SPACE and DEFENSE

Volume Five Number One Summer 2011

Coalitions in Space: Where Networks are Power by James Clay Moltz The 2010 National Space Policy: Down to Earth? by Joan Johnson-Freese Operationally Responsive Space: Past, Present, and Future by Stuart Eves Space Deterrence or Dominance? by Dwayne Liller

EISENHOWER CENTER FOR SPACE AND DEFENSE STUDIES Space and Defense Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies

Editor-in-Chief Ambassador Roger Harrison, [email protected] Director, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies

Academic Editor Dr. Michael Gleason, Lt Col, USAF U.S. Air Force Academy, USA

Associate Academic Editors Dr. Damon Coletta U.S. Air Force Academy, USA Dr. Peter Hays National Security Space Office, USA Dr. Schuyler Foerster U.S. Air Force Academy, USA Lt Col Deron Jackson U.S. Air Force Academy, USA

Reviewers Andrew Aldrin John Logsdon United Launch Alliance, USA George Washington University, USA James Armor Agnieszka Lukaszczyk ATK, USA Space Generation Advisory Council, Austria William Barry Molly Macauley NASA, France Resources for the Future, USA Frans von der Dunk Scott Pace University of Nebraska, USA George Washington University, USA Paul Eckart Xavier Pasco Boeing, USA Foundation for Strategic Research, France Andrew Erickson Wolfgang Rathbeger Naval War College, USA European Space Policy Institute, Austria Joanne Gabrynowicz Scott Trimboli University of Mississippi, USA University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, USA Dana Johnson James Vedda Northrop Grumman, USA Aerospace Corporation, USA Theresa Hitchens Rick Walker United Nations, Switzerland Digital Consulting Services, USA Wade Huntley Annalisa Weigel Independent Researcher, USA Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA Jonty Kasku-Jackson David Whalen National Security Space Institute, USA University of North Dakota, USA Ram Jakhu George Whitesides McGill University, Canada NASA Headquarters, USA Roger Launius Ray Williamson National Air and Space Museum, USA Secure Word Foundation, USA Space and Defense Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies Volume Five ▪ Number One ▪ Summer 2011

Introduction 3 Ambassador Roger Harrison

Articles

Coalition Building in Space: Where Networks are Power 5 James Clay Moltz

The 2010 National Space Policy: Down to Earth? 23 Joan Johnson-Freese

Operationally Responsive Space: The Past, Present, and Future 39 Stuart Eves

Space Deterrence or Dominance? 49 Dwayne Liller

Introduction

Ambassador Roger G. Harrison

Editor-in-Chief

All of the articles submitted for this edition of scalable, and by 2000, Europe was a our journal deal, in one way or another, with legitimate competitor, too. Commercial an essential change in the relative position of companies increased their share of space the United States in space, or – to put the activity, and became supra-national, moving matter rather more bluntly – the decline of offshore to places like the Bahamas and U.S. space power and what to do about it. I Luxemburg. And here came China with both should add quickly that the decline is relative, commercial programs and offensive ASAT and the base against which it’s measured is programs that brought into serious question arbitrary. What is treated as a base was in fact the central proposition of “space control” a high point. It came in the 1990s, when the ideology, i.e. that the U.S. could control former Soviet space program was in disarray, “access to space” and therefore space itself. the Europeans had not yet found their That seems to have become a hollow – albeit competitive edge and the prospect of China as in some circles still hallowed – claim. a power space player was, at best, on the horizon, no bigger than a man’s hand. The The Obama space policy and strategy are U.S. was, for that decade, the unchallenged meant to deal with this new reality, and with “shepherd of space” to use Everett Dolman’s the sobering prospect of budget shortfalls as evocative imagery. It was possible to imagine far as the eye can see. Operating in space the world accepting the United States as a sucks resources at a frightening rate, a bad benevolent hegemon, setting rules to benefit quality to have when the overall pie is all while remaining (as hegemonic powers shrinking. All of our authors seem to accept generally do) somewhere outside the rules this new reality. They focus on its ourselves. At least this vision of “space implications, which might be summed up in control” was possible for U.S. observers to two thoughts: in the future, the United States conjure. The rest of the world was simply will need to collaborate with other nations in annoyed. space, and get more out of every dollar spent. The era of autarky is over. It isn’t necessarily “declinism” to point out that the vision has faded. In space, as in golf, What should we do now? That is the subject it isn’t possible to win by preventing the other all our authors address, and I shall leave them guy from doing better, and the circumstances to speak for themselves. But there is one that led to U.S. domination in the 1990’s omission – not just from these articles, but began to change as the century turned. By from the national dialogue on security space in then, the Russian Federation had regained its general – that I must point out. In all the balanced, and reminded us that it was a near discussion of vaguely defined rules of the peer competitor with technology in some areas road, and norms, voluntary codes of conduct – notably rocket motors – that was still the and “transparency and confidence building best in the world. The European Arianne measures” there is a tendency to forget that launcher had proven both reliable and space is subject to binding international law in 4 Roger Harrison/Introduction

the form of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. That treaty speaks to issues that are no longer relevant: no one planned even in 1967 to station nuclear missiles on the moon. But also has pertinent things to say about consultation, and interference with the satellite operations of other states. It was meant to begin a process which – had it been taken seriously – might have allowed the evolution over time of a legal structure for space to deal with the problems of crowding and debris that we face now. It might even have been a framework for the discussion of curbing an arms race in space. None of this potential was realized, largely because both the Soviet Union and the United States preferred freedom of action to any legally binding regime in space. The Treaty was signed, ratified, and then largely ignored.

I pointed this out recently to a room full of government space analysts, listing the sorts of things the OST addresses, sometimes in specific terms. Someone commented: “We could never get that sort of thing now.” Perhaps not. Luckily, we already have that sort of thing. It may be time to burrow in the archives, dust off the OST and ask ourselves whether its relevant to the concerns we now have in space – and if not, how it can be improved.

RGH

Coalitions in Space: Where Networks are Power

James Clay Moltz Naval Postgraduate School

Abstract: This study begins with the widely largely bilateral (and a few multilateral) recognized problem of 21st century space treaties that banned certain extremely harmful vulnerabilities. To address this challenge, it activities. Fortunately, thanks to these limited proposes the new concept of an “allied space mechanisms and policies of self-restraint, the network” as a possible means of both Cold War in space ended without any direct reducing risks and enhancing space power. attacks on either side’s satellites or other Such a concept would move beyond realist, spacecraft. Cold War “balancing” in space, and instead would require new forms of technical and Yet, since the end of the Cold War, there has political cooperation in the military sector been very little further progress made toward among participating states. In thinking about strengthening international space security future space security this study argues that mechanisms, while there has been a spread of trans-national networks and alliances offer space technology and an expansion in the considerable untapped potential, with possibly number of actors capable of doing harm in significant benefits particularly for the United space. China broke an informal 22-year States, which—unlike China and Russia— moratorium against kinetic-kill anti-satellite already has established military alliances with tests in January 2007 by destroying its own a number of countries possessing or now Fen-Yung 1C weather satellite at 525 miles developing advanced space capabilities. up, creating more than 3,000 pieces of hazardous debris. In response, India has The challenge of achieving security in space vowed to develop an anti-satellite capability. has traditionally been viewed as purely a In the face of the 2002 U.S. decision to national security matter. Until 1991, space withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile activity was dominated by the hostile U.S.- (ABM) Treaty and the Navy’s February 2008 Soviet rivalry, which prevented active security destruction of an ailing satellite with a full cooperation in space beyond a series of tank of hydrazine (U.S. 193)—although at low restraint-based agreements. Other space altitude and with no long-lasting debris— actors remained too weak to matter. In terms Russia stated that it would respond to any of space operations, the two superpowers kept future U.S. action to weaponize space with its apart from one another except for occasional, own program. Among new actors, Iran publicity-serving civilian missions like the successfully orbited a satellite in 2009, and 1975 Apollo-Soyuz flight. What passed for North Korea has made two attempts to do so, cooperative space security arrangements raising concerns about these actors’ intentions during the Cold War emerged from a in space. Recent events have also stimulated somewhat uncomfortable mutual tolerance of interest in space among other national highly independent (and classified) U.S. and militaries, some of whom now speak of new Soviet reconnaissance satellites and a series of “threats” to their space assets. In this context, 6 James Clay Moltz/Coalitions in Space, Where Networks are Power

action-reaction space arming is a widely security and preventing a looming space arms feared trajectory. These dynamics pose a race. This school is found mostly among non- serious risk, particularly because there are a governmental organizations, the arms control number of significant loopholes in the loose community, and some members of the Obama network of existing Cold War space security Administration, who have argued that the risks treaties and conventions, which currently to space security are inherently international allow a variety of space weapons to be tested and that the main problem lies in the lack of and deployed in compliance with international clear “rules” for space. They point out that the law. Moreover, the space environment lacks use of space for weapons purposes will adequate verification mechanisms—such as impinge on other actors as well, particularly if pre-launch inspections, on-orbit spacecraft the attacking country creates orbital space monitoring, and comprehensive space debris that then becomes a risk to other space situational awareness—and is characterized by assets. For this reason, the Obama an increasing number of actors. Administration made significant changes in the U.S. National Space Policy released in In the face of this worrisome trend, one June 2010,2 which now—in contrast to the influential school of thought among U.S. Bush Administration’s policy—supports U.S. space analysts sees strengthened national consideration of new, verifiable international military measures—including ground-to-space agreements to improve space security. weapons, air-to-space systems, and space- based weapons—as the most desirable path Almost two years into the Obama for addressing this emerging space security Administration, however, progress on the dilemma. Such perspectives prevailed among international front has been elusive. Despite the senior ranks of Defense and State more accommodative policies undertaken Department officials during the George W. since 2009 by both the United States and Bush Administration and remain popular China at the U.N. Conference on among conservative analysts. This Disarmament in Geneva, there have been no perspective warns of the risk of what the 2001 formal international talks on space security, Rumsfeld Commission report called a “space thanks to Pakistan’s opposition to forming an Pearl Harbor,” unless the United States agenda that includes “Space is in deploys a range of defensive and offensive a Fissile Material space weapons,1 even though many of these Cut-Off Treaty. This serious need analysts recognize that such deployments has prolonged a gap of stronger might stimulate the same behavior among in such discussions international foreign space programs. But they see few that has lasted since regimes.” alternatives. the early 1990s. In this context, treaty loopholes have festered A second school of thought argues that since the end of the Cold War, while space strengthened norms, rules, and international technology has become more sophisticated treaties are the best means of achieving space and more dispersed during the same years. As a bipartisan U.S. study on security in the

1 U.S. House Armed Services Committee, “Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 2 The White House, “National Space Policy of the United Management and Organization,” January 11, 2001, available States of America,” June 28, 2010, available on the White online from the Air University’s National Space Studies House Office Science and Technology Policy website, at: Center website, at: http://space.au.af.mil/space_commission/ http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_ (accessed August 27, 2010). policy_6-28-10.pdf (accessed August 27, 2010). Space and Defense, Summer 2011 7

“global commons” issued in January 2010 space-based partnerships could reduce costs, concludes, “Space is in serious need of lessen vulnerability, and raise the challenges stronger international regimes.”3 facing would-be attackers, thus obviating the Unfortunately, such agreements do not need for expensive and destabilizing space- currently appear to be on the horizon, except based weapons. This could provide for a voluntary European-sponsored Code of considerable benefits in terms of U.S. and Conduct proposal. These trends foster allied space security and improve chances for uncertainty in regards to space and a tendency developing norms of peaceful international among national militaries to look to behavior. traditional, weapons-based solutions, whose testing, debris generation, and hair-trigger Yet despite these possible advantages of alert systems may put spacecraft at greater “allied” space thinking, no conceptual risk than even during the Cold War. For these framework had been developed to date, and reasons, alternative approaches to reducing policy support has only very recently emerged space vulnerability are needed—and soon. in the 2010 National Space Policy and the 2011 National Security Space Strategy. Notably, one option that has not been Operational cooperation is still very examined seriously enough in the current rudimentary, where it exists at all. Indeed, as space debate is a possible middle-ground the former head of U.S. space operations in alternative for reducing spacecraft Afghanistan complained regarding the lack of vulnerability: that of creating an allied space integration of allied orbital assets, “U.S. space “network.” Specifically, linking space operators are not trained in how to be capabilities first among formal U.S. military integrated into a coalition environment.”4 The allies and then reason stems from more than five decades of perhaps with “Linking space viewing space almost exclusively from a other friendly capabilities first national security perspective, rather than an nations could among formal international security or coalition framework. greatly reduce U.S. military This article argues, however, that changing (if not conditions in space are making the traditional eliminate) the allies … could approach out-dated and increasingly risks of single- greatly reduce ineffective. Instead, an allied approach to point failures the risks of space may represent the best short-term route to important single point to enhanced U.S. and allied space security, space systems failures… while potentially offering benefits to the and create a global community of space users as well new form of space deterrence by raising the through its promotion of restraint-based stakes for adversaries considering launching norms. attacks on space assets. That is, by spreading capabilities among allies in space through the In order to address these issues, this article creation of interoperable, redundant networks first analyzes the nature of space of satellites, including in the military sector, vulnerabilities and offers a

3 Abraham M. Denmark and James Mulvenon, eds., 4 USAF Lt. Col. Tom Single, quoted in Peter B. de Selding, “Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a “U.S. Officer: Secrecy Among Coalition Forces Hinders Use Multipolar World,” Center for a New American Security, of Space Assets in Afghanistan,” Space News, May 10, 2010, Washington, D.C., January 2010, p. 33. p. A1.

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reconceptualization of the current security There are real and credible threats to dilemma facing nations in space. It next Space systems. The ground systems st are vulnerable to attack. There has considers the specific emerging threats to 21 been demonstrated use of GPS and century space security and discusses a SATCOM jammers. Anti-satellite possible framework for moving from national (ASAT) weapons have been to multilateral means of combating them. In demonstrated by the Soviet doing so, it notes certain obstacles to be Union…and in January of 2007, China demonstrated its capability overcome as well. Finally, the article sketches […]. The potential exists for ground- out in draft form what specific capabilities based laser weapons, electro- might be desirable and what foreign magnetic pulse, and co-orbital ASAT contributions the United States might enlist in weapons. Additionally, there are risks creating an allied space network to increase of collision from Space debris and impacts from solar events. There have the mutual security of its members. been many instances of satellite telecommunications interference and piracy.6 Reconceptualizing Space Security Space assets are also threatened by a field of The issue of spacecraft vulnerability relates to orbital space debris that is steadily growing certain basic facts of orbital physics combined due to the increase in human space activity with the relative transparency of space to and the inability of space to “clean” itself radar, optical, and infrared observation.5 quickly. Depending on the altitude of the These conditions make spacecraft liable to orbit, it can take years, decades, or centuries tracking even by amateur astronomers with for pieces of space debris to deorbit. In the only moderately sophisticated equipment, meantime, these particles (even as small as 1 which is easily obtainable by any entry-level centimeter) represent 18,000 miles-per-hour space power. While more complex guidance speeding bullets, which can destroy solar cells technology is required for actual attacks on and cause often fatal damage to any spacecraft space assets and a global network of radars is that are unfortunate enough to cross their needed for conducting post-attack assessments paths.7 Today’s space environment is also of damage done, the ability of even characterized by an expansion in the number moderately advanced space powers to conduct of civil, commercial, and military space significant counterspace activities is not in actors, making international agreements more question. Thus far, only Russia, the United difficult than in the past. States, and China have tested kinetic capabilities, but a number of other countries In the face of these risks and evidence of both (including Iran) have carried out lesser forms expanding military space programs and of electronic interference. As a major space weapons test programs in several countries, assessment conducted by NATO’s Joint Air the response by many U.S. military leaders, Power Competence Centre in 2009 reported elected officials, and even experts is still a on some of the current vulnerabilities faced by traditional call for exclusively national action the alliance in space: to “defend” U.S. assets in space. To take just

5 On these issues, see David Wright, Laura Grego, and 6 Ibid., p. 8. Lisbeth Gronlund, The Physics of Space Security: A 7 National Research Council, Orbital Debris: A Technical Reference Manual (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Assessment (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, Arts and Sciences, 2005). 1995), p. 12. Space and Defense, Summer 2011 9

one U.S. example, Senator Jon Kyl (Rep., some of the same risks of growing human Arizona) stated after the 2007 Chinese ASAT activity, particularly due to the finiteness of its test that the United States must deploy a fleet main, usable resources (geostationary orbital of space-based weapons to defend itself in slots, radio frequencies available for space.8 He made no mention of the threat broadcasting, and safe access to low-Earth China posed to other allied nations or their orbit). All of these resources are becoming possible contributions to the U.S. response. stressed by increasing human space activity.

Historical conditions of anarchy in the Second, economic globalization is an international system have contributed to a increasing fact of life. Unlike during the Cold tendency among leaders to conceive mainly of War, when the world was dominated by two, national responses to international threats. nearly self-sufficient blocs, changes in the States are already organized for national international economic system (due to both defense, countries are jealous of spending political and technological factors) have made scarce resources in potentially risky ventures commercial exchange possible across almost with foreigners (even allies), and there are all political boundaries, vastly increasing relatively low levels of trust regarding the global trade. Interdependent economic reliability of international organizations. But relationships are the rule in U.S. ties with our three factors have altered global dynamics in NATO and Asian allies and even, in some the last few decades, each of which has an areas, with commercial partners like Russia important space component that supports the and China. Similar to many industries, the creation of an allied approach to space. commercial space industry has become truly international and now generates $161-billion First, the scale of multinational interactions to in sales,9 making it a valuable resource for deal with shared problems is increasing due to both national governments and the global the growing “finiteness” of the globe, as the economy more generally. Technologies built world’s population continues to expand and as in one country are frequently owned and communications technologies become more marketed by another and are sold to clients in intrusive and more widespread. Indeed, the yet another. Strong corporate alliances have very nature of the problems countries are already been formed in the space industry, for facing is changing as the Earth becomes example, linking Russian rocket motors with “smaller”: almost all free land and airspace U.S. launch vehicles (International Launch (up to 100 kilometers) have been claimed by Services) and U.S. sub-orbital flight nations (or otherwise allotted by international technology with British funding and law), the sheer scale of industrial pollutants is marketing (Virgin Galactic). With some beginning to have global effects, and such offshore corporations like Intelsat, it is often resources as clean air and water are becoming difficult to tell which individual country a increasingly scarce. Other problems, such as space enterprise actually “belongs” to. climate change, are becoming recognized as National militaries are also purchasing requiring an international response. Despite its bandwidth on a large number of commercial comparative vastness, near-Earth space faces satellites, causing the breadth of a country’s “critical assets” to expand. Some of these 8 “China’s ASAT Test and American National Security,” assets are already shared with other nations, remarks by Senator Kyl at the Heritage Foundation, January 29, 2007, posted on the Globalsecurity.org website, http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2007/space- 9 News Briefs, “Satellite Industry Revenues Topped $160B 070129-kyl01.htm (accessed February 1, 2010). Globally in ’09,” Space News, June 14, 2010, p. 8.

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although not in a joint operational sense. Yet activity have crossed the line from national to devoted military space cooperation between international? Realist political theory argues countries remains highly restricted, a that security, by its very nature, is something characteristic that is out of step with these that falls to states, as the essential building integrationist trends. blocks of the international system and the repositories of sovereignty within it. Yet Third, in military affairs, space is an area specifically delineated as questions of international legitimacy are beyond national sovereignty by international placing a growing emphasis on the need to law in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The conduct operations via coalitions. Put simply, failure of states to expand collective the unilateral use of force is seen as governance mechanisms in regard to space increasingly unacceptable within the may be a factor of habit, perspective, and international community. Largely for this inertia, plus normal bureaucratic opposition to reason, the United States fought under a U.N. negotiations aimed at creating new, mandate in 1991 in the Gulf War against specialized institutions beyond national Iraq’s intervention into Kuwait and in Libya in control. 2011; it fought under a NATO mandate in the Balkans and now under both UN and NATO Recent threats to U.S. space assets have been mandates in Afghanistan; and it fought (less viewed as national security threats because “legitimately” from the perspective of the rest there is a long U.S. tradition of self-reliance in of the world) with an ad hoc coalition of international relations and a perspective that friends and allies in 2003 in Iraq. Indeed, successful collective action is rarely achieved. there is a growing literature on the need for But, in space, all countries have an interest in some international approval even for protecting the environment from military humanitarian interventions by military forces threats and, in fact, from in the modern era.10 Ironically, given these any obstacles to either “To pursue self- pressures to cooperate in military activity, free access or free interest does not space remains an outlier. Unfortunately, the passage. These require U.S. military has found by experience in conditions create Afghanistan that national barriers have fundamental incentives maximizing impeded its effective use of space-derived for collective action that freedom of data. As one recent analysis of the problem of do not exist in other action.” information-sharing in Afghanistan observes, areas of international “secrecy often keeps coalition team members relations. Ironically, one of the primary from speaking about space-related topics with obstacles to enhanced collective action to each other.”11 protect space security may be the thinking of the actors themselves, which still remains These points raise a critical “process” largely rooted in the unilateral traditions of question: How do countries come to realize security provision from past security that their security needs in a particular area of frameworks. But, as Robert Keohane argues, “To pursue self-interest does not require

10 See, for example, Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms maximizing freedom of action. On the of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., contrary, intelligent and farsighted leaders The Culture of National Security and Identity in World understand that attainment of their objectives Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 11 De Selding, “U.S. Officer: Secrecy Among Coalition Forces Hinders Use of Space Assets in Afghanistan.” Space and Defense, Summer 2011 11

may depend on their commitment to space through collective means in the face of institutions that make cooperation possible.”12 threats of territorial claims, damage caused by Working with allies, therefore, may represent ongoing nuclear tests in orbit, and disputes the best security solution available at this over future liability questions. As mentioned point in space history, and perhaps may serve above, the further codification of space rules as a bridge to broader forms of international in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty helped expand cooperation in the future. Alliance-based the notion of space as an extra-territorial realm efforts could mitigate a variety of emerging with a range of collective restrictions on space-related security concerns. The prior military activities, particularly on the Moon existence of allied military institutions— and celestial bodies. The bilateral ABM particularly established patterns of cost- Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitations sharing, integration, joint operations, and joint Talks Interim Agreement (SALT I) in 1972 training—both in the case of NATO and in prohibited space-based missile defenses and various bilateral arrangements with Asian interference with national technical means of countries (such as Australia, Japan, and South verification (i.e., satellites). The 1972 Korea) should reduce typical collective action Convention on International Liability for problems in forming such new mechanisms Damage Caused by Space Objects further for space. expanded the norm of mutual restraint in space and provided evidence of the willingness of even the world’s most powerful Roots of a Multinational Approach to militaries to cede areas of space sovereignty to Space Security collective agreements in order to help ensure safe and reliable access. As Larry Wortzel Notably, there is a long history of attempted observes, “The U.S. and the Soviet Union transnational approaches to space security. seemed to realize that it is potentially Space activity actually began in the context of destabilizing to define the upper limits of a major multilateral scientific initiative known sovereignty. Thus, neither country interfered as the International Geo-Physical Year (IGY). with the other’s free passage in space. Also, Both the Soviet Union and the United States they agreed that the ability to conduct strategic announced plans to orbit satellites as part of verification from space stabilized the nuclear their contributions to the IGY—and the balance.”13 Although, joint military activities Soviets got there first. However, any hope of were not possible in the poisoned political using international science cooperation to environment of the Cold War, important promote international security in space soon norms of space restraint did emerge between fell to the wayside, given the context of the the two superpowers despite their political hostile competition between the Soviet Union tensions. and the United States. In the early 1990s, the two formerly most Yet multilateralism in space did not die hostile enemies took unprecedented steps after entirely. Two critical UN resolutions passed the Soviet break-up in civilian space in 1963 and the ratification of the Partial Test cooperation, joining with Canada, Japan, and Ban Treaty helped safeguard safe access to the countries of the European Space Agency

12 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and 13 Colonel (U.S. Army, ret.) Larry M. Wortzel, “The Chinese Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: People’s Liberation Army and Space Warfare,” Astropolitics, Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 259. Vol. 6, No. 2 (May-August 2008), p. 128.

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in the construction of the International Space As noted in the introduction, the existing Station (ISS). This $100 billion civilian project framework for space security remains is still ongoing and has linked the human problematic, and there are few new initiatives spaceflight programs of all major space-faring to address these gaps. The one exception to countries, except China and India. Despite the current stalemate occurred in December occasional glitches, it has worked remarkably 2007, when the countries of the United well and has served U.S. interests. The U.S. Nations agreed to adopt a voluntary set of commercial sector has become similarly U.S.-supported debris mitigation guidelines, international, including significant providing a limited set of norms. But the cooperation with Russia in the space launch effort still fell far short of halting non-WMD field. But little such effort has been made to weapons testing or deployment in space, even promote allied or other transnational space kinetic-kill tests, allowing such activities as security engagement, particularly in long as the debris was short lived. It also operational programs. created no international system for space situational awareness or enforcement, relying Since the Soviet break-up and the rise of U.S. only on national means. As for treaties, the skepticism of the need for further space arms only proposal on the international agenda is control, bilateral space security norms from the Russo-Chinese Prevention of the the Cold War have failed to spread adequately Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty among new space-faring nations, such as (PPWT)—a limited effort focused only on China. As Wortzel points out, in contrast to banning space-based weapons. However, the the history of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations in proposal exempts testing and development of regard to space, “No such dialogue has taken other space weapons, such systems as China’s place with China.”14 Wortzel blames ground-based ASAT, thus severely diluting opponents from the People’s Liberation Army the utility of such an agreement. The more for blocking initial U.S. overtures late in the limited, European-sponsored Code of Conduct Bush Administration. Others blame the has been informally available for comment United States for rejecting talks on space since December 2008, but—even if agreed security from 1998 to 2009 at the U.N. to—will offer only partial effectiveness Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Put toward increasing space security given its simply, the United States did not perceive a voluntary status and its lack of specific demand for such a dialogue until China’s monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.15 ASAT test in 2007. This neglect now seems As of late March 2011, the United States had short-sighted. What is more surprising is that, only announced its support for the “process” until very recently, there has been little of the code’s elaboration, not for the engagement between the United States and its document itself. Russian and China have allies in space security matters. Indeed, with flatly opposed the effort. Under these the exception of some limited studies in the conditions, it is not yet possible to make the NATO context, no overarching framework for jump to a fully inclusive international space allied space cooperation to enhance space security arrangement or treaty. In the security has emerged in the post-Cold War meantime, the United States and its allies period. 15 European Union, Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, December 17, 2008, available on the Stimson Center website at: 14 Wortzel, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and http://www.stimson.org/space/pdf/EU_Code_of_Conduct.pdf Space Warfare,” p. 128. (accessed August 27, 2010). Space and Defense, Summer 2011 13

might be well served to start building their alliance of countries might dominate own cooperative security network as a critical collectively is not considered, although first step. Such a move would enhance U.S. Dolman concedes that sustaining such a and allied space security and perhaps serve as offensive-oriented, state-centric approach to a model that can be expanded upon later, if achieving space security is “in the long other actors see benefits in joining the system term…counterproductive and detrimental.”16 (and the allies agree to such engagement). Similarly, Benjamin S. Lambeth’s otherwise To date, the concept of multinational space very thorough coverage of space challenges cooperation has been perhaps best exemplified Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next in the European Space Agency’s (ESA’s) civil Steps in the Military Uses of Space (RAND, space programs, which are collectively 2003) fails to refer to the possible contribution organized, funded, and implemented. The ISS of allies at all, assuming perhaps that U.S. case is another example of successful civilian allies have no space assets worth considering. cooperation, bringing together the United U.S. Navy Commander John J. Klein’s book States with ESA countries and Russia. Of Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and course, other countries have cooperated in Policy (Routledge, 2006) mentions allies on a joint scientific and commercial projects as handful of occasions but only in a very well, but almost none in the security realm. theoretical context, such as the need to rally Even in Europe, space security cooperation— support from allies in case of facing a superior particularly in operational terms—has been space power. Yet there is no discussion of very limited. Similarly, a review of the recent what such countries might contribute in an U.S. literature on space security reveals how operational sense in a conflict, much less little attention has been paid to concepts of consideration of the peacetime creation of a possible military alliance-building for space. space-based alliance as part of a strategy of With a few exceptions, the topic has been orbital deterrence. Notably, the Bush largely ignored, due to the enduring Administration’s 2006 National Space Policy propensity of most authors to view space does not mention U.S. allies in the section on security from a purely nationalistic lens. This “National Security Space Guidelines,” except is even true within the academic community. in a vague manner as possible recipients of A few examples are worth examining to U.S. space-derived intelligence data under highlight this point. certain, limited circumstances.17

Everett C. Dolman’s well-known book Among authors more supportive of Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the international space cooperation, Joan Johnson- Space Age (Cass, 2002) argues that a single, Freese’s book Space as a Strategic Asset major power (presumably, either the United (Columbia University Press, 2007) discusses States or China) will eventually exercise the failure of NATO to come up with a unified “space dominance” over other actors. space policy, in part due to the fact that “to Because of this assumption, he fails to date, most European military space programs consider seriously the possible role of alliance contributions to such strategies, arguing that 16 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in all other powers will simply be forced to the Space Age (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 2. comply with the rules established by the 17 The White House, “U.S. National Space Policy,” August 31, 2006, posted on the website of the Federation of American hegemon, rather than themselves establishing Scientists, at: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/space.pdf a multilateral structure. The concept that an (accessed August 27, 2010).

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have been strictly national programs.”18 She Earth: The Future of American Space Power contrasts this failure with their highly (University of Kentucky, 2001). Although integrated cooperation in the civil space field. Lambakis portrays space largely within a Nevertheless, she remains skeptical of the realist-driven framework of military struggle, ability of U.S. NATO allies to make he does consider the possible contribution of significant contributions to U.S. space allies, noting “The United States will need the security, except in a supporting role. In other political support of its allies and friends as areas of space activity, however, Johnson- well as their involvement in military space Freese cautions that unduly restrictive U.S. activities, to include economic contribution export controls could stimulate civil and through collaboration in system development commercial space partnerships among China, and participation in operations.”20 He Russia, and the countries of the European concludes by arguing in regard at least to Space Agency (including many leading ground stations and surveillance, there are NATO members). “undoubtedly several contributions U.S. allies can make in these areas.”21 A more recent USAF Lt. Col. (ret.) Forrest E. Morgan’s study by USAF Lt. Col. Michael P. Gleason highly informative report Deterrence and goes further in spelling out why the specific First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary political-economic situation of the second Assessment (RAND, 2010) makes the case decade of the twenty-first century is ripe for that the United States cannot expect to address such efforts, arguing, “With U.S. budgets its space vulnerabilities simply through threats constrained and U.S. security space programs of national retaliation, which are unlikely to lagging, now is the time to partner with the be effective or convincing in space. Instead, EU [European Union] in security space.”22 Morgan argues for a mixed strategy of USAF Lt. Col. (ret.) Peter Hays makes the “threatening a range of punitive responses in supporting argument that “State-of-the-art multiple domains while at the same time constellations…can be augmented with state- reducing the benefits of enemy attacks by of-the-world capabilities to make these improving defenses, dispersing and concealing capabilities more resilient.”23 space capabilities, and demonstrating the ability to rapidly replenish whatever losses are With some exceptions, this review of some of sustained.”19 Somewhat surprisingly, the leading recent studies of space security however, Morgan’s prescriptions fail to shows that there has been inadequate attention mention the potential role of allies in carrying paid to the prospects of truly allied strategies out such a strategy, perhaps because of the to accomplish shared goals of space threat difficulties of overcoming traditional secrecy reduction, deterrence, and defense. Part of the concerns.

Within the literature, therefore, there are 20 Steven Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power (Lexington, KY: The University Press relatively few supporters of new allied space of Kentucky, 2001), p. 285. structures. One of the few exceptions is 21 Ibid. Steven Lambakis’s book On the Edge of 22 Lt. Col. (USAF) Michael P. Gleason, “Shaping the Future with a New Space Power: Now is the Time,” High Frontier, Vol. 6, No. 2 (February 2010), p. 43. 18 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New 23 Peter L. Hays, “An Agile and Adaptive Enterprise: York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 187. Enhancing National Security Space by Improving 19 Forrest E. Morgan, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Management Structures and Leveraging Commercial and Space: A Preliminary Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: International Partners,” Astropolitics, Vol. 8, Nos. 2-3 (May- RAND, 2010), p. 6. December 2010), p. 163. Space and Defense, Summer 2011 15

reason, perhaps, is the general lack of leadership and partnership.”26 Although the familiarity among U.S. space experts with the NSSS provided few specifics, it pledged that: emerging capabilities of allied space actors. “With our allies, we will explore the Given the highly classified world of space development of combined space doctrine with operations, many military and governmental principles, goals, and objectives that, in analysts simply tend to focus on keeping track particular, endorse and enable the of U.S. capabilities and problems. Similarly, collaborative sharing of space capabilities in existing U.S. export control restrictions make crisis and conflict.”27 Implementation, some forms of cooperation simply impossible, however, remains in its initial stages only. depending on the level of technology exchange involved. Congress too has been With these challenges and opportunities in leery of funding any form of cooperation that mind, it is now worth considering what might seem like “foreign aid” in space, and specific advantages might accrue to U.S. has only grudgingly gone along with civil space security from a closer partnership with spaceflight purchases from Russia, despite the allies in this regard, as well as how such a new coming break in U.S. capabilities to deliver military space partnership might actually be astronauts to the ISS. formed.

But the United States has global military responsibilities and depends heavily on its space capabilities to fulfill them. It also works closely with allies on the ground, at sea, and in Getting from Here to There: Building a the air, such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Layered Framework for Policing Space Libya. Yet as the 2009 NATO assessment laments about the state of members’ space Despite the risks facing U.S. space assets, the assets: “[our] essential capabilities are at risk challenges for an adversary seeking to carry because we simply have not thought through out a sustained campaign against space assets the Alliance’s Space needs, developed any in multiple orbits in a non-cooperative context strategy, considered the consequences of no are still difficult. Redundancy and action, or prepared any risk mitigation reconstitution strategies could potentially be strategies.”24 As a result, the study complains, very effective against limited attacks. To the “The current approach to Space is piecemeal, extent that a group of allied spacefaring a bottom-up effort lacking overarching countries could create a network of interactive structure or direction.”25 satellites and develop policies for mutual support in a time of crisis, such efforts could The 2011 National Security Space Strategy greatly reduce even the risk of individual marked a major turning point in official U.S. attacks on satellites, since any gaps could be thinking about allied space activity when it quickly filled in and therefore rendered recognized that in an “increasingly congested, pointless. However, the United States and its contested, and competitive” environment, the allies are a long way from establishing this United States faced new “opportunities for capability. This raises two related questions:

24 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, “NATO Space 26 U.S. Department of Defense and the Office of the Director Operations Assessment,” Kalkar, Germany, January 2009, p. of National Intelligence, “National Security Space Strategy 7. (Unclassified Summary),” January 2011, p. i. 25 Ibid., p. 1 27 Ibid., p. 9.

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what countries should be involved and what experience. Finally, India is a highly capable capabilities should be linked? space power as well, with launch systems to both low-Earth and geostationary orbits, While the U.S. military has so far failed to reconnaissance assets, extensive space form true space partnerships with other applications experience, and an expanding countries, there has been a rapid expansion in pool of skilled personnel. This broad-based the space capabilities of allied militaries in the collection of space capabilities represents a past 15 years. France has led the way in major, untapped U.S. resource for dealing launch capabilities and Earth imaging with its space vulnerabilities. Indeed, it is fair (including for military purposes), but an to say that the United States has an additional five NATO countries—Canada, “asymmetric advantage” over countries like Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, and the United China and Russia in having a host of Kingdom—operate more than 10 satellites significant spacefaring countries that are also apiece for remote-sensing, communications, military allies or friends. Yet almost nothing and scientific purposes. Meanwhile, Spain, has been done to use this advantage to shape the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and the emerging space environment to benefit the Turkey each operate more than five satellites United States and its partners, or to set an and associated ground stations.28 Although the example for other countries worldwide in vast majority are civilian satellites, their responsible space behavior. Instead, as the militaries are becoming steadily more 2009 NATO space assessment describes, involved in space. Among U.S. allies in Asia, current regulations make space information Japan is a major spacefaring country with and operations “‘too sensitive’ to discuss extensive human spaceflight and space science outside of National boundaries.”30 experience, as well as valuable technology in its H-II Transfer Vehicle (used for the But a study of NATO’s emerging space needs International Space Station), launchers, and by USAF Major Thomas Single argues, “The communications satellites. In fact, a recent emphasis must be on moving from a ‘need to statement issued on the 50th anniversary of the know’ to a ‘need to share’.”31 Time also may U.S.-Japan alliance by U.S. Undersecretary of be of the essence. As Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy Lt. Col. Gleason points “The emphasis specifically highlighted “the need to out, the European must be on strengthen our cooperation under the alliance Union—given its moving from a to promote the security of the global growing range of space commons, including space and cyberspace.”29 assets—is “perfectly ‘need to know’ In addition, South Korea has increasing willing to develop its to a ‘need to experience in reconnaissance, dual-use security space share’.” communications, and satellite manufacturing, capabilities, while moving steadily toward space-launch architectures, and institutional structures capability. Australia, Taiwan, and Thailand without US involvement.”32 The same might also have significant satellite operations

30 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, “NATO Space 28 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, “NATO Space Operations Assessment,” Kalkar, Germany, January 2009, p. Operations Assessment,” Figure 5: Nations Operating 7. Satellites, p. 8. 31 Thomas Single, “Considerations for a NATO Space 29 Michele Flournoy, “Point of View: U.S.-Japan alliance a Policy,” European Space Policy Institute Perspectives, No. cornerstone in a complex world,” Asahi Shimbun, July 16, 12, September 2008, p. 4. 2010. 32 Gleason, “Shaping the Future,” p. 44. Space and Defense, Summer 2011 17

be said of Japanese and South Korean First, the United States and its allies need to capabilities in a few more years, without U.S. know where spacecraft are in orbit and where input. Thus, a priority should be placed on threats from orbital debris (whether intentional building partnerships from the ground up as or not) might arise. This requires keeping these systems evolve in order to, in Gleason’s track of both active and inactive spacecraft terms, influence the development of still in orbit. Today, the U.S. military operates capabilities “in ways which will benefit the Space Surveillance Network, which has American national security for decades into the world’s most extensive catalogue of space the future.”33 objects. Since the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos collision, the U.S. Air Force has begun to do While U.S. national security space programs more complete conjunction analysis and to need to be protected in this process, it is also share this information with other space users. worth observing that the United States has At the same time, U.S. allies could already shared sensitive data successfully with supplement this effort by providing a range of countries in the nuclear sector, information from their radar systems. In including with the United Kingdom and particular, U.S. NATO allies operate a number France. Moreover, officials and military of radars and telescopes at multiple sites in officers from Germany and Australia have Europe that could be used to bolster joint long cooperated with the United States on capabilities.34 Japan is also beginning research sensitive matters related to national defense on space-based surveillance via satellite that including, in Australia’s case, operating could in the future yield additional useful data, extremely sensitive facilities related to space- particularly on microsatellites and their derived intelligence and early-warning activities. Improved space situational information. Thus, the view of space awareness (SSA) through allied cooperation operations as “too sensitive” to share may be may be critical to determining interference an out-dated perspective, particularly as risks with spacecraft and determining fault, as well to assets rise and demands for cooperation as building international coalitions to establish increase. Under these conditions, a range of the “ground truth” necessary for levying fines possible means of reducing threats to U.S. and on space users, depriving perpetrators of allied systems might emerge through access to space business, stripping them of cooperation, with additional benefits in rights to geostationary slots, or cutting-off providing the framework for deterring harmful frequency allocations for broadcasting acts and perhaps building bridges with other satellites. Accordingly, the 2010 U.S. responsible spacefaring nations. Such efforts National Space Policy calls upon the U.S. would require amendment of existing and government to “Enhance capabilities and highly protective U.S. International Traffic in techniques, in cooperation with civil, Arms Regulations (ITAR). But many officials commercial, and foreign partners to identify, and military leaders have been calling for locate, and attribute sources of radio exactly such reforms for years. Assuming that frequency interference, and take necessary these controls could be modified to allow measures to sustain the radiofrequency greater cooperation, what areas might be most environment in which critical U.S. space fruitful for such allied networking?

34 Xavier Pasco, “Toward a Future European Space Surveillance System: Developing a Collaborative Model for the World,” in Logsdon, Moltz, and Hinds, eds., Collective 33 Ibid., p. 43. Security in Space European Perspectives.

18 James Clay Moltz/Coalitions in Space, Where Networks are Power

systems operate.”35 Similar techniques need to Satellites, Germany SAR-Lupe system, be developed against laser, microwave, and France’s Helios (and future Pleiades), and other hostile technologies. Italy’s Cosmo-Skymed.36 South Korea also operates imagery satellites, as does the United A second priority area after SSA is ensuring Kingdom. Unfortunately, even in conflict the continuation of service for global zones such as Afghanistan, there has been positioning, navigation, and timing networks little cooperation to date due to the lack of like the U.S. Global Positioning System established mechanisms and strong (GPS). The development of this satellite countervailing traditions of space secrecy.37 constellation has provided tremendous Such problems could be overcome through benefits to the U.S. military in being able to establishing protocols for exchanges of improve accuracy and reduce collateral information as well as possible designation of damage and deaths with its weaponry, as well certain satellites as “allied,” whether under as assisting in a range of other military NATO auspices or a larger space cooperation functions. Europe’s planned Galileo system, entity that would include non-NATO U.S. Japan’s Quasi-Zenith system, and India’s allies as well. These capabilities would ideally future GAGAN system could provide evolve over time toward development of a important supplemental data should the GPS common software interface, if not certain system ever be threatened by hostile actions in shared hardware to promote interoperability space. By ensuring compatibility among these and replacements. Joint training of officers networks and arranging for quick replacement could support such a system, thus developing responsibility within the constellation in case core expertise across the alliance that would of attack, the United States and its friends and serve to expand effective use of space imagery allies could guarantee that GPS information on the battlefield and in peacetime. would be available in any future crisis. Surprisingly, excluding U.S. military space personnel (which numbered approximately A third critical area is reconnaissance. 100), only one non-U.S. space professional Currently, the United States relies on a was serving in the Middle East Area of relatively small number of large, highly Operation as of 2009.38 Clearly, this is far expensive satellites in low-Earth orbit to from adequate. provide high-resolution images on critical adversaries or problem areas. Due to the risk As a fourth priority, communications and of their loss, the rising costs of such early-warning satellites located in spacecraft, and the need for more data, the geostationary orbit should be secured. U.S. military has already begun contracting Fortunately, this job is the easiest given the with such commercial firms as DigitalGlobe difficult of carrying out an undetected attack and GeoEye to provide imagery that, while on an object at an altitude of 22,300 miles. not as precise, is good enough in many Still, the United States and its allies should instances. Working with allies would provide first develop mechanisms for replacing critical yet another source of imagery in case of the loss of any U.S. military or commercial 36 Adam Keith, “Diversifying Capabilities for Image satellite in a crisis. These systems might Intelligence,” Space News, July 19, 2010, p. 15. include Japan’s Information Gathering 37 De Selding, “U.S. Officer: Secrecy Among Coalition Forces Hinders Use of Space Assets in Afghanistan.” 38 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, “NATO Space 35 The White House, “National Space Policy of the United Operations Assessment,” Table 3: Current Space Operations States of America,” June 28, 2010, p. 9. Personnel, p. 29. Space and Defense, Summer 2011 19

functions in case of problems. They should perhaps other assets). Their use against a also begin outreach with other parties— rogue actor would have to be coordinated by a including China, which is not covered by joint space council of the allied powers. Such U.S.-Russian non-interference pledges—to moves have critics and would need to be respect the inviolability of early-warning considered carefully for their possible effects satellites, in particular, given their role in on space security more generally. That is, promoting nuclear stability. Clearly, China while there is a temptation to take the next should understand that any attack on an early- step to allied deployment of orbital space warning satellite could be legitimately weapons in order to supplement new mistaken as part of the first stage in a major redundancy capabilities and currently limited nuclear attack and would trigger extreme ground- or sea-based counterspace weapons, means of defense by the United States and its further steps may be unwise, at least absent allies. new threats. Lt. Col. (ret.) Morgan argues in response to calls in some quarters supporting A fifth area for allied cooperation is that of deployment of space weapons and policies of developing avoidance mechanisms—in other attempted space dominance, “While such words, decoys and quick replacement arguments resonate with those acculturated in capabilities to protect satellites. This is better the U.S. military tradition, it is hard to done in concert with multiple parties than conceive how placing counterspace weapons unilaterally due to the advantages of having in orbit would do anything to defend U.S. multiple platforms available and multiple satellites from enemy ground-based weapons launch sites. This could include developing or, for that matter, other weapons in space.”39 standard, interoperable reconnaissance Morgan observes that such weapons satellites and other critical spacecraft and themselves would be in fixed orbits and locating them in different allied launch sites vulnerable to attack. He adds: “Taking this around the world. In a future world of step may also encourage other spacefaring cubesats, this kind of integration may become nations to follow suit, ultimately resulting in a easier (and more affordable) than it is dangerously unstable strategic environment currently. Allies could also fly decoy satellites that would generate severe ‘use-or-lose’ in their constellations to increase the burden of pressures.”40 numbers on potential attackers, or collectively develop and deploy spoofing systems or chaff- Finally, any allied approach to space security releasing pods to foil enemy radar seekers. would likely have to create a functioning transnational, operational body to manage Sixth, in case a satellite or spacecraft engaged share systems, provide joint training, and in harmful activity would need to be stopped handle finances. The 2009 NATO assessment by the collective forces of a cooperating group concludes by calling for a Space Office at of major space-faring powers, having the NATO headquarters as well as a NATO Space collective ability to deter, disable, and, if Operations Coordination Centre.41 But, given necessary, to destroy hostile space assets may the desirability of involving allies from Asia, a be necessary in extreme circumstances. These broader center seems to be more prudent. could include existing ballistic missile defense assets (such as the U.S., Japanese, and South Korean Aegis systems and Ground-Based 39 Morgan, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space, pp. 33-4. Interceptors in the United States, future 40 Ibid., p. 34. MEADS-type interceptors in NATO, and 41 Ibid., p. 46.

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Access to the operations center would have to weapons of mass destruction and related be strictly controlled through both a technologies, materials, and delivery systems. classification system and personnel reliability This Bush-Administration-inspired “coalition program. As noted, such efforts have of the willing” began to organize voluntary succeeded in the past at sensitive NATO national military and law enforcement efforts nuclear locations and at space sites in into a process that would allow inspection and Australia. The program would have to start seizure of crews and contraband. Such a small and perhaps with a limited numbers of model may be useful for space as well. countries most heavily involved in space Another supporting concept for collective already: Australia, France, Germany, Italy, space security might be the U.S. Navy’s idea Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Japan, and of creating a large coalition of international South Korea. assets to engage in collective maritime security: the 1,000-ship navy.43 As Admiral From this author’s informal discussions, Mike Mullen describes the maritime model, support for such a cooperative space network this would be a “global maritime partnership seems to exist already among a number of that united maritime forces, port operators, NATO members and in Australia, Japan, and commercial shippers, and international, South Korea. The U.S.-Australian governmental and nongovernmental agencies announcement of planned SSA cooperation in to address mutual concerns.”44 Mullen views the fall of 2010 and joint funding of the it as a voluntary network of maritime powers Wideband Global Satcom system mark “interested in using the power of the see to important first steps toward operational united, rather than to divide.”45 For space, this integration. Notably, these trends are could include commercial and scientific consistent with the 2010 U.S. National Space spacecraft as well and would thus involve Policy’s call for new types of cooperation at many more players—functioning like an the international level, including in the area of active “neighborhood watch” committee. The national security space. Indeed, the section on practical experience of international efforts to “National Security Space Guidelines” goes combat piracy off of the Horn of Africa may even further in spelling this out: “Options for provide a positive lesson in regard to the mission assurance may include rapid future “policing” of space. restoration of space assets and leveraging allied, foreign, and/or commercial space and Despite the advantages of creating such an nonspace capabilities to perform the allied network for space, it must be admitted mission.”42 These guidelines point to that a number of current obstacles exist to additional useful paths forward. such efforts. Traditional U.S. thinking about U.S. exceptionalism in space would have to be A supporting mechanism to begin building the revised and a more egalitarian view of alliance model outward to friends and other partners adopted. The U.S. State, Defense, responsible spacefaring nations—such as and Commerce Departments would need to India, Israel, and others—might be patterned engage in ITAR reform and craft new on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). military-to-military agreements (of the type This concept emerged in 2003 as a means of filling gaps in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for stopping the illicit transit of 43 Adm. Mike Mullen, “Commentary: We Can’t Do It Alone,” Honolulu Advertiser, October 29, 2006. 44 Ibid. 42 Ibid., p. 13. 45 Ibid. Space and Defense, Summer 2011 21

the U.S. has with Australia) to allow the spaced report concludes, “Increasing fiscal sharing of space information. In Congress, a constraints demand increased cooperation to new political willingness to fund space create synergy, reduce duplication of effort systems that would not be solely for national and ensure interoperability.”47 benefit or under purely national control would need to emerge. At the technical level, new This effort could begin with joint training integration with allied industry would likely among existing allies with more advanced be necessary to create common standards and military space experience and gradually interfaces, which would initially cost time and building outward to include those allies with money. Still, given the emerging risks in still-developing capabilities. During this time, space of and the possible benefits to be the more advanced militaries could begin to achieved by joint efforts, these problems do establish an information network to support not seem insurmountable. operational cooperation and eventually feed into a proposed allied space organization. As the assets of this body are developed, Conclusion operational control could gradually be transferred from national to allied mechanisms, thus providing greatly enhanced The challenges of space security today are peacetime deterrence and, when necessary, typically viewed today as a state-centric increased effectiveness in the use of rivalry for space supremacy: a highly conventional forces on the ground, at sea, and nationalistic framework best suited to in the air. Over time these institutions and unilateral actions.46 The context of traditional practices could transform the business of balance-of-power politics, therefore, has space security from a national into an allied colored the lenses of most observers, leading enterprise, spreading risk, reducing individual to predictions of a state-versus-state costs, and increasing reliability. Part of the showdown in space, similar to great battles of future-leaning agenda of such an organization naval armadas in centuries past. However, might be to explore possible contacts with under changing conditions, such a stove-piped countries like India, Russia and, eventually, view of space cooperation and operational even China, in order to make restraint-based practices may make conflict prevention mechanisms for space less and less sense Pooling truly international. and may even resources may increase risks to be the most As noted above, the United States is in a U.S. and allied uniquely advantageous situation compared to space assets. effective China in having highly capable space partners Moreover, given the means of who are also military allies. As China space tightening financial building new expert Gregory Kulacki argues, “China is situation in most capabilities. concerned about the general effort of the US allied countries during the Bush Administration to form a today and in the United States itself, pooling Japanese-Indian alliance to contain China,” resources may be the most effective means of building new capabilities. As the 2009 NATO

46 On this approach, see Gordon G. Chang, “The Space Arms 47 Joint Air Power Competence Centre, “NATO Space Race Begins,” Forbes, November 5, 2009. Operations Assessment,” p. 49.

22 James Clay Moltz/Coalitions in Space, Where Networks are Power

including in space.48 But Washington needs to by potential adversaries—emerge as be careful not to overplay its hand. Building a alternative space norms. collaborative alliance in space to reduce vulnerability could be seen as destabilizing by outside parties. Specifically, building an offensive-oriented space alliance, as noted by Morgan, is likely to threaten China and lead to hostile reactions and possibly a space arms race. For this reason, the United States and its allies need to be careful about their rhetoric and, when possible, be inclusive in terms of confidence-building measures with other countries, portraying the alliance as defensively oriented and non-threatening to other countries. Paths to cooperation with other parties through confidence-building measures, participatory space situational awareness, and community “policing” of space to identify bad behavior (such as jamming or laser interference) should also be encouraged. New rules and even treaties might be considered later based on the non- interference norms and newly established collective security practices developed by the alliance.

In this context, collaborative efforts in allied space security may be a good first step toward reducing space vulnerabilities and helping the world avoid action-reaction arming for space and its harmful effects. But this active cooperation in space security, even among existing U.S. allies, will take time, money, technical resources, as well as political commitments from national leaders, given existing national security barriers. Yet the negative implications of alternative paths that are foreseeable for space make these challenges worth addressing head on. If this process is to succeed, moreover, it should begin soon, before new risks to U.S. and allied space security—and further offensive testing

48 Kulacki quoted in Peter J. Brown, “China fears India-Japan space alliance,” Asia Times, November 12, 2008.

The 2010 National Space Policy: Down to Earth?

Joan Johnson-Freese Naval War College

The 2010 National Space Policy, intended “to changes in the Obama policy required express the President’s direction for the explanation for the shift.4 Michael Krepon at Nation’s space activities,”1 was released by the Stimson Center positively noted the the Obama Administration on June 28. difference between the Bush and Obama Responses were for the most part swift and policies regarding Obama’s renewed openness predictable. While drawing heavily from past to consider diplomatic initiatives toward consistent principles, all analysts agreed that strengthening U.S. international leadership on the tone and emphasis differed significantly space issues, but cited a lack of specifics about from the 2006 Bush Administration policy, potential initiatives, appearing disappointed which itself was a departure from past policies that the policy did not go further.5 Some in terms of a greater military focus and analysts thought there were too many details, nationalistic orientation.2 Views on which some not enough. Experts on a panel held tone and emphasis is best has ranged along the shortly after the policy was released sponsored ideological spectrum. A sampling of opinions by The Secure World Foundation (SWF) and is indicative. Baker Spring, from the The Arms Control Association (ACA) again conservative Heritage Foundation, focused on noted content consistencies with the past, and the Bush approach to space being “right” as differences in tone from the Bush policy. much or more than analyzing the Obama Independent analyst Marcia Smith from policy.3 Jeff Keuter at The Marshall Institute SpacePolicyOnline.com said it was “less provided a useful side-by-side comparison of nationalistic, more friendly” but noted “she the language, in part, it seems, toward had a friend” who viewed it as a “policy of establishing that the Bush policy was appeasement rather than leadership.” Bruce consistent with past policies and therefore any MacDonald from the U.S. Institute for Peace said he for one was “overall quite pleased with The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and the revised policy”,6 Not surprisingly, do not represent the official position of the Department of the professionals and pundits alike read the policy Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. I would like to thank Dr. Tom Nichols, CMDR Scott McPherson, Ph.D., and Victoria Samson for their views on 4 Jeff Keuter, “Evaluating the Obama National Space Policy: earlier drafts. Responsibility for the views and information Continuity and New Priorities,” Policy Outlook, The George contained in the article, however, remains solely that of the C. Marshall Institute, July 2010; The Space Foundation author. provided an comparison as well, U.S. national Space Policy Comparison: Comparing the 2010 National Space Policy to 1 Fact Sheet, The National Space Policy, The White House, the 2006 National Space Policy, June 28, 2010. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- www.SpaceFoundation.org/research office/fact-sheet-national-space-policy 5 Michael Krepon, “The Obama Administration’s National 2 Joan Johnson-Freese, “The New U.S. Space Policy: A Turn Space Policy,” 30 June 2010. Toward Militancy?” Issues in Science and Technology, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=983 Winter 2007. 6 Panel Discussion – The New National Space Policy: 3 Baker Spring, “Obama’s National Space Policy: Prospects for International Cooperation and Mankind Safe Subordinating National Security to Arms Control,” Safer for All. July 1, 2010. Webmemo, The Heritage Foundation, No. 2950, July 6, 2010. www.armscontrol.org/events/newnationalspacepolicy 24 Joan Johnson-Freese/The 2010 National Space Policy: Down to Earth

much like a Rorschach test, interpreting it speech” by his political opponents, though the largely based on long-established prior word malaise was never used by Carter. His perspectives. Across the spectrum of opinion, opponent for the presidency, Ronald Reagan, all acknowledged that the devil is in the countered with “morning in America” talks details of implementation. which, Bacevich says convinced Americans that “credit has no limits, the bills will never My own view of the policy is most akin to that come due.”7 Fast-forward to the October 19, of SWF attorney Ben Baseley-Walker, another 2009, cover of The National Review. It SWF/ACA panel member. He summarized it featured a cover image of a robed Obama as “a very sound, pragmatic approach.” I wearing his Nobel medal while contemplating would call it simply a realistic policy. It has a bust of Carter. Clearly Obama is intended to both strengths and weaknesses, but overall, be viewed as the snooty, contemporary commendably, it attempts to inject realism version of Carter, bearer of bad news and into future U.S. space planning, and realism pessimism. will ultimately strengthen U.S. security. While inherently more long-term focused and In some quarters, the contemporary additive to therefore less immediately satisfying, it is the malaise rhetoric is that of decline; important to remember the classic military instilling fear in the American public that if requirement for an executable, successful plan we don’t act (panic) now and act aggressively, of attack -- alignment of ends-ways-means. America will fall off the precipice of Certainly the requirement for a prolonged U.S. hegemony and into economic, political and/or military presence in Iraq after the initial social decline. "Decline," The National shock-and-awe success demonstrated how a Review cover stated, "is a Choice." Using mismatch between those key elements can declinist images and rhetoric is perhaps to be result. Unfortunately, looking long-term will expected in partisan politics. However, it is likely not bode well for the Obama both hackneyed and hyperbolic; eventually Administration, as the last thing many each cycle of declinism gives way to reality.8 American people seem to want, and therefore politicians will support, is a policy that James Fallows in his January/February 2010 recognizes and addresses the changing article in The Atlantic addresses this notion. realities of the space environment. He points out that declinism is woven into our Nevertheless, several areas of change in the culture. “Thomas Jefferson was sure the policy specifically reflect looking at the world country was going to hell when John Adams as it is, rather than how the United States supported the Alien and Sedition Acts. And wants it to be. Adams was sure it was going to hell when

Reality as Risky Political Business 7 Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism, (New York, Metropolitan Books, 2008) p.36. Andrew Bacevich in his 2008 book The Limits 8 Joan Johnson-Freese and Thomas M. Nichols, “U.S. Less of Power: The End of American Dominant But So What?” Op-Ed, DOD Buzz, November 25, 2009. Exceptionalism examines President Jimmy http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19743/us_less Carter’s 1979 speech to the American people _dominant_but_so_what.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F2 about self-indulgence (specifically regarding 145%2Fjoan_johnsonfreese%3Fback_url%3D%252Fpublicati on%252F20227%252Fspace_stability_and_nuclear_strategy oil) and what Bacevich terms “profligacy.” %253Fbreadcrumb%253D%2525252F%26back_text%3DBac That speech was quickly dubbed “the malaise k%2520to%2520publication Space and Defense, Summer 2011 25

Jefferson was elected.”9 While assuring us that Here is President Eisenhower in 1958: America has historically gone through cycles of crisis and renewal, he also reminds us that More than by any other imaginative renewal takes effort, sometimes based on hard concept, the mind of man is aroused choices, and addressing issues and problems by the thought of exploring the 10 mysteries of outer space. Through realistically. such exploration, man hopes to broaden his horizons, add to his This pragmatic approach, however, is not the knowledge, improve his way of living stuff of the polarized partisan politics sadly on Earth. characterizing America today. More typically seen is the profligacy of which Bacevich And President Obama today: warns, generalized public anger, and a distinct Fifty years after the creation of disdain of expertise – the latter especially NASA, our goal is no longer just a dangerous on issues such as space where the destination to reach. Our goal is the laws of physics prevail over ideology and capacity for people to work and learn wishful thinking. National security, however, and operate and live safely beyond is not well served by wishful thinking, nor is Earth for extended periods of time, ultimately in ways that are more realism synonymous with decline. Space sustainable and even indefinite. And assets are too important as vital national in fulfilling this task, we will not only interests – and stated as such in both the Bush extend humanity’s reach in space – and Obama policies -- to be subjected to the we will strengthen America’s 11 facile analysis of “declinism” and “gut” leadership on Earth. analysis rather than sound, though admittedly difficult, realistic strategic planning for a These epigraphs talk about all people being stable and secure future. able to fully utilize space and the benefits it yields, thereby setting the stage for an 12 internationally cooperative policy. Tone and Leadership The 2006 Bush policy, by contrast, was either more assertive and patriotic, or more caustic The Obama policy begins with two epigraphs, and bombastic, depending on ideological one from President Eisenhower and one from perspective. While domestic opinion was President Obama. These epigraphs speak to split, international opinion leaned heavily the consistent connection between American toward the latter. The Times of London goals in space and improving life on Earth, perhaps best summed up the international and their relationship to American leadership view in an October 19, 2006, commentary more broadly. They establish a cooperative entitled “America Wants it All – Life, the tone and put forth an important justification Universe, and Everything.” There the author for space activity for those who still question posited that space apparently was no longer st why we spend finite U.S. resources on space the final frontier, but the 51 state of the rather than here on Earth.

11 U.S. National Space Policy, June 28, 2010. p. 1 12 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank Rose called international cooperation a “key cornerstone” of the new 9 James Fallows, “How America Can Rise Again,” The policy. Press Conference: Deputy Assistant Secretary Frank Atlantic, January/February 2010, p 48. A. Rose – U.S. National Space Policy 2010, July 13, 2010. 10 Ibid, p 55. http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/07/13/rose-press-briefing

26 Joan Johnson-Freese/The 2010 National Space Policy: Down to Earth

United States. It went on to say that “The new including supporting infrastructure, National Space Policy that President Bush has will be considered an infringement of a nation’s rights.” The Bush policy signed is comically proprietary in tone about spoke only of interference with US the U.S.’s right to control access to the rest of space systems, while the Obama 13 the solar system.” policy refers to interference with any 14 nation’s space systems. The Obama tone reflects the reality that leadership cannot be coerced (at least not If the goal of the United States is to maintain indefinitely) and true space as a peaceful, secure and sustainable leadership requires …true environment for the benefit of all - a global others wanting to leadership commons - then it must lead by example and follow. While many of in a way that others are willing to follow. 15 the same points are requires others reiterated in the wanting to With almost one thousand space assets in orbit Obama policy as in the follow. critical to all aspects of our way of life and prior Bush policy, they security, and almost half belonging to the are reiterated in less nationalistic language and United States,16 “stability” is not just a recognize that a right declared by the United realistic policy goal, but a security imperative. States is going to be expected to have It is not in the interest of the United States to universal application. have the space environment (more) littered and volatile. Bruce MacDonald pointed out Jeff Foust points out a useful example of that the 2009 Strategic Posture Review difference in tone and language in his article, Commission reached similar conclusions “A Change in Tone in National Space Policy”: about space. MacDonald, who served as Senior Director to the Commission, noted the For example, the Bush policy stated commission recommendation “that the U.S. “The United States considers space should develop and pursue options for U.S. systems to have the rights of passage through and operations in space interests and stability in space, including the without interference. Consistent with possibility of negotiated measures.” This this principle, the United States will commission was not a group of left-wing view purposeful interference with its ideologues; it was six Republicans and six space systems as an infringement on Democrats headed by former Defense its rights.” Contrast that with the new policy: “The United States considers the space systems of all nations to

have the rights of passage through, 14 and conduct of operations in, space Jeff Foust, “A change in tone in national space policy,” The Space Review, July 6, 2010. without interference. Purposeful http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1660/1 interference with space systems, 15 See, America’s Future in Space: Aligning the Civil Space Program With National Needs, National Research Council, 2009, p. 44. 13 Bronwen Maddox, “America Wants it All – Life, the 16 See Union of Concerned Scientists Satellite Database. Universe, and Everything,” The Times (London), October 19, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security 2006. /space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/bronw Of the 438 satellites owned by the United States as of August en_maddox/article605583.ece. See also: “Russian official 2010, ownership is dispersed between the military, slams new US space policy as leading to confrontation,” BBC intelligence, other U.S. government organizations, civil and Monitoring Former Soviet Union, December 1, 2006; “Bush commercial sectors. Of those foreign –owned assets, many Doctrine goes into space: Unilateralism at the last frontier,” still provide service for the U.S. military and Americans in Sydney Morning Herald (Australia) , October 23, 2006, p.14. general. Space and Defense, Summer 2011 27

Secretaries Perry and Schlesinger.17 While – China, India, Iran, Brazil, and Nigeria, for turning from unilateralism and an emphasis on example -- will be willing to step up to the space war to a new tone of internationalism challenge of acting as responsible spacefaring and stability is clearly viewed by some as actors remains to be seen, but it is evident that “weakness,”18 the Obama Administration, the world is not willing to follow a leader who perhaps recalling that the 2009 Schriever V seems primarily self-interested. space wargame clearly demonstrated the need for allies and partners in times of conflict,19 is Reasserting U.S. space leadership will pay striving for less chest thumping and more important dividends on Earth. The United cooperation. States unquestionably “leads” space activity based on sheer numbers of assets and the Like it or not, the United States is not the only ability to use them. But when considering spacefaring nation. Other countries metrics such as United Nations’ voting increasingly see space assets as requisite tools coalitions on space issues, where the United for success in a globalized world because of States is often in a minority even against our the information they yield. They are not allies, and the decreasing share of foreign willing to forego their ownership and use, and satellite orders going to U.S. firms, U.S. in fact are seeking to expand both. This is a leadership has been lacking for some time. reality the United States must acknowledge The 2009 National Research Council report, and deal with - as the 2010 policy does - America’s Future in Space, directly spoke to rather than trying space enhancing U.S. strategic leadership on to discourage and Trying to maintain Earth. hinder the use of the status quo so space by others, that U.S. Strategic leadership for the United as has been the States means thinking about the preeminence can future in a way that sees beyond case for those never be immediate and particularly American who see an challenged is needs and policies – such as assuring increase in access to resources or a temporary China’s space unrealistic. military advantage – and positioning capabilities as the nation to help set an agenda for worldwide action. In considering both inherently zero-sum for the United States. In its own national interests and benefits other words, trying to maintain the status quo to humankind, the United States so that U.S. preeminence (or what some call should aim for more than immediate dominance) can never be challenged is solutions to transitory problems and should find approaches that seek to unrealistic. Whether other countries with, in 20 some cases, rapidly maturing space programs shape the future.

Effectively re-asserting American 17 Panel Discussion – The New National Space Policy: leadership will help create a more Prospects for International Cooperation and Mankind Safe Safer for All. July 1, 2010. stable and predictable environment in www.armscontrol.org/events/newnationalspacepolicy space and more realistically allow the 18 Taylor Dinerman, “National Space Policy,” from Strength United States to shape a secure and to Weakness, July 16, 2010. http:// www.hudson- ny.org/1417/national-space-policy-strength-weakness prosperous future. 19 See articles reviewing Schreiver V in High Frontier, Vol. 5. No. 4, 20 America’s Future in Space: Aligning the Civil Space https://newafpims.afnews.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD Program With National Needs, National Research Council, -090827-008.pdf 2009, p. 42

28 Joan Johnson-Freese/The 2010 National Space Policy: Down to Earth

sharp, power capabilities. After the Using all U.S. Tools to Protect invasion of Iraq, the United States was Our Space Assets viewed by much of the world as relying too heavily on the military In admittedly simplistic terms, the sharp power tool, and as a first choice. United States has four basic categories But in a globalized world populated of “tools” available to implement its with transnational and non-traditional policies abroad: diplomatic, threats and challenges, not all are informational, military and economic – effectively dealt with by kinetic power. sometimes referred to by the acronym Increasingly, effective abeyance DIME. Alone and in combinations, requires coordinated international they represent the spectrum of U.S. efforts, and reliance on hard power and power. coercion is counterproductive if they alienate those with whom we must Since the end of the Cold War, work to be successful. however, “power” has become a much more complicated concept. No longer All the tools of U.S. power must be does power simply equate to kinetic, or available. The United States must be “hard,” power deliverable by platforms willing and able to use its sharp power that can be counted and countered. if necessary, but it shouldn’t be the Joseph Nye coined the term “soft first or only option, and it may not be power,” though initially Donald the best option. The 2006 policy states Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defense, that the United States should “develop said he didn’t “know what that capabilities, plans, and options to means.”21 Walter Russell Mead ensure freedom of action in space, and, distinguished between sharp power if directed, deny such freedom of (military), soft power (cultural power, action to adversaries.” The 2010 the power of examples), sweet power policy instead uses the language (values, culture, and policy, and setting “develop capabilities, plans, and the agenda) and sticky power options to deter, defend against, and if (economic).22 At her Senate necessary, defeat efforts to interfere confirmation hearing, Secretary of with or attack U.S. or allied space State Hillary Clinton took these a step systems.” The Obama space policy farther, calling for the United States to recognizes the potential for using hard execute “smart power,” a combination power, but also recognizes that such of diplomacy and defense, to restore use (and the debris it creates) could be American power.23 Clearly, the United damaging to U.S. assets as well, and so States is preeminent in its hard, or adjusts the tone to encourage cooperation, and opens the door to a 21 See: Joseph Nye, Jr. “Think Again: Soft Power,” Foreign greater use of diplomacy. That door, Policy, March 1, 2006, though rhetorically not completely http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/think-again-soft-power 22 Walter Russell Mead, Power, Terror, Peace and War, slammed shut during the Bush years, (New York, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004) pp. 24-25. had de facto been largely ignored. 23 Anne E. Kornblut and Glenn Kessler, “In Foreign Policy, A New Trio at the Top,” Washington Post, January 13, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- What increased diplomacy will mean dyn/content/article/2009/01/12/AR2009011203510.html in practice remains to be seen and will Space and Defense, Summer 2011 29

not be without difficulties. What weapons treaty. The United States stance the United States will take at generally has not been favorably future United Nations Conference on inclined toward Disarmament meetings and votes will multilateral It is unlikely the be indicative. For many years the treaties in United States conference has pursued an agenda item recent years, will (or even called “Prevention of an Arms Race in dating back to should) support Space” (PAROS). While the United the Clinton States has since 2002 cast the only Administration. a space “no” vote against a resolution to Alternatively, weapons treaty. establish a working group on PAROS, Ben Baseley- in 2009 it switched its vote to an Walker refers to the potential for “soft- abstention – a small but significant law” options toward actions step in the right direction. management.25 This could include Additionally, another resolution, this efforts such as Codes of Conduct, or one Russian-led, called “Transparency Rules of the Road, which have drawn and Confidence-building Measures in increasingly support from European Outer-space,” encourages states to countries, commercial organizations, submit concrete proposals on and even from within the U.S. international confidence building and military26 - indeed anyone seriously transparency measures to the U.N. interested in protecting the space Secretary General. While the United environment. States voted “no” in 2008, it declined to participate in 2009, thereby The idea is that actors should and can allowing the resolution to be adopted learn to manage their actions toward a by consensus.24 The United States had stable and sustainable space previously been a consistent obstacle environment. When the United States to furthering such cooperation. This tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon obstructiveness had allowed China and in 1985 by destroying its Solwind Russia, the two countries which have satellite, and China tested its ASAT in set forth proposals for a treaty banning 2007, neither explicitly broke any the use of weapons in space and the specific “rules” or laws.27 But each transparency resolution, to portray the United States as opposing peace in 25 Panel Discussion – The New National Space Policy: space and as perhaps its greatest threat. Prospects for International Cooperation and Mankind Safe Safer for All. July 1, 2010. U.S. rhetoric, through the 2006 www.armscontrol.org/events/newnationalspacepolicy National Space Policy, and actions at 26See: Answers to Advance Questions for General Kevin P. the United Nations, made it Chilton, USAF, Nominee for Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. http://armed- understandable that other countries services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/September/Chilton%2009- would accept this portrayal. 27-07.pdf 27Lawyers could argue that Article 9 of the Outer Space Treaty required consultations ahead of time for actions that It is unlikely that the United States will could affect others’ space assets. It could also be argued that (or even should) support a space since the United States had observed prior Chinese fly-by tests and likely knew of the potentially upcoming impact test, it had a responsibility to warn others. As with all legal 24Paul Meyer, “US Space Security Policy: Still in Orbit or arguments, however, it is likely both arguments would be Commencing Re-entry?” unpublished assessment. July 2010. refuted as not applying for one reason or another.

30 Joan Johnson-Freese/The 2010 National Space Policy: Down to Earth

created a substantial amount of space preach that others should “do as we debris potentially dangerous to other say, not as we do.” spacecraft. The United States subsequently adjusted its manner of testing, as a matter of self-interest. Implementation Complications China, after the rightful international condemnation it suffered consequent The single-most complicating to its debris-creating 2007 ASAT test, factor in space policy stems from the seemed to learn as well. When China vast majority of space technology tested similar technology again in being dual-use, over 90% by most 2010, the test was characterized as a approximations. The term “dual-use” missile defense test and conducted has two equally important meanings: more along the political and technical 1) that the same basic technology has lines of what the United States did applications in both the civil and when it deliberately destroyed its military sectors, and 2) that it is often malfunctioning USA-193 at a lower difficult to distinguish whether orbit, indirectly rather than explicitly military space technology is intended testing ASAT technology, thereby for defensive or offensive use. Much avoiding both political condemnation of the world considers investment in and the creation of lingering debris. dual-use technology a good investment since it can be used for multiple As a matter of fact, China created the applications. The United States, biggest space mess in history with its however, with its more highly ASAT weapon in 2007, at the very bifurcated civil and military programs time the United States was aiming for, than other countries (and with larger or claiming, space dominance. That budgets), largely considers dual-use test deflated if not dispelled technology as an opportunity for completely the idea that the United countries like China, Iran and North States could technologically protect its Korea to develop military technology space assets by constantly playing for nefarious use under civilian guise. defense better than anyone else could play offense. The Chinese quickly and For example, imagery satellites are harshly demonstrated both the neutral in themselves; the way the ineffectiveness of bellicosity and the imagery they produce is used - tenuousness of space dominance. It is whether for crop rotation or targeting possible to establish air dominance weapons - determines whether it is a over a specific area for a limited time. civil or military asset, or in the case of, The same is true for sea control. But for example, the Japanese Information unless the United States is willing and Gathering Satellite (IGS) system, able to shoot down anything that both.28 By some U.S. accounts, nearly anyone launches that we don’t approve all Chinese space assets are military, of, anytime and anywhere – and deal though often very similar with the consequent creation of an orbital debris mess, to say nothing of 28 Joan Johnson-Freese and Lance Gatling, “Security potentially igniting a war – claiming Implications of Japan’s Information Gathering Satellite dominance leaves the United States to System,” Intelligence & National Security, Issue 19/3 (2004). Space and Defense, Summer 2011 31

technologically to U.S. civil programs. “strengthening stability in space” In another case, as long as the United through “domestic and international States pursues missile defense, some measures”31 and elaborated on in countries will consider the United discussion regarding preserving the States as having an (offensive) anti- space environment.32 Ideally that satellite capability because the might mean a treaty to prohibit certain technology is so well-suited for the debris-creating actions. Realistically, ASAT mission. The self- however, ratification of such a treaty congratulatory American media would likely evoke a partisan battle in coverage after the successful the Senate, framed as between those intentional destruction of USA-193 who want to protect national security basically confirmed that ASAT and those who are willing to forego it capability to the world. “The for the sake of soft international goals. unprecedented downing of an errant Bacevich sees the former group as spy satellite by a Navy missile makes supporters of an “Ideology of National it clear that the Pentagon has a new Security” that allows American weapon in its arsenal – an antisatellite profligacy - and reality avoidance - to missile adapted from the nation’s prevail.33 missile defense system.” 29 Policy language that “The United Though space has long been States will consider proposals and militarized, the Bush Administration concepts for arms control if they are continued to assert that the Rubicon of equitable, effectively verifiable, and actual space weaponry had yet to be enhance the national security of the crossed. 30 But dual-use technology United States and its allies” could also blurs the line between militarization present real difficulties in making that and weaponization considerably. ideal occur, to the likely While the Obama Administration has disappointment of many. Under what backed away from initial indications it circumstances, for example, could a would ban space weapons, it has space treaty be considered verifiable? encouraged instead other avenues for Though verification has long been “actions management” - ways to considered a potential “stopper” for distinguish between legitimate military space arms control mechanisms, there uses of space and weaponization, or at are efforts underway to specify least to discourage weaponization. conditions for verifiability from both a political and technical perspectives.34 Strengthening measures to mitigate orbital debris, an example of “actions 312010 NSP, p. 4. management,” is given a special nod as 322010 NSP, p. 7 part of the stated 2010 policy goal of 33See: Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism, (New York, Metropolitan Books, 2008), pp. 74-84. 29 Marc Kaufman and Josh White, “Spy Satellite Downing 34See: Ambassador Roger G. Harrison, Space and Shows a New Weapons Capability,” Washington Post, Verification, Volume I: Policy Implications, Eisenhower February 22, 2008, A03. Center for Space & Defense Studies, 2011; Dr. David 30 Although Baker Spring says in his July 6, 2010 Webmemo Finkleman, Space and Verification, Volume II: Technical that “space has been weaponzied since the dawn of the space Assessment, Eisenhower Center for Space & Defense Studies, age.” 2011.

32 Joan Johnson-Freese/The 2010 National Space Policy: Down to Earth

Though still preliminary, it is consistently, findings fall along three heartening that discussion has begun general axes: lower launch costs, more rather than simply being assumed to be cooperation between the civil and “too hard.” In the meantime, efforts for military space communities, and more debris management, support for commercial involvement. We have increased space situational awareness, known the necessary goals for some and the fragile support for arms control time, yet all remain elusive. Since indicate a more likely path toward President Obama clearly intends to actions management, rather than the rely considerably on commercial space creation of a legal regime that may not for achieving his human spaceflight be able to be enforced anyway. plans, as became Equally important, while the Obama clear with the FY We have known Administration clearly wants to return 2011 NASA budget the necessary U.S. space policy back to within request, more goals for some mainstream international views, it appears to be riding time, yet all must do so within domestic on this iteration of remain elusive. considerations. Politics is the art of the expanding the possible, not the ideal. Thus, while commercial space those who would support a treaty effort of “fixing space” than in the actually have a realistic view of the past. This pragmatic approach seems debris problem as one unsolvable by necessary as the U.S. human hard power unilateralism, a treaty is spaceflight program has, since Apollo, just as likely an unrealistic approach to often been funded by unsupportable solving it. Creativity will be at a methods, somewhat analogous to using premium. a Mastercard to pay off a Visa. So this, again, is an attempt at a realistic approach to an old problem. JetBlue to Space? This pragmatic approach has not seen universal acclaim; the cancellation of A plethora of studies and the Constellation program brought commissions, particularly in the American-hero astronauts Neil 1980’s and 1990’s, have looked at how Armstrong and Eugene Cernan out to “fix” space, meaning how to more from retirement to protest. They effectively utilize government claimed the move was “devastating” to resources and grow the space the space program and that Obama’s development field.35 Fairly new plan was a “blueprint” to get to “nowhere.”36 Their angst is

35See, for example, Pioneering the Space Frontier, the 1986 understandable. It is like watching the report of the National Commission on Space; the 1987 Leadership and America’s Future in Space generated by the first American woman in space, Sally Ride; the Space Architect Study done by DOD in 1988; the 1990 Report of the and A Post Cold War Assessment of US Space Policy, and the Advisory Committee on the Future of the US space Program 1992 National Research Council report From Earth to Orbit. (the Augustine committee); the 1991 Synthesis Group Report 36Kathy Steinmetz, “Moonwalkers Defense Spaceflight at (the Stafford committee); the 1992 reports from the National Senate Hearing,” Time, May 13, 2010. Space Council and the Vice-President’s Space Policy http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1989024,00.h Advisory Board, The Future of US Space launch Capability tml

Space and Defense, Summer 2011 33

auto plants in Michigan close up and The commission recommended taking move to Mexico. But both candidates a flexible approach to exploration if Obama and McCain realistically had to significant budget increases were not tell voters in Michigan that those auto forthcoming, which were not. Obama’s manufacturing jobs weren’t coming epigraph at the beginning of the 2010 back. In the same vein, economic NSP says the United States’ goals in realities have left President Obama to space go beyond “a destination to tell disappointed space enthusiasts that reach.” Coupled with the cancellation the Constellation program was being of Constellation, it is clear we are no cancelled. This is a particularly bitter longer racing the Chinese (back) to the pill to swallow during very difficult Moon, a race we handily won against economic times, as jobs were the Soviets in 1969, but in which we subsequently lost in key aerospace stood a good chance of losing this time states like Florida, Alabama, Texas around. Likely anticipating the outcry and California. Nonetheless, the adage from those at a loss without “only poets write strategy without a destinations and timetables, however, budget” comes to mind when it also states the United States will retrospectively viewing the “begin crewed missions beyond the Constellation program from its roots in moon, including sending humans to an the 2004 Bush Vision for Space asteroid” by 2025 and “by the mid- Exploration speech.37 The reality is – 2030s, send humans to orbit Mars and as supported by the report of the 2009 return them safely to Earth.”40 Clearly Augustine Commission,38 specifically these were intended to reassure created to advise the President on the skeptics that the future of human human spaceflight program – spaceflight remained a priority. Constellation, as it stood at the time of Personally, I think it was a mistake to cancellation, suffered an irrecoverable include timetables for which there are ends-ways-means mismatch such as no programs authorized or funding to discussed prior. As the program stood, achieve them. The political will to potential success was an illusion. fund human spaceflight to a level commensurate for success within a Based on the cancellation of timetable is unlikely to be any stronger Constellation and his speech in April for a new program than it was to fund 2010,39 the Obama Administration Constellation. This is where (and why) appears to have largely heeded the the commercial sector is being counted advice of the Augustine Commission. on to step up.

That commercial, civil, and national 37 Statement by Joan Johnson-Freese, Senate Hearing on Reauthorizing the Vision for Space Exploration, May 7, 2008. security space sector guidelines for http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=27924 policy implementation are listed in the 38 Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great 2010 National Space Policy beginning Nation, October 2009. http://legislative.nasa.gov/396093main_HSF_Cmte_FinalRep with the commercial space sector and ort.pdf ending with national security space 39 Kenneth Chang, “Obama Vows Renewed Space Program,” sector has been analyzed with New York Times, April 15, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/science/space/16nasa.ht ml 402010 NSP, p.11.

34 Joan Johnson-Freese/The 2010 National Space Policy: Down to Earth

Talmudic scrutiny. Those who The importance of national security is consider space-related national not downgraded, but it is being defined interests as equating first and foremost more broadly and realistically. In to the national security space sector terms of space, “change” means have cited that ordering as indicative attempting – and I say attempting in that national security has been recognition of past efforts – to bring subordinated to arms control in this space development to a path more NSP.41 Government strategies are similar to other areas of high-tech intended to be in alignment like development rather than the anomaly it “nested” Russian dolls, one fitting has been. Whereas airplanes and within the other. If the NSP is nested computers required government within the National Security Strategy investment as seed money to then (NSS), as is likely and intended, then (relatively quickly) allow a the space sector prioritization is not commercial sector to flourish, in really surprising. While the 2006 NSS human spaceflight, the tipping point began with the words “America is at for the commercial sector to overtake war,”42 clearly and unequivocally government efforts has yet to occur. focusing America on the fight against More than fifty years after John Glenn terrorism, the Obama NSS begins with orbited the Earth, the government still a note of change. controls tickets to space much differently than passengers booking a Time and again in our nation’s ticket on Jetblue, an aberration in an history, American’s have risen to era of globalization. meet – and shape – moments of transition. This must be one of those moments. We live in a time of Globalization has meant that sweeping change. The success of free capabilities like high resolution nations, open markets, and social imagery, once available only to progress in recent decades has security communities in a very few accelerated globalization on an unprecedented scale. This has opened countries, are now available on the the doors of opportunity around the commercial market. Globalization also globe, extended democracy to means that countries are connected in hundreds of millions of people, and ways that change how they can act and made peace possible among the major react in shaping and coercing the powers. Yet globalization has also intensified the dangers we face – actions of others. Ben Baseley-Walker from international terrorism and the illustrates that point well when it spread of deadly technologies, to comes to space. “If, for example, the economic upheaval and a changing United States blows up a Chinese 43 climate. satellite, what would I do if I were sitting in Beijing? Would I go and launch a missile at an American satellite? No, I would crash the 44 41See: Baker Spring, “Obama’s National Space Policy: dollar.” Space is a different venue Subordinating National Security to Arms Control,” Webmemo, The Heritage Foundation, No. 2950, July 6, 2010. 42 http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ 43http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/nat 44Panel Discussion – The New National Space Policy: ional_security_strategy.pdf Prospects for International Cooperation and Mankind Safe

Space and Defense, Summer 2011 35

than it was during the Cold War when customers.”46 A major change in this governments controlled all assets, and policy is the removal of a clause hard power ruled the day. forbidding direct subsidies for commercial space, a ban included in Despite the best attempts of some both the Bush and Clinton policies. entrepreneurs, human spaceflight has The apparent intent is to move U.S. remained largely the purview of commercial space activities onto a governments. Some of those best level playing field with most other attempts have taught investor spacefaring nations. Is the Ariane billionaires that space is an arena rocket, for example, marketed through where large fortunes can quickly Arianespace, a commercial space become small ones. PayPal founder venture? It is certainly categorized as Elon Musk got into the space launch such within the international launch business and founded the SpaceX market, but the majority of shares are Corporation, subsequently saying: “I owned by the French government.47 want to be able to make sure that we The French government also invested have enough capital to survive at least heavily in its development. The United three consecutive failures. If you want States appears to be moving in the to make a small fortune in the launch direction of this model, which other vehicle business, start with a large countries have long utilized. Again, one.”45 there is no guarantee that the commercial sector will step up to the Where the Obama policy offers new challenge, but trying to change the hope for the heretofore unattainable status quo model to a more realistic goal of commercial viability is in its and sustainable approach over the definition of the commercial sector, long-term is laudable. including the omission of a previously laudable but unrealistic parameter. According to the NSP, commercial From Muddling Through to a space “refers to space goods, services, Realistic Approach? or activities provided by private sector enterprises that bear a reasonable It has been apparent for some time to portion of the investment risk and those who scrutinize space budgets and responsibility for the activity, operate timetables that a day of reckoning was in accordance with typical market- coming, sooner rather than later. That based incentives for controlling cost day has arrived. In human spaceflight and optimizing return on investment, and exploration, you get what you are and have the legal capacity to offer willing to pay for. Without a viable these goods or services to existing or commercial sector, it is largely up to potential nongovernmental the American public, through their Members of Congress, to decide what

462010 NSP, p.10. Safer for All. July 1, 2010. 47The French space agency, Centre National d'Études www.armscontrol.org/events/newnationalspacepolicy Spatiales (CNES), owns 32% of Arianespace. 45http://www.evancarmichael.com/Famous- http://www.arianespace.com/about-us-corporate- Entrepreneurs/1610/Elon-Musk-Quotes.html information/shareholders.asp

36 Joan Johnson-Freese/The 2010 National Space Policy: Down to Earth

they need, in accordance with what with other countries and reform of they want to spend. Cold War-era, ham-fisted, complicated export control laws to allow the United While there are those in Congress who States to work with other countries and are angry and vocal over the revitalize its competitive place in the cancellation of Constellation international (including the loss of jobs in many of aerospace 49 The Obama their districts) it must be remembered market. The policy will require that Congress can always reallocate illusion that we funds into the space budget if there can defend space unprecedented really is enough political will to do so. technology levels of In the early years of NASA, Congress exclusively with cooperation with provided more money than the agency technology has other countries. requested in their eagerness to counter been debunked Soviet space achievements. Today, and overcome by events, specifically however, with competition for federal the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. Yet funding running the gamut across whether the Obama Administration has social welfare programs, job stimulus the political capital to push the programs, on-going war efforts, execution of this policy forward, and domestic infrastructure, the the political will to spend that capital environment, education, health care on this issue, remains to be seen. and more, human spaceflight will likely find itself with more rhetorical Recognizing and choosing a new path support than actual funding. forward, one perhaps less “visionary” in the short term, could be more The President has said space is a vital realistic in the long term. The auto interest of the United States, but there manufacturing jobs are not coming are finite resources to meet infinite back to Michigan and Ohio, and the possible interests. Though rhetorically United States is not going to be supportive, the American public standing on the Moon in 2020. But largely sees space exploration and resistance to change will still be development as admirable, but more strong. expendable than schools, roads, health care, tax cuts and other priorities.48 Already there are signs that short-term, The Obama policy sets a way forward muddling-through advocates will not to try and achieve realistic goals within give up easily. The Senate Committee realistic budgets. It will require on Commerce, Science and unprecedented levels of cooperation Transportation unanimously agreed in July to an authorization bill plan to cut Constellation, but initiate development 48“50% Favor Cutting Back on Space Exploration,” of a heavy-lift rocket in 2011, Rasmussen Reports, January 15, 2010. http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/lifestyle/ge neral_lifestyle/january_2010/50_favor_cutting_back_on_spac 49See: Joan Johnson-Freese, “Becoming Chinese: Or, How e_exploration; Darren K. Carlson, “Space: to Infinity and U.S. Satellite Export Policy Threatens National Security,” Beyond on a Budget,” August 17, 2004. Space Times, January-February 2001; Joan Johnson-Freese, http://www.gallup.com/poll/12727/space-infinity-beyond- “Alice in Licenseland: U.S. Satellite Export Controls Since budget.aspx 1990”, Space Policy, August 2000. Space and Defense, Summer 2011 37

potentially to be ready for use by the China on ideological grounds.52 There end of 2016. Again, politics being the are also those who will oppose the art of the possible, that compromise NSP on simple partisan grounds. But provides jobs in aerospace states for the time for profligacy is over, and the politicians and near-term action for time for renewal and reality-based those who demand them. Not decision-making is here. surprisingly, the money to start work on the heavy-lift vehicle will not be Those who have been pushing for the new money, but will be sliced from United States to move toward space funds the administration proposed for dominance, to include the development developing new space technologies of space weapons, under the guise of and commercial efforts. Also, since offensive-defensive capabilities or any the Senate bill only covers the next other guise, will just have to try to wait three years, it is unknown what will out the President. While President happen after that.50 So again, funding Obama will likely not ban them, he problems have not been realistically also is unlikely to promote them. There solved, just put off for somebody else are parallels in the space sector to that to deal with. of the nuclear sector – where the President has said he wanted to move There will be those who will resist to “zero” but has found the path there change in time-honored ways: slow- strewn with political compromise and rolling, dwelling on difficulties with efforts by nuclear modernization past change efforts (just too hard), stalwarts to “hold on” for the future. magnifying risks, and pointing out Space weapons advocates will likely potential personal power impacts. do the same. Baker Spring warns against arms control agendas that “effectively The 2010 NSP offers a blueprint for circumvent the Senate’s constitutional renewal rather than a blueprint back to role in consenting to the ratification of the Moon, or a space battle plan. The international agreements that should be challenge for NASA is to develop – concluded as treaties.”51 While quickly – innovative, affordable and, certainly not advocating a treaty, he yes, inspiring, plans to take America also objects to anything short of a forward in human and robotic space treaty (such as a Code of Conduct) - exploration. The commercial sector’s effectively reinforcing the “status quo” challenge will be not only to facilitate - by cautioning the Senate that its NASA’s plans, but also to innovate power could be circumvented. and implement plans of their own to go Additionally, there are those in beyond NASA and truly develop government and in Congress especially space. The challenge for the military (on both sides of the aisle) who will is to protect space as an environment oppose any sort of cooperation with for use by all, but especially the United States, without relying on potentially 50Kenneth Chang, “Senate Committee’s NASA Plan Cuts Moon Program,” The New York Times, July 15, 2010. 51Baker Spring, “Obama’s National Space Policy: 52See comments in: Peter J. Brown, Asia takes stock of new Subordinating National Security to Arms Control,” US space policy,” Asia Times, July 16, 2010. Webmemo, The Heritage Foundation, No. 2950, July 6, 2010. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html

38 Joan Johnson-Freese/The 2010 National Space Policy: Down to Earth

counterproductive, debris-creating, extremely expensive and technically unfeasible hardware. Taking up these challenges will yield not just benefits in space, but benefits regarding U.S. strategic leadership on Earth and in international security. The new blueprint offers new technical goals and opportunities ahead, and the revitalization of our strategic leadership. All are realistic goals worth pursuing. If we ignore them in favor of short-term, status quo approaches, it will ultimately be at the peril of U.S. national security.

Operationally Responsive Space: Past, Present and Future

Stuart Eves Surrey Satellite Technology Limited

The Past West launched just one military mission, and had Russia chosen to engage in that conflict, it Where did the idea of Operationally is clear which side would have possessed the Responsive Space originate? You might “information edge”. Analysts in the West imagine that the idea was born during the First quietly doffed their caps to the “operationally Gulf War, (sometimes called the First Space responsive” space programme in Moscow, War), where use was made of strategic space who had comprehensively demonstrated a systems to support operations. It was apparent, “Tier-2” launch-on-demand capability long though, that strategic systems with very small before the concept was formally articulated in fields of view and long revisit times were not the West well suited to operational reconnaissance. Other limitations of these strategic systems And the Russians didn’t stop there. In the mid- included a tasking system not suited for 1990’s they fielded a system called Arkon, tactical timelines; significant data downlink which had an astonishing level of tactical requirements, making it difficult to deliver capability. Placed in a high-altitude LEO, data into the theatre; a large in-theatre (with an apogee of 2750 km and a perigee of “footprint” for intelligence analysts; and lack 1500 km), this large mission, (which would be of “command assurance” that the requested considered a “Tier-1” asset in today’s collection would not be pre-empted by higher responsive space terminology), was able to national priorities, for which reason field deliver imagery with a resolution of better commanders were unwilling to place reliance than five meters over enormous fields of on them for critical operations. It is tempting regard. In the summer months, when the to think that these limitations inspired system lighting in the Northern hemisphere was at its designers to conceive of constellations of best, this single satellite could have provided smaller, more affordable satellites with wider between 8 and 10 images of a given point on fields of view. the Earth’s surface per day, and its high- altitude orbit would also have provided But in 1991, while the West was struggling to frequent opportunities for commanding and adapt the operations of its satellites to meet data dissemination. the demands of the conflict situation, the Russians were launching optical and RF surveillance satellites at an impressive rate. If the ORS programme does ever succeed in launching 18 low Earth orbit surveillance satellites in a four-month period like the Desert Shield operation, it will simply be emulating what the Russians achieved 20 The Russian Arkon Satellite years ago. In the same period in 1991, the 40 Stuart Eves/Operationally Responsive Space: Past, Present and Future

The Arkon satellite had a repeating ground from a satellite platform weighing just 120 kg. trace, allowing it provide repeat coverage For a satellite that cost less than $20m to build from the same point in space when required. and launch, this mission set a new This capability allowed the imagery from two performance threshold. By the time TopSat consecutive days to be compared very easily, was launched in 2005, the U.S. tactical space highlighting changes which would focus the programme had commenced, and had assigned attention of the analysts on areas of interest the designators TacSat-1, TacSat-2, TacSat-3, within the very large imagery scenes. etc. Since TopSat preceded these US missions into orbit, collaborative experiments were The Arkon satellite was large – it required a conducted with U.S. researchers and TopSat Proton launch vehicle to place it in orbit – but was designated TacSat-0. it was also agile. Illustrations released by the production organization in Russia showed at least four different modes of operation, including imaging of point targets, of areas, of lines of communication, and a mode in which the satellite could be trained on a specific location for tens of minutes if required.

The Arkon Satellite’s Operational Modes

Once again, analysts in the West doffed their caps!! The TopSat satellite and one of its images of Kirtland AFB, NM The Present The specific technical trick that TopSat Tactically oriented satellites in the West have employed was to pitch backwards quite taken a different path, based on much smaller deliberately as it passed over its targets. This hardware, but it was not the United States who pitching motion slowed the effective ground took the lead. Built in the United Kingdom, rate of its sensor, allowing more light into the the TopSat satellite set a world record for camera system, thereby getting close to the “resolution per mass of satellite” by delivering diffraction-limited performance of its 20 cm better than three meter resolution imagery aperture telescope. This level of agility is only Space and Defense, Summer 2011 41

possible with small, rigid satellites. Large meaning that the constellation can provide platforms are seldom capable of achieving the imaging opportunities over the entire globe at angular rates required; and generally initiate least once per day. And the SAR-Lupe vibrational modes that demand significant satellites are equipped with an intersatellite “settling time” before acceptable quality link system which enables the satellites to imagery can be collected. transfer commanding information when they come within view of one-another and thereby But TopSat’s pitching trick permits two other enhance the response time of the system. advantages that are key to ORS. One is that, if deployed into a sun-synchronous orbit, the satellite is no longer constrained to a local In an ORS context, both these systems would time of ascending node close to noon. It is be regarded as “Tier-1” capabilities, in that able to extend the range of local times of day they are already “on-orbit”. However, they when imagery can be collected by pitching differ from the assets that have traditionally through a larger angle; compensating for the been assumed to comprise Tier-1 because they comparative lack of reflected sunlight near the are not strategically oriented, single satellites terminator by slowing the ground rate of its being pressed into service as inefficient sensor still further. The other key advantage is tactical surrogates. that a satellite like TopSat is no longer constrained to operate in a sun-synchronous These systems differ philosophically from the orbit. If a satellite is deployed into a lower missions in the TacSat and ORS programmes inclination orbit, (to provide more frequent in at least three key respects:- revisits over operational regions, for instance), it is inevitable due to the laws of orbital • Firstly, they are clearly designed to dynamics that it will pass over its targets at operate as part of a constellation, (which different local times of day. For a larger affects all aspects of the satellite design, satellite, this might be a problem, but for including both the payload and the TopSat it simply means selecting an platform). By contrast, the U.S. systems appropriate pitch rate for the local time of day have yet to clearly indicate the “objective and the prevailing lighting conditions. systems” that might result if the TacSat and ORS experiments are deemed The low cost of the TopSat mission successful. demonstrated the potential affordability of constellations of small satellites to provide • Secondly, they are being used to support significantly greater timeliness, but to date it commercial and strategic applications is Germany which has exploited the whilst in orbit. It is arguable that one constellation concept most effectively for reason why the ORS programme in the US military purposes. Germany now has two 5- has not gained more momentum is that it satellite constellations at its disposal; the is seeking to find funding for missions military SAR system, SAR-Lupe, and the which, if only used over operational zones, commercial RapidEye optical imaging system. are only going to be exploited for 1% or SAR-Lupe and RapidEye are specifically 2% of the time. Clearly the value for designed to operate as constellations with money from a satellite is greatly enhanced much better revisit characteristics. The if it can also be used to support other RapidEye constellation is comprised of small missions, such as homeland defense; agile satellites which can roll off-nadir, commercial collection; operational

42 Stuart Eves/Operationally Responsive Space: Past, Present and Future

training; and the requirements of allies elsewhere on the globe.

• Thirdly, they are expected to be launched once constructed, rather than being held on the ground as a series of sub-systems. For a commercial system like RapidEye, there is clearly a significant “opportunity cost” involved in having valuable hardware on the ground rather than in orbit, and even in the case of a military system such as SAR- The SSTL-300 imaging satellite Lupe, the pace of change in small satellite design means that hardware can rapidly So where have the major successes of the become technically obsolescent if kept in ORS programme occurred to date? One of the storage for too long, (which some might principal achievements was the inclusion of suggest was the fate of the original both imagery and Radio Frequency (RF) TacSat-1 payload) surveillance sensors on the TacSat-2 mission. To extend the analogy with the human sensing Now it might be argued that it is very difficult system, this satellite had ears as well as eyes, to design a satellite that can be used to support and was therefore potentially capable of all these differing requirements, and this may greater “self-cueing”. (In practice, once have been true. However, sensor and accommodation constraints and power budget payload technology has advanced to the point limitations meant that TacSat-2 was not able where the agility of small satellites can to operate its eyes and ears simultaneously support a number of different modes of over the same region of the ground, but it operation. The SSTL-300, which is due for its certainly points towards the future.) first launch in May 2011, is a prime example. Another clue to the future is provided by the Some of these modes presume detailed feedback from the TacSat-3 mission. advanced knowledge of the target regions, and Equipped with a small-footprint hyper- so are more suited to strategic surveillance, spectral sensor the satellite demonstrated the whereas others cover larger regions and can potential value of spectral imagery, if not the provide support to operational and tactical area coverage rate and timeliness required to missions. Moreover, the satellite is equipped support the warfighter. with both wide area cameras and a high resolution camera on the same platform. This is analogous to the way that the human eye The Future operates, with the lower resolution, wide-area “peripheral vision” cameras providing As technologies continue to improve, the detection and cueing data for the higher contribution that operationally responsive resolution, small area camera that provides the space systems can make to military operations high fidelity imaging. will continue to increase. Charge Coupled Device (CCD) detectors now allow the imaging of far greater areas than was possible previously.

Space and Defense, Summer 2011 43

The image below shows the image footprint of collection to the ground – although the raw a modern small satellite over Australia. The data could be downloaded if necessary. much smaller brown stripes across the continent are the footprints generated by the And the nature of the connections available to Landsat satellites at a comparable resolution. transfer this data will also change. At present, the number of ground stations available to an ORS system is usually quite limited. This constrains both the speed with which the imagery data can be returned, and the overall capacity of the system, (since the number of times that the satellite’s on-board memory can be filled and emptied on a given day will also be dependent on its access to ground station facilities).

Those downlink requirements are becoming more impressive all the time. An example is SSTL’s Earthmappper system, where a constellation of 5 satellites, each weighing just 100 kg, now has the capability to image the entire landmass of the globe on a daily basis.

A comparison of current and historical Essentially the satellites are “always on”, and coverage rates collect imagery whenever the mission is over the Earth’s surface. The challenge is clearly to Clearly, the increased volumes of data ensure that this valuable imagery is down- generated by such sensors demand greater on- linked to the ground, and not trapped on orbit. board storage capacities, and higher data downlink rates, but again the rapid pace of In the next generation, it is expected that the development in terrestrial computing use of inter-satellite links will become technologies is providing a solution to these increasingly common on ORS assets. problems. In the case of the SSTL-300, the Currently, such links are generally reserved demand for greater downlink capacity is being for grand strategic systems, but the success of addressed via the development of a steerable UAV’s using satellite communication systems data downlink antenna system which can track suggests that this will also become routine for a specific ground station with a narrow beam- satellites in the future. They are, after all, the width antenna, enabling the available satellite ultimate high-flying UAV’s, and some, (e.g. power to be concentrated into a smaller region ORS-1) are even based on modified airborne and so deliver a higher capacity link budget. sensor technology!

And as the power of on-board computing Another obvious solution to the downlink increases, it will become increasingly issue is to internationalize the ORS common to process the imagery data on board programme, providing the opportunity to the satellite, and downlink a much smaller access ground station facilities in multiple image file, rather than transfer the raw nations at different longitudes around the globe. A thirteen-nation MOU is currently in

44 Stuart Eves/Operationally Responsive Space: Past, Present and Future

the process of negotiation, and this has the Conclusion potential to start the process of creating the “Coalition ORS” concept which has been Finally and perhaps most importantly, small proposed previously. satellites can radically change the calculus concerning satellite lifetimes. Smaller, Moreover, international collaboration between cheaper satellites simply do not have to last as the United States and other nations already long as large satellites in order to deliver the exists elsewhere in the space arena. One same value for money. As a consequence, it is example is the use by the U.S. Government of logical to consider deploying them in lower, leased capacity on Paradigm’s Skynet 5 shorter-lived orbits, and this could modify the satellites, which were launched to provide overall approach to ORS enormously. secure communications for the UK MOD Satellites closer to the Earth require smaller under an innovative procurement process apertures and less power, with the result that which transferred significant risk to the the missions can be scaled down to the point contractor in exchange for a long duration where they become candidates for air-launch. contract. This arrangement establishes a precedent which could also be exploited in the These new technologies and new capabilities surveillance domain if the UK elects to invest offer tremendous flexibility that will make the in a sovereign surveillance system. . The next generation of satellite constellations truly recently released U.S. National Space Policy operationally responsive. and the DoD National Security Space Strategy both direct the use of coalitions where appropriate for both operational and geopolitical reasons.

As satellites have become essential to war- winning, they have increasingly become the target for anti-satellite capabilities – both in space and on the ground. Expect to see increasing efforts to protect satellites from such measures by the application of stealth technologies to the space vehicles and continuing efforts to harden the terrestrial networks and infrastructure against all forms of hostile interference. Augmenting existing satellite constellations with small satellites makes intentional or unintentional interference or denial of the overall capability more difficult. Additionally, integrating space and terrestrial capabilities can further enhance the overall resilience of the system, and although breaking down “stovepipes” is difficult, this is another possible medium-term development.

Space Deterrence or Dominance?

Dwayne Liller U.S. Northern Command*

*Unless otherwise noted, the conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the author writing in his personal capacity. They are not intended and should not be thought to represent official ideas, attitudes, or policies of any agency of the United States Government. The author has used publically available information in the researching and presentation of this work.

ABSTRACT: A strategy to safeguard United fear is the best policy, not because of an States’ space assets is needed. Deterrence idealistic view of benevolent human nature, strategies, like Cold War nuclear deterrence, but because that will be the end result in the are often recommended. Nuclear deterrence long run even after great effort and expense to history reveals that deterrence through dominate space. dominance is what early strategists employed. Both Cold War adversaries attempted repeatedly to gain the lead in nuclear “I DO BELIEVE THAT MAN’S WISDOM IN weapons. Seeking short term advantages AVOIDING WAR IS OFTEN SURPASSED BY HIS 1 activated the security dilemma and both sides FOLLY IN PROMOTING IT.” responded in kind, guaranteeing an arms race. The faulty logic of the security dilemma Space capabilities are vital to the United was that the next advantage would bring States. It is critical, therefore, for the United security. This did not happen and illustrated States to develop an effective long term how mutual vulnerability resulted from long strategy to safeguard assets in space. term and determined opposition. That Deterrence strategies based on the Cold War condition exists to this day, made bearable by example are often discussed as a model for agreements and procedures that reduce fear space. Examining the evolution of nuclear through increased transparency and deterrence reveals, however, that a deterrence verification. model accepting long term vulnerability emerged after attempts at deterrence through The 2001 Space Commission Report identified dominance strategies failed. The Cold War the threat of a “Space Pearl Harbor” and experience with two determined adversaries called for military solutions, including illustrates how the security dilemma can denying space to adversaries. This set United spawn an arms race. In the long run, however, States’ space policy on a course to repeat the a situation of deterrence based on mutual Cold War mistake of seeking deterrence vulnerability is the inevitable end state. The through dominance. deterrence found in mutual vulnerability is based on both sides having the ability to inflict The United States’ best option is to abandon harm. It is deterrence from a position of space deterrence through dominance reciprocal strength. While dominance in a strategies and accept the inevitable end state of mutual vulnerability and thereby avoid 1Robert S. MacNamara, “The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy,” engaging in a space arms race. A cooperative Department of State Bulletin 57, (9 October 1967), p. 450. legal framework with transparency to assuage 46 Dwayne Liller/Space Deterrence or Dominance?

military capability can provide deterrence while it lasts, it also activates the security dilemma and any ensuing arms race negates The Cold War the deterrent effect just recently enjoyed. In “WE DO NOT WANT A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE WITH spite of the Cold War example of unsuccessful THE SOVIET UNION—PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE short term dominance strategies, the United ACTION-REACTION PHENOMENON MAKES IT 2 States openly advocated steps toward a FOOLISH AND FUTILE.” dominance strategy in space with the release of the Report of the Commission to Assess The last chapters of the Cold War left an United States National Security Space impression that nuclear deterrence was finally Management and Organization published in attained after years of effort. Mutually 2001 (hereafter referred to as the Space Assured Destruction (MAD) is the nuclear Commission Report). While deterrence is deterrent end state that the world became cited as the goal for space, some of the actions familiar with. It involves living under threat called for by the Space Commission Report of annihilation because of the reserved can be interpreted as steps toward a capability to inflict equally unacceptable dominance strategy. A possible outcome of devastation upon the enemy.3 This “delicate the military’s pursuit of some of the more balance of terror” continues to keep both sides aggressive goals set out in the Space in check and is what we have come to know as Commission Report is a costly arms race. nuclear deterrence.4 This idea of nuclear History shows that new offensive capabilities deterrence—deterrence under mutual are eventually negated by defensive vulnerability—is a strategy that emerged after countermeasures or countered with greater attempts at deterrence through dominance numbers of opposing capabilities. Once failed. Deterrence through nuclear dominance begun, arms race momentum is difficult to was embraced from the outset as illustrated by reign in. In a competitive global environment, the U.S. reaction to the Soviets’ first there is little likelihood that the United States successful atomic detonation. The U.S. can maintain space dominance over the long response was “to raise the nuclear stakes even run. Like the nuclear arms race of the Cold higher by authorizing development of the War, a space policy seeking deterrence hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb.”5 This through dominance will yield mutual capability escalation in order to gain, maintain vulnerability as the end state. The key to or regain an advantage continued throughout making deterrence under mutual vulnerability the Cold War. The ensuing arms race was bearable is to increase transparency in order to enormously expensive to both sides and ease fears and build trust. For space, this neither felt much more secure for the effort. requires much better space situational awareness (SSA) for all concerned parties. Comprehensive and cooperative SSA will 2 Ibid., p. 447. 3 Fred Iklé, “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century,” allow space faring nations to know what is Foreign Affairs 51, no. 2 (January 1973), p. 268. actually happening in space instead of 4 Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” defaulting to worst case scenario assumptions. RAND P-1472, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 6 November 1958). The best approach to space policy for the long 5 Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two Generations of run is a cooperative arrangement that accepts Nuclear Strategists,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: from mutual vulnerability because that’s the Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 738. Walter A. situation most likely to emerge even after McDougal, …the Heavens and the Earth (Baltimore: Basic great efforts to dominate space are made. Books, 1985), p. 50. Space and Defense, Summer 2011 47

Competitiveness and seeking advantage are close of the Second World War (WWII), the part of human nature. Nowhere is this more United States sought to offset Soviet evident than in military organizations. conventional force superiority by using its Military leaders are charged with fighting and relative advantage, atomic weapons. The winning the nation’s wars. They are Soviet Union, threatened by this, countered archetypal advantage seekers, an essential trait the U.S. advantage by developing atomic their fellow citizens demand of them. It weapons of its own. The U.S. advantage should come as no surprise that military eroded under this concerted opposition, so it thinkers advocate dominance strategies. stayed competitive by developing the There are negative consequences to always hydrogen bomb. It did not occur immediately seeking the advantage, however. The most to advocates of the hydrogen bomb that an significant is the “security dilemma” arms race would be the result. The (originally “security and power dilemma”) thermonuclear bomb was a way to stay in the which describes a situation where one nation’s race and hopefully win.8 This is the effort to attain more security, normally problematic logic of the security dilemma, that through armaments, serves to threaten the the next advantage will provide the security security of another nation.6 The security desired—the fallacy of the last move. An dilemma is the foundation for an arms race— arms race is a short sighted plan to garner essentially an action-reaction model. security through the “immediate benefits that “Country A is stimulated by B’s arms temporary superiority might afford.”9 After accumulation, and what A does by way of embarking down this path, it proved reaction serves as a further stimulus to B….”7 impossible for either to change course. This can become a never ending cycle when resolute adversaries confront one another, When there were 100 nuclear warheads, each apprehensive of the other and determined deterrence was thought to hold. When there to protect itself. It seems a logical choice to were 1000, the same was true. At 10,000, try to attain or maintain an advantage over an people probably felt about as safe as they had adversary. Unfortunately, the very act of at 100, and yet the sides continued to build to deterring through military advantages is a more than 30,000. It is estimated that between dominance strategy and practically guarantees 1945 and 2000, the United States built 70,000 an arms race when a determined adversary nuclear warheads and the Soviet Union/Russia exists and has the means to compete. The 55,000.10 irony of the security dilemma and subsequent arms race is that, despite the incredible effort As the security dilemma predicts, both and expense, there is little added security in countries increased their capabilities in a cycle the long run due to the heightened danger of action and reaction. By the end of the Cold caused by high levels of armament. War both sides had spent an enormous amount of money with neither feeling much safer for The Cold War illustrates the security dilemma the expense. and resulting arms race very well. At the

6 John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A 8 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New Study in Theories and Realities, (Chicago: University of York: Simon & Shuster, 1986), p. 768. Chicago Press, 1951). 9 Freedman, “Nuclear Strategists,” p. 739. 7 James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 10 Edward Ifft, “Deterrence, Blackmail, Friendly Persuasion,” Contending Theories of International Relations: A Defense & Security Analysis 23, no. 3, (September 2007), p. Comprehensive Survey, (New York: Longman, 2001), p. 292. 240.

48 Dwayne Liller/Space Deterrence or Dominance?

In addition to matching offensive capabilities, ran its logical course and mutual vulnerability defensive measures are an important part of was the end result. With the realization of the competition too. In an arms race, each mutual vulnerability came strategies that were new offensive capability is offset by defensive more purely deterrent in nature.15 This is not countermeasures which, in turn, spur the next to say that deterrence wasn’t sought all along. round of offensive capabilities.11 The Cold It was. However, much Cold War deterrence War illustrates this “iron law of weapons was sought through advantage or dominance development” which says that any new strategies, not from positions of equality or capability is countered over time with mutual vulnerability. Unlike deterrence technology and procedures to defeat it.12 The strategies based on some level of dominance, sword was met with armor and shields. the new deterrence introduced by ICBMs German bombers were identified with British accepted the reality of the other side’s radar. Submarines spawned sonar and depth capabilities and sought to manage the situation charges. Tanks were attacked with bazookas. somewhere short of conflict. Since deterrence Radio communications were foiled by seeks security through maintaining jammers. The list is long and the point behind capabilities to dissuade aggressive behavior it paramount. Where a determined adversary from the other side, the ideal situation is to exists, the security dilemma dictates that there keep that level of military capability at the is seldom more than ephemeral advantages. lowest possible level. This reduces overall To avert an arms race, a way must be found to costs and the inherent danger of large weapons avoid short term dominance strategies. The stockpiles. The huge buildup of weapons Cold War illustrates the intoxicating logic of during the Cold War illustrates that the longer seeking advantage as a way to attain it takes to transition from deterrence via deterrence, then embracing as rational the dominance to deterrence accepting mutual arms race and insecurity it produces. vulnerability, the more costly and potentially dangerous the arms race. Nuclear policy began to shift from deterrence via dominance to deterrence under mutual Arresting the momentum of the arms race vulnerability with the introduction of during the Cold War was difficult to do. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Greater transparency was essential to disrupt ICBMs represented, in some ways, the the cycle of fear. This was because military culmination of the offense-defense duel. They leaders’ desire for more weapons was often were a relatively safe offensive weapon due to motivated by the unknown capabilities of their mobility and hardened facilities and nearly adversary. Military leaders must plan for the impossible to defend against because of their worst case scenario. Lack of real knowledge flight path and speed.13 As a result of these of Soviet capabilities led to more U.S. weapon characteristics, ICBMs were fielded with the acquisitions that fueled the “mad momentum” knowledge that populations on both sides of the arms race.16 The Cold War saw bomber would be vulnerable.14 The nuclear arms race gaps, missile gaps and every other conceivable capabilities gap which required more weapons to fill. Closing all of these perceived gaps 11 Freedman, “Nuclear Strategists,” p. 755. 12 Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Air Power, Space Power and gave momentum to the arms race until, after Geography,” Journal of Strategic Studies 2, no. 2/3, significant effort and great expense, “both (June/Sept 1999), p. 72. 13 Warren Amster, “Design for Deterrence,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (May 1956), p. 165. 15 Amster, “Design for Deterrence,” p. 165. 14 Freedman, “Nuclear Strategists,” p. 757. 16 MacNamara, “Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy,” p. 450. Space and Defense, Summer 2011 49

sides gradually came to understand that the Cold War and the Soviet Union ceased to transparency…could improve their security.”17 be. Transparency permitted planning for real threats, not imagined ones, and allowed the upward trajectory of the arms race to finally The Space Commission Report subside. Arms control agreements were negotiated and verification procedures “BUT WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT IT IS provided the necessary transparency to MONEY SPENT BECAUSE OF THE ACTION- gradually ease fears. The end result was a REACTION PHENOMENON.”19 way out of the arms race with transparency making the uncomfortable feeling of mutual Fear of losing a vital capability can drive the vulnerability a bit more bearable. security dilemma in the same way as fear of another’s capabilities. Relative capabilities This is a narrow review of just some of the and advantages matter most for security dynamics of the Cold War that are applicable concerns since one nation’s strengths are to future space policy. It is not intended as a important mostly as compared to the strengths complete analysis of the myriad dynamics of of others. The United States publicly Cold War strategy, policy or decision making. announced fear of a “Space Pearl Harbor” in 20 It is clear, however, that in spite of difficult the Space Commission Report. This fear has debates and agonizing decisions over Cold some parallels to the situation at the close of War military strategy, both the United States WWII. Then, as now, the United States and former Soviet Union did, in fact, develop actually had the advantage. The fear then, as nuclear weapons in the tens of thousands only now, was of losing it. The perceived threat to to work toward their destruction after the Cold U.S. space dominance spurred the United War thawed.18 Space policy practitioners can States to action. According to the Union of learn some lessons from Cold War deterrence Concerned Scientists database, as of 1 January practices. First, deterrence through 2010 there were 926 satellites in orbit. Of dominance (advantage seeking) is a short term those, 422 were solely U.S. satellites with strategy if a capable and determined adversary another 20 having the United States as a exists. The long term situation will be cooperating partner. This means the United deterrence under mutual vulnerability and States operates solely, or has a stake in, 48 21 acceptance of other nations’ capabilities. percent of all satellites in orbit. In spite of Second, policy makers should recall that the this substantial numerical advantage, the security dilemma, once activated, can lead to commission expressed concern. This concern an arms race which is very difficult to reign is founded on one belief in particular. “We in. Finally, transparency is required to know from history that every medium—air, assuage fears, whether to prevent an arms race land, and sea—has seen conflict; reality 22 or to end one. These lessons are important to indicates that space will be no different.” remember because the United States indebted This logic is similar to the logic that led to the future generations with the cost of “winning” 19 MacNamara, “The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy,” 448. 20 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National 17 William C. Martel and Toshi Yoshihara, “Averting a Sino- Security Space Management and Organization, (11 January U.S. Space Race,” The Washington Quarterly, (Autumn 2001), p. 22. 2003), p. 28. 21 “UCS Satellite Database,” Union of Concerned Scientists, 18 Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Global Nuclear http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security Stockpiles, 1945-2006,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, /space_weapons/technical_issues/ucs-satellite-database.html. (July/August 2006), pp. 64-66. 22 Report of the Commission, p. 100.

50 Dwayne Liller/Space Deterrence or Dominance?

Cold War arms race. The United States substantial advantage over those who do expected the former Soviet Union to advance not.”26 This is the language of competition conflict in every way possible, and the Soviets and dominance like that of the early Cold expected the same. Due largely to this War. An arms race in space could emerge if a pessimistic and uncooperative view of human determined adversary with the means to nature, both nations’ fears were realized in the compete chooses to do so. arms race that followed. While the commission’s assessment of conflict in every An alternative to the aggressive approach medium is accurate, history reveals another suggested in these two documents seems important factor that the commission did not unlikely to come from military leadership. address. To borrow from the commission’s The military is charged with ensuring that if statement about history: we know from history the nation “calls its sons and daughters to that every military capability—whether in air, arms…that they have every advantage in the land, or sea—has seen countermeasures; field so that they prevail.”27 Gaining and reality indicates that space will be no maintaining capability advantages is what the different. This is also an “iron law” from military does. Space will be no different. history and warns of an arms race to follow if determined opposition exists.23 Policy makers Indeed, three months after the release of the must deal with both these realities or risk Space Commission’s report, General Eberhart activating the security dilemma. indicated that Air Force Space Command had supported the commission’s recommendations The foundational beliefs of the 2001 Space “in every respect.” He also noted that the Air Commission Report were incorporated into Force chief of staff, General Ryan, had moved the 2006 National Space Policy. The promptly to cut off any nonconcurring groups commission’s recommendations set the stage within the Air Force to telegraph clearly that for a more assertive space policy. The the Air Force had accepted the commission’s specific language of the 2006 National Space recommendations in principle and was now Policy that received a great deal of attention is deep in the process of trying to determine how that of denying space capabilities to potential best to comply with them.28 adversaries. Joan Johnson-Freese writes that “although the words ‘space weapons’ are A survey of 75 space professionals attending never uttered, they can be heard if one listens classes at the National Security Space Institute closely.”24 The assumption is that denying a (NSSI) in March 2010 confirms that the space capability to an adversary will require military has internalized the space some type of space weapon, something the commission’s assessment. Of those surveyed, Space Commission Report advocates 92 percent believe that space will see conflict, outright.25 Whether or not the policy explicitly with 81 percent identifying China as the calls for weapons in space, its tone promotes primary competitor. An almost unanimous 97 the image of space superiority. The second paragraph of the policy states that “those who 26 “U.S. National Space Policy,” The White House, August effectively utilize space…will hold a 31, 2006, p. 1. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ files/microsites/ostp/national-space-policy-2006.pdf 27 John Hyten and Robert Uy, “Moral and Ethical Decisions Regarding Space Warfare,” Air & Space Power Journal, 23 Lambeth, “Air Power, Space Power and Geography,” p. 72. (Summer 2004), p. 55. 24 Joan Johnson-Freese, “The New U.S. Space Policy: A Turn 28 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Toward Militancy?,” Perspectives, (Winter 2007), p. 34. Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space, (Santa 25 Report of the Commission, p. 17. Monica: RAND, 2003), p. 80. Space and Defense, Summer 2011 51

percent believe the United States should unknown. Lack of real knowledge about attempt to maintain its current advantage in Soviet capabilities and intentions certainly space.29 These views represent space motivated the United States to participate in professionals dedicated to a dominance the arms race. After all, national survival was strategy in space. This was the approach at stake. Soviet apprehension about the followed at the start of the Cold War as well— United States motivated them in the same trying to stay ahead. Predicting what lies way. ahead, 69 percent of those surveyed also think an arms race in space is likely.30 In light of Representative of the military dominance the near unanimous call to maintain U.S. approach to space, Everett C. Dolman, advantages in space, this indicates that the professor at the Air Force’s School of current group of space professionals has Advanced Air and Space Studies, writes that embraced the concept of an arms race to stay “the United States should seize control of ahead—space dominance. outer space and become the shepherd (or perhaps watchdog) for all who would venture There is a time to engage in an arms race, but there, for if any one state must do it, it is the that time is not now. Participating in an arms most likely to establish a benign hegemony.”32 race makes sense if an adversary builds The rest of the world seems not to agree with military capabilities that represent an this assessment of the United States as an existential threat to national survival. During unthreatening power. The European Union is the Cold War, both the United States and the developing its own version of the Global former Soviet Union built nuclear arsenals Positioning System (GPS), called Galileo, that could almost completely destroy the illustrating its doubt about the enduring other. Faced with the threat of destruction, it benevolence of the United States.33 Russia did make sense for both sides to offset the and China are developing and improving their capabilities of the other. The faulty logic was own space based navigation systems as well. in endlessly pursuing dominance rather than This in spite of U.S. assurances that the GPS accepting deterrence and the mutual signal would never be denied to worldwide vulnerability it implied. Neither the United users. China feels that “the United States’ States nor the former Soviet Union was self-appointed guardianship of space is satisfied to stop the arms race unless they presumptuous and represents a genuine were in the lead. This focus on short term challenge to China’s national security advantage even when long term mutual concerns.”34 Rather than speak with words vulnerability was evident is why the arms race that the United States might not hear, China took on such a “mad momentum.”31 All this demonstrated an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon effort was ultimately unnecessary since the in January 2007, destroying one of its own condition of mutual vulnerability, once satellites in a possible “shot across the bow of established, did not change throughout the Cold War. It is the condition that remains today. To some extent, the problem early in the Cold War was unmitigated fear of the 32 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age, (Portland: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 157. 33 Simon P. Worden and Joan Johnson-Freese, “Globalizing 29 Author’s survey of students attending National Security Space Security,” Joint Forces Quarterly, (Winter 2002-2003), Space Institute (NSSI) classes, March 2010. pp. 65-66. 30 Ibid. 34 Martel and Yoshihara, “Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race,” 31 MacNamara, “The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy,” p. 450. p. 19.

52 Dwayne Liller/Space Deterrence or Dominance?

U.S. military power.”35 Uncontested the next potential threat to the United States. hegemony in space is as unlikely as earlier Absent a state of hostilities, it is difficult to attempts at nuclear hegemony—opposition is imagine U.S. civilian decision-makers evident. authorizing a U.S. first strike on China for the morally indefensible goal of staying in the lead in space. China and the United States are Mutual Vulnerability also intimately connected through trade and financial transactions, with China holding a “FOR IT IS A PROFITLESS WASTE OF RESOURCES, large stake in U.S. debt. This, and the fact PROVIDED WE AND THE SOVIETS CAN COME TO A that the American people are unlikely to REALISTIC STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION tolerate a preventive conflict to stay ahead in AGREEMENT.”36 space, makes preventive war highly improbable. The long term end state in space will be deterrence under mutual vulnerability, as with Another alternative to mutual vulnerability is nuclear weapons before. In a competitive the fortuitous situation where no adversary strategic environment, there are essentially emerges to challenge U.S. space dominance. three alternatives to this end state over the This thinking often accompanies dominance long run. The United States could fight a strategies. It suggests that U.S. space preventive war to eliminate an adversary’s capabilities will not be challenged due to the space capabilities so they cannot threaten U.S. enormous effort required to catch up. As space assets. Absent war, a unique situation previously discussed, the former Soviet could arise where no competitor emerges to Union’s actions early in the Cold War when challenge U.S. dominance in space—a forfeit its atomic detonation ended the U.S. nuclear win. The final alternative is to compete in an monopoly undermine this kind of thinking. arms race and win, maintaining the dominance An unchallenged position in space today is as sought. An examination of each alternative unlikely as an unchallenged position in reveals that, for a variety of reasons, mutual nuclear arms was after WWII. China, Russia, vulnerability will be the long term end state. and the EU have signaled various degrees of dissatisfaction with unchecked U.S. Preventive war is striking a country without dominance and, if history is a guide, that provocation for the purpose of maintaining a position will not go uncontested over the long power advantage. This is the most violent run. side of dominance strategies where it is deemed acceptable to wage war rather than The final alternative to mutual vulnerability in accept a potential threat sometime in the space is to engage in, and win, a space arms future. Preventive war is something that race. Winning an arms race means the U.S liberal democracies are averse to do since .maintains space dominance and does not have justification for it usually fails to cross the to accept mutual vulnerability as the end state. political and moral imperative thresholds. Winning is not just participating in an arms China is the country most often mentioned as race and surviving. Winning means attaining the goal—dominance. If mutual vulnerability lies at the end of the arms race then nothing 35 Bates Gill and Martin Kleiber, “China’s Space Odyssey: has been won. What the Antisatellite Test Reveals About Decision-Making in Beijing,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 3, (May/June 2007), p. 2. 36 MacNamara, “The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy,” p. 448. Space and Defense, Summer 2011 53

The Cold War illustrates that true deterrence is power, increasing transparency will pose a strategy that accepts mutual vulnerability, difficulties for the United States. A not dominance. It is certainly true that verification study conducted by the dominant military capabilities have a profound Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense deterrent effect while they last. But deterrence Studies points out that “[i]ncreasing the based on dominance is fleeting. A stable openness of space operations…involves deterrent end state is based on mutual inequity for the United States. Because we vulnerability after the competition subsides. can see more and see further, others stand to However, mutual vulnerability doesn’t mean gain more in the short run than we do. A defenseless. Nor is it a position of weakness. political judgment will be needed as to It is simply the condition that emerges when whether the long term gain in stability and neither side can dominate the other, but each predictability outweighs this short term, maintains a capacity to inflict harm. This relative disadvantage.”39 As discussed so far, concept of mutually vulnerable deterrence the Cold War example strongly suggests that already applies to space. Satellites are long term stability is preferable to short term practically the definition of vulnerable, flying advantage. When the United States feared the predictable orbits with few defenses. Due to unknown nuclear capabilities of the former this orbit predictability, lack of defenses and Soviet Union during the Cold War, the an inadequate space object identification and introduction of reconnaissance satellites characterization capability, the offense has the helped lower anxiety levels. Real information advantage over the defense in space such that was far more useful than the imagined worst taking out a satellite is relatively much less case scenarios in military planners’ minds. difficult than defending one.37 This means that Once arms control agreements where mutual vulnerability is the condition that negotiated and in place, transparency made exists in space today. Combined with the them bearable and helped them stick. knowledge of ready space competitors and demonstrated countermeasures, the likely end U.S. de facto dominance in space means that state is clear. Deterrence based on mutual the United States has the most to lose there. vulnerability, not dominance, is the future of In order to keep an arms race at bay, the space. United States needs to improve its information about what is happening in space in an An important step toward making deterrence accurate and timely manner. Like under mutual vulnerability politically and reconnaissance satellites during the Cold War, militarily tolerable is to increase transparency. better SSA can provide real information and Cooperation between space faring nations will alleviate tension. SSA is the ability to assess require agreed upon procedures that establish the big picture in space through detection, the transparency necessary to solidify trust.38 characterization and tracking. It is who, what, Verification of the conditions of an agreement where, and why for all things in space. But serves to lower tensions in a de-escalating the capability to accomplish this in a timely cycle opposite that of the escalating cycle of manner at the level of fidelity required for the security dilemma. As the dominant space accurate characterization of both capability

37 Robert Giffen (General, USAF retired, PhD) in discussion with the author, March 2010. 39 Roger G. Harrison, Space and Verification, “Volume I: 38 Martel and Yoshihara, “Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race,” Policy Implications,” (Eisenhower Center for Space and pp. 27-28. Defense Studies, 2009), p. 13.

54 Dwayne Liller/Space Deterrence or Dominance?

and intent does not currently exist.40 As Dr. Deterrence or Dominance? David Finkleman points out, “the United States Air Force Space Surveillance Network “WHAT MADE WAR INEVITABLE WAS THE GROWTH (SSN) cannot gather data sufficient for OF ATHENIAN POWER AND THE FEAR WHICH THIS complete collision avoidance” of objects in CAUSED IN SPARTA.”44 space.41 In light of the vital nature of space assets to U.S. national security, this The Cold War illustrates how nuclear knowledge gap serves to aggravate U.S. fears deterrence under mutual vulnerability and gives credence to calls for dominance emerged after deterrence through dominance, strategies. One step toward improving SSA pursued by both sides, failed. Faced with a could be the incorporation of “Persistent determined adversary, there are only short Technical Means for ground-based space term advantages. The security dilemma situational awareness.”42 This method would guarantees a response by the other side and employ the many civil and commercial means the action-reaction cycle ensures that neither of space surveillance already in place, gains any lasting security. The Cold War providing more timely and accurate SSA than experience shows that, in spite of enormous is possible utilizing just the Air Force Space effort and expense, two competitors can Surveillance Network (SSN). One unique remain nearly as vulnerable in the end as benefit of this approach, from a cooperative when they started. There was evidence early legal framework perspective, is that “[n]o in the Cold War that the long term reality single authority or stakeholder could prevent would not be dominance for either side, but the collective perception.”43 In other words, a rather managed cooperation due to the de degree of transparency is implied in the facto condition of mutual vulnerability. The collaborative process itself, partially relieving same will likely be true of space. Space assets the problem of trusting no verification means are vulnerable today and will remain so in but your own. This approach has the added spite of all the effort and money the United benefit of including those with the least States can muster. The difference now is that technical means in cooperative arrangements the United States can work to implement that since they can attain the information required long term reality before spending large for verification from outside resources. amounts of money trying to ward off the However it evolves, an improved, reliable and inevitable vulnerability. There is an comprehensive SSA capability is a critical opportunity to avoid a space arms race step toward accepting the relative security of entirely. In light of the current financial deterrence within a legal framework of troubles in the United States and elsewhere, it verifiable mutual vulnerability. is in the United States best interests that an arms competition in space never occurs.

The latest National Space Policy published by the Obama administration in June 2010 is a small step in the right direction. It uses more cooperative language than the previous space 40 Robert Giffen (General, USAF retired, PhD) in discussion with the author, March 2010. policy and avoids the dominance rhetoric, but 41 David Finkleman, Space and Verification, “Volume II: Technical Assessment,” (Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies, 2009), p. 6. 42 Ibid., p. 16. 44 Thucydides,“History of the Peloponnesian War,” translated 43 Ibid., p. 1. by Rex Warner (New York: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 49. Space and Defense, Summer 2011 55

does not go far enough.45 The next iteration should include specific steps required to move toward long term cooperation with a workable verification regime. Political leadership from the highest levels is required both to guide military efforts and to garner international cooperation and commitment. The effort will not be easy, but it’s much better to do it now than to wait for a space arms race to put a further drain on national coffers.

45 “National Space Policy of the United States of America,” The White House, June 28, 2010, pp. 2-7.

Notes for Contributors to Space and Defense

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If required, the author(s) will be Indeed, the emergence of space as a unique and critical element in required to make additional changes and corrections as a result of the external peer review. national security, economic security, homeland security, cyber security, environmental security, and even human security has Tables and Figures persuaded us that this line of inquiry is vital to the future of international security. All maps, diagrams, charts, and graphs should be referred to as figures and consecutively numbered and given appropriate captions. Captions for each figure should be submitted on the same page as the figure to avoid Contributions are welcome from academic scholars and policy confusion. Tables should be kept to a minimum and contain only essential analysts at think tanks and research institutes; senior management data. Each figure and table must be given an Arabic numeral, followed by a and policy officials from international and governmental agencies heading, and be referred to in the text. Figures and tables are not to be and departments relevant to space and security issues; senior embedded in the text. Each table and figure should be clearly labeled. In the text, make sure and clearly explain all aspects of any figures or tables management and policy officials from organizations responsible used. for critical national and international infrastructures that rely upon space; major aerospace corporations; scientists and engineers Style interested or involved in space and security policy issues; military officers and operators in relevant units, commands, and in staff Authors are responsible for ensuring that their manuscripts conform to the colleges and service academies. style of Space and Defense. The editors will not undertake retyping of manuscripts before publication. Please follow the Chicago Manual of Style. The journal welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent Listed below are some additional style and writing guides: research articles and viewpoint essays. There is no standard length • Dates in the form: 1 January 2009. for articles, but 7,500 to 10,000 words, including notes and • Headings (bold title case and centered). references, is a useful target for research articles, and viewpoint • Subheadings (italic title case and centered). essays should be in the range of 2,500 to 5,000 words. The • Acronyms/abbreviations should always be spelled out in full on first opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied use in the text. within Space and Defense are those of the contributors and do not • The 24-hour clock is used for time, e.g., 0800, 1300, 1800. reflect those of the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense • Use percent rather than % except in figures and tables. Studies, the Air Force Academy, the Air Force, the Department of • For numbers, spell out numbers less than 10. Make use of 21st style where appropriate. Defense, or any other agency of the United States Government. • • Keep capitalization to a minimum. • Concise paragraphs and sentences are desirable. Articles submitted to Space and Defense should be original • Avoid a paper that is just descriptive; rather engage in analytical rigor contributions and not under consideration for any other publication and assessment. at the same time. If another version of the article is under • Avoid policy recommendations in the analysis part of paper; leave consideration by another publication, or will be published this, if applicable, for a separate section at the end of the paper. elsewhere in whatever format, authors should clearly indicate this • Define all new terms used in paper. at the time of submission. When appropriate, all articles are • Avoid hyphenated words when possible. • Avoid the use of passive voice when possible. required to have a separate abstract of up to 250 words that describes the main arguments and conclusions of the article. Footnotes Details of the author's institutional affiliation, full address, and other contact information should be included in a separate file or Footnotes need to be numbered consecutively with a raised numeral in the cover sheet. text. Please make use of the Insert-Preference-Footnote function of Word. Please do not use endnote style or scientific notation. Footnotes should be Contributors are required to submit all articles electronically by e- in full bibliographic style with first name, last name format for authors. mail attachment as a Microsoft word file (.doc or .docx format).

Contributors should not submit PDF files. All manuscripts submitted to Space and Defense need to be double-spaced with margins of 1inch or 2.5 cm, and all pages, including those containing only diagrams and tables, should be numbered consecutively. It is the author’s responsibility to ensure when copyrighted materials are included in a manuscript that the