1 Bahrain's Opposition and the 2014 Parliamentary Elections Brief

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1 Bahrain's Opposition and the 2014 Parliamentary Elections Brief Bahrain’s opposition and the 2014 Parliamentary Elections Bahrain’s opposition and the 2014 Parliamentary Elections Brief Bahrain’s national democratic opposition societies will currently not Be partaking in the 2014 parliamentary elections. Although this is not the preferred position, due to their ongoing insistence of working within the system proactively for political reform, a lack of positive movements from the authorities render this position unavoidable. The powers of the elected parliament have in fact regressed during the past four years, and other outstanding concerns remain unaddressed. Meanwhile human rights violations remain flagrant and senior opposition figures continue to Be held Behind Bars, many of whom should Be accommodated into a political process. The Bahrain Government suffers from an acute crisis of legitimacy and the opposition must work to alter this, without alienating the people of Bahrain who have committed themselves to democratic change. Background Al Wefaq National Islamic Society came into inception in 2001 following the National Action Charter that permitted opposition political societies. A founding core of the society is to promote democratic reform through the transition to a genuine constitutional monarchy, engaging within the system to do so. It did not participate in the 2002 parliamentary elections, following the King’s reneging on the National Action Charter with the unilateral imposing of a new constitution that granted little power to the elected chamBer of Parliament1. However, in 2006 Al Wefaq did take part in the elections gaining 16 of the 40 seats2. In 2010 they gained two further seats affirming its position as the largest Bloc in the parliament3. In FeBruary 2011 mass protests took place across Bahrain, calling for greater democracy. They were Brutally crushed4; to this date more than 1005 protesters have Been killed either in detention or By heavy-handed violence from the security forces. In response all 18 of Al Wefaq’s MP’s resigned from parliament, refusing to legitimise the repression of peaceful protests6. Along with the treatment of protesters, Al Wefaq has complained over a lack of powers held By the elected chamBer of parliament, with the power of veto offered to Both the unelected shura council and the King himself. Furthermore, their MP’s, Both whilst in and out of parliament, criticized the inability to hold ministers to account, particularly over issues relating to corruption. In addition to the nature of the parliament Al Wefaq has descriBed the electoral system as “gerrymandered”, in order to ensure the opposition can never take hold of a majority in parliament. 1 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67553/jane-kinninmont/Bahrains-re-reform-movement?page=show 2 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/26/AR2006112600280.html 3 http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/23/us-bahrain-elections-fb-idUSTRE69M0TO20101023 4 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201121714223324820.html 5 http://www.tasnimnews.com/English/Home/Single/373903 6 http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=44626 Al Wefaq National Islamic Society – OctoBer 2014 1 Bahrain’s opposition and the 2014 Parliamentary Elections An election is not dialogue Since the Beginning of the current political crisis in 2011, Al Wefaq has regularly pushed for a political dialogue with the authorities7, in order to reach agreement over a reform plan that can provide a solution. There have Been various attempts at doing this, with each having failed to ever truly get off the ground. Whilst there are some within the royal family who accept the need to negotiate a solution, the powerful hard-line Bloc, centred on the Prime Minister, have worked to undermine any talks By widening human rights abuses. For them, the only solution to the crisis is repression of the popular demands. Previous dialogue failures • March 2011 – Following 3 weeks of protest, Bahrain’s Crown Prince came forward and proposed a 7 point plan to discuss with the opposition8. The plan included: 1. Parliament will full powers 2. A government that represents the will of the people 3. Fair voting constituencies 4. Citizenship issues 5. Anti-corruption 6. Selling of state properties 7. Addressing sectarianism These seven principles are in fact very close to the general demands of the Bahraini people and make up the BackBone of the oppositions “Manama Document” that outlines their aspirations for a democratic Bahrain9. Therefore the opportunity was positively responded to By the opposition, But this chance was immediately taken away when the following day the King invited Saudi troops into the country to crush protests10. • July 2011 – The first “national consensus dialogue” Began in July 2011 following the ending of the emergency martial law. It was clear from early on that this would not Be following on from the principles of the Crown Prince and failed after just a few days. The opposition received just 5 seats at the table, out of the 300 in total, revealing how heavily weighted it would Be against the opposition. Just a few months later, during the opening of the 66th General AssemBly, President OBama called for “meaningful dialogue” in Bahrain11, as a signal that the dialogue of July 2011 was far from realising this. 7 http://alwefaq.net/cms/2014/02/09/26690/ 8 http://alive.in/bahrain/blog/2011/03/13/crown-prince-asserts-that-the-right-of-security-and-safety-is- above-all-other-considerations-and-that-the-legality-to-claim-must-not-be-at-the-expense-of-security- staBility/ 9 alwefaq.net/cms/2011/10/12/5934/ 10 www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/world/middleeast/15Bahrain.html?pagewanted=all 11 bahrainjdm.hopto.org/2011/09/21/president-obama-calls-for-meaningful-dialogue-and-peaceful-change- for-bahrain/ Al Wefaq National Islamic Society – OctoBer 2014 2 Bahrain’s opposition and the 2014 Parliamentary Elections • February 2013 – September 2013 – Despite regular calls from the opposition for a dialogue it took 18 months for it to finally arrive Back on the agenda. A new “national dialogue” was set up that was much smaller in size and initially provided some promise. However, no agreement was ever reached upon even an agenda or the make-up of the table. More importantly it was portrayed By the Authorities as Being Between the communities of Bahrain, whilst the Government stands aside and mediates. This was rejected By the opposition who felt the serious power Brokers in the country had to Be engaged in order for it to Be worthwhile. In SeptemBer 2013, after the arrest of Khalil Almarzooq a leading figure of Al Wefaq, the opposition suspended their involvement and it was formally ended in DecemBer 2013. • January 2014 – Crown Prince re-emerges – At the Beginning of this year there was some potential promise when the Crown Prince met with Sheikh Ali Salman, Al Wefaq Secretary General. They agreed to meet to discuss how to reignite a dialogue process, although little progress has since Been recorded. The main sticking point has Been the failure of the authority as a whole to endorse this process, leaving the Crown Prince in a position of acting on his own Behalf, rather than the authority as a whole. The international community, urging Both sides to come together in this regard, has supported the call for dialogue. What is clear is that an electoral process cannot Be a suBstitute for a dialogue. A dialogue is a step outside of the establishment, in order to review Best practices and to seek common agreement. An election is nothing more than a continuation of the current system and only legitimises the status quo, rather than challenging it. The people of Bahrain have underlined their rejection of this state of affairs and an election will not fix Bahrain’s proBlems. In order for a successful election to take place, a dialogue must come first that can address the issues of why the majority of the population feel unrepresented and alienated By the current system. Although some argue that engaging in parliament will give the opposition the opportunity to lay forward their demands, their experience of 5 years in parliament is contrary to this idea. 1) Weak parliamentary powers When Al Wefaq withdrew from parliament in 2011 they cited an inability to hold ministers to account. Since then this has taken a further step Back. In August 2014 the current parliament voted to weaken itself, agreeing a proposal to change how a Minister can Be summoned. Previously only a simple majority was needed, But this is changing to an absolute majority meaning 27 out of the 40 MP’s will Be needed in order to summon a Minster for questioning. In addition a commission must also Be formed to determine whether or not the question is in fact “valid”12. So whilst the 12 http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:oR5lGWzZwxQJ:m.gulf-daily- news.com/NewsDetails.aspx%3Fnewsid%3D378449+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk (article removed from Gulf Daily News But availaBle as a cached version.) Al Wefaq National Islamic Society – OctoBer 2014 3 Bahrain’s opposition and the 2014 Parliamentary Elections powers the parliament held previously were weak, they have now Become even weaker, despite promises to make democratic reforms. Beyond the current attempts to weaken the parliament, the original make-up leaves much to Be desired. Bahrain has a Bi-cameral electoral system, the elected Council of Representatives and the unelected Shura Council, appointed By royal decree. Both chamBers hold equal weight, But the Shura Council is appointed By an unaccountable and unelected government, thereBy leaving no space to question the appointments. In practical terms this allows the government to handpick its supporters to sit in the upper house, acting as a stalwart against any legislation coming from the elected chamBer.
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