THE NEW SECTARIANISM: the Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘A-Sunni Divide

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THE NEW SECTARIANISM: the Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘A-Sunni Divide ANALYSIS PAPER Number 29, April 2013 THE NEW SECTARIANISM: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide Geneive Abdo The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are not determined by any donation. Copyright © 2013 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 www.brookings.edu Table of Contents Acknowledgments..........................................................iv The Author ............................................................... v Introduction: The New Sectarianism ......................................... 1 The Roots of Contemporary Sectarianism..................................... 5 Part One: The Case of Bahrain............................................... 9 A Brief History ........................................................... 9 The Sectarian Divide Deepens .............................................. 12 Shi‘a and Sunni Radicalization ............................................. 19 Shi‘a Marginalization..................................................... 28 Bahrain’s Clerics: Religious Guides or Political Figures?....................... 31 Part Two: The Case of Lebanon ............................................. 34 The History of Sectarianism Takes a New Turn................................ 34 Syrian War Spills Over Into Lebanon........................................ 39 The Salafists’ Ascendance In the Wake of the Syrian War ...................... 41 Religious Discourse as a Political Tool...................................... 45 The Sunni Awakening ..................................................... 48 Part Three: The Iran Factor ................................................ 51 Part Four: What Can the United States Do? .................................. 56 Selected Bibliography ..................................................... 60 About the Saban Center . 67 THE NEW SEctaRIANISM: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide iii Acknowledgements he author is deeply grateful to the Hen- of the research topic from the beginning, nearly ry Luce Foundation for a generous grant two years ago, and gave initial backing to the proj- which made this project possible. The ect. Jean-Francois Seznec offered very useful feed- TEarhart Foundation, a long-time supporter of the back on Bahrain. author’s work over the last decade, extended vital support. The Heinrich Boell Stiftung North Amer- This monograph benefited from skilled and insight- ica, the author’s loyal partner on unrelated work, ful researchers. Reza H. Akbari, the author’s gifted and the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, also and perceptive research associate, worked hard to contributed. provide material on a tough deadline and was always willing to go beyond what was required. Nadine The author is also grateful for intellectual support Elali provided vital on-the-ground research in Leba- from Daniel Byman, who was an insightful, knowl- non. Fatema Al Hashemi and Theodore Waddelow edgeable, and even-handed adviser, Kenneth Pol- were of great help with issues regarding Bahrain. lack and Tamara Cofman Wittes. Nathan Brown provided brilliant feedback during the paper’s early drafts. Peter Mandaville recognized the importance THE NEW SEctaRIANISM: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide iv The Author Geneive Abdo, a nonresident fellow in the Saban Ms. Abdo is the coauthor of Answering Only to God: Center for Middle East Policy, and a fellow in the Faith and Freedom in Twenty-First Century Iran Middle East program at the Stimson Center, specializ- (Henry Holt, 2003), a work that explains the theo- es in issues regarding modern Iran and political Islam. logical struggle in Iran among the Shiite clerics and She also co-chairs a project on Iran in conjunction how this struggle has caused political stagnation. with the Heinrich Boell Stiftung, North America. Her latest book on Muslims in America, Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life in America After 9/11, was She was formerly the Liaison Officer for the Alli- published in September 2006 by Oxford Universi- ance of Civilizations, a United Nations initiative es- ty Press. This book explained the changing identity tablished by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, among American Muslims as they struggle to keep which aims to improve relations between Islamic true to their faith while deciding to what degree and western societies. they will integrate into American society. Before joining the United Nations, Ms. Abdo was a From 2001-2002, Ms. Abdo was a Nieman Fellow foreign correspondent. Her 20-year career focused at Harvard University. That year, she also received on coverage of the Middle East and the Muslim the prestigious John Simon Guggenheim award. world. From 1998-2001, Ms.Abdo was the Iran correspondent for the British newspaper the Guard- Ms. Abdo’s commentaries and essays on Islam have ian and a regular contributor to The Economist and appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy magazine, the International Herald Tribune. She was the first The New York Times, The Washington Post, Washing- American journalist to be based in Iran since the ton Quarterly, The New Republic, Newsweek, The 1979 Islamic Revolution. Nation, the Christian Science Monitor, CNN, and Middle East Report. She has been a commentator on Ms. Abdo is the author of No God But God: Egypt CNN, National Public Radio, the BBC, the New- and the Triumph of Islam (Oxford University Press, sHour with Jim Lehrer, the Oprah Winfrey show, 2000), a work that documents the social and politi- al Jazeera, PBS, and other radio and television ser- cal transformation of Egypt into an Islamic society. vices. The book is the first to detail the leading figures and events responsible for giving moderate Islamists in She is a regular speaker at universities, think tanks, Egypt enormous social and political power. Oxford and other institutions in the United States, Europe, University Press will publish an updated edition lat- and the Middle East. er in 2013. THE NEW SEctaRIANISM: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide v Introduction: The New Sectarianism hen the Arab uprisings began in the future of these societies than the actions, policies, winter of 2011, Iran’s Supreme Leader or intentions of external actors. Tehran may well Ali Khamenei was quick to express his believe it can meddle as it pleases and bend events glee:W one of the long-awaited objectives of the 1979 to its purposes—and Washington and its western Islamic revolution would now be realized. Khame- allies may well agree. However, a close inspection of nei praised what he called the “Islamic awakening” facts on the ground in two potential regional flash- in the Arab world and claimed vindication for Iran’s points—Bahrain and Lebanon—reveals that this is long-running efforts to overcome the West’s region- simply not the case. Tehran’s tendency to see the al hegemony. Arab uprisings in its own terms is more strategic spin rather than an accurate reading of events, and The realization of a pan-Islamic Middle East was on it is particularly vulnerable to overestimating its the horizon, in what Khamenei declared was a great own influence and the degree to which the Arabs defeat for the United States and Israel. In a speech are prepared to look to Persian Iran for leadership on March 2, 2011, to celebrate the Persian New or guidance. Year, he expressed strong support for the recent re- gional uprisings, and insisted that Iran supported In fact, the Arab uprisings and their knock-on ef- both its fellow Shi‘a and the Sunni who make up fects across the region are the very definition of the majority of the world’s Muslims. “We do not local, “retail” politics and represent a significant distinguish among Gaza, Palestine, Tunisia, Libya, break with a past largely dictated by outside forces, Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen. We have supported Pal- foreign policy considerations, and proxy contests estine for thirty-two years, and they are not Shi‘a. It between rival regional and global forces. As a re- is not an issue of Shi‘a or Sunni. It is the protest of a sult, the United States must continue to take into nation against oppression,” Khamenei said.1 account domestic political players across the Arab world in order to protect and advance its geopoliti- Yet Khamenei’s rhetoric fails to take into account cal and economic interests. In other words, it is do- one of the most important facets of the Arab upris- mestic politics that now drives foreign policy—not ings: domestic politics now has more sway over the the other way around. 1 1390 Ayatollah Khamenei Nowruz Message,” YouTube video, posted by IranFree1390, March 20, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=44GvFGTLQZw. THE NEW SEctaRIANISM: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi‘a-Sunni Divide 1 Although external actors played some role in the The Sunni in Lebanon believe that by confronting uprisings in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, it is local Hizballah they are
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