few options: either fall back recognized, since their wealth consists of eties where patron-client ties are highly on the kinship structures, "scavenge" houses, building and enterprises whose institutionalized, such as northern Ni­ the formal economy or migrate to value increases along with speculative geria, Rwanda and Burundi. In the lat­ Uganda or Tanzania. business ventures, and they have their ter two the concept of power is inextri­ Informal economies thus generate own way of speaking, of dressing and behaving towards others. 16 cably bound up with gift-giving. The their own "perverse effects", rooted in Kirundi term kugaba means both "to the patterns of access and exclusion Tieb-tyib, according to the same source, give" and "to claim power". The de­ inherent in their operation. On the one is an entirely new word ... [used] to de­ rivatives are equally instructive: umu­ hand, capitalist development provides a scribe a situation of quasi-theft or certain gabire, "he who has received", in short remarkably fertile soil for the efflores­ murky business dealings [ces affaires peu claires et peu soignees). The phe­ the client whose acceptance of a gift cence of clientelistic networks of one nomenon appeared for the first time in places him under the dependence of his sort or another: it opens up new oppor­ 1980, with the rise of structural unem­ gift-giving superior; ubugabire, the tunities for the expansion of patron­ ployment caused by the inability of the social exchange that enters into a clien­ client ties; it releases new resources and economy to absorb those young school tele relationship: umugabo, the author­ energies for the institutionalization of graduates in search of a job. ity that is expected of a chief. It is easy personalized friendships, informal re­ As for lehasse, the term is of Hassaniya to see why in such an environment gift­ ciprocities and ostentatious displays of origins and means literally "he who giving should be interpreted as the nor­ wealth - all of which testify to the rapid licks". It refers to "this army of civil mal response of power-holders to the inflation of traditional modes of social servants who rip off the coffers of the demands of their subordinates. What exchange. On the other hand, there are state; here they are, raking off fabulous Westerners see as tangible proof of cor­ limits to how far clientelistic polities amounts while concealing their theft rupt behaviour is generally perceived, can handle the shocks of capitalist behind accounting procedures which "from the native's point of view", as development without creating the seeds they have learned to manipulate". the embodiment of social virtue. of their own undoing. To properly grasp

Gazra,) or "usurpation" in Hassaniya, Gift-giving incorporates a logic of the nature of these limitations a shift of 0 perspective is in order - one that draws refers1 to any illegal appropriation of social exchange that is by no means state0 property, but normally refers to devoid of rationality, albeit a very dif­ attention to the transformations taking 2

thed appropriation of land owned by the ferent one from that normally presiding place in the upper reaches of patron­ e state.t "What is especially worrisome", over rural development projects. A case client pyramids, and that, for lack of a a wed are told, "is that no one can avail in point is the fate that befell the World better phrase, may conveniently be sub­ (

himselfr of public services unless he has Bank's paysannat scheme in northern sumed under the rubric of "clientelistic e

theh 'force' or the 'means' to avail him­ Rwanda, designed to open up new tracts involution". s i selfl of such services" .17 of land for peasant cultivation. Though b

u That these are practices for which they intended to give land to the landless,

P Clientelistic involution and are no exact parallels in the traditional most of the lots ended up in the hands of e malign neglect societyh is reasonably clear. To quote: either rich peasants, civil servants or t

y secondary school teachers (moniteurs). "The informal economy is about link­ 1960-1988: three decades that have demol­ b ished an entire system of social organiza­ Only because of their access to wealth ages", writes Chazan. So, too, is clien­ d

e could they provide the local authorities telism, with patronage providing much

t tion and life in common ... everything bears

n traces of these transformations: traditional (bourgmestres) with the expected cash of the lubricant for the smooth func­ a

r values are in decline (en berne), the rewards. The recipients thus became the tioning of patron-client linkages. And g people's life-styles evolve according to the

e clients of the bourgmestres, and were just as the informal economy "flourishes

c rhythms of fashion and of the changes that

n designated as such (bagererwa) in local on the fringes of the formal economy",19

e have taken place in the West, and new

c parlance. Meanwhile, the recipients clientelism, likewise, straddles state and i ideas have been introduced that are all the l called upon their own clients and relat­ society. Each, in fact, is intimately r more dangerous since they are at the anti­ e pode of public order. 18 ives to cultivate their lots, and as the related to the other. The growth of the d

n size of clienteles increased so did informal sectors is both the symptom and u

Andy yet, no matter how extensive and their prestige and social status. While the cause of the logic of political clien­

"outa of sync" with the traditional order, thoroughly subverting the project's tel ism. Access to the formal apparatus of w thesee changes have been given some­ objectives, the informal economy of the the state is a major precondition for t thinga of a sanction of legitimacy paysannat scheme led to a process of allowing clients to enter into the in­ G

throught their symbolic insertion into clientele-building that served the inter­ formal economy; conversely, the wealth e

then cultural idiom of Mauritanian soci­ ests of both patrons and clients. The accumulated in the informal sectors may i ety.b Even though the batroune is local authorities were able to accumu­ also become a key qualification for a

clearlyS a very different political animal late substantial "bribes", the recipients access to a formal government position,

fromy his traditional analogues, his cor­ gained both land and clients, and from which in turn can be used as a source of b

ruptd wheeling and dealing unfolds in a their enhanced social status some could patronage (a situation best exemplified e c u d o

216r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R ------Political economy

by the case of Zaire). As Lancine Sylla Patronage gives way to prebends; detailed inquest into Abidjan's maquis,25 puts it, "Ie clientelisme, c' est l' expres­ cronies and parasites take the place of to cite but one example, while confirm­ sion d' une certaine confusion struc­ patrons and clients. Although official ing many of the points made by Cha­ turelle entre societe et Etat, une confu­ ideologies may emphasize the merits of zan, conveys a singularly more precari­ sion entre prive et public".2o community norms, or paternalist meta­ ous form of existence than might be That there are major variations in the phors, this thinly disguised form of inferred from her analysis of the Ghan­ degree of confusion regarding public ideological domination only serves to aian situation. and private spheres is equally plain. A legitimize the interests of the dominant Although its contours are anything familiar trajectory can be detected in patrons. What comes into view is "a but precise, the social landscape of eco­ the evolution of clientelistic polities, polity of both parasitism and riot, pre­ nomic informality reveals immense basically reducible to the shift from disposed to elaborate a mystique of poverty, considerable social fragmenta­ patronage to prebends as the critical popular resistance".22 tion, and forms of oppression directly mode of social exchange. Patronage is a Popular resistance from the poor and traceable to the malign neglect that ne­ way of eliciting popular support; preb­ the downtrodden takes a variety of forms cessarily affects the rural sectors when endalism is overwhelmingly centred on short of open social violence. These clientelistic involution sets in. Our own personal gain, that is, on the accumula­ have been thoroughly catalogued by investigation of the Bandundu region of tion of personal benefits from the Chazan in her discussion of coping Zaire, in 1978, brings to light remark­ appropriation of public office. The phe­ mechanisms in Ghana: (a) the "suffer­ ably diversified social aggregates: sub­ nomenon has been excellently analysed manage strategy"; (b) escape to greener sistence cultivators, cash crop farmers, by Richard Joseph in his discussion of pastures, often leading to massive plantation workers, fruit cutters, prebendal politics in Nigeria, and many migrations to neighbouring countries; migrant labourers, hunters and scav­ of his insights are equally applicable to (c) "beat-the-system strategies", invol­ engers, all of whom share, besides their Zaire or Uganda. What is involved here ving the construction of an informal extreme poverty, the characteristic of is an involution of clientelistic nets, economy "which bred on the formal sec­ being in one way or another the victims leading to a shrinkage of the field of tor, diverted its resources and set out to of a predatory state.26 social exchange, along with the repro­ manipulate the state in order to serve the Though some of its characteristics duction of increasingly complex forms needs of diverse groups of persons", in can be intuitively grasped from our of personalized reciprocities, rip-offs short what is normally referred to in sketch of clientelistic involution, the and corrupt forms of behaviour, many Ghana as kalahule; (d) "the strategy of concept of the predatory state is inher­

of) them transcending the domestic withdrawal and readjustment of produc­ ently vague. Just how predatory is the 0

arena.1 The concept of involution is bor­ tion modes", which in Ghana "centered state? Who are the predators? What 0

rowed2 from Clifford Geertz (who him­ most notably on agriculture and its reor­ are the mechanisms of predation? Tent­

selfd borrowed it from Alexander ganization as an ongoing basis for eco­ ative answers to these questions can be e Goldenweister),t to denote the growing nomic development".23 On the strength gleaned from an empirical discussion of a complexityd of transactions, including. of her analysis of one rural community state society interactions in specific (

"ar special kind of virtuosity", behind (the village of Rani in Brong Ahafo), contexts. What follows, then, is an e theh persistence of clientelistic patterns. Chazan reaches the conclusion that "the attempt to go beyond the clientelistic s i Thusl Geertz calls attention to the exist­ increased productivity and rise in stand­ involution syndrome and pin down the b

enceu of ard and quality of life evident in Rani patterns of social interactions that lie in P ... those cultural patterns which, after was symptomatic of manifold self­ the background of rural neglect, op­ e

h having reached what would seem to be a reliant moves taking place in other parts pression and revolt. t definitive form, nonetheless fail either to y of the country as well".24 Exactly on b stabilize or transform themselves into a what basis the case of Rani can be said d new pattern but rather continue to e to be "symptomatic" of what was hap­ t develop by becoming internally more The dynamics of state­ n pening in other parts of Ghana remains a

a complicated... . The pattern precludes r mystery, however. society interactions

g the use of another unit or units. but it is

e not inimical to play within the unit or While much of Chazan's analysis is Typically, state and society are linked c

n units. The inevitable result is progressive convincing, the seamier side of the through clientelistic arrangements; who e

c complication, a variety within uniform­ rural economy is entirely left out of the penetrates whom is not always clear, i l

ity, virtuosity within monotony. This is

r account. Indeed the impression one gets however. Situations may arise where

e involution... . Expansive creativeness is that of a remarkably healthy agricul­ the patron-client nets built around the d having dried up at the source, a special n kind of virtuosity takes its place .... 21 ture, drawing renewed strength from state compete with, and in the end u

y the neglect of the state. Although destroy, subsidiary societal networks;

Ina such circumstances, the state is the Ghana may well be the exception that or else the opposite may be the case, w onlye market place for the investment of confirms the rule, to generalize from with traditional social networks in t creativea energies, and the only source Chazan's case study of Rani would effect capturing the state. As it seeks to G

oft profit. Virtuosity in deal-making is seem unwarranted. Moreover, one is co-opt, incorporate and control tradi­ e

substitutedn for "expansive creativeness", impelled to wonder whether in this case tional nets, the latter may in fact end up i andb rip-offs for trade-offs. The giver­ the "convivialist" features of the urban­ controlling the state; as in matters of a receiverS relationship operates in a based kahulale economy have not been inheritance "Le mort saisit Ie V!l".

rapidlyy shrinking political arena, giving overemphasized at the expense of their When this happens, the blurring of b

rised to growing social inequalities. more negative aspects. Bonnassieux's boundaries between the old and the new e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 217 p e R Political economy------

makes for considerable conceptual con­ As alms-giving (zakat) ceased to be the time of Diori's overthrow in 1974, fusion. What some may see as evidence widely practised, and as many of their much of the formal state apparatus had of new social configurations is some­ traditional employment opportunities been "clientelized" by the wealthiest times better understood as a reconfig­ vanished, many students lost their prin­ elements of this class. uration of pre-colonial social forma­ cipal means of subsistence, as well as Though traceable to a pre-colonial, tions, whose renewed vitality stems their means of social reproduction. Hausa-centred trading diaspora, in the from their partial insertion into the So over the decade of the petroleum post independence years the so-called formal apparatus of the state. boom the gardawa, once a respected alhazai (singular: alhaji) emerged as As the following examples demon­ social category that had reproduced the one of the most influential groups in strate, each pattern allows considerable ideology of the Islamic state and pro­ Niger, owing in part to their heavy vided an opportunity for Muslims to gain room for variation - and indeed for ex­ religious merit by giving alms, became involvement in the commercialization planation. No single set of factors redefined by the newly wealthy classes of ground nuts (through their control of accounts for the sharply divergent pat­ as an embarrassing, dangerous and im­ marketing co-operatives), and in part to terns of social dislocation and reconfig­ moral set of people. 28 their informal connections with their 3o uration discernible in the recent histor­ Behind the riots lies something quite dif­ Hausa kinsmen in northern Nigeria. ies of Nigeria, Niger and Mali. ferent from a class struggle - a millenar­ While the apparatus of the state was In part, the explanation lies in the ian insurrection activated by a vision of overwhelmingly dominated by Djerma character and scale of capitalist devel­ "the just society" rooted in the tradition elements from the south-west, until the opment (the oil boom in Nigeria evi­ of Mahdist social movements, a phe­ fall of the Hamani Diori government dently holds very different implications nomenon that, as Lubeck notes, finds an the Hausa merchants were able to from the peanut boom in Niger), in part analogy in Western Europe when "dur­ rapidly expand their control of the in­ in the nature of the networks affected ing a historically analogous period, dis­ formal sectors of the economy, and this by such development (the Koranic net­ placed vagabonds became attracted to with the active (though seldom acknow­ works of Nigeria are qualitatively very ledged) co-operation of Djerma civil militant religious movements in order to 31 different from the dyula networks of regain the material and social security of servants and politicians. The point Mali), and in part in the developmental a lost moral economy".29 that needs to be stressed is that their options of African rulers, or what some As capitalist development threatens control of the informal economy was might describe as "governance". subsistence guarantees the point is intimately tied up with, and conditioned eventually reached where the imperat­ by, their access to the state. Northern) Nigeria: God and This is where another aspect of the 0 ives of social protection and economic gardawa1 against the state informal economy comes into focus­ 0 survival can no longer be handled on 2 What became known in northern Ni­ the basis of established patron-client the so called biki institution, described d

geriae as the Yan Tatsine riots caused by Polly Hill as a "non-usurous device,

t nets. These either tend to disintegrate widespreada violence in at least five and to give way to an alternative mode facilitating borrowing from trusted part­ d major( cities from 1980 to 1985, result­ ners at moments of crisis or celebra­ of social organization, or they undergo r inge in thousands of deaths and the major alterations. In either case, how­ tion".32 The significance of the biki lies h wholesales destruction of public and pri­ in another feature of Niger society: an i ever, the claims of the traditional social l vateb property. As Lubeck argues, the order are difficult to resist. In challeng­ "oblatory" economy involving recipro­ riotsu show "how a pre-capitalist institu­ cal offerings of the kind associated with

P ing the vehicles of official Islam the

tione with a pre-capitalist function and Koranic students drew their inspiration potlatch ceremonies, where status is h supportedt by essentially pre-capitalist heavily conditioned by ostentatious dis­ from a populist, militant Islam associ­ communitiesy is modified by and, in tum, plays of wealth on specific occasions

b ated with an earlier (Mahdist) tradition; reacts to capitalist development".27 (births, circumcisions, marriages, and d a new social configuration came into e t The pre-capitalist institution was the being (the Yan Tatsine sect) to chal­ the like).33 Widely practised among n networka of peripatetic Koranic students lenge the old (the networks of official Djerma cabinet ministers and civil r

(gardawa)g attached to a religious patron servants as a means of reinforcing their and reformist Islam), yet its ideological ore mallam; the pre-capitalist function c roots claimed an even more ancient status and influence within and outside hingedn around the ideological, political the political system, such offerings of­ e pedigree than that of the social system c andi economic reproduction of society; ten led to considerable individual in­ l they sought to displace.

ther pre-capitalist communities were the debtedness. Recourse to the alhazai was e socio-politicald hierarchies of the north­ the normal strategy to secure the loans n Niger: The capture of the state ernu emirates. Capitalist development necessary for servicing the informal net­

duringy the oil boom dealt a devastating While northern Nigeria brings into works built around ostentatious gift giv­ a

bloww to the gardawa networks, as it focus a "client revolt" that looked to the ing. Biki arrangements rapidly flour­ e usheredt in, along with a variety of eco­ past for its inspiration, the case of Niger ished between merchants and civil ser­ nomica constraints (rampant inflation, under Hamani Diori (1960-1974) exem­ vants. As money lenders, however, they G decliningt food output, growing social plifies a very different type of phe­ were seldom repaid in cash but through e n

inequalities),i extensive corruption in nomenon: a merchant class whose inser­ informal concessions ranging from free highb places and the rise of a rentier tion into the formal and informal eco­ access to import licences to tax evasion a S class largely indifferent to the needs of nomic networks of the country gave it a or a blank cheque to smuggle commodi­ y

theb poor. The gardawa were the first to power of patronage out of all proportion ties in and out of the country. Pre­

experienced severe economic hardships. to its traditional role. So much so that, at dictably, the resulting losses in tax e c u d o 218r Africa Insight, vo121, no 4,1991 p e R ------Political economy

revenue were made up by additional de­ Agrarian socialism in Mali led to a money changers and "strong-arm men", mands on peasant producers who, in a catastrophic decline of the rural eco­ representing "up to 200 000 house­ sense, ended up subsidizing the oppor­ nomy; the sheer oppressiveness of the holds".38 Sucked into the bowels of the tunity costs of the informal economy. control mechanisms built into the rural magendo economy the state virtually The capture of the state by the co-operatives caused a substantial num­ ceased to exist as an independent agent. alhazai did not result in anything like ber of peasant families to tum to subsist­ Nor could it be otherwise given the rot­ an "uncaptured peasantry". In fact ex­ ence farming; many simply left the tenness of the state apparatus. Reginald actly the opposite happened, with the country. At the heart of this egregious Green's telling metaphor comes close rural producers emerging as the most failure lies a profound misconception of to approximating the situation in Zaire: exploited sector in society. Every effort rural society. Operating on the wholly Uganda's public sector now resembles an was made to squeeze maximum returns unwarranted assumption that the intro­ old battered but apparently sturdy chair. from peasant production. Raynaut's ac­ duction of collective cultivation would It appears serviceable until one sits in it. count of what he calls "the conflictual fit naturally into the framework of tradi­ Then it collapses into dust because white dynamic of social relationships" leaves tional practices, the Malian leaders ants have eaten out its heart, leaving only a brittle shell.39 little doubt as to the scale of rural ended up driving thousands of peasants exploitation. on to a "forced draft" system of rural The Zairean state has yet to reach this It was not uncommon to see heads of mobilization ominously reminiscent of degree of decomposition, yet what households chained and flogged for failing the worst features of the colonial state. Janet MacGaffey calls "the secondary to meet their fiscal obligations, and village Escape from the state found expression economy" has produced a pattern of chiefs thrown in jail for not being able to in the revitalization of local self-help corruption, embezzlement and fraud en­ obtain from their people the amount of and mutual assistance groups (such as tirely reminiscent of the Uganda situ­ taxes they were expected to pay.3 4 the ton among the Bambara); sub­ ation. What few spasmodic attempts are Unequal exchange is almost a euphem­ sequent attempts to introduce a new made by civil servants to control the ism to describe what was in fact a form of co-operation il) the countryside secondary economy is to make sure that thoroughly exploitative form of state­ through ton-villageois, or village collect­ they and their friends get the lion's sponsored clientelism. ive aid groups, only met with partial share of the loot - a process described success. In the absence of commercial­ by Janet MacGaffey as an attempt "to Mali: The dyula against the state ization networks of the kind that the effect closure of class boundaries". As A very different state of affairs devel­ dyula used to provide, much of the she puts it: ) oped0 in Mali, where the traditional trade Malian economy remained captive of ... the mobilization of these (personal) 1

networks0 built around the dyula mer­ incompetent and corrupt bureaucrats. connections (among members of the 2 chants were virtually wiped out in the administrative class) is a manifestation of d the struggle between this class and those namee of the regime's socialist options. It Uganda and Zaire: Statelessness t who aspire to enter it and represents an is a not an exaggeration to say that the as a variable d effort to effect closure of class bound­ ( dyula-diatigi nets, extensively spread Uganda and Zaire are perfect examples 40

r aries. throughoute the country, served as the of clientelistic involution. Their state h s

buildingi blocks of Modibo Keita's capabilities are almost nil. The impov­ The appropriation of an ever larger l

Unionb Soudanaise (US) in the years erishment of their economies leaves no share of the agricultural production by u room for extensive state-centred patron­ the political class is inseparable from immediatelyP preceding independence in

1960.e By 1962, however, Mali's move client ties; cronyism reigns supreme. the penetration of the rural sectors by h t towards the "radicalization" of the eco­ The society restructures itself independ­ political elites whose strategic positions y

nomyb - involving, among other prior­ ently of the state; it generates its own in the political system and the army

ities,d control of the commanding and fluid, inchoate patterns of stratification, enable them to control both the produc­ e lowert heights of the economy and a replicating at the lower levels the ex­ tion and marketing of agricultural com­ n withdrawala from the CFA franc zone­ emplary cronyism of the centre. modities as well as the sale of consumer r g had driven most of the dyula merchants In Uganda the magendo economy commodities to the rural masses. At the e outc of business. By then the state had has generated a process of capital accu­ elite level, the trade-offs that keep the n emergede as the central arena for a brand mulation over which the state has re­ system going cover a broad spectrum of c i ofl "administrative clientelism"35 through latively little control, except as a means mutual back-scratching and reciprocal

r of entry into the dominant mafutamingi benefits. At the village level, however, whiche huge material profits were siphonedd off the formal economy and stratum, characterized by Reginald the terms of exchange are not nego­ n redistributedu among civil servants and Green as "the dominant capitalist sub­ tiable. They are enforced through the

theiry obedient clients. As administrative class who control the magendo sys­ brutal logic of the Mobutuist state: non­ a

corruptionw flourished on an unpreced­ tem",37 Below this top group, number­ compliance inevitably brings forth retri­ e entedt scale the Malian economy went ing anywhere from 50 to 100 members, bution. The only alternative for the a

intoG a tailspin. A class of nouveaux Green identifies the magendoists, per­ peasants is to take to the bush. Or to

t find solace in various forms of "suffer­ richese thus emerged on the debris of the haps 2 500 strong, as "substantial mag­ n traditionali merchant class that not only endo businessmen, in some cases relat­ manage" strategies, which in most cases b

lackeda the latter's powerful connections ively independent but often related to a means considerable suffering and very S with the rural sectors, but failed utterly mafutamingi's group"; finally, at the few resources to manage. A vicious cir­ y

b cle develops in which rural stagnation to restructure Mali's peasant societies bottom of the heap are the bayaye,

d 36 consisting of street traders, drivers, feeds upon coercion, and the likelihood alonge the lines of its socialist options. c u d o Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p 219 e R Political economy------

of coercion increases in proportion to some having to do with Houphouet's entirely predictable consequence of the levels of exploitation tolerated by flagging energies, others with the catas­ individual or collective disaffection the state. trophic decline in the price of cocoa, becoming the characteristic feature of and the decision of international lend­ the informal economy. Cote d'ivoire: The uneasy synthesis ing agencies to negotiate loans directly Second, the relationships between the At the other end of the spectrum are with the representatives of ministries state and the informal sectors are not cases where the state retains enough and parastatal agencies - the old clien­ always reducible to a zero-sum game, control over the economy to orchestrate telistic pyramid had given way to "a where the latter expand while the former a wide range of clientelistic strategies; segmentary structure, each agent who atrophies; in their more corrupt and il­ the aim is to convert patronage re­ controlled a network and each holder of legal manifestations informal economies sources into bases of political support; a resource in the universe of patronage must be understood as an integral part the stability of the system depends not claiming a growing autonomy".46 The of a state system that has a major stake only on its distributive capacities but on crisis of patronal authority, as Faure in their perpetuation. The irony is that in the ability of the super-patron to estab­ suggests, is also a crisis of the patrimo­ so doing the state unwittingly sets the lish his own scale of priorities. Cote nial economy. The constraints thus stage for its own undoing, thus leaving d'Ivoire provides a classic example. placed upon patron-client relations the path clear for the proliferation of The alliance of the old plantocracy and calls into question their long-term via­ self-encapsulated communities operat­ the new generations of civil servants bility, and raises the more fundamental ing independently of, and often in oppo­ has proved remarkably beneficial to problem of how far a clientelist polity sition to, the residual state. both (though by no means to the eco­ can continue to draw on its shrinking Third, and as a consequence of the nomy) while at the same time providing economic resources without engender­ foregoing, the absence of appropriate the basis for what might be described as ing its own collapse. market incentives is only one of several the epitome of the clientelist polity.41 The cumulative impact of indebted­ factors that have contributed to the As long as the planter-politicians ness, declining commodity prices, and growth of informal sectors. The lack of provided the principal linkages between shrinking foreign exchange resources market incentives is itself a reflection the state and the rural constituencies, a has radically transformed the social of a more fundamental crisis - the rapid substantial portion of investment cap­ parameters of Ivoirean politics. Eco­ decline of state capabilities in a context ital found its way into the rural sectors. nomic austerity seriously complicates of self-generating economic scarcity. Over the last decade, however, the the maintenance of extensive patron­ The result is a rapid shrinkage of patron­ ) agrarian0 bourgeoisie has been largely client sets; prebendalism threatens to client nets, accompanied by a prolifera­ 1 displaced0 by bureaucrats and party offi­ dry up the sources of patronage and tion of transient and instrumental ties 2 cials with few solid roots in the coun­ substitute "crony statism" for clientel­ between civil servants and their inter­ d

e 48 tryside.t The new generation of bureau­ istic statism. Structural readjustment in mediaries. Although the use of the cratsa derive none of their income from such circumstances can only perpetuate clientelistic model smacks of reduction­ d ( cocoa and coffee farming, but through the built-in propensities of the system ism, as a heuristic device it is not with­ r state-centrede activities of an increas­ towards corruption and cronyism. out merit. As we have seen, out of the h s inglyi prebendal character. These in­ encounter of clientelistic nets with the l cludeb "directorships and minority shares spread of capitalist economies, both u Conclusion inP foreign companies; holdings in end up drastically transformed, the for­ trucking,e shipping and taxi services; Let us, by way of a conclusion, try to mer into involuted, prebendal forms of h t

Abidjan real estate; and investments in formulate a few tentative generaliza­ exchange, the latter into informal sec­ y

exportb agriculture not subject to mar­ tions about this highly fluid and varie­ tors dominated by corruption and social

ketingd boards regulations".42 The result­ gated social universe. The first and inequalities. In short, the forces that e ingt decline of investment in cocoa and most obvious point to be made relates drive individuals into informal channels n coffeea farming has had disastrous ef­ to the difficulties involved in conceptu­ are largely beyond their control, and the r g fects on the rural sectors, leaving the alizing the informal economy in terms choices they make to ensure their own e vastc majority of peasant producers "as a of a "vacant space" occupied by cultur­ survival are rooted in a social universe n heavilye taxed and unorganized group".43 ally determined "affective" dispositions. that is neither reducible to the economy c i

l Predictably, the logic of the system Such a view leaves out two critical of affection nor limited to the calculus

r hase tended to produce an increasingly variables: the extraordinary diversity of of profits and losses that normally predatoryd economy.44 The privatization

n social structures that underlie self-help enters into the accounting of rational­ u of the public sectors (state enterprises or self-encapsulation strategies, ranging choice theorists. y

anda parastatal organizations) has led to from community and kinship ties to a w massive siphoning of state funds into household organization, occupati~mal e t

privatea hands. "At the beginning of the divisions along caste lines, age-grade

G Notes and references

1980s", writes Faure, "more than half work groups, patron-client ties, and so t thee public external debt was attribut­ forth, all of which point to different World Bank, Sub·Saharan Africa: From n ablei to ten or so parapublic concerns".45 modes of social exchange rather than a crisis to sustainable growth, Washington b DC: World Bank, 1990. Ata the same time, the system contains universal and spontaneous display of S affection;47 and the changes in the 2 Ibid, P 60. withiny itself the seeds of severe social b fragmentation. Some have already structure of social exchange attendant 3 Ibid, P 61. d sprouted.e For a variety of reasons- upon capitalist development, with the 4 D K Fieldhouse, Black Africa 1945-1980: c u d o r

220p Africa Insight. vol 21, no 4, 1991 e R ------Political economy

Economic decolonization and arrested de­ 19 Naomi Chazan, "Patterns of state-society vol IX, no 33, 1978; idem, "Develop­ velopment, London: Allen and Unwin, 1986. incorporation ... ", op cit, p 127. pement rural et comportement economique 5 Thomas Callaghy, "Lost between state and 20 Lancine Sylla, "Genese et fonctionnement traditionnel au sem d'une societe afri­ market: The politics of economic adjust­ de I'etat c1ienteliste en Cote d'lvoire", caine", Geneve-Afrique, vol VIII, no 2, ment in Ghana, Zambia and Nigeria", in Archives Europeennes de Sociologie, vol 1969. Joan Nelson (ed), Economic crisis and XXVI, 1985, P 30. 34 C Raynaut, "L'agriculture nigerienne et la policy choice: The politics of adjustment 21 Clifford Geertz, Agricultural involution: crise du Sahel", Politique Africaine, no 28, in the Third World, Princeton, NJ: The process of ecological change in 1987, p 103 Princeton University Press, 1990, p 262. Indonesia, Berkeley, CA: University of 35 Jean-Loup Amselle and Emmanuel Gre­ 6 Goran E Hyden, No shortcuts to progress, California Press, 1968, p 81. goire, op cit, p 28. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University 22 Kenneth Dawson, The state tradition in 36 William Jones, Planning and economic of California Press, 1983, p 10. Western Europe, New York, Oxford policy: Socialist Mali and her neighbours, 7 Naomi Chazan, "Patterns of state-society University Press: 1990, p 62. Washington, DC: Three Continents Press, incorporation and disengagement from 23 Naomi Chazan, An anatomy of Ghanaian 1976. Africa", in D Rothchild and N Chazan politics ... , op cit, pp 192-196. 37 Reginald Green, op cit, p ii. (eds), The precarious balance: State and society in Africa, Boulder, CO: Westview 24 Ibid, P 198. 38 Ibid. Press, 1988, p 126. 25 Alain Bonnassieux, L' autre Abidjan: 39 Ibid, P 3. Histoire d' un quartier oublie, Paris: Kar­ 8 Ibid. 40 Janet MacGaffey, "How to survive and thala, 1987. 9 A Toure, Les petits metiers a Abidjan: become rich amidst devastation: The sec­ L'imagination au service de la conjonc­ 26 Rene Lemarchand, "The politics of penury ond economy in Zaire", African Affairs, ture, Paris: Karthala, 1985. in rural Zaire: The view from Bandundu", vol 82, no 328, July 1983, p 363. in Guy Gran (ed), Zaire: The political 41 Lancine Sylla, op cit. 10 Hernando de Soto, The other path, New economy of underdevelopment, New York: York: Harper & Row. 1989. Praeger, 1979. 42 Robert Hecht, "The Ivory Coast economic II Naomi Chazan, An anatomy of Ghanaian 27 Paul Lubeck, "Islamic protest under semi­ miracle: What benefits for peasant farm­ politics: Managing political recession, industrial capitalism: Yan Tatsine ex­ ers?", The Journal of Modern African 1969-1982, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, plained", in J D Y Peel and C C Stewart Studies, vol 21, no I, March 1983, p 50. 1983, p 192 ff. (eds), Popular Islam south of the Sahara, 43 Ibid, P 53. 12 Reginald Green, Magendo in the political Manchester: Manchester University Press, 44 Yves Faure, "Cote d'lvoire: Analyzing the economy of Uganda: Pathology, parallel 1985, p 372. crisis",in Donal B Cruise O'Brien, John system or dominant sub-mode of produc­ 28 Ibid, P 380. Dunn and Richard Rathbone (eds), Con­ ) tion? IDS, Discussion Paper 164, Brigh­ 0 29 Ibid, P 385. temporary West African states, Cam­ 1 ton: University of Sussex, 1981, P i. bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 0 30 Emmanuel Gregoire, aLe fait economique 132 James C Scott, The moral economy of the p 70. 'Haoussa', Politique Africaine, no 38. d peasant, New Haven, CT: Yale University e 1990. 45 Ibid. t Press, 1976 a 31 Ibid; Jean-Loup Amselle and Emmanuel 46 Ibid. 14d Terence Ranger, "The invention of tradi­ ( Gregoire, "Complicites et conflits entre 47 Rene Lemarchand, "African peasantries, r tion in colonial Africa",in E Hobsbawm e and T Ranger (eds), The invention of tra­ bourgeoisies d'etat et bourgeoisies d' affaires reciprocity and the market: The economy h

s au Mali et au Niger", in E Terray (ed), of affection reconsidered", Cahiers i dition, Cambridge: Cambridge University l L' etat contemporain en Afrique, Paris: b Press, 1983. d' Etudes Africaines, vol XXIX. no I, 1989,

u L'Harmattan, 1987. pp 33- 67.

15P Michel Agier, "Un secteur informel tres 32 Polly I Hill, Rural Hausa: A village and a e structure", Autrement, Hors Serie no 9, 48 Idem, "The state, the parallel economy and

h setting, Cambridge: Cambridge University t October 1984, pp 80-88. the changing structure of patronage sys­ Press, 1972, p 151. y tems", in Naomi Chazan and Donald

16b Chaab (Nouakchott), 23 December 1982. 33 Guy Nicolas, "Processus oblatifs a l'occa­ Rothchild (eds), The precarious balance: 17d Ibid. e sion de l'intonisation de chefs tradition­ state and society in Africa, Boulder, CO: t

18n Ibid. nels en pays Hausa", Revue Tiers Monde. Westview Press, 1988, p 161. a r g

e c n e c i l

r e d n u

y a w e t a G

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Africap Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 221 e R Political economy------

Policy impact of democracy in South Africa

Professor Fanie Cloete, Department of Development Studies, Rand Afrikaans University, analyses the policy issues that will confront South Africans in the near future*

Introduction democracy there. This will therefore be Policy choices in democratic This article will explore a few dimen­ an exercise in institutional policy ana­ transitions sions of the causal relationship between lysis, undertaking a tentative, qualitat­ ive assessment of certain potential con­ The study of political transitions to policy choices by political actors and democracy is fast becoming a growth institutional development in South sequences of the pending regime change in South Africa. 2 industry. It was triggered by an excel­ Africa.) Larry Diamond has argued the lent exploratory study in theory build­

0 After the events of the preceding issue1 as follows: ing by O'Donnell and Schmitter, fol­

0 eighteen months in South Africa, it

2 lowed by analyses by equally eminent ... politicalleadership - both of individual appears to be only a matter of time d scholars such as Diamond, Linz and e government and party leaders, and of before a new inclusive democratic sys­ t

a political leaders cont1icting and concili­ tem of black majority rule is estab­ Lipset, Higley and Burton, and a num­

d 3

( ating as a group - can make a difference ber of others. The political domino lished there. This assumption, however, r both to the success and failure of demo­ effect of democratic transition that e is a dangerous oversimplification of the

h cratic development. But the extent of that

s started in Southern Europe with the

i difference depends not only on the qual­ present position in South Africa. Di­ l unexpected collapse of the authoritarian b ities of leadership, but on the nature of verse (potential and real) demographic, u the social, economic, cultural, and polit­ Portuguese regime in 1974 and quickly

P political, cultural, social and economic spread to South America, Central e ical conditions in which it operates. constraints complicate the achievement h Moreover - and this is the most crucial

t America, Eastern Europe and now

of this objective. It is quite possible

y linkage that is often missed - those con­ Southern Africa, will probably be keep­

b that the first post-apartheid govern­ ditions themselves are not just given: ing students of democracy occupied for d they are significantly the product of the ment, which may initially be more rep­ e

t years to come. policies, choices and decisions of previ­ resentative and legitimate than its n Central to all these analyses is the a ous generations of leaders.l immediate predecessor, may quickly r important role attributed to political g

deteriorate into a system as authoritar­

e leaders and the deliberate policy Unlikec Diamond, who analysed dif­ ian and repressive as the system it

n choices they make to enter into vitally ferente types of leadership and their replaces. Experience in other parts of c

i important agreements with one another implicationsl for a comparative study, I the world confirms this assessment. willr devote attention here to certain These conclusions have profound pol­ during the transition process. The im­ e societald constraints in South Africa as icy implications for any post-apartheid portance of this political phenomenon n was also confirmed by my personal par­ wellu as to certain policy choices open to

government in South Africa, irrespect­ politicaly actors that will substantially ive of its composition. ticipation in (and subsequent assess­ a ment ot) the initiation of recent polit­ influencew the (possible) development of My article will briefly identify the

e 4 t crucial forces that will probably deter­ ical change in South Africa. a Although political "leaders" (Dia­

G mine the outcome and assess the impact

* t This article is based on a paper prepared for mond) or "elites" (Higley and Burton) e that several different policies to deal

then 15th World Congress of the International must take mass preferences and inter­ i with these forces will have on the Politicalb Science Association in Buenos ests into consideration, these issues:

a nature of future political institutions

Aires,S Argentina, July 1991. Financial assist­ and processes in South Africa. An ana­ ancey by the Human Sciences Research ... constitute parameters within which b

Council for this study is gratefully acknow­ lytical focus will be used, not a descript­ elites can safely and effectively act. d

ledged.e ive approach to the subject matter. These parameters normally leave elites a c u d o r

222p Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 e R ------Political economy

range of choices, and the choices they he personally adheres to a very conser­ apartheid government. This would prob­ make tend to be decisive for political vative ideology, and still is vehemently ably necessitate an alliance of some 5 outcomes. anti-communist, he abolished the thirty­ sort with the ANC/SACP as the major In the transition literature, institutional year bans on the three principal illegal political force in a new South Africa. political change to democracy is nor­ political resistance movements in the On the other hand, being a staunch mally initiated by such relatively auto­ country: the dominant Marxist-Leninist anti-communist and a devout and fun­ nomous political elites.6 For a number oriented African National Congress damentalist Calvinist Christian, De of reasons (of which personal ambition, (AN C), its close ally the (until recently Klerk finds the idea of associating him­ interest and survival frequently make Stalinist-oriented) South African Com­ self with the SACP unacceptable. This up a substantial part), they normally munist Party (SACP) and their political is also the predominant view of his decide to bury the hatchet (literally in rival the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), party, which in decades of propaganda the South African situation), and to an African socialist political organiza­ has equated the avowedly atheist SACP enter into one or more negotiated settle­ tion. He also lifted a five year national with the Antichrist and Satan. De Klerk's ments, pacts or agreements aimed at state of emergency, released scores of attempts to persuade the de facto leader ending violent conflict and replacing it political prisoners, announced the in­ of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, to break with a new political arrangement. These tended abolition of many racially dis­ the alliance between the ANC and the pacts do not always guarantee a demo­ criminatory policies constituting "apart­ SACP have so far failed. Mandela has cratic system. And attempts at settle­ heid", and declared himself willing to proved fiercely loyal to his old friends ment may break down, depending on negotiate a new political system with and allies, as well as to his increasingly the participants' commitment to a nego­ equal rights for all citizens.9 controversial wife, Winnie. tiated resolution of the existing dispute The ANC/SACP alliance reciproc­ This situation has forced De Klerk to and their willingness to compromise. In ated by formally ending its "armed look towards another political actor for the last resort, the determining factor is struggle" aimed at violently overthrow­ assistance, Chief Mangosuthu Buthe­ always to be found in the policy choices ing De Klerk's white minority govern­ lezi, powerful leader of the Inkatha exercised by the negotiating partners, ment through a revolution started among Freedom Party (lFP), political vehicle influenced by various intervening soci­ the disfranchised black masses and for the largest and most aggressive eth­ etal and psychological variables as per­ aimed at taking over power in the coun­ nic group in the country, the Zulus. ceived by the parties concerned.7 try. It declared itself willing to negoti­ The Zulus today total approximately ate a new multiparty democratic system 8,5 million people compared with the

) for South Africa on condition that all Xhosas (the ethnic group dominating Recent0 political develop­ 1 remaining political prisoners were the ANC to which Mandela and most of 0

ments2 in South Africa

freed, all political exiles were allowed the senior members of the ANC be­ d

Coloniale occupation of the southern­ to return and the remaining security long), with approximately 6,9 million t

mosta tip of the African continent oc­ laws restricting free political expres­ members and the white racial commun­ d curred( as early as 1652, when the Dutch sion and action were abolished. IO ity of 5 million members (approx­ r

Easte India Company established a per­ De Klerk's policy changes on 2 Feb­ imately 2,5 million Afrikaners and 2,5 h manents provisioning depot on the site ruary 1990 sent shock waves through million other members chiefly speaking i l 8 the conservative white Afrikaner estab­ English, German, Dutch, Portuguese,

whereb Cape Town later developed.

Sinceu that moment - three-and-a-half lishment that makes up his main polit­ Greek, Italian, and French). P

centuriese ago - the descendants of these ical constituency. They led to large­ Buthelezi is a professed Anglican, h

Europeant settlers, supplemented by im­ scale defections from his pragmatic free-market supporter and political

migrantsy mainly of British, French, National Party (NP) to the ultra-right moderate compared to the more radical b

Germand and Portuguese descent, have wing Conservative Party (CP) which ANC/SACP leaders. The Zulus, how­ e dominatedt this region in all respects, tries to reinstate classical apartheid. ever, are politically split between the n

despitea the fact that they today consti­ Although recent opinion polls have still IFP and the ANC/SACP. This weakens r

tuteg only 12 per cent of the inhabitants. predicted a close victory for the NP Buthelezi's power base. Buthelezi is

e over the CP if an election should be also for a number of reasons persona c As in other similar situations, Euro­ peann intrusion established a colonial held now, the NP's margin of success is non grata with many influential ANC e c rulei that sparked off the protracted con­ steadily diminishing. It has been stated leaders, although he has been a friend l

flictr being waged to this day in South by government spokesmen that no of Mandela himself for a long time. e

Africa,d earning the country the dubious whites-only election will ever be held These facts, together with a history of n again. This alleviates political pressures ethnic competition between Zulus and distinctionu of being, probably, the last

remainingy important example of colo­ on De Klerk from the right, although Xhosas for scarce resources, diminish nialisma in the world. sporadic and small-scale vigilante the prospects of an aIliance between w e t After these centuries of white minor­ actions by frustrated white farmers and Buthelezi and the ANC/SACP. itya rule, a political breakthrough in the isolated individual right-wing terrorists The beginnings of a trend of closer G

directiont of popular democracy in South continue. co-operation between De Klerk and e

African now seems imminent. On 2 Feb­ De Klerk has not made up his own Buthelezi (and concomitantly between i ruaryb 1990, today's State President, mind as to which strategy he wishes to the NP and the IFP) in opposition to the a S

F W de Klerk, announced sudden and pursue. On one hand he wants to retain ANC/SACP can be perceived as a y

far-reachingb concessions to his black for himself and the NP as much polit­ result of these forces. An important

politicald enemies. Despite the fact that ical influence as possible in any post- manifestation of this trend is the not so e c u d o Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 223 p e R Political economy------

subtle bias of the South African Police legitimate non-partisan umbrella organ­ Real negotlatIOns on the principal and Defence Force in favour of the IFP ization to co-ordinate all these bodies in political issues have, therefore, not yet in the increasingly frequent incidents of order to establish a vibrant and inde­ started. South Africa finds itself in urban violence in black townships pendent civil society. This will cer­ what is sometimes called the prepara­ resulting from the political power strug­ tainly further undermine the ANC's tory phase of negotiations. gle between the IFP and ANC/SACP attempts to consolidate political con­ alliance. As a result of these devel­ trol, but will stimulate free democratic opments, De Klerk's early political organization and a spirit of lively enter­ Policy implications of honeymoon with the ANC is something prise in civil society. I I demographic constraints of the past. The reason for the decision to The racial and ethnic composition of A legal organization for only seven­ replace the UDF with another non-par­ the South African popUlation is an teen months, after being banned for tisan organization is to be found in the important fact in the political debate. thirty years, the ANC is finding it continuing political enmity between the The total population of approximately exceedingly difficult to organize itself ANC and the PAC, a result of the 39,5 million, including the residents of as a streamlined political movement PAC's splitting away from the ANC in what have been known as the self-gov­ and exercise control over its supporters. 1959 through its rejection of the erning and "independent" homelands, is It has not yet succeeded in transforming Freedom Charter of 1955, still the constituted as follows: itself from a revolutionary resistance ANC's political credo. The UDF also movement into a recognized party and accepted the Freedom Charter as an Table 1: Racial composition of part of the country's political establish­ operating framework when it was the South African population ment. It has become notorious for an established on 20 August 1983. The (1990 projections)13 administration in disarray, with tele­ PAC rejects the Freedom Charter prin­ phones that are not answered, messages cipally because of its non-racial charac­ Black 30289000 (76,6%) that are not delivered and appointments ter. The PAC's strongly African social­ White 5031000 (12,7%) that are made and then just ignored. Its ist ideology accords a more important Coloured 3245000 (8,2%) membership drive has attracted fewer role to Africans than to whites in the Indian. 961000 (2,5%) members than expected. struggle for a new South Africa. The ANC also suffers from internal During April 1991 the ANC and the Total 39526000 (100%) power struggles among a number of PAC agreed to work seriously towards

"Young) Turks" in the organization who a settlement of their differences; but in 0 are 1 all in the race to succeed an ageing practice the ideological gap looms Cross-cutting language and cultural 0 2

and frail leadership. Thirty years under­ large. The PAC still refuses to formally cleavages further complicate the demo­

d graphic situation in the country. Table 2 grounde has had an unhappy effect on end its armed struggle and embrace a t

the a cohesion of the organization. At negotiated settlement with the NP summarizes these language cleavages. d least( five powerful interest groups cur­ before all remaining discriminatory le­ There are no less than 24 different

r

rentlye compete for dominance in the gislation has been repealed, before the home languages, of which eight are h

ANC.s They are the present Robben NP has made a commitment to return spoken by ethnic groups with more than i Islandl prison leadership cadre who all land taken away from blacks, and I million members each. b wereu released in February 1990 and before they have accepted the principle The relatively small-minority status P

worke closely with the second group, the of an elected Constituent Assembly as of the white community (12,7 per cent

h 12 Lusaka-basedt external wing of the negotiating forum. of the total population), linked to its

organization;y the SACP; the trades Negotiations between the NP and the high level of development and strong b unions; and the United Democratic ANC have recently stalled on the issue economic position because of the policy d e

Frontt (UDF), founded as an internal of certain remaining political prisoners, of apartheid, have caused strong feel­ frontn in the days when the ANC was ings of apprehension and fear among

a exiles not granted amnesty, the refusal r

stillg banned. The trades unions and the of the NP to accept the principle of an members of that community of the con­

UDFe have since acquired a life of their elected constitutional assembly and an sequences for them of black majority c own,n independent of the ANC, chiefly interim government to oversee the pro­ rule. These emotions are strengthened e c becausei the Robben Island leaders have cess of transformation to a new South by the unfavourable record, as white l

so r far failed to integrate UDF and Africa, and the refusal of the NP to ban South Africans see it, of black govern­ e tradesd union leaders fully into national the carrying of spears (as traditional ments' treatment of white settler com­ n

andu regional ANC executive structures. weapons) by Zulus. munities in the former Belgian Congo,

Therey are a number of reasons why The inability of the ANC to persuade Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe and so forth. the a ANC finds it difficult to bring these w the NP to accede to its requests, and the This has persuaded De Klerk to strongly e localt civic organizations, trades unions delays in achieving constructive results emphasize the need for statutory guar­ anda other interest groups, which had a from negotiations, have caused many antees of minority rights and the estab­ G fieldt day inside the country while the youth members of the ANC to defect to lishment of a federal-type government e

ANCn was still a banned organization

i the PAC, which has a more hard-line with a two-chamber legislature of which operatingb from outside South Africa's policy. This further undermines the one chamber would be constituted on a a S borders, fully into its influence sphere. authority and status of the ANC as the community basis, with a weak national y

Plansb are in an advanced stage to chief liberation movement in South government, and with stronger regional

replaced the UDF with another, more Africa. and local governments. Although the e c u d o r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991

224p e R ------Political economy

Table 2: Home languages in Policy implications of socio­ are R34,3 bn (1.32 per cent) and South Africa (1990 projections)14 economic constraints R3S, I bn (2,26 per cent) respectively. The corresponding export figures Zulu 8541000 (21,6%) In contrast to the relative affluence of are R46,7 bn for 1990 (3,41 per Xhosa 6891 000 (17,4%) the white community in the country, cent), R47 bn (0,S7 per cent) for Afrikaans 6 188000 (15,7%) blacks in South Africa suffer many of 1991 and R48,S bn (3, IS per cent) (1980 racial breakdown of Afrikaans: the social ills characteristic of Third for 1992. 18 World states: illiteracy, poverty, hunger, whites 551000 (51,6%) A positive foreign trade balance of a lack of access to sufficient opportun­ coloureds 2297000 (46,6%) R 1,7 bn existed in February 1991. 19 ities for housing, health services, em­ blacks 81000 (1,6%) ployment, skilled labour, land and so South Africa's gold and foreign Indians 10000 (0,2%» on. This is the inheritance of colonial reserves (1991) are worth R6,9 bn.2o Tswana 3601000 (9.1%) discrimination, not only present in The prime interest rate at the end of North Sotho 3438000 (8.7%) many sectors of society but still domi­ 1990 was 21 per cent, estimated to drop to 18 per cent at the end of English 3432000 (8.7%) nant in some. 1991.21 (1980 racial breakdown of English: What is necessary here is a deliber­ ate attempt to redistribute wealth, ser­ Inflation, measured by the annual whites I 720000 (62,2%) vices and land in order to reverse the rate of increase in the consumer Indians 676000 (24,5%) huge inequalities currently existing in price index, is expected to fall from coloureds 337000 (12.2%) society; and to effect a durable demo­ 13,S per cent during 1990 to 12,36 blacks 30000 (1,1%» cratic system. It is uncertain, however. per cent at the end of 1991 but will South Sotho 2652000 (6.7%) whether the white community is willing probably rise again in 1992 to 12,86 22 Shangaanffsonga I 349000 (3,4%) to face this challenge; whether the state per cent. Swazi 926 000 (2,3%) of the economy will allow it; and The rise in wage levels for 1990 whether there will be a sufficiently was IS,8 per cent while the pro­ Ndebele 802 000 (2,0%) innovative entrepreneurial class and jected changes for 1991 and 1992 Venda 763000 (1,9%) skilled work-force to generate surpluses are still below the inflation rate - Other home languages 943 000 (2,5%) for redistribution, or sufficient interna­ 11.2 per cent and 13,12 per cent (Portuguese, German, tional investment and assistance to respectively.23 Greek. Italian, Dutch. make possible such a vast project. French,Chinese,) Gujerati, The officially estimated unemploy­ Hindi,0 Tamil, Urdu, Telegu) If inequalities between the different

1 ment figures for 1988 (excluding that

0 communities cannot be remedied, how­ for whites which was minimal), were: 2 Total 39526000 (100%) ever, the chances of a stable democracy d blacks, 13 per cent of the economi­ e

t in South Africa are slim. cally active black population (823 (00); a

d South Africa's present economic Indians, 8 per cent (26 000); and (

ANCr has already agreed to the principle position does not offer encouragement coloureds, 8 per cent (92000).24 e for large-scale spending sprees on re­ h Employment figures grew 0,3 per

ofs a bill of rights and minority guaran­ i tees,l it has so far resisted pressures for a distributive action: cent in 1990 but are estimated to b Its 1991 budget was R8S bn (approx­ federal-typeu system from fear that it grow by 4,08 per cent in 1991 and P might lead to a perpetuation of apart­ imately US$34 bn at the current grow again slightly by 0, 10 per cent e

h exchange rate of US$I =R2,80) with in 1992.25 According to one estimate

heidt and therefore white privilege. a deficit before borrowing of RIO, I bn y The relatively small size of the white 4S0 000 new jobs are needed every b community and its history of total dom­ (3,4 per cent of GDP).15 year over the next 13 years in order to d

e It grapples with a foreign debt of provide sufficient jobs for everybody. inationt may, however. just entice the ANCn to ignore these white fears. This RSO bn.16 This would necessitate a massive a

r 1990 saw a real economic growth annual growth rate of S-6 per cent mayg increase the possibility of a reac­

tionarye white backlash and complicate rate of -0,9 per cent in the GDP of every year over this period - a goal c 26 then negotiations process and the imple­ R132,4 bn and -3,1 per cent in the clearly impossible to achieve. e

c GDE of R119,S bn. The expected mentationi of its eventual outcome. If a There is a housing backlog of 2,2 l

substantialr number of whites refuse to growth rate in GDP for 1991 is million units at present, mainly for e slightly better at R132 bn (-0,27 per acceptd a negotiated outcome, the devel­ blacks in urban areas. In addition to opmentn of a durable democratic system cent) while an improved 1992 pro­ this backlog, it is estimated that an u

iny South Africa will be endangered. jection is estimated at R 134,4 bn additional 240 000 homes must be Thea organizational, economic and milit­ 0.83 per cent). The expected changes provided each year until the year w

e in the GDE for these periods are a 2000 in order to meet future aryt power bases of the white commu­ nitya make any political decision by the change of R119,3 bn (-O,IS per cent) demands resulting from expected G

ANCt to alienate substantial numbers of for 1991 and RI21 bn (1,43 per cent) population increases. This is a huge e thisn community a risky one. Unfor­ for 1992.17 and probably impossible demand - i tunatelyb there is an influential school of The 1990 import figure of R33,9 bn triple the current rate of 70 000 to a

S 80000 new dwellings per year.27 thought in the ANC - and especially represents a growth of -3,07 per y

amongb political elites in the SACP­ cent over the previous year. The Educational inequalities. Govern­

thatd promotes just such a hard line. expected changes for 1991 and 1992 ment schools are still organized on a e c u d o Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 225 p e R Political economy------

racial basis. In 1989, 26 per cent of mines, banks and industries is still an statement is the plain fact that federal­ of the available places in white official policy objective, subject to the ism operates with a low degree of suc­ schools were not filled (307 000 out ANC's being offered acceptable altern­ cess in the Soviet Union, Brazil, of I 180000). Simultaneously there ative proposals strong enough to per­ Nigeria and India; and failed some was a shortage of 60 000 places for suade its leaders that sufficient finances years ago in colonial Central Africa. children in black primary schools for redistributive purposes can be gener­ Complex democratic political sys­ and 99 500 places in black sec­ ated in other ways. The ANC also plans tems designed on the basis of the theory ondary schools.28 an increase in the role of the public sec­ and principles of extreme non-central­ In 1988 the state's per capita expen­ tor in South African society. Judging by ization or decentralization (federalism diture on school education outside experience in other societies, this or devolution), are implemented differ­ the homelands was: whites, R2 722; increase in state intervention will preju­ ently in different developing countries: coloureds, RI 507; Indians, R2 014; dice lasting democracy in the country strong and effective central control is and blacks, R595. 29 because it will still further weaken the exercised over all subsystems in various The pupil/teacher ratios in 1988 economy.35 direct or indirect ways (a state of emer­ (excluding some homelands) were: It has not been my intention to assess gency in India, military governments in white, 16 to I; Indian, 20 to 1; the socio-economic status of South Nigeria and Brazil and the ideology of coloured, 25 to I; and black, 41 to 1.30 Africa here but to draw certain conclu­ communism in the Soviet Union).37 Black school-Ieavers in 1987 to­ sions from the situation as it is. The central problem is illustrated by talled 718 000, of whom 63 per cent the following comments from an Indian left primary schoo!.3l judge in 1977 on the Indian experience Policy implications of politi­ of federalism: In 1988 the five Afrikaans-language cal constraints The extent of federalism is largely universities had a black student en­ watered down by the needs of progress rolment of 3 per cent (1 800 out of Democracy in the Third World and development of a country which had 63700 students) while the tradition­ The record of democracy in the Third to be nationally integrated; politically ally English language universities and economically co-ordinated; and World, especially in Africa, is not had an enrolment of 10 per cent socially, intellectually and spiritually good. 36 The single-party state is the black, 5 per cent coloured and 6 per uplifted. In such a system, the States can­ most favoured model of government, not stand in the way of legitimate and cent Indian students, in all approx­ although the domino effect of social­ comprehensively planned development imately 8 000 out of 40000 students. 32 ) ism's collapse in other parts of the of the country in the manner dictated by 0 In 1989 per capita expenditures on the Central Government. 38 1 world has had a beneficial impact on 0 pensions for the different races were 2 Africa and the rest of the developing

Federalism, with its delicate balance of as follows: whites, R2l8; Indians, d world. Nevertheless, authoritarian gov­ power between diversity and unity, is a e

t R167; Coloureds, R167; and blacks

a 33 ernment in Africa is the norm. Where very sophisticated form of government.

d RI17 per month.

( democratic governments do appear, Even in industrial democracies where

r If literacy is defined as basic read­ they are unitary in nature (examples are e the discrepancies between rich and poor

h ing, writing and computing skills

s Botswana and Namibia). The record of are not as pronounced as in developing i l and an elementary knowledge of the federal models of government in the countries, the federal balance is diffi­ b

u physical and social environment Third World is even worse. cult to maintain (example: Canada). In P (approximately a primary school edu­ The key question is this: Can soci­ younger countries, what is more, nation­ e

h cation - 7 years' education), then 99

t etal forces in developing countries cope building objectives are regarded as per cent of South Africa's white y with the intricacies of democracy - and more important than the entrenchment b population of 5 million people of 13 especially federalism? Another way to of minority rights. In fact, minority d

e years and over are literate. This

t frame the same question is to ask: Does rights are regarded as obstacles to n must be compared with 85 per cent an appropriate value system conducive effective nation building (example: a

r of the Indian community of I mil­

g to democracy - and especially federal­ Zimbabwe). In South Africa, nation

e lion, 70 per cent of the coloured ism - exist? Or can it develop and pre­ building has already been accepted by c

n community of 2,5 million people vail within a reasonable time in the all significant political interest groups e

c and only 48 per cent of the black

i society concerned? Such a value system as an urgent priority. l community of approximately 18 r as we are enquiring about must include Conclusion: unless a number of ob­ e million people living in the urban d a high degree of tolerance for specific stacles can be effectively overcome, the n and immediately surrounding rural interest groups, and for regions that u prospects for successful federal region­ areas of the country.34 This 48 per y want autonomy to solve problems in alism are not very good in most Third a cent figure excludes the notorious their own way, not the tendency to ram w World countries, suffering as they do

e rural homelands, where the situation t some uniform approach down peoples' from many of the constraints we have a is much worse. throats willy-nilly. listed. G

A t seriously complicating fact relevant This question is especially acute in Federalism is not the only model of e ton the future economic position of the developing societies. And it is doubtful i geographical autonomy that may be countryb is the ANC's declared economic whether ideal-type federal systems can applicable to South Africa. One can a S

policy, which is strongly socialist and in the medium- to long-run be trans­ think of several other types of regional y

distribution-orientedb to the detriment of planted successfully into such societies. autonomy, using a wide range of consti­

economicd growth. The nationalization The reason for this rather dramatic tutional mechanisms. e c u d o 226r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R ------Political economy

There is, for example, not much dif­ authoritarian political cultures. The NP to attend mass gatherings such as meet­ ference between strong "federal" gov­ governed the country for years as a ings, funerals, protest actions and so on ernments, such as those of Nigeria and white minority party that refused to and so forth. This is routinely accom­ India, and a weak unitary government acknowledge the right of the majority panied by the commandeering by the that is effectively decentralized - as we of blacks to equal political rights. Even comrades of public and private vehicles see in Spain. In both instances effective within the party, NP leaders have a for this purpose. It is clear that the minority rights enforcement would pro­ strong and authoritarian stranglehold on ANC leadership does not have full con­ vide sufficient protection for minorities policy making. trol over its members and supporters at who presently fear domination and sup­ The party is supposed to consist of a grass-roots level. pression. The geographical decentral­ federation of four provincial parties Another illustration of the authori­ ization of decision making and policy linked by an advisory Main Council. In tarian nature of decision making in the implementation within a unitary system practice, the Council rules by making ANC is the fact that virtually all invita­ to regions that want such autonomy is binding policy decisions, which are later tions to individual leaders in the organ­ an important and potentially successful ratified by the annual provincial con­ ization to present a public address had conflict-regulating mechanism. The intro­ gresses. Although policy is supposed to to be referred at one time to the top pol­ duction of this type of autonomy must be made by the provincial congresses of icy-making body of the organization, be seriously considered where feasible. the NP, the leaders of the party, those the National Executive Committee - Another important point to bear in who make up the Cabinet, are in fact rel­ until the burden of work resulting from mind in establishing a new constitu­ atively autonomous elites who decide this practice became unbearable. There tional order is that it always proceeds upon policy themselves and have their were incredible administrative delays in by trial and error until a relatively sta­ proposals only legitimized/rubber-stamped merely trying to secure an appointment ble system has developed appropriate to at the provincial congresses. In the past, of this nature with an ANC official. local circumstances and the effective these congresses have been well stage­ One of South Africa's most eminent balancing of opposing interests. A fed­ managed, with virtually no spontaneous writers, a member of the ANC who eral system is by nature very rigid. Its participation and all discussion points served a prison term for conspiring very strength may simultaneously be a prepared (in writing) well in advance. against the state, Breyten Breytenbach, fatal weakness that may make it impos­ The last series of congresses saw a devi­ recently expressed his extreme disap­ sible to change if the need for change ation from this pattern in the direction pointment with what he termed the should arise. In extreme cases it may of a more open and democratic discus­ "Stalinist roots" underlying the ANC's allow) small minority groups to veto the sion of issues. Nevertheless, the party's organizational culture.4o 0 wishes1 of the majority. This flaw inter leaders largely control the agenda and Authoritarian cultures are also largely 0 2 alia contributed to the failure of the the contents of all contributions made characteristic of other organizations d

Lebanesee and Cypriot experiments in during such congresses. such as the CP, the PAC and, especially. t

constitutionala engineering. Political sys­ In this respect the ANC is not much the IFP. The only political party that d tems( in developing states must there­ different. As recently as eighteen months really conforms to democratic practices

r

foree be flexible in order to be able to ago it was still a devoted Marxist­ is the small and basically all-white h changes shape when needed without Leninist vanguard party. One can Democratic Party. i l These authoritarian traditions in the endangeringb the position of their observe the traumatic effects of the col­ minorities.u lapse of socialism in other parts of the country's principal political movements P

e A last point: the economies of most world on the intellectual elites within the make one sceptical of all the demo­ h

Thirdt World countries are in a desper­ ANC/SACP - and also those in the cratic rhetoric spouted by them so rou­

atey state, with hyperinflation and huge PAC - in their agonizing analyses of tinely. It places a question mark behind b

debtsd that cannot by any stretch of the what went wrong, and why it need not the democratic nature of post-apartheid e imaginationt be repaid. This, linked to a happen in a socialist South Africa, in the government in South Africa n

weaka world economy, fast deteriorating pages of radical local journals such as r intog a worldwide depression as a result Transformation and Work in Progress.

e Forces facilitating

interc alia of today's de facto Third Despite the rhetoric of being based

n on popular participation and democratic democratic development Worlde War in the Persian Gulf, makes it c highlyi improbable that the conditions action, the ANC consists of street and Despite all the obstacles on the road to l

necessaryr for successful federal region­ area committees that are frequently democracy in South Africa summarized e alismd could be created in the foresee­ self-appointed, self-perpetuating and above, there are also forces facilitating n

ableu future in most developing coun­ self-coopting bodies. The level of polit­ the move towards more democratic gov­

tries.y Viewed against this background, ical sophistication of their members ernment of the country. The rest of this a

unitaryw regionalism is probably more and supporters is minimal in certain article will be devoted to a discussion of e feasiblet and to be preferred in the Third instances, and the organization has a the most important variables here. a 39 reputation for its intimidation of mem­

World.G This argument will receive moret attention later in its application to bers and of the public at large in order Relatively strong economic e

n infrastructure Southi Africa. to secure compliance with the direct­ b ives of the frequently self-appointed Despite all the headaches summarized a S

Authoritarian political cultures leaders (the "comrades"). This fre­ earlier, South Africa is one of the strong­ y

b quently results in people being rounded est Third World countries. It has well­

Both the ruling NP and the resistance movementsd in South Africa have strong up in the streets and on buses and trains developed agricultural, manufacturing. e c u d o Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4. 1991 p 227 e R Political economy------

distributing, mining and military sectors, regular and free elections controlling political resistance movements. Such a with relatively effective and efficient eco­ political elites at the ballot box. system may evolve over time into a nomic and technological capabilities and One of a number of possible illustra­ more pronounced federal state, or even with basic infrastructures that compare tions of this development is to be found in the opposite direction, depending very favourably with most other Third in the positions these elites are adopting upon quite a number of different consid­ World states. It can be argued that South on multiparty democracy, a bill of indi­ erations. Constitutional mechanisms­ Africa is in fact the strongest power in vidual rights, minority safeguards and such as an optimum delimitation of Africa and also one of the strongest in the regionalism. Here, the current debate wards or constituencies and the use of Third World. The comparative world on the unitary or federal nature of the multi-member constituencies linked to development indicators compiled by the new political system for the country is transferable-vote electoral systems - World Bank confirm this assessment.41 of interest. would facilitate this type of guaranteed What this national strength means is Federalism is not a concept new to representation on a non-racial basis. that, given the adoption and implemen­ South Africa. lt was considered as an This model will probably address the tation of appropriate government pol­ option for the new state in 1910, but crucial issues of minority guarantees icies, South Africa will be in a better lost out against the perceived merits of and decentralized government favoured position than many other developing a unitary model for nation building by the NP as well as the overarching countries to achieve that minimal level among the four disparate colonies. The need of the ANC for a strong central of economic growth that is a prerequis­ resulL was that four relatively auto­ government in order to effect nation ite for an effective and stable redis­ nomous provinces were established building and a redistribution of tribution of resources. This will make it within the Union of South Africa. resources. It is, in any event, doubtful easier to address the serious material Until 1987 the governing National whether there is any difference in prac­ inequalities inherent in the South Party consistently and vehemently tice between an effectively decentral­ African economy, which in turn will rejected the federal concept. Today, the ized unitary system and a federal sys­ enhance prospects for a more durable NP is in favour of a federal-type model tem in which the balance of powers is democratic system in the longer term. It in which are embedded effective minor­ tilted towards the federal government. does not mean that the problems of eco­ ity guarantees. The increasing moderation of the nomics and finance foreseen earlier The most detailed proposal yet for a principal actors is further illustrated in will not materialize. They will, how­ federal model in South Africa came in the following section. ever, pale into relative insignificance 1987 from the KwaZulu-Natal Indaba.

when) set beside similar problems in After a long wait, the NP has accepted No feasible alternative to a 0

many1 other Third World countries. the principles of this proposal. The negotiated settlement 0 2

African National Congress, however, Negotiations can produce one or more Developingd cultures of e still rejects federalism because it is seen of only three possible outcomes: t

moderationa and tolerance to be an attempt to retain the privileged - a continuation of the process of ne­ d

( position of whites - thereby obstructing Despite the ANC/SACP's ideological gotiations until either an agreement r

commitmente to Marxism-Leninism and the aim of redistribution - and to be or a breakdown occurs; h

thes NP's history of authoritarianism detrimental to the job of nation building i - no agreement, leading to a break­ l

andb centralized decision making in (the same argument that sank it in down in talks and renewed conflict; Southu Africa, it is apparently becoming 1910). It has, however, accepted the P

- an agreement resolving some, or all, clearere to both of these actors that they principle of regional administrations of the outstanding issues.44 h

willt have to tolerate each other and with autonomous powers.

moderatey their own policies within a Now as argued earlier,42 experience The likelihood in the South African con­ b

multipartyd democratic system in order so far with federalism in developing text of each of these outcomes will now

e 45 tot achieve a compromise in the negoti­ countries is not encouraging for its be briefly summarized and assessed. n

atinga process. future in South Africa. This, however, r

g The collapse of socialism in the rest does not exclude a federal-type regional Continue talking

e

ofc the world has made it difficult for model, adopted in order to achieve and One possible result is that the outstand­ n

adherentse of that philosophy in South reconcile goals such as economic ing issues may prove so intractable that c i

Africal to explain why it should succeed growth, development, political self­ negotiations continue in the current

there.r It has even resulted (inter alia) in determination, grass-roots democracy, on/off mode for an indefinite period e

spokespersonsd for the ANC denying that ethnic conflict regulation and so on. without coming closer to a settlement or n

theu organization ever propagated social­ Rondinelli and Nellis have found that a deteriorating again into conflict.

isty (or even authoritarian) policies. The decentralization of governmental power Although this, theoretically, may hap­ a

internationalw demise of socialism has and functions to regional and local pen, the relative ease with which the few e thust already stimulated some reflection levels in Third World societies is an preliminary meetings between the gov­ a

in G the minds of those who will probably important instrument of development. 43 ernment and the ANC were set up, the

t

bee members of the new policy elites in These arguments all point inevitably apparent cordial atmosphere prevailing n

Southi Africa. It will facilitate the devel­ to a strongly decentralized unitary state among participants, the absence so far of b

opmenta of effective multiparty democ­ rather than a well-entrenched and rigid blatant antagonism, and the favourable S racy by pressuring political actors into federal balance of power for South outcome of those few meetings that y b policy modes that acknowledge the pri­ Africa - even in the face of existing resulted in consensus reports by joint d

macye of participatory planning and opposition to such steps by the leading technical committees on procedural c u d o r

228p Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 e R ------Political economy

matters, point strongly against such an is unlikely, and that, with time, the talks Many exiled ANC leaders are already inconclusive result. will either break down or a series of back in the country, settling in after a Already some issues have apparently mutually acceptable settlements or long absence. Poor (and deteriorating) been agreed to by both sides to the pacts will (probably) eventually be living conditions abroad for exiles, es­ talks: issues relating to the continuation reached. The outcome may take some pecially in Africa, have further caused a of the armed struggle, the return of time to appear. grounds well of urgency among these exiles, the release of the remaining exiles to return as soon as possible. political prisoners and the conditions Breakdown: Endemic conflict, deadlock, They will probably rebel against either for amnesty. As suggested earlier, it is or temporary setback being exiled again or not being able to conceivable that other issues such as In July 1990 the ANC formally aban­ return home after all. land and economic reform may prove to doned, in favour of a negotiated settle­ Although the negotiations seem to be more intractable. Experience with ment, the "armed struggle" it waged for proceed slowly, and are currently sub­ such issues in other instances of negoti­ thirty years against the NP government ject to many a political hiccup, the ations is that they are normally, with in an attempt to attain full political prospects of the ANC's achieving most the consent of all the negotiating part­ rights and political power. The current of their objectives through a negotiated ners, deliberately left out of the initial president of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, settlement are still very good. As we "political pacts", with the understand­ has reiterated recently that the ANC pointed out above, the most important ing that they will be addressed at a later will not return to the armed struggle.47 intervening variable probably lies with stage, so as not to endanger the success Nevertheless, in some circles (of both the time constraints involved. of initial negotiations.46 This, however, participants and outside observers), a An ANC decision at this stage to presupposes commitments from all return to the armed struggle is still con­ reverse the peace process and return to concerned to the success of the talks. If templated as a feasible alternative if exile and violent conflict does not seem a sufficient degree of commitment to negotiations should reach stalemate or likely. It would have a vastly superior success does not exist, the talks may, in do not work out as expected,. Both the military force against it - and have to fact, break down. ANC and the Afrikaner Weerstands­ operate, probably, as we have seen, Another point that militates against beweging (AWB) continue training with international (and even domestic) such an inconclusive scenario is that of their forces for such an eventuality. The support insufficient to maintain even time constraints. The support bases of Conservative Party hints increasingly the status quo ante. Too much prestige, both the ANC and the NP are too fragile that it would consider violent resistance too many vested interests and too great ) and volatile to maintain the status quo an investment in costs of all kinds are

0 to attempts to obstruct whites from

1 indefinitely without increasing defec­ exercising racial self-determination. already tied up in the negotiations for 0 2

tions both to the left and the right. Although the option of returning to the ANC to now risk a breakdown. d e Neither De Klerk nor Mandela can really violence in order to settle the country's The NP finds itself in an even more t a afford to allow this to happen through political disputes cannot be totally dis­ difficult position regarding a return to d (

allowing stalling tactics or the develop­ counted, a number of different consid­ counter-revolutionary war with the ANC. r e ment of a stalemate. Their own credibil­ erations make it only a theoretical It would face a massive international h s ity, legitimacy, status and therefore polit­ option raised purely for purposes of backlash, which might even be stronger i l

b ical future in their organizations depend propaganda. than today's economic and political u upon a speedy and successful conclusion To begin with, the ANC's "armed sanctions. Many international statesmen P

e to the negotiations. Otherwise the struggle" was for all practical purposes have put their personal reputations on h t

increasing opposition to both leaders a dead letter for at least two or three the line to support the De Klerk regime y (from both the right and the left) may in its reform efforts (in many instances b years before it was formally aban­

d weaken their bargaining positions and doned. The ANC faced a strong and rel­ in the face of huge resistance in their e t complicate the successful implementa­ atively effective counter-revolutionary own constituencies). De Klerk just can­ n a tion of any eventual settlement. strategy by the South African govern­ not afford to alienate these international r g

In addition, De Klerk faces an elec­ ment that minimized armed struggle supporters by reverting to a hard-line e c tion at the latest in 1995 - unless it is successes. The changes brought about counter-revolutionary position. n

e postponed by some earlier amendment in the international political climate by The dismantling of apartheid has also c i

l to the constitution. If De Klerk and the reforms in the Soviet Union caused proceeded to a point at which it is in fact r Mandela can conclude a "quick" settle­ a reduction in moral and material sup­ irreversible. The NP thus faces crucial e d ment providing for measures that will port by the Soviet government, the decisions in its own ranks concerning its n

u effectively address the most pressing ANC's biggest sponsor. The interna­ future identity and goals. Its only

y needs and fears of their supporters, they tional climate against the export of re­ chance of medium- to long-term polit­ a

w may again succeed in re-recruiting volution to other countries is today at ical survival is to continue along the e t some of the defectors who have already its strongest. And in the absence of out­ road of reform it has chosen to take. A a

G left their parties. Such defectors may side sponsorship, the ANC does not return to the crossroads is impossible. t Financially, the South African gov­ e return because they decide that fears of command sufficient resources to take n i their leaders selling them out may have up the armed struggle again. ernment cannot in any case afford to go b back to war; here lies the most im­ a been unjustified. A programme to return ANC exiles S This time constraint leads to the con­ to South Africa is in full swing, as we portant reason why an attempt was y b made in the first place to make peace

clusion that an indefinite period of noted earlier. This will reverse the thirty d negotiation without substantial progress with the ANC. The fragile condition of e year-long outflow of political exiles. c u d o r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p 229 e R Political economy------

the South African economy will only be result of a deliberate (or even uninten­ the most prominent existing moderate prejudiced if peace efforts break down. tional) brinkmanship ploy pushed too far political parties in the establishment of And this the NP simply cannot afford. by one or other of the participants. This a government of national unity/recon­ Extremists both to the left and the may cause temporary setbacks, but will ciliation. Such a government would right continue to threaten violent action. probably not lead to lasting connict - include the ANC, NP, DP and IFP.48 But this is because they perceive the unless one of the existing variables in In support of this argument we impossibility of attaining their respect­ the political equation changes dramat­ adduce the following: ive goals: these threats are not serious. ically' causing one or more of the parti­ - This would be the optimum nego­ Left-wing radicals find it increasingly cipants to reassess the costs and benefits tiated compromise resulting in a difficult to mobilize international sup­ of a negotiated settlement against what it clearly integrative result in which port for violence. Their domestic sup­ might achieve through another attempt every member of the governing port seems to be limited to radical intel­ at violent overthrow of the present re­ alliance would be a winner. It lectual youths frustrated with the slow gime or a retum to the status quo ante. would minimize resistance to the pace of reform. They can no longer The additional variable of time con­ new government from the ranks of mobilize mass popular support. If the straints (already addressed), will ser­ opposition parties and maximize negotiation process produces construct­ iously affect the outcome of negotiations their co-operation with government ive results, the incidence of left-wing and the potential breaking down of peace. policies. violence will diminish. The longer a settlement is delayed, the - The stated policies of the four organ­ Right-wing resistance is of an indi­ greater is the danger that an increasing izations already to a large extent vidualistic and small-scale nature. It is number of De Klerk's and Mandela's overlap, the principal differences not well-organized for a number of rea­ already reluctant supporters may defect, being the preferences of the NP, DP sons, one of which is important - the from sheer frustration, to more right­ and lnkatha for more free-market lack of a feasible right-wing alternative wing or more left-wing organizations mechanisms and a lesser role for the to negotiated settlement. From all indi­ opposing a negotiated settlement. state than the ANC would like to cations the security forces are easily see. The NP, what is more, is much containing and curbing sporadic out­ Agreement closer to the ANC than one might bursts of sabotage and terrorism. As a A negotiated settlement can be of a dis­ think on the issue of state interven­ result, it is probable that right-wing tributive or an integrative nature. A dis­ tion in society. The existence of supporters and sympathizers will in the tributive agreement means that in the agricultural control boards, the big end) follow one of four possible courses end there are both winners and losers, 0 role currently played by the state in of action:1 and that the extent of one's gain equals 0 the provision of black housing, the 2

- emigrate to another country if they the extent of the other's losses. An integ­

d existence of subsidized housing for

e do not wish to accept a new South rative result means that all parties can t public officials, health services for a Africa - and if they can afford to; claim gains from the negotiations. This

d the poor and so forth prove the point ( - fight until apprehended or killed by is the "win-win" outcome (not a "win­

r sufficientl y. e security action; lose" one). An integrative result is ob­ h For the rest, all parties agree on s viously preferable because it gives all i - l accept the new situation under the necessity of having a multiparty, b protest and either continue to sup­ parties a share of the political spoils as u well as improved face-saving opportun­ democratic political system with a P port their leaders in opposition to bill of rights protected by a constitu­ e the new society or return to the NP ities and therefore better chances of a h tional court, and on the importance t durable settlement in the long run. One as the only party that can effectively y example of each kind of settlement will of minority guarantees in order to b try to protect white interests; protect cultural, linguistic and reli­

d be briefly summarized.

- e fall into political apathy and con­ gious minorities from majority dom­ t The most likely potential outcomes

n centrate on becoming as financially ination.

a of the current political negotiations r independent as possible - or on con­ - The ANC (which is a predominantly g concerning the future distribution of

e ducting themselves as inconspicu­ Xhosa-controlled organization) can­

c power in the country are the following: ously as possible in order to con­ n not in its own interest allow the

e either a coalition government of na­

c tinue with their accustomed life

i alienation of perhaps the majority of

l tional reconciliation; or an ANC domin­ style as part of a subsociety of r ated socialist-oriented alliance in power the largest and third largest ethnic e whites. This is what has happened d opposed by an NP dominated capitalist­ groups in the country; nation build­ n in Zimbabwe. ing would be severely affected if u oriented opposition alliance - a situa­

All y these arguments point to the conclu­ tion similar to that currently to be seen this were to happen. a

sionw that both the ANC and the NP are in Namibia. - It would stimulate and attract eco­ e captivet audiences of the negotiations nomic growth because it would re­ a A government of national unityl store investors' confidence in the process,G and that we can be very clear on

t reconciliation country.

the e absence of feasible alternatives to a n negotiatedi settlement. The doomsday Although the ANC already probably - It would further bind these other b

scenarioa of a protracted, endemic con­ commands sufficient support to win ethnic groups to the policies of the S nict situation in South Africa thus seems outright an at-large election, it will be ANC by establishing co-responsibil­ y unrealistic.b At the worst, we may experi­ in its interest to consider bending over ity for the decisions of a govern­ enced short-term breakdowns in talks as a e backwards to accommodate at least ment in which the ANC would c u d o r

230p Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 e R Political economy

probably in any case be the major/ Conclusions form either a new post-apartheid gov­ senior partner and driving force. ernment on its own, or be the senior Comparative studies have proved that and most influential partner in a future - It would pacify and reassure whites policy choices by political elites directly that they still had a stake in govern­ affect the political and institutional out­ coalition government. The organiza­ ment (especially if politically sens­ comes of the process of government. tion's publicly declared political and economic policy positions are unfortu­ itive portfolios such as Police, De­ This is especially relevant for the devel­ fence and Agriculture were left in opment of democratic cultures, struc­ nately still totally inappropriate to white hands). This would guarantee tures and processes in South Africa. achieve the objectives of a more just the support of the security establish­ redistribution of resources against the Various potential ciemographic, cul­ ment, minimize the risk of a right­ necessary background of a growing tural, economic and political constraints wing coup, and maximize stability ecqnomy. These policies are already on the future development of democracy in post-apartheid South Africa. much watered-down versions of the in the country have been identified. organizatiun's original Marxist-Lenin­ - It would be the only way in which Fortunately, they are not independent ist doctrines, and further indications minority parties such as the NP, DP variables but dependent variables. It exist that the ANC will moderate them and Inkatha could still retain some will depend very much on the leaders of even further. Strong ideological resist­ measure of influence in the govern­ the different interest groups that will ance against such steps can, however, ment of the country. eventually participate in the political he expected from ideologues in the - This option would probably enjoy negotiations process concerning a new ANC/SACP alliance. the support of an overwhelming political system for South Africa as to The strong economic position of number of people in the country whether these potential constraints South Africa relative to that of other because it would have the support of prove true constraints or not. the three largest ethnic groups and Third World countries means that the It is much too early to tell whether country can probably absorb some of of substantial numbers of people the current trend towards populist from the smaller groups too. the economic shocks and setbacks that democratization in South Africa will lie ahead. It will, however, not be able No other option has the all-round poten­ become established practice. Never­ to maintain satisfactory economic pros­ tial of a government of national unity to theless, it is clear that, despite the exist­ perity under badly-conceived macro­ consolidate the maximum political sup­ ence of strongly authoritarian political economic policies. port possible in the country. cultures in virtually all the principal Perhaps the most important lesson to

) political parties in the country, there are he learnt from other transitions to 0

The1 Democratic Turnhalle indications of emerging value and atti­ democracy is that, once the transition 0

Alliance2 (DTA) option tudinal changes leading increasingly to has started, it is not a foregone conclu­ d a generally accepted political culture of e Although the benefits of a government of sion that the final outcome will be a t moderation and greater tolerance of nationala unity are clear, there is a ques­ lasting democratic system. Many things d political criticism. This is underscored (

tion-mark behind its acceptance in cer­ can go awry. The choice of what will r by all the signs of a strong and develop­ taine circles, especially a query concern­ happen, however, lies squarely within h ing civil society relatively independent ings the ANC's commitment to such a pol­ the discretion of the political elites i l of the ANC. These are all encouraging

icyb as a result of its perceived dominant involved in steering the transition in positionu at present. If the ANC is not indications of a development in demo­ one or another direction. P cratization; they are creating the norm­ e interested in such an option, it presents One can only hope that the demo­ h ative preconditions for durable political thet other parties with no other choice cratic navigation system is effective

thany to consolidate support in an alliance pluralism. enough to st~er a post-apartheid South b Linked to this development another, ord coalition opposing the ANC. This Africa clearly and safely between the e t would probably result in the Namibian parallel consideration is making itself Scylla of authoritarian post-apartheid n ever more surely at home within South a DTA-option: the ANC and a few other society and the Charybdis of a typical r g sympathetic political parties form a African society. This is the important run-down Third World state.

e perception that there is no feasible c working relationship in order to govern, n alternative to a negotiated settlement.

e with an NP/lFP alliance in opposition. c i This solution would inevitably ren­ The costs of a full-scale renewal of war l Notes and references

derr ethnic polarization more acute and are still perceived to be higher than the

e L Diamond, "Crisis, choice and structure: bed detrimental to the goal of nation costs of compromise. This perception Reconciling alternative models for ex­ n fortunately has a moderating effect on plaining democratic success and failure in buildingu and legitimate government. It

isy a good example of a distributive type the policy positions of the country's the Third World", paper presented at the a different political interest groups. As 1989 Annual Meeting of the American

ofw ethnically-based outcome that would

e Political Science Association, Atlanta, generatet substantial potential for soci­ argued earlier, it is, fortunately, incon­

a GA, 31 August - 3 September 1989, p 3. etal destabilization. For this reason a ceivable for a number of reasons that G

2 See W T Gormley, "Institutional policy DTAt option should probably only be this perception will soon change. e analysis: A critical review", Journal of n Stable democratic government in consideredi as a long-stop position by Policy Analysis and Management, vol 6, no theb prospective members of the opposi­ South Africa in the longer term needs 2, 1987, pp 153-169 for a critical review of a S tion alliance, while the ANC for its part radical policy changes within the recent approaches to institutional analysis. y wouldb be well advised to consider a parameters of a growing economy. The 3 G O'Donnell and P C Schmitter, Transitions

reconciliationd alliance as first option. ANC is currently the front-runner to from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclu- e c u d o Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4. 1991 231 p e R Political economy------

sions aboUl uncertain democracies, Johns 13 Adapted from G Schuring, Language 31 Ibid, P 269. Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, planning for a new South Africa, Pretoria: 32 Ibid, P 300. 1986; L Diamond, J Linz and S M Lipset Human Sciences Research Council, 1990. 33 Ibid, P 20. (eds), Democracy in developing countries, 4 14 Adapted from ibid and SA Foundation, volumes, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, South Africa: Information digest, Johan­ 34 RSA, Department of National Health and Population Development, Monitoring re­ 1988, 1989; J Higley and M G Burton, "The nesburg, 1991. elite variable in democratic transitions and port: 1989, Pretoria, 1989. 15 Rand Afrikaans University (RAU), Eco­ breakdowns", American Sociological 35 Weekly Mail (Johannesburg), 12-18 April Review, vol 51, 1989, pp 17-34. nomic monitor, Johannesburg: Department of Economics, Rand Afrikaans University, 1991, Saturday Star (Johannesburg), 13 4 F Cloete, "Negotiating political change", 3 June 1991. April 1991. In L Nieuwmeijer and F Cloete (eds), 16 SA Foundation, op cit, p 44. 36 J A Wiseman, Democracy in black Africa: Dynamics of negotiation in South Africa, Survival and revival, New York: Paragon Pretoria: HSRC Publishers, (forthcoming), 17 RAU, op cit. House, 1990; L Diamond, J Linz and S M 1991. 18 Ibid. Lipset, op cit. 5 G Field, J Higley and M G Burton, "A new 19 Standard Bank, Economic review, Jo­ 37 See W A Selcher, "A new start towards a elite framework for political sociology", hannesburg: Standard Bank, 4 April 1991. more decentralized federalism in Brazil", Revue Europeenne des Sciences Sociales, 20 R E Pretorius, Stats. Cape Town: Warman Publius, no 19, 1989, pp 167-183. vol 28, no 88, 1990, P 164. Publications, 1991, P 52. 38 Rajasthan case, A I R 1977 S C 1382. 6 See G O'Donnell and P C Schmitter, op 21 United Bank, Economic monitor: 2nd 39 See also 0 Rondinelli and J R Nellis, cit; J Higley and M G Burton, op cit; F Quarter 1991, Johannesburg: United "Assessing decentralization policies In Cloete, op cit. Bank, 1991, p 14. developing countries: The case for cau­ 7 F Cloete, "Characteristics of political 22 RAU, op cit. tious optimism", Development Policy Review, no 4, 1986, pp 3-23. change in South Africa: 1980-1990", in F 23 Ibid. Cloete, L Schlemmer and 0 van Vuuren 40 Sunday Star Review (Johannesburg), 2 24 SAIRR, Race relations survey 1988189, (eds), Policy options for a new South June 1991. Africa, Pretoria: HSRC Publishers, 1991. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1989, p 401. 41 World Bank, World development report 8 H Giliomee and L Schlemmer, From 1990, New York: Oxford University Press, 25 RAU, op cit. apartheid to nation-building, Cape Town: 1990, p 169. Oxford University Press, 1990, p 1. 26 SAIRR, op cit, p 404. 42 See also F Cloete, "Characteristics of 9 F Cloete, "The state policy machine", in R 27 T De Vos, Housing and Group Areas in political change ... ", op cit. South Africa, Occasional Paper no 2/1989, Lee and L Schlemmer (eds), Transition to 43 0 Rondinelli and J R Nellis, op cit. Department of Development Adminis­ ) democracy, Cape Town: Oxford Univer­ 44 F C Ikle, How nations negotiate, London: 0 sity Press, 1990. tration, University of South Africa, 1 Pretoria, 1989, p 16. Harper & Row, 1964. 0

10 2 ANC, Year of mass action for the transfer 28 M Bot, The blackboard debate: Hurdles, 45 F Cloete, "Negotiating political change", d of power to the people, (Statement of the op cit. e options and opportunities in school integ­ t National Executive Committee of the

a ration, Johannesburg: South African In­ 46 G O'Donnell and PC Schmitter, op cit.

d ANC), Johannesburg, 8 January 1991.

( stitute of Race Relations, 1991, p 24.

47 8eeld(Johannesburg), 28 May 1991.

11 r Work in Progress, no 74, p 4. e 29 SAIRR, op cit. p 245. 48 F Cloete, "Negotiating political change" h

12 s Ibid. 30 Ibid, P 260. op cit. i l b u P

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d e t n a r g

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232r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R ------Political economy

Madagascar: Change and continuity

Eduardo Serpa, an independent researchel~ has been analysing historical and present developments in Africa for many years. In this article he examines the role played by the great weight of the past in contemporary Madagascar.

"Separated from Africa hy those 392 The transitional period began with no worn out with the continual unrest. km of the Mozamhique Channel Mada­ reports of violence. Opposition leaders It does not seem possible at this Rascar turns her hack on the African were given key positions in the admin­ stage to determine how radically Mada­ continent, to which she does not istration, in which Ratsiraka continues gascar's socio-political course will be belonR, either hy her soil, hy her his­ to hold only nominal power. Zafy heads affected by the accord of 29 October. tory or hy her present (international) a 3 I-member interim government. The If profound changes fail to occur, a relationships." I opposition spokesman, Rev Richard clear trend in Malagasy history will be

) Andrianamanjato has been made head reconfirmed: dramatic events fre­ 0

1 of a l30-strong Economic and Social quently take place, but not in such a

Ratsiraka0 wins a battle, but

2 Recovery Council, dominated by the way as to threaten the essential continu­

seemsd set to lose the war Forces Vives. s ity of the country's history. e t Ratsiraka's loss of effective power The recent turbulence in Malagasy

Ona 29 October 1991 the leader of the d

Active( Forces (Forces Vives), Professor came as something of a surprise, after a life, beginning in June 1991, can there­

Albertr Zafy, concluded an agreement month in which the political tide in fore be understood only in terms of the e

withh Prime Minister Guy Razanamary. Madagascar suddenly turned against him. country's geography, ethnography and s i Thisl constituted the beginning of a state Indeed, reports received from Mada­ history. b

ofu transition in Madagascar, with a gascar early in October 1991 seemed to P unity government and the immediate indicate that, after almost four months of e The geographical environment h

suspensiont or dissolution of those insti­ continuous anti-government demon­ 2 tutionsy created by the previous regime. strations and strikes, the opposition had Separated from Africa before the end of b The objective of the state of transi­ abandoned its hopes of dislodging the Paleozoic era, an ancient pre-Cam­ d

e brian fragment, Madagascar is almost a tiont is to remove (mettre a l' ecart) President Ratsiraka from his palace­ 2 Presidentn Ratsiraka from the political fortress. This came as a major surprise to small continent: a 590000 km land a r the Western media, which, after unrest mass, extending over I 580 km from stageg pending the holding of elections.

Ratsiraka,e however, has announced that had brought a halt to Madagascar's eco­ north to south, and over 580 km from c

hen will run for the presidency. Zafy nomic and administrative life, was east to west. The aspect of the landscape e

c contrasts with that of the neighbouring

expectsi that the armed forces, which announcing that Ratsiraka's fall was l 6 coast of East Africa. This huge island is haver remained fairly neutral during the imminent. e far more mountainous, although its

pastd five months of anarchy, to back the It was possibly the intransigence of the interimn government. He also believes opposition Forces Vives that deprived highest point, the Tsaranana, does not u rise above 2 886 metres. The average thaty these arrangements will meet with them of immediate success. The West, internationala approval. 3 France in particular, had been seeking a altitude lies around I 300 metres and w

e flat areas are scarcely to be found. The

t A national conference is to be held compromise solution. Ratsiraka would beforea the end of November and a ref­ remain in office while an interim govern­ general picture is one of a "jumble of G small ravines joining the main valleys". erendumt on a draft constitution before ment held the reins of power. By reject­ e Although Madagascar is situated near then end of the year. General elections - ing such a solution, the opposition pre­ i

legislative,b presidential and local, are cipitated a protracted conflict. This the ISO N line of latitude, a number of a

S favoured Ratsiraka in two ways: the West different types of tropical climate, in

expected some time after the middle of 1992,y to bring the Third Republic into was alienated by the opposition's radical­ some cases affected by temperate influ­ b 4 ences, can be found there. As are many being.d ism and the population at large became e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 233 p e R Political economy------

represent a major potential resource, their numbers roughly equivalent to population numbers, but they are kept mainly for prestige reasons and to be MADAGASCAR ritually slaughtered at funerals and on other important occasions. Fishing and forestry are practised still at simple working level. Chromite, graphite and mica are the main mining resources.9 The extra-African character of Mada­ gascar is not strange to the origins and composition of the island 's population. There is a light brown, Asian type that resembles the Indonesian. This is to be found, in varying degrees of purity, mainly among the Andriana and the Hova castes of the Merina people. It makes up roughly one half of that ethnic group. There is a black African type, with both short (Antesaka) and tall (Bara) elements. There is also a mixed group that seems to constitute the majority of the total population. The diversity of culture and social structure that characterizes Madagascar appears then as the natural consequence of a mixture of different heritages, in which Indonesian elements blend with others of Persian, Arab, African, Indian and

) Dravidian origin. The situation is, how­ 0

1 ever, one of diversity within unity, as 0

2 the existence of a common language

d serves to link and bind the various e t

a groups. This language, spoken by a d

( population in which the African element

r constitutes the majority, belongs to the e

h Indonesian branch of the Malayan­ s i l Polynesian group of languages.9 b

u The origin of the Malagasy language P provides some insight into the inter­ e h

t group dynamics on the island, the

y Eastern elements prevailing over the b African elements and representing the d e

t essential continuity that has survived

n all the vicissitudes of Malagasy history, a r

g including the colonial era and the revo­

e lutionary period after 1972. c

n A rural base and rapid growth consti­ e c

i tute the two main traits of Malagasy l

r demography. In 1975 the rural popula­ e

d tion constituted an overwhelming

n majority, 86 per cent of its total living in u

y Q centres with less than 4 000 inhabitants. a In that year, only 11 per cent of the w

e

t exceed 3 380000 in 1921 reached e 7 tropicaln countries, Madagascar is struck in the Highlands, by terrible droughts. 7600000 in 1975 and 9985000 in 1985. i

everyb year by tropical cyclones that do Rice, maize and manioc are the main Estimates indicate that it had risen to a S

damage to the economy. Agricultural subsistence crops; coffee, vanilla, sugar­ 11 560000 by the middle of 1989. In y cane, cotton, tobacco, sunflower and 1974 the Merina were still the largest productionb is often adversely affected in

the d south, along the western coast, even sisal are the main cash crops. Bovines ethnic group, with almost two million e c u d o 234r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R l______~ ------Political economy

members. A large number of the many foreigners living in Madagascar left the country after the fall of Tsiranana's MADAGASCAR regime. In 1975 foreign residents num­ bered 55 000, with the French (37 000), Indians and Pakistanis (6 000) and o 100 200km Chinese (4 000) constituting the largest I 1 I communities of foreign origin. By 1986,10 the number of French nationals had dwindled to less than 15 000.

Going back in history As we have noted, a strong element of continuity has played a vital role in the history of Madagascar. And this makes an understanding of contemporary de­ velopments almost incomprehensible unless they are related to the very beginning of the island's history. Malagasy tradition says that the first settlers, known as the Vazimba, were a dark-skinned people of small stature who settled in the west and north-west of the island at a date that cannot be precisely determined, perhaps in the ninth century of the Christian era. These people expanded to the central plateau areas before they were ousted, some

time) in the tenth or eleventh century, by 0

newcomers1 , the Merina and the Bet­ 0

sileo,2 coming from Malaysia, Indonesia

ord even the Polynesian islands. The lat­ e tert retained their maritime traditions and a raidedd the Comoros, from where they (

broughtr slaves, origin of the Makoa. 11 e h s i l b

Recentu history P

Thee expansion of the Merina and the h arrivalt of the Europeans may be consid­

eredy as the two events marking the Relief b

beginningd of the recent history of e Madagascart . By the end of the eigh­ ~ 0-300m n

teentha century the Merina lived in r 300-600m manyg small kingdoms before being uni­ ~ e

fiedc by King Andrianampoinimerina.

Politicaln change was followed by true ~ 600-1200m e c culturali revolution, sparked off by mis­ l

• 1200-1800 m sionaries.r The first envoys from the e

Londond Missionary Society arrived in

n • >1800m

1818;u and they were followed in the

1860sy by British, American and Nor­ wegiana missionaries sent by other soci­ w e etiest . Their religious activity was com­ there were some 70 000 Catholics on commercial agreements. Paris recog­ plementeda by educational and medical the island and 50 000 children studied nized the Merina sovereigns as Kings of G

programmest . By 1895 there were some at Catholic schools. 12 Madagascar, a measure that confirmed e

300n 000 Christians in the island, either Trade followed the cross in the pro­ their rights over the whole island. In i

Reformedb or Lutheran. Their schools cess of European penetration of Mada­ 1883, the rejection of a French ultima­ a S were attended by more than 100 000 gascar. Between 1862 and 1869, France tum was followed by France's occupa­ y

pupils.b Catholic missionaries, arriving tried to assure herself of a privileged tion of a number of points on the coast.

ind 1861, were also successful. In 1895 position on the island by concluding A poorly worded treaty, concluded in e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 21 , no 4 , 1991

p 235 e R Political economy------

1885, convinced the French that they both parties. The role played by the cessarily in an anti-French manner; and had been granted protectorate rights over French in the consolidation of Merina the PADESM (Parti des desherites de the entire Merina kingdom. 13 influence outside the central plateau was MadagascarlParty of the Disinherited of It should be added that; on the eve of balanced by the fact that the very institu­ Madagascar), backed by the colonial the French conquest, Madagascar had tions and culture developed under the administration, which wanted to balance attained a level of development without Merina monarchy helped to prevent colo­ the Merina wish for independence. 19 parallel in sub-Saharan Africa, with the nial rule's being seriously challenged The development of post-war politi­ single exception of Ethiopia. A rela­ before the rebellion of 1947. Hatzfeld is cal life was seriously disrupted by the tively sophisticated form of govern­ of the opinion that the respect and almost insurrection of 1947, which revived, in ment had been established. A prime religious submission evinced by the its causes, the themes that had fed the minister, absolute in practice, was Malagasy for royalty were transferred to Fahavalo movement half a century ear­ assisted by ministers and secretaries of the French administration - and that such lier: xenophobia and paganism. The state in charge of different specialized feelings were boosted by the material superstitious violence that dominated departments. Quasi-diplomatic relations progress brought by France and by expect­ this revolutionary movement was of had been established with the United ations concerning what was still to come. great avail to France, as it alienated States and a number of European If some threat to colonial rule did exist, even many supporters of independence, powers. Schools, churches and medical such danger was not posed by the sur­ particularly a large element among the services were run by Malagasy teachers, vival of Merina tradition. It could only Merina and other evolved people, who pastors and doctors, trained in institu­ come from those few men who had were in a position to supply the rebel­ tions that included Malagasy among absorbed the concepts of equality and lib­ lion with those cadres it lacked and their teaching staff. "In all these erty brought by the French themselves. In never got. By the end of 1948 the rebel­ aspects, Madagascar in 1895 was con­ any case, little came from those ideas, lion had been suppressed even in the siderably more advanced than most since the authorities,' in blatant contrast most remote areas of the island. 2o black African countries when they with the principles they proclaimed, dealt The bloody events of 1947-48, achieved their independence from colo­ sternly with any challenge to their which claimed a very great number of nial rule sixty or seventy years later."14 authoritarian administration. Such a pol­ victims, moved the authorities to imple­ Clashes between the Malagasy gov­ icy stimulated the irreducible dissatisfac­ ment urgent reforms in a number of dif­ ernment and the Resident-General of tion felt by the thinking indigenous ferent areas. 21 After a period of restric­ France, La Myre de Villiers, were fol­ minority. I? tions upon it, political activity re­ lowed) by the French expedition of This educated elite, principally Mer­ started, but with limited vitality except 0

1895,1 which occupied Tananarive. The ina, were in the main responsible for in times of election. The French gov­ 0 2

Merina monarchy was abolished and, in the wave of agitation that broke upon ernment, rather than local political d

Auguste 1896, Madagascar became a the island in the 1930s, with labour forces, now proved to be the main t

Frencha colony.15 unrest its main expression. A marriage motor of political activity by creating d (

Lengthy and difficult campaigns took of convenience between part of the the French Union, passing the Loi­ r

placee before the island was entirely Merina elite and left-wing French Cadre. The Loi-Cadre of 23 June 1956, h

pacified.s The revolt of the Fahavalo in forces made it possible for the former also known as the Defferre Law, i l

1896b and the insurrection of 1904-1905 to play the leading role in a revolution­ granted the legislative power in each

markedu the end of violent resistance to ary movement in which a proletariat, French colonial territory to an assembly P

Frenche rule. The conquest of Mada­ principally c8tier, supplied the troopS.18 elected by universal franchise. It also h gascart by the French represented, para­ This somewhat strange alliance was not made provision for the creation of an doxically,y a further step in the consoli­ an isolated case in the history of executive of local ministers, to assist b

dationd of Merina power. The French Madagascar: some three decades later a the French governor, with whom ulti­ e

administrationt had an authoritarian similar conjugation of forces served to mate power lay. Its implementation in n character.a From the governor-general undermine the moderate regime of Madagascar paved the way for the r

g President Tsiranana, opening the way to establishment of an increasingly inde­ down to the native head of canton, the e entirec administration was officially ap­ a revolutionary regime in which the pendent republic, "accepted rather than n

pointed,e unaccountable to the popula­ Merina elite remained in control of wanted" by the Malagasy. It is interest­ c i

tion.l Only in the major cities did elected most of the top positions. ing to note that the Merina constitued

municipalitiesr exist, chosen by an elect­ World War II saw the occupation of the section of the population that e orated in which the Malagasy presence Madagascar by British forces; and the wished most strongly for independence, n

wasu limited to a few notables. Regional ensuing settlement of accounts between expecting that the end of French rule

differencesy were reduced by a body of Vichyists and Gaullists profoundly un­ would favour the consolidation of their a

legislationw that ignored local customs. dermined French prestige among the own power in Madagascar. It seems e

Thist unification not only boosted the Malagasy. The immediate post-war that they overlooked the fact that access, a to independence and democracy would FrenchG presence. It helped the Merina years were marked by the implantation

t in the island of a modem political party bring in government by the cotier too.e The latter, as the most evolved and n

largesti ethnic segment, supplied the system. The two principal forces were majority. The coming of the Fifth Re­ b the MDRM (Mouvement democratique public, with the vision of almost imme­ majoritya of those subaltern officials ne­

S 16 cessary to the French administration. de la renovation malgache/Democratic diate political independence, revolu­ y

Theb Franco-Merina relationship seems Movement for Malagasy Renewal) tionized political life in the island. A

to haved worked in a manner beneficial to which wanted independence but not ne- situation characterized by a myriad of e c u d o r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 236p e R ------Political economy

parties was soon replaced by a sound the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, headed by Monja Jaona, was able to stir pluralism from which the PSD (Parti France's economic difficulties in 1968- up the impoverished peasantry of the social democrate/Social Democratic 69 and the country's excessively fast south-west of the island. Swift repres­ Party) emerged as the dominant force. 22 demographic growth. Tsiranana looked sion brought many deaths (estimated for pragmatic solutions to halt his variously at between 46 and 2 000) and land's economic decline, overlooking arrests. Monima, however, was able to The first twelve years of the fact that such measures could be ex­ change from a regional group to a resis­ independence ploited by political adversaries. The tance movement, backed by students In July 1960 Madagascar became an expansion of the country's economic and urban radicals. In January 1972 independent nation and started upon a ties with South Africa and the cession Tsiranana was re-elected as the sole can­ new period of its history without a rad­ of monopolies to a French company, didate in an 86 per cent poll but this did ical break with its colonial past. The the Grands Moulins de Dakar, were but not prevent the continuation of unrest. PSD, which had been in control of the two of his decisions that brewed up a In May thirty-four people were killed government council since May 1957, political storm.26 when the security forces clashed with won the elections of September 1960, In the late 1960s Tsiranana had to students, labourers and urban unem­ by taking 81 of the 107 seats in dispute. face growing dissatisfaction, coming ployed. After that, the President relin­ Philibert Tsiranana, an anti-communist from both outside and inside his own quished his powers to General Gabriel high-school teacher, trained at the Uni­ party. The principal opposition force Ramanantsoa, an apolitical Merina. 3o versity of Montpellier, became presi­ was that of the AKFM (Parti du con­ This decision opened a new chapter in dent of the new republic. A constitution gres de l'independance de Madagascar/ the history of Madagascar, a chronicle favouring a strong presidency made it Congress Party for the Independence of of left-wing revolution and failure. possible for him to build considerable Madagascar), a left-wing party headed personal power. His domestic policies by the mayor of Antananarivo, the were based upon a concept of national Protestant minister Richard Andriana­ Time of transition (1972-75) unity that implied both the elimination manjato, a Merina who was neither Ramanantsoa's rise to power marked of Merina prejudices with regard to the Marxist nor frightened of Marxism. the beginning of a three years' period catiers and a moderate and pragmatic The rivalry between these two men of transition that put an end to the "neo­ form of socialism.23 reinforced the clash between the colonial" phase in the post-indepen­ Tsiranana's foreign policy was based Merina and the catiers. The PSD re­ dence history of Madagascar. The new

upon) reinforced ties with France, other jected offers of a merger emanating leader, who lacked any clearly defined 0

1 European countries and the United from the AKFM, as Tsiranana preferred ideological orientation, kept Tsiranana 0

States,2 from whom he expected and re­ to retain a multiparty democracy with as a figurehead president, while looking

ceivedd military support and both finan­ an impartial judiciary and freedom of about him for popular backing for him­ e cialt and technical assistance. He was the press.27 For the second time in the self. After creating a division between a notd afraid that a strong French presence history of Madagascar, an elitist ethnic students on the one side, and workers (

mightr generate a neo-colonial situation, group was playing the role of leader of and peasants on the other, Ramanantsoa e inh spite of opposition from his own left-wing forces. became a popular figure by granting s i partyl on this point. In January 1964 Dissatisfaction inside the PSD could wage increases and annulling poll and b

thereu were still 1 736 French citizens in be related to the combined effects of cattle taxes. Such policies explain why. P government employment, in spite of dismay caused by Tsiranana's foreign in October 1972, eighty per cent of the e progressiveh reductions brought about as policies (which could not be calmed by electorate gave him a mandate, used by t

ay result of resolutions passed in July signing a few agreements with Eastern him to remove Tsiranana, abolish all b 1961 by the Congress of the PSD. bloc countries), and concerns related to elected bodies, and announce that a d

Tsirananae snubbed relations with the the president's declining health. This constitutional referendum, followed by t

Easternn bloc, fearing that they might be last was particularly worrying since the elections. would take place in 1977. 31 a r used to further communist penetration. Party's tenuous ideology made the exist­ It is difficult to ascertain the exact g

Hee was also very afraid of Asian inter­ ence of a charismatic leader necessary.28 meaning of the events that occurred in c 24 ference.n These difficulties were insufficient 1972, involving as they did a coalition e c

i A neo-colonial situation was clearly to undermine Tsiranana's popular sup­ of quite disparate forces whose com­ l

detectabler in the Malagasy economy port, as shown by the March 1967 elec­ mon denominator was a reassertion of e

underd Tsiranana's regime. In 1968, tions, which gave him 2 153 236 out of the Malagasy as a nation. But it does ninetyn per cent of the existing 528 2208275 votes cast in a 97 per cent seem as if the political revolution that u

enterprisesy belonged to foreigners. This poll. In practice the AKFM never posed overthrew the First Republic was situationa did not, however, fail to bring a real threat to Tsiranana's power, unable to demolish a structure of privil­ w e

witht it certain benefits to the country, proved by the elections of 1970, which ege and, consequently, start a genuine since,a in the early 1960s, some sixty per confirmed that Andrianamantsoa's sup­ social revolution.32 G

centt of state expenditure was covered port was limited to the Merina bour­ Major changes now took place e 29 byn taxes levied upon these selfsame geoisie of the capital. mainly in the fields of external relations i foreignb companies.25 Violence started after the Monima and economic policies. a

S (Mouvement national pour l'independance In the late 1960s the Malagasy eco­ Ramanantsoa established diplomatic y de Madagascar/National Movement relations with China, the USSR and nomyb entered upon a difficult phase

broughtd about by such developments as for the Independence of Madagascar), radical African countries. A loosening e c u d o Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 237 p e R Political economy------

of ties with France pleased nationalists logical quarrels. A sinking economy ment of a long line of nationalist move­ of all shades of opinion, partiCularly the had destroyed Rabetafika's influence. ments. There were specific promises to radicals. 33 Those excluded from the privileges particular interest groups, such as re­ Ramanantsoa's domestic policies, granted by Ramanantsoa to members of assurances to the bourgeoisie. The revo­ which represented an attempt to "mala­ the forces started plotting against him. lution also declared its compatibility gasize" public life and, particularly, the A plot mounted by Colonel Brechard with religion, small-scale private prop­ economy, failed to match the wide Rajaonarison, a cotier and former NCO, erty, rights of inheritance, and even approval earned by his changes in thl! was detected in December 19" 4. The with rule by social elites if they showed field of external relations. This was a colonel e~caped arrest and issued a the right attitudes. The desire to consequence of the fact that "malaga­ communique accusing the government achieve the objectives historically pur­ sization" revived fears of Merina dom­ of corruption and the preferment of sued by Malagasy nationalism was ination among the cotiers. 34 How that Merina before cotier officers in the expressed in the Charter's selection of policy was put into practice in the eco­ hierarchy The rebels secured support those elements in Marxism-Leninism nomic field served only to increase from figures from the previous regime, that fitted its authors' conception of such fears. Colonel Roland Rabetafika, such as Tsiranana and Resampa, and Malagasy realities and political needs. who became the new president's right­ also from Monja Jaona. On 5 February The attempt to attract into some sort of hand man, was an upper-class Pro­ 1975, Ramanantsoa resigned, after ap­ unity the various sectors of Malagasy testant who interpreted "malagasiza­ pointing Ratsimandrava as his successor. society was also expressed in a com­ tion" as the appointment of Malagasy The latter was murdered on 11 Feb­ mitment concerning the revival of the to positions previously occupied by for­ ruary. On the following day, an eigh­ Malagasy soul.41 eigners and as an assertion of local con­ teen-member "Military Directorate" At institutional level, the boky mena trol over the economy. The establish­ took over, headed by General Gilles made provision for a juxtaposition of ment of state enterprises was expected Andriamahazo.39 classical political structures (President to drive non-Malagasy out. 35 In prac­ Over the following months one of the of the Republic, a government respon­ tice there was, broadly, a good deal of members of the directorate, Lieutenant­ sible to the People's National Assem­ mismanagement and corruption. And Commander Didier Ratsiraka, built a bly) and others of a revolutionary kind. fears generated by developments in the coalition between supporters of Rama­ The latter included, at central level, the economic field were reinforced by the nantsoa's state capitalism and partisans Supreme Council of the Revolution, the result of events taking place in govern­ of radical ecqnomic and political Military Council for Development and ment administration. Here, the Merina change. In June, Ratsiraka became head the National Front for the Defence of )

bourgeoisie0 effected a real take-over. of both state and government. He imple­ the Revolution (FNDR). Genuine power 1

The 0 opposition to this found expression mented policies that expressed a deter­ was granted to the masses through the 2

in thed late 1972 - April 1973 riots in mination to establish a brand of scien­ fokonolana or local communities - e

the t island's coastal towns, which tific socialislil adapted to the existence which played the role of a buffer in this a

almostd paralysed both government in the country of so many particularist "self-managed socialism" - directed by (

administrationr and economic activity.36 elements. Banks, insurance, shipping, elected councils. A privileged position e

Theh economic crisis that followed the petroleum refinery and mineral was granted to the village community, s i

was l serious enough to undermine Rabe­ resources were nationalized. 30 as part of an experiment in which the tafika'sb position. Peasants were being pursuit of a scientific form of socialism u P

defrauded by the state marketing boards. was expressed in the following defini­

e Setting the foundations for

Suppliersh disappeared. The black market tion of socialist revolution put forward t flourished. Corruption became general.J7 full-fledged socialism by Ratsiraka: y b

Rabetafika's policies were most In December 1975 Ratsiraka was .. , the only possible choice available to d

stronglye opposed by the Minister of the awarded a seven-years mandate by us, concerning the realization of a rapid t economic, social and cultural develop­ Interior,n Colonel Richard Ratsimandrava, 94,66 per cent of the votes expressed in

a ment, autonomous and human and har­ whor came from the other pole of the a 90 per cent poll. The previous six g

monious.

sociale hierarchy. He was able to put months had been a time of frenetic togetherc the urban lumpenproletariat, the n political activity on the island. The new Battistini is of the opinion that the new e

peasantryc and many radical intellectuals leader had convinced both left and right regime was searching for economic i l not affiliated to the MFM (Party for that he belonged among them, although self-sufficiency by trying to lay down r Proletariane Power), which had assembled his personal commitment to a socialist new economic principles upon old d 42 withinn itself those sectors of the radical revolution was ambiguous and that of foundations. The result, as analysed u

oppositiony that had failed to gain control his regime even more so. Broadcasts in the following section of this article,

of thea revolution. This new strongman made by Ratsiraka m August served as was the continuation of a position of w

pushede reform in the direction of "a rad­ foundations for the elaboration of the dependence vis-iI-vis foreign powers t

ical a vision of rural autonomy and urban boky mena (red book) or Charter of the and institutions. G

populism",t which should replace the Malagasy Socialist Revolution. These The construction of the revolution­ e

staten apparatus by a "popular control of broadcasts endeavoured to please every­ ary state was envisaged by Ratsiraka i development".b But his authoritarian rule body, an objective made possible by the before it was capped with an adequate a 38 arousedS opposition. fact that the local revolution was never party system. A one-party state ap­

Byy mid-1974 the government was identified as part of a national or inter­ peared the most suitable solution hav­ b

almostd paralysed by personal and ideo- national class struggle but as the fulfil- ing regard to the objectives set; and it e c u d o

238r Africa Insight, vo121, no 4, 1991 p e R ------Politica/ economy

was also the solution favoured by the of becoming increasingly isolated from run economy, and members who consid­ president. This choice proved impracti­ the rest of the population. It was itself ered it as a transitional s~'stem that should cal, however: the existing parties op­ unable to eliminate its structural weak­ prepare the economy for being handed posed the end of political pluralism and nesses, since distinctions between tradi­ over to Malagasy entrepreneurs. 51 seemed to have enough strength to tional and new, between Merina and By about 1980 the flaws in the coun­ resist the president's attempts.43 non-Merina elites remained strong. The try's economic planning had become The deadlock on this issue was broken tension generated by this situation was apparent. Its authors had overlooked by an ingenious solution conceived by rendered more acute by the impossibility the inadequate supply of raw materials, Ratsiraka - one that permitted the sort of of accommodating the large number of the growing rice deficit, the lack of situation normally associated with a one­ new job-seekers, 100 000 a year accord­ spares for industry and transport and of party system to be realized without abol­ ing to World Bank estimates. There was consumer-goods inducements for the ishing a multiparty framework. This no redistribution of wealth to remove peasantry. They had also failed to con­ solution served Ratsiraka's objectives these tensions. On the contrary, there sider a possible fall in international particularly well, because it presented an was increased poverty among the popu­ price for Madagascar's main exports.52 additional advantage: that of serving as a lation in general, as lower prices were A lack of finance rendered the con­ buffer against political manoeuvres by paid to agricultural producers in order to sequences of these difficulties even more the armed forces. The tool to achieve support both state-based and private unpleasant. Both public and private such an objective was provided by Art­ elites.47 investment, already low under Tsira­ icle 9 of the Constitution, which made The trend followed by Ratsiraka in nana's regime, had virtually ceased provision for the existence of the FNDR domestic policy was matched by similar from 1972 onwards, partly as a result of (which we have already noted) and en­ measures in external relations. He tried to the government's excessive expenditure trusted it with the duty to "motivate and secure for himself a significant position in fields that could make no immediate guide the spirit of the Revolution towards on the international stage by acting as a contribution to economic progress. Its the establishment of Socialism."44 spokesman for underdeveloped countries value in mass-appeal lay behind an The first step in that direction was and becoming the champion of the demil­ unnecessary expansion of the educa­ taken in March 1976 with the creation itarization of the Indian Ocean, a stand­ tional system, which absorbed no less of the regime's own party, the Arema point greatly favouring Soviet interests in than 26 per cent of the national budget. (Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution). the area. Such total alignment with There were no jobs for university gradu­ It was presented as "non-political". The Moscow's external policies involved ates. In order to accommodate them,

new) party, which was backed by vari­ approval of the invasion of Afghanistan. the size of the civil service was doubled ous0 auxiliary organizations and by the Madagascar became an importer of between 1972 and 1978, while the ex­ 1

TTS0 militia, soon claimed a 90 000 Soviet weapons and some one thousand panding armed forces became an ex­ 2

membership.d In May, the Arema was Malagasy students received bursaries to pensive pressure group.53 e admittedt to the FNDR. The latter's study in the USSR.48 State expansion into areas of invest­ a

statutes,d published in December of the ment promising no directly productive (

samer year, laid down that only those benefit represented a particularly ser­ e Building a socialist economy partiesh that became members of the ious problem in a country where state s i

FNDRl - and admission was subject to The economic component of Ratsiraka's control was expanding in most areas of Ratsiraka'sb approval- could put for­ socialist revolution was to some extent a economic activity. The following table u

P 45 ward candidates in the elections. continuation of Ramanantsoa's attempt gives us the picture: e

h Later events showed that the solution to achieve economic independence by t Estimated state control of adoptedy here by the leader of the means of the implementation of some b

Malagasy revolution was most ade­ form of state-capitalism. This attempt economic activity (per cent) d quatee from a political point of view, was combined, after 1975, with a social­ t sincen it worked out well for both organ­ ist reorganization of the economy.49 The Sector June 1975 1978 a izedr political forces and the electorate new leader expected that his policies g

Banking 25 100

ine general. In August 1981 the last would be able, between 1978 and 1984,

c Insurance 15 100

organizedn resistance to Ratsiraka's to lay the foundations for a new order in

e Imports 20 60 groupc was eliminated with the integra­ Malagasy infrastructures and agro­ i l tion of Monima in the FNDR. In 1982 industries; and that, by the year 2000, Exports 78 r

Ratsirakae was re-elected, in a 86 per the industrial sector would provide thirty Sea transport 14 14 d centn poll, by collecting 80,17 per cent per cent of Madagascar's GNP and the Water and energy 100 100 u of the votes cast against the 19,83 per real income per capita would double.50

y Internal trade 30 70 centa given to Monja Jaona. In 1985 a A combination of both political and Industry 18 33 w cabinete reshuffle reinforced the social­ material factors, however, precluded t 46 ista character of the regime. Ratsiraka's ambitious expectations. Total 13 61 G Such political success proved insuffi­ The fact was that the Malagasy leader­ t cient,e however, to solve some difficulties ship lacked any unanimity of view on the Source: J du Bois de Gaudusson, Madagascar: n

i Des entreprises pub/iques aux entre­

ofb sociological character related to the road to be followed. By 1977 the regime prises socialistes, p 219 - quoted in a

traditionalS divisory lines in Malagasy was split by quarrels between a faction

M Covell, Madagascar - Politics. society.y The elite was able to consolidate that considered nationalization as a tool economics and society, London: b its power at national level, but at the cost with which to build a permanently state- Frances Pinter, 1987, P 142. d e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 239 p e R Political economy------~------

The government tried to solve the marks the beginning of what Covell products they needed as payment for unfavourable effects of its economic considers the third phase in the eco­ their crops. 59 policies by starting an "all-out invest­ nomic history of the Malagasy revolu­ Liberalization measures adopted in the ment" phase which gave prominence to tion, there being now a partial return to mid-1980s included a new investment state economic initiative and involved a previous policies, including the involve­ code introduced in 1986 to motivate both borrowing of very great sums of over­ ment of external partners. 57 local and foreign investors. Most of the seas money. This produced an almost By seeking assistance in the form of state's control of the internal rice trade complete collapse of the economy.54 It donations and credit from the IMF, the was abolished, and, early in 1987, ex­ did little to increase the country's World Bank and a number of Western porters secured permission to set prices medium-term productive capacity - but countries, the Antananarivo govern­ with their foreign clients. Successive de­ quadrupled its external debt. Parallel ment laid itself open to their interfer­ valuations of the Malagasy franc oc­ expansionary financial policies, com­ ence and was forced to liberalize trade curred in 1986-87. These measures made bined with increased quantitative re­ conditions and devalue the Malagasy possible the granting of new facilities by strictions on trade, produced both exter­ currency. These reforms produced some the IMF and by the "London Club" of nal and domestic disequilibria. The level positive results by reducing the value of Western commercial creditors.6D of external debt became such that in the external current account deficit It must be stressed that these relat­ 1980 its servicing obligations could not from 14,6 per cent of the GDP in 1980 ively successful results achieved through be met. . to 8,7 per cent in 1986, and by making the implementation of measures heavily Ratsiraka's foreign policy proved an it possible for the country's foreign recommended by overseas agencies additional liability in such a financial reserves, which in November 1982 could not stop a continuous deterioration and economic situation, since his com­ were insufficient to cover even one in most sectors of the island's economic munist allies were either unable or day's imports, to rise, gold excluded, to activity. This explains why in 1988 unwilling to offer Madagascar the kind US$223,7 million by the end of 1988. Madagascar was to be listed among the of assistance needed by the country. Some of the measures inspired from fifteen poorest countries in the world. Libya supplied some short-term assist­ outside produced results, we must note, The annual income per capita was esti­ ance, and the USSR agreed to supply that were, at best, mixed. This was so mated at less than US$200, having de­ oil; but no Eastern bloc state actually with the increased payments to farmers clined by an annual average of 3,4 per provided financial assistance. 55 and more freedom in the rice trade. By cent between 1980 and 1988.61 1983-84 these measures had certainly The rural sector in Madagascar is of brought an improved supply to urban the utmost importance, as it is responsi­ )

Build-up0 to an economic crisis centres, but accompanied by rising ble for 80 per cent of the country's 1

It should0 be mentioned at this point that prices that placed basic necessities be­ export revenues and for the supply of 2

the Malagasyd economy was already in yond the means of the average person raw materials to most local industries. e declinet before the crisis ignited by since there were no substantial salary The production of both cash crops and a

the socialistd revolution. Its trend may increases for non-agricultural workers. 58 subsistence crops, with the single ex­ (

be illustratedr by the fact that 1970 It should be added that this more free ception of cotton, either stagnated or e

consumptionh levels, which the Plan and commercial approach to agricul­ declined from 1975 onwards as a result s i for 1978-80l intended to restore, were tural production, in spite of its unhappy of the combined effects of socialist b

loweru than those of 1960. Some figures particulars, appeared only as a minor, policies and natural calamities. The P mentioned by Covell may be used to and possibly temporary, evil made nec­ peasantry gave the thumbs-down to the e

estimateh the dimensions and growth essary by the total failure of socialist various models of co-operative and t rhythm attained by the economic crisis in structures. It must also be said that the state-owned farm, considered important y b the early 1980s. External debt climbed problem had deep roots as Ratsiraka's components of the regime's agricultural d

frome US$293,5 million in 1981, when regime had inherited structures of gov­ policy. The government's goal of self­ t

the n cost of its servicing rose to the ernment intervention in rural areas, sufficiency in food could never be a equivalentr of one-third of export earn­ whose action oscillated between the attained in a country where the area g

ings.e The budget deficit increased from ineffective and the outright counter­ occupied by rice paddies shrank instead c

1,5 pern cent of GDP in 1977 to 19,2 per productive. These state structures (cre­ of expanding, causing 162 000 tons of e

cent c in 1981. The volume of rice im­ ated by Ramanantsoa to assure supplies that cereal to be imported both in 1986 i l ports trebled between 1980 and 1982. of important commodities) underwent and in 1987. The 11 per cent production r

In 1982e the GNP declined by 10 per only minor changes after 1975. The increase registered in 1989 allowed a d cent n over that for the previous year, Sinpa (Societe d'interet national de reduction in rice imports to 73 000 tons. u while inflation oscillated between 30 commercialization des produits agri­ The income generated by agricultural y and 50a per cent.56 coles), operating since 1973, had be­ exports was also badly affected by w

Thee financial situation became so come totally useless by the early 1980s. declining vanilla prices, since Mada­ t criticala that the Malagasy government, Black markets flourished, with rice gascar is the leading world exporter of G

unablet to obtain suitable assistance from selling at five times the official price. that commodity. Forestry was badly e The same kind of inefficiency charac­ neglected, and husbandry remained its allies,n was forced to follow economic i policies,b both domestic and external, that terized Sonaco. (Societe nationale de uneconomic as cattle are regarded as an a

clashedS both with its principles and with commerce exterieur), responsible for indication of wealth rather than a

the liney followed as a result of foreign the purchase of export goods and for source of income.62 b

politicald entanglements. This new trend the import and sale to the peasants of Decline also occurred in the small e c u d o

240 r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R ------Political economy

industrial sector inherited from the colo­ conduct external trade in a direction externally imposed economic reforms, nial period - although the straight quite opposed to that taken by those particularly the liberalization package nationalization of industries was rare, in aligned with them politically. In 1987- demanded by the IMF, was endangering spite of the fact that most of them were 88 France, followed by the USA and the survival of the regime. 68 owned by foreigners. In 1972 an in­ other Western countries, was the main In 1987 there was increasing opposi­ dustrial sector mainly geared for import buyer of Malagasy exports. The same tion to Ratsiraka, even within the substitution generated only 5,1 per cent was true of imports, with the single FNDR, which cracked in March of that of the total output of the national eco­ exception that the USSR occupied sec­ year, when the Monima, the MFM and nomy. Between 1980 and 1987 industrial ond place among suppliers, immedi­ the Vonjy formed a coalition to oppose output registered a 2 per cent annual ately after France.66 the youth wing of the Arema. At that decline, most plants working at less than point, the pro-Soviet AKFM was the one-third of their capacity. Food pro­ only member of the FNDR that con­ cessing, brewing, paper, soap and tex­ Economic failure triggers tinued to offer active support to the tiles remained the most important indus­ political crisis Arema, most of the remaining parties tries. In an attempt to halt industrial In August 1983 Arema achieved a land­ having moved into active opposition. decline, a new investment code, intro­ slide victory in the legislative elections. Ratsiraka reacted by postponing until duced in June 1986, announced special Ratsiraka tried to exploit this success to 1989 the elections due to take place in privileges for manufacturers with incent­ attempt afresh the establishment of a the following year, 1988.69 ives to spur on both local and foreign one-party state, but his plan was The March 1989 elections confirmed private investment. 63 rejected out of hand and defeated by the the fall in Ratsiraka's popularity, as he In a country with sizeable deposits opposition. The president's failure to received only 62,7 per cent of the votes of minerals, although natural conditions impose his will here heralded the cast. Nevertheless, the legislative elec­ often make their exploitation difficult beginning of a phase of political in­ tions held in May gave Arema 120 of and expensive, mining followed a trend stability that appears to have had, as its the 137 seats in dispute, in spite of similar to that of industry. Chromite, principal cause, the continued deteriora growing opposition from intellectuals graphite and mica constitute the prjn­ tion of the economy. As Covell says, and different classes of the urban popu­ cipal mineral exports. The evolution of the implementation of the austerity lation. In September, Ratsiraka's Arema chromite exports will illustrate the policies demanded by the IMF pro­ increased its tally of municipal posts to trend in this sector: duced "unacceptable social costs", 85 per cent. 70

) which set off the riots of late 1984 and 0 - 1976: 200 000 metric tons 1 early 1985 in A!J,tananarivo. Popular 0 - 1987: 106 800 metric tons Democratization 2 discontent developed simultaneously - 1988: 64 200 metric tons d with signs of opposition to government The beginning of democratization in e t

Ina an attempt to improve the mining policies inside the FNDR, Arema and Madagascar matched similar processes d

sector( picture, the government offered the armed forces which, rather than taking shape in Eastern Europe: on tor private companies the exploitation of pulling together in everyone's interests, 21 December 1989 Madagascar's parli­ e h

golds deposits nationalized in 1975.64 looked upon government and their own ament abolished the rule that a party's i Andl in tourism the government was organizations as arenas in which to membership of the FRDM was a re­ b compelledu to take measures similar to compete for benefits. quirement for participation in elections. P those for industry and mining. The In 1985 Ratsiraka reacted to the pres­ The privileged status granted to social­ e h

Frencht group Savanna and Pullman­ sures he was experiencing by declaring ism by the constitution was left undis­

Internationaly Hotels are how imple­ that the Revolution was open to different turbed. In spite of this concession to the b menting a US$234 million project.65 currents of thought, and by proclaiming past, the legal foundations had been laid d e

t The evolution of the country's for­ the compatibility of a Marxist economic for the creation of a multiparty democ­ eignn trade balance seems to illustrate approach with religious faith.67 racy, backed by freedom of the press and a r

theg failure of the somewhat direction­ In November 1986 an attempt to re­ the economic liberalization demanded

lesse attempt at economic recovery duce the number of students was by the IMP. The resumption of a plural­ c launchedn in the early 1980s: dropped after arousing serious resis­ ist system, formally announced in March e c

i tance. In 1986-87 famine and food 1990, was accompanied by the forma­ l

r shortages in the rural south were fol­ tion of a number of new parties'?]

Foriegne trade balance (in billion

d lowed by a number of outbursts of viol­ Events during the initial phase of Malagasy francs) n ence. Monja Jaona claimed that 40 000 democratization have given the impres­ u

y people had died from starvation over sion that the Arema, in spite of the

Yeara 1983 1984 1986 1988 the previous two years. Here clearly electoral successes of 1989, lacks the w e

t was a vicious circle: economic difficul­ resources to preserve its hegemonic po­ Exports 113,4 192,3 332,5 396,8 a ties generated a new phase of political sition in a pluralist democracy. It seems G

Imports 166,8 213,5 408,4 537,5

t violence, and this caused further dis­ that the former Party for Proletarian Balancee -53,4 -21,2 -75,9 -140,7

n ruptions in the economy. Orchestrated Power (MFM), renamed the Party for i

b attacks on Indian (but not Chinese) Political Progress, was emerging as a S

An analysis of foreign trade provides traders disrupted commerce, and a feel­ the leading political force, leading a y ing of instability jeopardized invest­ powerful pro-business, church-backed furtherb evidence that economic realities

compelledd Ratsiraka's government to ment projects. Popular resistance to opposition coalition, organized by the e c u d o

Africar Insight, vo121, no 4,1991 241 p e R Political economy------

FFKM (Christian Council of Mada­ The West also appears to be replac­ a new investment code introducing gascar). The FFKM was recently recog­ ing the USSR as Antananarivo's sup­ incentives to lure foreign investors. This nized by all Catholic bishops as repre­ plier of defence and security equip­ made provision for the relaxation of senting Catholic ethics. The MFM ment. In the course of the 1991 Budget regulations concerning the numbers of wished to form a provisional govern­ vote in the French Chamber of De­ foreign workers to be employed and ment opposed to the embattled post­ puties, a representative of the National regulations concerning exchange con­ socialist administration of Ratsiraka, Defence Commission mentioned that trol. Tax incentives were granted to pri­ but had been unable to secure the ne­ Madagascar's police were going to vate investors. And EPZs (export pro­ cessary support from other opposition receive French equipment to the time of cessing zones) were established and forces for its solution.72 US$2 million. Additionally, the FAC were able to attract foreign investors The increasing strength of opposition (Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation), (particularly from Mauritius, South-East parties does not mean, however, that which falls under the jurisdiction of the Asia and France) who showed their Ratsiraka considers the return to demo­ French Ministry of Overseas Aid and approval of the benefits of preferential cracy betokens the end of his political Co-operation, granted a US$800 mil­ corporate taxes and the availability of career. In order to weaken the opposi­ lion loan to the same police force in cheap labour. tion, he has been trying to undermine the order to finance the acquisition of Progress towards a freer economic FFKM by funding a number of religious equipment necessary for effective system did not move ahead without hind­ sects. He has also been attempting to policing of urban areas.75 rances, however. The new investment bring certain members of the opposition That the president of South Africa, code was opposed by both politicians into various para-governmental struc­ F W de Klerk, was able to visit Mada­ and local business. But the demolition tures such as the Economic and Social gascar in August 1990 and sign a of the state-controlled economy con­ Council - the new name for the Supreme tourism and civil aviation agreement, at tinued in March 1990 with the liberal­ Revolutionary Council, a body com­ a time when most African countries ization of the banking sector. A foreign posed entirely of men loyal to the re­ were still demanding sanctions against controlled bank, Banque Malgache de gime, which could be transformed, even­ Pretoria, shows how far Ratsiraka had l' Ocean Indien, and a locally-owned tually, into an upper chamber or senate moved away from the radical approach private bank soon opened their doors.77 when the time is ripe for the introduction that used to characterize his foreign The liberalization of the Malagasy of a full bicameral system.73 policies.76 economy was accompanied by the It is also important to consider that implementation of the monetary re­ only) a future general election can deter­ forms recommended by the IMF and 0 mine1 whether the opposition enjoys Reform of the economy the World Bank to consolidate the 0 enough2 popular backing to defeat Rat­ Dramatic economic reforms' accompa­ country's financial resources. It is

siraka'sd MMSM (Mouvement militant nied the democratization of 1989. They expected that the Malagasy franc will e t

poura Ie socialisme malgache/Militant may be considered the logical develop­ become convertible and access to for­ d

Movement( for Malagasy Socialism), ment of the pragmatic steps taken in the eign currency eased. Simultaneously, whichr has been consolidating its struc­ early 1980s, with little consideration

e the interest rates for deposits made in a h

tures with the creation of grass-roots for ideological principles, in a desper­ foreign currency will be raised to i units,l a labour union and a youth organ­ ate attempt to halt the race towards 22 per cent, while interest rates paid for b ization.u That MMSM candidates won total economic collapse. bank loans will fluctuate between P the three by-elections held in February An entirely new phase of radical 27 and 30 per cent. These measures, e

1991h may provide some indication that t economic reform begun in 1989 repre­ based on macro-economic considera­

Ratsiraka'sy position might well be sents an attempt to achieve positive per tions, may generate a repetition of the b stronger than it appeared to be late in capita real growth without endangering excessively high social price paid for d e

1990,t when the MFM gave the impres­ the progress made in the search for true the economic reforms implemented in sionn that it was on its way to being the financial stability. To reach this real­ the early 1980s. Such negative side­ a leadingr political force in the country.74 g growth objective, the country must at­ effects may take the shape of inflation

Thee fact that some 100 000 people tain a rate of economic growth higher or of long-term debt problems for local c participatedn in the wave of agitation than the rate of population growth: businesses, whose profit margins are e c thati engulfed Antananarivo and other there will have to be a move from the often insufficient to absorb high in­ l

78 majorr cities after June 1991 does not 1,8 per cent economic growth regis­ terest rates in this range. e

invalidated this assessment of Ratsi­ tered in 1988 to 4,5 per cent. Economic raka'sn strength. It is quite possible that growth must be boosted through the u

the y government retains strong influence liberalization of both internal and for­ A crisis of expectations? in thea rural areas, which apparently re­ eign trade and by reforms bearing on The wave of unrest that began in June w e mainedt free of agitation. finance and public enterprises: by re­ 1991 provides strong evidence of the Closera relations with France and re­ storing market-determined policies and failure of the democratization process G

newedt contacts with South Africa show prices, and by reducing administrative initiated in December 1990. e welln that domestic political change is constraints on agriculture. This process gave rise to high expecta­ i beingb matched by similar developments The liberalizing process began in tions, particularly following the announce­ a S in the external relations, where pragma­ March 1989 with the abolition of all ment in March 1990 that Madagascar y

tismb has triumphed over ideological price subsidies. A fundamental step was was to become a pluralist democracy.

considerations.d taken in January 1990 with approval of The crisis came to a head after alterations e c u d o 242r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4,1991 p e R ------Political economy

to the constitution, tabled in May 1991, State, but in some ministries senior civil added "If the government were to resign indicated that genuine democratization servants were showing their sympathy now, the opposition have no policy. was not taking place. with the opposition. Yet the opposition There would be a vacuum and chaos."88 On 31 May 1991 a draft bill revising was unable to formulate a coherent At that stage a beleaguered Ratsiraka the Malagasy constitution was tabled in strategy. The leadership of the MFM still had several trumps in his hand, and the National Assembly. This included wanted dialogue with Ratsiraka to con­ the situation was already showing signs more alterations to the constitution than tinue, while other opposition forces of improvement. Most promising among those announced by Ratsiraka a few preferred more forceful methods.84 the cards he held was the one marked months previously. The objective of the By the end of July the situation had "ethnic cleavages". proposed amendments was to consoli­ deteriorated further, with seven ministry On 17 August, five of the country's date the presidential nature of the re­ buildings occupied by opposition ele­ six regions announced that they would gime. To make this plan more palatable ments. Security forces were unwilling to form federal states. Meanwhile, local to the opposition, the new draft re­ interfere with the crowds surrounding chiefs were expressing their support for moved the references to "socialism" those buildings. Ratsiraka, possibly Ratsiraka. These events indicated that a contained in the previous text.79 aware of the opposition's lack of cohe­ federal option was emerging as a new As a consequence of the rejection of sion, responded to demands for his alternative for the hard-liners in the these constitutional reforms, since 10 June resignation with minor concessions.85 regime. That the government could Ratsiraka has struggled with the "most The demonstrations now became exploit ethnic divisions to control the powerful protest movement he has met increasingly violent. On 10 August at rebellion on the plateau where the cap­ since coming to power in 1975".80 least 10 people were killed in the north­ ital is located, became apparent on 10 The protest against Ratsiraka's pro­ eastern port town of Mahajanga. The fol­ September. The governor of the federal posals generated a mass mobilization lowing day more than 100 died and over state of Taormina (former province of greater than that accompanying the 300 were injured when the Regiment de Tamatave) threatened to impose an eco­ "Revolution of 1972". In Antananarivo la Securite Presidentielle used grenades, nomic freeze on the capital and to dis­ • some 100 000 people marched on three anti-tartk rockets and automatic weapons continue fuel supplies if the civil ser­ consecutive days, calling for a national to repel a crowd of 500 000 marching on vants did not abandon their strike. This conference, which would draft a new the presidential palace.87 reflected the possibility of mobilizing constitution, and for a transitional gov­ With the violence came increasing the cotiers against a Merina-dominated ernment preparatory to a general elec­ political radicalization. The FFKM, opposition.89 tion. The principal force behind this which had played a leading mediating As indicated at the beginning of this )

wave0 of unrest was the Active Oppo­ role in earlier negotiations, turned article, the opposition's intransigence, 1

sition,0 a coalition of political parties, against Ratsiraka, describing him as a in its refusal to accept Ratsiraka's con­ 2 "non-Christian" and a user of rampy, or tinuing as president, even with reduced tradesd unions and other associations, e

stronglyt backed by the FFKM. Be­ traditional religious talismans. Early in powers, placed a major obstacle in the a

caused Ratsiraka was in France when the September, Prime Minister Razanamary way of its achieving success. Later in (

troubler broke, the authorities adopted a threatened to dismiss 100 000 civil ser­ September the deadlock remained after e a proposal suggested by the French wait-and-seeh attitude until his return. vants unless they ended their ten-week s i

Theyl then reacted firmly, giving no strike by the 4th of the month. The ambassador had been rejected. He was indicationb of a willingness to yield to threat was ignored and another march of the opinion that Ratsiraka should u

P 81

opposition demands. of 500 000 people took place in Antan­ transfer his powers to a Public Salvation e Committee. A similar plan was pro­ h Ratsiraka's intransigence stimulated anarivo. The opposition thought Raza­ t further protest. On 19 June between namary's failure very significant, for it posed by the FFKM, which, possibly y b

200 000 and 300 000 people marched pointed out to international opinion convinced that frontal opposition could d

ine the capital, demanding the presi­ where the real power lay.87 not break Ratsiraka's determination, t

dent'sn resignation and the formation of Yet there were other indications that revived its earlier willingness to talk. Its a 82 ar new government within the week. the impressive mass demonstrations formula now was a consensus govern­ g ment, which, besides inheriting those

e Subsequent events created the im­ notwithstanding, Ratsiraka was not in pressionc that Ratsiraka's regime was on the hopeless position sketched by oppo­ powers held by the Head of State, would n

e 9o

itsc last legs, for the opposition now be­ sition leaders and most of the inter­ be empowered to legislate. i l gan to build alternative, parallel hier­ national media. r

archies.e On 18 July a crowd estimated at Even as a rally of civil servants was d Conclusion 400n 000 marched in Antananarivo, deciding to continue the strike, many u while a general strike paralysed govern­ strikers were queuing outside banks to The fact that the dramatic process of y

menta offices. The opposition selected an receive their salary cheques. The new change that has been taking place in w

alternativee government headed by Jean minister of mines and industry, Jean Madagascar since 1989 is far from being t

Rakotoharison,a a retired general. The Jacques Rakotoniaina, said "The people completed, makes it hazardous to fore­ G ruling coalition declared the alternative are tired of the situation of constant cast how the country will evolve - even t governmente illegal. 83 strikes and shortages caused by the in the near future. Nevertheless, there n i

b By this time there were clear signs of opposition." That most shops were re­ are clear trends, some of them deeply a

divisionS within both government and opening seemed to lend credence to his rooted in the Malagasy tradition, that

oppositiony structures. The military words. Rakotoniaina, only a few weeks give us a few hints as to the possible out­ b leaders remained loyal to the Head of earlier an opposition shadow minister, come oftoday's "transformation scene". d e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 243 p e R Political economy------·------

There were signs of economic re­ absence of a neat, cut and dried, philo­ Notes and references vival early in 1991, after Ratsiraka had sophically based ideology made the o Hatzfeld, Madagascar, Paris: PUF, made some tentative openings to for­ choice and implementation of pragmatic 1960, P 7. eign investment. After a few months of solutions easier. The policies followed in 2 BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, political anarchy, however, many for­ external commerce since the very begin­ November 1991, ME 1218, B/4-5. eign investments were shelved, in­ ning of Ratsiraka's regime offer a good 3 Ihid. vestors who had planned to establish deal of evidence on this point. The fact 4 Ihid. export-oriented industries fled, and that the economic failure of socialism 5 The Citizen (Johannesburg), 2 November many local business either closed or generated radical political change, not 1991, P 11. face the risk of doing so. minor reforms of a palliative nature, 6 Ken Vernon, "Round One to Ratsiraka, but With regard to the immediate future, confirms this interpretation. battle not yet won", Star (Johannesburg), 7 Ratsiraka, having won the initial pro­ A second point: the highly dramatic October 1991, p 15. tracted battle, during which he so often changes that have taken place in the 7 R Battistini and J M Hoerner, Geographie appeared on the verge of defeat, finally recent history of Madagascar - conquest de Madagascar, Paris: EDICEF, 1986, lost his nerve and conceded to opposi­ by the French, national independence pp 11,35 and 42; 0 Hatzfeld, op cit, pp 7 tion pressure. and socialist revolution - show that the and 91. It does not seem that he would have Merina elite, through its ability to ride 8 R Battistini and J M Hoerner, op cit, pp much chance of retaining power at the out storms of all kinds can ensure some 105-20. elections. Nevertheless, there remains form of continuity in Madagascar. 9 Ibid, P 71; H Deschamps, Histoire de the remote possibility that he could These two constants, without which Madagascar, Paris: Berger-Levoyant, profit from a combination of two factors. the present situation cannot be under­ 1965,pp 18-19. The opposition is far from united and stood, appear to indicate that the coun­ 10 R Battistini and J M Hoerner, op cit, pp could present more than one presidential try has the potential to eliminate, in the 82-85; J Carroll, "Economy", in Africa candidate. In addition, nobody knows long run at least, the consequences of south of the Sahara, 20th edition, London: Europa Publications, 1991, p 637; how much support Ratsiraka still enjoys almost two decades of steady decline. V Thompson, "Physical and social geogra­ outside the principal urban centres. The Prospects appear even better when we phy", in ihid, p 627; Economist Intelli­ positions adopted by regional authorities consider the facts of international power gence Unit, Madagascar, Comoros - and local chiefs leave the impression today. The new distribution of power in Country profile 1990-91, London: EIU, that such support may be more wide­ the world, with the Soviet Union adopt­ 1991, P 2. II M Brown, Madagascar rediscovered - A spread) than generally suspected. ing a lower profile in its relations with

0 history from early times to independence,

It1 is also impossible to surmise how Third World countries, makes it easier a new0 government will revive an eco­ Cape Town: David Philip, 1978, P 13; 0 2 for Antananarivo to move further with

Hatzfeld, op cit, pp 21-22; E

nomyd to all intents and purposes already its traditional policy of following those

e Ralaimihoatra, Histoire de Madagascar, dead.t Its success will depend prin­ trends considered to be more favourable

a Tananarive: Societe Malgache d 'Edition,

cipallyd upon two things: how peace­ to the national interest. 1965,voll,.p207. (

fullyr the transition process continues; Madagascar is a country well-en­ 12 0 Hatzfeld, op cit, pp 22, 30-31 and 34-35. e

and h the level of confidence of foreign dowed with agricultural, fishing and, to s 13 Ibid, P 38. i

financiall circles in Madagascar's polit­ some extent, mining resources. Set

b 14 M Brown, Madagascar rediscovered

ical u evolution. Only an orderly process against this, it lacks the technology and op cit, p 237. P

of political reform would create the financial means to develop its resources e 15 0 Hatzfeld, op cit, pp 38-39. conditionsh necessary to attract the lev­ and launch the industrialization neces­ t

16 Ibid, pp 43 and 49-51.

els y of foreign investment essential to sary to attain some reasonable degree

b 17 Ibid, pp 52-53. Madagascar's economic recovery. The of economic self-sufficiency. And its d

politicale future of Madagascar may well very rapid demographic growth, which 18 H Deschamps, op cit, pp 262-63; Eduardo t Serpa, "Comunismo & Descolonizacao", be determinedn by the attitude of the shows no signs of losing its momen­ a Resistencia (Lisbon), Nov-Dec 1972, p 45. internationalr bankers and aid agencies. tum, makes even more urgent the devel­ g

19 Charles Cadoux, La republique malgache,

Yete this article aims at more than a opment of the island's potential, a goal

c Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1969, pp 51-52.

predictionn of the immediate future. that can never be achieved unless

e 20 0 Hatzfeld, op cit, p 93. The most detailed Whatc we note everywhere, first of all, policies favourable to foreign invest­ i

l analysis of the rebellion is offered by is a deeply rooted sense of pragmatism ment are put into practice. r Jacques Tronchon in a work that neverthe­ e

whichd never disappeared completely, Malagasy courage in dealing with less presents serious shortcomings, evenn during the most agitated phases of South Africa (while many African coun­ L'insurrection malgache de 1947, Paris: u Editions Diffusion Karthala, 1986. the revolutionaryy period. This it was that tries are still protesting against the lift­ madea it possible for Madagascar to call a ing of sanctions by various Western 21 The French General Staff put at some 89 w

e 000 the number of people killed during the

halt t to the race into the abyss, and do countries) seems to point to the possibil­

this a by taking measures which ignored ity that strong relations may develop repression. Other sources give very differ­ G

ent figures. Jacques Tronchon, op cit, pp the government'st proclaimed ideological between Pretoria and Antananarivo. The

e 70-71; Charles-Robert Agerion (ed), Les

principles.n The latter, with the benefits little distance separating the two coun­

i chemins de la decolonisation de /' Empire of hindsight,b seem to have played the tries, and the competitive prices of many Franr;ais, Paris: CNRS, 1986, pp 70-71, a role S of mere tools, useful to attain South African products of potential 293-94.

certainy objectives of national interest - interest to Madagascar, point strongly in

b 22 0 Hatzfeld, op cit, pp 96-116; Charles

but d not objectives in themselves. The that direction. Cadoux, op cit, pp 51-55; V Thompson e c u d o

244r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R ------Political economy

and RAdloff. The Malagasy Republic - 42 R Battistini and J M Hoerner. op cit. pp 70 M Brown. "Recent history". op cit. p 632. Madagascar today. Stanford: Stanford 123-24. 71 Ibid. University Press. 1965. p 115. 43 Maureen Covell. op cit. p 60. 71 Africa Confidential. vol 32. no 3, 8 23 V Thompson and RAdloff. op cit. pp 79. 44 Quoted in ibid. p 60. February 1991. 119-120 and 135; M Brown. "Recent his­ tory". in Afica south ...• op cit. p 628. 45 Ibid. P 61. 73 Ibid; Indian Ocean Newsletter. no 465. 9 February 1991. p 4. 24 V Thompson and RAdloff. op cit. pp 128- 46 M Brown. "Recent history". op cit. pp 171.175-177 and 181. 630-31. 74 Indian Ocean Newsletter. no 465. 9 February 1991. p 4. 25 R Battistini and J M Hoerner. op cit. pp 47 Maureen Covell. op cit. pp 78-79. 122-23. 48 M Brown. "Recent history". op cit. p 630. 75 Ibid. 26 M Brown. "Recent history". op cit. p 628. 49 Maureen Covell. op cit. p 136. 76 New African. no 280. January 1991, p 27. 27 Ibid; V Thompson and RAdloff. op cit. p 50 J Carroll. op cit. p 636. 77 J Carroll. op cit. pp 634 and 637. 105. 51 Maureen Covell. op cit. p 77. 78 Indian Ocean Newsletter, no 465. 9 28 M Brown. "Recent history". op cit. p 628; 52 J Carroll. op cit, p 636. February 1991. p 4. V Thompson and RAdloff. op cit. p 105. 53 Maureen Covell. op cit, pp 64-65. 79 Indian Ocean Newsletter. no 482. 8 June 29 M Brown. "Recent history". op cit. p 628; 1991. p 5 V Thompson and RAdloff. op cit. pp 137- 54 Ibid. P 136. 138. 55 Ibid. pp 67-68; M Brown. "Recent his- 80 Indian Ocean Newsletter. no 483. 15 June 1991. p 1. 30 M Brown. "Recent history". op cit. pp tory". op cit. p 630. 628-29. 56 Maureen Covell. op cit. pp 63 and 67. 81 Ibid. pp I and 4. 31 Ibid. P 629. 57 Ibid. P 136. 82 BBC. Summary of World Broadcasts. ME/lI04 B/l. 21 June 1991 32 Maureen Covell. Madagascar - Politics, 58 J Carroll. op cit. p 636. 83 The Citizen. 19 June 1991. economics and society. London: Frances 59 Maureen Covell. op cit. pp 136-38. Pinter. 1987. pp 35-36. 84 Indian Ocean Newsletter. no 488. 20 July 60 J Carroll. op cit. p 637. 33 M Brown. "Recent history". op cit. p 629. 1991. P 1. 61 Ibid. P 633. 34 Ibid. 85 The Star (Johannesburg). 30 July 1991. 62 Ibid. pp 633-634; Maureen Covell. op cit. 35 Maureen Covell. op cit. p 53. p 139. 86 The Citizen. 12 August. 1991; Africa Confidential. vol 32. no 18, 13 September 36 M Brown. "Recent history". op cit. p 629. 63 Ibid. pp 141-142; J Carroll. op cit. p 634. 1991. p 7. 37 Maureen Covell. op cit. pp 53-54. 64 J Carroll. op cit, p 635.

) 87 Africa Confidential. vol 32. no 18. 13

380 Ibid. pp 51 and 54. 65 Ibid. P 636. September 1991. p 7; BBC. Summary of 1

0 66 Economist Intelligence Unit. op cit, pp 25-26. World Broadcasts, ME/l169 B/4-5. 5

392 Ibid. pp 55-56. September 1991. 40d Ibid. P 57; R Battistini and J M Hoerner. 67 Ibid, P 3; J Covell. op cit. pp 60. 70 and 74. e t op cit. p 123; M Brown. Madagascar redis­ 88 The Star. 4 September 1991.

a 68 M Brown. "Recent history". op cit. p 631-

d covered .... op cit. p 129-30. 632; Economist Intelligence Unit. op cit. p 4. 89 Indian Ocean Newsletter. no 493. 14 (

41r M Brown. "Recent history". op cit. p 630; 69 M Brown. "Recent history". op cit. p 632; Septem ber 1991. p 4. e

h Maureen Covell. op cit. pp 57-59 and 98. Economist Intelligence Unit. op cit. p 5. 90 Ibid. s i l b u P

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d e c u d o Africar Insight. vol 21. no 4. 1991 245 p e R Administration ------

Inertia in African public administration: An examination of some causes and remedies

Dr S K Asibuo, Lecturer in Public Administration at the University of Ghana, Legon, looks at some of the obstacles that have prevented African bureaucracies from responding to rapid technological, social and economic change and suggests remedies for their defects.

Introduction and aspirations, and in the fulfilment of can come only from above; there is also All ovef the world, governments have their multifaceted functions, however, emphasis on obedience by subordinates extended) the scope of their activities these public organizations face several to their superiors; all operations are 0 beyond1 the traditional tasks of defence, administrative difficulties that call for regulated by a system of rules; bureau­ 0 maintenance2 of law and order and the reform. It is these problems that have cratic authority resides in the office, not

collectiond of taxes. Robson has made the public sector in most African in the occupant of that office; and the e t

remarked:a countries ineffective, inefficient and office-holder should not misappropriate d

The( increased functions of the state are unresponsive to the changing needs of the resources attending his office; that is,

oner of the most commonplace facts of their societies.. One of the most official activity must be separated from e

modernh political history. Every text-book

s intractable of such obstacles is inertia. the private life of the official. Weber's i onl government emphasizes the vast This may be defined as the combination bureaucratic model was not specifically growthb in the duties and responsibilities u of forces that tend to generate resis­ intended for anyone particular bureau­

ofP public authorities today compared 1 tance to change and reduce the ability cracy; it has elements familiar to all pub­ withe a century ago.

h and capacity of organizations to be t lic organizations.

Upony attaining independence, many flexible, adaptable and productive - Inertia may be caused by a variety of b new African states realized that polit­ whether in the form of services or things. These include the following: the d e

ical independence,t though laudable, was goods. This article seeks to examine sheer size of the civil service; an exces­ not sufficientn in itself to promote their some of the causes of inertia in African sive centralization of decision-making a economicr and social development. So it public administration and also suggest g authority; an inadequate delegation of

is that,e to enhance their welfare objec­ possible solutions that will help to authority and responsibility; a rigid c tives,n many governments in these new ameliorate the conduct of business by adherence to rules and procedures; the e c

statesi have created environments fully the bureaucracy. attitudes to work and authority of civil l

conduciver to the general social and servants; the inadequacy of qualified e

economicd well-being of their citizens. personnel; and the political and consti­ Educationaln institutions and hospitals The causes of inertia tutional environment of a public sector u

havey been established. Basic infrastruc­ Any diagnosis of the organizational that may not be conducive to risk ture a such as water supplies, roads, tele­ framework in which public servants taking. There are other causes too. w e phonet networks, railways, electricity operate should begin with Max Weber's supplya and similar projects dl!manding model of bureaucracy. For our purposes The sheer size of the civil service G

heavyt capital expenditure have been the key features to note in Weber's ideal The public bureaucracy (or what is com­ e undertaken.n Public enterprises, boards bureaucracy are the following: the stress monly referred to as the civil service) is i and b other agencies have also been on its hierarchical structure of author­ the biggest organization in many coun­ a S

established in order to accelerate the ity - each lower office being under the tries. As a complex organization, it y

paceb of socio-economic development. control and supervision of a higher consists of ministries, each of which is

Ind the pursuit of their multiple goals one - and the assumption that initiative subdivided into several departments and e c u d o 246 r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R ------Administration

divisions. Currently, Ghana's civil ser­ tends to be deficient, too, because deci­ officials and their lack of confidence in vice, for one instance, comprises about sions in the capital are divorced from the quality and capabilities of subordi­ eighteen ministries. The heavy volume local realities. Consequently local initi­ nates, especially field staff. Ironically, of work handled by the large staff in ative and enthusiasm and aspirations both regional and district departmental these ministries results in the introduc­ are suppressed, if not killed altogether. heads have been promoted to their pre­ tion of standardized procedures, which If, on the other hand, the district depart­ sent positions after thorough assess­ normally become the subject of regula­ mental head takes a unilateral decision ment of their experience and compet­ tions and rules. Thus the sheer size and (driven by the urgency of the issue) ence by central ministry officials; yet complexity of the civil service make it without reference to his immediate there is an increasing tendency on the difficult for it to operate with the speed boss, the regional head of department, part of the latter, even though they that characterizes small organizations. his actions will be queried.2 themselves appointed the officers in One should not forget that big creatures In Ghana, despite the government's question to head regions, provinces and normally move slowly. commitment to decentralization, there districts, to look down upon them. are still some elements of centralization Other factors for officials' failure to Excessive centralization of in the public bureaucracy. Traces of delegate include their fear of losing decision-making authority centralization can be seen in the pay­ their posts to well-groomed and bril­ An important fact that has been of much ment of annual increments, leave claims liant subordinates, their desire to create public concern appears to be the inordi­ and the omission of names on payment the impression of indispensability, and nate delays experienced in rendering of vouchers. The payment of an annual the subordinates' inexperience and lack service to members of the public and in leave bonus sometimes involves the of self-confidence. prosecuting government business. beneficiary's travelling to the Account­ In addition, with decentralized pro­ Delays may be attributed to the ant-General's Department in Accra to grammes, central ministry officials are structure and procedures of the civil expedite the processing of payment quite often reluctant to relinquish some service. The problem of structure may forms. Similarly, the omission of names of their powers and functions to decen­ stem from an excessive centralization on payment vouchers also means going tralized departments because the pro­ of the decision-making authority in from the remotest parts of the country grammes are seen by them as a device central ministries in the national cap­ to Accra to clarify the matter with the for curtailing their own powers and ital. Arising from such a highly central­ Accountant-General's Department. Cor­ influence. They are therefore not com­ ized bnreaucratic structure, there is respondence alone, even when it mitted to the success of such a pro­

inadequate) co-ordination of policies emanates from regional or district gramme. Thus the decentralization pro­ between0 departments and also a lack of departmental heads, is not enough: the gramme initiated by several African 1 the0 dissemination of the information trip to the national capital has to be governments suffer from one funda­ 2 3 necessaryd for effective decision mak­ made. The cost of transport and hotel mental defect: the very people who are e ing.t The ministers/commissioners and accommodation may at times make the to implement the programmes and a thed top central ministry officials are journey scarcely worthwhile. whose attitudes will determine their (

hardr pressed to cope with the volume of success or failure are at the outset e Inadequate delegation of workh and range of decisions they have opposed to them owing to the loss of s i tol make. The overall effect is one of authority and responsibility privileges that effective implementa­ b

procrastination.u Another cause of inertia closely related tion would entail. P

The centralization of the machinery to the problem of excessive centraliza­ There is also the problem of effective e

ofh government that we have noted tion is the inadequate delegation of supervision and control in the civil ser­ t

stiflesy the prompt execution of certain authority and responsibility. That dele­ vice. In order to encourage the subordi­ b rural development programmes because gation of authority is of much practical nate to feel at ease in his dependency d regionale and district officers lack suffi­ significance in administration cannot be and to perform in a manner consonant t cientn discretionary authority to take disputed. Delegation frees superior offi­ with the objectives, policies, rules and a decisions:r almost all major develop­ cers to concentrate on more important regulations and the standards expected g

mente decisions affecting local issues tasks dnd gives subordinates an oppor­ of him, his responsibilities must be c

haven to be taken in the national capital. tunity to take the initiative in certain clearly defined. This is virtually absent e

This,c usually, entails a loss of precious matters as well as demonstrate their cap­ in most civil service departments and i l time due to an ineffective and poor abilities. It also saves time and allows agencies. As a result of the lack of r communicationse network - several dis­ the utilization of local knowledge and clearly defined responsibilities and the d trictn headquarters do not have a tele­ talent. Thus delegation can provide a withholding of information, many u phone network and officers have to rely basis both for making reliable per­ junior civil servants always appear, and y ona correspondence. The postal system, formance appraisals and for ensuring are, na"ive - from sheer ignorance; so w too,e tends to be unreliable because that decision making is brought down they fail to perform well. This ignorance t manya postal vehicles frequently break as close as possible to the activity and the prevailing tendency on the part G 4 of civil servants to refer issues upwards down;t so letters take a long time to concerned. reache their destination. In some in­ Yet available evidence indicates that for clarification cause delay. The shift­ n i

stancesb this delay throws many pro­ senior public officials are reluctant to ing of responsibility has become com­ a

grammesS and projects out of gear­ delegate for a variety of reasons. mon, the safest way to avoid making

particularlyy those whose implementa­ Important points are the habits and mistakes is not to act at all. Here is yet b ingrained attitudes of central ministry another source of delay. tiond has seasonal constraints. Execution e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 247 p e R Administration ------

Rigid adherence to rules and paperwork, including a multiplicity of similar action. The basic rationale be­ procedures authorizations and signatures. All this hind the idea of precedents is not only may be justified when matters of princi­ to avoid the possibility of a central gov­ An important goal of the civil service is ple are involved, but it is very doubtful to give the public a service that is safe whether it serves any useful purpose ernment department or agency giving and sure rather than swift and cheap. when applied to routine matters where different decisions at different times in This necessitates caution and delibera­ fixed procedures suffice.? similar cases but also to facilitate the tion in the activities of civil servants. expeditious disposal of identical cases Rules and regulations are rigidly ad­ Cumbersome operating procedures stem time after time. In effect, the constant hered to in the interests of impersonal partly from the hierarchic nature and reference to precedents helps to achieve and impartial behaviour; but a lack of structure of the civil service and also a certain uniformity and preserve the imagination, discretion and initiative on from the accountability with which civil service tradition of fairness and the part of public officials and the civil servants are burdened. The hier­ impartiality. But an inherent major excessive exercise of caution result in archical routeing of correspondence weakness is that little or no allowance the phenomenon labelled "red tape". and other communications delays deci­ is made for instances in which unusual According to Juran, red tape may be sion making, too. Documents and files circumstances mean that established defined as "delay, buckpassing, pigeon­ must follow a prescribed series of steps precedents simply have no bearing on holing, indecision and other phenomena through different administrative levels. the present situation. So in a situation which contribute to, and end in in­ Thus one of the major impediments to where precedent is lacking, the official action".5 Red tape contributes to iner­ quick action can be traced to the prolif­ will refer the matter to his superior; tia. Thus one thing that has often been eration of levels in central ministries. and, if the case is unusually difficult, it denounced for causing delay in civil Files move from one office to another; may slowly travel along the administrat­ service operation is the body of stand­ and since most of these files are not ive chain of responsibility until a deci­ ing operating procedures popularly classified according to their import­ sion is made at top level - after an called "General Orders". The Daily ance, many matters cannot be settled exasperating time lag. Graphic in Ghana in an editorial com­ without reference to the Permanent ment reiterated public condemnation of Secretary himself. Much of the time of Attitudes to work and authority of cumbersome civil service procedures as senior officials is devoted to a review civil servants follows: of 'papers and files received from sub­ Besides the structural and procedural Much of the red-tapism and the civil ser­ ordinates. These are then passed on to problems of the civil service, there are 8 vants') much-condemned inefficiency can still higher officers. According to attitudinal problems that have not only 0

be1 traced to the unrealistic and unneces­ Fainsod "Procedural slavishness and called for constant public comment but sarily0 rigid orders which make it virtu­

2 dilatory tactics at lower levels have created room for delay. The attitudes to ally impossible for the organisation to d created bottlenecks which only heroic work and authority of most public ser­ e functiont as it should and yield the action can break".9 vants leave much to be desired. Their desireda results.6 d A typical cause of unjustified delay apathetic attitudes preclude their apply­ (

It is truer that the delay may simply arise is the processing of simple routine mat­ ing themselves to work as they should. e fromh the time legitimately needed by a ters through excessively cumbersome In an editorial, the Ghanaian Times s i civil l service department or a public procedures. Examples are money claims opined: b organizationu to perform its official such as insurance, social security, bank ... by every yardstick, the attitude to P work. It should also not be forgotten loans against large organizations, li­ work of the civil servant of today has e that certainh services undertaken by some cence applications, passport issues and become one of the most serious problems t which must be counted among those that publicy institutions and agencies by their so forth. Contractors and private busi­

b call for priority treatmenLIO very nature are extremely complex and nessmen face handicaps imposed by d may e require reference to several differ­ rigidly followed rules and regulations. While it is fair to accept that the atti­ t ent departmentsn for their proper execu­ To secure approval for industrial or tudes to work of quite a number of pub­ a tion. r But what is disturbing is not the import licences often requires a busi­ lic servants are poor, one must also not g

existencee of the rules but the rigidity nessman to fill out numerous forms, lose sight of the facts which have cre­ c

with n which they are adhered to without visit several government offices in the ated this situation. Their purchasing e regardc to variations in circumstances. national capital, and wait at govern­ power, their sense of motivation in rela­ i l

Besides,r some of these rules and proce­ ment offices for long periods. tion to the incentives that are given e

duresd are outmoded. Most African A related cause of delay in the civil them and their pattern of living are all countriesn have not reviewed their service is the devotion to precedents. important points that deserve attention u

Generaly Orders and Civil Service Codes Considerable pressures are often exert­ in any critical analysis of administrat­ sincea Independence. Ghana is currently ed by the public, and administrators ive problems. Low morale and lack of w e

reviewingt its General Orders and Civil find it more convenient to solve prob­ motivation on the part of both manage­ Servicea Code - after some thirty years. lems in a manner that has been tried ment and staff of public organizations G

Civilt services also resort to exces­ before rather than venture out into the may stem from several causes. It may e

sive n paperwork - not on policy issues unknown. Precedents thus playa major be due to the politicization of the civil i aloneb but even on routine matters. As role in decision making in the civil service, carried out in order to make it a pointedS out by Aryeh Globerson, service, a precedent being a previous politically responsive to the aspirations y decision or case taken as an example Anb exaggeratedly legalistic approach of the regime. And when public office

leadsd to excessive correspondence and for subsequent cases or for supporting is treated as a legitimate object of e c u d o 248 r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R ------Administration

spoils - when promotion is not based Let us tum to Ghana. Since 1983 the often subject to public scrutiny and entirely on seniority or merit but rather central government has embarked upon question. (The mere thought of account­ on political considerations - these can an economic recovery programme with ability fosters legalism and delay.) only result in a sharp deterioration of substantial financial support from the Niskanen has reflected thus: morale, efficiency and discipline. International Monetary Fund and the It has long been observed that legislators, Another cause of low morale is that World Bank. As part of this programme the press, and political scientists appear civil servants are grossly under-remu­ 32 542 persons in the Civil Service and to be more interested in how honestly our nerated. They also lack other forms of the Ghana Education Service have been public activities are conducted than in incentive. And they enjoy no welfare retrenched over the period 1987-1989 how well they are conducted. 12 programme. Under these circumstances and a total of $5,5 billion has been paid Such attitudes, it is argued, have made many civil servants are compelled to out in compensation packages. \] Since public servants cautious. For them, the supplement their salaries by engaging 1985 there has been an embargo on the successful career will be one without in business or accepting other employ­ recruitment of new staff. This has ex­ mistakes - not one noted for innovation. ment with resulting neglect of their acerbated the acute personnel problems This is what Painter refers to as "main­ official duties. In some African coun­ facing ministries and departments. In tenance values", broadly described as tries, especially those that have em­ the course of field work conducted in "keeping your nose clean". 13 barked upon International Monetary 1988, I discovered in Ghana's Ejisu­ Fund/World Bank inspired structural Juaben and Bosomtwe Districts that Other influences adjustment programmes, currencies many decentralized departments such Inertia in administration can be caused have been massively devalued. Con­ as Social Welfare, Information and by an unwillingness to alter some pro­ sequently inflation is too high, and Community Development did not have gramme in which a government organ­ minimum wages are so low that civil any supporting staff - messengers, cleri­ ization has invested substantial finan­ servants cannot even buy a kilo of cal officers, typists and so on - at all. cial, human and technical resources. meat. They are therefore dissatisfied This situation clearly makes field For example, when the Ghana Govern­ with their poor incentives - a dissatis­ administration virtually impossible in ment has spent a great deal of money faction manifested in their widespread that offices may at times have to be on equipment, seminars and workshops lack of concern for the nation and the closed in the absence of the only senior to facilitate the implementation of some masses in favour of personal interests. officer manning the whole district de­ particular educational reform - the Junior This lack of concern for the nation partment. The shortage of basic office Secondary School Programme - it re­

finds) expression in the careless manner skills, too, hampers the expeditious dis­ sists any efforts by parents, the 0

in1 which some civil servants use public posal of public business. While these National Union of Ghanaian Students 0

or2 government property and in their shortcomings cannot easily be rem­ (NUGS) and other pressure groups to

desired to grab for themselves at the edied, more attention to such lower­ suggest alternative educational pro­ e expenset of the state. Civil servants are level administrative problems might a grammes.

sod demoralized that they are unlikely, in well help break through the bottlenecks ( Decision making through the com­

fact,r to identify the objectives of the that frustrate administrators.

e mittee system in public administration,

civilh service/organization with their

s despite its alleged advantages, can i ownl aspirations. This situation is fur­ The political and constitutional sometimes lead to inertia. Rather than b

theru exacerbated when workers either environment: A public sector save time, committees may actually P have no access to the decision-making averse to risk taking

e waste it by going into excessive detail

processh or to any channel for articulat­ The political and constitutional frame­ t and by delaying decisions while waiting

ingy their needs and points of view. work within which public administra­ for another committee to arrive at a b tion, especially the public service, oper­ decision that affects its own work. At d

Inadequacye of qualified personnel t ates is not conducive to creativity. times the sheer size of some committees Inertian may be caused by a shortage of Creativity involves risk taking, some­ and their cumbersome procedures im­ a qualifiedr personnel. The tremendous thing not appreciated in the public sec­ g pede prompt decisions on vital issues. In

expansione in the functions of govern­ tor. A commercial firm, on the other fact some of these committees are not c

mentn over the past four decades has not hand, can take a risk; if it makes a mis­ necessarily meant for taking important e c

beeni matched by a corresponding in­ take, no great harm is done to the coun­ decisions but avoiding them! Walter l

creaser in the availability of qualified try at large - any harmful repercussions Sharp argues that public administration e

personnel.d Our educational institutions are strictly local. But in the event of a in the United Arab Republic (UAR) was haven been unable to produce qualified mistake by the public service the situa­

u ... cluttered with special committees and

personnely in the numbers and with the tion assumes a different dimension councils for a variety of purposes .... speeda demanded by the economic, social because the whole country may be [These Committees often] reflect a desire w

e to sidetrack knotty problems, or to

andt political development of Africa. affected. The public sector deals with

Consequentlya the few trained people people's lives, ambitions and aspira­ remove the onus for difficult decisions

G from a single official to a group .... 14

theret are, find themselves so heavily tions. So caution is certainly called for e

overloadedn with responsibilities that in its handling of public business, espe­ Political instability also causes delays i

theirb effectiveness is dissipated. In some cially in the area of health and food in administration. Experience has shown a

governmentS departments it is difficult to where the slightest mistake or omission that in those African countries that have

securey staff to carry out the routine opera­ may result in danger to the public. witnessed several military interventions, b

tionsd prescribed for simple documents. Moreover, public servants are quite as have Ghana and Nigeria, continuity e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 249 p e R I Administration ------

of administration has been undermined. day-to-day activities, most of which in A good deal of conflict and confusion This has retarded progress in the imple­ any event are governed by established therefore appears to be attributed to the mentation of several development pro­ precedents. To senior managers in other fact that people are expected to work within an organizational model which is jects. A new government assumes public organizations, decentralization is basically different from the one they are office and blames the previous regime also valuable because it tends to ease the used to, and nobody has put much efforts for adopting policies and programmes burden of detail that weighs on them and into explaining to them the difference. 15 not in the interest of the people. In so allows them more time to devote to order to legitimize its new power base, major problems. Sound decentralization demands a clear the succeeding regime abandons some Decentralization requires the del­ enunciation of policy. To this end, it is of the programmes and projects inher­ egation of a large amount of discre­ suggested that legislation dealing with ited from its predecessor without any tionary authority and the allocation of decentralization programmes should be evaluation of their viability and responsibility. This in tum increases the seriously reviewed, paying particular embarks upon its own objectives and opportunities for initiative. There is no attention to those sections which priorities. For political reasons, years better way of training young officers for through their imprecision are conducive may pass before any consideration can higher duties than by letting them take to role conflict. Similarly, policy state­ be given to the revitalization of such decisions at their own level. Decentral­ ments must be clear as to the type of abandoned projects. This sequence of ization also facilitates an increased decentralization to be adopted - whether events has retarded the development of knowledge of and sensitivity to local the intention of central government is certain coup-prone African countries problems and needs because of the deconcentration or devolution. The suc­ and underlined the fragility of the closer contact it brings about between cess of decentralization in Third World authoritarian system. From the fre­ field officials and local residents. countries will depend upon the extent quency of coups, some African coun­ Another argument in favour of de­ to which decentralized departments and tries have not been able to build up any centralization is that if decisions are agencies receive the political support of stable institutions capable of devising made by local residents they are more national leaders. Success will also any long-term plans. likely to be relevant to local needs and depend upon the extent to which dis­ conditions. If administered in this way, trict officials help to provide the neces­ local residents are more likely to be sary administrative support for district Possible solutions seriously committed to development councillors, thus enabling them to initi­ Let us now discuss solutions to some programmes affecting them and will ate plans for effective local develop­

of the) problems of inertia that have therefore participate actively in their ment. Finally, decentralization pro­ 0

been 1 the subject matter of the preced­ implementation. Moreover, success in grammes cannot be implemented with­ 0

ing section.2 The first major remedy to fulfilling one community need will out adequate financial and human

problemsd caused by the excessive cen­ encourage people to try to meet others. resources. e tralizationt of decision-making author­ Nevertheless, decentralization pro­ The problem of ineffective delegation a ity isd decentralization. It is as simple grammes in Africa have recorded more can be remedied by the education of (

as that.r Decentralization means of failures than successes - for a variety senior officials - by showing them that e courseh the transfer of functions from of reasons. In the past, some decentral­ sharing responsibility with competent s i the l centre (which may be either ization programmes were hastily insti­ subordinates does not necessarily de­ b

functionalu or the authority to perform tuted without careful assessment of the prive them of their managerial prerogat­ P certain tasks or activities) to special­ decentralized department's personnel ives. The counselling and participation e ized organizationsh that operate nation­ establishment and capacities or of the of officials in seminars and workshops t

ally. Examplesy are the creation of pub­ agencies that would be needed to per­ may further help to remove any fear b lic enterprises to build and maintain form certain functions. It was simply senior officials may have of losing their d utilitiese and of field offices within assumed that a capacity for local man­ jobs to subordinates. The latters' inexpe­ t nationaln ministries to deal with health agement existed. These deficiencies rience, lack of self-confidence and other a care orr road construction. Geographi­ adversely affected the implementation difficulties might be solved through a g

cal decentralization,e on the other hand, of decentralization reform. Caution and systematic training and counselling pro­ c

involvesn either deconcentration (a del­ careful planning are called for before gramme for them. In order to encour­ e egationc to field offices) or devolution governments in the Third World can age efficiency, realistic targets should be i l (the handing over of duties to local safely embark on such major institu­

r set for workers. Workers must be in­ authoritiese or other local bodies). tional reforms.

d volved in this. Their progress can be

As n the latest fashion in development Most African decentralization pro­ monitored at mutually agreed stages and u

administration,y decentralization has a grammes have failed because of an by methods familiar to them. numbera of things in its favour. It ensures insufficient understanding of the provi­ Outmoded and cumbersome proce­ w that publice business is dealt with more t sions of the reform measures and the dures, rules and regulations such as expeditiously,a various kinds of procras­ new roles expected of both local coun­ those of the General Orders and the Civil G

tinationt and red tape are eliminated by cillors and district civil servants. This Service Code should be revised to suit e

doingn away with the requirement to has stemmed from a lack of adequate current changes in the machinery of gov­ i make b frequent reference to central education concerning the real meaning ernment and society as a whole. Further­ a authoritiesS before action can be taken in and fundamental philosophy of the more, in order to check the withholding

the field.y Ministers/commissioners and reform. On the 1980 Zambia reforms or hoarding of information in the civil b

the nationald ministries are relieved of for instance, Bodemeyer notes that: service and other public organizations, it e c u d o

250 r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R I ------Administration

is suggested that ministries and depart­ are effected at regular intervals, they Notes and references ments prepare handy brochures covering may reduce the tendency of civil ser­ W A Robson, "Recent trends in public only those parts of the General Orders vants to establish an informal network administration" in W A Robson (ed), The (Gas) and other policies relevant to their of relations based on vested interests in civil service in Britain and France, own operations. These should be distri­ the status quo at stations occupied for a London: The Hogarth Press, 1956, p 48. buted to every literate employee of the long time. Such regular transfers, if 2 Interview with district government offi­ organization. A clear understanding of effectively implemented, will also help cials at Ejisu-Juaben and Bosomtwe and the Gas, it is hoped, will increase the to reduce the acute problem of person­ Atwima districts in Ghana respectively. flexibility with which the civil service nel shortage experienced most of all in 3 Ibid. and other public agencies cope with their rural areas. Transfers will further en­ 4 See K A Owusu-Ansah, "Possible areas environment. sure a fair distribution of competent and strategy for administrative reform in In order to overcome irresolution, officials, some of whom - as matters the Ghana civil service", Greenhill Journal lack of initiative and other tendencies to stand today - are concentrated at head­ of Administration, vol I, no I, April-June 1974, pp 12-14. inertia, and attract administrators of quarters and are reluctant to go into the high calibre, it is suggested that positive rural districts. 5 J M Juran, Bureaucracy, a challenge to better management, New York, 1944, p 38. efforts be directed at the proper and sys­ tematic selection, training and promo­ 6 Daily Graphic (Accra), 2 January 1974. tion of suitable candidates for all levels Conclusion 7 Aryeh Globerson, "Problems of public administration in West African countries", of the public service. A career service It is evident from our review of some of Public Administration in Israel and based on merit must not only be estab­ its principal causes that inertia is not abroad, Jerusalem, 1964, p 92. lished but encouraged. Such a system only detrimental to the needs of a 8 Albert Waterston, "Administrative obsta­ cannot be effective without adequate dynamic administration but inimical to cles to planning", Economia Latina facilities for training. Comprehensive rapid socio-economic development. By Americana, vol I, no 3, July 1964, p 318. training schemes and development pro­ its very nature inertia breeds stagnation 9 Merle Fainsod, "The structure of grammes should therefore be made and frustration. Inertia runs counter to Development Administration" in I Swerd­ available for all categories of staff. reforms aimed at ensuring that organ­ low (ed), Development Administration - These will serve a double purpose, both izations will be more responsive to Concepts and problems, New York: Syra­ improving the performance of the pre­ changes taking place in their environ­ cuse University Press, 1963, p II. sent duties of the trainees and the identi­ ment. More importantly, inertia in pub­ 10 Ghanaian Times (Accra), 4 September 1973. ) fication of promising candidates for lic administration, by slowing down 0 II See Anonymous, "$5,5 billion paid out to 1 future promotion. and impeding the provision of essential

0 redeployees in civil and education ser­

2 Besides training, any reform pro­ services such as those concerning vices", Ghana Civil Service Journal, no I, d gramme should aim at improving health, is inimical to the interests of e 1990, P 27. t morale, developing leadership skills, ordinary people, especially the illiterate a 12 W Niskanen, Bureaucracy and representa­ d improving esprit de corps and above all poor in the countryside who have little (

tive government, New York: Aldine­ r ensuring that civil servants are paid access to public officials; and who may e Atherton, 1971, p 192. h attractive salaries comparable to those not have social and political connec­ s 13 Martin Painter, "Administrative change i l in other public organizations and com­ tions and, above all, money to help and reform", in Brian Galligan (ed), b u mensurate with their qualifications and them on their way through life. Australian state politics, Melbourne: P output. This will not only remove the Public expectations point to a more Longman Cheshire, 1986, p 203. e h tendency among civil servants to de­ dynamic and flexible civil service 14 Walter R Sharp, "Bureaucracy and poli­ t

y vote less than the full working day to which will be more responsive to tech­ tics: Egyptian model" in W J Siffin (ed), b official business because of the need to nological changes taking place, not Towards a comparative study of public d administration, Bloomington: Indiana e

t earn additional income for their suste­ only in its environment but also in its University Press, 1975, p 165. n nance, but will help to retain staff. The scope and functions, a civil service a r pay structure, cost of living and fringe more responsible to socio-economic 15 R Bodemeyer, Administrative develop­ g

ment: The effects of decentralization on e benefits should be reviewed from time challenges. Thus if management tech­ c district development in Zambia, Giesen: n to time in line with changing economic nology, that is, the appropriate applica­ Centre for Regional Development Re­ e c

i trends. And if civil servants are to oper­ tion of methods, procedures, rules, search, 1984, p 66. l

r ate effectively without any anxiety then operation (and the functioning of the e

d they should be assured of security of organization's culture) are improved, n tenure and adequate pension and social the major constraints on efficiency and u

y security schemes. productivity will be removed. Tax­ a Finally, a regular system of transfers payers will then enjoy better services w e

t may help to reduce inertia. If transfers from their civil service. a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 251 p e R Devewpment------

Training for development: At the crossroads

Professor Hennie Swanepoel of the University of South Africa's Department of Development Administration argues that much training for development is ineffec­ tive and suggests ways to overcome this problem

Introduction extremely difficult to apply their pro­ have gradually moved (or are moving) Training for development has become a fessional knowledge in the work situa­ towards a development orientation. very important part of development tion. These professionals work mostly This augurs well for their work in activities in the Third World. This is with the poor - and therefore in a poverty-stricken environments. Unfortu­ also true of South Africa. More often poverty-stricken environment. We are nately, however, trends in development than not, training is seen as a way to not, therefore, talking about certain thinking are some way ahead of adapta­

cure ) the ills experienced during devel­ cases of poverty in some community or tions in organizations operating in the 0

opment1 activities. But while training is other, but of entire communities struck field; this complicates the issue still absolutely0 necessary for successful by poverty. And this requires a very further. Put more clearly, the greater 2

development,d it is not a panacea; per­ specific approach. The first problem, emphasis on a people-centred, adaptive e haps t too much is expected of it. Added therefore, is one of communities that and experimental type of development a to thisd is the fact that training for devel­ are difficult to work with and of profes­ administration, one that works towards (

opmentr suffers many shortcomings that sionals not trained to work with them. participation and empowerment, ex­ e

severelyh limit its success. Whether Very closely related to this first acerbates the problem of field profes­ s i explainedl away by excessively high problem is another: that most of these sionals incapable of doing their job, b

expectations,u or by some deficiency of professionals are not skilled in further­ and thereby again increases the need P the training itself, the fact remains that ing development. Their formal training for further training. e

disappointmenth with the results of is very much Western oriented, with the This new focus or trend requires, t I trainingy is growing: what seemed a result that they are set on delivering a according to Rondinelli, managers b solution to many development prob­ service, and not on furthering the de­ who can facilitate rather than control d lems e is proving not such a success after velopment of an entire community. the interaction of individuals and t all. Asn has happened with many "solu­ From these observations it is clear groups, skilled people who can act as a tions"r in the past, training now finds that the formal professional training catalysts, mobilizing those whose sup­ g

itself e at the crossroads. these people receive is not sufficiently port or commitment is needed - admin­ c

Trainingn for development usually development oriented and so does not istrators who can respond creatively e concentratesc on three cadres: villagers prepare them for work in an environ­ and quickly to changes, administrators i l who wish to be involved in develop­ ment characterized by universal poverty. who view themselves as facilitators of r ment e projects, lay workers and profes­ Further, the organizations that employ development rather than bureaucrats. d sionals.n This article will deal only with these professionals are also not suffi­ Brinkerhoff and Klauss add that we u the third cadre, the professionals, and y ciently geared to furthering develop­ need professionals with interpersonal then a not with their formal pre-job ment, in spite of the fact that their skills for dealing with inter-organiza­ w traininge but with their continuous or in­ missions quite often have very clearly tional relations and with community t servicea training. pronounced development objectives. interaction aimed at local capacities G

t These organizations, what is more, are and power: professionals with personal e

n not suitably structured to operate within traits such as a tolerance of ambiguity, The i need for training b an environment of utter poverty. patience, a propensity to take risks, an a

WhileS development personnel are well Many of the organizations we have ability to interact with people from

or fairlyy well-trained in their profes­ in mind here have of late started to peasants to top ministry officials, and b 2 sionald fields, many of them find it become more problem-focused and with some entrepreneurial skills. e c u d o

252 r Africa Insight, vol2I, no 4,1991 p e R I ------Development

It is quite clear that in-service training subject at hand. This is also, at least idea behind such courses is to transfer a • has a tremendous task ahead of it prepar­ partly, the result of an attempt to certain body of knowledge to the ing professionals for a poverty-address­ accommodate as many situations as trainees. Honadle and Hannah call it the ing, development-furthering, human ori­ possible in order to get as broad a clien­ "dictation and absorption" method and ented, participatory type of development tele as possible. One of the main criti­ they contrast it with "the exciting possi­ administration - a task all the more diffi­ cisms of the theoretical nature of many bilities of a mutual learning ex peri­ cult since the formal pre-job training courses is that trainees are seldom ence".5 Their main criticism of this these professionals receive does not give capable of adapting this theoretical form of training is that it suggests a enough attention to this. knowledge and turning it into practical ritualized rather than developmental These facts have been appreciated: guidelines for their everyday tasks. The approach to training, and that it is based in-service training for development has trainer who believes that this process of on a belief that methods developed and come to the fore in recent years. Train­ theory application is natural and easily applied in anyone place can be readily ing courses have become something handled by the trainees is na"ive - or has transferred across cultures, sectors and like the fashion - and it has certainly wrong ideas about the objective of organizational settings. become the fashion among profession­ training. Trainees are interested in what Courses are not adapted to address als to collect "trophies" of those they will actually work, and not what will specific work situations and work en­ have attended. But while this height­ theoretically work.4 The failure of vironments. There is a notion that care­ ened awareness of the need for training courses to step down from the theoret­ fully worked out courses with a sound is commendable, it is equally clear that ical level leads to wastage in the sense theoretical base, and in harmony with training struggles to fulfil the high aspi­ that the course content cannot be practi­ the most important educational pre­ rations people have always associated cally implemented. It also leads to frus­ requisites, will be appropriate for all with it. In fact, voices are already heard tration on the part of trainees, who can occasions. Two misconceptions are ap­ announcing loudly that training is see the wisdom of the theory but can parent here. One is that adaptation is doing very little to put things right. only continue doing things as they have unnecessary, since answers and solutions always been done before. will somehow appear to situation-spe­ An inexcusable shortcoming is that cific problems without the latter being The shortcomings of training courses are often irrelevant. They do directly addressed. The other is that the It is true that current training efforts not reflect the necessity of working to­ trainees are able to make the jump from suffer quite a few shortcomings that wards human-oriented, problem-solv­ the course content to the work situation

will) have to be addressed before real ing development in a poverty-stricken by themselves: they will be able to take fruit0 can be expected. environment. The reason here is simply what is relevant in Sandton and adapt it 1

0 Some of the more important short­ that training courses for a Western for Nkowakowa. But the fact of the 2

comingsd are the following. Courses are milieu are presented unchanged to pro­ matter is that trainees are in need of spe­ e

presentedt without first ascertaining the fessionals in a situation miles removed cific practical guidelines on how to a

trainingd needs of the organization and from the situation the course was origi­ handle their own peculiar work situation (

itsr staff. "Canned" programmes are nally meant for. The emphasis in such and work environment. e

veryh popular, first for the ease with courses is on generic processes and the Trainees do not contribute to the s i

whichl they can be presented, and, sec­ structures to carry them out. Sophis­ content of courses. In most courses the b

ond,u for the professionalism of their ticated cost-benefit analysis and blue­ trainees are passive receivers of in­ P

manner and content. Powell has the fol­ print planning are being taught to pro­ formation and knowledge. There are, e

lowingh to say about this: fessionals who should actually be re­ therefore, "clear distinctions between t

y [T]he trainer or training organisation oriented to an experimental and adapt­ those who give and those who receive b

finds a program that "works" in a partic­ ive type of administration. Trainers or knowledge".6 This does not mean that d

e ular situation and then - to overstate the training institutions offering this type trainees are passive and do not partici­ t case - canonises it, publishes "the" train­ n of course must either be totally ignorant pate in simulation exercises, role play­

a ing manual, prints appealing course r of the trends in development thinking, ing and group work. The problem is

g brochures, and markets it as effective and

e tested.3 the results of decades of experience, or that these trainee activities are so styl­ c

n they must be unscrupulous enough to ized and circumscribed that very little e

Ifc such a training package is offered to present such courses in the hope that scope exists for any exercise of initiat­ i l an organization, if it sounds relevant to they will get away with it. On the other ive. This may be one of the principal r thee work of the organization and if the hand, organizations accepting such reasons why there is a notion among d

brochuren reflects a professional image, courses for their professionals must still many professionals that training semi­ u then it is accepted. Now in order to fit be extremely na"ive if they expect that nars exist for entertainment purposes. y

alla occasions and appeal to as many some transfer of knowledge and techni­ They attend them, first, because it pro­ w

cliente organizations as possible, these cal skills from a First World situation vides a plus mark on their personal t

coursesa are of necessity very broad in will cure all the ills experienced in a files; second, because it takes them out G content, with sessions covering all the Third World one. of the isolation that many professionals, t well-knowne ingredients of any work Courses are presented in the form of especially in rural areas, experience; n i

situationb such as management, planning lectures. Because of their broad theoret­ and, third, because it is recreational. a Many of the shortcomings thus far andS budgeting. ical content, courses are presented as

y Courses tend to be theoretical. They knowledge-transfer occasions by way discussed simply result from the fact that b tend to be theoretical expositions of the of straightforward lectures: the chief trainers are not familiar with the work d e c u d o

Africar Insight, vo121, no 4, 1991 253 p e R Oeve/opment------

environment of the trainees. They hide, out any apparent pattern, leaving serious the list. It therefore seems necessary to therefore, behind the relatively safe shel­ gaps behind them in the knowledge and make training sessions problem-solving ter of the fonnal lecture. They make understanding of those who attend. ones. Honadle and Hannah regard this their contribution in a theoretical or aca­ Training is regarded as an indepen­ as part of what they call "action train­ demic way and leave it to the trainees to dent, discrete, time-bound occurrence. ing" - the opposite of lecture training.9 apply this body of knowledge in their Each course gains an independent iden­ It has been pleaded earlier that training work situation. Questions from trainees tity "rather than just one ripple in a be relevant to the work situation. This regarding the application of the know­ constant stream of management devel­ relevance hinges upon a specific orienta­ ledge they have imbibed to their specific opment activity".8 And because most tion to solving problems, and ample work situation and environment are dealt courses are presented by unattached out­ time should be allowed for discussing with in one of three ways: siders there is very little or no follow­ different problems identified by the - The trainer answers theoretically, up. There is also very little or no co­ trainees themselves. As Shrivastava re-stating what the theory says. operation between trainer and super­ and Tandon put it: "The training arises - The trainer tries to give a practical visor. The result is that training remains out of specific needs of participants as answer, but his limited knowledge distinct from everyday work; and per­ articulated by them". \0 results in a naIve approach. sonnel development conducted by the It goes without saying that a prob­ lem-solving orientation demands that - The question is thrown back to the professional's supervisor or manager is training be situation specific. General trainees for "sorting out" without unlinked (even unrelated) to the train­ the necessary facilitation by the ing courses presented from time to theoretical inputs may have a place, but trainer. time. The notion naturally develops that cannot be left as theoretical inputs. training is limited to the lecture room; Trainer and trainees must go through an The dominance of the lecture method, that it has nothing to do with day-to­ exercise to relate the general and theo­ the theoretical character of lectures, the day personnel development within the retical to their particular situation. One neglect of field research to produce organization. of the main aims of any training course, indigenous training material, and undue therefore, should be to solve the local reliance on foreign textbooks are all problems of professionals in their spe­ part of this problem.? The imperatives for cific work situation and environment. Courses are disconnected, often successful training unrelated. There is a plentiful supply of Training is not having the good results Open-ended training

trammg) courses on the market. that were once anticipated; and it is very This approach to training demands an 0

Different1 experts try to catch the difficult to place one's finger on any open-ended approach. It means that the 0

client's2 eye with different packaged one particular reason for its relatively trainer cannot rely on a carefully

coursesd on offer. And because of a relat­ humble results. One should perhaps worked out lecture. The contents of a e ivelyt healthy financial allocation for regard all the above problems as con­ training session will be subject to a trainingd in most organizations, there are tributing factors - and not forget the fact change even while it is in progress: the (

alwaysr buyers for these courses. The that the overall problem of poverty has particular needs of the trainees regard­ e end result,h naturally, is that the profes­ increased and become more complex ing the subject under discussion in any s i sionall finds himself attending courses over the last few decades. Thus, while session will decide that session's b

that u are unrelated or else, if there is training has floundered in misconcep­ emphasis. This approach demands dia­ P some relationship, the chances are high tions and shortcomings, the task of the logue between trainer and trainees (and e that h the courses duplicate each other, professional has become even more among trainees themselves) during any t

or, worse,y sometimes contradict each daunting. training session. It makes for a very b other. There is very little sense in sub­ Past failings have taught us some­ fluid (for the trainer, uncertain) situa­ d jectinge professionals to this kind of thing about the imperatives for success­ tion and necessitates a lot of "on the t experiencen - and paying good money ful training for development. Current feet thinking" from him or her. a for doingr so. realities in the development environ­ What should happen during any g

Coursese do not show a logical pro­ ment bear this out. training session is exactly what we say c

gression.n Tied to the problem outlined in should happen in the community situa­ e the previousc paragraph is the fact that Training as problem solving tion. The clamour for the community to i l Most professionals look to training for traineesr do not progress through a struc­ identify its own needs and work towards turede or logical learning process as they a solution of their everyday work prob­ d addressing those needs during a learning attendn course after course. They may lems. They come to training sessions process in which the professional plays u

receivey a fairly advanced course in with great expectations. Questions from the role of facilitator, should be true of managementa without having the neces­ the floor during training sessions are the training situation, in which the w e

sary groundt knowledge - and only later usually problem-oriented. They are trainees take the place of the community attenda a very simple course in planning. often short descriptions of scenarios on and the trainer that of the professional. G

Theret is no pattern to the training of any some such lines as: "in spite of what In this type of training the trainer can e

one particularn professional. One course the trainer has said, this is the reality - never be a mere lecturer. He must play the i does b not necessarily lead to another. what now?" In summary, if trainees are very complex and difficult role of facilit­ a

FairlyS sophisticated and advanced asked at the start of a training session

ator. He facilitates a learning process in coursesy and fairly unsophisticated and what they hope it will achieve, the solu­ which the trainees, and he, can tackle and b

simpled courses follow each other with- tion of work problems features high on deal with the different problems they e c u d o

254 r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R I ------Development

experience in their daily work. This trainer A knowledgeable trainer number of times until the trainee has • is not the omniscient leader, but more a From what has been said so far, it is reached an advanced stage of know­ co-traveller on the path of joint explor­ clear that the trainer should have pre­ ledge and understanding. ation. II His facilitation task is a very fluid cise knowledge of the work situation In order to structure this cycle of one that cannot really be programmed and work environment of his trainees. training sessions and practical applica­ beforehand; it can take him in anyone or The problem-solving, situation-specific, tions, certain practicals to be done by more of a number of directions depending open-ended approach also requires of the trainees during interim periods must on how that particular session progresses. him to have a solid background corpus be prescribed. These practicals should of knowledge for use in facilitation. always be linked to the following train­ This trainer should therefore have a ing session in order to ensure a steadily Training as capacity building broad knowledge of poverty situations continuing movement from the previ­ This participatory, open-ended training in general and the development admin­ ous training session, through the pract­ from which formal lectures are absent istration imperatives in these situations, ical, and so on to the next session. and where emphasis is not on know­ plus accurate knowledge and insight ledge transfer, may be regarded as into the particular work situation of his Training as part of management capacity building. Capacity building is trainees. Powell calls it "a careful and development the direct opposite of knowledge trans­ comprehensive understanding of the Training does not begin and end at the fer. Where knowledge transfer offers a existing operational context",14 and training session. It is not a discrete fixed "truth", capacity-building dis­ Shrivastava and Tandon regard "famili­ isolated entity. It must be seen as part covers this truth through a participatory arization with and orientation to the of management development overall. learning process. Where knowledge context and people" as a necessary pre­ When training is isolated as a separate transfer relies upon the knowledge of requisite for the trainer. IS They specifi­ event it becomes an end in itself instead the trainer, capacity building relies on cally warn against a trainer's "walking of a means. 16 For this reason close co­ the knowledge and experience of in cold". It therefore seems necessary operation should exist between trainer trainer and trainees. Where knowledge for the trainer to look into the organiza­ and manager or supervisor. The latter transfer starts a process and then leaves tional set-up within which the profes­ must continue what the former has its application in the work situation to sionals work, into their work situation started. Training continues from the the trainees, capacity building contin­ and environment. His enquiry can ob­ training session into the everyday situa­ ues outside the lecture room to the ex­ viously not be exhaustive; it is ex­ tion. The trainer cannot always be pre­ tent) that the distinctions between theory sent and so the manager or supervisor 0 ploratory. Such an enquiry must give

and1 practice and between academic and takes over training during the trainee's

0 the trainer a sound knowledge of the 2

empirical become ever more difficult to work situation and environment of the periods of practical work. d

trace.e Capacity-building work is not professional and must enable him to Note that training can never be t

donea by the trainer alone but by a team identify some of his problems. It must "added on" to the organizational strat­ d

( egy. Professionals must do their job in consisting of trainer and trainees, help him to understand something of r

supervisore and management. This kind the organizational background, the harmony with the philosophy of their h

ofs training becomes an integral part of organization and must share the organ­

i organization's mission and objectives, l

theb ongoing process of organization, and must give him an idea of the way ization's vision. Training too must managementu and system development.12 management thinks and the way in therefore also be in harmony with the P

e Some authors maintain that the capa­ which the professionals lower down organization's philosophy and vision h

city-buildingt approach takes the focus and must form an integral part of accept and interpret this thinking. awayy from the individual and places it organizational strategy. I7 If part of the b 13 Progressive training ond the group or team. It is true that organization's strategy, it cannot be e

thet group features very strongly, but A professional must show progress in anything other than an integral part of n

thisa can never be to the detriment of the knowledge and understanding. Training management. This means a high com­ r

individualg professional. In the end this must facilitate this. For this reason patibility between training and manage­

e

individualc must understand his duties there must also be a progression in the ment and an integration of organiza­

n training the professional receives. tional and training objectives.

ande overcome his problems, because in c

mosti cases his membership of a work Training should be experienced step by If training is to be totally integrated l

teamr is secondary to his individual step so that the trainee can progress with organizational strategy and manage­ e

responsibilities.d Most of his duties are from the basic to the advanced. This ment practices, it follows that it should n

carriedu out in isolation. His supervisor means that training simply cannot take enjoy official status. This means, inter

is y often physically removed from him place in one single session. One train­ alia, that training should also include a ing session should be followed by a the assessment of trainees and the

andw communication facilities are poor. e

Fort these reasons problem identifica­ period in which the trainee can apply issue of certificates to the successful. tiona in a training session is handled his new knowledge and understanding Trainees should be kept in no doubt as G

throught the nominal group technique in and test it to see whether it works. After to the standing of such certificates e

n a reasonable time a second training ses­ vis-a-vis other certificates and dip­

orderi to afford every individual profes­

sionalb the opportunity of bringing his sion must take place that will look into lomas. Obtaining the certificate should a S

view of his job and the problems he the experience of trainees in the interim therefore be prescribed by the organ­ y

experiencesb to the attention of the and represent an advance upon the first ization and the status respected by

trainerd and his fellow trainees. session. This cycle must be repeated a management. e c u d o Africar Insight, vol21, no 4, 1991 255 p e R I Deve/opment------

The creation of self-reliance, Conclusion 2 D W Brinkerhoff and R Klauss, "Mana­ awareness and the correct attitude gerial roles for social development man­ Training for development has come agement", Public Administration and Training's main objective is not to trans­ quite some way along the road. Very Development, vol 5, no 2, 1985, P 153. fer knowledge. Its problem-solving ori­ high expectations have been toned entation has little to do with knowledge 3 F Powell, "Training for participation", in down to more reasonable levels. But J Burbidge (ed) Approaches that work in transfer, but a lot to do with facilitating this is not enough to ensure its success. rural development: Emerging trends, par­ self-reliant action in order to solve prob­ Its inherited shortcomings must be ticipating methods and local initiatives, lems. Any organization's main objective addressed as a matter of urgency. Train­ Miinchen: KG Saur, 1988, p 162. in human resource development should ing can play a very important role in 4 Ibid, p 165. be to have self-reliant officers in the development; but if its weaknesses are field. Related to this objective is the 5 G H Honadle and J P Hannah, "Manage­ ignored, it is bound to go the same way ment performance for rural development: objective of creating a certain aware­ as many a previous development effort. Packaged training or capacity building", ness among the organization's profes­ Training for development is therefore Public Administration and Development, sionals. Training must bring awareness standing at the crossroads. It has the vol 2, 1982, P 297. among the trainees first, of the environ­ potential to fulfil many of its expecta­ 6 K Bhasin, "Training for participatory ment of deprivation within which they tions. It also has the potential to be development", in 0 Shrivastava and R work; second, of the plight of human rendered worthless by its own short­ Tandon (eds), Participatory training for beings in this situation; third, of the comings and take the path to redund­ rural development, New Delhi: Society for special task of an organization such as ancy. Wise and responsible decisions at Participatory Research in Asia, 1982, p 24. theirs in addressing this problem; and, this point are therefore imperative. 7 S Paul, Training for Public Administration fourth, of the complex nature of this This article has done little more than and management in developing countries: kind of work. A review, Washington, DC: World Bank, identify a few of training's more import­ 1983, p 60. Closely related to the creation of ant shortcomings and suggest several special awareness is attitude develop­ imperatives. Mere acknowledgement of 8 G H Honadle and J P Hannah, op cit, ment. It is a well known fact that a clin­ these will unfortunately not be suffi­ p 298. ical execution of professional duties is cient. What are needed are wise and 9 Ibid, p 300. not enough in this line of work. The responsible decisions from develop­ 10 0 Shivastava and R Tandon, op cit, p 6. correct attitude is of prime importance. ment organizations (who are the clients Many a problem has in the past been 11 Ibid.

) of training), and trainers and training experienced0 as a result of an incorrect 12 G H Honadle and J P Hannah, op cit,

1 institutions to deliver the goods: goods attitude0 among professionals. This p 305.

2 in the form of decisions that will put "wrong" attitude usually manifests it­ 13 Ibid; 0 Shivastava and R Tandon, op cit, d training for development on the high e selft in aloofness and a businesslike road to success. p 8; S Paul, op cit, p 77. a

approachd in rendering services instead 14 F Powell, op cit, p 163. ( of in compassionate help in solving a r References 15 0 Shivastava and R Tandon, op cit, p 10. problem.e Training must change the h D A Rondinelli, Development projects as s formeri attitude into one of compassion 16 G H Honadle and J P Hannah, op cit, l policy experiments: An adaptive approach

b p 299. and dedication, a determination to to development administration, London: u assistP the poor to become self-reliant. Methuen, 1983, p 148. 17 F Powell, op cit, p 165.

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d e t n a r g

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256p Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 e R I ------Development

•

West Africa's river basin organizations

Denis Fair, Senior Research Fellow at the Africa Institute, looks at the potential and problems of a particular type of regional organization in the development of West Africa's water resources.

A conference entitled "African develop­ bodies, financially and technically. Their was made between 1977 and 1981 by ment from a regional perspective" was origin lay in the perception that water is Egypt, Sudan and the East African held by the United States Agency for "a precious resource to West African countries. At the national level a num­ International Development (USAID) in peoples", especially that of its larger ber of countries in sub-Saharan Africa 1969. It attempted to assess the poss­ rivers, the Senegal and the Niger, which have used the river basin model as a ible advantages of a regional over a flow through the subhumid Sahel region development tool, among them Ghana nation-by-nation approach to African bordering on the Sahara desert.4 An (Volta River)6, Nigeria (river basin

development.) 1 Could a regional view increased interest in river basin devel­ development authorities) 7, Kenya (Tana 0

permit1 a more effective use of the lim­ opment had been generated, too, by a River) and South Africa (Tugela 0

2 basin).8

ited funds available by overcoming the decrease in the agricultural potential of

needd to single out particular recipients, many parts of the continent, especially e Internationally-integrated river basin

t 5

especiallya where development poten­ for irrigated food production. organizations are, by their nature, more d

tialities( overlapped international bound­ The Lake Chad Basin Commission difficult to establish, manage and keep

r

aries?e Various models were considered, and the Niger Basin Commission, com­ going than national ones. Their quest h

ones of them being lake and river basins prising four and nine countries respect­ for hydrologic unity can so easily con­ i asl a possible spatial and organizational ively, were established as early as 1964. flict with national socio-economic and b

frameworku for the planning and imple­ The Organization for the Management political objectives. "What is best for P mentation of multi-purpose interna­ and Development of the Senegal River/ e the basin may not necessarily be the h

tionalt projects. Support for this Organisation pour la Mise en Valeur best for the country."9 But the great

approachy had come from the adoption du Fleuve Senegal (OMVS) had its ori­ advantage of the river basin as a devel­ b in 1966 of the Helsinki rules on the gin in a conference held in 1962. Its opment concept at the international d e

usest of the waters of international present composition and organizational level is still the essential need for a rivers.n This was followed in 1970 by

a structure dates to 1972. In 1978 there unified approach to the exploitation of r

theg initiation of an on-going study by followed the Organization for the its unique natural resource, water.

thee International Law Commission on Management and Development of the This need, in turn, offers opportunities c

then law of non-navigational uses of Gambia River/Organisation pour la for the planning and implementation of e

c 2 internationali watercourses. Later, fur­ Mise en Valeur du Fleuve Gambie multi-purpose, integrated projects of l

therr interest was generated by the (OMVG) comprising three, and later many kinds - watershed management, e

Unitedd Nations' seminar on river basin four, countries. In East Africa the flood control, irrigation and agricul­ andn interbasin development held in Organization for the Management and u ture, drainage, electric power genera­ 3 Budapesty in 1975. Development of the Kagera River tion, navigation, domestic and indus­ a Of immediate concern at the USAID Basin was established in 1977. Nine trial water supply, recreation and wild­ w e

conferencet was that in the early 1960s countries fall within the basin of the life conservation. threea international lake and river basin Nile, Africa's longest river, and interna­ Clearly, though, the chances of suc­ G

organizationst had already been estab­ tional agreements on the control and cess for an international river basin organ­ e

n apportionment of its waters date to ization depend heavily upon its strict

lishedi in West Africa. By the early

1970sb the United Nations Development colonial times. But no formal river adherence to a limited number of object­ a S

Programme (UNDP) and a number of basin commission has yet been estab­ ives within the framework of the basin's y

Westernb countries had become directly lished to manage and develop its water hydrologic and ecologic unity. Even the

involvedd in assisting these multinational resources, although an attempt to do so water-related projects mentioned above e c u d o Africar Insight, vol 2 I, no 4, 1991

p 257 e R I Devewpment------

can involve a multiplicity of objectives social legislation and a common labour ministers, the high commissariat (the and Bloch has shown that at least four­ code. Longer term consideration was to executive organ) and the permanent teen individual objectives have been be given to the co-ordination of their water commission (a consultative body). enunciated for irrigation projects alone, constitutional, economic and financial The OMVS, with headquarters at Dakar, in various African countries at different systems. The heads of state also took continued with the OERS plan for the times.1O The inclusion, then, of a wide steps to co-operate more closely with river. This meant seeking funds for the range of social, economic and polit­ the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Libya, construction of the Manantali Dam and ical objectives, in addition to those Algeria and Tunisia) and even to estab­ the Diama Dam, near the river mouth, specifically related to the development lish an OERS military committee. the former to control the river's flow of water resources, is clearly a recipe for The organization, in fact, saw itself and the latter to stem the encroachment failure. as the starting point for the closer eco­ of salt-water from the sea and to hold This account, and some recent nomic integration of West Africa as a back the river for navigation. Both assessments, of West Africa's four lake whole. This view was in line with the dams would make nearly 400 000 and river basin organizations illustrates thinking of the Organization of African hectares available for irrigation and some of the successes achieved and Unity (OAU) that such regional organ­ provide domestic and industrial water some of the pitfalls experienced by izations could be the building blocks supplies for the 1,6 million inhabitants these international bodies in their for a larger African economic commun­ of the basin (14 per cent of the total search for co-operative action. ity able to hold its own against the population of the three countries). industrialized countries. Regional unity, Included in the plan, too, was the devel­ it was believed, was the key to the unity opment of the coastal port of St Louis, Senegal River Basin of the African continent. In this sense, the inland port of Kayes, ten inter­ Organization (OMVS)11 OERS anticipated the inauguration in mediate staging ports and a navigation The Senegal River basin, 300 000 km2 1975 of the Economic Community of channel to give Mali a 950-km water­ in extent, encompasses four countries - West African States (Ecowas), which way to the Atlantic Ocean. Guinea in the upper, Mali in the middle became operational in 1980. The main problem was raising funds and Senegal and Mauritania in the Within this broader frame of activity, for these projects in an inflationary lower reaches. In 1962 the four govern­ OERS continued to promote the devel­ environment. Not until 1976, following ments recommended the establishment opment of the basin. Particularly im­ the devastating drought in the Sahel of an interstate committee for the man­ portant was the agreement in principle region, did money become available

agement) and development of the basin made in 1970 to build the Manantali from European, American and Arab 0

and signed1 a convention to that effect in Dam in Mali and another in the lower sources. Work started on the Diama 0

1963.2 The committee got off to a good valley, although it was another 16 to 18 Dam in November 1978 and on the

start.d By 1965 $5 million had already years before these structures saw the Manantali Dam in May 1982, the cost e beent voted from the UN Special Fund light of day. Further studies included a of both being put at $830 million. The a

d five-year pilot scheme for the conver­

for studies( directed at increasing the former was completed in November

irrigationr and hydroelectric capacity of sion of traditional methods of agricul­ 1986 and the latter in March 1988. e

the riverh and at improving its navig­ ture to modem methods of irrigation Manantali was the largest single civil s i abilityl by building dams in its upper and a three-phase plan for developing works project ever carried out in the b

and loweru reaches. the river's navigational potential. Sahel. A joint company was established P Like the Niger, the Senegal is a Stresses, however, soon appeared in by the three countries to maintain the e

highlyh seasonal river. The average OERS, less over a conflict of objectives dams and manage water supplies. t

annualy flow is substantial but the flow than over political action. After a coup OMVS continues to face financial b in the rainy season was much too great d' etat in Mali in 1968 strained relations problems, however. In some instances d

for thee uses to which the river was with its partners, the differences were

t donors have agreed to the cancellation

beingn put at the time and too little for patched up. More serious was the of loans and their conversion to grants. a substantialr increases in irrigation for tension caused in 1970 by Guinea's Nor have funds been forthcoming for g 12 the reste of the year. Dam building to accusations of an impending invasion Manantali's 200 MW hydroelectric plant c regulaten the flow was an essential first by Senegal, which that country denied. which, including the construction of e

step c to developing the river's fuller Guinea responded by boycotting the i transmission lines, has been costed at l

potential.r meetings of OERS, and Senegal, in $1 400 million. The navigation project, e

Ind 1968 the four governments tum, resigned from the organization in too, has little chance of implementation

decidedn to expand their range of opera­ 1971. Senegal then joined Mali and since development agencies believe u

tionsy and created the Organization of Mauritania in 1972 to form the OMVS, that returns would not justify the sub­ Senegala River States/Organisation des with the one limited objective of pro­ stantial outlay involved. In addition, w e

Etatst Riverains du Senegal (OERS), the moting the economic development of irrigation plans are well behind sched­ aims a of which went well beyond those the river basin. ule, only 54 000 hectares having been G

13 of a t purely river basin organization. Visser has described the structure, developed thus far out of the 100 000 e

The n intention now was to integrate the composItIOn, powers and functions of hectares planned by 1990. i

economiesb of the member countries by the new body in a well-documented Other problems have arisen out of the a S

forming a common market, instituting a paper.14 The OMVS consists of four switch from traditional to irrigation monetaryy system to facilitate trade b institutions - the conference of heads of agriculture. While yields have in­

betweend them, and formulating joint state and government, the council of creased, incomes have not - because of e c u d o 258 r Africa Insight, vo121, no 4, 1991 p e R I ------Development

•

Basin boundary ... Dam sites ) 0 1 0 2

d e t a d (

r

Elizee van As (;]1 h s i l

Senegalb River basin u P

e

theh small size of plots, the inadequate land is most tightly controlled and the the whole of the river's valuable flood­ t most valuable in the arid and semi-arid usey of modern farming techniques, low plain. Despite attempts at mediation by

b regions and its value rises by an order of producer prices, the high cost of inputs, the OAU and Mali, further outbreaks of d magnitude with irrigation. 15 ande indebtedness. The resulting low violence in March 1991 have endan­ t

returnsn have meant that many farmers The Economist Intelligence Unit con­ gered the reconciliation process. The a haver reverted to their traditional flood firms that land along the banks of the OMVS, regarded as a model of regional g

recessione techniques, and the govern­ Senegal River has become "prime agri­ cooperation, now finds the river a ser­ c

ments,n bowing to their needs, have cultural property" since the building of ious source of dispute and its work has e 16 c suffered in consequence. 17

agreedi to open Manantali for four weeks the Manantali Dam. In April 1989 viol­ l

inr the rainy season to create an artificial ence broke out along the river between e

flood.d This means that sufficient water peasants from Senegal and cattle farm­

willn not be available when required to ers from Mauritania, aggravated by the The Gambia River Basin u Organization (OMVG)18

meety the dam's potential generating ethnic differences between them. The capacitya or to render the river navigable. violence spread to Nouakchott and Dakar Senegal and Gambia sought assistance w

e from the UN Special Fund in 1965 for a t Of immediate and more serious con­ and diplomatic relations were broken

cern,a however, has been the friction off between the two countries. Exacer­ five-year survey aimed at an integrated G

betweent Mauritania and Senegal caused bating the problem is Senegal's claim conservation plan for the Gambia River. e

byn border incidents and conflicting ter­ that the border does not lie along the Further studies on other projects fol­ i

ritorialb claims. Bloch states that middle of the river as determined by a lowed and the two countries created the a

S French colonial decree of 1933, but OMVG in 1978, much along the lines of ... some of the most intense land tenure y along the northern bank. Mauritania dis­ the OMVS. Guinea, where the river has b problems in Africa arise during the

d development of river basins. Riverbank putes this claim, which gives Senegal its source, joined the organization in e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 259 p e • R Development------~------

1980 and Guinea-Bissau in 1983. Although the basin is relatively small, it '. '\. • is vital to the regional economic devel­ LIBYA '. -- Lake Chad Basin opment of the four countries. ..".,...... The aim of the OMVG was to build a o 300 km I series of dams, two in the upper reaches ALGERIA of the river for irrigation and hydro­ electric power generation, and a com­ ...... bined barrage and bridge near the ./ mouth to halt the intrusion of salt-water .-' I into potentially irrigable land and to I I improve Senegal's access to its south­ I I ern region of Casamance. The head­ CHAD quarters of the organization were trans­ ferred from Kaolack to Dakar in 1982 where it would be easier to approach donor countries for development funds. Feasibility studies for the proposed pro­ jects have been completed with techni­ cal and financial assistance from USAID and UNDP but funding for con­ struction, totalling $350 million, has still to be obtained. Donors have indic­ ated some interest but only if the pro­ jects are spread over several years. Internal financial and other difficul­ ties saw the organization fall into a period of quiescence in the late 1980s. In an attempt to revitalize itself, costs

have ) been cut, the high commission and the general0 secretariat have been re­ 1 AFRICAN placed0 by an executive committee and 2

CAMEROON staff d numbers have been reduced. At a \ B . /'-". REPUB~~~·(il····""1 e angUl~' '-. . .-: summitt meeting in January 1991 it was ) .. - ... .".~ a \. decidedd to prepare a "global pro­ (

gramme"r with the aid of donors in e Lake Chad basin orderh to get the organization's activities s i movingl again. b u P

development and co-ordination of trans­ calling of a joint summit meeting of the

Lakee Chad Basin

h port and telecommunication links. The LCBC and the Niger Basin Authority in t Commission (LCBC)19 disastrous effects of the 1968-73 1985 again to seek solutions to the water y b

Preparations for the formation of the drought prompted the commission to problem and to call on the international d

Chade (later Lake Chad) Basin Com­ intensify its efforts towards finding a community for help. Little progress was t

missionn started in 1962 and a conven­ solution to the water problem and to made, however, and at a second joint a tion r and statute were signed by the seek donor aid. But between 1976 and summit in 1987 the Chadian head of g

headse of state of Chad, Cameroon, 1982, with civil war raging in Chad, its state, who was then acting president of Nigerc and Nigeria in 1964. The organ­ work languished and no meetings were n both organizations, again warned of e

izationc comprises a commission, with a held for four years. "damaging self-interest" and emphasized i l rotating presidency, and a secretariat. 20 Calls were made to resurrect the the need for a greater political com­ r The aime is to protect and develop the "moribund" organization, which had not mitment on the part of member states. d watersn of the lake, which lies in the dry lived up to the hopes expressed in 1964. In the face of formidable environ­ u Sahel region. The lake has a catchment The Chadian government complained of

y mental problems and political and area ofa 427 300 km2 and is fed by rivers a "climate of suspicion" that had per­ financial constraints, it is not to be ex­ w that e rise in the wetter regions to the sisted among member states as a result pected that the commission's achieve­ t southa and south-east. of border clashes over fishing rights and ments have been anything more than G

Earlyt studies by the commission, accusations that Nigeria had diverted the modest. An LCBC summit meeting in with e assistance from United Nations n waters of the lake for its own benefit. early 1990 again appealed to donor i agencies,b covered not only water re­ Some renewal of activity and trust agencies to give more generously a

sourcesS and related agricultural and returned with the drought of the mid- towards protecting the waters of the

fishingy activities but also sleeping-sick­ 1980s when the lake basin was declared lake. The basin suffers growing environ­ b ness and tsetse fly eradication, and the d a "disaster zone". This setback led to the mental problems. As a result of the e c u d o

260 r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4. 1991 p e R • ------Devewpment

• j NIGER , MAURITANIA Timbuktu \ /"'. I t ./ ~ ... -... - ... - ... -... - ... / o • Capital city ,.. • Large town or city MALI .. o Aerodromes i - Joo. NIGER

.. ..,.,. ... -:I BURKINA FASO ...... J ... --- ... -. ... - o

i,.i ,...... _ ... _ ... _ ... _ ... / ... NIGERIA j",. : '. ! BENIN "-"'-"',: \ "., SIERRA ') l LEONE j 0 ::""'t-"', ~ i:TOGO: \ ... / COTE D'IVOIRE I \ ,; .. '" GHANA ! I , CAMEROON ~I

Niger River basin ) 0 1 0 2

recurrentd drought, the water level of the 1963 and an agreement in 1964 brought organization. Nigeria's head of state e

laket has fallen, its surface area now the Niger River Commission into being, complained of the "lukewarm attitude" of a 2 reducedd from 28000 to 10 000 km • aimed at promoting co-operation be­ member countries, of their failure to pay (

Windr erosion, the deposition of sand on tween the member states for the integ­ their dues and of "bureaucratic bottle­ e

arableh land, alkalinization, salinization rated development of this 4 200 km-long necks and a lack of political will". The s i

andl the building up of sand barriers are river and its basin. The institutional officials of the commission, he said, b

allu symptoms of worsening conditions structure comprised a summit of heads "seem dazed and immobilised by the P

and their deleterious effects upon agri­ of state and government, a council of magnitude of the problems they face". In e

cultureh and livestock. The problem is ministers, a technical committee of ex­ an effort to revitalize the organization, t 22

exacerbatedy by human reaction, which perts and an executive secretariat. the commission declared itself the Niger b

includes deforestation, over-cultivation, The early efforts of the commission Basin Authority in 1980. A development d

over-grazinge and the transition of were directed at improving the navigabil­ fund was established and a range of pro­ t

nomadsn to a sedentary life around the ity of the river in its middle and upper grammes proposed. But continuing lack a

lake;r all contributing to conflicting and reaches and a number of studies were of financial and administrative discipline, g

competinge claims to land and water undertaken with Dutch financial assist­ loss of credibility with international c

withn which the commission, in difficult ance. In the 1970s projects suggested for donors and concern with objectives that e

circumstances,c is attempting to cope. investigation were expanded to include were far too ambitious and wide-ranging i l water supply to towns, pollution control, encouraged "disillusionment" among the r e power generation for the exploitation of member states, fuelled also by the com­ Nigerd Basin Authority n the basin's mineral resources, irrigation plaint that West Africa had too many u (NBA)21 to increase food production and stock small subregional organizations. For y

Coloniala accords covering the interna­ rearing, and industrial to replace artisanal example, the interests of the Liptako­ w

tionale use of the Niger River for naviga­ fishing. A comprehensive development Gourma Integrated Development Autho­ t

tiona purposes date to 1885. These were plan was also contemplated to counter rity, established in 1970 and concerned G with a part of the middle Niger basin,

declaredt invalid, however, by the nine the effects of drought and a hydrologic e forecasting system was embarked upon overlap in part with those of the NBA.

riverinen states concerned - Benin, Bur­ i

kinab Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote with UNDP assistance. In a further bid "to shake off its leth­ a

d'Ivoire,S Guinea, Mali, Niger and Ni­ By the late 1970s, however, problems argy" members of the authority signed

g ::riay - after their independence in the began to appear that jeopardized the a new agreement in 1987 aimed at lim­ b iting its objectives, restructuring its 1960s.d In place of the accords a treaty in commission's effectiveness as a regional e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4,1991 261 p e • R Devewpment------

executive secretariat and improving its cooperation cannot be achieved without 3 United Nations, interregional seminar on finances. In 1989 a five-year pro­ political involvement" - technical ex­ river basin and interbasin development, • gramme was adopted to investigate the perts and outside consultants are part of Budapest, i975, New York, 1975. long-term development of the Niger its institutional structure.25 4 M S Gould and F A Zobrist, "An overview basin and to strengthen the NBA as a He sees the role of these organiza­ of water resources planning in West Africa", World Development, vol 17, no principal data source and reference tions in a hopeful light. He quotes the 11,1989, pp 1717-1722. centre for the region. An appeal was Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) 5 P C Bloch, Land tenure issues in river made for increased aid from international as saying that to most sub-Saharan Af­ basin development in sub-Saharan Africa, donors but in all its years the authority rican countries, when they gained their Land Tenure Centre, Madison: University has still not been able to formulate a independence, of first importance was, of Wisconsin, 1986, p I. 23 coherent master plan for the basin. among other concerns, their own eco­ 6 K Diaw and E Schmidt-Kallert, "Exodus, nomic development. They therefore but no promised land: Resettlement in tended to regard with caution such inter­ Ghana's Volta basin", D+C Development Some assessments national arrangements as the integrated, and Cooperation, no 5, 1990, pp 14-16. Gould and Zobrist, writing prior to the multisectoral development of river 7 W E Udofia, "The role of river basins and unfortunate events of April 1989, con­ basins. But African leaders are now in­ rural development authorities in the devel­ sider the OMVS to be the most effective creasingly realizing that in order to opment process: The case of Cross River state, Nigeria", Third World Planning of the four river basin organizations achieve the maximum exploitation of Review, vol 10, no 4, 1988, pp 405-417. "from a political perspective".24 It has at their water resources some degree of co­ 8 Natal Town and Regional Planning least obtained finance for two dams ordination and/or integration is needed: Commission, Towards a plan for the despite criticism of certain ecological and Increasing realism towards the prob­ Tuge/a basin, Pietermartizburg, 1960. agricultural impacts resulting from these lems of the continent is conducive to 9 J 0 Chapman, The international river structures. It has been successful, too, in the creation of structures which provide basin, Vancouver: University of British resolving potential conflicts over com­ for feelings of nationalism as well as Columbia, 1963. peting development issues that could giving the opportunity to form a joint 10 PC Bloch, op cit, P 5. have resulted from the construction of the political will within the parameters of II Africa Research Bulletin (ARB), Economic Manantali Dam. These involved, on the which effective development planning, series, pp 281, 939, 1097, 1756, 1924, one hand, Mauritania and Senegal's co-ordination and integration can be 2293, 3928, 4875, 9060-61. The activities interest in regulating the flow of the river reached. 26 of the river basin organizations dealt with for irrigation) purposes and, on the other, Since independence, both in West in this article have been monitored in the 0 ARB's economic series since the inception Mali's1 concern with the navigation and Africa and in sub-Saharan Africa as a

0 of the journal in 1964. The substantial use hydroelectric2 power projects. A further whole, international and regional organ­ of this source is acknowledged. achievementd of the OMVS, in their view, izations have proliferated. They now e

t 12 PC Bloch, op cit, pp 29-41.

is thata it alone of the four organizations cover customs and economic unions,

d 13 F Visser, op cit, pp 64-65.

has ( prepared a comprehensive regional specialist agricultural, forestry and

planr as a framework for the identification fishery groups, aid and development 14 ibid, pp 65-67. e of projectsh and their fuller investigation. bodies and many more in other fields. 15 PC Bloch, op cit, p 26. s i Overall,l Gould and Zobrist consider All, including the river basin organiza­ 16 Economist Intelligence Unit, Mauritania: b that,u with the exception of the OMVS, tions, have been grist to the OAU's mill Country profile i990-9i, London: EIU P West Africa's river basin organizations in its quest for an overarching African 1990. e haveh not been effective as co-ordinating economic community which it finally 17 Africa Research Bulletin, Political series, t pp 9240, 9370, 9402, 9478, 9510, 9821, bodiesy and, in consequence, have not established by treaty at its summit

b 10038. contributed significantly to the economic meeting in Nigeria in June 1991.27 The d

e 18 Africa Research Bulletin, Economic series,

developmentt of the region. Their plan­ treaty allows the foundations to be laid pp 4467,6296, 10244-45. ningn procedures are deficient, objectives over the next three decades of an integ­ a are r poorly defined and often unrealistic rated African economy aimed at devel­ 19 ibid, pp 628, 1108, 6364, 7360, 7710, g

8876,9859. and e political rather than economic solu­ oping the human and the natural c 20 F Visser, op cit, pp 61-64. tionsn are often sought. More is the pity resources of the continent for the bene­ e

c 21 Africa Research Bulletin, Economic series,

that i the OMVS and the LCBC have not fit of all its peoples. l

pp 732,2008,4981,5732,6867-68, 8877, beenr immune to the political conflicts in

e 9385.

whichd their member states have been embroiled.n 22 F Visser, op cit, pp 70-75. u 23 Africa Research Bulletin, Economic series, Alsoy writing before the 1989 set­ Notes and references

a p 9385. back, Visser's view of the OMVS is T J 0 Fair, "The regionalization of eco­ w

e nomic aid to Africa south of the Sahara", 24 M S Gould and F A Zobrist, op cit, p 1721. that t its objectives, responsibilities and authoritya are well-defined and realistic; South African Geographical Journal, vol 25 F Visser, op cit, pp 87-92. G

53, 1971, pp 29-38. theyt are conducive to the integrated 26 ibid, P 92. e 2 F Visser, "Recent developments in the developmentn of resources and the i joint management of international non­ 27 "Regional organisations", Africa south of organizationb has all the powers neces­ the Sahara, London: Europa Publications, a maritime water resources in Africa", S sary to perform its functions. Moreover, Comparative and international Law 1991. y althoughb decision making is in the Journal of Southern Africa, vol 22, no I, 27 B Moyo, "Regional cooperation", Wfst

handsd of the politicians - "effective 1989, pp 59-92. Africa, no 3846, May-June, 1991, pp 849-50. e c u d o 262r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R • ------Security ..

Geopolitics, glasnost and Africa's second liberation: Political and security implications for the continent

In the second of a new series of articles on African military and security issues, Dr Simon Baynham, Chief Researcher in Political and Strategic Studies at the Africa Institute, examines the significance for Africa of recent upheavals in Eastern Europe and the USSR, together with new types of aid conditionality emanating from the Western hemisphere. He argues that a new criterionfor external economic aid relates to levels of state expenditure on military budgets. ) 0 1 0 2

d e Introductiont a under attack as never before from an Ism In South-East Asia during the d

A ( commentator noted earlier this year increasingly impoverished and deeply 1960s.

r

thate when Mikhail Gorbachev suc­ disillusioned populace. h

ceededs Konstantin Chernenko to the In Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, i secretary-generalshipl of the Soviet Western conditionality

b Togo, Madagascar and a host of others,

Communistu Party in 1985, it seemed as students, trade unionists, public ser­ Pressure for a radical shake-up has P

if e it was merely another change in the vants and the unemployed lumpenpro­ come not only indirectly from the for­ h

rulingt political/bureaucratic elite. Very letariat have joined hands to demand mer Eastern bloc but also directly from

fewy observers - either inside or outside political reform, government account­ the Organization for Economic Co­ b

thed USSR - thought that Gorbachev ability and democratic pluralism. Many operation and Development (OECD) e

couldt unleash forces that within a few of the more educated opposition have countries, which regard the implementa­ n

shorta years would have profound reper­ come to view political and constitu­ tion of multiparty politics and open gov­ r

cussions,g not just inside the Soviet tional change as an indispensable pre­ ernment as a sine qua non for structural

e

Unionc but also in Europe and across the condition for the economic regenera­ adjustment and improvements in the

Thirdn World. l tion of their countries - where corrup­ economic sphere. Indeed, the two pro­ e c

i Political and economic reforms in the tion, maladministration, stagnation and cesses - political reform and economic l

USSRr (glasnost: political openness; decaying infrastructure and services salvation - are seen as inseparable. e

perestroika:d economic restructuring) and have been the enduring hallmarks of Thus Britain, France, the United n

theu rapid replacement of seemingly en­ public life for the past quarter century. States and other countries have begun

trenchedy and highly repressive regimes Echoing events in Eastern Europe, to serve notice on their erstwhile clients in a Eastern Europe, blew fresh gales of that financial aid is conditional, inter w popular demonstrations and demand for e

changet over the African landmass. They change have been characterized by ser­ alia, on political reform and a move­ hada major consequences for the contin­ ious public unrest and bloodshed. In ment towards free elections. For in­ G

ent,t catalysing demands for democratic many instances, "copycat" demonstra­ stance, Paris - which has for decades e

n supported favoured former colonies and reformi and an end to single-party hege­ tions have spread from the capital to

mony.b From Algeria in the north and regional cities and towns and, in some the status quo in francophone Africa - a S

Zambia in the south, and from Tanzania cases, across frontiers to other African is using economic inducements (both y

in theb east to Ghana in the west, Africa's states, in a fashion reminiscent of the carrot and stick) to urge Africa in the

militaryd and one-party dictatorships are "domino theory" infection of commun- preferred direction. e c u d o Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991

p 263 e • R Securffy------

Development assistance to the Third Schmidt. The Group, which included ex It is important to note that the World World is also increasingly likely to be Presidents or Prime Ministers of Nigeria, Bank and the IMF do not force their • tied to reductions in military spending. Peru, Canada and Korea, urged that, policies on anybody. No government in when decisions concerning allocations of In a paper presented at the Annual foreign aid are made, special considera­ Africa has to make use of their facil­ World Bank Conference on Develop­ tion be given to countries spending less ities. But those that do are required to ment Economics in Washington (25-26 than 2 percent of their GNP in the secu­ fulfil certain lending conditions. In­ April 1991), Mr Robert McNamara­ rity sector. The huge savings that many creasingly, however, the banks are in­ who served as US Secretary of Defence countries would make by reducing secur­ sisting that these conditions encompass from 1961 to 1968 and World Bank ity spending to 2 percent of GNP or less a move towards democratic institutions could be used to address pressing eco­ President from 1968 to 1981 - said that nomic and social needs. I am conscious and accountability, together with an during the previous two decades, devel­ that application of such conditionality improvement in the field of human oping countries' military budgets grew will be difficult and contentious. Never­ rights. Very few African states score twice as fast as incomes. According to theless, it is I believe an essential [my well on any of these counts'? McN amara, the developing countries emphasis] part of the solution to the are currently spending some $170 bil­ waste represented by excessive military 4 lion a year on weapons and their mil­ spending in poor countries. African leaders' reactions itary services, totalling over 4 per cent The idea of tying development aid to The response by Africa's ruling elites of Gross National Product (GNP).2 reductions in the security sphere has to the internal and external demands for He went on to link the question of also been endorsed by another financial political democracy and responsible military expenditure levels to the issue heavyweight: the World Bank's recently government has been mixed. To date, of democratic governance. retired president, Mr Barber Conable. the scoreboard might be divided into One of the most important effects of mil­ According to him, the World Bank three categories. itary expenditure, which has serious should examine how much a developing First, there are those leaders who implications for political advance and for state spends on arms when considering saw the writing on the wall before pop­ economic growth and development in the making a loan to that country. ular explosions removed them from Third World, is the degree to which it office. Thus, a year ago in January strengthens the political influence of the The World Bank has to look at the level armed forces at the expense of civilian of military spending to determine the 1991, voters in the former Portuguese groups within society. In many parts of capacity of a country to deal with devel­ colonies of Cape Verde and in Sao the Third World, economic systems func­ opment issues in case there is a big Tome and Principe swept the ruling

) tion primarily to benefit a relatively lim­ diversion of resources into military

0 politicians from power after fifteen spending.S 1 ited number of people, and political sys­ years of single-party domination. 8 And 0

2 tems are frequently manipulated to

It is interesting to stress that the World in March 1991, the West African repub­

d guarantee continued elite dominance. If

e Bank is the largest single source of aid lic of Benin (formerly Dahomey) be­

t development that meets the needs of all a social groups is to occur, however, there to the Third World, lending more than came the third recent convert to multi­ d (

must be, among other things, a relatively $23 billion (R66 billion) per annum. party democracy when free elections r

e equitable distribution of resources. This Although Mr Conable's predecessors ushered in a new president, Nicephore h

s in tum relies on the existence of a politi­ have been wary of military issues (at Soglo, removing President Mathieu i l cal system that allows all groups to artic­

b least while in office) since the bank is Kerekou from office after nineteen

u ulate their demands and is capable of owned by 155 countries, many of years of tyrannical rule.9 P producing workable compromises be­

e tween competing interests. The greater which have military dictatorships, it is Other countries or groups of coun­ h

t tries that have embarked, apparently the political power of the security forces, quite clear that the international com­ y the less likely it is that the requirements munity is witnessing a new emphasis genuinely, on the multiparty route b for democratic governance will be met.3 d by donors on sensible military expend­ include: e

t itures, "democratization" and good gov­ McNamaran added that the post-Cold the majority of the French-speaking a ernance as key yardsticks for Western Warr era now offered opportunities for states south of the Sahara - for g the Third World - not least Africa - to economic assistance. e instance, Cote d'lvoire, where Felix cutc back on military expenditure so that With regard to the last two criteria, n Houphouet-Boigny, president since resourcese could be reallocated towards Lancaster has noted that c

i 1960, held two sets of elections in

l These two goals have some similarities

investments that would improve the liv­

r but are not identical. "Democratization" 1991; and Togo, where President inge conditions of the poor. His un­

d is essentially an extension of the US con­ Gnassingbe Eyadema "saw the light

ambiguousn conclusion is worth repro­ cern with human rights and aims at and conceded serious reforms in the u ducing in its entirety. encouraging freedom of the media, free­ y nick of time"; 10

a I strongly urge the linking of financial dom of assembly, multipartyism, open

w assistance, through "conditionality" to political contests and fair elections. the three mainland lusophone (and e t movement toward "optimal levels" of "Governance" is far more modest in its formerly Marxist) states of Angola, a military expenditures. The "optimal lev­ Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau;

G goals and prescriptions. Priority is given

t els" should take account, of course, of to removing political obstacles to struc­

e a number of English-speaking coun­

n the external threat. The "conditionality" tural adjustment programs and renewed

i tries including Gambia, Ghana and

b could take the form of the proposal con­ growth. The emphasis is on account­

a Sierra Leone. Nigeria is in a slot of its tained in Facing One World, the report of ability, transparency, predictability, and S own as it grapples with a transition

y the Independent Group on Financial the rule of law in government, not on b

Flows to Developing Countries, chaired the prescription of specific political from authoritarian military domin­ d by former German Chancellor Helmut structures.6 ation to two-party civilian rule. II e c u d o r

264p Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 e R • ------Security

Second, there are a number of African Sudan - a country that has been at istration when President Siad Barre and • leaders who have also seen the writing war with itself for 25 of its 35 years his loyalist "Red Beret" presidential on the wall, but who are clearly attempt­ of independence and where the mil­ guards retreated under heavy artillery ing to "manage" the multiparty debate so itary dictatorship headed by General and mortar fire, first to an underground as to preserve single-party domination Omar el-Bashir shows no signs of bunker at the international airport garri­ and keep themselves in office. Examples moving with a political tide that son, before fleeing Mogadishu in in this category include: is beginning to engulf the continent armoured vehicles towards the Kenyan Zaire, where President Mobutu Sese at large. border on 27 January.15 Not very long Seko, who has held continuous Kenya, where President Daniel arap afterwards, in May this year, opposition office since 1965, has attempted to Moi remains rigidly opposed to multi­ forces under the leadership of Meles keep one step ahead of the opposi­ party ism, designating its advocates Zenawi toppled the embattled regime of tion by creating scores of parties in a as "criminals and subversives"13 and Mengistu Haile Mariam following time-honoured strategy of divide et arguing that party pluralism will years of debilitating civil war. In both impera. Although Mobutu promised inevitably engender tribal conflict Ethiopia and Somalia, the rebel move­ in April 1990 that he would hand and country-wide chaos. However, ments had denounced government over office to a democratically domestic critics counter that such offers to discuss democratic constitu­ elected government within a year, no divisions have also festered in tions and multiparty elections as simply elections were in fact scheduled. It Africa's single-party systems. a tactic to relieve pressures on their was only after the September 1991 Malawi, where the ageing Hastings regimes. mutiny of unpaid Zairean troops Banda seems even more vehemently (which prompted thousands of for­ set against reform than is the leader­ Conclusions eigners to flee and saw the dispatch ship in Nairobi. of French and Belgian paratroopers Zimbabwe, where President Robert Looking at these continental conclu­ to the vast Central African country) Mugabe's ideological support for sions as a whole, what is remarkable is that Mobutu appointed a "crisis gov­ single-party rule has been endorsed that in the twelve months between the ernment" headed by Etienne Tshi­ by a face-saving formula whereby June 1990 and June 1991 Organization sekedi. Tshisekedi's nomination other parties are permitted but the of African Unity (OAU) summits, no appears to signal that Mobutu's 26- ruling Zanu-PF is committed to fewer than nine African leaders lost year rule is nearing its end. maintenance of the status quo in their jobs - the highest turnover since )

0 Cameroon, where President Paul which the opposition seems doomed the OAU was created at Addis Ababa in 1 May 1963. And for the first time in 0 Biya's government has reluctantly to a permanent place in the political 2 initiated a process of change, away wilderness. post-colonial Africa, three presidents d

e lost office in the course of just three

t from the monopoly of power en­ a joyed by the Cameroon Peoples months earlier this year in free and fair d ( Democratic Movement (CPDM), Developments in Mali, elections. More widely, at least 16 r e but in a fashion that suggests a less Somalia and Ethiopia African dictators have been forced to h

s permit opposition parties to operate i than wholehearted commitment to

l However, the momentous events in

b de facto multipartyism. Mali, Somalia and Ethiopia during the legally during the past two years. u But while these developments raise P

Tanzania, where the sole ruling first half of 1991 - together with the as

e real hopes for the better government of yet unresolved CrISIS confronting h party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi t (CCM), is under threat from an President Didier Ratsiraka in Madagas­ Africa, fundamental to any chance of y sustained economic recovery, the surge b

independent ten-man committee, car - cannot have escaped the close

d towards multiparty democracy will

e headed by veteran politician Chief attention of Africa's hard-liners. For in t inevitably mean a painful and extended

n Fundikira, which is stealing the March this year, Mali's military dic­

a period of adjustment - with parallel

r thunder of a twenty-man commis­ tator, General Moussa Traore, was g arrested and ousted by his own army problems relating to domestic and

e sion set-up by President Ali Hassan c Mwinyi. Critics of Mwinyi claim following four days of anti-government regional security. As these countries n

e move towards democratization on a

c that his commission is simply a riots in which hundreds of civilians i

l continent where multiparty elections delaying tactic to maintain the status died. As one fortnightly newsletter r had become rarer than white rhinos, e quo and that it is merely a man­ explained: d there is another risk. The risk is that the n reuvre to legitimize one-party rule For months [Traore's] calculation

u "second liberation" will change not just and CCM hegemony.12 appeared to be paying off, as it seemed y Africa's despotic rulers but also the

a that a country as rural and poor as Mali

Thew third group might be labelled the could resist change more easily than a continent's international borders. e

"recalcitrants"t or the "die-hards". These more urbanised country with a larger However, as The Economist put it a middle class. Traore's overthrow has

areG the leaders who have set themselves quite recently:

t demonstrated that this is not so and has

resolutelye against any real political illustrated the danger of resisting n That is something Africa may have to put

refonni and who remain adamant that change. 14 b up with. Peaceful secession, based on the

thea de jure or actual monopoly of the freely expressed wish of a people, may S ruling party must be maintained at Two months earlier, in January 1991,

y be preferable to decades of debilitating b

all costs. The key countries figuring Somali rebel forces achieved a military civil war. It need not mean a wholesale

d redrawing of frontiers, or a licence to

heree are: breakthrough against the central admin- c u d o r

Africap Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 265 e • R Securi~------

every prosperous pocket in the continent ical and economic refugees are pouring West "loses interest by virtue of having to copy Katanga. But, after a generation out of Somalia into Kenya and won the Cold War .... [Africa] stand[s] of independence, Africa may have to Ethiopia, adding to the complexity of a fate worse in some aspects than being shed some shibboleths to catch up with fought over - being ignored."21 the rest of the world.l6 the Horn's problems and imposing painful security stresses on the region. On the other hand, the West has Meanwhile the outside world - and es­ Yet while moves towards political long-standing historical and moral pecially given the Phoenix-like birth of pluralism are vital for Africa's long­ commitments to the African continent. new states from the fragmentation of the term economic survival, they are not As a consequence - and so long as the old order in Central and Eastern Europe - likely to yield quick results. Structural contentious but admirable principle of a is providing a role model for ethnic/ adjustment programmes - and the pub­ link between foreign assistance and regional aspirations across the length and lic sacrifices inherent in them - will put political/economic reform is main­ breadth of the African continent. increased pressure on the continent's tained - aid from the industrialized In the past of course, the OAU (and evolving polities and one can expect countries will continue to flow. So far, most of its constituent members) continued turmoil as a result. In short, the coercion that is inherent in condi­ insisted that Africa's colonial borders multiparty systems will have to deal tionality has not been spelled out in any must remain untouched and sacrosanct. with the same (and for some time prob­ great detail. Nonetheless, it seems clear But the OAU might now have to accept ably worse) economic dilemmas faced that the rest of the 1990s will witness a some negotiated adjustments to the con­ by their predecessors. clearer articulation, or more detailed tinent's internal frontiers - especially Earlier in this essay the positive con­ specification, of the yardsticks (be they given last year's go-ahead by Ethiopia's sequences for Africa of reform in the political, economic or those relating to post-Mengistu administration for an socialist bloc were emphasized, as was human rights and military expenditure) independence referendum in Eritrea, the impact of the superpower rapproche­ that will increasingly influence donor together with the actual declaration of ment that, inter alia, paved the way for handouts. independent sovereignty by the pre­ Namibia's independence and raised With regard to what appears to be dominantly Issaq Somali National prospects for the end of other conflicts the most recently added dimension of Movement (SNM) in northern Somalia. in the subcontinent. Yet the democratic conditionality - that is, the guidelines The OAU's acute dilemma on the revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the focusing on defence spending - it is issue, and the most likely options or sensational developments that have clear that the views and exhortations of scenarios confronting the continent, occurred in the international system, people such as McNamara and Con able were) crystalized by a leading British

0 may have far-reaching repercussions for are unlikely to fall on deaf ears inside scholar1 at a Cambridge conference this Africa that may have negative con­ the foreign ministries and treasuries of 0 2 year when he said that: sequences for the continent. the OECD states. Indeed, even the d

e ... although the great majority of Africa's As Salim Lone has pointed out, the Japanese (whose terms of conditional­ t

a current frontiers will almost certainly situation in the Soviet Union and ity to date seem to be have been solely d

( remain, there may be occasional cases

Eastern Europe is turning out to be rooted in the commercial sphere) have

r where divorce along the lines of the

e infinitely more challenging for the West jumped on the defence budget band­

h Bangladesh secession becomes the

s than was thought to be the case in the wagon - as evidenced recently in an i answer - or alternatively, an opposition l

b movement may retain tacitly accepted heady days of two years ago. Also the address to a Wilton Park conference in u control over its home region, because the Western European nations are intensely England by Mr Yoshi Nogami, Tokyo's P

e central government cannot conquer it and preoccupied with the growing demands deputy director-general of the Middle

h the insurgents cannot gain formal recog­ t Eastern and African Affairs Bureau at

of 1992; and the devastating scope of y nition of independent statehood. 17 the Gulf War has ensured that the Japan's Foreign Ministry.22 b

It isd already becoming clear, however, industrialized countries will make the As noted, Robert McNamara has e thatt the emergence of African countries strategic Middle East region their main specified that special consideration n 19 froma the strait-jacket of authoritarian priority for some years to come. All should be given to countries spending r

g these developments have pushed Africa under 2 per cent of their GNP in the rule presents grave security risks for e

partsc of the continent. In Somalia, for down the list of Western priorities. security sector. For the past few years, n

example,e the end of SHad Barre's harsh Indeed approximately two-thirds of Africa's c i administrationl has been replaced by ... it quickly became clear that the much­ states have been spending more than 2

murderousr non-rule by competing awaited "peace dividend" - resources per cent of GNP on their armed forces, e armiesd in a country that once again freed by the ending of the Cold War arms while eight countries spend at least n race - would be directed, ironically, not openlyu reveals the grim reality of deep­ three times and in two of these cases - seatedy primordial affiliations and inter­ towards the poorest countries but back Angola and Libya - six times this a towards the very region with which the clanw rivalry and suspicion. IS Next door, figure (see table).

e West had been involved in a major politi­ in t Ethiopia, the ousting in May of 20 McNamara made it clear that the

a cal struggle.

MengistuG by the Ethiopian People's Re­ linkage of financial assistance to "opti­

t

volutionarye Democratic Front (EPRDF) The relaxation of East-West geopolit­ mal levels" of defence expenditure n mayi yet represent something of a false ical tensions has also eroded whatever would be difficult and controversial, b

dawn:a armed bandits plague the south­ strategic significance superpower ri­ but he has also stressed that he views S eastern region of the country and in the valry once provided. Put another way, such conditionality as an essential y b

north millions are threatened with star­ and to quote Stephen Rosenfeld, an check on the profligacy represented by d

vation.e Meanwhile, thousands of polit- editor on The Washington Post, the excessive military spending in Africa c u d o r

266p Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 e R • ------Security

Military expenditure (ME) of selected African states 1988 interests of the socialist bureaucrats that 'liberation' spawned in Africa. But when Country Expenditure US$ million ME AS % GNP it comes to the interests of ordinary people - especially fanners - the bank has the Angola 1 181 12,0 most to offer". Botswana 99 8,2 8 The election result in Cape Verde came as something of a surprise to the leader of the Egypt 6086 7,8 opposition Movement for Democracy Ethiopia 447 8,2 (MPD), Carlos Veiga, a 41-year old lawyer. The MPD won some 65 per cent of Libya 2996 12,9 the seats. "The irony of it all is that Cape Morocco 1 138 6,0 Verde, under the [ruling African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde], has Mozambique 74 8,0 been a relatively stable and prosperous Zimbabwe 386 6,3 country in the region. The party of Prime Minister Pedro Pires had hoped to win Source: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World military most of the 79 parliamentary seats on a expenditures and arms transfers, 1989, Washington, DC: US Government platfonn of political continuity .... [Cape Printing Office, October 1990. Verde] is the first of Portugal's five fonner colonies in Africa to abandon Marxist dogma and one-party rule, and liberalise its economy after the collapse of commun­ ism in Eastern Europe." Africa Events, and other parts of the Third World. He and a legitimate concern to protect February 1991, P 23. In Sao Tome and added that the global community must national sovereignty, there clearly is great Principe, the ruling party lost to the oppo­ sition Democratic Convergence Party, playa major role in creating an envir­ scope for reducing Third World military expenditure by reducing anns imports" (p which won 30 out of the 55 parliamentary onment that would make this possible. 15). seats. For further details, see Pierre Botha, In his view, actions should include "Multiparty elections in Sao Tome and guarantees from the UN Security 3 Ibid, P 21. The paper continues on the same Cape Verde", Africa Institute Bulletin, vol page: "When security forces claim for 31, no 5,1991, p 4. Council of nations' territorial integrity; themselves a role in guaranteeing internal 9 The almost Byzantine complexity of substantial limitations on arms exports; security for a society, they are not, in most Benin's independent history up to and and tight control over the proliferation cases, seeking to make all citizens equally ) after Kerekou's October 1972 coup is of0 weapons of mass destruction and secure. Indeed, their actions often create 1 examined in Simon Baynham, "Praetorian their0 delivery systems. greater instability. All too frequently, the

2 politics and the Benin raid", Army If this cocktail of imperatives can be security forces are not protecting a major­ d Quarterly and Defence Journal, vol 107,

e ity of the population from a minority bent

successfullyt co-ordinated, there can be no 4, October 1977, pp 422-34.

a on pursuing its own political and economic

littled doubt, ceteris paribus, that this objectives, instead they are seeking to 10 Africa Confidential, vol 32, no 7, 15 April ( 1991,p2. newr facet of "with-strings" or qualifi­ guarantee 'regime security' (which often catorye aid will result in the steady means 'military regime security')." h 11 It is interesting to note that Nigeria's large s

i northern neighbour, Niger, also began transferl of resources from the military 4 Ibid, P 22. andb security spheres to the civilian sec­ talking (in September 1991) about imple­ u 5 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), I May menting a two-party system similar to the P

tor during the twilight years of the twentiethe century. 1991. Mr Conable's views were given to a Nigerian model. h

t news conference on 26 April. So long as the major powers heed 12 In fact the debate on mUltiparty pluralism y 6 Carol Lancaster, "The new politics of US was actually initiated not by Mwinyi but b

McNamara's calls for the creation of aid to Africa", CSIS Africa Notes, no 120, by the fonner president, Julius Nyerere. d

ane enabling environment that makes 28 January 1991, p 3. "Inspired by refonns in Eastern Europe - t

thisn possible, bilateral and multilateral 7 Financial Mail, 26 April 1991, P 28. In a and (according to one diplomatic source) a

conditionalityr on military budgets may leading article on the impact of World severely shocked by the collapse of the g be able to catalyse socio-economic state apparatus in the ill-named Gennan

e Bank/lMF policies, the weekly continues developmentc without reducing national on the same page as follows: "Whether Democratic Republic - Nyerere, still CCM n chainnan, came out with a shock sece uri ty. 23 bank policies have been a success in c

i announcement ... in February 1990, by

l Africa is open to argument. Certainly the questioning the appropriateness of Tan­ r [World Bank] appears to have evidence of e zania's single-party system, forcing CCM Notesd and references substantial and durable progress in other n parts of the Third World, in particular diehards to sit up when he said that 'what u Joseph Takougang, "Is multipartyism the South America. It certainly acknowledges is happening in Rumania, Hungary and y answer?", Africa Events, April 1991, p 34. East Gennany can also happen here if we a that African countries have indulged in don't change"'. Simon Baynham, "Tan­ 2 w "The post-Cold War world and its implica­ such extreme and intransigent economic e t tions for military expenditures in the and social degradation that too many of its zania 1990: Economic and political devel­ a developing countries", p 1. McNamara small national economies have became opments", Africa Insight, vol 20, no 4, G

1990, P 258. t goes on to say that in the period 1978 to basket cases. e 13 It seems paradoxical that the politically

n 1988, "the Third World imported US$371 "The extremity of their deprivation i obdurate Moi presides over one of Africa's b billion of anns (nearly US$450 billion at may mean that what the. bank prescribes

a 1988 prices), or over three-quarters of the will take longer than expected to bear most successful economies. For an assess­ S anns traded internationally .... While these fruit. Often, too, progress is slow as ment of the country's relatively positive y

b economic perfonnance, see Simon

figures reflect the relative lack of domestic African rulers have to be cajoled into the

d production capability in the Third World application of policies that are not in the Baynham, "The Kenyan economy: An e c u d o Africar Insight, vo121, no 4,1991

p 267 e R I Securi~------

overview", Africa Insight, vol 19, no 4, speculation that a struggle for the presi­ fighting. A peace agreement, signed in July, 1989, pp 225-32. dential succession was in progress - led to has had little effect. Government, if that 14 Africa Confidential, vol 32, no 7, 5 April an intensification of attacks on military means a stable bureaucracy and the rule of 1991, p 1. On the same page, the newslet­ targets by a variety of insurgent forces. At law, does not exist." The Economist, vol ter goes on to say that the coup against the same time, food and fuel shortages 320, no 7723, 7 September 1991, p 54. sparked off anti-government riots in Traore "may now have a knock-on effect 19 "Political liberalization builds in Africa", Mogadishu and provincial urban centres". in other French-speaking countries which Africa Recovery, vol 4, nos 3-4, October­ Simon Baynham, "Somalia - The rise and have been unenthusiastic in the implemen­ December 1990, p 10. tation of reform, especially Niger and fall of Siad Barre", Africa Institute Guinea". Bulletin, vol31, no 5,1991, p 2. 20 Ibid, P 9. 15 The forcible overthrow of Siad Barre 16 The Economist, vol 319, no 7708, 25 May 21 Ibid. began in earnest in May 1988, when the 1991, p 64. 22 Mr Nogami said that when Japan allocated Somali National Movement (SNM) - a 17 Christopher Clapham, "The African state", its aid, it looked at the proportion of the predominantly Issaq opposition group paper delivered at the Conference of the national budget spent on defence and from the north of the country - began its Royal African Society on "Sub-Saharan whether the country in question was campaign by orchestrating unrest in the Africa: The record and the outlook", St moving towards good government and a north and launching unprecedented attacks John's College, Cambridge, 14-16 April market economy. For details, see The Star against government buildings and offices. 1991, p 19. (Johannesburg), 3 October 1990. "In response, the authorities ... started a full-scale military campaign aimed at 18 "The clans have subdivided, forming mili­ 23 This conclusion, and a distillation of the curbing support for the rebels, a process tias around subclans. There are at least arguments about the new litmus test on that saw the systematic saturation bomb­ three of them among the Darod, and several military spending, also appears in Simon ing and slaughter of civilians. Neverthe­ among the Hawiye. For the eight months Baynham, "The new conditionality: Swords less, growing popular discontent against since Mr Barre fled to his home region in into ploughshares?", Africa Institute the administration - meshed with renewed the west of the country, they have been Bulletin, vol 31, no 8, 1991. ) 0 1 0 2

d e t a d (

r e h s i l b u P

e h t

y b

d e t n a r g

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y b

d e c u d o r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991

268p e R I ------Land policy

The dilemmas of land policy in Zimbabwe

Jef!rey Herbst, Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Woodrow Wdson School, Princeton University, analyses the tensions inherent in the Zimbabwe government's land policy*

Introduction politicians repeatedly stressed the Africans into overcrowded Reserves importance of accelerating land redis­ and the blatantly discriminatory pol­ It is not too much to say that in one way or another the fate of property rights in tribution once these unpopular constitu­ icies against African farmers, designed the land area will be a key determinant tional provisions lapsed. In December to protect fledgling white farmers from of the shape of Zimbabwe's entire 1990 Parliament passed a bill that competition, meant that "by the end of political economy in the years to come. allowed the government to seize farm the 1930's, the agricultural economy of Land was the central issue during the land and pay whatever compensation it the Shona and the Ndebele, like that of ) chose. But this new land policy, with its the Kikuyu and most South African liberation0 struggle for Zimbabwe and 1 potentially dramatic challenge to prop­ peoples, had been destroyed."3 Not continues0 to be the most important

2 erty rights, obviously clashes with surprisingly, since control over land domestic issue in the post-Indepen­ d Zimbabwe's efforts to reform its eco­ was essential to the whites achieving e

dencet period. The appropriation of

a economic and political dominance, African land by European settlers guar­ nomy and promote domestic and for­ d

( eign investment. A close examination their appropriation of land became the anteed white economic domination and r most important African grievance. blacke poverty during the colonial of the politics surrounding land during h

s the first ten years of Zimbabwe's inde­ In 1977 the land laws were amended, period,i and the inequitable distribution l pendence also makes it doubtful if the and racial classifications were abol­ of b land in Zimbabwe today is the most u new land legislation has addressed ished, except for the 47 per cent of the dramaticP symbol of the enduring struc­ many of the most significant problems land reserved for Africans (now know turese of an unequal society. The evolu­ h

t that caused the perceived failure of the as Communal Lands). However, since tion of the government's efforts to y government's resettlement programme few blacks could afford to buy white addressb the land question is of great in the first place. farms, the racial division of the land at importanced because of the peasants' e expectationst that their long-held Independence in April 1980 was not n significantly different from what it had grievancesa will be addressed as the new r Inequitable land distribution 4

g been a few years before. regime redistributes property formerly e Land has been a central issue in There are also considerable inequal­ heldc by white farmers. n Zimbabwe ever since the coming of the ities in the quality of the land held. At e The land question promises to con­ c

i colonists.! By 1910, 23,4 per cent of Independence, 74 per cent of all peas­ l

tinue dominating Zimbabwe politics

r the land had been appropriated by ant land was in areas where droughts duringe the 1990s because of the expira­

d are frequent and even normal levels of tion of the Lancaster House Con­ whites, and 26 per cent had been n declared Native Reserves, later to rainfall are inadequate for intensive u stitution and its prohibition on govern­ 2 5 y become known as Tribal Trust Lands. crop production. Similarly, in areas

menta expropriation of land. In the The Land Apportionment Act (LAA) of where blacks were permitted to own run-upw to the 1990 elections, Zanu e

t 1930 legalized the division of the coun­ land (previously called African Pur­ a try's land, and prohibited members of chase Areas, but now known as small­ G

* Thist article is also a chapter in the forthcom­ either racial group from owning land in scale commercial farming areas), 75 ing e book Zimbabwe in transition, edited by n areas assigned to the other. By this per cent of the land was located in Simoni Baynham, to be published by the Africa b time, 1930, 50,8 per cent of the land regions where, at best, only extensive Institutea in January 1992. Interviews noted in S this article were conducted in Zimbabwe had been declared "European," while crop and livestock farming can be y carried on. In contrast, most of the betweenb 1986 and 1988. A Fulbright 30 per cent had been reserved for the

Scholarshipd enabled me to study in Zimbabwe. African population. The herding of large-scale commercial white farmland e c u d o Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 269 p e R Land policy------

is concentrated in good rainfall areas the economy. At Independence, white gramme to resettle 18 000 families on where intensive crop production is pos­ farmers produced approximately 80 per approximately 1,1 million hectares of sible. The Communal Lands have a cent of the country's total agricultural land at a cost of Z$60 million. 14 Half population density of approximately 28 output. 12 Further, they accounted for this programme was to be funded by people per square kilometre compared nearly all the tobacco, tea, coffee, and the British government; Zimbabwe with nine people per square kilometre sugar the country exported. And while would pay for the remainder. Seeing the in formerly white areas,6 even though black peasant farmers have made enor­ clear inadequacy of this programme in the Communal Lands are less able by mous strides during the first decade of a country where 800 000 peasant fam­ far to support intensive cultivation and independence, it is clear that white ilies faced severe land pressures, the large concentrations of people. farmers still dominate the agricultural government soon decided to embark on This inequitable distribution of land sector. something much more ambitious. In the doomed most peasants to ever-worsen­ What makes the white farmers espe­ three-year Transitional Development ing poverty. By 1979, the population of cially powerful is their extremely good Plan, published in November 1982 and the Reserves exceeded their carrying organization. Their status as the most covering the period 1983-85, the new capacity by approximately two million powerful and sophisticated political government stated its intention ofreset­ people.? Zimbabwe's major commis­ group in Rhodesia can be traced back to tling at least 162 000 peasant families, sion of inquiry into incomes and prices, the passage of the Farmers Licensing "subject to practical financial and eco­ the Riddell Commission, bluntly sum­ Act and the subsequent establishment of nomic constraints."15 This was an marized the economic problems caused the Rhodesian National Farmers Union exceedingly ambitious goal because it by the inequitable distribution of land: (RNFU) in 1942. To meet the demands meant resettling approximately 20 per The most fundamental constraint on rais­ of World War II, the colonial govern­ cent of all the nation's peasants. The ing the incomes of families in the peasant ment needed the farmers' co-operation new programme implied the purchase sector to a level that will meet their mini­ in increasing food production. And the of nine million hectares (the equivalent mum needs is land shortage.8 farmers were able to use this leverage to of 57 per cent of all white agricultural At Independence in 1980, the national­ persuade the government to pass the land before Independence) and an ist leaders made it clear that redistribu­ Licensing Act. This made it mandatory expenditure of at least Z$570 million. 16 tion of land was a central element in for all commercial farmers to buy a Owing to these and other constraints, their vision of Zimbabwe. Robert Mu­ farming licence from the newly formed the government subsequently scaled gabe stated in Zanu (PF)'s 1980 elec­ Union. 13 To this day, the Commercial down its immediate goals. In Zim­ tion) manifesto: Farmers Union (CFU), as the RNFU babwe's First Five-Year National 0

1 became after Independence, is possibly Development Plan (covering the years

0 It is not only anti-people but criminal for

2 the only farmers' union in the world 1986-1990) the government set a any government to ignore the acute land

d hunger in the country, especially when it enjoying a government-enforced closed new goal of resettling 15000 families e t is realized that 83 per cent of our popula­

a shop. This closed shop allows during each year of the Plan.

d tion live in the rpral areas and depend on

( Zimbabwe's white farmers to undertake The government resettlement pro­

9

r agriculture for their livelihood.

e costly research and lobbying exercises gramme has lagged considerably be­ h

Thes President has also stated that, be­ of enormous sophistication. hind the admittedly ambitious targets i causel of the importance of land in the Thus, at Independence in 1980, the set by these two National Development b livesu of the people, "We can never have lines were drawn between a govern­ Plans. Land acquisition and family P peace in this country unless the peasant ment committed to redressing the in­ resettlement certainly did increase im­ e h

populationt is satisfied in relation to the equitable distribution of land and a pressively during the first three years of

landy issue."10 white farming community whose extra­ independence: by the end of 1983, over b However, despite the importance of ordinary economic dominance stemmed 15000 families had been resettled. But d e

thist issue to the people, the Zimbabwe from that same distribution of land. At because of the severe economic crisis governmentn was severely restricted. the same time, the government was caused by the unprecedented three-year a r

Theg Lancaster House Constitution re­ committed to working with the white drought between 1982 and 1984, land

quirede that all land acquired by the gov­ farmers and had agreed to constitu­ purchase and resettlement soon began c ernmentn be purchased on a "willing tional provisions inhibiting it from any to level off. After good rains in 1985 e c seller-willingi buyer" basis and that radical changes in land distribution for and 1986, the programme encountered l

ownersr of any land seized by the gov­ a whole decade. Indeed, there was a number of additional problems, e

ernmentd be compensated in foreign cur­ probably no more controversial ques­ resulting in a slow-down in the total rency.n The land provisions of the tion at Independence than how the new

u number of people resettled. For exam­

Constitutiony were an essential part of regime would be able to resist the polit­ ple, in the financial year 1986/7, funds thea bargain between the white govern­ ical power of the white farmers and ful­ were made available for only 2750 w e mentt and the black guerrillas and could fil the promises concerning land that it families to be resettled instead of the nota be changed for ten years. II had made during the liberation struggle. original target of 15 000.17 By 1988, G

t The white farmers were formidable the government had resettled approx­ e opponentsn for a new government seek­ imately 42000 families on approx­ i ingb to redress some of the inequalities in The evolution of Zimbabwe's imately 2,6 million hectares of land. 18 a

S land programme, 1980-1990 land ownership. The provisions in the By the end of 1990, the number of fam­ y

Constitution,b indeed, were symbolic of Upon gaining power in April 1980, the ilies resettled had risen by only 10 000

thed key role white farmers retained in Mugabe government initiated a pro- to a figure of 52000;19 and the 162000 e c u d o 270r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R ------Land policy

family goal, which the government had 15 000 families a year implied for their During the first year and a half of inde­ once hoped to reach in three years, is province. The response of one Mas­ pendence, the Mugabe government nowadays seen as the eventual target vingo Province official was typical: "I resettled 8 600 families on 520 000 for the entire resettlement effort. don't know. I have not addressed my­ hectares of land. Thus, in only eighteen self to how many would be resettled months, it managed to transfer only 10 here." Or, as one Manicaland Province per cent less land than Kenya reallo­ Explaining the evolution of official said, "Government resettlement cated under its smallholder resettlement the land programme goals are not translated into budgets. schemes between its own Independence The reason for the consistent failure to The goals from the top bear little and 1976.20 Kenya has resettled more meet resettlement targets has been the resemblance to what actually goes on." people (63000 families had been reset­ subject of considerable debate. By point­ The National Plans, therefore, may tled through official government pro­ ing to the constitutional provisions re­ be read as essentially ideological state­ grammes by the end of 1975), but these garding land, many government leaders ments from the regime detailing what it figures result in part from better agro­ explicitly suggest that the main reason would like to do, not as blueprints out­ ecological conditions in Kenya, which for failure has been the need to meet lining what in fact it was actually going allow more intensive farming per unit of the willing seller-willing buyer provi­ to do. The planning and budgeting - the land. Set alongside this, Zimbabwe's sions of the Lancaster House Constitu­ real stuff of government - has never resettlement programme - conducted by tion. In addition, some have suggested been undertaken, or even seriously con­ a young government with no experience that the political power of the white templated, for resettling 162000 peas­ in this area - must be seen as a substan­ farmers has prevented the government ant families. Indeed, the very restric­ tial achievement. from fully implementing its plans. Thus tions of the Lancaster House Consti­ The Lancaster House Constitution an investigation of the political, admin­ tution may have encouraged Zim­ must also be examined in its proper istrative and economic facts influencing babwe's leaders to make exaggerated context if the evolution of the land pro­ the land programme will go some way estimates of the number of families that gramme is to be fully appreciated. The towards developing an understanding could be resettled. After all, when the black liberation forces did not win a of how the land programme may evolve gulf between rhetoric and reality military victory in 1980. Probably they now that the government is free of the became obvious, the Mugabe govern­ could have won; but outright victory Lancaster House land restrictions. ment could always assert that the exter­ would have taken a further year or To truly appreciate the way in which nally-imposed Lancaster House Con­ more at the very least, and would have

the) land programme has evolved, it stitution kept it from actually engaging resulted in thousands of additional 0

must1 be noted that it is pointless to in any true programme of radical land deaths among black combatants and 0

judge2 the progress of the resettlement reform. peasants and the destruction of a large

programmed by the public goals set for it. The best way to understand Zim­ part of the country's infrastructure and e Theset goals were never realistic, and the babwe's resettlement programme is to of its agricultural and industrial base. a

governmentd made virtually no effort to ignore the targets stated in the different The land provision of the Lancaster (

transformr its stated targets into reality. development plans. The starting point House Constitution was an essential e

Conversationsh with present and former for an analysis of the land programme part of any political solution to the war, s i governmentl officials have revealed that should be the original programme of because the last settler government b

theu figure of 162000 families, which is resettling 18 000 families in three could not have compromised unless its P now accepted by everyone in Zimbabwe years, the only goal ever supported with most important constituency, the white e

to h have been the target for the resettle­ a committed budget and real plans. farmers, were at least to some extent t

menty programme, was developed with That programme was completed; and reassured about their future. b little reference to government abilities resettlement then continued, though at a Indeed, through the first ten years d e

ort the actual situation in the country­ slower pace. Indeed, the 52000 famil­ of independence, the Mugabe gov­

side.n A former Ministry of Lands offi­ ies resettled after ten years is not far off ernment used its strict observance of a cialr said in an interview: "The 162000 the 6 000 families a year goal set in the property rights to attract a consider­ g

familiese figure was just a figure pro­ original budget. This is not a matter for able amount of foreign aid from around c

duced.n No real calculations went into astonishment seeing that governments the world. For instance, Dr Bernard e c

thei figure." Similarly, a Ministry of must run on real budgets and concrete Chidzero, the Senior Minister of Fi­ l

Landsr official in the Mashonaland plans. But those who look simply at the nance, Economic Planning, and Devel­ e

regiond noted in another interview; "We societal balance of power miss seeing opment, recognized that the constitu­

weren totally mortified by the 162000 the facts in this way. Far from being tional bargain was essential to Zim­ u

figure.y Neither the land nor the money derailed, the only land programme ever babwe's future: wasa available for the goal." seriously planned in Zimbabwe stayed

w We have a constitution thal guarantees e

t It is even unclear whether the goal on course more or less happily for a property rights. It is as watertight as any . adopteda in 1986 of resettling 15 000 whole decade . constitution you can ever imagine. We G cannot therefore expropriate or national­ f

targetn that could be translated into an The programme's i it requires changing the constitution and achievableb programme. I asked officials accomplishments

a it is not very easy to change the constitu­ S of the resettlement programme in each Although the programme has not tion. We have accepted the constitution y

ofb Zimbabwe's eight provinces what achieved its stated aims, what it actually and we live by it. Therefore, we respect

thed Five-Year Plan's goal of resettling achieved should not be underestimated. property rights.21 e c u d o Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 271 p e R Land poJicy------

The fact that the Mugabe govern­ resources for newly resettled farmers about resettlement. He said in an inter­ ment was attentive to the rights of was difficult for the government to co­ view that there had been a "creeping white farmers, arguably the most racist ordinate. It proved, in fact, the most collective consciousness that resettle­ section of the white population and the serious obstacle encountered. In inter­ ment alone would not be enough." A backbone of Ian Smith's Rhodesian views, resettlement officials constantly provincial official in Mashonaland also Front, did much to add to Zimbabwe's emphasized the water problem, be­ mentioned "the realization that resettle­ prestige. moaning the fact that some peasants had ment is not going to solve the problems essentially been dumped on newly of the Communal Lands." Similarly, a Constraints acquired land while geophysical surveys Masvingo official said: "in this part of There is, of course, no doubt that the were still being conducted to search for the world I don't really see resettlement method of purchase mandated by the the necessary water resources that making a major impact." Lancaster House Constitution has been might, or might not, be there. Instead of focusing entirely on reset­ a major constraint on the land pro­ Of course, if Zimbabwe could have tlement, government officials have re­ gramme. The government has consist­ simply seized well-watered commercial cognized that the land-use patterns in ently been unable to appropriate the farming land, the water constraint the Communal Lands themselves can funds needed to purchase anywhere near would not have been nearly as import­ and should be changed to increase the the amount of land the programme's ant. But owing to the Lancaster House land's carrying capacity and provide stated goals would require. However, in provisions, the government was forced better economic opportunities for peas­ the early years of the programme, land­ to focus much of its resettlement efforts ant farmers. The history of the Com­ acquisition costs amounted to only 44 upon land that needed a great deal of munal Lands is a history of more and per cent of the total costs incurred in preparation before it could be farmed. more people being forced on to the resettlement.22 So even if Zimbabwe These Lancaster House provisions, then, same piece of land with little attention had been free of the Lancaster House by effectively requiring the government paid to rational land-use patterns. There provisions, funding would still have to buy the land needing the most work, is thus great potential for redevelop­ been a very significant problem and the put tremendous strains on the already ment here. Although the shift to re­ government would have had great diffi­ weak resettlement bureaucracy. development of the Communal Lands culty in resettling a significantly larger Apart from their organizational prob­ has received relatively little attention in number of peasants. The highly sophist­ lems, the resettlement administrators Zimbabwe, the Five-Year Plan actually icated and technical approach Zim­ have come to realize that the original called for a major reorganization of

babwe) has taken to resettlement - invol­ emphasis on the value of resettlement these areas to help 20 000 families a 0

ving1 complex geophysical plans, was over-optimistic. This realization year.26 And while this target was as 0 2

thoroughly demarcated plots, and the has been prompted by two simple facts unrealistic as the Plan's goal of reset­ d

constructione of roads, schools, and clin­ that too many people who study tling 15000 families a year, the fact t

icsa for each project - has probably con­ Zimbabwe's land problems fail, or that the number of families to be d

( refuse, to recognize. First, as a result of assisted by changes in the communal

tributed as much to the funding prob­ r

lemse of resettlement as have land­ population growth alone, Zimbabwe's areas is greater than the number to be h

acquisitions costs. This sophisticated Communal Lands are producing the resettled reflects a basic change in gov­ i l

approachb will no doubt pay dividends in equivalent of approximately 40 000 ernment thinking.

theu future; but it is important to recog­ families each year, and nothing can be P White political power nizee that the method of land acquisition done to change this fact in the short to h

demandedt by the Lancaster House medium term.24 So even if the govern­ The bureaucracy's organizational prob­

Constitutiony was far from the only ment managed the Herculean feat of lems, their evaluation of the resettle­ b

obstacled to resettlement. resettling 162000 families, in four to ment programme, and the presence of e

t six years' time the Communal Lands under-used land have until now, Organizationaln barriers a would once more be facing the same together, obviated the need for white r

Whileg land-acquisition costs are im­ land-pressure problems as they did in commercial farmers to come into con­

e

portant,c other things, too, have influ­ the early 1980s. Second, there are flict with the government on land pol­

n already 263 000 farm-workers and their encede the pace of resettlement. First, icies. For instance, Jim Sinclair, at one c

thei government simply does not have families on white farms, and these l time President of the Commercial

ther organizational expertise to resettle people will have to be resettled first Farmers Union, noted that farmers had e peopled significantly faster than it did in (since they have nowhere else to go) if not had to pressure the government on n

theu first years of independence. For the farms on which they work are the land issue: "If we believed they

resettlementy in Zimbabwe is an extra­ acquired by the government. 25 While could do it [resettle 162000 families], a

ordinarilyw complicated task involving this problem has yet to become signifi­ we'd be a lot more worried."27 Cer­ e literallyt government-wide co-operation. cant (because most of the land so far tainly, as far as the land issue is con­ a

OneG Department of Rural Development used for resettlement had not previously cerned, there is nothing approaching

t

documente lists twenty-five ministries, been farmed, or had been abandoned the co-ordinated pressure tactics the n departments,i and parastatals with a role during the war), it could begin to have white farmers orchestrate annually in

b 23 in a the resettlement programme. an impact in the near future. order to obtain higher agricultural pro­ S Another example. Even at the reset­ The cumulative impact of these facts ducer prices. 28 y

b has caused what one Ministry of Lands tlement programme's moderate pace, While white agricultural power did

d official called a "sea change" in thinking thee provision of vitally needed water not come into direct conflict with the c u d o r

272p Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 e R ------Land policy

land resettlement programme before The answer is too ghastly to contem­ before Independence.32 Naturally, the 1990, the white farmers did lose a few plate."31 organization has faced severe logistic skirmishes. In terms of actual land law, The risk-averse tendencies of the and organizational problems in expand­ commercial farmers were unable to pre­ bureaucracy were strengthened by the ing into a national lobbying group vent the passage of the Land Acquisi­ government's failure to develop a designed to represent the total interests tion Act of 1985. The Act's most vision of the way in which Zim­ of the country's smallholders. As a important provision was to allow the babwean agriculture should evolve over result, the NFAZ has not had a particu­ government the right of first refusal on the next twenty years or so. No view larly powerful voice in the political any rural land being offered for sale.29 has emerged concerning what roles conflict over land policy. As one exten­ This provision gave the government white agriculture should play - nor sion official noted in an interview: substantial control over land supply and what functions should be left to the The peasant farmers aren't really orga­ may have had an effect on the price of communal farmer. As a result, bureau­ nized to present their views. The chan­ land. The Act also established a crats saw the downside of resettlement nels barely exist for peasant farmers to Derelict Lands Board to enable the but were much less clear on the advant­ have a national voice... . There is no government to seize abandoned land.3o ages that might accrue from a policy mechanism [for peasant farmers] to actu­ From observation of more informal involving certain risks. This attitude, to ally have an impact on the Ministry of Lands ... . There is no way to translate government practices, it is also less be expected in a new country under­ land pressure into policy. than clear that white political power taking a venture without precedent in significantly influenced government's the region, was just another fact that There does exist another black farmers' land policy. For instance, the CFU tried has forestalled the need for whites to union in Zimbabwe, but it has not had a to persuade the government to indicate begin actively pressuring the government. very significant impact on the resettle­ well in advance which farming areas The political power of the white ment programme either, although for the resettlement bureaucracy intended farmers, therefore, has been important, different reasons. The Land Appor­ turning into resettlement areas so that but by no means consequential, in the tionment Act of 1930, which legalized farmers could plan accordingly. But the government's land-policy decisions. the division of the colony's land, did government consistently refused to The power these farmers exercised was create certain areas where land could be commit itself to identifying the land it not so much in direct lobbying as in bought outright by blacks. These 9 000 planned to purchase. And this refusal to contributing to an atmosphere of risk­ or so black freeholders are now repre­ indicate in advance the land it intended aversion by stressing the importance of sented by the Zimbabwe National to ) acquire had the effect of reducing the their commercial agriculture: they tried Farmers Union (ZNFU). The ZNFU is 0 commercial1 farmers' leverage, because to influence the "atmospherics" of the in a conspicuously poor position to 0 2 they were forced to make investment land debate by stressing the dangers of influence the land programme and has d

decisionse though unsure how long they drastic change, by giving wide circula­ had little impact on government policy. t woulda actually be allowed to remain on tion to reports that argued against quick As outright landowners, the small-scale d the( land. If white commercial agricul­ resettlement, and by highlighting the farmers the ZNFU represents were

r

turee was really influencing the land importance of white commercial farm­ sometimes accused of collaborating h programme,s the farmers would at least ing to Zimbabwe. Emphasizing the with the colonial regime during the lib­ i l

haveb been able to force the government need to go slow was particularly easy in eration struggle; and the existence of intou saying which land it was going to Zimbabwe because the government it­ black farmers committed publicly to P

transfere to the peasants. self had decided to err on the side of individual ownership has caused some h

t The white farmers have influenced caution when changing the agrarian friction with the new socialist govern­

government'sy thinking, however, in a system, and because it had not enunci­ ment. In addition, this group of farmers b

mored subtle manner. The role commer­ ated a clear vision of the country's agri­ has shown neither the productivity of e cialt agriculture plays in the economy of cultural future. In addition, the govern­ white farmers nor the spectacular gains n

Zimbabwea is so daunting that govern­ ment simply did not have the of peasant farmers. r mentg officials have, of necessity, been organizational ability to resettle peasant After years of silence, the ZNFU

e

quitec cautious in tampering with it. families at a rate significantly faster began to argue that master farmers and

n agricultural institute graduates (rather Politicianse and civil servants involved than it was doing. c

i than the communal farmers represented in l the resettlement programme are well

awarer that, in a country still reliant on by the NFAZ) should be resettled on e Lack of countervailing political agricultured and unwilling to be depen­ land purchased from white farmers. 33 n power dentu upon South Africa for food sup­ Indeed, the President of the ZNFU

plies,y changes in land-tenure patterns Organizational and technocratic deci­ openly criticized the 162 000 family a

couldw have an absolutely disastrous sions were allowed to dominate Zim­ goal as "unprofessional" because the

e 34 impactt on the nation's future if carried babwe's land policy because peasant wrong people might be resettled. outa incorrectly. For instance, former farmers were unable to bring signifi­ While there is not an explicit alliance G

Ministert Enos Nkala, a hard-line cant political pressure to bear on the between the ZNFU and the white e n

Zanu(i PF) supporter who was hardly government. The National Farmers farmers on land, it is clear that the b Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ), the interests of black freeholders are prob­ knowna for his sympathy for whites dur­ S ing the liberation war, said, "It would mass organization representing Zimba­ ably more closely aligned with those of y beb quite possible to distribute every­ bwe's 800 000 peasant families, was white farmers than with those of the

thingd we found, but after that, what? only a small, non-political organization black peasants. e c u d o Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p 273 e R Land policy------

The 1990 Land Law reform programme, businessmen must be left over from the period when be certain that the government is en­ Zimbabwe's leaders knew that, what­ With the expiration of the Lancaster forcing property rights. Indeed, as North ever their stated intentions, the Lan­ House Constitution, the Mugabe gov­ and Thomas make clear in their eco­ caster House Constitution provided a ernment quickly moved to enact land nomic history of Europe, government credible guarantee of property rights. legislation that, it asserted, would en­ enforcement of property rights is an Since the new land legislation was able it at last to meet its long-postponed important precondition for savings and passed, however, such impassioned goals concerning resettlement. The Act investment.37 The new legislation, for rhetoric on land will have a direct effect in question gives the government the the first time in independent Zimbabwe, on investor confidence. Zimbabwe may right to confiscate land and pay what­ suggests that property rights are now in yet proceed with de facto expropriation ever compensation the state believes is doubt. For instance, Enock Dumbut­ of white farming land. But the costs will fair. The farmer has no appeal against shena, Zimbabwe's first black Chief be high indeed. the land valuation judgment. It appears Justice said the land legislation "flies in In addition, the new land legislation that the government at one time con­ the face of all accepted norms of mod­ probably does not even touch on some sidered including an appeals provision, em society, and the rule of law."38 The of the real obstacles to resettlement. It but decided later to make no conces­ current chief of the judiciary, Mr Justice certainly takes political power away sions to white farmers at all on this Gubbay, has also criticized the new land from white farmers. But, as we noted point.35 The celebrations that broke out legislation.39 Similarly, the head of the above, the formal exercise of white in Parliament after the bill was passed International Monetary Fund has political power has never been a real provided a poignant reminder that many warned Zimbabwe that the new land determinant of the pace of resettlement. in the country viewed this new Act as legislation may threaten investor confi­ Indeed, the relative ineffectiveness of finally signalling the triumph of black dence.4o Of course the government has direct white political power was once revolution after ten years labouring declared that it will not take land from again made clear during the debate under the provisions of the Lancaster "productive" farmers. But the spectre of on the new land legislation. For in­ House agreement. To the government, the government's constantly threatening stance, Minister Mangwende told white the new legislation marked a dramatic to evaluate productivity and continually farmers that break with the (perceived) failure of the intervening in the land market will only land policies of the past. As President The [land) policy is not negotiable. The further increase uncertainty on the role only useful debate that government is Mugabe noted, of property rightS.41 willing to entertain about the resettle­ ment programme is on the implementa­ ) We failed to achieve our target of acquir­ It is probably impossible at this point 0 ing enough agricultural land to resettle tion of modalities.44 1 for Zimbabwe to disentangle the i~sue

0 162000 communal farmers for various

2 of land from the more general question Many of the bureaucratic obstacles that reasons. The position has now been d 6 of investor confidence and property have afflicted the land programme over e renewed.3 t rights. Indeed, the continual emphasis

a the last ten years are still there. The d

It ( remains, however, unclear just how over the last ten years on Zimbabwe's organizational weaknesses afflicting the

dramaticallyr the new land legislation respect for property rights has all but resettlement bureaucracy have not been e

willh affect the politics of resettlement in guaranteed that each and every investor

s resolved. As a result, it is unclear if the i Zimbabwe.l There are, in fact, several will closely monitor the evolution of government can significantly increase b

significantu reasons for believing that the the land issue and may very well decide the speed of resettlement. As one P new legislation will have much less of not to invest if Zimbabwe follows a British diplomat noted, e

anh impact than is believed by the many confiscatory land policy. Nor will in­ t We have a problem where government

whoy celebrated when the provisions of vestors be reassured by the rhetoric capacity to implement the [resettlement] b the Lancaster House Constitution were emerging from top leadership. For programme has deteriorated. Here we are d

e instance, shortly after the land law was looking at the capacity to plan or effec­ sweptt away. Zimbabwe may be facing a

significantn political problem here passed, President Mugabe said: tively appraise projects in the programme a and management of actual implemen­ becauser the nation's leaders have raised g Our view in the party and government is 45 tation. considerablee expectations concerning that nothing must stand in our way to the c

whatn the new law can achieve - al­ acquisition of any land we identify and The Ministry of Agriculture itself has e

c designate for resettlement. Whilst we

thoughi in fact they will probably not be admitted that a shortage of manpower l

concede the principle of fair and reason­

abler to resettle families at a significantly is seriously hampering resettlement e able compensation, we cannot brook any 46 fasterd pace than before. contentious arguments or disputes in efforts. Further, efforts to rein in n First, the new legislation goes against 42 spending in order to control the budget

u court on this subject.

they thrust of Zimbabwe's economic deficit, a key aspect of Zimbabwe's policya for the last ten years and its Indeed, Zimbabwe's leaders seem to new reform programme, may hinder w e recentlyt announced economic reform have gone out of their way to lock them­ the development of an administrative programme.a As noted above, Zimbabwe selves into a confrontation over prop­ cadre capable of managing significantly G

usedt the Lancaster House restrictions to erty rights. For instance, the Minister of larger resettlement plans, all the more e

demonstraten to the world that property Lands, Agriculture and Rural Develop­ so since the country's new economic i rightsb were taken seriously in the coun­ ment, Witness Mangwende, said in early reform programme calls for a 25 per a

S 47

try and that no investor would ever have 1991 "The land question is a time bomb cent reduction in the civil service. y

to b fear confiscation. Now if there is to which must be solved now."43 This Finally, Zimbabwe still lacks a

be d new investment under the economic extraordinarily dangerous rhetoric may vision of how agriculture will evolve in e c u d o 274r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R ------Land policy

the future. Indeed, it is striking that during the first decade of Zimbabwe's 3 R H Palmer, "The agricultural history of • political leadership now talks of reset­ independence, while the goal of reset­ Rhodesia", in R H Palmer and Q N tling 110 000 additional families, there­ tling 162 000 families was being re­ Parsons (eds), The roots of rural poverty by bringing the country to the 162 000 in Central and Southern Africa, London: affirmed, it has been estimated that Heinemann, 1977, p 243. family goal originally propounded in another 300 000 families, more or less, 4 R C Riddell, The land question in the early 1980s. The fact that this goal were being created in the rural areas. Rhodesia, Gwelo: Mambo Press, 1978, pp has no rational basis has not affected The black farm workers , problem will 12 and 33. the plans announced and probably in­ also have to be confronted if Zimbabwe 5 Zimbabwe, Statistical yearbook 1987, dicates that relatively little additional really does begin to resettle families on Harare: Central Statistical Office, 1987, planning has been done on how agricul­ what has been prime white commercial p 138. ture will evolve. As the quotes from agricultural land. 6 Whitsun Foundation, Land reform in President Mugabe indicate, resettle­ The clash between the political Zimbabwe, Harare: The Whitsun Foun­ ment in and of itself seems to be the leaders' genuine desire to accelerate the dation, 1983, p 26. goal (rather than any true reform of land programme and the numerous organ­ 7 J D Jordan, "The land question in agriculture) as Zimbabwe enters the izational and political barriers to reset­ Zimbabwe", Zimbabwe Journal of Eco­ twenty-first century. tling more than 6 000 families a year nomics,vol1, 1979,p 134, The lack of vision is important will produce considerable frustration. 8 Zimbabwe, Report of the Commission of because it means that the government is One way in which the government may Inquiry into Incomes, Prices, and still susceptible to arguments that signifi­ try to distract attention from its failure to Conditions of Service, Harare, Govern­ ment Printer, 1981, P 57. cant increases in resettlement will be a reach its new goals may be to expropri­ direct threat to the country's agrarian ate some of the land actually owned by 9 Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front), Zanu (PF) 1980 election base. Indeed, suggestions that the new the black freeholders, represented by the manifesto, Salisbury: Zanu (PF), 1979, P 9. land reform will grievously weaken ZNFU. It is perhaps in response to this 10 The Herald (Harare), 29 October 1981. Zimbabwe's agrarian sector are already threat that the head of the ZNFU has being made by white farmers with warned the government not to run down 11 Jeffrey Herbst, op cit, Chapter Two. renewed emphasis. For instance, at a commercial agriculture into "another 12 Zimbabwe, Statistical yearbook, op cit, p 3. crisis meeting to discuss the new land communal type" and has commented 13 D J Murray, The governmental system in legislation with Minister Mangwende, favourably on many of the proposals the Southern Rhodesia, Oxford: Clarendon white farmers estimated that fulfilment of CFU had put to the government.49 Press, 1970, pp 97-98. 14 B H Kinsey, "Emerging policy issues in the) government's resettlement pledges

0 Zimbabwe's land resettlement pro­

would1 cause total agricultural produc­

0 Conclusion gramme", Development Policy Review,

tion,2 currently at Z$836 million, to drop The land question symbolizes many of 1983, p 170. byd $190 million; and exports, which e 15 Zimbabwe, Transitional National De­ presentlyt totalled Z$570 million, to the contradictions of post-Independence a velopment Plan 1982/83-1984/5, Harare:

d 48 Zimbabwe. The liberation struggle was

decrease( by Z$161 million. These argu­ Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning fought in large part because of the mentsr can also now be combined with the and Development, 1982, vol 1, P 66. e inequitable distribution of land; but the moreh general fear that the new land legis­ s 16 B H Kinsey, op cit, pp 180-181. i lationl will affect overall investor confi­ country has not only preserved the old b structure of land ownership but gained 17 Zimbabwe, Annual economic review of dence.u When putting forward this argu­ Zimbabwe, 1986, Harare: Ministry of

P considerable prestige by not challenging ment, the white farmers may have power­ Finance, Economic Planning and Develop­ e the property rights of the white farmer. h ment, 1987, p 27.

fult allies in the bilateral donors, the IMF, In the 1990s the government wishes to andy the World Bank, both of whom are 18 Andrew Meldrum, "The prize-winning b concerned that expropriation of land will encourage investment, but is now peasant farmers", Africa Report, Sep­ d

e embarking upon a land programme that tember-October 1988, p 43.

irreparablyt threaten investor confidence

inn Zimbabwe. We may thus infer that the could severely shake the confidence of 19 "Government lacks funds for resettlement a

r precisely those investors it needs to program", Foreign Broadcast Information

landg law does not really touch the most attract. How successful the Mugabe Service-Africa (FBIS-AFR), 6 November importante means by which white agrarian c government is in resolving these contra­ 1990, p 36. powern has traditionally been expressed, e dictions will be a key determinant 20 B H Kinsey, "Forever gained: Resettle­ c of the

andi that while Zimbabwe's leaders de-

l ment and land policy in the context of

country's ability to meet the develop­

monstrater great bravado when addressing national development in Zimbabwe," e ment challenges of the 1990s.

peasantd audiences, they may hesitate in J D Y Peel and T Ranger (eds),

beforen taking significant new steps that Past and present in Zimbabwe, Man­ u chester: Manchester University Press,

~ wouldy dramatically change the nation's

a Notes and references agricultural pattern. 1983, p 102. w

e I have traced the history of land policy at 21 See the Chidzero interview in A J Hughes \ t Other factors that caused the resettle- \ and M A Novicki, "Interview: Bernard 'Q'lenta bureaucracy to re-evaluate the length in Jeffrey Herbst, State politics in

G Chidzero", Africa Report, May-June 1982,

Zimbabwe, Berkeley and Harare: Univer­ \)(;nefitst of resettlement are still present. p 7. e sity of California Press and University of

Althoughn Zimbabwe has been highly i Zimbabwe Publications Office, 1990. 22 B H Kinsey, "Forever gained ... ", op cit, successfulb in disseminating contracept­ a 2 J W Harbeson, Land and rural develop­ P 104. S ive technology, population growth in ment in independent Zimbabwe, Harare: 23 Zimbabwe, Intensive resettlement pro­ y

ruralb areas will continue to outrun any US Agency for International Develop­ gramme: Planning and management per­

conceivabled resettlement effort. Indeed, ment,198l,p5. spectives, Salisbury: Ministry of Lands, e c u d o Africar Insight, vol2l, no 4,1991 275 p e R Land policy------

Resettlement and Rural Development, provincial committees" unpublished B Ed 41 One instance: the government has also 1981, pp 5-8. thesis, University of Zimbabwe, 1981, said that it will set ceilings on land prices. • 24 The Financial Gazette (Harare), 20 Jan­ p 68. "Minister views restrictions on land own­ uary 1984. 33 ZNFU, Settlement of qualified farmers in ership", FBIS-AFR, 26 October 1990, p 20. 25 Jeffrey Herbst, op cit, Chapter Eight. resettlement areas, Harare: ZNFU, 1987, 42 Quoted in "Acquisitions to continue", P 13. FBIS-AFR, 14 December 1990, p 22. 26 Zimbabwe, First Five-Year Development Plan, vol 1, Harare: Government Printer, 34 In Andrew Meldrum, "Banking on the 43 Andrew Meldrum, "The land question", 1986, p 28. black fanner", in Andrew Meldrum, op cit, Africa Report, March-April 1991, p 27. pp 42-3. 27 Quoted in M A Novicki, "Zimbabwe: The 44 Quoted in "Ongoing land policy debate", 35 "Parliament passes law easing seizure of economic outlook", Africa Report, African Research Bul/etin, Political land", FBIS-AFR, 14 December 1990, January-February 1983, p 13. Series, January 1991, p 9721. p21. 28 See Jeffrey Herbst, op cit, Chapter Five. 36 Quoted in, "Mugabe calls resettlement 45 Quoted in "Donors reluctant to grant land 29 Zimbabwe, Land Acquisition Act (No 21 prime objective", FBIS-AFR, 26 October refonn funds", FBIS-AFR, 19 December of 1985), Section 6. 1990, p 36. 1990, p 25. 30 Ibid, Section 27. 37 Douglass C North and Robert Paul 46 "Government lacks funds for resettlement 31 Quoted in C Gregory, "The impact of rul­ Thomas, The rise of the Western World, program", FBIS-AFR, 6 November 1990, ing-party ideology on Zimbabwe's post­ Cambridge: University Press, 1973. p 36. independence domestic development", 47 FBIS-AFR, 27 February 1991, p 21. Journal of Social, Political, and Economic 38 In FBIS-AFR, 14 December 1990, p 21. Studies, vol 12, 1987, p 139. 39 "Chief Justice criticised on Constitution 48 Andrew Meldrum, "The land question", op cit, p 30. 32 J W Mutimba, "A case study of the Bill", FBIS-AFR, 22 March 1991, p 55. Victoria Association of Master Fanners' 40 "IMF head deplores land legislation", 49 "National Fanners Union praises land pol­ Clubs with specific reference to the role of FBIS-AFR, 27 February 1991, p 21. icy", FBIS-AFR, 22 March 1991, p 56. ) 0 1 0 2

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276r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R ------Bookshelf

Review

Gilles Perrault, Notre ami Ie roi. Paris: Gallimard, 1990. 367 pp, ISBN 2-07-071981-2.

The publication, in August 1990, of Gilles Perrault's book on regime within the broader framework of a past full of para­ King Hassan II caused great concern in Moroccan official dox, which helps to explain an even more paradoxical circles. It was not long before Notre ami Ie roi disappeared present. Perrault's analysis of Morocco's recent past is a from the shelves: the entire stock had been bought up by the valid one, pointing out those aspects most important in the Moroccan authorities. The extent of the Alouite sovereign's shaping of independent Morocco: concern may be measured by the fact that in November he The little more than nominal character of the Cherifian complained to the French foreign minister, Roland Dumas, sovereigns' power over most of their Empire. for the fact that the publication of Perrault's work had been The role played by the French protectorate in the central­ permitted.) 0 A reading of the book fully explains the reaction of the ization of the Makhzen, a process that, in the long run, 1

Moroccan0 government. This biography of Hassan II reads as a favoured the consolidation of the monarchy. Although sub­ 2

horrord story, in which the King is depicted as a despot whose jection to France placed the Sultan into a humiliating situa­ e interestst seem limited to the persecution of his enemies and to tion of dependence, the protectorate served the interests of a thed enjoyment of buffoons and easy-going women. the dynasty since, once the colonial yoke was broken, the (

r This brief synopsis may arouse doubts about the relevance Alouites' power was far more real than in 1912. e

ofh reviewing a book of this kind in a scientific journal.

s The role played by Islam in the construction of contem­ i However,l both the importance of the topic and some aspects porary Moroccan nationalism, is in fact instrumental in b ofu Perrault's work seem to justify analysis. the shaping of the differences distinguishing independent P

Of all the Maghrebian countries Morocco is the one

e Morocco from the neighbouring republics of Algeria and

retainingh a form of government compatible with local tradi­

t Tunisia.

tions,y both political and religious, in spite of some aspects of b the Makhzen that cannot be easily equated with orthodox This posItIve appreciatIOn of Perrault's analysis of d

Islam.e In a region divided by a fierce struggle between Morocco's recent history is also applicable to his analysis of t

Western-stylen socialism and a rising wave of Islamic funda­ that country's contradictory present. He identifies fundamen­ a mentalism,r Morocco may playa most important role by pro­ tal factors such as the combination of popular fidelity to the g

vidinge a moderate conservative solution, as Saudi Arabia has throne with a desire for major reforms; the coexistence of c

beenn doing in the Middle East. The same assessment applies socialism and an authoritarian monarchy; the constitutional e to c King Hassan, a man of charisma and also a wielder of real character of a monarchy based, nonetheless, on the concept i l power. Although the Alouite sovereign is the head of "a con­ of divine right to rule; and the possibility of agrarian reform r stitutional,e democratic and social monarchy" he does not that has left wealthy landowners better off than before. d merelyn reign. He also rules and exercises extensive powers, A reading of the book produces the impression that the u since he "presides over the council of Ministers", which is main objective of its author was to present King Hassan's y responsiblea simultaneously to the King and to a popularly regime as a totally despotic state, ruled by a sovereign who is w electede Chamber of Representatives. In addition, the presented as a combination of a bloody tyrant and of a t monarcha enjoys extensive powers regarding the dissolution womanizer, not without a good deal of courage, demon­ G of the Chamber of Representatives and fulfils the latter's strated at the massacre of Skhirat, and even more, when his t functione until a new Chamber is elected. Boeing was attacked, over the Mediterranean, by rebel pilots n i

b With regard to Perrault's book itself, one should start by of the Moroccan Air Force. a

sayingS that, however biased it may be, Notre ami Ie rai is not Perrault offers the reader an image of the Cherifien mon­

a lightlyy written work of sensationalist journalism. Its author archy matching the classical descriptions of Eastern des­ b was able to integrate his analysis of the present monarch and potism: the brutal torture of political prisoners, summary d e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 277 p e R Bookshelf------

executions, faked suicides of disgraced politicians, heavy Famine and survival strategies by Dessalegn sentences imposed on defendants who seem genuinely ig­ Rahmato. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1991. norant of their participation in rebellion, political prisoners 247pp. ISBN 91-7106-314-5. kept in the most degrading conditions at remote gaols, the in­ The principal questions in this study of famine in Ethiopia carceration of the relatives of political adversaries, and pris­ are: What do peasants do in the face of severe food crisis oners kept in gaol after the completion of the sentences and ecological stress, and how do they manage to survive on imposed in court. A rosary of scenes that seemed extracted their own? Community co-operation and post-famine re­ from a horror film moves in front of the reader while the covery are important to the answer. The book centres on a author discusses the trials of the presumed participants in the case study conducted by the author in the Awraja district in July 1963 plot, of the commandos of Basri and of the person­ the Ambassel Wollo province in north-eastern Ethiopia, nel of the air base of Kenitra suspected of involvement in the the region hardest hit by the 1984-85 famine. Rahmato also attack of the royal plane; the punishment of those officers critically examines other literature on famine response. and men involved in the massacre of Skhirat, the persecution suffered by General Oufkir's family after his disgrace and pretended suicide; the inhuman conditions at the gaols of Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique by Alex Vines. Fazmamart and Kenitra, provide enough concrete examples York: University of York, 1991. xi + 176pp. of the above enumerated violations of what the Western ISBN 0 85255 354 4. world considers as basic human rights. The author describes Renamo as a successful rebel move­ It is not easy to ascertain the veracity of the events ment that has limited the secure government presence t9 the described by Perrault, even though he provides very detailed towns and operates in all ten provinces of Mozambique. He information concerning names, dates, places and other also shows that what makes Renamo different from most circumstances related to those situations discussed in his successful rebel groups is that the equation between popular book. Whatever the level of accuracy of Perrault's analysis, support and rebel strength does not generally apply. Most of however, the kind of situation he describes does not differ Renamo's support from the Mozambican peasantry is greatly from that found in other non-European countries and, obtained by means of terror and coercion. The study attempts as such, cannot be used impartially to demonstrate that to demonstrate that Renamo is a military-based organization, Morocco is ruled by a particularly evil government. not an umbrella for numerous groups of un-coordinated Perrault's short analysis of Morocco's economic situation "armed bandits", or loosely aligned warlords, as is some­ suggests that he is not altogether impartial in his approach. times depicted. Vines also looks at the depth of South

He) mentions the poverty of the majority of the population, African influence over Renamo's tactics and objectives. 0

the1 enormous costs of the war in Western Sahara, a growing 0

external2 debt, ever rising food prices, and so on. Once

again,d this is a situation similar to that found in most non­ Amilcar Cabral's revolutionary theory and practice: e industrializedt countries, as a result of a combination of A critical guide by Ronald H Chilcote. Boulder: Lynne a

d Rienner Publishers, 1991. xii + 292pp.

circumstances( that, in general, are only partly the govern­

ment'sr fault. It is interesting that Perrault's brief reference to ISBN 1-55587-058-9. e

theh economic situation omits any mention of a positive kind The study introduces Cabral's writings on colonialism and s i sincel King Hassan's succession. imperialism, nationalism and national liberation, class and b

u King Hassan's own memoirs, The challenge, published by class struggle, and the state. Also included are verbatim texts P Macmillan in 1978, note the remarkable successes achieved of Chilcote's interviews with leaders of Guinea-Bissau and e

inh the fields of housing, health, education, construction, Cape Verde, to assess the impact of Cabral's thinking on t

agriculturaly modernization, industrialization and mining, those who followed in his path. A comprehensive biblio­ b despite a constant battle with problems caused by the demo­ graphy of works by and about Cabral completes the book. d

graphice explosion that characterizes the late twentieth­ t

centuryn Maghreb. It is true that historical criticism considers a

thatr memoirs do not constitute, in general, very reliable Mauritius: Democracy and development in the g

sourcese of information, since they may be used by their Indian Ocean by Larry W Bowman. Boulder: Westview c

authorsn in defence of their reputations. Nevertheless, any Press, 1991. xiv + 208pp. ISBN 0-8133-0508-X. e

defendantc is entitled to present his case, and monarchs Larry Bowman provides the reader with a historical back­ i l

shouldr not be deprived of this right. As such, it seems that ground, a look at the diverse cultural heritage and the issue e

thed sovereign of Morocco is entitled to present his case and of language, the politics of independent Mauritius, the eco­

ton claim what he intends to have done for the benefit of his nomy and Mauritius's international relations. The book also u

country.y Besides that, the information presented by him on contains many photographs of prominent personalities and economica matters is backed by what seems to be valuable places of interest. Describing Mauritius as the emergent "lit­ w e

statisticalt data, which may help a well-prepared reader to tle tiger" that hopes to become "the Hong Kong of the Indian

drawa his own conclusions. Ocean", the author outlines the remarkable economic growth G

t Whatever suspicions one may entertain about the accuracy experienced in the 1980s by a country that has not needed e

ofn Perrault's work, it certainly deserves to be read, since it new standby agreements with the IMF since 1986. He con­ i representsb an example of a common Western approach to the cludes by saying that the challenge for Mauritian leaders and a

analysisS of non-leftwing Third World regimes. the public in the 1990s will be to sustain what is unique

y about the island without sacrificing either core cultural values b

d Eduardo Serpa or the island's physical beauty. e c u d o

278r Africa Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 p e R ------Bookshelf

Malawi and Madagascar: The political economy of Extension alternatives in tropical Africa by Jon poverty, equity and growth: A World Bank Moris. London: Overseas Development Institute, 1991. comparative study by Frederic L Pryor. Washington: 184 pp. ISBN 0-85003-105-2. Oxford University Press, 1990. vii + 470pp. Noting that the debate about agricultural extension services ISBN 0-19-520823-4. has been dominated by financial considerations, Jon Moris This book is the first of several volumes emerging from the argues that it should rather be a knowledge of field con­ comparative study, "The political economy of poverty, equity straints that informs the policy choice between alternative and growth", sponsored by the World Bank. The study was institutional structures for extension in Africa. He draws on undertaken to provide a critical evaluation of the economic twenty-five years of personal experience of development history of selected developing countries in 1950-85. Malawi programmes in Africa to make suggestions for improving and Madagascar were paired for joint study because they African extension performance. represent two low-income East African countries with sim­ ilar initial conditions of development. The author shows how Malawi, popularly regarded as an example of African cap­ Rent-seeking and economic growth in Africa by italism, may be viewed as more socialistic than Madagascar Mark Gallagher. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, in its ratio of public expenditure and public investment to 1991. xi + 185 pp. ISBN 0-8133-8283-1. gross domestic product. An increasing number of expatriate development practitioners have now begun to record and reflect on their experiences in Africa. In this book Mark Gallagher, a former foreign service officer with USAIP, asks why it is that the usual economic variables do not account for the differences in growth among African economic reform: The external dimension African countries nor the declines in per capita incomes. by Carol Lancaster. Washington DC: Institute for He also speculates on why policy reforms have proved so International Economics, 1991. viii + 82 pp. difficult. His conclusion is that this is because some people ISBN 0-88132-096-X. in Africa benefit from harmful policies. This leads him to the According to the author, Africa needs not only increased important concept of "rent-seeking". Using data from financial support, but more coherent support from the twenty-two African states, he also analyses the relationship developed countries to fight its poverty, debt and depen­ between rent-seeking and political pluralism. dency on foreign aid. Too often international agencies and ) governments0 within and without the region have worked at 1 cross-purposes,0 wasting their resources and energies on well­ 2 meaning but un-coordinated and even conflicting initiatives. The urban informal sector in Africa in retrospect d

e and prospect: An annotated bibliography.

Thet study proposes a new initiative involving the can­ cellationa or concessional rescheduling of public bilateral Geneva: International Labour Office, 1991. x + 86 pp. d

( ISBN 92-2-107747-0. debt of reforming African countries through a new interna­ r tionale mechanism that would replace existing ones such as This bibliography lists much of the literature on a sector h s thei Paris Club and the World Bank Consultative Groups. The that has become of increasing interest to those concerned l end-resultb would be the building of a system in which eco­ with development, and in particular urban poverty. The u annotations on urban Africa are considered in the context of nomicP need and performance, not political favouritism, woulde play the principle roles in how debt and external other work done on Asia and Latin America. The literature is h t financing in general are managed. classified under a number of headings: general and sector­ y

b specific studies; formal-informal linkages; credit and finance;

d education and skill formation; women in the informal sector; e t policies and constraints; and direct interventions. n a r g

Choosinge sides: Alignment and realignment in the c

Thirdn World by Steven R David. Baltimore and The Horn of Africa: From war to peace by Paul B e

London:c The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. xii Henze. London: Macmillan, 1991. xii + 248 pp. i l + 247 pp. ISBN 0-8018-4122-4. ISBN 0-333-51359-2. r e

Takingd as case studies four African countries - Egypt, Looking at the roles played by the United States and the

Ethiopia,n Somalia and Sudan, the author investigates the Soviet Union in the Hom (Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and u

reasonsy why their leaders changed their alignments during Sudan), the author concentrates in the first part of the book thea Cold War. His findings have led him to question many of on the long road to the present. The following section w e

thet accepted generalizations about Third World behaviour in focuses on militarization, crisis and degeneration, to demon­ internationala relations. He argues that the political decisions strate how and why the Hom of Africa became one of the G

ont alignment are made by leaders determined to maximize world's prime disaster areas. In the third part he tries to point e

theirn personal political survival rather than considerations of the way to a better future for the people who live in the i theb preservation of the state against external threats. He also region. In an appendix the author also discusses certain a maintainsS that the end of the Cold War notwithstanding, it topics that did not fit into the narrative, but are important for

willy remain important to understand the international perfor­ their bearing on the major themes of the book, such as b

manced of Third World states. Eritrea, Tigre and some explanations of names in the Hom. e c u d o

Africar Insight, vol 21, no 4, 1991 279 p e R Bookshelf------

Making adjustment work for the poor: A framework The dynamiCS of Soviet policy in sub-Saharan for policy reform in Africa. Washington, DC: The Africa by Michael Radu and Arthur Jay Klinghoffer. World Bank, 1991. viii + 141 pp. ISBN 0-8213-1640-0. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1991. ix + 146 pp. The document deals with the World Bank's understanding of ISBN 0-8419-1226-2. the links among conceptual, empirical and policy issues In the light of the Soviet Union's deteriorating African involved in the integration of social and economic policies posture in the 1980s and the Reagan administration's policy and programmes. The broad theoretical underpinnings of the of selective support for anti-Marxist forces, which quickly Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) Programme in raised Soviet costs in Africa, and with the growing indica­ Africa policy approach are explained. This sets the bound­ tions that a process of reassessment of Soviet commitments aries for investigative studies on the social dimensions of in the Third World in general is gaining speed in Moscow, adjustment and provides the necessary economic rationale the authors identify the need to take a fresh look at Mos­ for empirical work to be both consistent across countries and cow's attitudes, goals, and capabilities in Africa. helpful for policy design. The study then explores the major policy issues that must be faced by governments to integrate social dimensions in the design of their structural adjustment programmes and development plans. Apartheid city in transition edited by Mark Swilling, Politics in modern Africa: The uneven tribal dimen­ Richard Humphries and Khehla Shubane. Cape Town: sion by Kenneth Ingham. London: Routledge, 1990. viii Oxford University Press, 1991. xx + 377 pp. ISBN 0-19- + 248 pp. ISBN 0-415-02278-9. 570585-8. Starting off with the imperial legacy, Ingham looks at Leading academics and specialists in the field of local gov­ Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, Guinea, Zaire, ernment analyse the causes, nature and challenges of the Angola and Zimbabwe and discusses each country's myriad problems facing South African cities, both now and response to their newly-acquired independent status. There is in the future. They examine key policy issues such as a still little evidence of any desire to dismember the countries single tax base for the currently segregated components of which came into being at independence, yet local loyalties our cities, urbanization, access to urban land, housing and exerted a powerful influence upon many people and under­ transport. They also consider the role of citizens and mined the working of the new state because of the non­ municipalities in the new system of local and national gov­ fulfilment of the expectations raised by independence. The ernment. Among the contributors are: Rodney Davenport, author) concludes that "tribalism" is in only limited instances Simon Bekker, Ann Bernstein, Fanie Cloete, Chris Heymans 0 the1 root cause of Africa's problems. It is its availability to and Lawrence Schlemmer. 0 2

reinforce the discontent created by inadequately admin­ d

isterede economies that constitutes its main threat to stability. Marita Snyman and Richard Cornwell t a d (

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280r Africa Insight, vo121, no 4,1991 p e R Membership of the Africa Institute

Membership fees: Rand Monetary area: R 60,00 P a (which includes Africa Insight and Africa Institute Bulletin) elsewhere US $60,00 or equivalent (which includes Africa Insight). Persons in South Africa and abroad who support the aims and activities of the Institute are welcome to apply for membership. The reference library is at the disposal of members and they are notified of meetings arranged by the Institute. The membership fee includes receipt of the Institute's periodicals and members can obtain research reports and occasional papers at reduced rates. Institutions such as libraries and companies, as well as persons who do not wish to become members, may subscribe or place standing orders for the Institute's publications. (A separate list of periodicals, communications and occasional papers is available on request.)

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Control and finance: The Institute is incorporated as an autonomous non-profit association in terms of section 21 of the South African Companies Act (no 61 of 1973) and derives its income from membership fees, sales of publications and services, donations and a grant from the Department of National Education. The Institute is governed by a council which is reconstituted every four years and represents all South African universities. The chief executive is the director who is assisted by full-time administrative and professional staff as well as research fellows serving in a temporary or part-time capacity. ) 0 1 0 2

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