SPACE and DEFENSE Volume Five Number One Summer 2011 Coalitions in Space: Where Networks are Power by James Clay Moltz The 2010 National Space Policy: Down to Earth? by Joan Johnson-Freese Operationally Responsive Space: Past, Present, and Future by Stuart Eves Space Deterrence or Dominance? by Dwayne Liller EISENHOWER CENTER FOR SPACE AND DEFENSE STUDIES Space and Defense Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies Editor-in-Chief Ambassador Roger Harrison, [email protected] Director, Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies Academic Editor Dr. Michael Gleason, Lt Col, USAF U.S. Air Force Academy, USA Associate Academic Editors Dr. Damon Coletta U.S. Air Force Academy, USA Dr. Peter Hays National Security Space Office, USA Dr. Schuyler Foerster U.S. Air Force Academy, USA Lt Col Deron Jackson U.S. Air Force Academy, USA Reviewers Andrew Aldrin John Logsdon United Launch Alliance, USA George Washington University, USA James Armor Agnieszka Lukaszczyk ATK, USA Space Generation Advisory Council, Austria William Barry Molly Macauley NASA, France Resources for the Future, USA Frans von der Dunk Scott Pace University of Nebraska, USA George Washington University, USA Paul Eckart Xavier Pasco Boeing, USA Foundation for Strategic Research, France Andrew Erickson Wolfgang Rathbeger Naval War College, USA European Space Policy Institute, Austria Joanne Gabrynowicz Scott Trimboli University of Mississippi, USA University of Colorado, Colorado Springs, USA Dana Johnson James Vedda Northrop Grumman, USA Aerospace Corporation, USA Theresa Hitchens Rick Walker United Nations, Switzerland Digital Consulting Services, USA Wade Huntley Annalisa Weigel Independent Researcher, USA Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA Jonty Kasku-Jackson David Whalen National Security Space Institute, USA University of North Dakota, USA Ram Jakhu George Whitesides McGill University, Canada NASA Headquarters, USA Roger Launius Ray Williamson National Air and Space Museum, USA Secure Word Foundation, USA Space and Defense Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies Volume Five ▪ Number One ▪ Summer 2011 Introduction 3 Ambassador Roger Harrison Articles Coalition Building in Space: Where Networks are Power 5 James Clay Moltz The 2010 National Space Policy: Down to Earth? 23 Joan Johnson-Freese Operationally Responsive Space: The Past, Present, and Future 39 Stuart Eves Space Deterrence or Dominance? 49 Dwayne Liller Introduction Ambassador Roger G. Harrison Editor-in-Chief All of the articles submitted for this edition of scalable, and by 2000, Europe was a our journal deal, in one way or another, with legitimate competitor, too. Commercial an essential change in the relative position of companies increased their share of space the United States in space, or – to put the activity, and became supra-national, moving matter rather more bluntly – the decline of offshore to places like the Bahamas and U.S. space power and what to do about it. I Luxemburg. And here came China with both should add quickly that the decline is relative, commercial programs and offensive ASAT and the base against which it’s measured is programs that brought into serious question arbitrary. What is treated as a base was in fact the central proposition of “space control” a high point. It came in the 1990s, when the ideology, i.e. that the U.S. could control former Soviet space program was in disarray, “access to space” and therefore space itself. the Europeans had not yet found their That seems to have become a hollow – albeit competitive edge and the prospect of China as in some circles still hallowed – claim. a power space player was, at best, on the horizon, no bigger than a man’s hand. The The Obama space policy and strategy are U.S. was, for that decade, the unchallenged meant to deal with this new reality, and with “shepherd of space” to use Everett Dolman’s the sobering prospect of budget shortfalls as evocative imagery. It was possible to imagine far as the eye can see. Operating in space the world accepting the United States as a sucks resources at a frightening rate, a bad benevolent hegemon, setting rules to benefit quality to have when the overall pie is all while remaining (as hegemonic powers shrinking. All of our authors seem to accept generally do) somewhere outside the rules this new reality. They focus on its ourselves. At least this vision of “space implications, which might be summed up in control” was possible for U.S. observers to two thoughts: in the future, the United States conjure. The rest of the world was simply will need to collaborate with other nations in annoyed. space, and get more out of every dollar spent. The era of autarky is over. It isn’t necessarily “declinism” to point out that the vision has faded. In space, as in golf, What should we do now? That is the subject it isn’t possible to win by preventing the other all our authors address, and I shall leave them guy from doing better, and the circumstances to speak for themselves. But there is one that led to U.S. domination in the 1990’s omission – not just from these articles, but began to change as the century turned. By from the national dialogue on security space in then, the Russian Federation had regained its general – that I must point out. In all the balanced, and reminded us that it was a near discussion of vaguely defined rules of the peer competitor with technology in some areas road, and norms, voluntary codes of conduct – notably rocket motors – that was still the and “transparency and confidence building best in the world. The European Arianne measures” there is a tendency to forget that launcher had proven both reliable and space is subject to binding international law in 4 Roger Harrison/Introduction the form of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. That treaty speaks to issues that are no longer relevant: no one planned even in 1967 to station nuclear missiles on the moon. But also has pertinent things to say about consultation, and interference with the satellite operations of other states. It was meant to begin a process which – had it been taken seriously – might have allowed the evolution over time of a legal structure for space to deal with the problems of crowding and debris that we face now. It might even have been a framework for the discussion of curbing an arms race in space. None of this potential was realized, largely because both the Soviet Union and the United States preferred freedom of action to any legally binding regime in space. The Treaty was signed, ratified, and then largely ignored. I pointed this out recently to a room full of government space analysts, listing the sorts of things the OST addresses, sometimes in specific terms. Someone commented: “We could never get that sort of thing now.” Perhaps not. Luckily, we already have that sort of thing. It may be time to burrow in the archives, dust off the OST and ask ourselves whether its relevant to the concerns we now have in space – and if not, how it can be improved. RGH Coalitions in Space: Where Networks are Power James Clay Moltz Naval Postgraduate School Abstract: This study begins with the widely largely bilateral (and a few multilateral) recognized problem of 21st century space treaties that banned certain extremely harmful vulnerabilities. To address this challenge, it activities. Fortunately, thanks to these limited proposes the new concept of an “allied space mechanisms and policies of self-restraint, the network” as a possible means of both Cold War in space ended without any direct reducing risks and enhancing space power. attacks on either side’s satellites or other Such a concept would move beyond realist, spacecraft. Cold War “balancing” in space, and instead would require new forms of technical and Yet, since the end of the Cold War, there has political cooperation in the military sector been very little further progress made toward among participating states. In thinking about strengthening international space security future space security this study argues that mechanisms, while there has been a spread of trans-national networks and alliances offer space technology and an expansion in the considerable untapped potential, with possibly number of actors capable of doing harm in significant benefits particularly for the United space. China broke an informal 22-year States, which—unlike China and Russia— moratorium against kinetic-kill anti-satellite already has established military alliances with tests in January 2007 by destroying its own a number of countries possessing or now Fen-Yung 1C weather satellite at 525 miles developing advanced space capabilities. up, creating more than 3,000 pieces of hazardous debris. In response, India has The challenge of achieving security in space vowed to develop an anti-satellite capability. has traditionally been viewed as purely a In the face of the 2002 U.S. decision to national security matter. Until 1991, space withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile activity was dominated by the hostile U.S.- (ABM) Treaty and the Navy’s February 2008 Soviet rivalry, which prevented active security destruction of an ailing satellite with a full cooperation in space beyond a series of tank of hydrazine (U.S. 193)—although at low restraint-based agreements. Other space altitude and with no long-lasting debris— actors remained too weak to matter. In terms Russia stated that it would respond to any of space operations, the two superpowers kept future U.S. action to weaponize space with its apart from one another except for occasional, own program. Among new actors, Iran publicity-serving civilian missions like the successfully orbited a satellite in 2009, and 1975 Apollo-Soyuz flight.