PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL REFORM POST ARAB SPRING essays by HALA ALDOSARI LORI PLOTKIN BOGHARDT JAMES BOWKER MOHAMED ELJARH BEYOND JOHN P. ENTELIS SARAH FEUER SIMON HENDERSON ISLAMISTS HASSAN MNEIMNEH GHAITH AL-OMARI DAVID POLLOCK AND NATHANIEL RABKIN NADIA AL-SAKKAF VISH SAKTHIVEL AUTOCRATS DAVID SCHENKER ANDREW J. TABLER SARAH FEUER, SERIES EDITOR ERIC TRAGER essays by HALA ALDOSARI LORI PLOTKIN BOGHARDT JAMES BOWKER BEYOND MOHAMED ELJARH JOHN P. ENTELIS SARAH FEUER SIMON HENDERSON ISLAMISTS HASSAN MNEIMNEH GHAITH AL-OMARI DAVID POLLOCK AND NATHANIEL RABKIN NADIA AL-SAKKAF VISH SAKTHIVEL AUTOCRATS DAVID SCHENKER ANDREW J. TABLER ERIC TRAGER SARAH FEUER, series editor Prospects for Political Reform Post Arab Spring The opinions expressed in this book are those of the authors and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, includ- ing photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permis- sion in writing from the publisher. © 2017 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 1111 19TH STREET NW, SUITE 500 WASHINGTON, DC 20036 www.washingtoninstitute.org DESIGN: 1000colors.org COVER PHOTO: Demonstrators chant slogans during a protest to support the transformation of the country into a federal state in Benghazi, Libya, 2012 (REUTERS/Asmaa Waguih). Introduction ... 1 CONTENTS DAVID SCHENKER, June 2015 By the first months of 2015, Post-Jasmine Tunisia ... 4 concern about the political di- SARAH FEUER, June 2015 rection of the Middle East had Morocco: Prospects for Civil Society ... 16 long since eclipsed the ephem- VISH SAKTHIVEL, August 2015 eral optimism of the 2010–11 The Algerian Conundrum ... 29 Arab Spring. Many countries JOHN P. ENTELIS, January 2016 in the region appeared to be headed toward either a return Bahrain: Stalled Reforms and Future U.S. Role ... 36 of traditional dictators or a new SIMON HENDERSON, January 2016 Islamist authoritarianism. Yet Lebanon’s [Un]Civil Society ... 42 despite this, modest opportu- DAVID SCHENKER, March 2016 nities to move toward greater Iraq’s Imperiled Democracy ... 50 pluralism, more-representative NATHANIEL RABKIN, June 2016 government, and increased re- ... spect for human values were still Yemen’s Relapse into Tribalism 61 NADIA AL-SAKKAF, August 2016 to be found in several Middle East countries. Egypt’s Occasional Non-Islamist Reformists ... 71 ERIC TRAGER, September 2016 To address the prospects for ... the region's non-Islamist, non- Saudi Arabia: The Virtual Quest for Citizenship and Identity 81 HALA ALDOSARI, October 2016 dictatorial forces, the Wash- ington Institute announced in Narratives of Reform in the UAE ... 90 June 2015 a new series of LORI PLOTKIN BOGHARDT, November 2016 scholarly papers, Beyond Is- Struggling to Advance in Post-Spring Libya ... 98 lamists and Autocrats: Pros- MOHAMED ELJARH, January 2017 pects for Political Reform Post Governance as a Path to Palestinian Political Rejuvenation ... 103 Arab Spring, to be published GHAITH AL-OMARI, January 2017 over the following eighteen to twenty-four months. The Narrowing Field of Syria’s Opposition ... 110 JAMES BOWKER, ANDREW J. TABLER, April 2017 This volume completes the Kuwait: Democracy Trumps Reform ... 118 cycle by bringing together the DAVID POLLOCK, July 2017 entire published series, pre- sented, with one exception, The Arab Spring at Six Years: Lessons and Prospects ... 126 chronologically. HASSAN MNEIMNEH, April 2017 BEYOND ISLAMISTS AND AUTOCRATS Four years on, the Middle East is aflame, but the Arab INTRODUCTION states have not fallen like dominoes to the Islamists. In Egypt, a Muslim Brotherhood electoral victory was re- ■ DAVID SCHENKER versed by a military coup; in Tunisia, a democratically elected but widely unpopular Islamist-led coalition ced- N LATE 2010 AND EARLY 2011, the Middle East ed power to a more secular coalition government. Else- was rocked by revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, where in the region, non-Islamists—individuals, NGOs, Yemen, and Syria, and by popular protests in a and political parties—are also contesting the concept of Inumber of other countries. The so-called Arab Spring religiously inspired government. Yet ISIS and other Islam- signaled the end of three Arab authoritarian regimes, ic extremists remain quite powerful in some places, while and appeared to promise improvements in gover- traditional autocrats claiming various shades of religious nance, if not democratic development, in these states legitimacy continue to rule in others. and throughout the region. Quickly, though, cautious To be sure, few of the non-Islamists are secular, ei- optimism shifted to concern—not only about the return ther in the sense of eschewing religion or in supporting of traditional secular Arab nationalist dictators but also a separation of mosque and state. Many adherents or about the potential for a new Islamist-leaning region- sympathizers are personally religious, and many sup- al authoritarianism. port some role for religious values in public life. Nor are By 2013, Islamist governments had come to power these non-Islamists all liberals: they comprise traditional in Egypt and Tunisia, Islamist militias had taken hold in elitists, ardent nationalists, leftists, and even varying de- a Libya liberated from Muammar Qadhafi’s rule, and grees of constitutional monarchists. But what does unite the secular Syrian revolt had morphed into a rebellion this group is its rhetorical emphasis on pluralism, reli- led by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and gious tolerance, and individual freedoms, and its oppo- al-Qaeda. The “spring,” from the perspective of both sition to Islamist political programs that have promoted Washington and the Middle East, was starting to feel exclusivist, intolerant, and sharia-based agendas. more like a long winter with little prospect for a positive Judging from contemporary Washington discourse, outcome. While many Arabs signaled their clear oppo- one might gather that the current Arab context repre- sition to collective sharia-based government, political sents a contest solely between religious fundamentalism Islam was ascendant and, many believed, irreversible. and authoritarianism, some military, some monarchical. 1 Beyond Islamists & Autocrats But the reality is more complex: between these two ex- Although the potential of non-Islamist political ac- tremes, there are authentic popular Arab forces calling tors should not be exaggerated, the group is critical if for more representative government and greater indi- Middle East states are to progress toward pluralistic, tol- vidual freedoms. Those forces, encompassed within the erant systems of governance. As such, the Washington non-Islamist camp, are central to determining the future Institute for Near East Policy has determined that survey- character of the Middle East. Despite the many deficits ing the ideas, organizational capacity, and domestic and of the region’s non-Islamist political actors, the United foreign support of these actors would be a productive States has an abiding interest in seeing them prevail. exercise. A series of scholarly papers, to be published To date, much has been written about the headline over the next eighteen months, will thus present differing cases of Egypt and Tunisia, but modest opportunities levels of optimism about prospects for the region’s non- to move toward greater pluralism, more-representative Islamist, nondictatorial forces. Most contributors, unsur- government, and increased respect for universal human prisingly, are not nearly as hopeful as the Washington values can be found elsewhere in the region as well. In Post’s Jackson Diehl, who wrote on April 27, 2015: a sense, Islamists’ poor governance record and declin- That one country, Tunisia, has succeeded in estab- ing popularity in some quarters have created an open- lishing a working democracy, despite power strug- ing for non-Islamist alternatives. gles between secularists and Islamists, and terror- Voting data confirms this opening. To cite two ex- ism by jihadists, shows that the goal of democratic amples, liberal, socialist/populist, and even avowedly transformation was neither a pipe dream nor a secular parties won a combined majority of seats in Western imposition unsuited for Arab lands. Tunisia’s 2011 Constituent Assembly elections, and non-Islamist candidates won 57 percent of the vote in What the articles will offer are sober assessments of non- the first round of Egypt’s 2012 presidential elections. Islamist and democratically and pluralistically inclined In many other Arab countries, from Morocco to Libya actors in a dozen or so Middle East states. The analy- all the way to Iraq and Kuwait, non-Islamist parties or sis focuses on the particular conditions in each country, candidates have tended to outpoll their rivals. detailing the goals, strengths, and weaknesses of the No doubt, ample reason exists for caution about the groups in question, and exploring their approach in the prospects for the region’s non-Islamist political forces. contest with their Islamist rivals. Many of these groups are poorly organized, plagued Only in recent months have voices in Washington be- by infighting, lack a coherent message, and have been gun to recognize the promise, however