UC Riverside UC Riverside Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Increasing State Capacity Through Clans Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1p59p2q5 Author Doyle, Jr, Thomas Martin Publication Date 2009 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE Increasing State Capacity Through Clans A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Thomas Martin Doyle December 2009 Dissertation Committee: Dr. Shaun Bowler, Chairperson Dr. William Barndt Dr. Ebru Erdem Dr. Douglas R. White Copyright by Thomas Martin Doyle 2009 The Dissertation of Thomas Martin Doyle is approved by: Committee Chairperson University of California, Riverside Acknowledgements It is with great appreciation and humility that I take this opportunity to thank the following people: Drs. Valerie O’Regan and Stephen Stambough for more than ten years of emotional and academic support. No student could hope to find better mentors and friends. Dr. Shaun Bowler, Chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of California Riverside and chair of my dissertation committee along with Dr. Will Barndt and Dr. Ebru Erdem for their steadfast efforts in my behalf. Drs. Douglas R. White and Lilyan-Brudner White at the University of California Irvine for their dedicated labors aimed at expanding my understanding of a complex world. The entire faculty and staff in the Department of Political Science at the University of California Riverside for help on many levels. Particular thanks go to Kevin Grisham and Mark Neiswender. This study would not be possible without the information provided by so many citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan. By previous arrangement, they shall remain anonymous but not forgotten. This is a portion of their story. To my three sons Tom, Allen, and Burt for all these wonderful years of memories, patience, and love. No man could be prouder of his children. I give credit to all these amazing people for the positive elements of this work and accept responsibility for all its weaknesses. iv ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Increasing State Capacity Through Clans by Thomas Martin Doyle Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Political Science University of California, Riverside, December 2009 Dr. Shaun Bowler, Chairperson State governance based on a clan system lacks definition in the early days of the twenty-first century. This dissertation seeks to explore the structures and functions of the clan system in the Republic of Azerbaijan. This requires examination of the formal and informal institutions using a cross-disciplinary mixed methods approach to capture the complexities present. Particular emphasis focuses on the local level clan ties to the Milli Məjlis (National Assembly) as expression of citizens’ voice in the political decision- making process. Field interviews reveal a bottom-up system with horizontal rather than vertical structures resulting in a dynamic parochial political culture. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………….………iv Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………v Table of Contents................................................................................................................vi List of Tables.....................................................................................................................vii List of Figures...................................................................................................................viii CHAPTER 1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………1 CHAPTER 2 The role of informal networks in increasing state capacity………………...9 CHAPTER 3 Research Methods and Methodological Approach………..........................44 CHAPTER 4 Timeframe 1 October 1991 – June 1993……………………………….....59 CHAPTER 5 Timeframe 2 June 1993 – November 1995…………………………….....79 CONCLUSION................................................................................................................117 APPENDICES Appendix 3A........................................................................................................120 Appendix 3B........................................................................................................124 Appendix 5A........................................................................................................126 Appendix 5B.........................................................................................................129 Appendix 5C……………………………………………………………………130 Appendix 5D…………………………………………………………………....133 vi List of Tables Chapter 2 Table 2.1 Hypothesis………………………………………………………………….....33 Table 2.2 Outcome of strong clan ties to state…………………………………………...37 Chapter 3 Table 3.4.1 Indicators of increasing state capacity in Azerbaijan present in T1………...52 Chapter 4 Table 4.5 Indicators of increasing state capacity in Azerbaijan present in T2………......75 Chapter 5 Table 5.6 Number of increasing state capacity indicators present in T1 and T2…….....112 Conclusion Table 6.1 Number of increasing state capacity indicators present in T1 and T2………117 Table 6.2 Short-term outcomes of clan ties to the state…………………………..…….118 vii List of Figures Chapter 5 Figure 5.1 Network graph of Azerbaijan National Assembly November 1995...............................................................................................101 Figure 5.2 Clan/political party representation map of Azerbaijan National Assembly November 1995..............................................105 Figure 5.3 Google Earth map of Azerbaijan with gridlines............................106 Figure 5.4 Azerbaijan voting district map November 1995...........................108 Figure 5.5 Azerbaijan clan dispersion map November 1995..........................109 viii Chapter 1: Preface “…a state… is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life”. Aristotle Aristotle’s definition of a state aimed at a perfect life may seem overly ambitious or idealistic in the early years of the twenty-first century. Yet there can be little doubt that states are comprised of aggregations of families. The city-state of Aristotle’s time has given way, in large part, to nation states and families as later defined by Aristotle have changed in many aspects. Numerous examples of “state” suggest that long-term family based states are given to elements of political patronage. Words like nepotism, cronyism or spoils system are often used in the same context. The word “corruption” is often associated with these governments. Short-term beneficial effects of family centric states are noticeably absent from mainstream studies of political behavior in nascent countries. The story presented in this dissertation is one of short-term benefits of extended family ties benefiting a new state in a nascent country. In the absence of properly functioning formal political institutions and organizations there may be few options but for a state leader to call upon trusted family members to fill critical political roles to prevent failed state status. Increasing state capacity through family ties is not a new concept. In the United States (U.S.) the Pendleton Act was a major step aimed at ending patronage by establishing the Civil Service Commission in 1883. Cronyism was common for the first 100 years of U.S. history. Joseph Stalin employed patronage in the Union of Soviet 1 Socialist Republics (USSR) in an effort to cement his position as leader of the USSR during the late 1920s. Certainly, the logic of political patronage is an understood part of state behavior. There are negative connotations associated with nepotism and justifiably so. In limited circumstances, however, patronage may be a short cut to establishing some measure of short-term “breathing space” during which state capacity may be strengthened in socially and/or politically acceptable ways. The study of newly formed countries receives wide attention within the discipline of political science. This academic quest for understanding often leads to shifts in foreign policy of other countries by those policy makers in political office. Analysis of state level formal structures and functions of governmental institutions and organizations makes any number of assumptions void of extensive research of informal sub national communities within the new countries. Essential characteristics of national political behavior often begin at the local level. Whether rural or urban small communities within a new country can have great impact on a centralized state. In countries with existing informal social networks and the absence of adequately functioning centralized infrastructure these local communities become the de facto state. For short periods of time transition from one form of governance to another can be accelerated by proper utilization of these networks of social interaction. The main body of existing literature in political science identifies reliance on these small communities of family members as some form of nepotism and as such 2 represents corruption. Little emphasis is placed on the possibility that extended family networks may actually be the norm in some new countries and increasing the capacity of the state to govern effectively may be a byproduct of these institutions. What occurs in the short-term as a result of some form of patronage, nepotism, or cronyism has yet to receive much attention. What