Downloaded By: [Georgetown University] At: 15:20 19 March 2008 60NS.N,Wsigo,D 05,UA -al [email protected] E-mail: USA. 20057, DC Washington, NW, St. N 3600 O:10.1080/10576100701878424 online DOI: 1521-0731 / print 1057-610X LLC ISSN: Group, Francis & Taylor © Copyright Terrorism & Conflict in Studies ftroim ernhsamd rie,fiacd nprd raie,adotherwise and organized, years. the inspired, over financed, groups trained, violent of armed, sponsors active dozens has most world’s supported the Tehran of one terrorism. been has of Iran 1979, in Revolution Islamic the Since a hne vrteyas h ril hnasse ..atmt opesIa ihregard with Iran press to attempts U.S. assesses then article The years. the over changed has international and that wrath aware U.S. highly incur is would it terrorism third, for And support condemnation. years. become its recent has in in Iran escalation terrorists Second, major of any weapons. backing and its are methods in groups cautious existing terrorists these more with as providing effectively advantages First, operate tactical transferred few to reasons. not Iran able several offers has weapons for Tehran unconventional transfer weapons such not years, with nuclear and restraint 15 or this over continue biological, to for likely chemical, is weapons Iran terrorists. chemical to systems of unconventional possession Iraq. in its groups radical and of array an to tied is Iran that contends regularly government U.S. the t esa ufnihoho,btas errssadrdcl nLbnn h Palestinian the Lebanon, in radicals elsewhere. and and Philippines, terrorists the also Bosnia, territories, but neighborhood, Gulf Persian its rn errs,adWaoso asDestruction Mass of Weapons and Terrorism, Iran, hsatcebgn yrveighwIa a sdtroimi h atadhwthis how and past the in terrorism used has Iran how reviewing by begins article This years 25 last the than more for terrorism for support real very Iran’s despite Yet drs orsodnet r ailBmn ietr etrfrPaeadScrt Studies, Security and Peace for Center Director, Byman, Daniel Dr. 2007. to June correspondence 15 Address accepted 2007; June 15 Received ahntn C USA DC, Washington, Institution Policy Brookings East Middle for Center Saban and USA DC, Washington, University Studies Georgetown Security and Peace for Center BYMAN DANIEL nisbcigo errssi eetyas n hr,Tha shgl wr htany international and that terrorism. 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Iran’s States—did reduce major United a the than as recently Iran more terrorism Tehran’s states—despite European experienced dialogue.” “critical having as known process a through Iran in moderation h ntdSae loetne h ec fsntosbyn rn uihn those punishing Iran, beyond sanctions of reach the extended also States United The Iran 1984, In increased. sanctions U.S. of type and number the year, passing each With ..pesr ae oehti h ae19s steUie ttshpdta h new, the that hoped States United the as 1990s, late the in somewhat eased pressure U.S. more isolation—and, and sanctions of effect cumulative the however, time, Over the in terrorism use to continued Iran dialogue,” “critical of beginning the after Even ..sntoscniudee fe h otg rssedd ahntnremained Washington ended. crisis hostage the after even continued sanctions U.S. sUS rsueicesdi h i-90,svrlErpa ttstidt foster to tried states European several mid-1990s, the in increased pressure U.S. As $ 0mlini rnsolindustry. oil Iran’s in million 20 19 20 rn errs,adWD177 WMD and Terrorism, Iran, uaei- Khalq, Mujahedin-e udru errs ru that group terrorist murderous a 21 Downloaded By: [Georgetown University] At: 15:20 19 March 2008 rncerwaost errs ru.Bcueteewaoscnb devastating—or, be can weapons these Because radiological, group. biological, terrorist chemical, that provide a is to to spot likely bright weapons One not either. nuclear is hopeless or not it is suggests it behavior but pretty, past not Iran’s is far thus painted picture The Terrorism WMD and Iran a and to 1980s led the have (in would oil mismanagement of political and price Iraq, event. the any with in for in war plunge crisis explanation the the the with of that along part notes 1990s), small She a Meghan morass. only infrastructure. Until with economic are oil Iran’s along debilitating. sanctions dilapidated which that Iran’s more investment, contends of crisis however, foreign development O’Sullivan, debt discouraged the Iran’s also delayed ILSA made sanctions Total, other Iran, block for to waiver to 1998 funding efforts the Bank successful World Washington’s and particular IMF in pressure, Financial considerably. any eventual for support the Iran. international and generate attacks to in 1996 harder retaliation. the it reform since made time culpability a Iranian of of Byman had of passage D. have determination the opponents historically Finally, attacks success. the terrorist of for record strengthen retaliation poor in would strikes military retaliation limited Moreover, that Administration complicity. reasoned Iranian of officials evidence considerable despite attack rapprochement. Towers further Khobar for gestures way symbolic the as paving intended to were addition but in part, economy openness most State Iran’s U.S. the of on For of Secretary impact pistachios. later, the little and caviar, 2000, had year carpets, In gestures Iranian One these Iran. of to import relationship. the medicine on improved and restrictions food an lifted export for to given called was permission and election Khatami’s welcomed 178 htUS opne ottaeadivsmn potnte.Idrc acin proved sanctions Indirect governments. other opportunities. and European investment from protests and vociferous to led trade ILSA costly. lost particularly companies U.S. that problem. this Mahmoud worsen of of only June will consolidation in president, charge The election new the anti-Americanism. heavy Iran’s by of particularly as symbolized wave years, Ahmadinejad a a recent on pressure, in part Iran U.S. in in into power power conservative gave to as came they regime branded if the being States as risked United leaders the of Iranian of costs considerable. the puppets were Washington, pressure to kowtowing U.S. perceived with any exports. complying opposed its for which price of maximize both the nationalism, gain to ability country’s supplier trade a one to on its market impact one diversified significant of cutoff no Tehran the has major and products, Iran’s commodity, Second, global Iranian States. a United essence Although for the in reach damage. export—oil—is market to countries potential major third the through worked a of and partners was much offset States to United Iran the allowing that manageable, “proof” were as costs sanctions cite to revolution. Iran’s regime Islamic increased the the crush sanctions enabling to the States, sought advance, Moreover, Washington United not objectives. did the U.S. shift its toward this overall shift but hostility back, did Israel, toward Iran set and terrorism. arguably Gulf to the and regard and Europe with from particularly away regime, terrorism the of orientation political lhuhuscesu nsopn errs,terneo ..sntosddhr Iran hurt did sanctions U.S. of range the terrorism, stopping in unsuccessful Although the for retaliate to not decided administration Clinton the however, importantly, Most h ott h ntdSae a locnieal.Sntos fcus,meant course, of Sanctions, considerable. also was States United the to cost The Persian and radicalism Islamic on legitimacy for depended regime Iran’s Because the importantly, most and First, reasons. several for sanctions resist to able was Iran the affect not did it damaging, was Iran on sanctions of impact economic the Although 22 23 24 Downloaded By: [Georgetown University] At: 15:20 19 March 2008 ilnttlrt otne abrn fsno lQeammeso n rna is even it ties, that Iranian Tehran any group. to or terrorist members clear the Qaeda make to Al ones, senior must indirect of States actively harboring and United continued lines” tolerate The “red not destruction. U.S. will the mass recognize of not weapons does seeks Qaeda Al proxies, traditional Iran’s to overall and considerable. economy be world is still the government—would it on or in effect Although agents confidence the radiological priority. thus or intelligence impact—and biological, psychological chemical, top the many a weapons, with casualties remain mass must inflict to destruction difficult mass of weapons and U.S. a cross would weapons recognize radiological and a terrorism or As line.” for nuclear, “red 9/11. support biological, their after in chemical, administration ever providing than Bush that cautious in the more attention from are today tremendous more states received even result, that and any concern administration Preventing policy. a Clinton U.S. was the for weapons success unconventional clear a of is transfer This its systems. decrease unconventional of to transfer and terrorists to systems general. in unconventional terrorism other for chemical support or provide not weapons does Tehran biological ensure to or steps several consider should States United The Recommendations tie ol edtevci orsodwt ulfreams immediately. almost force nuclear full a of with nothing respond say to (to victim Iran attack the As biological lead terrorists. or backing would chemical when strike) a day notes, this to Pollack Hizballah Kenneth Lebanese expert the through its works often to it agents or weapons so. biological do Perhaps to or sponsor. capability chemical state its transferred its despite is not and proxies, group has affected the Iran widely directly are surprisingly, both weapons number de-legitimating not these potentially addition, the heinous, In when escalation. as provoke even seen to likely terrifying more far psychologically are least, low—they very the at rvnefciefrTha.Ol nteeeto rl rv hetsc sa nainof invasion window. an the as out such go threat cautions grave have traditional truly Tehran’s bombs a of of truck many event would and the Iran in assassinations Only Tehran. as for such effective proven tactics terrorist Traditional circumstances. from considerable use be weapons. to would unconventional group with impact terrorist attack psychological limited skilled the a a although even even of casualties, for types mass difficult available inflict be more systems to would the and of agents tactics some biological current Indeed, and their casualties. chemical Moreover, considerable weapons. inflict these to powers them of other enable and use States terrorist United the to by regard drawn line” with “red the recognize to appear They Qaeda. Qaeda. Al to attacks compared any be about cautious to proxies them Iran’s lead made would Qaeda, that Al against and terrorism, campaign about U.S. concern active worldwide the tremendous The Lebanon. from withdrawal Israeli retaliation. from Iran shield not would cutouts or proxies roiyms lob ie octigayte ewe rnadA ad.I contrast In Qaeda. Al and Iran between ties any cutting to given be also must priority A terrorists between link the level, diplomatic a at pressure this continuing to addition In any to regard with pressure maintain to work must States United the obviously, Most ernhsas ogta es ereo eiblt nisueo errs— reason terrorism—a of use its in deniability of degree a least at sought also has Tehran erni o ieyt hneisbhvo nti cr xeti h otextreme most the in except score this on behavior its change to likely not is Tehran Al does as destruction mass of weapons seek actively proxies favored Iran’s do Nor the after year a over occurred attacks The effect. limiting a had also has 11 September rn errs,adWD179 WMD and Terrorism, Iran, 25 h s of use The Downloaded By: [Georgetown University] At: 15:20 19 March 2008 nMlyi n h hlpie,adta t xml nprdSiie nNrhYmn Saudi Yemen, North in Shi’ites inspired example its that and Bakhash, Pakistan. Philippines, and Turkey, the Arabia, and Malaysia in Terrorism Sponsor that rnhso h aw at ntal ondSII sddteOgnzto fIlmcAction. Islamic of Organization the did as SCIRI, joined initially party Da’wa the of Branches East the like groups secular 72. p. radical 1996), as Policy, East well Near for as Institute Algeria, Washington Eisenstadt, The in Michael DC: Party. Front Workers Kurdish Salvation al-Nahda the Egypt, Islamic and in PFLP-GC Group the Palestine Islamic the and the Hamas, Hezbollah, Tunisia, as Kurdish such in Action, Islamists Islamic with Turkish worked the has Jihad, Iran Islamic that notes Eisenstadt Michael 235–236. eouinadWar and Revolution 131. p. Notes that ensure otherwise continue and to Tehran Iran. toward is on policy pressure States U.S. increase United in that to the priority sense support a for a well. allied remains bet of counterterrorism up as best out shore future The and to the hostile. revenge try irrevocably in of to is out so and States both do terrorism activities, United conduct to its the to likely capacity increase Iran’s is certainly able damage and to almost to itself past little would shown regard do the has would with in strikes Iran military pressure areas. terrorism concerns Limited economic on these vital hard U.S. in pressing limited, resist other however Iraq—and to has progress, in activities any States its jeopardize United and may program The nuclear its limited. Iran—both are terrorism for sponsor to Hizballah also Lebanese the should Qaeda as States Al such United proxies terrorism. The senior uses Palestinian justice. it expel when to accountable to brought more be Iran well unwillingness will hold as regime’s they noted where Iranian countries be the to should members particularly inactions Tehran’s actions, particular, its In terrorism. as the for all support are of Iranian short that of fall states they reward In though to list. even power terrorism, sponsors” to more Byman “state criteria. regard D. given desired the with be behavior to should their linked improving branch punishments executive more of branch the executive implementation particular, the giving its requires in This terrorism. flexibility state to approach nuanced alone power more U.S. Europe. in terrorism for effective. support less its far reduced proved it has European sanctions, multilateralism. getting in in of succeed join would importance States to United the states the suggests that mid-1990s Iran the in on feared pressure Iran When of failure relative The alone. 180 ial,plcmkr hudrcgieta ..otoswt eadt rna support Iranian to regard with options U.S. that recognize should policymakers Finally, types other punish, and recognize, should lists and categories U.S. that is converse The a develop must States United the general, in terrorism of use Iran’s decrease To States United the by maintained be cannot efforts intelligence and pressure Effective Blioe D on okn nvriyPes 1985) Press, University Hopkins Johns MD: (Baltimore, .Prso hsatceda nm eetbo,Dne Byman, Daniel book, recent my on draw article this of Parts 1. .SalBkah o xml,cam hti h 90 rndrcl ie ulmradicals Muslim aided directly Iran 1980s the in that claims example, for Bakhash, Shaul 2. .ItrainlCii ru,“rqsSitsudrOcpto”(etme 03,p.12–13. pp. 2003), (September Occupation” under Shiites “Iraq’s Group, Crisis International 7. .A utdi nuhrvnEhteshami, Anoushiravan in quoted As 3. .Frarve ftewrpoetnece frvltoaysae,seSehnWalt, Stephen see states, revolutionary of tendencies war-prone the of review a For Bakhash, 5. in quoted As 4. .A utdi .K Ramazani, K. R. in quoted As 6. Ihc,N:CrelUiest rs,1994). Press, University Cornell NY: (Ithaca, NwYr:CmrdeUiest rs,2005). Press, University Cambridge York: (New eg fteAyatollahs the of Reign eg fteAyatollahs the of Reign eouinr rn hleg n epnei h Middle the in Response and Challenge Iran: Revolutionary fe Khomeini After .233. p. , , .24. p. rna iiayPower Military Iranian NwYr:BscBos 1986) Books, Basic York: (New NwYr:Rulde 1995) Routledge, York: (New edyCnetos States Connections: Deadly (Washington, , pp. , Downloaded By: [Georgetown University] At: 15:20 19 March 2008 ik oIa,bthv e ls ist h eaeeHzalh te rusta r o ikdin linked “Hizballah.” not name are the that adopted time groups to Other time Hizballah. from have Lebanese Hizballah, the Turkish as to such ties Tehran, close to term have reportedly way few often this have any have movements movements time, These but Hizballah countries. Iran, Over other regime. to revolution. among Islamic Arabia, links the the Saudi of and battles to Bahrain, loyalty days Kuwait, street in signify early fought appeared to the whom used in label of organizations a many other became militants, or pro-regime leftist rival with against associated are “Hizballahis” Iran, 159. p. 2001), oee,aintdmn aw ebr,laigprso h raiaint ev h movement. the leave to organization the of movement, parts the leading dominate members, to Da’wa attempt Iran’s many leader. alienated spiritual however, its as Khomeini Ayatollah accepted SCIRI okdwt h rna mas nDmsu o oitclspot o eiw e laWalsh, Elsa see review, a For support. logistical also IRGC suspects for Case,” the The Last Damascus Kingdom. that Freeh’s in the “Louis noted Embassy in Arabia Iranian operations Saudi several the directed to with leader deported worked IRGC later an and that and FBI him the recruited by detained suspect One members. 113. p. 1997), 138. Mind p. of Press), States University Theologies, Ideologies, Psychologies, Terrorism: of Origins 2004) n a rmrl h ornoscsso ohsdsadmta xasin ansRanstorp, Magnus exhaustion. war’s Crisis the mutual Hostage for and Western reason the sides 117. the of p. both Politics although 1997), on The Iran, costs Lebanon: hindered in horrendous efforts Hiz‘ballah the Such from regime. primarily particularly exiles the arms, was Iranian weaken buy end to to to support harder attempt limited far provided an it also in Washington making supplier. Iraq, major Iran’s against formerly effort America, war the hindered This arms. ootfrarsu iso,a hyblee nentoa upr ol o eforthcoming. be not would decision support administration’s international Carter believed the they as to mission, contributed rescue sanctions new a these allowing for essence of opt contracts in to nature new “expanded,” banned weak be they to rather Although contracts The reality. existing sales. in allowed they than republic, paper Islamic on the stronger with far them made that 2003) loopholes Brookings, DC: (Washington, p 83–98. pp. 4 uihPle Harik, Palmer Judith 14. In confusion. much to leading “Hizballah,” label the use frequently groups Iranian-linked 13. Pillar, Paul 12. 1 rnsosrdSuiHzalh hc are u h obn,adas rie cell trained also and bombing, the out carried which Hizballah, Saudi sponsored Iran 11. Jaber, Hala 10. 5 Ehteshami, 15. 8 ehnO’Sullivan, 1997,” in Spies Meghen Iran’s ‘Outed’ 18. U.S. “Officials: Slavin, Barbara 17. receiving from Iran prevent to Staunch” “Operation initiated States United the 1983, In 16. 1 aySc,“rn ofotn Terrorism,” Confronting “Iran: Sick, Gary 21. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 19. 2 O’Sullivan, 22. 5 ent Pollack, Kenneth 25. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 23. , .Ramazani, 8. .A utdi atnKae,“h oa oi fHzalh”i atrRih ed., Reich, Walter in Hizballah,” of Logic Moral “The Kramer, Martin in quoted As 9. p 2–4. pp. , , , , .90. p. 47–49. pp. .55. p. 86. p. eouinr Iran, Revolutionary errs n ..FrinPolicy Foreign U.S. and Terrorism fe Khomeini, After hedSanctions, Shrewd ebla:Br ihaVengeance a with Born Hezbollah: h esa Puzzle Persian The h e Yorker New The ebla:TeCagn aeo Terrorism of Face Changing The Hezbollah: hedSntos ttcatadSaeSosr fTerrorism of Sponsors State and Statecraft Sanctions: Shrewd rn errs,adWD181 WMD and Terrorism, Iran, , .152. p. p 84.TeErpa acin,hwvr a several had however, sanctions, European The 48–49. pp. p 1 67–72. 61, pp. .37. p. 4My20,p.68–79. pp. 2001, May 14 , NwYr:Rno os,2004) House, Random York: (New ahntnQuarterly Washington Wsigo,D:TeBoknsInstitution, Brookings The DC: (Washington, NwYr:Clmi nvriyPress, University Columbia York: (New NwYr:S.Mri’ Press, Martin’s St. York: (New S Today, USA Cmrde Cambridge (Cambridge: NwYr:IB Tauris, I.B. York: (New 64 Otbr2003), (October 26(4) , p 420–421. pp. 0Mrh2004. March 30