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Report By: Fair & Free Election Foundation of (FEFA) May 2009 Table of Contents Acknowledge I. Executive Summary II, Background and Introduction • The Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA) • Voter Registration Process 2008-09 • Observation Methodology • Lessons Leant Major Findings Underage registrations: a. Change in polling date b. Negligence of the electoral staff Multiple registrations:

Lack of Independence and Impartiality of the Election Worker: a. Political involvement of electoral staff Procedural violations by the electoral staff: a. Changing location of the centres b. Closing and opening of centres c. Temporary closure of the centre d. Handling of sensitive data

Inaccessibility of the voter registration centres: Kochis and other groups’ participation: Women: Security: Presence of monitors and media Recommendations • IEC • Civil Society • The Afghan Government • International Partners

Message of the Chairman of Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan

In less than four month Afghans will go to polling stations to choose for the second time their future president and to ensure for the first time a transfot of power from one elected government to another last month. The voter registration process for the upcoming elections has been successfully ended registering more the (4.5) million elegible voters.

The voter registration process was a major step towards further institutionalization of Democracy and realization of “people’s government by our people”; nevertheless, Keeping the numerous challenges in view, without full and active participation of hundreds of thousands of the courageous, devoted and committed men and women in an environment with serious security cancerns the process of voter registration would have not been a suc- cess.

Improvement of transparency of the process, abiding by the electoral laws and Avoiding violations and irregularities during the registration process are indebted to the hundreds of courageous volunteer and journalists, who jeopardizing their lives and exhibit- ing courage for ensuring a transparent and fair registration. These men and women in differ- ent parts of the country has proved wrong a claim by the cynics who assume that Afghans are tribal people and doesn’t want to have a say in choosing their leaders. This exercise was another building of a vibrant civil society and paved further the ground for holding a free, fair, true And impartial elections in 2009.

This report is the product of observation of the voter registration in four phases from which FEFA covered %50 of the whole registration process.

In complation of this report, apart from more than seven hundreds devoted volunteers, but also the committed team of the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan at the head quarters, and I thank them for their dedication and hard work. Finally this exercise was not 2009 Voter Regestration 1

possible if it was not because of the generous financial support of the international donor community that was managed and facilitated by UNDP.

I hope this report can help in identifying the lessons learned and highlight the problems and deficiencies in the process, and can be useful for reforming and reinforcing country’s elec- toral system. In addition, it can be a tool to improve the level of knowledge of the people and their politi- cal participation and reinforce their confidence in the transparent and democratic processes. Inshallah Ahmad Nader “Nadery”, Chairman, Free and fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan

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Executive Summary

FEFA, Afghanistan’s only domestic election observation agency, observed the voter registration process that took place between October 2008 and February 2009, in four phases throughout the country. This process registered around 4.5 million new voters in time for the presidential elections in 2009. FEFA believes that the process was a successful effort that enabled Afghanistan to move forward towards democra- tization. FEFA observed the process with the help of trained volunteers throughout the coun- try and in doing do the organization found instances of great work by all involved however it has also identified areas that can and should be improved. FEFA hopes that all involved, including the IEC, the Afghan Government, the civil society institutions all view the findings of this report in good spirit and use it to im- prove the Afghan people experience of democracy. The major violations encountered, as evident in the graphs below, include:

• Registration of people that would not be eighteen years of age on the polling day • Multiple registration where people obtained more than one registration card • Lack of impartiality and political independence of electoral staff • Registering women based on a list that was provided by male relatives • Location and distance of registration centers away from residential areas • Lack of observers and media in registration centers • Security situation that stopped people from taking part in the process

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The main reasons for these violations were: • Lack of adequate training of the staff by the IEC • Lack of appropriate vetting of the staff by IEC • Lack of female electoral staff • Lack of an understanding of democratic values among people and electoral workers • Lack of coordinated planning between different actors

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Recommendation: FEFA recommends that, as a matter of priority, following organizations take action in order to avoid repetition of same violations in future elections and registration op- erations:

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IEC:

• Strengthen training to avoid under age registrations • Increase numbers of female staff • Raise the personnel capacity to process observer registration • Better plan locations of voter registration centers • Share information and consult with the Civil Society and other institutions on policies and procedures prior to their publication and implementation

Afghan Government:

• Develop and bridge the gaps in the electoral laws • Use the existing legal means to prosecute those that have violated electoral law

The Civil Society:

• Raise awareness of elections and civil and political rights • Enhances domestic observation efforts

International actors:

• Provide an effective medium through which election process and observation could be funded and supported effectively • Provide secure environment for all specially women to participate in the electoral process

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Voter Registration 2008 – 09

Background and Introduction: The Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA): FEFA is an independent and impartial umbrella organization which was established by a number of civil society organizations to:

• Monitor elections to ensure that they are free and fair;

• Promote democracy in the country; Promote public participation in electoral affairs;

• Help consolidate public trust and faith in democracy and elections.

FEFA’s core functions are to work on:

• Advocating for better electoral laws and other legal and institutional frame- works

• Stimulating public discussion of elections related issues

• Monitoring all processes related to the elections

• Assessing and evaluating the mechanisms for complaints and alternative pol- icies.

• Encouraging the independence and capability of the Electoral Commission nationwide.

The FEFA was registered with the Ministry of Justice on 12 June 2004 and began its practical work in the second half of August 2004. Its first observation experience

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was that of the presidential election of 9 October 2004 during which it observed the elections in 100 districts inside the country and outside of it in Pakistan. Its second experience was observing the National Assembly Elections during which FEFA covered 217 districts containing 65% of all polling centres. FEFA is committed to ensuring free, fair and transparent electoral processes in Afg- hanistan, and believes that broad participation of civil society in such processes is of great importance in realizing the above values and strengthening democracy.

Voter Registration Process 2008-09 The voter registration process began in Afghanistan on 6th of October 2008 and ended on the 11th January 2009, although there are still a number of centres where people can continue to register until the day before the polling day. This process was conducted by the Independent Election Commission (IEC) that, according to the Article 156 of the Afghan Constitution, has the authority and re- sponsibility to administer and supervise all kinds of elections in the country. This in- cludes providing all logistical infrastructure, personnel and creating and enacting all relevant legislation and procedures. The IEC was funded by a selection of international doners to conduct the voter reg- istration process. The IEC divided the process in four phases, as shown in the map below.

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According to the IEC during the four phases of the registration process 4.5 million new voters were registered. This brings the total of registered voters in the country to approximately 17 millions. Of the new voters, according to the IEC, more than 38% are female. In the course of the registration process IEC accredited media and observer organi- zations. The IEC accredited 36 media outlets to be present during the registration process in the registration centres. IEC also provided identity badges, facilitating entry into the registration centres, to 2204 observers and reporters. FEFA obtained accreditation to observe the election once the first phase had al- ready started. This was due to funding issues as well as the delay in obtaining ob- server accreditation from the IEC. FEFA observed the process depending on the security situation, available personnel and funding. FEFA observed the four phases of the election through its network of local body of volunteers that is explained in later parts of this report.

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Phase Dates Provinces FEFA Coverage

First 6th Oct till 4th Nov 2008 Badakhshan, Bamyan, Dikondi, 20% Ghazni, Ghoor, Kapisa, Koner, Loger, Noorstan, Parwan, Sare- pol, Takhar and Wardak

Second 5th Nov till 4th Dec 2008 Badghis, Baghlan , Fariab, 65% Heart, Jozjan, Kabul, Kundez and Samangan

Third 12th Dec 2008 till 12th Farah, Laghman, Khost, Nangra- 70% har, Paktia, Paktika, Zabul January 2009

Fourth 20th Jan till 18 Feb 2009 Helmand, Kundahar, Nimrooz 50% and Orzgan

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Observation Methodology FEFA observed all four phases of the registration process using following method and personnel: Staff and volunteers: The staff/volunteer structure was as follows. In Kabul based FEFA headquarters, there was a group of staff providing strategic leadership, guidance, training and support to the provincial volunteers. In each province FEFA had at least one provincial representative that was an in- dependent qualified individual volunteering for FEFA and based in a FEFA partner organization. These volunteers were over all in charge of all FEFA activities within their provinces, including training and recruiting of the observers. District observers were recruited to work at a district level recruiting and training observers as well as acting as observers when needed. Observers were recruited to directly observe the process. All information gathered was collated and reported back by the provincial and dis- trict staff for analysis. All people involved in the process were volunteers, excluding the FEFA staff at the headquarters in Kabul. All involved was trained extensively on a range of observation related matters.

• During the first phase of the process, since funding and accreditation reached FEFA late, FEFA had to deploy its contingency plan. According to this plan, the pro- vincial representatives were deployed without the basic honorarium to observe the process in their province. • During the second phase of the process FEFA sent observers in all 10 provinces.

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Ten provincial representatives at this phase received training which they passed on to 298 observers of which 101 were female. Together they observed just over 60% of the process in this phase. • During the third phase of voter registration, FEFA managed to observe 70% of the voter registration process in 6 provinces. Every FEFA observer observed at least 3 centers. To do this, 6 provincial master trainers received extensive training at FEFA HQ in Kabul which they passed on to 136 observers, including 42 women. • During the fourth phase of the process FEFA observed 50% of the voter registra- tion process in four provinces. Every FEFA observer observed at least 2 centres. Prior to the commencement of the fourth phase, four provincial master trainers re- ceived extensive training at FEFA HQ in Kabul for two days and after receiving train- ing they were deployed to their respective provinces where they conducted training using a special program for 90 observers, including 23 women.

The training provided to the observers gave them skills such as observation skills especially in relation to registration process, observation methodology, and practical exercises for using the checklists, conducting interviews, reporting system and time- lines and more.

Information and data gathering tools: FEFA observers used following mechanisms to gather date throughout the project: Checklists: Observers were provided with and trained in the use of checklists that they used to gather data on procedural violations. The information gathered in these check lists were sent to the FEFA headquarters through the FEFA provincial repre- sentative. Urgent reports: FEFA observers also reported back any gross violations of the electoral law or democratic processes and values to the FEFA headquarters through FEFA provincial representatives. These reports were verbally conveyed

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through mobile phones. Weekly reports: These narrative reports were provided on a weekly basis to the FEFA headquarters. FEFA’s monitoring team, from the headquarters in Kabul, visited the field to verify some of the instances of violations. FEFA also conducted specific exercises in order to further investigate certain viola- tions. For instance, during fourth phase of the process, FEFA conducted a short study where the observers spent a week where every day for two hours they ob- served they number of young people that appeared to be under the voting age that registered. The finding of this study is in following parts of this report. There were instances where the checklist were not deemed the best way of gather- ing date, particularly when qualitative data was concerned. This is evident in cases of multiple registrations which could not be detected or quantifies within the registra- tion centers. Therefore the observers went outside the centres to detect and report on such instances using interviews. The interviews took place with the residents of the area outside of the official registration hours. Furthermore, observers liaised with the local civil society institutions who shared information on cases of multiple registrations and other kinds of violations. FEFA’s regularly shared its findings with IEC through weekly meetings with Mr. Na- jafi, Barakzi and the head of external relation Mr. Afghanzi. FEFA also conducted follow up meetings with the relevant IEC personal in Kabul to share specific infor- mation and physical evidence and submitted its recommendations for improvement of the process.

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Lessons learnt FEFA’s experience of observing the registration process can be improved. The or- ganization was aware of the areas of activity it could improve and has been con- stantly engaged in capacity building since the end of the registration process so that the organization is in a better position to observe the election process. Some areas that needed improvement are mentioned below alongside steps taken or planned to be taken to address these issues: Data gathering and analysis: FEFA recognizes that there is room for improvement in the organization’s data ga- thering and analysis methodology. The organization has already recruited a mem- ber of staff that is working on building the organization’s capacity in this regards. This will put the organization in a better position in terms of its observation capacity in time for presidential election 2009. Recruitment of female observers: FEFA believes that in order to increase women’s participation in election, women need to be involved in all aspects of the elections including observation. Therefore, FEFA has made recruitment of female observers for the presidential election in 2009 a priority. There is a particular project that is incorporated in the operation plan of FEFA that will ensure that more female observers are recruited. Working collaboratively: FEFA greatly benefited from working with local partners in provinces. In order to benefit from a wider range of partners FEFA plans to work with a larger number and

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a winder variety of partner organizations in future. Raise Capacity of its staff and observers: FEFA has identified areas where the organization needs to raise capacity. The or- ganization therefore is reviewing its training and support mechanism in time for the presidential elections in 2009.

Understanding democracy in Afghanistan: FEFA believes that elections are only one of many indicator of democracy and in order to truly democratize the country there ought to be a better understanding of people’s experience of it. There is a need for research in the Afghan experiences of democracy. Therefore, FEFA plans to research areas around civil and political rights of people of Afghanistan to understand the process of democracy in the coun- ty.

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Main Findings

Underage Voter Registration

Change in polling date:

Article 13 of the Afghan Electoral Law states the only person that are “least 18 years of age on the day of the election” are eligible to vote in the Afghan elections. However, FEFA witnessed several issues that causes violation of this rule both in fact and in spirit.

In a meeting held on the 7th April 2008, in presence of the Afghan president and the cabinet, the IEC fixed the election date to October 2009. Accordingly, it was decided that those that turn eighteen in September 2009, in time for the elections, would be able to register. Registration went ahead accordingly.

However, after the registration started, the IEC changed the election date to 20th August 2009. This has resulted in a situation where people younger than 18 years of age possess voter registration card and will be able to vote on the election date. The IEC has not taken any measure so far that can address this problem. There- fore, although at the time of the voter registration some seventeen year olds, ac- cording to the decision made by IEC, were granted voter registration card, due to change in election date that has brought the elections a month ahead, these young people will be violating the law when they vote.

Negligence of the electoral staff:

FEFA observed several instances of distribution of voter cards to people that were clearly under the age of 17; people that were not going to turn eighteen on the poll- ing day. These children were aged anywhere from seventeen to what seemed like twelve. This is evident in photographic proof obtained by FEFA observers.

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During the second phase of the voter registration FEFA observers noted instances of underage voter registration in 95% of the centres they observed.

Due to the high proportion of the centres involved in this violation FEFA observers paid particular attention in identifying similar instances during the third phase of the voter registration process. During the third phase FEFA observers noted the prob- lem of underage registration in the same proportion, 95%, of centres observed. Dur- ing the third phase of the process clear instances of this violation were observed in following provinces and centres:

Nangarhar Province: Voter registration centres in Istiqlal School, Public Hospital, Kochis’ Centre at the Tribal Provincial office and

Khost Province: Voter registration centres at Shahid Mohammad Dawood High School, Ismail Khail and Mandozi district, centre at the provincial office

Farrah Province: Voter registration centres at the Markazi High School and Mermen Nazo High School

Paktika Province: Centres at the Central Hospital, Soliman Baba High School and the Orgon district

Zabul Province: Centres at the Shah Jawi district and the Qalat Hospital

Laghman Province: Voter registration centres at the Qarghaie District, Ali Nigar and Roshan High School

As underage voter registration continued to be a major violation that the FEFA ob- servers noted throughout the first three phases of the registration process the or- ganization devised a new strategy to gauge the extent of this violation during the fourth phase.

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As part of this new strategy every observer spent two hours during the morning and two hours during the afternoon for a week counting the number of total voter regis- tered in their respective registration centre and then deducting the number of voters that were underage in order to find a relative frequency of irregularities.

The decision as to whether a voter was underage was based on their ID card, which at times indicated their real age, as well as their appearance. The findings show that on average 19% of the total number of voters that registered were under- age. This excludes people that had ID cards showing their age high enough to reg- ister but their appearance suggested otherwise.

Following is a table showing the number of underage people registering at some of the centres that FEFA observed during the phase four of the voter registration proc- ess using the above mentioned methodology:

Province VR FEFA’s ob- Observation Total Underage % of Centres servation period number registered total coverage of regis- applicants tered vot- ers Kandahar 199 45% 26 Jan- 3 25880 5176 20% Feb Oruzgan 55 72% 4 – 18 Feb 31000 9300 30% Helmand 120 45% 11 to 18 Feb 2738 575 21% Nemroz 26 38% 20-30 Feb 8899 445 5%

During the fourth phase of the process following centres in the following provinces

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showed high number of incidents of underage registration:

Kandahar Province: Centre in 002 Zarghuna Ana High School, Centre 016 Arghandab District, Centre 027 Panjwaie District, Centre 008 Haji Merwais Khan High School, Centre 005 Mahmood Tarzi High School, Centre 013, Karz High School

Oruzgan Province: Centre 04, District, Centre 01 Dahrawod Dis- trict, Centre 02, , Centre 01 Chenarto district, Centre 01 Oruzgan Khas District and Centre 01 Charino District

Nemroz Province: Centre 01 Gul Mohammad High School, Centre 02 Rodaba High School

Helmand Province: Centre 02, Boys’ High School, Centre 01 Girls’ High School, Centre 03 Teachers’ College, Gerishk Mechanical High School Cen- tre, Garmser Primary School Centre and Angar District Torang Centre

Why this violation occurred?

FEFA attributes this violation, in part, to the IEC staff’s failure to follow procedures, which can either be due to inadequate training they received or, in some cases, due to lack of impartiality.

In Article 6 of the Regulation on Voter Registration that IEC states that its staff must ensure that persons wishing to register to vote submit the following personal infor- mation:

(a) Name;

(b) Father’s name

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(c) Age;

(d) Complete home address to the extent possible;

(e) Gender;

(f) Where he or she wants to vote

(g) Thumbprint.

However, FEFA witnessed instances where this regulation was not followed by IEC staff resulting in registration of underage people to vote. During the second phase of the voter registration FEFA observed more than one hundred instances of IEC workers not obtaining the information required in Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Baghlan and Herat provinces. These were mainly in women’s registration centres.

During the fourth phase of the registration FEFA observers reported that in the 58% of the centres observed voter ID was not adequately checked for age and identity verification. FEFA believes that lack of adequate training was one f the rea- son why this violation continued to occur. FEFA, based on its field reports, con- cludes that some electoral staff were lenient in checking and verifying identity documents of people that they related to in terms of ethnicity and language.

Multiple Registrations

Article 4 of the Afghan electoral law states that:

“Each voter shall have one vote in the elections and shall vote only on his or her own behalf”

This legal provision is at the heart of the democratic process, FEFA believes that this principle must be adhered to at all stages of the electoral process. FEFA ob-

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served instances when violations took place that endangered the principle of one person one vote. Most important of these violations is the distribution of multiple cards to voters during the electoral process.

Since it is not possible to detect this type of violation when observing the registra- tion centre itself, FEFA observers interviewed people in the vicinity of the registra- tion centres and found a large number of people that volunteered to show their mul- tiple cards. FEFA photographed evidence such as the cards where possible.

Although in some cases this kind of violation was taking place with the knowledge of the IEC staff, in most cases the reason this continued to happen was IEC’s failure of place mechanisms to detect and avoid this kind of misuse. Following are details and examples of this violation throughout the four phases of the registration process. These examples show a variety of the factors that caused distribution of multiple cards to individuals.

During the first phase of the voter registration, FEFA observers discovered at in Doaba District of Nooristan Province, the IEC staff distributed the unfilled voter cards to the local elders. The FEFA observers report that the number of cards dis-

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tributed in this manner amounted to around one hundred.

Similar violations are observed in Asmar District , Anadr District and Cheghcheran City of Ghor. Once FEFA contacted Kunar’s IEC staff satisfactory provisions were made to overcome this issue. This violation spread wider during the last week of the first phase of the registration process.

During the second phase of the process, evidence of distribution of multiple cards, was evident in 40% of the centres that FEFA observed. Cases were witnessed in Kabul, Herat, Paktia, Kunduz and Baghlan. Involvement of IEC personnel contin- ued to be a cause of this violation. In Badghis, IEC staff distributed voting cards to applicants without registering them first. The most serious case was the distribution of around 500 voting card to a single individual.

In , FEFA observed that the IEC personnel put aside an unknown number of voting card of women (who do not need to be photographed) without ac- tually issuing these cards to women, keeping the cards for themselves.

During the third phase of the process, FEFA changed its methodology and its ob- servers started to report any centres where there were more than 4 incidents of multiple card distribution. The result was that of the total number of centres ob- served, 85% were noticed as being involved in providing multiple cards. Provinces where the highest number of such violations has occurred during the third phase are: Nangarhar, Laghman, Khost, and Farah.

During the fourth phase of the process, there continued to be a lack of mecha- nisms to detect this violation. This gap was used by individuals to obtain more than one card. Through interviews that the FEFA observers conducted with civil society institutions, the organisation concluded that there were incidents of multiple registra- tions in 30% of the centres it observed.

Main examples of this violation were observed in areas such as Gerishk Girls’ High

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School in , Sayeedal Khan and Tanali High Schools in Tarinkowt; Rodaba and Gul Mohammad Shahid High Schools in Zarang, and in all of the stations located in District four of Kandahar City.

Although there are provisions in the Article 53 of the Afghan electoral law indicating that “possessing, or attempting to obtain, more than one voter registration card” is a criminal offence, despite the wide spread nature of this issue and the involvement of IEC staff in this matter, no legal action was taken. Based on FEFA observers’ re- ports, those involved in such violations have been identified by IEC and security of- ficials, but in none of the cases the perpetrators were stopped, prevented or legally pursued.

IEC has since acknowledged the existence of this issue and has promised that it would deal with it by using appropriate technology to detect duplicate fingerprints and stop those with multiple registration cards from voting several times. Although the general plan is stated by the IEC several times in media and elsewhere how- ever, details such as whether the organisations has financial, personnel and techni- cal capacity to carry this out this activity before the polling date remain unclear.

Mechanics of this solution is also not clear, for example, it is not clear how, in ab- sence of exact addresses of individuals, how the ICE plans to locate people to re- cover extra cards? If the IEC plans to not recover the extra voter cards prior to the polling day then does it have extra capacity and technical means on the day to deal with this issue?

FEFA believes that polling day would not be appropriate time for dealing with this issue hence serious and immediate attention must e paid to this issue as soon as possible.

Lack of Independence and Impartiality of the Election Workers

Electoral Laws of the country clearly indicate that the electoral official must be

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committed to impartiality. This commitment, according to the Article 9 of the elec- toral law places following obligations:

(1) Electoral officials shall perform the duties assigned to them in an impartial and unbiased manner and may not seek or receive instructions from any government or non-government official or authority, except the Director of the Secretariat.

Furthermore, Article 10 of the Afghan Electoral Law, places following recruitment restrictions on electoral officials:

(3) A father, grandfather, descendant up to the third generation, mother, grand- mother, brother, sister, spouse, uncle, aunt, father-in-law, and mother-in-law of a candidate shall not have the right to work as an electoral official in the constituency in which the concerned candidate is running.

Although, these legal provisions clarify the legal and moral obligations of the elec- toral officials, FEFA observers noticed a variety of incidents that amounted to the violation of these rules throughout the voter registration process. Each incident that the FEFA observers noted were unique, however there were reoccurring types of incidents that amounted to violations. These incidents are described and analysed below:

Political involvement of the Staff:

During the second phase of the voter registration FEFA observers noted a variety of cases where the IEC staff at voter registration had political affiliations. Political af- filiation and involvement occurred in various forms and due to lack of resources FEFA was unable to record all of these occurrences, however, the incidents that are noted, the organisation believes, are indicators of the overall trends throughout the process of voter registration. This is because the incidents were observed in almost all provinces of the country instead of appearing on occasion in certain areas only.

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Following are some of the cases that the FEFA observers noted:

During the second phase of process, the head of the registration centre at the Setara High School at Maimana City of , was the active chair of the women’s affairs of the political party Junbish Mili Islami Afghani- stan. When FEFA officials posed the question as to why this violation oc- curred IEC provincial staff indicated that it was due to the fact that the person in question was promoted to her position without checks on her political in- volvement. Similar cases were also seen in Pakia Province where, for in- stance, the brother of a Mahaz e Mili party was heading the Voter Registra- tion centre and

• During the third phase of the registration process, in , civil society groups accused one Kochi member of the parliament of wilfully firing a staff member of the IEC and appointing a relative instead. When FEFA observers reported this incident to the IEC, no action was taken. • In Nangarhar Province, two brothers of the deputy of the political party “De Soli Ghurzang” were employed as electoral officials and were accused by the people of misusing their position for political purposes. • In Nangarhar Province, the son of the president of the political party Fesabil Allah was appointed as the logistics officer for the electoral process.

• The head of the voter registration centre at the Alinegar District of was identified by people as a member of the political party Afghan Milat. According to the local people he misused his position for political gain.

• During the fourth phase of the process, FEFA noted that 27% of the stations covered by FEFA indicated some degree of lack of impartiality of staff. In Helmand Province, civil society groups accused the head of Lashkargah Girls’ High School of interfering with the voter registration process. Incidents

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of underage registration were noted in this school and the IEC failed to re- spond to the complaints lodged by FEFA in this regard. • FEFA observers also noted cases of staff impartiality in Shah Walikot, Mai- wand, Panjwaie and Zhere Districts of Kandahar province. From FEFA’s ob- servations it was clear that the officials of these voter registration centres were part of a group of powerful local people. • In Oruzgan province local powerful people and former Jihadi commanders were appointed as head of some voter registration centres and stations par- ticularly in Tarinkowt and Khas and Chenarto Districts. • In Nemroz province the heads of two centers of Rodaba High School and Shahid Mohammad Gul High School were accused of being linked to left wing groups functioning unofficially. These centres were also the location for the underage registration cases. FEFA repeatedly asked for the opinion of the IEC provincial officials in this regard, but did not receive a satisfactory re- sponse.

Procedural violations by the electoral Staff

Beside above mentioned clear indicators of political bias and misuse there are inci- dents that indicate bias, lack of impartiality and incompetence.

Changing the location of voter registration centres: throughout the process some IEC staff used their authority to change the location of voter registration cen- tres which may have resulted in political gain for some.

Some examples noticed are:

o During the second phase of the process, on the 01/12/2008, in the 13 District of Kabul City, Dasht-e-Barchi, voter registration centre number 051 was authorized by the IEC provincial office to move to Kakur of Qalia Qazi area. However, due to un-

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known reasons the head of the local area delayed the move until the end of the phase. Due to this some of the eligible people in Kakur vil- lage couldn’t register especially women.

o On the 5th of January 2009, during the third phase of the registration process, the voter registration centre was moved from from Abdul Wakil School in Nangarhar Province to the house of the Nangarhar Provincial Council Representative for three days.

o On the 8th of January, again in Nangarhar province, voter registration number 014 in Bibi zainab Girls’ School located in district 3 was moved to the house of the representative of the Wolosi Jirga where 400 people were invited for Khatem Ul Quran (Quranic recitation ac- companied by a meal).

o Further, during the third phase of the process, registration centres’ lo- cations were changed in Alinegar District and Meterlaam city of Laghman; Pechar Agham, Gusha and Naziyan Districts of Nangarhar; Argon, Meta Khan and Katwaz Districts of Paktika; Mosa Khail District of Khost, indicating possibility of lack of impartiality at worse and in- competence of staff in following procedure at best.

Changing opening and closing of the centres: FEFA observers noted fre- quent changing the opening and closing time of the voter registration centres, which resulted in political gain of some.

• During the first phase of the voter registration, the opening time for voter registration centres were set to be 7:30 in the morning however, most cen- tres that FEFA observed did not open until at least 8:30 in the morning. Simi- larly, FEFA observed that 90% of the voter registration centres observed did not open before 8:30 in the morning and closed before 4 in eth afternoon.

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• At times voter registration centres remained closed for unnecessary occa- sions. For instance, during the first phase of the process in ’s Dawlat Yar District was closed due to the wedding party of the area elder.

Temporary closures of the centres: Centre personnel recruited, mostly public servants, were unable to attend their voter registration duties in full time basis. This applied particularly to schools teachers where the annual exams unexpectedly clashed with the process. This caused early closures temporary closure due to staff absence. In some cases the closures have been up to 6 hours. In this respect FEFA was able to verify at least 20 cases as such identified mostly in Baghlan, Kunduz, Faryab, Jowzjan, and Balkh provinces.

Handling of sensitive data: Electoral laws and regulation of the country places clear emphasis the need for maintaining confidentiality and due care in handling of the electoral data. Article 9 of the Afghan Electoral law places following obligation on the electoral staff:

“Prior to taking office, electoral officials shall declare, officially and as specified by the Commission, that throughout the electoral process they will fulfil the duties as- signed to them with decency, truthfulness, and confidentiality.”

This obligation is further clarified in by the IEC through its regulations on voter regis- tration’s Article (12) that states that the IEC must:

“take proper measures to ensure that the information supplied during voter registra- tion for the election process is not used for other purposes except as authorized by law.

FEFA witnessed instances where confidentiality was jeopardised as electoral data

30

was mishandled.

During the third phase of the process, of all centres that FEFA observed 20% showed evidence of mishandling of sensitive data. This issue manifested itself in several different ways. For instance:

• In Laghaman Province the head of the station in Alisheng District, head of the station at the Qarghaie Districy and the logistics officer of the Basram vil- lage and Meterlaam City station took the sensitive materials to their homes at night. • In Nangarhar province Shrzad, Qala Akhund, Kama and Shewa District sta- tions and Khusgunbad School in Behsood District the voter registration can- ters were not secured causing a variety of problems. th • On the 28 of December 2008, when the station was not secured in Paktika a camera and printer were stolen, which resulted in a two day closure of the station causing problems and creating doubts in people’s minds over the process. th • On the 29 of December 2008, in , the printer cartridge was sold by the IEC official. The accused was identified and it was verified that he had indeed committed the act, however he was not charged and he contin- ued at his job. rd • On the 3 of January 2009 a number of the active civil society organisations showed FEFA observers the registration books, the most sensitive materials in the process, no longer in possession of the IEC, which indicates either the possibility of the IEC staff being negligent in looking after the book or the had knowingly given the book to someone. This opened the opportunity for mis- use. • During the fourth phase of the process, 10% of the total of the stations that FEFA observed showed evidence of mishandling of sensitive materials. • In Helmand province FEFA observed that the Head of a station located in the Girls’ High School has taken sensitive materials to his home at night. • In Tarinkowt City of Oruzgan Province of Tanali High School station and De-

2009 Voter Regestration

hrawod district it has been observed that after VR hours the cameras have been used for personal purposes for an hour after every registration day.

Procedural violations are caused by lack of adequate training. This is an issue that needs to be addressed prior to the Election Day so that the process does not lose legitimacy.

Inaccessibility of voter registration centres: Due to a variety of reasons both practical and cultural, locations of the registration centres were of immense importance throughout Afghanistan. FEFA noted that when deciding on the location of registration centres, the IEC failed to make sure that all these cultural and practical considerations were taken in to account. This re- sulted in a number of people not registering to vote.

• During the first phase of the process FEFA noted that registration stations were situated in locations that were inaccessible either due to distance or the nature of the space where the station was situated. This was particularly true in rural area. • At the beginning of the process district buildings and other government offic- es were used to house registration centres. Since culturally it is not appropri- ate for women to go to government buildings particularly police stations, lo- cating registration centres there kept a number of women away. Secondly, since government offices, on account of them being seen as a primary target of the armed anti government groups, people chose not to go there for fear of insecurity. This issue was reported in Shegel, Asmar and Nari Districts of Kunar Province and Nangraj, and Doaba Districts of Nooristan province. • In some instances when the Electoral Commission realized that the location of the centres in government buildings were preventing people from register- ing therefore they decided to relocate the stations in neutral venues. 32

• However, shifting the centres from one area to another was time consuming that prevented even further people from attending the centres to register. • When FEFA communicated with the IEC on this issue they said that they have changed procedures and has now given the IEC provincial officials au- thorization to change centres’ location. • This FEFA believes may not be the ideal solution of the problem. Instaed the IEC must ensure that when deciding the location of the centres they should consider all socio cultural and practical aspects of their decision.

• During the third phase of the registration similar issues were noted by FEFA. • In 35% of the registration centres that FEFA observed people complained of the registration centres being too far from residential areas. This caused people to not participate, especially women. • Some examples of registration centres being far from residential areas are: a o Centre at Kama District Nangarhar Province had a minimum of 12KM distance from Neta Khail Village o Centre at Anar Dara District of had a minimum of 15 KM distance from Kalata Alam Khan Village o Centre at Dowa Manda District had a minimum of 25 KM distance from Sayeed Khail Village o During the fourth phase of the registration process the problem of lo- cation and distance of registration centres were predominant in rural areas. o In 53% of the centres that FEFA observed, people complained about distance and location of the centres, impeding people’s participation in the process. Following are some examples showing distance between substantial residential areas and their nearest registration centre:

Provinces Residential Areas Distance to near-

2009 Voter Regestration

est Station

Nemroz Hele, Din Moham- 50KM mad, and Kank Vil- lages

Nemroz Khawja, Sarjo and 15KM Awar Villages

Oruzgan Sarlaf, Sardasht and 30KM Kada Villages

Oruzgan Khowabgah Kolok- 15KM hak, Khudy Nazar Khan and Dah Raees Villages

Oruzgan Safid Qand Village 13KM Chahar Cheno Dis- trict

Oruzgan Sarab, Meyando, 10KM Paatan, Langar and Ghara

Kandahar Chenarto Village, 30KM Shah Wali Kot Dis- trict

Kandahar Berak village, Spin 45KM

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Boldak District

Kandahar Khogyani Village, 18KM Marof District

Kandahar Anjeran Village, 18KN Arghandab District

Distance and choice of locations of registration centres clearly played a part in hin- dering people’s participation in the process. FEFA believes that this issue must be dealt with immediately as if it is repeated for the polling day, many would not get the chance to vote. Kochis groups participation: In IEC’s Regulation on Voter Registration Article 3, the IEC commits to designating specific registration stations for Kochis, the nomadic people residing mainly in the warmer areas of the country at the time of the registration process. FEFA noted instances where IEC failed to fulfill their obligations. Some of these in- stances are mentioned throughout this report, particularly with relations to the lack of female staff in the mobile registration units that prevented Kochi women’s regis- tration. This was a major problem throughout the third phase of the process where Kochis residing in warm areas such as Khost, Laghman and Nangharhar a lack of female staff in the mobile teams preventing women’s participation in the process. This problem was noticed during the fourth phase too. Kochis are part of the people that have a specific life style which must not put them

2009 Voter Regestration

at a disadvantage as compared to the settled people of the country when exercising their rights. IEC must invest in mechanisms that would enable this groups access to the democratic processes in the country, including ensuring better staffing of mobile centres as well as ensuring all Kochi communities are served by the mobile sta- tions.

Women’s Participation:

According to the Article 3 of the Afghan Electoral law all “voters shall have equal rights of participation in the elections”. However, as in many other aspects of the Afghanistan’s socio legal culture, translating this legal provision into a practical one has not been achieved yet. Election registration process is marred with gender is- sues, and issues of various kinds have been observed consistently throughout the process.

Registration Rate:

Women’s participation in electoral registration has been lower than desired. This is due to a multitude of cultural and social restrictions. In some provinces women’s participation is a lot lower than it is in others and even within the province there are varying degrees of women’s participation in different districts.

There were three main causes of the low female participation in electoral registra- tion. Firstly, despite theoretical commitment to for instance in IEC regulations of Voter Registration Article 6 IEC commits to doing utmost to establish specific regis- tration centres for people with disabilities and for women to access.

• In the first phase of the project, in Maidan Wardak and Nooristan Provinces women’s participation was a lot lower than Parwan, Kapisa, Ghor and Takhar Provinces. • Similiarly, in Ghazni Province’s Andar Distrct women participated less than in 36

the of the same province. • During the second phase of the process women’s participation was gener- ally low; however numbers were comparatively higher in Northern cities. Fur- thermore, in rural areas women’s participation was lowers due to security challenges and the inaccessibility of registration centres. • The issue of low women’s participation was mainly seen in Baghlan, Kunduz, Faryab, Paktia and Badghis during this phase. • In Badghis and Pakita one particular cause of low female participation was employment of male staff in female registration centres, which was culturally unacceptable. • Employment of male staff in female centres is a procedural violation that oc- curred in 20% of the centres that FEFA observed during the second phase including in Paktia, Kuhistan District of Faryab, Ghur Maatch and Murghan Districts of Badghis. • During the third phase of the process women’s participation was generally good in central Nangarhar, Laghman, Farrah and Khost Provinces, but in outer regions it has remained poor. • Employment of male staff in female centres remained one of the key reasons for low female participation. This violation occurred in 93% of the stations ob- served by FEFA. Most of the district level mobile registration stations were run by male staff. In Pakitika Province no women were employed to take part in running mobile stations and in Zabul Province only three women were em- ployed in Qalat City. • In Khost, Farrah, Nangarhar and Laghman women were employed in urban areas but not in rural areas. High number of urban women’s participation can be attributed to the higher number of female staff. • A further reason for a low women’s participation in the third phase of the voter registration process has been the fact that some registration centres were located inside government buildings. This applied to 10% of the centres that FEFA observed. • In the fourth phase of the process security problems have been more seri- ous compared to the previous phases and it has had a negative impact on

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women’s participation. • Inaccessibility of VR stations, lack of female staff and male staff employed in female centres have all be a cause of lowers female participation. • Furthermore, in 16% of the IEC’s voter registration stations were located in- side governmental buildings like district buildings and police stations, which put adverse effects on women participation in the process.

The examples above indicate that women’s participation was an issue throughout the country and throughout the four phases of the voter registration process. How- ever, some of the reasons why this issue persisted were because gender issues were not taken into account when planning the registration process. This included recruitment of female electoral workers and considering gender implications when deciding on locations of the centres. These need to be considered when designing future voter registration as well as when planning for the polling day.

Security issues impact everyone; however, it impacts women’s participation more. Therefore, security must be strengthened if women’s participation is to be in- creased.

Quality of Participation:

On one hand, women’s over all participation was low and on the other hand where there seems to be high women’s participation in the elections they are marred with procedural violation.

Registration of women by a male family member:

• Article 5 Respect of the Afghan Electoral law states that the voters and can- didates take part in the elections on the basis of their free will. Imposition of any kind of direct or indirect restriction on voters or candidates on the basis of language, religious, ethnic, gender, tribal, geographical, or social status is prohibited.

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• However, there have been instances when free will of women has been ig- nored as the IEC has allowed male family members of women to act on their behalf and register them to vote. • One such violation has been registration of women based on lists, where men brought lists of women’s names, that they were supposedly related to and IEC staff provided voting cards based on the names on the list and is- sued the cards without a photograph and with the man’s fingerprint where the finger print of the holder of the card should have been. • In the second phase of women were registered, in their absence, and ac- cording to a list that their male relatives provided to the electoral officials. • Following tables shows prevalence of this act during the second phase of the voter registration.

Location % of station that Notes FEFA covered where

this violation was noted

Paktika Province 99 1% of stations ob- served were at hospi-

tals therefore women registered directly

Zabul 90 Khost 90 Nangarhar 30

This violation was also witnessed during the third phase of the registration

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process. Of the centres that FEFA observed in Paktia for instance, in 20% women were registered based on lists that the male members of the family provided, and without the women being present in the centres.

During the fourth phase of the registration the issue of distribution of cards on list system continued. Of the centres that FEFA observed 29% showed this is- sue.

In some station during the fourth phase, the IEC officials handed over the registration books to male members of families. The books were then taken by these men home where they supposedly obtained women’s finger prints and then cards were issued based on the provided lists.

Registration of women based on lists artificially inflated the numbers of women that seem to have registered to vote, in some areas women voters outnumbered men due to this violation whereas the reality was that in such areas women were de- prived of their right to register to vote. This created a situation where a fundamental issue, of women unable to register to vote, was hidden due to IEC staff’s accep- tance of lists.

When FEFA enquired as to why this violation was taking place at the provincial level, the IEC staff said that the list system was authorised by the central IEC office in Kabul. When FEFA officials raised the question at the central office they said that it had not authorised this and that the electoral officials involved in such violations were to be investigated. However, no investigations have taken place.

How IEC deals with this issue between the end of voter registration process and the polling day is extremely important. It is, however, not clear how the IEC intends to deal with the situation. If the IEC uses technology to detect and remove cards that have the same finger prints in them then most of the cards distributed through the list system will become void as they have the male head of the family’s finger print. This means that the women that were registered in this manner will lose their right

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to vote. The IEC must ensure that women that have already been prevented from practicing their democratic right once by being prevented from registering to vote are not discriminated against again when in comes to polling day. The IEC must therefore ensure that these women must have a legitimate way of participating in the elections.

Security

As expected, in light with the deteriorating security situation in the country people were prevented from registering to vote throughout the registration processes.

• During the first phase of the process a large number of voter registration centres were closed occasionally or permanently from the start of the proc- ess for security reasons. Some examples of closed/partially closed stations, that FEFA observed, include: o Ghazni Province: Andar, Khugyani and Nawa Districts o : Jalrez and Jeghato Districts o Ghor Province: Shahrak, Tolak and Charsada Districts o : o Nooristan Province: Doaba District

• During the second phase of the registration process the security forces did take measures to ensure safety of the centres however some incidents took place that jeopardised the registration process: th o On the 14 of November 2008, a suicide bomb attack caused closure of Nawaik District registration centre to postpone its activities for a

2009 Voter Regestration

day. o In of suicide attack occurred, although relatively far from the registration centre, it caused suspension of ac- tivities at the centre for a day. th o A suicide bomb at Masood Square on the 27 November 2008, caused closure of voter registration centre in nearby Abdul Dawi High School for at least one hour. • Security also created a situation where people could not access the centres. o In Pul e Khumri, some registration were not accessible to voters from Dand e Ghuri District due to security issues on the way. o Lovcal people, in this case approached the IEC with a written applica- tion and necessary guarantee of security asking to move the centre to their area. However, the IEC was unable to move the centre due to “potential security threat” in Dand e Ghuri District. In this district ap- proximately 50% of the people, mainly women could not vote for this reason. • In Paktia, Faryab, Badghis and Baghlan Provinces FEFA observers reported that the IEC has not been able to move the voter registration centres nor- mally from one area to the other because of the security situation. In some areas the lack of guarantee of security by community elders has caused these problems. • The presence of a rebel commander in the mountainous area of Dar-e-Kayan of has resulted in IEC staff being unable to go to the area and continue the registration process. This rebel commander’s brother is al- ready in detention with the government, and he is expected to take action to protest against his brother’s arrest that may include taking government offi- cials hostage. • Third phase of the registration process suffered security blow at the outset as the IEC staff were kidnapped in Farrah and Paktika Provinces. Although, these staff were released with co-operation of the local people, it put nega- tive impact on the morale of the staff working in the areas in question. • Due to security concerns, despite previous plans, the IEC could not open

42

some centres in third phase. This includes Kakar and Arghandab Districts of Zabul Provcince. • IEC also delayed opening of some centres due to security reasons until the last week of the third phase. These include, Wawmana, Geyan and Naka Districts of Paktika Province. The IEC stated that lack of security guarantee was reason for this delay. • The fear of attacks from both sides of the conflict or being arrested by both the coalition forces and the anti government armed groups, was a reasons for low turnout, specially for women. th • On the 8 December 2008 the coalition forces carried out an operation in Batki District of Nangarhar Province. Due to this and subsequent arrest of some people of terrorism related charges, a sense of fear was created in vil- lages around the district and people reduced their movement. This resulted in very little of no participation in the process in some villages. • Anti government groups issued night letters during the third phase of the reg- istration. This included in the Bati Koot District of Nangarhar Province, Baak District of Khost and Meterlaam City of Laghman. This created a feeling of terror and people decided to stay away from the registration process. • The fourth phase of the registration was carried out at the four most inse- cure provinces of the country. The concerns were high; however, the security forces did a good job of at least ensuring that some people were able to reg- ister. • However, the security situation had a negative impact particularly in the rural areas on the implementation of the fourth phase of the process, as it had on the previous phases. • Bad security situation resulted in the IEC not being able to establish registra- tion stations in seven districts: o Helmand Province: Bagheran, Nowzad, Washer, Desho and Khan- shin Districts o Kandahar Province: Ghorak and Meyanshin Districts • As a contingency measure, the IEC decided to change the locations and es- tablish registration centres for the above districts in other areas, but people’s

2009 Voter Regestration

participation were not noticeable in these centres. • In addition, 16% of the IEC’s registration centres were located inside gov- ernmental buildings such as the district buildings and police stations due to security reasons and this has resulted in a low turnout, especially of women. • Occurrence of single incidents during the process had temporary negative impact on stations close by. o On the 28 January 2009 a police officer guarding a registration cen- tres was killed close to the Zainab School in Kandahar City th o On 17 February 2009, two police officers were killed in Karz High School causing negative impact on people participation. th • The wilful military operation by coalition forces on 8 February 2009 in Dand District, 100 KM from the Karz High School registration centre, killed two lo- cal commanders and had a negative impact on the process as it created at- mosphere of fear. • Rumors about Taliban threats to avoid participation by the insurgents in the fourth phase in the following districts had a negative impact on participation, especially women’s participation: Shahwali Kowt, Panjwaie and Maiwand Districts in Kandahar Province. th • On 12 February 2009 a resident of of Helmand Province was arrested by Taliban on the way home from a VR station and they made him eat his card as punishment. This action has had a negative impact on the psychology of local people. • In Chaharchino and Chenarto Districts of Oruzgan province, Taliban were threatening people from the start to the end of the process not to participate and they did this via [messages from]Mullah Imams of local mosques.

Although there has been a major concern with regards to the security situation in the country and, at international level, there have been concerns as to whether the registration process would go ahead. The security situation has been relatively good. FEFA believes that of approximately 400 centres, 20 were closed due to se- curity concerns, although others were affected but only temporarily.

44

There were some instances, where IEC could have shown initiative and avoided closure of the centres or taken alternative measures to enable people to register.

Since security in Afghanistan is a contentious issue and at times perceived lack of it creates an atmosphere of fear in public that prevents them from participating in processes such as the elections. Therefore, IEC must make public clear and factual information about the security situation so that people do not have to rely on ru- mours.

Presence of monitors and media

IEC Regulations on voter registration article 3 states that media, observers, and agents of political parties and candidates can be present in any voter registration centre subject to accreditation by IEC and code of conduct. IEC also states in the same article of the regulations that it will accredit relevant people.

However, there were a range of issues that resulted in lack of observers and media attendance at the registration centres.

Firstly, IEC did not have enough capacity to process and issue accreditation to me- dia and observer organisations. This was one of the reasons why FEFA was pre- vented from starting observation on time. This resulted in FEFA observing a small proportion of the registration process during the first phase of the process.

Media agencies also had similar complaints as they were not issues with accredita- tion in time, therefore media could not report on the registration process as they would have liked to.

During the third phase of the process, in 98% of the centres that FEFA observed, FEFA was the only outside agency present. There were no other national or interna- tional observers present. The only instances where there were someone present, it was the media, mainly local radio stations, mainly in Nangarhar, Khost, Laghman

2009 Voter Regestration

and Paktika provinces.

During the fourth phase of the process in 99% of the centres observed by FEFA, the organization was the only outsider presence. There were no national or interna- tional observers, and few people that were there were mainly local radio journalists from Kandahar, Oruzgan, Helmand and Nemroz Provinces.

Presence of media and observers have duel effect on elections. Firstly, they ensure that the process takes place according to democratic values and the electoral laws and regulations of the country and secondly it gives the people information about the process, on which they can base their opinions. Therefore, their presence is a must for the conduct of election process that is fair and free and that attracts people trust and attention.

Observers in different provinces chose to use this method during separate period of voter registration process for the duration of one week.

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Recommendations

• FEFA recommends that the IEC 1. Strengthens training to avoid violations: The IEC must ensure that their staff are trained so that procedural violations such as underage registrations and multiple registrations. This would promote democrat- ic values and appropriate participation.

2. Increases numbers of female staff: Although there are several is- sues that may have prevented IEC from recruiting more female staff, they can invest resources and time in enabling women to fulfill roles within the electoral machinery, which in turn would increase women’s overall participation in the process.

3. Raises the personnel capacity to process observer registration: This would enable observers, both domestic and international and the media to observe and report on election processes and raise aware- ness of people on the process as well as creating a sense of trust in democracy.

4. Promotes democratic values to electoral staff: Staff at the IEC at times have violated the electoral laws as they are not aware of the un- 2009 Voter Regestration

derlying democratic value that it safeguards. Therefore, the IEC staff must be educated in understanding and upholding democratic values and not only be limited to training on procedural issues.

5. Better plans locations of voter registration centers: If the IEC takes all socio cultural and practical sensitivities of the people of Afghanistan it will be able to enable more people, specially women, to register and to vote.

6. Investigates alternative ways of registering people that reside in relatively unsafe area: Insecurity is a fact in Afghanistan and its neg- ative impact on the democratic process must be reduced to minimum. IEC can help do so by investigating alternative ways of enabling people to register in unsafe areas.

7. Conducts better outreach to publicize eligibility criteria to poten- tial voters: This will ensure that people are aware of their rights be- fore they register to vote. This may help prevent people under the vot- ing age to attempt to register.

8. Conducts ongoing promotion of democratic values: If the IEC uses the periods of quite between elections, the organization can edu- cate people about democratic values. This would ensure that people become an active and aware participant in the process and do not at- tempt to violate regulations that they do now due to lack of awareness.

9. Acts in a transparent way and shares information: If IEC shares in- formation with the civil society on matters such as its plans to use technology in prevention of multiple registrations, it would be able to have support from the civil society as well as increasing people’s trust

48

in the election process.

10. Involves civil society in public awareness campaign: the civil so- ciety institutions have experience of conducting public awareness campaigns and have wider possibility of outreach due to their perma- nent nature and nationwide access. IEC can utilize this when conduct- ing public awareness.

11. Maintains neutrality when recruiting staff and create a system of constantly monitoring neutrality of its staff: this would detect in- stances of lack of neutrality on an ongoing basis and would enable the IEC to deal with the issue as it arises.

12. Shares and consults with the Civil Society and other institutions on policies and procedures prior to publication: this would add to the credibility and authenticity of the said regulation as well as creating a better work environment between the civil society and the IEC.

13. Spends time in exploring options on avoiding multiple registra- tions during the next voter registration process: FEFA believes that the IEC must use the opportunity that exist between the 2009 and the next elections to explore options of avoiding repeat of the issues that resulted in multiple registration by people as if this violation is re- peated serious doubt could be raised on credibility of the election re- sults in the country.

14. Improves capacity to deal with and implement change: FEFA met with the IEC on numerous occasions during the registration process and informed them of the violations that were taking place. The IEC however, did not take any initiatives to deal with the issues. Therefore, improving its capacity to deal with and initiate change mid operation 2009 Voter Regestration

for IEC would be immense improvement for the IEC.

• FEFA recommends that the Afghan Civil Society:

1. Raise awareness of elections and civil and political rights: this would make the public an active and aware participant in the process.

2. Enhances domestic observation efforts: Presently FEFA is the only domestic observation organization. The civil society must en- sure that they strengthen the domestic observation efforts either by co-operating with FEFA as partners or taking new initiative.

3. Must follow up on instances of violation of people’s civil and political rights: Most complaints that came to FEFA’s attention with regards to the electoral procedures need to be followed up and the civil society is in a good position to do so. This would help pressure the IEC and other bodies to develop their capacity to uphold demo- cratic standards and develop them in between elections.

4. Conducts research and run projects on issues that arise throughout this report: Some issues that are identified in this re- port can only be resolved if work is carried out within communities in long term. These issues include women’s participation in electoral process and the lack of impartiality of political persons. The civil so- ciety can use the lull between elections to conduct research to better understand these issues as well as working on them through projects.

5. Lobby and advocate: the civil society must ensure that they lob- by all relevant government bodies so that changes and improvement 50

that this report suggests and the civil society believes in takes place.

• FEFA recommends that the Afghan Government: 1. Develop and bridge the gaps in the electoral laws: In the lulls be- tween elections the law and policy makers of the country must ensure that gaps in electoral laws are filled and effective policies and proce- dures are in place in timely manner and with consultation with civil so- ciety organizations

2. Use the existing legal means to prosecute those that have been in violation of the electoral law: FEFA have observed that instances of violation of electoral law have not been taken as seriously as they should have been. This needs to change in order to build sound dem- ocratic consciousness.

3. Provide secure environment for all specially women to participate in the electoral process: The number of people that could take part in the electoral process would rise considerably if the international partners of the Afghan people both avoid taking non essential military action during election period as it obstructs free movement of people.

• FEFA recommends that the International doners:

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o Provide an effective medium through which election process and observation could be funded and supported effectively: The inter- national community must provide funding not only for execution of the operational side of the elections but also towards raising Afghan people’s awareness of the civil and political rights. Therefore, the funding of the democratization project in Afghanistan must be conti- nuous and must be limited to the periods just before and during the elections. o Provide technical support in advance so that IEC and observer organizations could prepare for the electoral process: Afghans are still developing mechanisms to run, monitor and observe elections in the country and technical support, knowledge transfer and technol- ogical aid would made transition to an effective democracy swift and possible.

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