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The Myth of Iranian–Arab Enmity: ADeconstructive Approach

Kourosh Ahmadi∗

Abstract The paper aims to critically consider the proposition maintaining that the contemporary state of affairs between and the Arab world results from an endemic, deep-rooted enmity between these two peoples with roots in the annals of history. To elucidate its argument, the paper offers a brief review of the major ups and downs in the historical relationship between Iranians and to see whether animosity or good-neighbourliness has mainly prevailed. Then, seeking to pinpoint the causes of uneasiness in the Iranian-Arab relationship since the 1950s, the focus of the paper turns to the formation of pan-Arab ideology and its strong anti-Iranian elements. Major differences in outlooks, coupled with territorial and diplomatic disagreements, had Nasserite and especially Ba’athist embrace these elements and begin implementing them to their full and extreme extent at a time when a monarchical West-leaning regime was in power in Iran. The paper concludes that the uneasiness in Iran-Arab relations during the past five to six decades has been situational and a modern phenomenon, chiefly stemming from specific political circumstances with certain roots in nation-building activities in the concerned countries. Hence, historical and ethno-religious or civilizational roots of this strained relationship are either non-existent or insignificant. Keywords: Iran-Arabs relationship, Middle East, Pan-Arab ideology, Persian Iran.

∗ Senior Expert on International Relations.

Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 2011, pp. 79-103 The Myth of Iranian–Arab Enmity: A Deconstructive Approach

Introduction The tense relationshiponship between Iranians and Arabs has been a constant fixture of international relations in the Middle East during the past five to six decades. To explain this state of affairs,s, it is repeatedly arguedd that this tension is deeply rooted in hhistory. Moreover, ethno-sectarian and civilizational arguments are invokedoked to provide an explanationplanation for the outbreak of wars, standoffs,ndoffs, controversy and diplomatic ruptures that have strained Iraniann-Arab relations since thee mid-twentieth century. Iran and thehe Arab world are indispensable parts of every equation in the region. The nature of their relations enormouslymously affects regional peace and security as well as the way extra-regionalegional powers approachh issues in the Middle East. Hence, it is essentialntial to review the assumptionsmptions that may shape the perceptions which influence the approachproach of regional and global players. The ascribingcribing of contemporary difficulties to historical and ethno-sectarian elementsements is one of these assumptionssumptions that this paper will discuss. This author posits that historically, there is no sign indicatinging the existence of anyy particular intrinsic and deep-rooted animositymosity between Arabs and Iranians. A brief review of their relationshiponship reveals that the two have mostly co-existed in a rather good- neighborly as opposedpposed to adversarial way throughout history.y. The onset of a systematicmatic effort aimed at vilifying dates back to the 1920s and is discernible in the theoretical works of early pann-Arab ideologues as onene of the components of pan-Arab nationalism.nalism. Supporters of panan-Arabism, who seized power in Iraq in thee mid-

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1950s and held on to it until the collapse of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’ss regime in 2003, used anti-Iranian rhetoric as one of the driving forcess behind their campaigns. Arab nationalismnalism originated from the Arab enlightenmentenment during and followingwing World War I and was encouraged by Britain, which viewed the aforementioned as required to achieveve its geopolitical aims. However, the ideologues of Arab nationalismm in the 1920s through too the 1950s, and later Egypt’s Gamal Abdel NNasser and Iraq’s Abd al-Karim Qasim, took Arab nationalism to newew and uncharted territories.ories. In search of an enemy to define ‘onene self’ against, Arab nationalistsionalists were drawn to see in Persian Iran a basis to rely on for mobilizinglizing and energizing the masses in the easternn flank of the Arab world.d. Nasserite Egypt,gypt, mostly for political reasons, and Iraq, primarilyimarily for reasons relatedd to nation-building and the construction of ann Iraqi Arab identity as well as geopolitical considerations, tried to define Arab nationalism,m, inter alia, as opposed to ‘the Persians’ and Iranian nationalism. Mostost Arab intellectuals who developed and conceptualized Arab nationalism expressed this tendency and leaned towards depictingg ‘the Persians’ in a negative light and adoptedted an adversarial approachoach thereto. They were inclined to expandd their perception to coverver all aspects of Iranian civilization in all ages.s. This tendency was laterer advanced to its extreme by Ba’athists in Iraq,q, who tried to vilify alll aspects of Iranian legacy, to which the average Iranian may be emotiomotionally attached to.

I. Myth of Endemicemic Persian-Arab Enmity A quick review of the history of interaction between Iran andnd the Arab world revealsals that the frequent misunderstandings as well as animosity and, att times, conflicts and war in the past decadess have been recent phenomena.enomena. They originated from specific politicalolitical circumstances, includingncluding nation-building activities in the concernedcerned countries that requiredquired the adoption of specific policies. Historicalstorical

81 The Myth of Iranian–Arab Enmity: A Deconstructive Approach and ethno-religiousus or civilizational roots of this strained relationshiponship are insignificant. Hence, focusing on this aspect of the relationshipship to explain the recentnt and current state of affairs would be misleading.eading. The singling outt of Iran and Iranians as an enemy first found expression in the writings and rhetoric of Pan-Arab nationaliststs such as Sati’ al-Husri in the 1920s through the 1950s, and weree later operationalized by Nasserite Egypt in the 1960s and taken to its extreme by republicanblican and Ba'athist Iraq from 1958 through 200303. Arabs and Iranians, as two of the most prominent ethnic elements in the Middle East, have been in close contact withh each other through millenniallennia. In their history, there have been instancesnces of conflicts and discord,cord, as is the case with almost all neighbors,rs, but good-neighborlinessess has mostly prevailed. Language, religion,eligion, pilgrimage, migrationation and trade have tied them together throughoutughout history. They managednaged to generally live in peace with no majorr clash since the early centuriesenturies after the advent of Islam. Enmity was an exception ratherr than rule in Arab-Iranian relations andd they cooperated closelyly in the development of Islamic culture. In contrast,ontrast, major recurring wars and conflicts between Shiite Iran and Sunni Ottomans occurredred from the early sixteenth to nineteenth centunturies and mostly took place on the territory of present-day Iraq, in which most Mesopotamianmian Arabs, being of Shiite conviction, mostly aligned themselves with Iran. The relationshipnship between Persians and Arabs, from antiquityuity to Islam, was rich and continuous and, despite vicissitudes, benefitednefited both sides. Arab tribes helped ancient Persians in their war effortsforts in Egypt and againstst the Byzantines. The Persian capital, Ctesiphonsiphon, which was locateded at the gates of Arab territory for many centuriesnturies before Islam, allowedowed closer interaction between Persians and Arabs. Currents of influenceence in various fields mutually converged andd were crystallized more prominently during the Sassanid era. Hence,, many Persian names wereere and are still used by Arabs, both in the pre-and post-Islamic eras, and vice versa.

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At the appealeal of the King of Yemen, Sassanid ruler Khosrauosrau I (Chosroes I) launchednched a successful campaign in Yemen to expelpel the Abyssinians. Thehe relationship between the Persians andd the Mundhirite of all-Hirah was so close that the Sassanid Emperormperor pledged the educationcation of his crown prince Bahramjur, who became very involved with the Arabs and , to Mundhir (All-Duri, 1998:20). A striking examplexample of coexistence is , a man born with the PPersian name Rouzbeh who gained the Prophet’sophet’s sympathy and collaboratedollaborated with him in his efforts to spread Islam. Salman and his nationation are praised in many narrations attributed to the Prophet and his Household. One famous narration that Ibn Khaldun,haldun, the great Arab historianistorian, approvingly refers to in his Muqaddimahmah is: "If scholarship hungung suspended in the highest parts of heavens,ns, the Persians would attainttain it." (Ibn Khaldun, 430) These and manyy more narrations bear witness to the friendly coexistence between Arabsbs and Persians. Following the Arab conquest of Iran, the conquerors,s, who excelled in poetry,y, speech, cavalry and arms, failed to grasp thee art of governing a vast territory. Hence, they needed Persians, who masteredastered not only the art of politics and administration based on thehe vast experience of thehe Sassanid Empire, but also science, medicine,dicine, agriculture etc. Thehe conquerors enforced a governing system basedsed on Persian-inspired principles and character, such as succession basedsed on inheritance. As Ibnbn Khaldun puts it: "The Arabss came into contact with that flourishing sedentarydentary culture and exchangedanged their attitude for it… At thatt time, they considered itt a lowly thing to be a scholar, because scholarshiprship is a craft, and politicalcal leaders are always contemptuous of the craftsfts and professions and everything that leads to them. Thus, they leftft such things to non-AArabs and persons of mixed Arab and nonn-Arab parentage." (Ibn Khaldun, 430) The sympatheticthetic references made to Persians by the greatt Arab

83 The Myth of Iranian–Arab Enmity: A Deconstructive Approach writer, Ibn Khaldundun, are a typical example of the approach assumedsumed by Arab and Persiansian writers towards each other’s ethnic groups in the past. The rebelliousous Iranian Khorasanis, led by Abu Muslem, played an instrumental role in toppling the Umayyad dynasty, the purely Arab state, and bringing the Abbasids to power. This developmentopment allowed Persians to acquire prevalence in the establishment of the new dynasty, demonstratedmonstrated by the several generations of Barmakidsmakids playing roles as viziers and administrators. Later, Persians and Arabs united and cooperatedrated against common enemies, such as the Mongolsongols and Tatars. The Iranian province of Khorasan continued to be instrumental in effortsfforts by al-Ma'mun, who had an Iranian motherher and a mostly Iranian army, to prevail over his brother, al-Amin, whoho had an Arab mother. The new Abbasidbbasid caliphs were quick to move their capitalal from Syria to Iraq in 762 A.D, meaning that Muslim power became centered in the former Sassanid territories rather than in the eastern Mediterranean countrountries or the . Thus, the Maghrib became more distant andd less important. Persians were key players in the ,te, to the point that some early observers sawaw the cultural transformationmation of Islam as a victory for Persian Aryansns over Arab Semites (Simonsimons and Benn, pp 154-155). Islam becamee more cosmopolitan, withith Persians streaming into public life. Some Persian families, newly converted to Islam and with a traditionon of involvement in state affairs, were appointed as governorsrs and administrators. Widespread cooperation between Persians and Arabss was prevalent under the Abbasids. Persians participated in governmentrnment and administration,on, and a standing Arab-Persian army replacedd tribal armies. The institutionitution of Kuttab (secretaries), vastly composedsed of Iranians, became prominent under the Abbasids and had a significantnificant impact on administrationnistration and culture. Public life was dominatedted by several Iranian families (the Barmakids, the Banu Sahl, andd Banu

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Tahir), who serveded as viziers and kuttab. The same kuttab playedyed an important role in translating texts from Persian and transforminging the Sassanid heritage.e. As Abul Aziz al-Duri, the former Presidentent of Baghdad Universitysity says, "the contribution of peoples of nonn-Arab origin, especiallylly the Persians, to culture was very substantial…flourishingrishing and enriching Arab-Islamic culture" (AAl-Duri ,1998:8). Historical Persian tolerance, exemplified in King Cyrus’s open- mindedness towardsards vanquished peoples, was met with a degreegree of tolerance from thehe Arab end. The Zoroastrians were recognizedized as one of “the Peoplesoples of the Book” and Iranian customs suchuch as Nowruz, the feastt of spring, was tolerated. Intermarriage soon played an important role,e, to the point that whoever was not of a Persian parent was marrieded to a Persian woman. Moreover, the Arab elementlement lost priority in many fields and was balanced by the Iranian elementlement under the Abbasids.ids. While the Arabs transferred their religion and in some cases their language, they did not resist all Persian customsms and traditions. Iranians were instrumental in developing Fiqh, IIslamic jurisprudence, Hadithadith, traditions of the Prophet and his Household,sehold, and tafsir, exegesissis or interpretation. It is notable that theyey also excelled in grammarmar and syntax of the Arabic language and in ArabicA literature. As Ibnn Khaldun puts it, "the founder of grammarar was Sibawayha and, afterfter him, al-Farisi and az-Zajjaj. All of them were of non-Arab (Persian)an) descent… they invented the rules of (grammar)mmar) and made it into a discipline (in its own right) for later (generationsions to use)". He continues,nues, "most of the Hadith scholars who preservedeserved traditions for the were also Persians, or Persian in languagenguage and upbringing.” He goes on to write that "all scholars who worked with the science of the principles of jurisprudence were Persians.ns. The same applies to the speculative theologians and to most Qur’an commentators. Only Persians engaged in the task of preservingserving knowledge and writing systematic scholarly works" (Ibn Khaldunaldun ,

85 The Myth of Iranian–Arab Enmity: A Deconstructive Approach

429). Following the emergence of the Safavids in Iran in thehe 16th century, rivalry between the Persian and Ottomans Empires in the region was a majoror feature of regional developments until Worldld War I. Throughout fourur centuries, strong and ambitious Shahs and Sultans launched militaryy operations against each other, in which the Arabs did not play any active role, although their lands and those of the Kurds were the principalrincipal battle grounds. Finally, Iranan remained by and large within its historicalstorical boundaries and the Ottoman State disappeared. Followingng the establishment off modern Turkey, the two countries immediatelyediately delineated and demarcatedemarcated their common borders and opened a new chapter of a relationshipionship brim full of friendliness to the point thathat the only foreign trip Reza Shah embarked upon was to Istanbul, to visit Ata Turk. While Iraq was not an active party to the rivalry betweenetween the two empireses during the preceding centuries, the Iranan-Iraq relationship took a different course. During the Ottoman era, the number of Arabs who chosehose to reside in Iran grewrew considerably because of the hostile Ottomanttoman policy towards Arabs. Conversely, many Iranians immigratedted to present-day Iraq and the Arab littoral of the . Despitepite the limitations stemmingming from the prevalent cloudy ambiance, a major portion of peoplee residing on either side of the Persian Gulf todayday are still bilingual, speakingaking both Arabic and Persian. Following thehe emergence of modern Arab states, up to thehe rise of pan-Arab nationalism,tionalism, Iranians and Arabs enjoyed a friendlyriendly relationship. Iran, supportingrting the Arabs, stood with the thirteen stateses that voted against the partition of as sought by the andnd the then superpowers.s. Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, the popular Iranian prime minister, was the source of Nasser's inspiration (WWakim, 1987:157). Lebanonnon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the thenn only independent Arabb countries, in solidarity with Iran, backed Tehran'sehran's

86 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairss complaint to the Security Council in March 1946 over the Soviets' refusal to evacuatete part of Iran's territory at the end of World War II. As to the Palestiniannian question, the Arab cause par excellence, Iranran has always been supportiveportive of “the right of self-determination for the Palestinians,” in one way before the Islamic Revolution and in another way thereafter.eafter. There was a mutual supportiveness of Iranian and Arab nationalism in thehe brief span of time between the coup againstnst the monarchy in Egyptypt (1952) and the coup against Mossadegh in Iran (1953). This precededceded the "Tehran-Cairo strategic alliance" in the 1970s, which followedllowed the cold war in Iran-Egypt relations in the second half of thehe 1950s and the 1960s; all indicating the lackack of inherent dissentionon between the national aspirations of the Arabsbs and the Iranians. Irann supported the Egyptian nationalization of thee Suez Canal Company and denounced the 1956 invasion of Egyptypt by Britain, France, andnd Israel. Although thehe assumption of ‘endemic Arab-Iranian enmity’ cannot stand up to any academic scrutiny, the historic Irann-Arab relationship has not been fully without friction. Obviously,ly, the Iranians and Arabs,abs, like any other neighbors, at times, havee gone through wars, rebellions,bellions, alignments and realignments. The case of retaliatory action by Shapur II (A.D. 309 or 310-79) against Arabs who had crossed the Persian Gulf and raided Iran’s interior is notable.otable. Later, the long Iraniananian struggle against the Arab military conquestest and occupation in thehe seventh and eighth centuries A.D., whichch was aimed at regainingng and securing independence, was the originn of a series of battles. These wars bred ill-feelings whose traces can be found sporadicallylly in passages in some fringe classical or modern works. Frictions betweenetween modern Iran and Arab states in relationtion to concrete interestss and concerns grew after the beginning off their nation-building processes. The Arab world's exploitation of Iran's difficulties with the British caused some bitterness in Iran:n: the

87 The Myth of Iranian–Arab Enmity: A Deconstructive Approach annulment of the Anglo-Iranian Oil agreement in 1950 and the virtual stoppage of oil exports from Iran for about two years providedded an opportunity to some in the Arab world to promote theirr own interests. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia increased their production to fill the gap left by Iranan and established themselves as the most importantportant oil exporters in the region, thus severely hurting the feelings of the Iranians who werere engaged in a hard fight with the British (Marlowe,arlowe, 1964:23). The Shah’s reassertion of Iran’s old claim to Bahrain inn 1957 and the Iranian move to establish sovereignty over three Persian Gulf islands in 1971 tthat Iran considers part of its territory - seizedzed by Britain in the earlyarly nineteenth century and claimed for itss Arab protégés - createdd tension and provided pan-Arab nationaliststs with fodder to strain Iranran-Arab relations. At the time, Iran demonstratedrated a considerable capacityacity for reconciliation in the case of Bahrainin and continental shelves.ves. It easily agreed to shelve its claim to Bahrain,ahrain, which it had pursuedsued for more than 170 years against Britain which was Bahrain’s protectingotecting power. The Persian Gulf naming disputepute is yet another big sourceource of friction between Iran and the Arabs. Here, an Iranian grass-root movement lies at the origin of the resistanceistance against the activee push by Arab governments to change the nameame of the stretch of water,ater, which separates the Iranian plateau fromom the .la. This is currently the major issue that breedseeds ill feelings between the two peoples.

II. The Role of Pan-Arab Ideology An aggressive approachproach towards the Iranians or ‘Persians’ was clearly on the agenda off those who aimed at working out an Arab identityntity in general, and an Iraqi Arab identity in particular. In this respect,ct, the teachings of schoolsools of Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism as the ones led by Sati’ al-Husri, Sami Shawkat, Darwish al-Miqdadi, MMichel Aflaq etc, and thee way their views were put to action, are notable.le. The developmentpment of national education and the diffusionn of a

88 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairss state ideology off national identity were among the means thathat all Middle Eastern states, including new emerging Arab states, uused in the years followingng World War I to achieve national coherence.ce. To this end, they tried to recuperate the past and identify what distinguished theirir own people or 'nation' from others. While someome of these states, suchh as Iraq, expanded their efforts to form an ideologyeology of antagonism towards their neighbors, others, like Iran, llimited themselves to strengthenrengthen their coherence by putting emphasisasis on what distinguishedd them from others. The Iraqis, in their process to build the Iraqi state, put inn place an educational programrogram that drew heavily on the writings off Arab nationalist Sati' al-Husri. Al-Husri, dubbed the “intellectual prophetrophet of Arab nationalism”lism” (Dawisha, 2005:49), is known as the primary ideologue of Arabb nationalism and one of the fathers of pan-Arabism.rabism. He was an ideologue,ogue, educator, prolific author, lecturer and confidantnfidant of King Faisal. He was less concerned about borders than ethnic identity, and attachedched the greatest importance to a common languagenguage and a common history as the basis of nation formationn and nationalism. As he put it, “the language is the soul and the life of the nation, but historyry is its memory and its consciousness.” For him,im, the history of the Arabab nation was the history of the Arabs, not of Islam; Islam’s role in historyistory was to spread Arabism, to help preserverve the Arab identity of the Arabs, which began in pre-Islamic Arabiabia and spread with the Islamicslamic conquest (Simon, 1997:90). Stressing thee importance of language and culture, for Husri,sri, the ultimate goal wass to create a Great Arab State consisting of Arabic speaking peoples.. Thus, Arabic-speaking peoples, whether Muslimslims or not, could be incorporatedcorporated in the Arab Nation, whereas nonn-Arab Muslims, primarilyily Iranians, could not be members of the same community. It is said that his thoughts had wide implications andnd that his writings ‘had a considerable impact on political developmentsents in the Middle East””(Choueiri, 2000:101). Al-Husri also argued against the possibility of Muslim unity, emphasizing more desirablele and

89 The Myth of Iranian–Arab Enmity: A Deconstructive Approach attainable Arab unitynity (Holliday, 1996:33). Through hisis writings and lectures in Iraq and in otherr Arab countries, al-Husriri gave the concept of ‘Arab nationalism’ intellectualllectual coherence and sophistication.ophistication. And as a chief architect of modern Iraq’s education system, he could spread his views intoto the mainstream Iraqi and, to some extent, other Arab educational system and mass media. For him, the main purpose of the education system that he was buildingding was to disseminate Arab nationalist ideaas and sentiment into thee consciousness of future Arab generations. From al-Husri’susri’s thinking followed his approach to buildingg Iraqi education, which included facilitating the arrival of Palestinian, Syrian and Egyptian educatorsucators on the one hand, and excluding Iraniansns and Iraqis of Iranian origin on the other. Given the presence of a strong Iranian communityity in Iraq at the time and their old-age interactionraction with Iraqi Shiites,, this approach was not inconsequential and did not go unchallenged. As “not jusust a formulator of ideas”; but as “an unbending,ending, almost autocratic,c, missionary, and enforcer of the ‘only correct ideology,’” as well,ll, al-Husri “once fired an Iraqi Shiite poet, M. M. al- Jawahiri, from hisis teaching for singing the praises of an Iranian summer resort, ann endeavor which al-Husri considered to be shu’ubi (roughly anti-Arab).”ab).” Heated exchanges between al-Jawahiri and al- Husri that followedwed the incident shed more light on al-HHusri’s thinking (Dawishaha, 2005:72). In one of his writing, he offerffers a description of a campaign he waged against a school in a Shiite neighborhood whosehose headmaster was an ex-Ottoman officerr who “placed his hatredd of the Arabs in the service of the Iranian state…”ate…” by, among other things, applying a uniform similar to that uused in Iran (Makiya, 1989:15589:155). Anti-Iranian thinking is also apparentt in al- Husri’s writings. OOf special interest is one of al-Husri's works entitled "Iranian teacherss who caused us (Arabs) big problems" (MMakiya , 1989:153-54). Hiss activities also included a struggle against PPersian schools. Al-Husriri wrote fictional stories that focused on the

90 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairss suspicious influencence of Iran on the Arabs as well. The stories do not only overemphasizeize the unique national characteristics of the Arabs, but also identify Persia as the great enemy of the Arab people (Holliday, 1996:122). Many otherr pan-Arab nationalists, like Darwish al-Miqdadiiqdadi, stress the importancetance of language in defining a nation. Thee Arab- Semitic homelandd has been, according to al-Miqdadi, occupiedied by Semitic-speaking people from the beginning of historyy and surrounded by hostileostile Aryans on both sides. From the West came a series of Aryans,, starting with Alexander the Great to the BBritish. However, a greaterter Aryan threat to the Arabs was to their eastt - the Persians - who, according to al-Miqdadi, had a long historyory of aggression towardsds Arab lands, seeking vengeance against Arabsabs for the loss of their glory, and who humiliated Arabs on a numbermber of occasions and corruptedrrupted their culture (Abdi:219). An analysis of history textbooks designed for use in schoolsools in Palestine, Syria, aand Iraq in the 1930s and 40s reveals the parametersmeters of pan-Arab nationalism.ationalism. These textbooks, prepared by several renowned pan-AArabists including al-Miqdadi, portray the Arab homeland as a natural geographical unit, consisting of the “Arab Island” – of whichich ‘the head’ was the Fertile Crescent, ‘the heart’ central Arabia, andnd ‘the extremities’ the Arabian coastlands fromom the Gulf of to the Persian Gulf (Moaddel, 2005:165). In these textbooks,xtbooks, the Persians were commonly portrayedayed as having been filledd with hatred of the Arabs and a fanatical desiresire for revenge for the lossoss of their sovereignty and glory. Persian influencefluence was also blamed for the corruption of the position of women,en, the family as well as Arab culture and society. In a play by al-MMiqdadi featured in the same schoolbooks, titled Between the Two Jahiliyyaahiliyya, Persian and Romanoomano-Byzantine imperialists were portrayedyed as occupiers of Arabb lands, bringing trade routes under their controlrol and the Arabs’ happinessness to an end. Al-Miqdadi argued that the Arabs’ dangerous enemyy had been one: the Aryans – that is, the Persiansians in

91 The Myth of Iranian–Arab Enmity: A Deconstructive Approach the east and the Greeks, Romans, and Franks in the west (Moaddel,oaddel, 2005:166). Sami Shawkatkat was another pan-Arab ideologue who stirredred up hatred against Persiansrsians and tried to turn pan-Arabism into the highest Arab value. He was a noted educator in the 1930s whose thinkinghinking influenced the Ba’atha’ath Party. He, among others, strongly advocatedocated assimilating the Kurds into Arab nationalism. He believed that “every nation seeking revivalevival must use all possible means to mergee every minority living onn its soil into its nationalism” (Bengio , 1998:1100). Another centralntral defining issue that made pan-Arab nationalistsonalists and thinkers nervousrvous about Iran was the predominance of Shiite Islam in Iran andd the high-level status of their coreligionists inn some Arab countries, including their majority status in Iraq and Bahrain.ahrain. The great difficultyty they always experienced in assimilating Shiiteses into the “Iraqi State” naturally undermined the efforts of the country’suntry’s dominant Sunni establishment to propagate the ideas off Arab nationalism. A greatreat majority of Arab Shiites tended to vieww Arab nationalism as “aa Sunni project designed to reduce the Shiitess to an insignificant minorityority in an expanded Sunni Arab domain” (Dawishawisha , 2005:91). The Iraqiqi Sunni establishment always suspected Arab Shiites of feeling closer to Iran than other Arabs. A book published inn 1933, in which the Iraqiqi Shiite population was equated with the Sassanidassanid Persians and Iraqiqi Shiite teachers accused of being more loyal too Iran, stirred up widespreadpread protests, including attacks on security forces. Such events werere commonplace in Iraq in the 1930s (Dawiswisha , 2005:49). The identityentity-building efforts by the dominant Iraqi Sunni Arab minority facedced the same difficulties with regard to assimilatingmilating the Kurdish population.ulation. Moreover, it is not uncommon for such pan-Arab attitudeudes to be expressed as attacks on Iran's cultural identity through its cultural heritage. In somee cases, pan-Arab ideologues’ thinking and actions expanded over timeime and covered a wide-range of issues and areas, including attemptsts to Arabize Iran’s civilizational legacy and Persian

92 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairss contributions on the world stage. The efforts included attemptsmpts to label Persian writers/scientistsers/scientists as Arabs and take credit of workss done by other nations. This proprietary attitude on the part of some Arabs towards Islamic heritage and those prominent figures that developedeloped it is another sourceource of resentment for Iranians. The followinglowing observation by Sir Richard Nelson Frye encapsulates the crisisrisis in Arab attitudes towardswards Iranians: "Arabs no longer understand the role of Iran and the in the formation of Islamic culture. Perhaps they wish to forget the past, but in so doing they remove the bases of theirir own spiritual, moral andnd cultural being…without the heritage of thehe past and a healthy respectspect for it…there is little chance for stabilityty and proper growth" (FFrye, 1989:236). In their ownn minds, al-Husri and others were combating foreign influences amongg the Arabs, and as the Iranian community wasas one of the most vocall in Iraq, it attracted al-Husri’s hostile approach.h. This thinking later developeveloped under the Ba’athists into the particularar pan- Arab fascination with the idea of “the enemy from within”, leadingding to waves of expulsionsions of Iraqis of Iranian descent from Iraq.q. The Ba’athists played an important role in laying down a basis foror anti- Iranian thinking in the Arab world, in general, and in Iraq,raq, in particular, and trainedained a generation of Iraqis who brought the issuessue to its extreme.

III. The Role off Nasserism and Ba’athism Pan-Arab nationalistalist thinkers and ideologues played a significantnt role in creating and propagating ill feelings towards the Persians,s, thus fostering the agendasgendas of Arab governments that, in turn,, used ideologies to energizergize their populations. They laid the foundationion for Nasserim and BBa’athism which, compelled by nation-builduilding exigencies, took pan-Arabist ideologies to their extreme,, thus simultaneously sowingowing the seeds of antagonism towards the West and Iranians among someome sections of the Arab population.

93 The Myth of Iranian–Arab Enmity: A Deconstructive Approach

Ba’athist ideologueseologues and political leaders went further thanhan al- Husri and other like-minded thinkers, trying to deeply embeded the concept surroundingding “the enemy from within” in the Arab psyche and popular mainstreamnstream and making Arabs, especially Shiite Arabs, believe that Iraniansians are the "enemy of the Arabs." The articlele "Us and Our Enemies"ies" by Michel Aflaq, the ideological founderder of Ba’athism, is an example which extols the virtues of ‘us’ alongsideside an outpouring of vitriolic hate directed at ‘our’ enemies (MMakiya, 1989:219). He was of the view that “[t]he existence of a real,al, live enemy imparts vitalitytality to our doctrine and makes our blood circulate”culate” (Bengio , 1998:1255). From the basicasic proposition of pan-Arabism, it flowed thathat the unified Arab Statete would be created by a supreme act of will,l, by a revolt that wouldd shatter the artificial frontiers and discard the selfish local leaders that imprisoned the Arabs. Soon, Nasser, followinging his role in the Suez Crisis of 1956, found himself in this role. And so did the leaders of thee rising Ba'ath movement, who shared powerer with Iraqi nationalists following the 1958 coup in Iraq, later monopolizingolizing power briefly in 11963 and then for 35 years after 1968. The Ba’athists’athists had their own visionsion of the way to implement the task, and inn their eyes, Nasser fell far short of the clear vision and the ruthlessnessss that they thought was indispensable for achieving the objective. The Nasseritesrites were less ideologically bent on antagonismgonism against Iran and rather reacted against some political developmentspments such as the de-ffacto recognition of Israel by Iran in July 1960. Meanwhile, the Ba'athists, mostly trained in the educational system structured by al-HHusri and others, fought an ideological war against Iran which was stronglytrongly fed by Iraq's geopolitical predicaments.s. They reinforced pan-Arabirabist views and ideas via ideology and implementedmented them to their extremetreme and full, official and racist, culmination.. They mastered efforts to advance the myth purporting the existencece of a perennial conflictt between Persians and Arabs. Their efforts too build an Arab national identity included a systematic attempt to inventnt strict

94 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairss boundaries betweeneen the ‘Arab self’ and the ‘Iranian others’, whom they aimed to demonize.monize. For the Ba'athists,a'athists, pan-Arab ideology was laced withh anti- Persian racism, justust as their interpretation of Iraq's internationalal role, and of the characteracter of Iraqi society, rested on the pursuit of anti- Persian themes. TThe major themes which the anti-Iranian propagandaaganda that the Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi government discourse revolvedvolved around could be summarized as follows: a. Referring to Iraniansians as 'Persians' and to Iran as 'Persia' with a view to stressing the ‘racial’ composition of the country and portraying 'Persians' as oppressingressing minorities withinn their borders and being aggressive towardss their neighbors; b. Accusingcusing Iranians of being possessed by a destructiveructive mentality, aqliyya takhribiyya, a racial attribute, throughout history;tory; c. Highlighting racialial and linguistic differences between Iraniansns and Arabs as well as emphasizing the ‘cultural’ and ‘racial’ inferiorityority of the ‘Persian race’ by calling them '', an inferior people subservientervient to Arabs within Islam, and standard bearers of shu’ubiyya, thosese who hate Arab; d. Portrayingortraying the Iranians as Majusi Persians, or fire worshippers, bothh derogatory terms for Zoroastrians; e. Claiminging the existence of an intrinsic hostility on the part of Iranians towardsowards Arabs, which wasas the central argument of Ba’ath party-sponsorednsored poems, books pamphletsmphlets etc. Ba’athists resortedesorted to widespread historicizing attempts to prove the above pointss and demonstrate the myth of seemingly endemicndemic Persian-Arab enmitymity and the challenge of the Persians since ancient times. Iraqi Ba’athistsathists described “Iranians as , Tatars,ars, or ” in greatereater detail. The ‘Persian Character’ was describedibed as aggressive, domineering,neering, prone to war, and bloodthirsty. Persians,ns, and in particular theirir rulers, were fanatics and likely to engage in the ‘collective killing’ of thousands of people. Iraq must at all timeses keep one eye open to the east, ‘where the treacherous, the heretical, and the bloodthirsty are found.’ The Iranians would ‘cut off the breastsasts of Iraqi women unlessnless their sons fought’ to protect them’ (Adid-

95 The Myth of Iranian–Arab Enmity: A Deconstructive Approach

Moghaddam, 2008:9108:91). As a part off “the war of names”, the Ba'athists always referredeferred to Iran as ‘Persia’,’, having no regard for the fact that Iran has always been Iran for thee Iranians and all peoples in the region, andd even Reza Shah, a nationalistionalist, asked Europeans in 1935 to call his countryountry Iran, and not Perrsia. The Ba'athists aimed to highlight the Persians’ersians’ ‘racial character’ and depict it as expansionist towards minoritiesnorities within Iran and neighboring nations. Except for a few periodss when Iraqi Ba'athists soughtought a thaw in relations with Iran, i.e. immediaediately before and after their invasion of Kuwait, they referred to Iraniansians by many other namesmes too. In thousands of documents fromm Iraqi intelligence, confiscatedfiscated by the Kurds and later posted on the Internet, the Iraniansnians are systematically referred to as “the Zionist Persians”, al-adu al-Ajami (Ajam enemy) and (Adid-Moghaddam,addam, 2008:214). Duringg the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi propaganda made muchuch of the claim that Ayatollahyatollah Khomeini was a majus, a derogatory term for Zoroastrians. Another derogatoryrogatory term for Shiites and Persians, thoughgh not exclusively for them,hem, was shu’ubiyya, derived from shu’ub (singular,ngular, shu’ubi). It originallyiginally connoted tribes who had historicallyorically campaigned to deny Arab superiority and claim equality for all different Muslim ethnic groups. This term was used by the Ba’ath Party to attack thehe enemies of the Arabs, whether real or imaginary,ginary, foreign or domestic,stic, Arab or non-Arab. Accused of hating Arabs, Iranians were describedescribed as the standard-bearers of shu’ubiyyaya and forming the vanguardguard of the ‘waves of shu’ubiyya’, wheneverer they ‘strike the Muslimsms so as to harm Islam” (Bengio, 1998:142). Ba’athist racismcism was sometimes breathtaking in its crudity.ty. For example, in 1981, Dar al-Hurriyya, the government publishing house, widely circulated a pamphlet whose title can be translated as ‘Three Whom Shouldd Not Have Created: Persians, Jews and Flies.’ The author was Khairallah Tulfah, former Governor of Baghdad, and foster- father, uncle, andd father-in-law of Saddam Hussein. Persians, Tulfah

96 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairss wrote, are “animalsals God created in the shape of humans.” Jewsws are a “mixture of the dirt and leftovers of diverse peoples,” and fliess are a trifling creation “whom we do not understand God’s purposeose in creating.” (Makiyaya , 1989:17) Equally incredible is that "…Saddam’sddam’s government offeredered 'pure Iraqis' married to anyone with Iranian blood a $2500 rewardward for divorcing him or her" (Aburish , 2000:123:123). By historicizingzing and invoking history to explain contemporarymporary attitudes, the Ba'athists tried to project their conflict with Iran back to the reign of the Persian king, Cyrus, and bestow a historical depthepth to contemporary disputessputes and present them as a result of an endemicndemic and deeply-rootedd Arab-Persian enmity. In doing so, the Ba’’athists hoped to mobilizeze Arab public opinion on their side. The ‘PersianPersian black hatred’ againstainst the Arabs, was said to have existed forr 2,500 years, from Cyruss to Ayatollah Khomeini. It was repeatedly saidid that from the Achaemenidsmenids to Ayatollah Khomeini, the Persianns had plunged a knife “into the back of the Arabs whenever their guardrd was down. They haveve stolen from the Arabs whenever there was an opportunity; theyy fought the Ottomans to conquer Arab lands, befriended the British and are collaborating with the Americancans to stab the Arabs in the back” ( Bengio, 1998:141-42). Cyrus was cursed for releasing the Jews deported to Babyloniabylonia by king Nebuchadnezzaradnezzar in the sixth century B.C. In the samee vein, the Iran-Iraq warr was presented as Saddam’s Qadisiyyah, referringring to the first major batattle in which invading Arab forces defeated Iranian Sassanid troops in 637 A.D., representing a systematic attemptmpt to portray Saddam in a comparable historic role against the Persians.ersians. The imagery of thehe battle of Qadisiyyah and the conquest of Iran by Arab armies werere also invoked by Saddam and other Arabss as a mobilizing symbolol in the war against Iran. The ‘Persiansans perpetual hostility towards the Arabs’s’ was ‘documented’ in a book published shortly before the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. It was entitled Ta’rich al-Higd al-Farsi ala al-Arabab (the History of Persianian Hatred of the Arabs). The same topicic was

97 The Myth of Iranian–Arab Enmity: A Deconstructive Approach serialized at the end of the war in the al-Qadisiyyah newspaper under the heading ‘Judhurhur al-ada al-Farsi li-al-Ummah al-Arabiyya’, (Thee roots of Persian hostilityity towards the Arab nation.) The series hadd been prepared by the Iraqi army and found environmental, geographicalaphical and geopolitical reasons for this hatred but kept stressing the ‘PersianPersian destructive mentally’tally’ (aqliyya takhribiyya) as the underlying cause (Bengio, 1998:1422). To depict modern Iranians as the descendants of the Mongols,ongols, the Ba’athists warnedarned Iraqis and the Arabs of a ‘yellow storm’,m’, asifa safra, trying to evokevoke the most traumatic event in Arab history:ry: the Mongol conquestt of Baghdad and the destruction of Iraq inn 1258, depicting themselveselves as soldiers ‘defending Iraq against thee new ‘Hulagu Khan’ and Iraqis as the guardians of the easternn Arab gateway (Bengio, 1998:142). Content analysisalysis of schoolbooks published between 19922-94 in Ba'athist Iraq, andd to a lesser extent in some other Arab countries,ies, has also made clear that the image of ‘the others’ in these bookss were more or less subjectedbjected to the needs and demands of politicalal and ideological interests.sts. The image oof Iranians (Persians) in Iraqi schoolbooks wasas clear cut, arguing that it has not underwent any change since the dawnawn of history. In these books, 'the Iranian is always that mean racist Persian who conspires againstgainst the Arab Nation, its unity and its language,age, as well as the Islamicic-Arabic civilization since the era of the Orthodoxthodox Caliphs until Saddam'sddam's 'glorious Qadissiyah'. Each time the Persiansersians are mentioned inn the textbooks, they are the invaders, and absolutebsolute evil that has to be deterred. In these textbooks, all the problemsems of Muslims and Arabs,bs, including sectarian conflicts and unrest as well as attempts to underminermine their civilization, are ultimately the productduct of Persian conspiraciescies (Atrissi:155). According to the content analysis,lysis, it is interesting to note that in Iraqi schoolbooks under Saddam,m, only quick references were made to the invasion of Kuwait and Zionism,onism, and "apart from the reference that [Zionist] occupied Palestine is part

98 Iranian Review of Foreign Affairss of the Arab world,rld, there is no incitement like the one againnst the Persians or Iran in general" (Atrissi:164). The image of Iraniansians in schoolbooks in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, is also not painted in a positive lightht as is the case in other Islamic countries. At best, they remain neutralral about Iran (Atrissi:191).

IV. Iran’s Approachoach While new emergingging Arab states carved out of the Ottoman Empire following World War I were involved in an arduous nation-buildinguilding process, Iran wasas busy forging a fresh national homogeneity.y. The Pahlavi dynasty, too, attempted to use newly-developed nationalational education systems,ms, state media and national conscription, among other things, to diffuse a state ideology of national identity wwith a view to consolidateolidate national coherence. To this end,d, the distinguishing of Iranians from ‘others’ was a key aim of the IIranian government. Nonetheless,s, it is important to note that, contrary too pan- Arabism, Iraniann nationalism mainly predicated itself on frontiersontiers rather than ethnichnic or lingual identity. Another attributee that distinguishes Iraniannian nationalism from pan-Arabism was the factact that the latter advanceed on the path of forming an ideology of antagonismonism. Whereas the Iraniansnians, whether officially or unofficially, essentiallyentially sought to distinguishuish themselves from their neighbors, includinging the Arabs, by glorifyingying pre-Islamic and Islamic Iranian kingshipip and culture. Iran alsoo tried to do the aforementioned by revivingng the Persian language and ridding it of Arabic and Turkish words, abiding reverence for ,rdowsi, Hafez and Saadi’s poetic traditions of Persian culture, maintainingning the solar calendar and Nowrouz festivities,tivities, promoting changesges in symbolism, vocabulary and personal names,mes, as well as identify Iran as 'Aryan', distinct from Semitic culturere and peoples. All of thishis was in parallel with the secular trend unleashedhed by the constitutionalal revolution. What Iran was trying to mainstreamstream during its nationalal-identity-building period was to establish andd prove

99 The Myth of Iranian–Arab Enmity: A Deconstructive Approach

'itself' rather than trying to deny or denigrate 'others'. Resorting too racial slurs to demean its rival nations was never a prevailing trend in Iran and remained limited to fringe groupsps and elements. As an example, it should be noted that no negative imagemage is depicted of Arabs,s, as an ethnic group, in Iranian schoolbooks,s, be it before or after the Islamic Revolution. Quite to the contrary,ry, the schoolbooks aimm to strengthen ties between Iranians and Arabs. Arabic is taught after the elementary level and before university.ty. The work of some great Arab writers and poets are reproducedced in schoolbooks. Afterer the Islamic Revolution, they no longer attemptmpt to whip up nationalistlist sentiments, referring to ancient Iran as thee ideal lost city. Under monarchical Iran too, negative remarks related only to the Arab conquestest with no attempt to generalize and extendd it to periods precedingg or following the Arab occupation (Haddadd Adel: 145-51). At the sameme time, there were fringe Iranian nationalistionalist movements sincee the late nineteenth century that disparageded the Iranian traditionalal culture, which included certain religious practicesactices associated with Arabic mores and portrayed as a source of Iran's backwardness. Thishis trend cannot be labeled as an anti-Arab one, as the harsh judgmentsments Iranian pass on the long-term effectscts of Alexander's, Genghis'sghis's or Timur's invasions of Iran can't be regardedgarded as proof of hostilitytility against modern-day peoples or regions those invasions originatedted from. The emphasissis on Iranian identity before the Islamic Revolutioolution was abandoned thereafter in favor of an Islamic, laden with Arab, character. The leaders of the Islamic Revolution began to de- emphasize pre-Islamiclamic Persian revivalism and aimed to re-Islamizeize the country, which requiredequired the welcoming of Arab elements.

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Conclusion The assumption that there is such a thing as 'endemic Iraniann–Arab enmity' cannot withstand serious academic scrutiny. Comparedred to many other neighbours,ghbours, Iranians and Arabs have coexisted rather peacefully than clashed manically throughout history and good- neighbourliness has far outweighed frictions in their relations.s. The misgivings and uneasinessneasiness that have clouded the relationship betweenetween them since the mid-1950s can be for the most part understoodood in relation to regionalnal and global politics and political developmentspments within the concernederned countries. Mostly, in this period, the major currents in the Arab world and key Arab countries on the onee hand and Iran on the other were not on the same side of regionalnal and international alignments.gnments. Differences in ideologies and politicalolitical outlooks, coupleded with geopolitical predicaments and territorialritorial disputes, gave risee to chronic frictions between their governing elites. Pan-Arab ideologues,deologues, frantically preoccupied with layingng the groundwork for building a pan-Arab nation, left no stone unturnedrned in falsely presentingng Iranians as ethno-religious and civilizationalational enemies which Arabs need to close ranks against. They did whateverhatever was in their powerwer to historicize and conceptualize enmity betweenetween Iranians and Arabs,abs, paving the way for the Ba'athists to harshly reinforce their conceptsoncepts and put them to work. Saddam’s eightht-year war on Iran was the culmination of what the pan-Arab ideologuesues put together and the Ba'athists attempted to carry out. Now that thehe Arab Spring has removed parts of the obstacles,stacles, the elites of the two sides can discuss the fundamental issuesues of mutual concern and interest more freely, more directly andnd less through the West’st’s lenses. It will take lots of direct encountersers and numerous exchangesnges of visits among shapers of public opinionnion to help wipe out the legacy that ideologies have and continuenue to sediment since the mid-1950s, leading to strained bilateralal ties between Iranians and Arabs.

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