Geopolitical Realignments
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Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis Volume 6, Issue 1 Jan/Feb 2014
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis Volume 6, Issue 1 Jan/Feb 2014 Annual Threat Assessment SOUTHEAST ASIA Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore SOUTH ASIA Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA China and Central Asia MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Somalia INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY 2 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT Terrorism and Political Violence in 2013 Southeast Asia peace talks were held in January 2014. Iraq, too, remains besieged by sectarian violence and constant attacks. In Yemen, Southeast Asia has seen some of its insurgencies and conflicts multiple insurgencies and a robust threat from Al Qaeda in the diminish while others have continued unabated. In Thailand, the Arabian Peninsula have hampered an already difficult political restive south continued to see violence in 2013 while Bangkok transition. In Egypt, Morsi’s ouster has seen protests continuing witnessed a political crisis with protests against the government to plague the country while the military attempts another turning violent. In Myanmar, reforms have moved forward but political transition. Libya, meanwhile, faces a persistent security communal violence continues to plague the country and has challenge in its southern border region and the success of its evolved from targeting Rohingyas towards Muslim minority transition after Gaddafi will depend on the militias which communities in general. Indonesia continues to face a potent deposed the former dictator giving up their arms. In Somalia, threat from radicalization and concern has emerged over the al-Shabaab has intensified its campaign against the role its “hard” counterterrorist approach is playing in fueling government in the wake of a hardline faction emerging further extremism. -
Sheikh Qassim, the Bahraini Shi'a, and Iran
k o No. 4 • July 2012 o l Between Reform and Revolution: Sheikh Qassim, t the Bahraini Shi’a, and Iran u O By Ali Alfoneh The political stability of the small island state of Bahrain—home to the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet—matters to the n United States. And Sheikh Qassim, who simultaneously leads the Bahraini Shi’a majority’s just struggle for a more r democratic society and acts as an agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran, matters to the future of Bahrain. A survey e of the history of Shi’a activism in Bahrain, including Sheikh Qassim’s political life, shows two tendencies: reform and t revolution. Regardless of Sheikh Qassim’s dual roles and the Shi’a protest movement’s periodic ties to the regime in Tehran, the United States should do its utmost to reconcile the rulers and the ruled in Bahrain by defending the s civil rights of the Bahraini Shi’a. This action would not only conform to the United States’ principle of promoting a democracy and human rights abroad, but also help stabilize Bahrain and the broader Persian Gulf region and under- mine the ability of the regime in Tehran to continue to exploit the sectarian conflict in Bahrain in a way that broadens E its sphere of influence and foments anti-Americanism. e Every Friday, the elderly Ayatollah Isa Ahmad The Sunni ruling elites of Bahrain, however, l Qassim al-Dirazi al-Bahrani, more commonly see Sheikh Qassim not as a reformer but as d known as Sheikh Qassim, climbs the stairs to the a zealous revolutionary serving the Islamic pulpit at the Imam al-Sadiq mosque in Diraz, d Bahrain, to deliver his sermon. -
Bahrain: Reform Shelved, Repression Unleashed
Bahrain: reform shelved, repression unleashed amnesty international is a global movement of more than 3 million supporters, members and activists in more than 150 countries and territories who campaign to end grave abuses of human rights. our vision is for every person to enjoy all the rights enshrined in the universal declaration of human rights and other international human rights standards. We are independent of any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion and are funded mainly by our membership and public donations. first published in 2012 by amnesty international ltd peter Benenson house 1 easton street london WC1X 0dW united Kingdom © amnesty international 2012 index: mde 11/062/2012 english original language: english printed by amnesty international, international secretariat, united Kingdom all rights reserved. This publication is copyright, but may be reproduced by any method without fee for advocacy, campaigning and teaching purposes, but not for resale. The copyright holders request that all such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. for copying in any other circumstances, or for reuse in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, prior written permission must be obtained from the publishers, and a fee may be payable. To request permission, or for any other inquiries, please contact [email protected] Cover photo : police try to restrain a suspected protester during clashes in the Bahraini capital, manama, 21 september 2012. © epa/maZen mahdi amnesty.org Bahrain 1 Reform shelved, repression unleashed BAHRAIN: REFORM SHELVED, REPRESSION UNLEASHED CONTENTS 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................2 2. Investigations into past torture and use of excessive force .............................................5 3. -
Bahrain: Civil Society and Political Imagination Contents
Research Paper Jane Kinninmont and Omar Sirri Middle East and North Africa Programme | October 2014 Bahrain: Civil Society and Political Imagination Contents Summary 2 Introduction 3 Political Disputes and Failed Dialogues 7 Bahraini Civil Society, Youth and Informal Political Processes 16 The International Context 28 Conclusions 33 About the Authors 36 Acknowledgments 36 1 | Chatham House Bahrain: Civil Society and Political Imagination Summary • Bahrain’s political crisis continues, following the failure of dialogue efforts since 2011. That crisis is not only damaging the country’s economy and social fabric; it is also contributing to a deepening of sectarian tensions and an increased risk of violence. • The failure of the dialogue efforts to date is radicalizing the opposition and weakening the reformist elements within the government. At the same time, tight restrictions on freedom of association, speech and political activity are not silencing the most vocal and radical of the political opposition; rather, they are squeezing out the very moderates with whom the authorities will eventually need to work if they are to reach a sustainable political resolution to the crisis. • Because of the stalemate, many Bahrainis expect the future of their country to be determined by the government’s interactions with larger powers – especially the United States, Iran and Saudi Arabia – adding to the sense of disempowerment among the population. But those countries have many other priorities; and it is unclear whether they have a clear vision for the future of Bahrain. • Despite the stalling of the formal dialogue, Bahrain’s traditionally active civil society could make a valuable contribution to sincere efforts to reach a political resolution – if, that is, it were given the political space to do so. -
Bahrain: Change of the Regime Or Changes Within the Regime?
Bahrain: Change of the Regime or Changes within the Regime? The 14th February Uprising opposition of all shades was in agreement with Bahrain has been witnessing an uprising since the uprising, despite differences on the agenda 14th February 2011, the eruption of which had and means of protests. been signaled by a call on Facebook two weeks The first days of the uprisings (14–17 before. The call promoted two slogans: one, that February) witnessed increasingly dramatic the protests should be of a peaceful nature; and developments, which led to an unprecedented two, that the aim is to topple the regime. Both situation in the country. None of the concerned demands were in line with their precedents parties, neither the opposition nor the security in Tunisia and Egypt, and with the popular establishment, government or the general public expected such a large turnout of protesters amid tight security measures. Tens of Despite the peaceful nature thousands showed up in defiance. Despite the of the protests, it was quelled peaceful nature of the protests, it was quelled with ruthless force resulting in with ruthless force resulting in deaths and tens deaths and tens of causalities of causalities among the protesters. The funeral among the protesters. of a victim at Al-Daih village east of the island’s capital Manama on 15th February was massive. Thousands advanced towards the so-called expression “The People want the downfall of Lulu (eng: Pearl) roundabout1 in Manama. the regime“ (ash-sha’b yurid isqat al-nizam). The call came from anonymous persons, but thousands of Bahrainis supported it on the Facebook group entitled “14th February Bahrain Revolution”. -
The Impact of Arab Spring Throughout the Middle East and North Africa
A MODEL OF REGIME CHANGE: THE IMPACT OF ARAB SPRING THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts By OMAR KHALFAN BIZURU BA, Al Azhar University, Egypt, 1996 MA, Institute of Arab Research and Studies, Egypt, 1998 Ph.D. Nkumba University, Uganda, 2019 2021 Wright State University WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL April 21st, 2021 I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Omar Khalfan Bizuru ENTITLED A Model of Regime Change: The Impact of Arab Spring Throughout the Middle East and North Africa BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts. Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. Thesis Director Laura M. Luehrmann, Ph.D. Director, Master of Arts Program in International and Comparative Politics Committee on Final Examination: _________________________________ Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. School of Public and International Affairs ___________________________________ Liam Anderson, Ph.D. School of Public and International Affairs ___________________________________ Awad Halabi, Ph.D. Department of History ___________________________________ Barry Milligan, Ph.D. Vice Provost for Academic Affairs Dean of the Graduate School ABSTRACT Bizuru, Omar Khalfan, M.A., International and Comparative Politics Graduate Program, School of Public and International Affairs, Wright State University, 2021. A Model of Regime Change: The Impact of the Arab Spring Throughout the Middle East and North Africa. This study examined the catalysts for social movements around the globe; specifically, why and how the Arab Spring uprisings led to regime change in Tunisia, why they transformed into civil war in some countries of the Middle East and North Africa (Syria), and why they did not lead to significant change at all in other places (Bahrain). -
Bahrain Timeline 2010–2016
Bahrain Timeline 2010–2016 COLOR KEY: ■ EVENTS IN BAHRAIN ■ HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST REPORTS ■ U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS/STATEMENTS 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 —— DECEMBER 3 —— FEBRUARY 14–16: Mass protests break out in Bahrain, voicing a range of grievances including —— FEBRUARY: Bahrain: The —— FEBRUARY 10: A new round of —— JULY 7 —— JANUARY 20: —— JANUARY 12: political and socio-economic concerns. Police open fire killing two protestors. Gathering Storm “reconciliation talks” begins, Court sentences Triggered by —— FEBRUARY 17: Police clear the Pearl Roundabout. Hundreds of protestors are injured and three —— MAY 5 excluding key opposition Nabeel Rajab the global drop are killed by police using shotguns. Al Wefaq, the political society with the largest amount of figures still in prison. to 6 months in in oil price, seats in Parliament, announces it will suspend its participation in Parliament. —— AUGUST: State Department prison for online the Bahraini releases human rights report comments made government cuts Secretary Clinton —— FEBRUARY 18–MAY 30: King Hamad declares a three month state of emergency. Hundreds of State Department: “The on Bahrain, simultaneously in 2014. subsidies on after meeting peaceful dissidents, opposition leaders, and medics are arrested and many tortured. U.S. is deeply concerned noting a failure to implement —— FEBRUARY: How gasoline, raising with Bahrain by the Government of —— MARCH 14: The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) agrees to send troops at the request of the most of the recommendations to Bring Stability the price by Foreign Minister the Kingdom of Bahrain’s Bahraini Government. Saudi Arabian troops arrive and are joined by security forces from the Authorities arrest leading while praising the King for to Bahrain 60%. -
Zainab Al-Khawaja Arrested Headlines
Bahrain Weekly – August 7: Al-Wefaq Dialogue Call Rebuffed by Government; Zainab al-Khawaja Arrested Headlines • Government Holds Meeting with Wa’ad, Rejects Bi-Party Political Dialogue with al-Wefaq • Protests Continue, Zainab al-Khawaja Arrested • Government Charges Policemen with Mistreating Prisoners • Congressman’s Connections to Bahrain Lobby Scrutinized • NGOs React to Meeting Between French, Bahraini Leaders Updates from Bahrain Government Holds Bilateral Meeting with Wa’ad, Rejects Bi-Party Dialogue with al-Wefaq: The Bahraini government announced that the Minister of Justice, Islamic Affairs and Endowments, Shaikh Khalid bin Ali Al Khalifa, met with a delegation of the National Democratic Action Society (Wa’ad). The discussions were centered on “the urgent need to end the country’s political, social, economic and security decline.” The minister reiterated the government’s “seriousness to initiate a dialogue [that] starts with bilateral meetings, with an end result to please all parties.” Last week, Minister of State for Information Affairs Sameera Rajab called al-Wefaq’s request for dialogue between the party and the government “unacceptable” until al-Wefaq “acknowledge[s] what has been done [since the BICI was released]” and “call[s] for stopping the violence on the streets.” Rajab’s statement was in reaction to former al-Wefaq MP Matar Matar‘s public call for dialogue, saying “we are inviting [the government] and we are ready to talk to hardliners as well as moderates.” Al-Wefaq confirmed that they had met with the Minister of Justice but that the meeting did “nothing to deal with the [reconciliation] dialogue nor with resolving the political crisis in Bahrain.” The delegation reportedly stressed that “violence is rejected from all parties” and that political prisoners should be permitted to be a part of any political dialogue. -
1 Bahrain's Opposition and the 2014 Parliamentary Elections Brief
Bahrain’s opposition and the 2014 Parliamentary Elections Bahrain’s opposition and the 2014 Parliamentary Elections Brief Bahrain’s national democratic opposition societies will currently not Be partaking in the 2014 parliamentary elections. Although this is not the preferred position, due to their ongoing insistence of working within the system proactively for political reform, a lack of positive movements from the authorities render this position unavoidable. The powers of the elected parliament have in fact regressed during the past four years, and other outstanding concerns remain unaddressed. Meanwhile human rights violations remain flagrant and senior opposition figures continue to Be held Behind Bars, many of whom should Be accommodated into a political process. The Bahrain Government suffers from an acute crisis of legitimacy and the opposition must work to alter this, without alienating the people of Bahrain who have committed themselves to democratic change. Background Al Wefaq National Islamic Society came into inception in 2001 following the National Action Charter that permitted opposition political societies. A founding core of the society is to promote democratic reform through the transition to a genuine constitutional monarchy, engaging within the system to do so. It did not participate in the 2002 parliamentary elections, following the King’s reneging on the National Action Charter with the unilateral imposing of a new constitution that granted little power to the elected chamBer of Parliament1. However, in 2006 Al Wefaq did take part in the elections gaining 16 of the 40 seats2. In 2010 they gained two further seats affirming its position as the largest Bloc in the parliament3. -
Beyond Islamists and Autocrats
PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL REFORM POST ARAB SPRING essays by HALA ALDOSARI LORI PLOTKIN BOGHARDT JAMES BOWKER MOHAMED ELJARH BEYOND JOHN P. ENTELIS SARAH FEUER SIMON HENDERSON ISLAMISTS HASSAN MNEIMNEH GHAITH AL-OMARI DAVID POLLOCK AND NATHANIEL RABKIN NADIA AL-SAKKAF VISH SAKTHIVEL AUTOCRATS DAVID SCHENKER ANDREW J. TABLER SARAH FEUER, SERIES EDITOR ERIC TRAGER essays by HALA ALDOSARI LORI PLOTKIN BOGHARDT JAMES BOWKER BEYOND MOHAMED ELJARH JOHN P. ENTELIS SARAH FEUER SIMON HENDERSON ISLAMISTS HASSAN MNEIMNEH GHAITH AL-OMARI DAVID POLLOCK AND NATHANIEL RABKIN NADIA AL-SAKKAF VISH SAKTHIVEL AUTOCRATS DAVID SCHENKER ANDREW J. TABLER ERIC TRAGER SARAH FEUER, series editor Prospects for Political Reform Post Arab Spring The opinions expressed in this book are those of the authors and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, includ- ing photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permis- sion in writing from the publisher. © 2017 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 1111 19TH STREET NW, SUITE 500 WASHINGTON, DC 20036 www.washingtoninstitute.org DESIGN: 1000colors.org COVER PHOTO: Demonstrators chant slogans during a protest to support the transformation of the country into a federal state in Benghazi, Libya, 2012 (REUTERS/Asmaa Waguih). Introduction ... 1 CONTENTS DAVID SCHENKER, June 2015 By the first months of 2015, Post-Jasmine Tunisia .. -
Understanding the Dynamics of the Arab Spring
Cilja Harders, Christoph J. König Mobilization, Repression, and Coalitions: Understanding the Dynamics of the Arab Spring Discussion Paper | February 2013 www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/vorderer-orient 2 Cilja Harders, Christoph J. König: Mobilization, Repression, and Coalitions Discussion Papers for Middle Eastern and North African Politics This Discussion Paper Series is edited by the Center for Middle Eastern and North African Politics at the Freie Universität Berlin. It presents original research about the social, political, cultural and economic transformations in the region and beyond. It features contributions in area studies, comparative politics, gender studies and peace and conflict studies, thus representing a broad variety of critical and empirically founded fresh insights on current issues in these fields. Downloads The Discussion Papers are available online at www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/vorderer-orient/wp . You can order your print copy at [email protected]. © 2013 by the authors: Cilja Harders, Christoph J. König Harders, Cilja; König, Christoph J. (2013) Mobilization, Repression, and Coalitions: Understan- ding the Dynamics of the Arab Spring, Discussion Paper | February 2013 , Center for Middle Eastern and North African Politics, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin. ISSN (Print): 2192-7499 ISSN (Internet): 2193-0775 Center for Middle Eastern and North African Politics Fachbereich Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften Otto-Suhr-Institute for Political Science Freie Universität Berlin Ihnestr. 22 14195 Berlin Germany Phone: +49(0) 30 838 56640 Fax: +49(0) 30 838 56637 E-Mail: [email protected] Discussion Paper | February 2013 3 Mobilization, Repression, and Coalitions: Understanding the Dynamics of the Arab Spring Cilja Harders, Christoph J. -
The Multiple Meanings of Elections in Non-Democratic Regimes: Breakdown, Response and Outcome in the Arab Uprisings
The Multiple Meanings of Elections in Non-Democratic Regimes: Breakdown, Response and Outcome in the Arab Uprisings Ellen Lust1 Yale University 1 The author gratefully acknowledges the excellent research assistance of Tabitha Decker. 1 The difference couldn’t seem starker. Egypt’s parliamentary election in November 2010 was a dour affair. Widespread repression marked the months leading up to the election; few voters came out on polling day, as military trucks lined-up near voting stations; and the Egyptian opposition heavily contested the results. The election may have been aimed, in part, to prepare the ground for Gamal Mubarak to succeed his father, but many would argue this election– like others before it and elsewhere in the Arab world – was meaningless. Only one year later, following dramatic uprisings across Egypt and Mubarak’s downfall, elections were held once again. Arguably, the air was equally tense, but this time filled with energy. Campaigning was boisterous; voters streamed to the polls –most for the first time ever, and results, although contested, were unprecedented and largely seen as legitimate. The elections left open many questions about Egypt’s future, but one thing that seemed certain: these elections mattered. This dichotomous portrayal of elections before and after the Arab uprisings – viewed, respectively, as irrelevant and significant – is widespread, but hardly accurate. As scholars of elections under authoritarian regimes have spent much time and ink explaining, elections play an important role in the maintenance and breakdown of authoritarian regimes, and this was as true in the Arab world as anywhere else.2 Elections did not “cause” uprisings or wholly determine regimes’ ability to withstand the pressures of 2011, but they did affect the maintenance and breakdown of authoritarian regimes, the regimes’ responses to region-wide crises that erupted in January 2011, and ultimately, will affect the outcomes of these crises as well.