Baku Dialoguesbaku Dialogues Policy Perspectives on the Silk Road Region

BAKU DIALOGUESBAKU DIALOGUES POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE SILK ROAD REGION

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020

Silk Road Region as Global Keystone? Geopolitics & Connectivity in the Heart of the World Between Eurasia and the Middle East Geopolitical Keystone Svante Cornell Nikolas K. Gvosdev Against ‘the Blob’ Not A Top European Priority Michael A. Reynolds Amanda Paul

Five-Star Hubs Eurasia, the Hegemon, and the Three Sovereigns Taleh Ziyadov Pepe Escobar Silk Road Pathways Completing the Southern Gas Corridor Yu Hongjun Akhmed Gumbatov

Taking Stock of Regional Quandaries The Karabakh Peace Process Dennis Sammut Iran’s Longstanding Cooperation with Armenia Brenda Shaffer The OSCE and Minorities in the Silk Road Region Lamberto Zannier

Profile in Leadership Zbigniew Brzezinski: My Friendship with America’s Geopolitical Sage Hafiz Pashayev

Baku Dialogues Interview Strategic Equilibrium: Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy Hikmat Hajiyev

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ISSN Print: 2709-1848 ISSN Online: 2709-1856 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUESBAKU DIALOGUES POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE SILK ROAD REGION

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020

Five-Star Hubs Eurasia, the Hegemon, and the Three Sovereigns Taleh Ziyadov Pepe Escobar Silk Road Pathways Completing the Southern Gas Corridor Yu Hongjun Akhmed Gumbatov

Profile in Leadership Zbigniew Brzezinski: My Friendship with America’s Geopolitical Sage Hafiz Pashayev

Baku Dialogues Interview Strategic Equilibrium: Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy Hikmat Hajiyev

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 2 3 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUESBAKU DIALOGUES POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE SILK ROAD REGION bakudialogues.ada.edu.az

Published by ADA University Baku, Azerbaijan

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Baku Dialogues is an independent policy journal. The content of each issue of the journal (e.g. essays, interviews, profiles, etc.) thus does not represent any institutional viewpoint. The analyses provided and viewpoints expressed by the authors featured in Baku Dialogues do not necessarily reflect those of its publisher, editors, consultants, Editorial Advisory Council members, and anyone else affiliated with ADA University orBaku Dialogues. Our sole acceptance of Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 4 responsibility is the provision of a forum dedicated5 to intellectual discussionVol. 4 and | No. debate. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUESBAKU DIALOGUES POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE SILK ROAD REGION Editorial Statement

The first issue of Baku Dialogues was released in Fall 2014 and was published semi- regularly in the years that followed. The present issue, published in Fall 2020, marks the re- launch of Baku Dialogues, ADA University’s flagship English-language quarterly journal. Henceforth, the publication’s subtitle is Policy Perspectives on the Silk Road Region.

This choice reflects a triple intention. First, to cover broadly topics of geopolitical relevance to the overlapping set of regions to which Azerbaijan and its neighbors belong. We thus define the Silk Road region loosely as the geographic space looking west past Anatolia to the warm seas beyond; north across the Caspian towards the Great Plain and the Great Steppe; east to the peaks of the Altai and the arid sands of the Taklamakan; and south towards the Hindu Kush and the Indus valley, looping down around in the direction of the Persian Gulf and across the Fertile Crescent.

Second, to focus on contemporary cross-cutting issues that impact on the international position of what we view as one of the few keystone regions of global affairs, ranging from energy politics and infrastructure security to economic development and cultural heritage.

Third, the choice of subtitle is indicative of our deep-seated conviction that the comprehensive rejuvenation of a vast region that stood for centuries at the fulcrum of trade, innovation, and refinement requires both a healthy respect of frontiers as sovereign markers of territorial integrity and a farsighted predisposition to ensure the region can continue to grow as a strategic center of attraction for capital, goods, talent, and technologies.

The editorial premise of Baku Dialogues is that the Silk Road region is and will remain an important seam of international relations, continuing to serve as (i) a significant political and economic crossroads between various geographies; (ii) an important intercessor between major powers; and (iii) an unavoidable gateway between different blocks of states, regional associations, and civilizational groupings.

The intended audience ofBaku Dialogues is diverse: national, regional, and international policymakers, diplomats, officials, legislators, commentators, thought leaders, journalists, business executives, think-tankers, academics, scholars, and students—all those who in one way or another pay attention to issues of consequence affecting the trajectory of this part of the world.

As has been the case throughout its publication history, Baku Dialogues is and will remain an independent policy journal. The content of each issue of the journal (e.g. essays, interviews, profiles, etc.) thus does not represent any institutional viewpoint. The analyses provided and viewpoints expressed by the authors featured in Baku Dialogues do not necessarily reflect those of its publisher, editors, consultants, Editorial Advisory Council members, and anyone else affiliated with ADA University or Baku Dialogues. Our sole acceptance of responsibility is the provision of a forum dedicated to intellectual discussion and debate.

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 6 7 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES Table of ContentsBAKU DIALOGUES Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020

Essays 10 Between Eurasia and the Middle East: Azerbaijan’s New Geopolitics Svante Cornell 26 Geopolitical Keystone: Azerbaijan and the Global Position of the Silk Road Region Nikolas K. Gvosdev

40 Against ‘the Blob’: America’s Foreign Policy in Eurasia’s Heartland is Becoming its Own Greatest Enemy Michael A. Reynolds 60 Not A Top European Priority: Can the EU Engage Geopolitically in the South Caucasus? Amanda Paul 78 Five-Star Hubs: Conceptual Key to Innovation and Prosperity Taleh Ziyadov 90 Eurasia, the Hegemon, and the Three Sovereigns Pepe Escobar 104 Silk Road Pathways: The China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor Yu Hongjun 116 Completing the Southern Gas Corridor: SGC in a Post-pandemic World Akhmed Gumbatov 128 The Karabakh Peace Process: Rebuilding Trust for International Engagement Dennis Sammut 142 Iran’s Longstanding Cooperation with Armenia: Domestic Azerbaijani Opposition May be Rising Brenda Shaffer 154 The OSCE and Minorities in the Silk Road Region: Fostering Social Cohesion and Integration Lamberto Zannier Profile in Leadership 170 Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928-2017): My Friendship with America’s Geopolitical Sage Hafiz Pashayev Interview 186 Strategic Equilibrium: Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy Hikmat Hajiyev Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 8 9 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES

1991, Azerbaijan a particular ex- Between Eurasia and has similarly had to Azerbaijan has em- ternal force for confront a reality barked on a foreign poli- their respective se- the Middle East in which outside cy that seeks to maintain curity. Armenia, in powers cannot be functioning relations order to safeguard trusted to respect with all neighbors and the conquest of Azerbaijan’s New Geopolitics the country’ sover- Nagorno-Karabakh avoid making itself de- eignty. Moscow, of and adjoining ter- pendent on any particu- Svante Cornell course, makes no ritories, mortgaged secret of its claim lar power for its security. its independence to a “sphere of priv- to Russia in ex- zerbaijan’s geopolitics have the geopolitics of Eurasia and the ileged interests” in change for mili- changed considerably Middle East have merged, bringing the former Soviet Union “but not tary and political support. Georgia, in the last decade, along increasing complications. only,” to use former Russian presi- seeing Russia as the main threat to withA the growing general instability Azerbaijan’s Foreign dent Dmitry Medvedev’s 2008 for- its independence, has appealed for in its neighborhood. Gone are the mulation. Iran, with a large ethnic Western support. days symbolized by the Baku-Tbili- Policy Priorities Azerbaijani population and a theo- si-Ceyhan pipeline’s construction, While Azerbaijan largely shares zerbaijan’s foreign policy is cratic form of government, has also when a relatively stable balance ex- Tbilisi’s analysis of the regional determined by a set of prior- shown hostility to Azerbaijan: high- isted between a loose Russian-led situation, it has embarked on a A ranking Iranian figures have spec- alignment including Iran and Ar- ities that have remained essentially foreign policy that seeks to main- ulated loudly on the necessity of menia, and an informal entente be- unchanged since the mid-1990s. tain functioning relations with all Azerbaijan to “return” to the Iranian tween the United States and Turkey, First and foremost among these is neighbors and avoid making it- realm. Even Turkey, Azerbaijan’s which supported the independence the strengthening and consolida- self dependent on any particular closest ally, has occasionally exhibited of Azerbaijan and Georgia and the tion of the independence and sov- power for its security. Azerbaijan behavior akin to that of a domineering construction of direct energy trans- ereignty of the country. Indepen- has embarked on a foreign policy big brother. And Western states, with portation routes to Europe. dence is something that many states that seeks to maintain functioning can take for granted; but this is not which Azerbaijan sought to build From 2008 until today, the geo- relations with all neighbors and the case in the South Caucasus. close relations, have not shied from avoid making itself dependent on political environment has shifted interfering in the country’s internal Many Azerbaijanis are well aware any particular power for its secu- in several important ways. First, it affairs to promote their preferred that the country’s first attempt at in- rity. While this was a bold propo- is more unstable and unpredictable. political priorities. Second, the threshold of the use of dependence in 1918 was ended by sition for a relatively small country force has decreased dramatically. a Soviet invasion two years later. his is a geopolitical reality surrounded by large powers, it has And third, to a significant extent, After independence was restored in TAzerbaijan shares with been a successful policy for several two of its immediate neighbors, reasons. First, Azerbaijan’s oil and Armenia and Georgia. But those gas resources provided it with fi- Svante Cornell is Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road states are both considerably weaker nancial resources that allowed it to Studies Program, Co-founder of the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Stockholm, Senior Fellow for Eurasia at the American Foreign Policy Council, and a than Azerbaijan and have essen- build security and military institu- member of the Swedish Royal Academy of Military Science. tially accepted the need to rely on tions as well as improve the living

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 10 11 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES standards of its population. Second, territorial integrity. Most important, the corridor as well. Outside forces the renewed assertiveness of Russia Azerbaijan’s society is considerably it has led Baku to pursue a robust opposing the corridor were led first under Vladimir Putin; and second, more cohesive than Georgia’s. Put defense posture, with the aim of and foremost by Russia, which viewed the growing injection by the United together, these have meant that building a military capable enough the development of the corridor as a States of normative concerns in its foreign powers have fewer levers to force Armenia to make mean- threat to its efforts to re-establish a foreign policy toward the region. to use to destabilize the country ingful concessions in negotiations. sphere of influence among former The rise of Putin, and his growing internally. And third, the commit- Soviet states in what is now termed Changes in Geopolitics aggressiveness toward regional ment by Azerbaijan’s leadership to by some as the Silk Road region. states, raised the cost of embracing a stable and cautious foreign policy or the two first decades of its Because it feared the corridor a pro-Western foreign policy. course translated these conditions Findependence, Azerbaijan would lead to a surge of Western It also increased the downside of into an actual viable strategy. was a key part of a relatively stable and Turkish influence in the re- engaging in an opening of the po- The second factor determining geopolitical environment, centered gion, Iran joined with Russia in litical system, with Russian subver- opposition to its development. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy has been on the development of the east-west sive activities increasing in scope the conflict with Armenia, and the corridor connecting Europe with Among regional states, Georgia and intensity—as the United States latter’s occupation of one-sixth of Central Asia. Put in a very simpli- and Azerbaijan were enthusiastic would itself discover, Moscow Azerbaijan’s territory. The resto- fied way, this period saw a geopolit- supporters and prime beneficia- developed skill at exploiting the ration of the country’s territorial ical alignment uniting those forces ries of the corridor. Only Armenia, vulnerabilities of open societies. integrity is second only to the con- that supported the development which was left isolated as a result of Meanwhile, President George W. solidation of its independence as a and expansion of the east-west its occupation of Azerbaijani terri- Bush’s “Freedom Agenda” came to priority for the Baku government. corridor against those that opposed tory, was solidly subsumed under the differentiate among regional states This has led Azerbaijan to design it. This corridor began with the Russian-Iranian alignment. Central on the basis of their domestic po- a foreign policy geared toward this development of Caspian oil and Asian dynamics were less clear: neu- litical system: focusing particular goal. It has made Azerbaijan rela- gas resources, and subsequently tral Turkmenistan avoided most in- support on those countries that ex- tively hostile to those countries that expanded to military transit for ternational entanglements, while Ka- perienced “color revolutions” while have supported Armenia, such as American and NATO operations in zakhstan sought to walk a tightrope, adopting an increasingly frosty Russia and Iran, and positively pre- Afghanistan. More recently, it has being a key part of Russian-led co- stance toward countries that did disposed to those that took Baku’s developed into a civilian transpor- operative institutions while simulta- not engage in significant political side early on, such as Turkey, Israel, tation corridor—a land bridge con- neously welcoming the corridor’s de- reform. and Pakistan. But Azerbaijan has necting Europe and Asia—in which velopment. East of the Caspian, only The 2008 Russian invasion of been forced to accept the continued the Port of Baku plays a key role as Uzbekistan was able to firmly stake Georgia effectively brought an end dominant influence of Russia on well. out an independent and assertive to the stability of regional geopol- the conflict, and thus to seek to re- The outside forces supporting the position, but its relationship with the itics. This effectively undermined duce Russia’s tendency to lean to- corridor were led by the United States West suffered from controversy over the logic of the east-west corridor, ward Armenia in the conflict. It has and Turkey, whose policies at the time its domestic policies. as it led the United States to ne- also led Azerbaijan to take on an ac- aligned closely and were coordinated, his geopolitical balance was glect its ties with geopolitically cru- tive role in a number of multilateral while European states played a sec- Trelatively stable until the cial countries like Azerbaijan and organizations in order to cement ondary role. In Central Asia, China mid-2000s. It came to be chal- Uzbekistan, and in fact contrib- broad international support for its gradually emerged as a supporter of lenged by two developments: first, uted to driving a wedge between

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Azerbaijan and Georgia, contrary the Saakashvili government; own, outside powers’ “hybrid war- This changed gradually as Sovi- to earlier efforts to support the bud- but the message had been heard fare” designed to undermine and et-era psychological boundaries ding strategic partnership between loud and clear across the re- compromise their statehood. began to fade and regional dynamics these states. gion: cross Russia at your own Gradually, in Central Asia, the began to intertwine. The decisive It indicated that the threshold for peril. Only two years later, new geopolitical environment led moment was the 2011 Arab up- the use of massive force against a this message was reiterated in to a newfound urge among leaders heavals. As several Middle Eastern sovereign state had been dramat- Kyrgyzstan, as Moscow endorsed in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, pri- states descended into civil strife, the ically lowered in the region; but the ouster of President Kurmanbek marily, to develop mechanisms of regional powers that surrounded also indicated that the willingness Bakiyev after his government had regional coordination and coopera- the South Caucasus emerged as key of outside powers to step in to sup- failed to deliver on a promise tion to prevent foreign powers from players in these conflicts as well. port the east-west corridor when to Moscow to remove America’s engaging in “divide and rule” policies While Iran had always been closely push came to shove was relatively military base in the country. BD in the region. In the South Caucasus, focused on Middle Eastern affairs, limited. More importantly, it in- his new reality forced by contrast, the Armenia-Azerbaijan the growing involvement of both dicated that Western states either Tregional states to reconsider conflict made such regional cooper- Turkey and Russia in the geopoli- saw the corridor as a feat that had their foreign policy approaches. It ation impossible, and thus reinforced tics of the Middle East were key fac- already been accomplished, or one led several states, Azerbaijan prom- Moscow’s intent to manipulate the tors in the process that connected in which they were not willing to inently among them, to turn away conflict to prevent regional states the South Caucasus to that region. invest considerable resources. from an overtly pro-Western stance from coming together. n this perspective, Turkey’s For states in toward a policy of From Eurasia to the Itransformation is of utmost Central Asia and non-alignment. importance. In the several de- the Caucasus, The 2008 Russian in- This implied that Middle East? cades after the collapse of the Ot- these develop- vasion of Georgia effec- the country would further development over toman Empire and the emergence ments indicated tively brought an end to not seek member- Athe past decade has been of Turkey as a nation-state, the that outside (read: the stability of regional ship in Western the gradual merger of the geopoli- country had, for most practical pur- Western) backing geopolitics. institutions like tics of the South Caucasus and the poses, acted as part of “the West” for their sover- NATO and the Middle East. In a sense, the South and both turned its back from eignty and territo- EU, while it would Caucasus has historically been con- and sought to stay out of Middle rial integrity would simultaneously nected to the Middle East, and from Eastern entanglements. Moreover, be limited to diplomatic support reject membership in Russian- a long-term perspective, its integra- its policies were closely aligned and economic aid; and that such led institutions like the emerging tion into the Russian empire from with those of the United States and support may not be sufficient to Eurasian Economic Union. In 1828 to 1991 could be considered Europe. This gradually began to counter an armed challenge from Central Asia, Uzbekistan adopted a historical anomaly. Still, in the change as the Cold War was coming either Russia or Iran. Western a similar approach, as did first two decades of independence, to an end and was accelerated with security guarantees came to be Tajikistan. Moreover, it led regional Middle Eastern dynamics had only Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s arrival on seen as the opposite of robust, to states to focus on strengthening a minor influence on the region; it the political scene. From then on, put it euphemistically. Granted, their state institutions—not least was connected much more closely Turkey pursued increasingly uni- the Russian invasion of Georgia in the security sector—in order with the dynamics of Eastern lateral policies designed to establish failed to result in the ouster of to be able to withstand, on their Europe and the Black Sea region. itself as a “manager of change” in

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 14 15 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES the region, to quote then-Foreign which backed the opposition to Turkey of sending military helicop- the Middle East, coupled with the Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Assad. ters into Armenian airspace. After region’s ideological currents, can In practice, this policy sought to As a result, Turkey shot down a Turkey shot down the Russian jet, have an impact on populations bring the Muslim Brotherhood to Russian jet over the Turkish-Syrian Russia responded by deploying elsewhere. In recent years, it has af- power across the region, particu- border in November 2015, leading military helicopters to the Erebuni fected Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the larly in Syria and Egypt. Turkey to a rapid deterioration of the base near Yerevan. During the fall of North Caucasus, all of which have intervened in the Syrian civil previously relatively friendly re- 2015, Moscow also made a demon- been sources of fighters, posing war, agitated for the overthrow of lations between the two powers. stration of strength by using war- challenges for governments con- President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Aggressive Russian actions against ships in the Caspian sea to fire mis- cerned with the activities of these and then emerged as the major Turkey, including substantial sanc- siles at targets in Syria. There was radicalized individuals as they re- backer of the short-lived Muslim tions, a tourism embargo, and co- no clear military rationale for using turn to their home countries. Brotherhood regime led by vert actions led to considerable ships to fire these missiles; the move zerbaijan is particularly Mohammed Morsi. More recently, consequences for Turkey, not was interpreted instead mainly as a Avulnerable to developments Turkey has involved itself in the least in the economic realm. By sign of Russia’s military capabilities. in the Middle East, as the conflicts civil war in Libya, as the main ex- the summer of 2016, Turkey was It also served as a key reminder of in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen have fea- ternal backer of the Tripoli govern- forced to apologize for the incident, the connection between the South tured a strong element of sectarian ment led by Fayaz al-Sarraj, pro- in an effort to normalize relations. Caucasus and Middle Eastern violence pitting Sunni and Shia viding weapons as well as fighters Following the failed July 2016 coup “theaters” of operation. groups against each other. Whether to back up that government. against Erdogan, Turkish-Russian Other elements than these these sectarian conflicts are the re- Russia’s return to Middle East relations again improved rapidly, great power politics connect the sult of genuine communal tensions politics has been equally dramatic. not least because Ankara blamed Caucasus with the Middle or have been manufactured by out- The Kremlin identified a vacuum in the United States for involvement in East. The rising level of Middle side powers is beside the point: 2013, when U.S. President Barack the coup. But by 2018-2019, the re- Eastern tourism to as in the Western Obama reneged on his stated “red lationship soured again, as Ankara Azerbaijan and Balkans of the line,” which implied that America and Moscow were unable to agree Georgia is a small Nearing the beginning 1990s, it is clear that would intervene against Syria’s on a common approach in Syria; but culturally sig- of the fourth decade once established, president Bashar al-Assad should meanwhile, they found themselves nificant example of its independence, such sectarian ten- his regime use chemical weapons. on opposing sides of the civil war of this. A factor Azerbaijan is more sions pose con- Moscow initially took the lead in in Libya, given Russian support for that is more im- closely connected to siderable danger the Benghazi-based government removing most chemical weapons portant from a po- Middle Eastern dynam- of spreading. As and the Libyan National Army. from Syria, thus establishing it- litical perspective ics than it has been in a country that is self as a key arbiter of the conflict. his volatile situation had has been jihadist two centuries. majority Shia with Subsequently, Moscow agreed with Timplications for the South recruitment to the a large Sunni mi- Tehran on a joint effort to prop up Caucasus. Only days after Turkey conflicts in the nority, Azerbaijan’s the Assad regime, and inserted its accused Russia of violating its air- Levant. This phe- very social sta- military forces into Syria in 2015. space while conducting raids in nomenon, which has also affected bility is connected to the conflicts This brought Moscow and Tehran northern Syria in October 2015, Central Asia to a considerable de- in the Middle East. While there in confrontation with Ankara, Armenian authorities accused gree, has shown how conflicts in has thus far been little evidence

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 16 17 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES of the spread of sectarian en- represented first and foremost by a administration’s nuclear deal with to conclude the opposite. In this mity to Azerbaijan, the situation transformed Turkey’s bid to take a Iran, which was followed by the process of reform, Saudi Arabia has in the Middle East has led the leading role in Near East politics, rising power of two Crown Princes, become socially much more liberal Azerbaijani government to strengthen but also by the declining abilities of Mohammed bin Zayed of Abu yet politically more authoritarian. its commitment to the secularism of formerly leading Arab powers like Dhabi and Mohammed bin Sultan ran dominates a second faction the state, which the leadership un- Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. of Saudi Arabia. Iseeking domination in the Near derstands to be the sole guarantor The three groupings that have Both can be termed authoritarian East, and is assertively trying to of inter-communal harmony. emerged are each led by a regional modernizers: the UAE has devel- build what has come to be termed In sum, nearing the beginning of player contending for power and oped much farther on the course the Shia crescent. Tehran benefited the fourth decade of its indepen- influence. All three exhibit con- of modernization and is an in- considerably from America’s trou- dence, Azerbaijan is more closely siderable ambition; but all three comparably more liberal a society bles in Iraq, and particularly from connected to Middle Eastern dy- also face grave internal challenges, than Saudi Arabia. Mohammed bin the Obama administration’s deci- namics than it has been in two which only raise the region’s geopo- Sultan, of course, has shown nu- sion to effectively withdraw its pres- centuries. This process, more- litical stakes. merous instances of rashness and ence from the country. With the over, is likely to continue to bring audi Arabia and the UAE bad judgment, most infamously in growth of sectarian tensions across Azerbaijan in ever greater prox- Slead a first group, consisting the killing of dissident writer Jamal the Near East in the past decade, imity to dynamics of the Middle mainly of conservative Arab mon- Khashoggi that took place in the Tehran capitalized on the fear of East. This, in turn, requires Baku archies. This group views with con- Saudi consulate in Istanbul. But he the Salafi-jihadi extremists among to spend greater energy in under- siderable alarm both Iran’s regional has done what no one else has done the Shia as well as other non-Sunni standing the rapidly developing ambitions and the Islamist pop- in Saudi Arabia: push back against groups across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, logic of the region’s geopolitics. ulism represented by Turkey and the Salafi-Wahhabi clergy as well and Yemen. the Muslim Brotherhood. Riyadh as against the more conservative This process began in Lebanon Middle East Dynamics and Abu Dhabi are supported, with elements of the House of Saud that over a decade ago, as Iran succeeded he geopolitics of the Near varying degrees of enthusiasm, had dominated the country since in installing Hezbollah as the most TEast have changed funda- by Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the 1979 siege of the Grand Mosque powerful force in Lebanese so- mentally in recent decades. Today, Jordan. Israel also forms a de facto in Mecca. Indeed, the social free- ciety and subsequently also in the the region is not defined primarily part of this alignment, though Is- doms that have been introduced in Lebanese state. Tehran then abetted by the Arab-Israeli conflict, or even rael does so as an independent out- the kingdom could scarcely have the sectarian violence in Iraq, an Arab-Iranian rivalry. Instead, a sider, rather than as a full part of been imagined five years ago. making itself the benefactor and trilateral rivalry has emerged for the alignment. Events in recent years have protector of Shia political groups domination of the Near East, pitting Saudi-Iranian animosity has been confirmed that Riyadh’s main aim and armed militias in that country. three factions against one another: present for decades. Still, during is the preservation of the regime. That, in turn, has provided Tehran an Iranian faction, a conservative the presidencies of Mohammad Whereas earlier leaders saw the with the ability to operate covertly Sunni group led by Saudi Arabia Khatami and Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, promotion of Salafi ideology as an in Iraq and to use Iraqi Shia militias and the United Arab Emirates, and they were not directly hostile. The instrument toward this goal, the for its larger foreign policy goals. a radical Sunni group led by Turkey rivalry acquired new momentum fact that Salafi-jihadi extremists In Syria, Iran proved the decisive and Qatar. This novel situation after the American invasion of Iraq, have targeted the kingdom itself force in ensuring the survival of the is the result of an important shift and particularly after the Obama has led a new generation of leaders Assad regime. It has utilized this

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 18 19 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES dependency to seek to install itself Brotherhood regime in Egypt, extremist fighters and Turkish presidential system is faltering in in southern Syria, forcing Israeli and Ankara similarly meddled regular troops as well as arms to the midst of economic misman- military intervention to prevent an in the domestic affairs of Syria, shore up the Tripoli-based gov- agement and the remarkable re- Iranian presence directly on its Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco, ernment against the forces of the silience of Turkish society to his border. In Yemen, Iran exercises con- where it worked to shore up or in- Libyan National Army endorsed vision of a “New Turkey.” siderably influence on the Houthi stall friendly political forces. This by Abu Dhabi and Cairo, as well as This means that the stability of militias, who in turn have adopted included supporting Sunni mili- Moscow and Paris. the trilateral geopolitical rivalry is the rhetoric and ideology of the Ira- tant groups in Syria to topple the ll three of the faction-leading tenuous. Considerable domestic nian regime, despite coming—like Assad regime, thereby bringing Amajor powers have consid- shocks in any one of these major Syria’s Alawites—from a very dif- Turkey in conflict with Iran, erable domestic challenges. Saudi players is bound to have serious re- ferent branch of Shia Islam than the which worked assertively to se- Arabia’s leadership faces a rapidly percussions and may even usher in Iranian Jafari tradition. cure the regime’s survival. growing, pampered, and in many a paradigm shift across the region. On this basis, Tehran has Ankara’s gambit, however bold, ways ultra-Orthodox population, But it also means that the stakes for succeeded in building a sphere has not been successful. The con- not to mention a restive and sup- each of the three powers could not of influence that is truly transna- servative Sunni bloc succeeded in pressed Shia minority. The success be higher; and their understanding tional: it ignores national bound- its efforts to ensure the overthrow of the modernization process is by of the cut-throat nature of regional aries and involves the undeclared of the Muslim Brotherhood gov- no means assured, and the country’ politics is exemplified by the risks deployment of Iranian troops and/ ernment in Egypt, while Iran and transition to an economy that is they have all been willing to take, or Iranian-controlled proxies in Russia forced Turkey to retreat in not dominated by oil is question- and the sums they have been willing conflict zones in all these countries. its ambitions in Syria, narrowing able at best. At stake is the survival to invest, in conflict zones where This, along with Tehran’s quest for them to restraining Kurdish polit- of the country itself and the Saud their interests have clashed. nuclear weapons, has caused con- ical aspirations there. dynasty. Iran also faces mounting While the rivalry is trilateral, its siderable alarm across the conser- But these setbacks have not re- domestic dissent. The Islamic Re- intensity varies considerably. The vative Sunni bloc, as it has in the duced Ankara’s long-term am- public has largely exhausted itself Saudi-Iranian rivalry is no doubt United States. bitions. Turkey has developed a in intellectual terms, its legitimacy the most intense and deep-seated. urkey leads a third grouping military presence abroad for the among the population undermined But the intra-Sunni conflict is be- Tthat wants to dominate the first time since Ottoman days, by its economic failures and foreign ginning to approach it in terms of region, and it is Ankara’s return with Qatar, again, serving as a key adventurism, and its legitimacy intensity. As it has played out over to the Near East that has played ally—and Ankara arguably played particularly weak among the large Egypt and now in Libya, the stakes the greatest, but seldom acknowl- a key role in halting the Saudi-led ethnic minorities in the country, in the Turkish-Qatari rivalry with edged, role in reshaping the geo- effort to seek regime change in including tens of millions of ethnic- Riyadh and Abu Dhabi appears to politics of the Near East. Whereas Doha in 2017. But Ankara also has Azerbaijanis and Kurds concen- rival those of the Saudi-Iranian con- Turkey was previously not a key established a military presence in trated in the country’s northwest. frontation. Ankara sought to maxi- factor in regional affairs, Ankara Somalia, and sought to develop one Large-scale protests periodically mize use of the Khashoggi affair made a bid for leadership in the on Sudan’s Suakin island, directly force the regime to engage in brutal to discredit the Saudi leadership; Near East in which its key partner opposite Jeddah on the Red Sea. repression to maintain power. as was revealed in summer 2019, has been Qatar. As mentioned, Most recently, Ankara has upped And in Turkey, Erdogan’s efforts the Saudi leadership retaliated by the pair sought to install a Muslim the ante in Libya, sending Syrian to introduce a new, Islamist-tinged a systematic plan to undermine

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Erdogan’s power in Turkey. The distance from Tehran while si- then found itself under fire from toward the ideological zeal pur- GCC monarchies—and particu- multaneously seeking to build Ankara because of its close ties to sued either by the Iranian regime larly Abu Dhabi—view the rise of a functioning relationship—not the Jewish state. Significantly, Baku or, intermittently, by Ankara and the Muslim Brotherhood across the least in the economic realm. While did not let such Turkish criticism Doha, while it has cordial rela- region as a mortal threat. Their con- Azerbaijan does not side with affect its priorities. tions with Israel. And like the Arab certed assault on Qatar indicated Tehran, and never will, it is also Thankfully, in the past five years, powers, Azerbaijan is interested in the seriousness with which they cautious not to become a target of Erdogan has begun to soften the regional stability and the mainte- viewed the matter. By comparison, Iranian actions. country’s Islamist leanings some- nance of the status quo, and sees the rivalry between Turkey and urkey is another matter: what, and instead, Turkish na- the emergence of upheavals and Iran appears ever-present but man- TAzerbaijan and Turkey share tionalism has risen in importance internal conflicts not as an oppor- ageable, ebbing and flowing without close linguistic, cultural, economic, as state ideology under Erdogan’s tunity but as a significant threat to ever reaching the boiling point. and military ties. In fact, Turkey coalition with the nationalist party. its own stability. Implications for is Azerbaijan’s sole solid backer This may cause Azerbaijan’s po- among the great powers. This is trouble for some of sition at the geo- Azerbaijan something the Azerbaijani lead- Turkey’s neighbors In the past decade, the graphic outskirts zerbaijan, happily, finds itself ership acknowledges and values but is a blessing geopolitical environment of the Middle Aat the periphery of this tri- highly, particularly as it forms the for Azerbaijan: it surrounding the South East is a blessing lateral rivalry. Still, it needs to sole counterweight to Russian and means a stronger Caucasus has become in this regard, as navigate the stormy waters of the Iranian backing of Armenia. Yet endorsement of more unpredictable. it may help the region cautiously, Turkey’s own ideo- Azerbaijan’s po- country main- as it has important logical transfor- sition in the contain cordial re- relationships with Turkey is Azerbaijan’s mation has been a flict with Armenia compared to lations with the various protag- all three sides. With sole solid backer among cause for concern Erdogan’s earlier stance, which in- onists in Middle Eastern affairs. Iran, Azerbaijan the great powers. in Azerbaijan. cluded opening for the possibility Still, Azerbaijan must follow de- shares a common Erdogan’s em- of a rapprochement with Yerevan. velopments in the region more majority religion as brace of Islamism Ankara’s strong response to the closely, as they risk having an well as a long his- as a guideline in July 2020 skirmishes on the Arme- impact on its own freedom of tory. But Iran has also been a threat Turkish foreign policy has been nia-Azerbaijan border is illustrative maneuver. The Turkish-Israeli re- to Azerbaijan’s independence and met with skepticism in Baku, as of Turkey’s assertive support for lationship is a key example: the has developed close relations with has Ankara’s enthusiasm for regime Azerbaijan. sudden downturn in Turkish- Armenia that have effectively en- change in countries like Egypt. The y contrast, in ideological Israeli relations led Ankara to de- abled the economic survival of the increasing Islamization of Turkey, Bterms, Azerbaijan would mand a shift in Azerbaijan’s own Armenian-occupied territories in furthermore, is a poor fit with seem to have most in common approach to Israel. It is not diffi- Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s doubling down on with the conservative Arab powers. cult to imagine similar situations Because of Iran’s proven ability to secularism as state policy. Azerbai- Similar to them, Azerbaijan is pur- in the future, potentially as a result create internal turmoil in Azerbaijan jan’s ties with Israel were developed suing a policy of authoritarian of new flare-ups between Turkey through support for Islamist groups, very much in conjunction with modernization; also like them, and Iran, or between Turkey and Baku has sought to maintain a Turkey two decades ago; but Baku Azerbaijan’s leadership is hostile the Sunni powers.

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Unenviable Environment that the negotiation process is useless, leaving the use of force as the only n the past decade, the geo- option to restore its territorial integ- political environment sur- I rity. As the events of July 2020 have rounding the South Caucasus shown, a considerable section of the has become more unpredictable. Azerbaijani public appears to have Regional powers and their proxies concluded as much. Still, a large-scale are more prone to use force than escalation of the conflict is previously, and the unresolved con- almost certain to bring the in- flicts of the region appear further from solution than ever. While the tervention of several regional geopolitics of the region are in- powers, with highly unpredictable creasingly connected to those of the consequences that could threaten Middle East, the region’s own unre- a larger conflagration and solved conflicts remain a key vulner- jeopardize the very sovereignty of the ability that are available to outside country. powers seeking to maximize their In conclusion, the environment in influence. Chief among these is the which Azerbaijani leaders must design Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, which and execute a foreign policy strategy has been on a trajectory of escala- has become even less enviable. Over tion for the past decade, mirroring the past decade, the country’s adoption broader regional developments. of a policy of mixing assertiveness with An increasingly unstable regional caution—while increasing reliance on environment makes it that much its own resources at the expense of harder for Baku to seek a negoti- entanglements with foreign powers— ated solution to the conflict with has served it well. The growing Yerevan—not least because of what merger of Eurasian and Middle appears to be the growing acceptance Eastern geopolitics has made of the use of force in regional affairs, Azerbaijan’s position more chal- and a concomitant decline of multilat- lenging, and there is little hope that eral institutions tasked with conflict the environment will improve in the resolution. This in turn appears to fuel coming decade. For Azerbaijan, the Armenia’s increasingly bold approach key task in the coming years will be to the conflict, which appears to in- to build enough leverage over re- clude the rejection of agreed-upon gional powers to ensure that they principles of the negotiation process. take the country’s interests into This puts Azerbaijan in a very diffi- consideration when designing re- cult conundrum. On the one hand, sponses to the crises that are sure to Azerbaijani leaders may conclude emerge. BD

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he Silk Road region is between major powers like China Geopolitical Keystone Temerging as the central east- and the United States could tip over west interchange between the Eu- into confrontation—other intercon- Azerbaijan and the Global Position ropean Union (population of 500 nectors, such as the Arctic northern million with a $19.6 trillion gross route or the “maritime roads” of the Silk Road Region domestic product) and China (1.4 running through the Indo-Pacific billion people and a GDP of $22.5 basin—face the possibility of inter- trillion), with a north-south corridor ruption or even interdiction. The Nikolas K. Gvosdev connecting India (1.3 billion people challenge, therefore, is to keep the with a $2.7 trillion GDP) with Russia Silk Road region stable but also (144 million people and a $1.7 trillion istorian Peter Frankopan which he defines as “the area to keep open its interconnecting GDP) and Turkey concludes his magisterial stretching from India to the Black channels linking (83 million and sweep of world history, and Mediterranean Seas with the the most critical re- $770 billion GDP). entitledH The Silk Roads (2015), by Caspian Sea at the center.” Arguably, the Silk Road gions of the world. In geostrategic The countries of noting that at the beginning of the A recent revival of the term “Silk region is emerging as the terms, this region this region, if they twenty-first century, “networks Road region” is perhaps to be pre- most critical keystone is the geopolit- embrace their po- and connections are quietly being ferred. It is defined much in the same zone for international re- ical hinge where sition as a central knitted together across the spine way as Bryza in terms of east-west lations in the twenty-first the North Atlantic keystone of inter- of Asia; or rather, they are being boundaries, but adds, with purposeful Treaty Organization century; and Azerbaijan, national relations, restored. The Silk Roads are rising imprecision, the Siberian steppe as meets the Shanghai as the central axis of the can guarantee that again.” The Caspian-Black Sea a northern boundary, then sweeps Cooperation Orga- area, is poised to assume their interchanges mega-region, to use the formula- down in a southerly direction towards nization, and where a more important role in will remain open, tion of Amur Hajiyev, director of the Persian Gulf and up and back the Belt and Road world affairs as a result. even in the event the Modern Turkey Study Center at westward across the Fertile Crescent Initiative connects that other east-west the Institute of Oriental Studies of and the Levant to the Mediterranean. with the wider Eu- and north-south the Russian Academy of Sciences, Whichever term is used, this stra- ropean neighborhood and the Eu- routes go down due to environ- serves as the buckle connecting tegic area interlinks not only the ropean Union itself. Arguably, the mental issues or political and eco- these various belts together— world’s two most critically important Silk Road region is emerging as the nomic challenges. linking the northern Middle East regions (the Euro-Atlantic and most critical keystone zone for inter- he Silk Road region—with with Central Asia and Southeastern Indo-Pacific basins), but also directly national relations in the twenty-first Azerbaijan at its geopolitical Europe. Former U.S. ambassador to interconnects South Asia, the Middle T century; and Azerbaijan, as the cen- center—is located at the seams of the Azerbaijan Matthew Bryza prefers East, and the Eurasian space with tral axis of the area, is poised to as- global system and is positioned to the term “greater Caspian region,” each other. sume a more important role in world serve as a critical mediator between affairs as a result. different major powers, acting as Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the Captain Jerome E. Levy chair at the U.S. Naval War Moreover, in conditions of “great gateways between different blocs College, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. The views expressed in this essay power competition”—where the of states, regional associations, and are his own. possibility exists that competition civilizational groupings. In turn, the

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 26 27 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES security and prosperity of almost newly-independent states of the During the 1990s, the focus for of a trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific all countries is now dependent on Caucasus only had a brief period countries like Azerbaijan was to network has not quite come to pass, a series of transnational economic, to try and secure their position as rebalance the northern vector (to- both because the United States it- security, and political networks intermediaries between east and wards a post-Soviet Russia) with a self has turned away from this ap- that transfer capital, information, west until their sovereignty was western vector that would connect proach, especially under the Trump goods, and services across borders. snuffed out by the Soviet Union. the Silk Road region to the United administration, but also because As deputy prime minister of Soviet power was used to forcibly States via the trans-Atlantic cor- of the rise and resurgence of other Azerbaijan Shahin Mustafayev has sever the cultural and economic ridor. Based on the geostrategic major powers, starting with Russia noted, this region “has a unique ties of the Silk Road region with logic as outlined in Zbigniew Brzez- and China. geographical location, and many its western, southern, and eastern inski’s famous 1997 Foreign Affairs or the countries of the Silk transportation corridors span our neighbors. Because of the geo- article (“A Geostrategy for Eur- FRoad region, the new post-So- country. In addition to the East- graphic determinism of Winston asia”), the Silk Road region would viet lines of communication west- West Trans-Caspian Corridor, Churchill’s famous 1946 address become the easternmost annex of ward are being augmented not North-South, South-West and at Westminster College, we have the Euro-Atlantic world, while the only by a refurbished northern North-West international trans- grown accustomed to conceiving rest of Asia would connect eastward route but also the enhancing of portation corridors pass through of the “Iron Curtain” as stretching across the Pacific into the American eastward and southern connectiv- Azerbaijan.” Safeguarding these across the continent of Europe. hub. The geographic concept of the ities to Southern and Eastern Asia interconnections ought to be the But there was no less an iron cur- “continental divide”—the point at and the Middle East. Competing top priority for Azerbaijan’s foreign tain running from the Bulgari- which rivers on one side flow to- and complementary projects— policy. By acting as the keystone an-Greek-Turkish frontier, across wards a different ocean than on especially those sponsored by the state of a keystone region of the the Black and Caspian Seas, and the other—applied here: the Cas- United States, the European Union, world, Azerbaijan secures its posi- dividing Transcaucasia and Central pian Sea would serve as the geo- and China—mean that the “geo- tion as one of the world’s influential Asia from Turkey, Iran, and South economic continental divide be- economics of Asia, Central Asia, “middle powers” (in the words of Asia. After the Sino-Soviet split, tween the Atlantic and Pacific basins. the Middle East, Africa, and Europe Esmira Jafarova of the Baku-based there was a similar barrier isolating The “hub and spokes” approach are becoming spatially reconfigured AIR Center)—and can act as the China from Central Asia. was grounded in an assumption by connectivity,” as Leiden Univer- gatekeeper and guarantor of one of After the Soviet Union collapsed, that the United States would, for sity’s Mohammadbagher Forough the world economic system’s prin- the artificial corralling of the re- the foreseeable future, remain in has concluded. But it also requires cipal passageways. gion’s trade and transport networks what Washington Post columnist a deft approach to balance and co- to run through the Russian center Charles Krauthammer had termed ordinate competing interests, espe- Keystone Region ended. Azerbaijan and other states the “unipolar moment”—where no cially to ensure that the region does hile the Silk Roads run- in the region looked to re-establish significant alternative centers of not become a zone of geopolitical Wning across Eurasia were their pre-Soviet contacts and con- power would emerge in the interna- confrontation. a defining feature of antiquity, for nections. The driving imperative, tional system—and that the United In general, the United States re- much of the twentieth century the however, was that the United States, States would be able to redraw the mains the principal hub of the focus was on disconnection and in the formulation of Die Zeit pub- political and economic geography global political and economic order, disassociation. Following the col- lisher-editor Josef Joffe, would serve of the region. This vision of the but there are other centers of power lapse of the Tsarist empire, the as the “hub” of the new global order. United States sitting at the center and influence emerging which

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 28 29 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES will make it very by one or two even in the greater Silk Road region. As within conditions of “contested difficult for Wash- The Silk Road region is several states but Sokolsky and Rumer note, these multipolarity” expands on the ington to coordi- a particularly good ex- rather by dozens of factors “pose major obstacles to the concept of neutrality as the latter actors possessing emergence of a hegemonic power nate under a single ample of a geography in concept has traditionally been agenda. This has and exercising in the critical geopolitical regions understood. Neutrality implies created conditions which all major players various kinds of of Eurasia.” equidistance from all contenders, that Ian Bremmer have a presence, but no power.” but often has conveyed a passive one player can dominate. iven this reality, the chal- terms the GZero As Richard Glenge for the countries of and even disengaged approach to world—where the Sokolsky and Eu- the Silk Road region is to ensure world affairs, as reflected in Swit- United States, on gene Rumer of the that the negative form of multipo- zerland’s decision for many decades its own, can no longer set the global Carnegie Endowment for Interna- larity—what the U.S. National Se- not even to sign the Charter of the agenda but where no other power tional Peace conclude in a recent curity Strategy describes as “great United Nations and join the orga- or group of stakeholders are pre- paper: power competition”—does not pro- nization. Nonpolarity, in contrast, pared to take up those burdens, ei- The United States and China duce contestation that will be de- is an active approach in which ther. Each of the major powers also will remain superpowers in structive. The tragedies of Georgia constant engagement with all the finds it more difficult to project and the major dimensions of pow- major stakeholders is a sine qua er (that is, military, economic, (in 2008) and Ukraine (in 2014) sustain power the further it extends technological, and diplomatic), are stark warnings of what happens non. Nonpolarity recognizes that from their core areas. but there will be multiple pow- when a country’s preferred partner in conditions of a GZero world no er centers—at both the interna- one power can establish and guar- The Silk Road region is a partic- tional (like the United Nations) is unable or unwilling to offer effec- ularly good example of a geography and regional levels, such as the tive security guarantees and other antee absolute security or impose in which all major players have a European Union, India, Ja- great powers are prepared to inter- a uniform set of preferences—and pan, and Russia in its self-pro- vene—to the point of using force— that to align exclusively with one presence, but no one player can claimed sphere of privileged dominate. And despite talk that in interests—that are capable of to defend their interests. In short, major power increases, rather than a GZero world globalization will exercising influence in specif- governments in Tbilisi and Kyiv reduces, insecurity by incentiv- ic areas. Nonstate actors like both hoped that a major super- izing other powers to then take ac- continue to fracture, economic in- Google, Amazon, Facebook, terconnectedness remains intact. and Apple—as well as transna- power patron (namely, the United tion detrimental to one’s national In such conditions, it is incumbent tional forces, such as pandemic States) would be prepared to re- interests. diseases; jihadist terrorism; and shape the realities of both physical on the states of the Silk Road region populist, nationalist, and na- Nonpolarity and to guarantee that at least this major tivist movements—will affect and political geography on their be- interlocking corridor between the global security and prosperity. halves—a task that Washington was Integrative Power world’s principal political and eco- This creates conditions that neither able nor willing to fulfill. he Silk Road region is one nomic centers remains open and Turkish political scientist Tarık If a great power patron that can Tof the few areas in the world functioning. In many respects, the Oguzlu describes as “contested protect its client from the vicissi- where all the major global players Silk Road region reflects a state of multipolarity” as the United States tudes of great power competition have interests and influence. It affairs that Council of Foreign Re- loses its ability to unilaterally set the is unavailable, then an embrace is the point where the European lations president Richard Haass global agenda. This development is of nonpolarity may make greater Union’s “eastern partnerships” and defines as “nonpolarity” in which even more pronounced when one strategic sense. As a foreign policy Western New Silk Road initiatives regional security is determined “not considers the balances of power strategy, the pursuit of nonpolarity intersect with China’s Belt and

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Road Initiative and connect with he Silk Road region, both by associated costs. Moreover, in geo- could become a proxy battlefield the Indo-Iranian-Russian “north- Tvirtue of physical and polit- graphic terms, the United States, in any sustained great power south” route. When one looks at ical geography, is not well set up to as a maritime power, finds it more competition. the major foreign investors in Azer- serve as the first type of geopolitical difficult and costly to create bilat- n order to avoid being torn baijan, for instance, what is striking region: the frontline or barrier re- eral security arrangements further Iapart by clashes between the is that all five permanent members gion. Places like the Baltic Sea lit- inland where major continental major power centers, a sounder of the UN Security Council plus the toral or the East Asian “first island powers enjoy a greater preponder- geopolitical strategy for the region leading countries of the European chain” in the western Pacific form ance of influence and ability. The consists in adopting an approach Union are represented, as well as cohesive, compact territories that, admission of the Baltic states, as based on two concepts: integrative key Middle Eastern players. Indeed, while they are points of interchange well as the western Black Sea coun- power and nonpolarity. With re- Azerbaijan is one of the few coun- between major powers, have had tries of Bulgaria and Romania, may gards to integrative power, Amitai tries in the world where American, the opportunity to affiliate to a great have marked the high-water point Etzioni defines it as the “ability to French, German, Turkish, Chinese, power or regional security bloc in for the expansion of NATO, while generate positive relationships,” Iranian, Russian, Emirati, Dutch, order to serve as an effective barrier the United States has found limits which can be Indian, and Japanese companies that limits the ability of others to in developing its “quartet” as a basis derived from a number of might end up as de facto—or even project influence. However, for this for South and East Asian regional sources: the existence of im- de jure—partners. Lastly, the Silk to work there needs to be a set of security. portant transit and communications lines that are vital for Road region is a place where all of geographic and political criteria in From the American perspec- trade traversing its territory; the major military-security players place. In the case of the Baltic lit- tive, the situation with regards to the position of the state to pro- and blocs have the ability to project toral, this region, although it bor- mote regional integration and the Silk Road region, in contrast, collective security among its power and to operate. ders Russia, is fully integrated into is different: therein, it is far more neighbors; its role as a point This means that no major power the European economic order and expensive and dangerous for Wash- of passage between different can be integrated under the defen- blocs, or its position overlap- center can pursue what can be ington to try to bar any major pow- ping the spheres of influence of termed a “denial/compellence” sive umbrella of the North Atlantic er’s exercise of power and projec- several different major actors, strategy in the region: denying access alliance. The East Asian island and tion. Over the past several years, a thus serving as a mediator be- peninsular states—Japan, South tween them; or its willingness to other key players while attempting series of crises and war scares—in to take up the role as a guaran- to compel the countries of the region Korea, Taiwan, and the Philip- Syria, the Black Sea, and the Per- teed barrier securing neighbors to exclusively affiliate to their posi- pines—all enjoy formal alliances sian Gulf—involving, at times, from attack. with the United States that predate tion. Moreover, because of the in- Turkey, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, In policy terms, a strategy of non- the rise of China. termodal linkages that crisscross the the United States, and members of polarity is executed by the practice region, the benefits for keeping these The challenges of maintaining the NATO alliance—all highlighted of what Azerbaijani political sci- ways open—the China to Europe and expanding American alliances the risks that Azerbaijan and other entists Anar Valiyev and Narmina east-west link, the north-south con- in the immediate post-Cold War countries of the region might face Mamishova have described as nection between Russia and Iran, period was relatively low, with costs from choosing sides. And as China “transactional neutrality.” Trans- the American transport corridor to quite manageable; but the further increases its footprint in the area actional neutrality is based both Central Asia—are more important into the Silk Road region heartland and India expands its presence, this on the countries of the region but than risking a complete closure by the United States has attempted to danger only increases. Moreover, also every major power center ac- trying to deny anyone else access. expand, the higher have been the the threat remains that the region cepting the reality that the states

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 32 33 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES of the Silk Road region will have to develop and maintain the Silk a post-Soviet Russia. Matters were all the major regional and global economic, political, and even secu- Road region as one of these glob- not helped by a clumsy approach actors and to avoid dependence on rity relationships with every great ally vital keystone regions. It also taken by Boris Yeltsin’s administra- any one power. power and bloc and that these re- means managing relations with the tion, which attempted to corral the nder Heydar Aliyev’s lead- lationships will major power cen- states of the Silk Road region into Uership, Azerbaijan sought be non-exclusive. ters to incentivize Russian-led regional institutions and to position itself as the central Within the region, Azerbaijan must em- their acceptance of tried to block the establishment of terminal uniting the north-south a country would the Silk Road re- corridors and links that would by- brace its position as a route from Europe through Russia forgo the opportu- gion as a keystone pass Russian territory. Moreover, in and Iran to India with the emerging nity to enter into keystone state for a key- region—that its the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, stone region. infrastructure network connecting an exclusive rela- effective neutrality a post-Soviet Russia could not main- China and the West. The govern- tionship with one and integrative po- tain the artificiality of an iron curtain ment found ways to make sure that bloc (the neutrality sition is a greater in the Silk Road region, as not only every key player had incentives to part) but would purchase guaran- benefit than attempting to deny Turkey and Iran but more impor- maintain Azerbaijan’s stability and tees that it retains the sovereign others access to the area. In other tantly the European Union, NATO, independence. right to make choices which may and China could penetrate the region words, Azerbaijan must embrace Baku marketed itself to Turkey not always align with every prefer- even without Russia’s permission. its position as a keystone state for a and Europe as a source for Eur- ence of the outside actor. keystone region. As long as Russia posed a threat asian energy independent from This would require the countries Keystone State to the independence of the states of Russia, but still found ways to give of the region to adopt the mindset the area, starting with Azerbaijan, it Moscow and Tehran stakes in its of being “keystone states.” As al- n the immediate post-Soviet pe- was only natural energy industry. It ready noted above, such states are Iriod, Azerbaijan and the other that governments cultivated its po- critical because they are located at states of the region wanted to es- in Baku and other Azerbaijan’s foreign poli- sition as a nomi- the seams of the global system and cape the legacy of imperial control capitals would seek cy is predicated on safe- nally Shia Muslim serve as critical mediators between from Moscow (both during the rule partners that could state interested in of the tsars as well as the Soviet ex- guarding open access to different major powers, acting as counterbalance the region whilst ensur- good ties with Is- gateways between different blocs perience) and firmly establish their Moscow. However, rael without com- of states, regional associations, and independence and sovereignty. ing it is not subject to President Heydar the whims of the major promising its out- civilizational groupings. For the reach to the Arab To rebalance its international re- Aliyev correctly players. Silk Road region to serve as a key- lations, a country like Azerbaijan assessed that the world and Iran. stone, it requires its own keystone had to pursue what in the short term United States or The Baku Process state to utilize its integrative power. would be a zero-sum approach; Europe would not that has emerged Per the assessment undertaken re-establishing former relationships be prepared to risk confronting from these dialogues further pro- by Jafarova, Azerbaijan is poised (with Turkey and Iran) or new Russia in order to fundamentally motes interaction and discussion to function as a leading “middle linkages (with Europe, the Middle reorder the geopolitics and geoeco- between the Council of Europe and power” with both regional and East, India, and China) of necessity nomics of the region. He instead the Islamic countries of the Middle global influence precisely because subtracted from the overall tally committed Azerbaijan to a policy East. Finally, in geoeconomic of its ability to coordinate the efforts of Soviet-era connectivities with of favoritism towards none with terms, Heydar Aliyev ensured that

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 34 35 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES positions in major energy and zerbaijan’s foreign policy is tion. Therefore, Baku pursues NATO; it also has a bilateral secu- infrastructure projects were ex- predicated on safeguarding a foreign policy strategy that rity relationship with both Russia A seeks to alter those aspects of tended across a wide range of open access to the region whilst en- the status quo it sees as unfa- and the United States. This creates, American, European, Middle suring it is not subject to the whims vorable, instead of siding with in the words of Deputy Secretary Eastern, Russian, Eurasian, and of the major players but has the a specific bloc. [...] Pursuit of General of NATO for Political Af- Asian firms, so that no one would military, economic, and political this strategy, thus, has meant diversifying Azerbaijan’s for- fairs and Security Policy James be excluded from the development resources to project a degree of in- eign policy partnerships with Appathurai, a “unique orientation: of the country’s oil and gas deposits fluence in world affairs. Azerbaijan different multilateral unions Baku is not an ally of Russia, but and no one would have any incen- also has a defense posture config- and military alliances by devel- it does not seek membership in oping closer ties with individ- tive to block the shipment of these ured around what is sometimes ual member states but without NATO,” he continued. NATO has resources to global markets. termed the “porcupine defense”— committing itself to any one “excellent cooperation with Azer- This approach has continued having enough capabilities in play specific bloc. baijan. A good example is that it under the presidency of Ilham to make the costs of trying to use Moreover, for every move to en- hosts meetings between our mili- Aliyev. In a February 2019 inter- military force as a tool of coercion gage with Western institutions, tary leadership and the Russian top view, he stressed the importance of against the country too costly for there is a corresponding initiative military leadership on its territory. the region’s keystone position: any would-be aggressor. towards a non-Western organiza- We are developing important coop- We live in this geography, in In other words, Azerbaijan’s em- tion. This is not, as Ilham Aliyev eration in this direction.” this region. Of course, relations brace of a neutral status—formally has noted, because the country his enables Azerbaijan, acting with neighbors are of particu- affirmed in 2011 when the country is pursuing a balanced policy for lar importance for any coun- Ton behalf of the Silk Road re- try. I believe that any country became a member of the Non- the sake of balance, but comes out gion as a whole (one could say), to wants to see a friendly country aligned Movement—is taken from a of an assessment of the country’s take important steps to secure it in its vicinity. In recent years, position of strength, not weakness. national interest—and the impor- from the risks of geopolitical com- we have further strengthened This is because Azerbaijan, while friendly relations with all our tance of positioning the country as petition. For instance, the Caspian not pursuing formal membership in neighbors [...]. If we did not a keystone interlocutor and trusted Convention neutralizes the sea, have good relations with our different security institutions, does intermediary. It is the outgrowth of barring the military forces of any neighbors, could we have im- not keep its distance from them but plemented energy and trans- what Valiyev and Mamishova de- non-littoral states from operating engages with each—and uses that port projects? Of course not! scribe as an “‘interest-based’ multi- there—which helps to reassure I have already mentioned that engagement to bolster its capabili- dimensional policy.” Russia and Iran, among others, that Azerbaijan has become a trans- ties. As Baku-based regional analyst port center of Eurasia. Could Rahim Rahimov concluded: But for a country that has inves- this vital maritime zone cannot be- we have achieved this without tors from all the major players and come a vulnerability. This is why our neighbors? Of course not! Azerbaijan frames neutrality We are already creating a coop- as key to its independent for- has cargo transiting along east-west Caspian-Eurasia Center’s director eration format covering a wid- eign policy. However, making a and north-south routes, having Ksenia Tyurenkova sees the ratifi- er geography—not only with sovereign choice on which bloc a state that can guarantee access cation as setting a “new stage in [the] close neighbors. It is this for- (if any) to join is also an inde- mat of cooperation that allows pendent policy. Due to its small through this important zone is development of relations between the us the opportunity to success- power limitations, Azerbaijan critical. Thus, Azerbaijan is both a Caspian states, about [the] possibility fully and promptly implement is not in a position to influence “dialogue partner” of the Shanghai of intensification of integration pro- giant transnational projects. the positions of big powers or This is why such an approach is single-handedly change the Cooperation Organization (SCO) cesses”—especially between Russia, of strategic importance for us. regional geopolitical situa- and has a robust partnership with Azerbaijan, and Iran.

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At the same time, outside countries, Majlis Javid Osmanov has noted: south. These are the ambitions that it Azeri partners and view Baku as starting with the United States, have “Azerbaijan, which is one of the im- has, and it’s certainly in Europe’s in- neutral ground. Azerbaijan has worked to enhance Azerbaijan’s own portant countries of the historical Silk terest to be part of the attainment of also emerged as the linchpin of the capabilities. The United States, the Road, located in the center of Eurasia, those ambitions.” trilateral Russia-Iran-Azerbaijan European Union, and even China at the junction of East and West, today and Russia-Turkey-Azerbaijan for- can trust that Azerbaijan will be able is actively involved in the creation of Strategic Hedging mats, and as one of the key bridges to keep the Caspian Sea open for international trade corridors, based n essence, Azerbaijan has de- between OPEC and non-OPEC transit—whether U.S. assistance to on its historical traditions.” This in- Icided on a foreign policy of members in regulating and stabi- Central Asia or Chinese shipping cludes the north-south corridor con- not having to choose between good lizing global energy markets. Thus, transiting to Europe. Thus, as member necting Russia to Iran as well as the relations with Russia, China, and Baku can emerge as one of the cen- of the Majlis Rasim Musabeyov noted, trans-Caspian cargo fleet and the Ba- Iran, and good relations with the ters where the leading geopolitical “the strengthening of Azerbaijan’s con- ku-Tbilisi-Kars railway for east-west countries of the Middle East, the players can dialogue—and this trol over its land, sea, and air borders transit, with trade in all directions United States, and the European helps to sustain support among all meets the strategic interests of the U.S., utilizing Baku cargo terminals and the Union (the latter being Azerbaijan’s for Azerbaijan’s ability to maintain whose companies have invested many Alat trade port. single largest trading partner). its independent stance. billions of dollars in oil and gas proj- or Moscow, the Azerbaijani Because of this, Azerbaijan has Thus geographic position and ects in the Caspian, and the U.S. mil- keystone is essential as part of a emerged as a trusted mediator and the deft wielding of diplomacy itary conducts transit to Afghanistan F much larger arc designed to connect interlocutor, bringing together allows Azerbaijan, on behalf of the via Azerbaijan.” the Arctic Ocean basin with the In- partners, rivals, and competitors. larger Caspian area and perhaps Similar trends can be observed in dian Ocean. As Elkhan Alasgarov of As Ilham Aliyev himself noted, be- the entire Silk Road region, to economic matters. Azerbaijan main- the Baku Network concludes: “The yond Azerbaijan’s bilateral relation- engage in “strategic hedging.” tains trade relationships with both the geopolitical project of the North- ships (with the U.S., Russia, Turkey, Every major global actor now Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) South corridor, which is of strategic etc.) “there are already formats of has an interest in maintaining and the European Union, but in a way importance for Russia and which the trilateral and even quadrilateral an effective keystone region, that avoids the trap which befell the country is implementing jointly with cooperation with our neighbors. I because their own prosperity and Ukrainians in 2013-2014 of having to Azerbaijan and Iran, has its logical should also note that Azerbaijan is security are best served by this choose between productive relations continuation to the East.” the initiator of this.” arrangement. Rather than relying with both blocs. In fact, Azerbaijan At the same time, Azerbaijan has At a time when most other on great power competition and is positioned to create preferential been marketing itself as an alternative channels of communication have a zero-sum approach, Azerbaijan’s customs zones with both the EU and conduit for Russia to Western mar- closed, Azerbaijan serves as the focus is on complementarity, not Russia, which makes Azerbaijan more kets and as a sanctions-free intercon- host for regular meetings between rivalry, within the framework of attractive as a center for commerce nector between Europe and Russia. In senior Russian and American mil- a regional transport and energy and trade. turn, Europeans also see the benefits. itary officials, as noted above. Re- hub in which all of these countries Moreover, Baku’s engagement with Outgoing British MEP Sajjad Karim iterating Appathurai’s comments, participate and benefit. No wonder both the EU and the EAEU does not noted that Azerbaijan, as the keystone it is not accidental that Baku was that in that famous Foreign come at the expense of taking part state of the region, “has the opportu- chosen to host these contacts— Affairs essay, Zbigniew Brzezinski in the Chinese-led Belt and Road nity to be a real transport hub and a because both countries’ military concluded that Azerbaijan was a Initiative. Thus, as member of the link between east and west, north and establishments have trust in their strategic pivot state. BD

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culminated in liberal democracy, of the United States. What is more, Against ‘the Blob’ reveled in American unipolar it grows out of cleavages that have dominance of the world order, been in formation for some time America’s Foreign Policy in and boasted—in the 1998 words of and will not disappear overnight. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine This shift in elite mindset ineluc- Eurasia’s Heartland is Becoming Albright—that “we are the indis- tably will effect a shift in American pensable nation. We stand tall and foreign policy. its Own Greatest Enemy we see further than other countries Just as premonitions of tumult into the future.” in American domestic politics Michael A. Reynolds ess than a year ago almost have been visible for some time, Lall America’s elites still took forewarnings of a reckoning in for granted that their society pre- American foreign policy have s this article goes to press, inform those decisions is essential sented a model for the globe to been surfacing with increasing America and the world for Americans and non-Americans emulate. They regarded Ameri- frequency since the invasion of are in the midst of the alike, not least for decisionmakers ca’s 1776 Declaration of Indepen- Iraq in 2003. From different parts coronavirusA pandemic. The pan- in the Silk Road region of greater dence as a signal moment in world of the political spectrum, more demic’s end remains invisible, yet it Eurasia. history—a milestone in a grand and more independent observers has already wreaked extraordinary The sources and causes of the un- story of the of liberation of man- began concluding that something economic disruption around the rest roiling America are manifold kind from tyranny. Today, however, fundamental has gone wrong in globe. Inevitably, political upheaval and predate the pandemic by years, they increasingly describe their American foreign policy. To state will follow. Indeed, the strain of the even decades, and they have drawn country as one founded on slavery just one obvious point, despite pandemic has now catalyzed social Americans into a bitter feud over and genocide and ask whether it can spending trillions of dollars on wars and political unrest throughout the the very nature and value of their even be redeemed. For example, and interventions in Iraq, Afgha- United States on a level not seen in republic. The American zeitgeist the country’s largest newspaper, nistan, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere, half a century. today differs radically from that The New York Times, has embraced Washington in the Middle East not America’s weight in global affairs of the 1990s when American elites an initiative known as the “1619 only failed to achieve its objectives is such that no country on earth were basking in their victory in Project” that portrays America but often generated results precisely can be wholly indifferent to its fate. the Cold War, their unrivaled mil- as a country founded on slavery, the opposite of what it sought. Decisions taken inside the United itary and economic might, and, not not freedom. To be sure, much of Successes elsewhere in American States are consequential to millions least, the promise of globalization this self-loathing is performative. foreign policy have been rare. outside the United States, including to transform the world in America’s Serious historians have noted the Yet unlike the case with Amer- Eurasia. Attaining a better under- image and enrich themselves in the project’s myriad scholarly short- ican domestic politics, where a standing of the nature of the de- process. They speculated without comings. It reflects a solipsism remarkable constellation of elite bates and intellectual currents that irony that history had ended and that only a superpower society interests, institutions, and corpo- could cultivate and indulge. rations coalesced in support of Nonetheless, the ongoing feud over those protesting (including the Michael A. Reynolds is Associate Professor of Near Eastern Studies and Director of the Program in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies at Princeton University, as America’s founding betrays genuine Democrat Party, American uni- well as a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. doubt about the exceptional nature versities, The New York Times and

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The Washington Post, J.P. Morgan, the name Quincy Institute for ssessing a foreign policy prosperity of Americans at home, Apple, Amazon, and Major League Responsible Statecraft for the ex- Atrack record is not simple. since 1991 Washington’s foreign Baseball, among others), in foreign plicit goal of overturning the “intel- One factor complicating assess- policy has consumed exorbitant policy the American establishment lectual lethargy and dysfunction” in ment is the difficulty of assessing resources while delivering results has remained stolidly united in American foreign policy. the counterfactual, the road not opposite of what it intended and favor of the status quo over the past An indicator that this domestic crit- taken. As BFI caution, “Critics coinciding with the dangerous hol- decade and a half. icism has begun to rattle America’s count the problems that have oc- lowing out of America’s industrial ut as of late—perhaps for the foreign policy establishment came curred but ignore the problems that base and declining prosperity and Bfirst time since the Vietnam this spring when Foreign Affairs, the have been avoided.” Another factor quality of life, especially for the War—America’s foreign policy and flagship journal of that establishment, is the strategic essence of foreign middle class. policy; i.e. it is never unilateral, but national security establishments struck back with a self-congratula- The Blob Strikes Back have become targets of sustained tory apologia. The title of the article, always a product of interaction be- criticism from journalists, veterans, “In Defense of the Blob: America’s tween two or more actors. A third is he United States “has a academics, and politicians from all Foreign Policy Establishment Is the its contextual nature. A great power Thealthy marketplace of for- sides of the political Solution, Not the possessing abundant resources, for eign policy ideas,” BFI assure us. spectrum. In a sign Problem,” made example, can mask chronic foreign “Discussion over American for- of the times, an off- In foreign policy the clear that Foreign policy failure in a way that small, eign policy,” they contend, “is loud hand remark made American establishment Affairs imbibes what vulnerable states with limited contentious, diverse, and generally in 2016 by Ben has remained remark- it has been pre- means cannot. pragmatic.” Those of us old enough Rhodes, at the time ably stolid in favor of the scribing for Amer- But to recognize that the assess- to remember the 2016 Republican a senior aide to U.S. status quo over the past ica’s foreign policy: ment of foreign policy requires Primary, however, may not be per- President Barack decade and a half. when in trouble, discernment is not to say it is im- suaded. Then-candidate Donald Obama, that dis- simply double down possible. Contra BFI, even a cur- Trump stunned the Republican paraged Washing- with more of the sory examination of three key the- Party establishment and his rivals ton’s foreign policy same. aters—the Middle East, Russia (and when at a debate in South Carolina establishment as he had the temerity to say that the an expansive, relentless, and brain- The authors of the article—Hal its southern geographic periphery), invasion of Iraq “was a big, fat mis- less “Blob” has stuck. Not the least Brands, Peter Feaver, and Will In- and China, each of which is prox- of these critics has been America’s boden (hereafter BFI)—are full imate to the Silk Road region—retake” in presidential history. president, Donald Trump, who time scholars and part-time practi- veals that the track record of Amer- Trump’s comment was neither owes his wholly improbable elec- tioners with stints in government. ican foreign policy since the end of new nor outlandish. Eleven years tion in 2016 in part to his dispar- As such, they should be as qualified the Cold War has been impressive earlier, former U.S. Army general agement of Washington’s foreign as any to mount a persuasive defense. primarily in its litany of fumbling and director of the National Secu- policy orthodoxy and who in his Their message is blunt. There are no and failure. rity Agency William Odom pre- current re-election bid is reminding grounds for any reckoning: the “es- Whereas between 1945 and 1991 dicted that “the invasion of Iraq voters of his contrarian stance. This tablishment’s practical track record America’s foreign policy yielded may well turn out to be the greatest past year, a think-tank with funding has been impressive,” they assert. a global victory over a formi- strategic disaster in American his- from disparate ideological sources “The Blob is not the problem. It is the dable multidimensional enemy tory.” Subsequent history bore was founded in Washington under solution.” while managing to preserve the out Odom’s prognostication. Yet

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Trump’s assessment of the most In today’s America, the use of The reason why the term “the Blob” books, workshops, and conferences momentous foreign policy decision insinuation to corral discussion of caught on is because it captures this as evidence that intellectual debate of the past three decades caught foreign policy is quotidian. The ex- sprawling essence. The term “cabal” on American campuses is open and his fellow candidates, virtually all pansion of the country’s military thus is a gross misrepresentation, vigorous. Second, argue that the po- of whom were advised by foreign presence and security commit- but it is an effective litical imbalance is policy professionals from Wash- ments around the world is an axiom term for discred- a feature, not a bug, of the Blob. As BFI write, the mere iting one’s oppo- ington, DC, dumbstruck. Perhaps A broad bipartisan con- as it reflects simply noise from raucous foreign policy fact that post-Cold War presidents nents as wild-eyed, the intellectual and debates in Washington was still “maintained and even expanded tin-foil hat wearing glomeration of inter- moral superiority ringing in their advisors’ heads. the country’s global network of al- “conspiracy theo- locking bureaucracies, of some ideas over liances and military bases” is itself rists,” or to hint that think-tanks, and lobbies others. Third, re- This is not a partisan phenom- constitutes the Blob. enon. Obama as a candidate in an achievement. It is as if expansion they may be dab- mind listeners that bling in the worst 2008 pointed to his opposition to were the goal, not a means. American universi- kind of conspiracy the Iraq war. In office, however, he Those who question expansion ties are the envy of thinking, the antisemitic kind. acquiesced to the relentless pres- for its own sake, let alone those the world, whatever their flaws. sure to intervene abroad, spurring who advocate retrenchment, the Impugning the moral character of BFI attempt all three. The Blob’s Rhodes to coin the term “the Blob” Blob reflexively labels “isolation- one’s intellectual opponents can be expert community, they tell us, is and leading others, like the Fletcher ists.” The label “isolationist” implies an effective tactic to control polit- “large and heterogeneous,” makes School’s Michael J. Glennon in his the critic is, at best, a foreign policy ical debates, but reliance on it cor- available “vast amounts of techno- book National Security and Double simpleton: the kind who in the rodes clear thinking. Indeed, the “In cratic knowledge and institutional Government (2016), to conclude 1930s would have thought that the Defense of the Blob” article betrays memory,” and supports an impos- that a national security state bu- United States could have safely kept some of this corrosion. BFI’s argu- sible range of opinions. “Pick any reaucracy controls policy and is out of a war with Hitler. At worst, ment that Washington, DC, hosts a policy issue, and you can put together responsible for the uncanny conti- it suggests the critic might even be wide-ranging foreign policy debate a lively debate with ease,” BFI assure nuity in foreign policy from Bush sympathetic to Hitler. parallels in uncanny ways the ar- us. “Other countries,” they chasten to Obama. Discussion of foreign imilarly, BFI write that their guments of those who contend that their doubting reader, “simply do policy in the Democrat Party’s 2020 Sopponents imagine “the Blob” American universities are citadels of not have comparably large, diverse, Presidential primaries was scant, as a cabal, a term derived from the free and open discussion of ideas. permeable, expert communities that and not coincidentally. The Dem- Hebrew word for esoteric mysti- o counter arguments and evi- encourage vigorous debate over na- ocrat and media establishments cism and one that denotes a small, Tdence that American universi- tional policy.” Indeed, those “other smeared the one candidate who did secretive group. This is an odd di- ties have shifted markedly to the left countries would love to have such a question the wisdom of American version, given that the more in- in recent decades and therefore host Blob of their own.” military intervention, U.S. Army fluential critics of Washington’s a steadily narrowing range of view- National Guard major and Iraq foreign policy consensus argue the points on campus, university presi- Signature Pathologies war veteran Congresswoman Tulsi opposite, namely that a broad bi- dents, deans, and faculty have gen- ignificantly, BFI concede that Gabbard, as sympathetic to war partisan conglomeration of inter- erally responded in three ways. First, Sthe Blob has presided over criminals, insinuating that she is a locking bureaucracies, think-tanks, engage in denial, often by pointing to “disappointments and even disas- tool of Russian. and lobbies constitutes the Blob. the vast array of scholarly journals, ters.” For instance, they write, “far

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 44 45 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES too many military interventions— tactic of tarnishing that of their pre- America’s expansion of democracy positioning America in a grand from Somalia to Afghanistan, Iraq decessors. In doing so, they betray and free markets, the belief is, rests metaphysical struggle with a single, to Libya—have been misconceived a signature pathology of the Blob: on a synergistic dynamic wherein clear, and simple choice: freedom and mishandled,” they acknowl- the inability to conceive of limits to rising prosperity feeds a desire for or oppression. “We will,” he prom- edge. Their phrase “from Somalia to America’s power or responsibility. more freedom and hence democ- ised, “persistently clarify the choice Afghanistan, Iraq to Libya” would Thus, they charge the Cold War racy, which in turn creates more before every ruler and every na- suggest that they recognize that class with “losing” China, failing friends and allies of America and tion.” Bush imagined a world his- error has been the rule, not the ex- to preserve a nuclear monopoly, more trade and prosperity. torical spirit worthy of Hegel: “His- ception. Yet they decline to own this not stopping the Berlin Wall, and he notion that America is tory has an ebb and flow of justice, and investigate the not preventing Tobligated and empowered but history also has a visible direc- Blob’s blundering, the Tiananmen to mold the nations of the world tion, set by liberty and the Author and opt instead for A signature pathology Square mas- in its image is an assertion, not a of Liberty.” sacre. The reality a classic dodge: the of the Blob: the inabil- statement of empirical fact. Yet, Obama was not as Manichean as so-called “past exon- is these events ity to conceive of limits BFI insist, “the American foreign Bush, but he was still more insistent erative”—the passive were amenable to to America’s power or policy establishment is generally that history had a right side and admission that mis- American influ- responsibility. more pragmatic than ideological.” a wrong side. The “arc of history takes were made. ence only partially Anyone who doubts that ideology that bends toward justice,” was no or not at all. On the flip side, profoundly shaped the foreign mere ornament of Obama’s rhet- BFI credit American post-Cold War A dangerous lack of self- policies of George W. Bush and oric, but an ordering principle of policy for the fact that “billions of awareness is another closely related Barack Obama need only read their his worldview and foreign policy. people” in East Asia “benefited from defect of the Blob. Absent from the administrations’ words and look Speaking of the fight against ISIS, decades of sustained economic Foreign Affairs article is any appre- at their deeds. In Obama declared, growth,” as if the extraordinary ciation of the fact that America (like 2002, Condoleezza “I am confident we growth of the Chinese economy was any other country) has limited re- Rice explained that The belief that History will succeed in this not the primary driver of this epic sources. Without a sense of limits, Bush’s national will vanquish America’s mission because transformation. America did play policymakers have little incentive security strategy foes and redeem Wash- we are on the right a role. But, alas, it was not simply think about how prioritize. Prioriti- “calls on America ington is faith-based and side of history.” through the provision of security zation, however, is absolutely essen- to use our position When Moscow an- that American taxpayers subsidized tial to long-term success. It is what facile, neither pragmatic of unparalleled nor wise. nexed Crimea, he East Asia’s economic growth from separates plans from wish lists. strength and influ- scolded, “Russia is 1979, but also through the transfer What has allowed American pol- ence to create a bal- on the wrong side to China of much of their indus- icymakers to avoid the questions ance of power that favors freedom.” of history on this.” His Secretary of trial base, technology, and scientific of limits and priorities is the belief America will rely on a “paradigm of State, John Kerry, rebuked Russia know-how from the 1990s onward. that America is on a quasi-divine progress, founded on political and with precisely the same words. The he reluctance to confront grant or mission to remake the economic liberty [...] to bring every belief that History will vanquish Tfailure is common. And in world, and that whatever resources nation into an expanding circle of America’s foes and redeem Wash- their effort to burnish the Blob’s rep- its expends toward that end are development.” Bush hardened and ington is faith-based and facile, nei- utation, BFI employ the common multiplied as in a virtuous circle. sharpened his ideology in 2005, ther pragmatic nor wise.

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Sand Trap remains in the field and, in fact, the over and over while expecting a Obama’s intervention in Syria was jihadist movement has metastasized. different result. coyer, but no more clear-eyed. As he greater Middle East re- According to a 2018 study issued by ush set a pattern of failure, unrest and rebellion against Bashar Tvealed the depth of the Blob’s the Center for Strategic and Interna- Bbut Obama followed his Assad spread in August 2011, ideological delusion. Washington tional Studies (CSIS), the number of trail. Obama’s innate skittishness Obama inserted himself. Not unlike undertook the invasions of Afghan- jihadis has more than doubled since preserved him from committing a a Marxist who interpreted events istan and Iraq with the objectives of 2001. The Islamic State superseded blunder as great as the invasion of only as struggles between a pro- vanquishing al-Qaeda in the short- al-Qaeda in both organization and Iraq. But the faith of Obama and his gressive proletariat and reactionary term and catalyzing the “paradigm the virulence of ideology. Iraq never team that history inevitably breaks capital, Obama—like Bush—saw of progress” that over the long-term became an outpost of democratiza- toward democracy left them prey only democrats and dictators. “The would allow democracy to take root tion, but it did become an outpost of to their own conceits, most notably United States,” he announced, “has and cause radical Islam and other Iranian influence and incubator of during the Arab Spring when they been inspired by the Syrian people’s forms of violent extremism to dis- the Islamic State. interpreted the burgeoning protests pursuit of a peaceful transition to sipate. Despite fighting in Afghanistan and unrest rippling through mul- democracy.” The “repressive tactics That vision was not simplistic, for over 18 years and spending be- tiple Arab countries as the long- of the past,” Obama warned Assad, and it was, by its own logic, not un- tween one and two trillion dollars awaited moment when a younger would no longer work, and so, in clear reasonable. It was, however, wholly on reconstruction, development, and and more liberal generation would signal that he expected Assad to go, he unreal. Convinced that humani- democracy promotion, the United rise and pull their societies out announced, “the time has come for ty’s only real choice was between States today is reduced to negotiating from oppressive torpor. President Assad to step aside.” freedom or oppression, and that the terms of its withdrawal with the In Egypt, the Obama administra- The arc of history failed to bend, history moves ineluctably toward Taliban—the opponent it overthrew tion facilitated the rise of the Muslim however, and the repressive tactics the former, the Blob was convinced with great fanfare in 2001. Wash- Brotherhood by withdrawing support of the past became the effective that so long as America acted boldly ington is now estranged from the one from the senescent Hosni Mubarak. ones of the present. Obama then and resolutely, its success was Muslim society with a democratic But when just two years later the authorized American military and foreordained. government and tradition, Turkey, Egyptian armed forces toppled the intelligence bodies to arm and train To realize its vision, the Blob in no small measure due to policies it elected government of Muhammad Syrian rebels in what become one of disposed of staggering resources. felt compelled to adopt to contain the Morsi, the administration could only history’s largest “covert” operations. As scholars like Stephen Walt and Islamic State. watch awkwardly as the cycle of re- The effort quickly became another Andrew Krepinevich have pointed The debacle of Afghanistan—it pression came full circle. It declined large and embarrassing American out, Washington spent on its wars bears remembering—was not a to call the coup a coup, as American failure, as it recruited a patheti- in Afghanistan and Iraq some four single, discrete error. It was instead law would then block weapons sales cally small number of fighters and to six trillion dollars, or several an error repeated over and over, as to Egypt. Obama’s Washington had fell apart. Matters took a surreal times more what China is investing Washington obstinately clung to shown itself by turns to be irreso- turn in 2015 when former CIA di- in its massive Belt and Road initia- its strategy year after year. Blinded lute, feckless, and cynical. In Libya, rector and retired general David tive, or tens of times more than the by its ideology to the failures un- it jubilantly helped topple another Petraeus advocated that the United cost of the Marshall Plan. And yet folding before its eyes, the Blob repressive regime, but that country States “peel-off [...] moderates” from the Blob achieved the very contrary acted out the quotidian definition became a redoubt of ISIS and site of Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. Only in of what it had intended. Al-Qaeda of insanity: doing the same thing an ongoing civil war. America, one might jest, could

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 48 49 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES al-Qaeda members become partners McCain famously put it, “Russia much of America’s national security the Soviet Union without military in the war on terror. is a gas station masquerading as a establishment, and the contempo- bases between the Baltic and Black Next door in Iraq, the Islamic country.” Obama dismissed Russia rary portrayal of a revanchist Russia Seas and while securing prosperity State of Iraq and Syria scattered the as a “regional power” with an legitimizes much of the same force for its citizens at home. Iraqi army on which Washington “economy in tatters” and politically structures. This is not to mention FI draw an unwarranted had lavished so much. Adding in- “isolated.” Vice President Joe Biden the multiple functions that hysteria Bequivalence between the Blob sult to injury, ISIS seized copious in July 2009 clucked that America over Russia has served in Amer- and expertise. The problem is not stockpiles of American arms, need not work too hard on rela- ican domestic politics since 2016, that the vast American establish- treating the world to the sight of ji- tions with Russia since time is on including deflecting blame for Hil- ment do not possess talented and hadists driving American-made M1 America’s side. Russia’s troubles are lary Clinton’s stunning defeat and informed people, but that it cannot Abrams tanks into battle. Wash- such that it will have no choice but undermining Donald Trump by use such assets better. NATO expan- ington then countered those jihad- to bow to American pressure. Duke suggesting that he is a Russian tool. sion is a telling—and important— ists by collaborating with a Kurdish University’s Peter Feaver—the ‘F’ Playing up the Russian threat legit- example. Expert opinion was over- group that it knew well to be a in the subsequently BFI-authored imates large swathes of contempo- whelmingly against it. Not only did subsidiary of the most lethal foe of “In Defense of the Blob” article— rary Washington. George Kennan, one of America’s Turkey. It was a reckless betrayal of the following day enthusiastically In reality, outside of a nuclear best Russia experts and perhaps its a treaty ally. Meanwhile, as Wash- endorsed Biden’s opinion and in a exchange it is almost impossible to greatest diplomat, oppose NATO ington flailed around harming demonstration of bipartisan simpa- contend that Russia today threatens expansion, so did hawkish ex- friends and aiding foes, Russia tico likened Russia to an adolescent vital American interests. A compar- perts such as Paul Nitze, Richard stepped in and decisively altered and its behaviors to “tantrums.” In ison with the So- Pipes, and Fred the course of the Syrian Civil War so doing, Feaver revealed another viet threat is telling. Iklé, among many with the deployment of a modest curiosity of the bipartisan Blob: its The Soviet Union In reality, outside of a others. NATO ex- amount of airpower, managing to proclivity to imagine America not was an enormous nuclear exchange it is pansion, these build closer ties to Turkey, Israel, as the world’s policeman so much entity with seem- almost impossible to con- experts warned, and others in the process. as the world’s nanny, there to scold, ingly inexhaustible tend that Russia today would do nothing punish, and praise as appropriate human and natural threatens vital American to improve Amer- Mother Goose Tussling the other, more immature members resources, massive interests. ican security but with Russia of the family of nations. This might military and nu- would inevitably be called the “Mother Goose” his brings us to the Eurasian clear forces, and alienate the Russian Theartland. Toward Russia, theory of American statecraft. a formidable net- people, not just the Blob is schizoid, careening be- Yet simultaneously the Blob pres- work of satellites and allies around the leadership. Strobe Talbott, Bill tween two incompatible readings of ents Russia as a grave menace, ca- the world. Not least, it espoused a Clinton’s point man on NATO ex- the country. One is contemptuous pable of overrunning NATO terri- revolutionary ideology, Marxist-Le- pansion, lamented that everyone in of Russia as an economically feeble, tory and manipulating American ninism, that fired imaginations and expert circles opposed enlargement. demographically dying, militarily public opinion and even elections. ambitions of millions around the Nonetheless, NATO expanded. overstretched kleptocracy that is There is undoubtedly an element globe and targeted Western society When issuing their admoni- dependent on the export of hydro- of bureaucratic self-interest here. for destruction. Yet the United States tions about NATO enlargement, carbons. As the late Senator John The Cold War birthed and shaped managed to contain and prevail over the aforementioned architects of

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America’s Cold War strategy prob- Saakashvili tightly. The young were they partnering on the pe- Hadley or anyone else any warning ably never anticipated the ama- Georgian’s enthusiasm for the riphery of Eurasia? It was Saakash- of the conflict, even though it was teurism of their successors. In May United States was especially wel- vili who had ignited the war when our friends, the Georgians, who 2008, George W. Bush declared come at a time when America’s in- he ordered Georgian forces to had precipitated it.” at a conference in Bucharest that ternational prestige was at a low as retake the breakaway republic of Bush left office with a Russian Georgia and Ukraine would be- a result of the moldering interven- South Ossetia. Saakashvili, in the policy in tatters. Obama’s team, too, come members of NATO, over- tion in Iraq. Bush visited the moun- words of then-Secretary of State combined striking lapses in profes- riding the express wishes of Amer- tainous country, hailed Georgia as Condoleezza Rice, was “capricious” sionalism with autopilot overexten- ica’s French and German allies. It a “beacon of liberty” in the broader and a “firebrand.” Secretary of De- sion. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was a wildly provocative move. region, and the Georgians named fense Robert Gates was still more recognized that Bush had bungled Whereas Georgia and Ukraine a prominent thoroughfare in their direct, describing the Georgian with Russia to America’s detriment could in no way be regarded as capital after him. president as an “aggressive and im- and sought to repair matters. She “vital” to the United States or of Yet for all its celebration of part- petuous nationalist.” stumbled out of the gate, however, NATO, as neighbors of Russia they nership with Georgia, Washington ussia’s rout of Georgia was when, in a bid to signal the Obama are by definition of special con- was inattentive to the country, another fiasco of Blob expan- administration’s desire for a new start cern to Moscow. Georgia borders R and the outbreak of war caught sionism. In defeating Saakashvili, in relations, she handed her Russian the most sensitive part of the Rus- Washington shamefully flatfooted. Vladimir Putin counterpart, Sergei sian Federation, Chechnya, where When the Director of the Central had demonstrated Lavrov, a gimmicky Russia was then fighting an active Intelligence Agency received news that he under- red button reading Islamist insurgency that had made Another question that of the war, he was uncertain who stood better than in big bold letters use of Georgian territory for supply. America’s foreign policy in his agency was responsible for “Reset” in English Ukraine, aside from its size and lo- Washington’s pro- professionals should have Georgia and had to scramble to get cation, is the cradle of Russian cul- fessionals the low asked earlier, is with and “Peregruzka” in personnel there. The Bush White ture and identity. One can insist value that Wash- whom were they part- Russian. As Lavrov House, according to then-Na- that Russia’s strategic and cultural ington assigned stood holding the tional Security Advisor Stephen nering on the periphery sensitivities should be irrelevant, to Georgia. When button, Clinton Hadley, ran hot with talk of hitting of Eurasia? since Georgia and Ukraine are sov- push had come to asked whether the ereign nation-states. That might be the Russians hard. At least, that shove, Washington Russian translation true from an ideological and legal- is, until Hadley essentially posed balked, supplying was correct, adding, istic standpoint, but is thoroughly the question: “Are we ready to go some humanitarian aid and flying “We worked hard to get the Russian false from a prudential, pragmatic, to war with Russia over Georgia?” a Georgian brigade back home word right.” An uncomfortable Lavrov and political one. Hadley’s query brought the discus- from Iraq, where the Georgian sol- could answer only, “No.” The Amer- sion to a halt, since the answer was diers had been deployed to shore icans had not translated the word First Georgia... obvious. But that question should up the pretense that Washington properly. The word peregruzka means ashington’s recklessness have been asked—and answered— was leading a multinational coali- “overload.” Her staff might have tried a Wextended into involvement in Bucharest in May. tion there. Reflecting on the war, little harder and looked at a dictionary. in Georgian and Ukrainian politics. Another question that America’s CIA director Hayden confessed the Such rank amateurism was an The Bush administration had em- foreign policy professionals should United States “came up short.” And embarrassing start, but it was not braced Georgian president Mikheil have asked earlier, is with whom the CIA, he said, “had not given the end of embarrassment. Right

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 52 53 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES before taking up his post in 2012, for European and Eurasian Af- diplomats for America’s allies, and tured, corrupt, and economically Obama’s handpicked envoy to fairs Victoria Nuland arrived on demonstrated again an American sputtering. While it is true that Moscow Michael McFaul described the scene to show her support, inability to maintain secure com- Russia has suffered from the on- himself to the Russian media as “a demonstratively sticking loaves of munications. Coming on the heels going stalemate, the United States specialist on democracy, anti-dicta- bread into the hands of often un- of the Wikileaks, Edward Snowden, has not won anything from a crisis torial movements, on revolutions” comprehending people standing on and Chelsea Manning scandals, that it did so much to escalate. As and added that this was the reason the Maidan. It was a curious act of the lax communication discipline the title of a 2017 study of the con- behind his appointment as ambas- street theater, particularly for a dip- shown by State Department officials flict issued by the International In- sador. It takes a certain chutzpah to lomat, but Nuland made her point was another worrying indicator of stitute for Strategic Studies (IISS) go to Moscow boasting of expertise that American officials would play a slipping professional standards. puts it, “Everyone Loses.” in social movements and revolu- role in Ukraine. Similarly, McCain or American foreign policy, That the cases of Ukraine and tions. That McFaul was not by pro- and other American politicians flew the fall of the pro-Russian Georgia represent clear-cut failures fession a diplomat became pain- F to Kyiv to speak to anti-government Ukrainian president did initially of reckless American overextension fully obvious when he violated the crowds on the Maidan, adding to appear to be a is not the unduly first rule of diplomacy and publicly the pageantry. coup, in the sense harsh assessment insulted his host state by calling of a stroke of suc- of an outside ac- Russia “a savage country” in front In February 2014, tensions on It is still harder to see cess. But true to ademic, but the of a Russian television crew. Mc- the Maidan exploded in violence. how picking and then the predictions judgment of one of Faul was understandably frustrated Ukraine’s president fled to Moscow, losing fights in Eurasia of the manifold America’s most ex- by the crew’s relentless tracking of converting Ukraine’s simmering either benefits America American experts perienced foreign him, but the optics were damning. internal crisis into an acute interna- or deters bullying. who had cautioned policy insiders, Not much in McFaul’s tenure as tional one. Moscow labeled the event against NATO en- former Director of ambassador was successful, and he an illegal coup. As Washington was largement, Russia the CIA and Sec- resigned his post in February 2014. instructing Russia not to meddle in Ukraine’s internal politics and that was willing to fight, and responded retary of Defense Robert Gates, ...Then Ukraine... “it is up to the Ukrainian people to America’s involvement promptly who wrote forthrightly that “trying by seizing the Crimean Peninsula to bring Georgia and Ukraine into s in Georgia, the United to decide their future,” a recording and raising insurrections in eastern NATO was truly overreaching.” Yet States has little at stake in of a conversation where Nuland A Ukraine. Washington was again BFI assert, “It is hard to see how Ukraine and the conflict there has and the American ambassador to done nothing to advance Amer- Ukraine discuss who should and caught flat-footed, confused, and [...] not expanding NATO would ican interests. Once again, key for- should not serve in the new gov- unsure how to respond, because, have encouraged less bullying from eign policy officials demonstrated ernment and how to achieve this rhetoric aside, it had little at stake Moscow.” It is still harder to see a greater talent for provocation outcome surfaced. In the discussion in Ukraine. Once again, a forward how picking and then losing fights than for professionalism. When in Nuland used a profanity to dismiss leaning foreign policy that cannot in Eurasia either benefits America December 2013 demonstrators in the European Union. It was a triple distinguish between vital and other or deters bullying. The electoral favor of an association agreement embarrassment. In a stroke it left interests had needlessly placed crisis brewing in Belarus at the time with the European Union took to no doubt about American involve- America in an exposed position. of writing may well reveal both the Maidan square in Ukraine’s cap- ment in Ukrainian affairs, revealed The standoff in and over Ukraine fragility of that country’s ruling ital, Assistant Secretary of State the disdain of prominent American continues. Ukraine remains frac- regime and the anemic condition

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 54 55 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES of Putin’s Russia. The outcome Contrast that with the post- eign policy failures noted above virus touched off, but did not regardless can contribute little Cold War record on China. Two have compounded the signal that cause, this crisis. Large sectors of to American security, and the decades ago, Washington wa- America’s mismanagement of America’s elites have welcomed asymmetry in the stakes involved gered that “globalization,” e.g. its economy has sent to China. and fanned the crisis for a mix of promises a perpetual volatility. the admission of China to the One may argue how to apportion motives. Nonetheless, the crisis WTO and the transfer of Amer- blame for this between Trump’s is rooted in a genuine clash over ...Now China ica’s industrial base there, would, missteps and those of his prede- America’s worth as a civilization, he rise of China presents in BFI’s words, “mellow” China cessors, but from Beijing’s per- and it portends an inevitable Ta challenge far greater and help it “fit easily into the spective they are all American. shake up in foreign policy, in- than those of the Middle East or U.S.-led order.” Today we know his is not the place for a cluding in the Silk Road region. Russia, as China is a continen- this wager was a loser. BFI cor- Tcomprehensive account of But whereas in this domestic tal-sized power that possesses rectly describe Trump’s refusal to why the Blob failed to recognize crisis a large portion of America’s the population, economy, tech- accept China’s exploitative trade and adapt to such a momentous elites are insistent on change, in nological base, military capacity, practices as “overdue.” But this change. A willful self-delusion the sphere of foreign policy the and social cohesion that match raises the question of why it re- fed by a corporate interest in elites have maintained a robust or supersede those of the United quired an outsider to get some- easy profits from China’s cheaper consensus in favor of the status States. To get China right truly is thing so fundamental right? The labor and manufacturing costs is quo. Since the end of the Cold vital. Thus far the Blob has not. rise of China has been long in the one part. Another source of delu- War, that consensus has equated BFI do acknowledge this rather making and open in plain sight. sion was Washington’s conviction the American national interest important point, but shy from According to the World Bank, that global “free trade” is sacro- with the expansion of America’s exploring it. in 1991 China’s GDP was $383 sanct, good in and of itself and military alliances and presence U.S. President Richard Nixon’s billion. In 2018 it was $13.6 tril- indistinguishable from America’s around the world, prioritizing opening to China in 1972 is ac- lion. The coronavirus pandemic national interest, and its corol- global trade over the mainte- knowledged as a master stroke revealed some important things lary that a trade war with China nance of industry at home, and in the Cold War. Whereas cat- about China and its relations could only be ruinous. Addled by the liberal use of military, co- echizing schoolmarms can see with America. such dogma and distracted by its vert, and other forms of inter- non-democracies only as a ho- One is America’s mortal de- pursuit of secondary and tertiary vention to promote the estab- mogenous class of miscreants, pendence on China for medical interests in other parts of the lishment of regimes led by local Nixon understood geography and and pharmaceutical products. globe, the Blob allowed America elites amenable to the Ameri- context. By reaching out to Mao, Another is that China prioritizes to slide into a dangerous position can-led international order. This incidentally one of history’s most the lives of its citizens over those vis-à-vis China. consensus has persisted despite odious actors, Nixon outflanked of Americans and will deploy its overwhelming evidence that the Soviets in Asia and helped economic capacity accordingly. Unsustainable post-Cold War American foreign check their global ambitions pre- A third is that China has not o return to the theme policy has been ineffective, even cisely when the United States was mellowed but grown contemp- Traised at the opening of self-destructive. reeling from overextension in tuous of the United States. Far this article: America is now un- A coalescing of critiques in the Vietnam and a stagnant, infla- from composing a picture of re- dergoing a domestic crisis over past year has finally compelled tionary economy at home. solve and competence, the for- its very legitimacy. The corona- the foreign policy establishment

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 56 57 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES to begin defending its record and tant to understanding how funda- assumptions. BFI’s “In Defense of mentally it has failed in past two the Blob” represents one promi- decades in critical theatres such nent apologetic. Yet far from re- as the greater Middle East and the assuring the reader about the fu- broader Silk Road region, and how ture of American foreign policy, much the world has changed in instead the article displays some the meantime. Sapped internally of the pathologies of the Blob’s by a domestic crisis of legitimacy worldview and thought processes. and crippled by a foreign policy BFI’s readers are left to conclude apparatus that is prideful, blind, that America’s foreign policy es- and bullheaded, America has be- tablishment is stubbornly resis- come its own greatest enemy. BD

bakudialogues.ada.edu.az

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at the influence of other external tive regional cooperation. Rather, Not A Top European Priority actors, such as Russia, China, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia Turkey, their cooperation with the have integrated into a wide-range Can the EU Engage Geopolitically three regional states, and how their of different, sometimes opposing, influence is shifting the geopolitical organizations and alliances. Long in the South Caucasus? landscape of the region. A final sec- influenced by three powerful neigh- tion argues that if the EU wants to bors (Russia, Turkey, and Iran), the achieve the goal of becoming a geo- arrival of the United States, the EU, Amanda Paul political power, as set by European and most recently China to the re- Commission president Ursula von gion over the last three decades has der Leyen, much will depend on he European Union has Over the past few years a series of intensified geopolitical rivalries. how it deals with its neighborhood, been active in the South internal crises, confrontation with The EU joined the mix of actors including the South Caucasus. Caucasus since Armenia, Russia, wars in Ukraine and Syria, and organizations engaged in the Azerbaijan,T and Georgia regained a fractured trans-Atlantic alliance, The EU’s Expanding South Caucasus in the early 1990s. independence in 1991. While the and, more recently, the COVID-19 Following the collapse of the Soviet EU has established itself as an im- pandemic have consumed the EU, Presence Union, the EU did not rush to the portant partner for all three states leaving the South Caucasus some- he history of the South Cau- region. In large part this was due to over the past three decades, the what detached from its agenda. Yet Tcasus since the re-emer- the Union’s attention being focused South Caucasus is certainly not the combination of all these devel- gence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and on developments in East-Central a top foreign policy priority for opments have also had an impact Georgia as inde- Europe following Brussels. Despite hopes that EU on the geopolitics and stability of pendent countries the collapse of policies could act as transforma- the region—as have the recent skir- has been turbulent. If the EU wants to the Iron Curtain, tive tools to help strengthen sta- mishes at the Armenia-Azerbaijan Almost thirty years achieve the goal of be- along with the un- bility, security, and democracy as border—making EU engagement on, the three states coming a geopolitical folding wars in the well as bring about a more cohe- there more important than ever. are still dogged by power, much will de- Western Balkans. conflict and closed Both of these de- sive and resilient region, the re- This essay will look at the objec- pend on how it deals borders, with the velopments rep- sults have been rather patchy from tives and impact of EU policies in region remaining with its neighborhood, resented a direct the EU’s perspective. Likewise, the South Caucasus. It starts with highly congested including the South threat to EU sta- expectations that the EU would an overview of the EU’s involve- militarily. The re- Caucasus. bility and security; develop a more geostrategic and ment in the region and the evolu- gion’s three pro- upheavals in the security orientated policy in tion of its policies. It then goes on to tracted conflicts, South Caucasus order to balance Russia have been address the EU’s performance as a Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan did not. However, this relative lack dashed. security actor. Finally, it takes a look and Armenia) and South Ossetia of attention was also due to the and Abkhazia (Georgia), act as a EU not viewing the South Cau- Amanda Paul is Senior Policy Analyst in the Europe in the World Programme handbrake on sustainable peace, casus as its neighborhood. Rather it at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, Senior Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Policy Studies in Kyiv, and Senior Advisor for Stober, Poltavets economic development and pros- was seen as a remote place viewed and Associates, a corporate and public affairs consultancy. perity, and efforts to create effec- through the prism of Russia.

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uring the 1990s only a wanted to bring the region closer included, only being mentioned in Corridor (SGC), which is expected Dhandful of EU member to the West as a way to strengthen a footnote to the policy as possible to become operational by the end of states opened embassies in the regional stability and security. neighbors. This again reflected the 2020. The region has also become South Caucasus states. At this time During the 1990s, Turkey sup- EU’s failure to view them as part of a central part of the EU’s connec- the EU’s main involvement was re- ported the integration processes of its direct neighborhood. tivity strategy—portrayed by the lated to humanitarian and finan- the South Caucasus states with the However, much has changed EU as its answer to China’s Belt and cial assistance. The Union was the West via their integration into the since then. Over the years the EU Road Initiative (BRI)—which has biggest financer of Council of Europe, has intensified its political and eco- gained significant traction in EaP development proj- OSCE, NATO, and nomic ties with all three countries. states, including those located in ects in the region During the 1990s only a the EU, as well as This happened for several reasons. the South Caucasus. between 1991 and through regional handful of EU member First, eastward enlargement in 2004 ENP and EaP Impact 2000, investing states opened embassies projects, including and 2007 brought the South Cau- well over €1 billion those related to in the South Caucasus casus geographically closer to the he ENP aimed to strengthen in the three states. transport, such as stability, security, and pros- states. EU across the Black Sea. Second, T Keen to diversify the East-West Cor- Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution perity in the EU’s eastern and their foreign poli- ridor. The United resulted in the country’s new pres- southern neighborhoods. As cies to reduce Rus- States played a cen- ident, Mikheil Saakashvili, making then-European Commission presi- sian dominance (as was the case tral role in developing the region’s Euro-Atlantic integration a priority. dent Romano Prodi put it, the EU with other former Soviet coun- energy resources. It began with the wanted to build a ring of well-gov- Indeed, Saakashvili played an tries), Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 1994 U.S.-backed “Contract of the erned states around the EU. How- important role in the eventual in- Georgia signed partnership and Century” that Azerbaijan signed ever, the ENP had little overall clusion of the South Caucasus in cooperation agreements (PCAs) with a group of largely Western impact in terms of bringing about the ENP. Without his active lob- with the EU, which opened the way partners. This major development real change. It had a very technical, bying, the region may never have for greater political dialogue and broke Russia’s hold on Caspian oil one-policy-fits-all approach, of- become part of the ENP. The 2008 economic cooperation. Yet these and gas transportation and paved fering only vague incentives com- Russia-Georgia war was a further agreements were both significantly the way for the construction of the bined with unclear conditionality important milestone. In the after- lighter in content and more lim- Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline as and almost zero local ownership. It math of the conflict, the EU in- ited in scope when compared to well as the subsequent Baku-Tbili- creased its visibility in the region, also required rather unclear com- those signed with countries such si-Erzurum natural gas pipeline. becoming the main security actor in mitments from partner countries. as Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia, big boost in ties with the Georgia with the deployment of its Frankly, the EU focus on the which also included the prospect of AEU came in the 2000s when EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM). wide-scale export of EU standards a Free Trade Area with the EU. the three states became part of the Third, the EU was keen to develop was rather unrealistic. It was also Non-EU actors, notably Turkey EU’s European Neighbourhood energy relations with Azerbaijan as viewed as a rather “one-way street,” and the United States, played Policy (ENP) in 2004 and the a way to strengthen Western efforts meaning partner countries felt they much bigger roles (as did Russia, Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009. to diversify routes and sources of were not in a partnership with the obviously). With Turkey at that Yet when the ENP was launched natural gas to reduce dependence EU, but rather were being dictated time strongly anchored to the Eu- in 2003, the three South Cau- on Russia. This culminated in the to by Brussels as if they were the ro-Atlantic community, Ankara casus countries were not initially development of the Southern Gas pupil and the EU was the teacher.

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The ENP was also eurocentric in have chosen “tailor made” relations individual EU member states, par- in the EU institutions would be an conception and broadly ignored in line with the EU’s differentiated ticularly with Germany and France. understatement. the roles outside actors play in approach, meaning each country Yet Tbilisi’s efforts to convince EU et despite many positive the EU’s neighborhood—not least has a different type of agreement capitals that Georgia’s EU mem- Ydevelopments, the EU’s re- Russia—and their impact on the with the EU. bership would have added value spective bilateral agendas with the region. Furthermore, the security oday, cooperation between for the European Union—and that three South Caucasus states have rationale underlying the ENP did Tthe three South Caucasus there is a need for a more robust started to become rather lackluster not translate into an increased EU countries and the EU covers every- EU response to Russian aggression and bogged-down. Armenia joined role in conflict resolution in the thing from trade, cyber-security, in their country—has more or less the Russian-led Eurasian Eco- South Caucasus, despite the ENP and security sector reform to edu- fallen on deaf ears (with the excep- nomic Union in January 2015 after citing conflict resolution as an EU cation, counter-terrorism, human tion of Poland and the three Baltic Moscow more or less forced Ye- priority. rights dialogues, and disinforma- states). revan to abandon talks with the EU The EaP was developed in 2009 to tion. The EU is now the biggest trade When it comes to Azerbaijan for an AA in 2013. Moreover, not- differentiate between southern and partner of all three countries. It has and Armenia, both have lobbied withstanding the fact that Yerevan eastern partners in the ENP. Since also been the biggest provider of for greater economic cooperation signed a new Comprehensive and its inception, it has brought the humanitarian assistance during the and investment opportunities. In Enhanced Partnership Agreement three South Caucasus states closer COVID-19 pandemic via its Team particular, Azerbaijan has worked (CEPA) with the EU in November to the EU in accordance to their Europe Package, putting on the hard to establish fruitful ties in 2017, Armenia has moved slowly in individual preferences, ambitions, table some €92 million. This is an terms of energy cooperation with its implementation, despite having and starting points. EaP put on the enormous sum, particularly when EU member states, including with a new, reform-minded government. table a strengthened contractual compared to other actors such as Hungary, Greece, and Italy. Both Meanwhile, despite years of negoti- framework through Association the United States, which only pro- Baku and Yerevan have also focused ations for a new strategic agreement Agreements (AAs) and Deep and vided some $2 million in assistance, on efforts to win support for their with Azerbaijan, talks have stalled. Comprehensive Free-Trade Areas and Russia and China, which pro- positions on Nagorno-Karabakh With the exception of Georgia, (DCFTAs), as well as through the vided no financial support at all (al- from both national parliaments real reform (as the EU under- gradual liberalization of respective though the Jack Ma Foundation and and governments. Local diaspora stands it) has been rather thin visa regimes and increased sectoral the Alibaba Foundation, amongst communities, along with business on the ground. Where reform cooperation. other Chinese philanthropies, sent communities and other actors, also has taken place, implementation Based on a “more for more” or large quantities of emergency sup- play a central role. This operation has often been adversely affected “less for less” approach, the EaP plies to Azerbaijan in the form of is also carried on by poor adminis- offered a further opportunity for medical masks, test kits, protective into the European trative capacities, the three countries to strengthen suits, ventilators, and thermal im- Parliament, with The EU’s respective bi- weak institutional political and economic ties with agers; and Beijing sent significant regular battles lateral agendas with the coordination, and the EU—albeit to different degrees humanitarian aid to Armenia and over the wording three South Caucasus vested interests. The and based on their own interests Georgia). of EP reports and states have started to be- leverage the EU and priorities. While Georgia con- In parallel, all three countries resolutions. To say come rather lackluster believed it could tinues to aspire for full EU mem- have focused on strengthening there is Nagorno- and bogged-down. have, together with bership, Armenia and Azerbaijan political and economic ties with Karabakh fatigue the conditionality

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 64 65 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES it believed it could place, has not have been viewed by the Kremlin as But in all frankness, EU enlarge- Caucasus. This in part can be put always been there. The ability of something aimed at undermining ment vis-à-vis the South Caucasus down to the fact that a number of the three countries to deal with the what Russia considers to be within will remain off the table for the dura- international (not least Russia) and COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the sphere of its vital interests. This tion of this European Commission multilateral (the UN and the OSCE) serious weaknesses. Georgia has has sometimes put leaderships in at least, if not forever. The series of actors had been present in the region most capably handled the pan- a tight spot, as Yerevan found out crises that the EU has undergone since the dissolution of the Soviet demic, in large part due to Tbilisi’s in 2013. Furthermore, Russia has over the past few years—including Union. However, it was also due to a efforts to reform and profession- shown it is ready to use force to the eurozone and migration crises, lack of appetite on the part of the EU. alize its civil service and to crack achieve what it wants—namely to Brexit, the rise of Still, the EU has down on corruption. Heightened populism, and the screw up the integration of EaP EU enlargement vis-à- progressively rec- public trust in professionals has COVID-19 pan- ognized the impor- states with the EU and rattle the vis the South Caucasus also contributed to better compli- Union’s cage, in the knowledge that demic—has dulled tance of improving ance with emergency regulations EU member states have little appe- the appetite for fur- will remain off the table security and sta- and guidance on behavior during tite to seriously challenge Russia in ther enlargement for the duration of this bility in its eastern the pandemic. the South Caucasus, particularly on and left the EU very European Commission neighborhood as a security issues. focused on internal at least, if not forever. way to strengthen Overall, the slow pace of reform matters. Armenia’s its own security can be put down to three factors: he EU’s goal of creating a progress towards and resilience. This a large extend to a lack of political Tmore cohesive region has starting talks for visa liberalization came to the fore will from regional elites to imple- also not been achieved. In fact with the EU were effectively delayed in the aftermath of the 2008 Rus- ment massive and often costly re- quite the opposite as happened. because of attitudes towards migra- sia-Georgia war, and more recently forms; the challenge of uprooting With EaP having both a bilateral tion within the EU. Getting una- following Russia’s annexation of the networks of vested interests that and multilateral dimension, it was nimity from 27 EU member states Crimea in 2014 and ongoing war have dominated key bodies such as hoped that the multilateral track on foreign policy has become an ex- in the Donbas—and even more re- judiciaries for years; and weak civil could be a useful framework for ercise akin to herding cats in a sack. cently due to conflict in Syria and societies unable to wield influence representatives of the three South Hence while the EU continues to Libya. The Black Sea region in par- over political elites, which makes Caucasus states to meet and foster “go through the motions” of saying ticular has become a stage of geo- a bottom-up approach to reform ties (including via the Civil Society that the EaP remains a top priority, political competition between the more difficult to achieve. Forum and within the framework beyond visible support for Ukraine, West and Russia. The Kremlin is However, there is an additional of EURONEST), ultimately leading the EU’s focus is clearly elsewhere. determined to prevent the further issue. The EU’s approach broadly to stronger regional cooperation. The South Caucasus in particular fragmentation of Russian influence. failed to adequately calculate the The fact that each state has chosen seems to have disappeared from the Moscow sees no way to do this geopolitical realities on the ground a different geopolitical trajectory EU’s agenda to a large extent. without maintaining buffer states in the South Caucasus and the threat and a different type of relationship and imposing its will on neighbors that all three states continue to feel with the EU has led to greater frag- EU as Security Actor to secure its borders. from Russia. The integration pro- mentation. Moreover, for Georgia, uring the 1990s and for a large umerous EU documents, cesses used by the EU, while being the lack of long-term EU mem- Dpart of the 2000s, the EU was Ngoing as far back as 2003, seen as technical rather than geo- bership perspective is becoming not directly engaged in security and highlight the need for Brussels strategic instruments by Brussels increasingly frustrating. conflict resolution issues in the South to take a more active role in the

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 66 67 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES problems of the South Caucasus. supposed to drive reforms in key denied access to the occupied ter- with tensions in and around the This has resulted in the establish- sectors (e.g. justice, security sector ritories by Russia and the de facto line of contact remaining high. A ment of the post of Special Repre- reform) with the aim of strength- authorities in Abkhazia and South series of incidents on the Arme- sentative for the South Caucasus. ening democratic institutions and Ossetia. nia-Azerbaijan border that began in We also saw the publication of a ultimately contributing to a more The GID talks have effectively mid-July 2020 resulted in casualties 2006 European Commission report positive climate for conflict settle- stalled. Nevertheless, while the on both sides—including the taking on the implementation of the ENP, ment. However, this long-term ap- GID process has not achieved of civilian lives—received little at- which underlined the need for the proach stumbled against regional much concrete progress in terms tention from the EU other than EU to “be more active in addressing realities. For example, the EU’s of agreements between the con- the standard statement expressing frozen conflicts.” Most recently, a emphasis on the rule of law as a flict parties—Russia continues to concern. Indeed, with regards to November 2015 review of the ENP preliminary condition for stability insist that it is not even a party in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, was at odds with Georgia’s priori- reiterates the EU’s commitment the conflict—the EUSR has played the EU narrative is so weak as to be tization of territorial integrity and to fostering stability, security, and an important role by keeping the hardly noticeable. the reintegration of the breakaway prosperity that states the EU should negotiations going even though In fact, the EU does not have a regions of Abkhazia and South Os- use all means available to support the process has become little more setia. Something similar could be policy on the conflict. Unlike in the management of crises and the than a talking shop. As is often the said with regards to Azerbaijan. other conflicts in the Black Sea re- settlement of protracted conflicts case, the status quo has become gion, the EU has tried to maintain in the neighborhood. The EU’s A Status Quo Actor comfortable. a balanced position between Ar- 2016 Global Strategy also mentions hen the EU’s former for- menia and Azerbaijan. This was ev- building up the resilience of neigh- s noted above, the security eign policy chief Federica ident from differences between the bors to prevent insecurity spilling landscape in Georgia and the W A Mogherini visited the South Cau- two ENP Action Plan texts related over into the EU. South Caucasus more broadly was transformed by the Russia-Georgia casus in March 2016, she was quoted to the conflict. While the conflict’s As was the case with the Western war and Moscow’s subsequent rec- as saying that the settlement is the Balkans, the EU hoped that soft ognition of both regions. The EU Nagorno-Kara- first priority under power tools could be used to bring brokered the ceasefire and took on bakh conflict was With regards to the the EU-Azerbaijan about change that would lead to a top priority. In ENP Action Plan, a key post-conflict role. The EU be- Armenia-Azerbaijan greater democracy, which could came a main security actor in both reality the EU has it is ranked sev- in turn have a positive impact on post-conflict theaters, deploying its chosen to take a conflict, the EU narra- enth in the text peace processes and increase sta- EUMM and becoming a co-chair back seat in the tive is so weak as to be concluded with Ar- bility. However, the South Caucasus of the multi-party Geneva Interna- peace process, hardly noticeable. In fact, menia. The latter is not the Western Balkans. The EU tional Discussions (GID) aimed at being satisfied to the EU does not have a also mentions the chose to focus on the partner coun- finding a solution to the two dis- continue to simply policy on the conflict. principle of the tries’ reform processes as a first step putes. However, the six-point peace support the efforts right to self-deter- to conflict resolution, focusing on plan remains only partially imple- of the OSCE Minsk mination of peo- the role of good governance and mented by Russia and there has Group in which France is a co-chair ples, which is not included in the rule of law as key drivers of secu- been little effort to adequately en- alongside Russia and the United Azerbaijani Action Plan. This dam- rity and stability. Both the EU’s gage Moscow on this issue. For ex- States. Multi-year negotiations are aged the EU’s reputation in Azer- assistance and conditionality were ample, the EUMM has so far been stalled on a set of Basic Principles, baijan. As underlined by Svante

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Cornell, a leading Western expert on are facing—namely those concerned part of a more extensive Russian three South Caucasus countries. the South Caucasus, “with the Action with security—it is broadly viewed southern strategy, aiming at pro- Moscow has important and influ- Plans the EU played a worse than as a weak player that has little appe- jecting power across what some ential networks, including ties with passive role. It was tite for power. The have taken to calling the Silk Road the militaries of all three states. Yet actively sowing con- EU’s failure to re- region. Russia has already achieved many fusion and contra- The EU’s failure to respond to Russian Russia’s influence in the South of its objectives. It has more or less dicting international spond to Russian ag- aggression against Caucasus is certainly not the same blocked Georgia’s path to NATO principles into the Georgia weakened gression against Georgia as it was some years ago. Russian membership, with the same fate conflict.” However, the belief in the language use is declining, Russian likely to meet Georgia’s EU aspira- in the aftermath of weakened the belief in ability of the West television viewership has declined tions. It has forced Yerevan, which Russia’s annexation the ability of the West to to counter Mos- precipitately, and ethnic Russians depends on Russia for its security, to of Crimea and the counter Moscow’s pow- cow’s power pro- comprise less than 5 percent of the join the EAEU and renounce plans onset of war in the er projection or provide jection or provide population of each of the South to sign an AA with the EU. And de- Donbas, the Eu- security guarantees to security guarantees Caucasus states. Furthermore, spite the efforts of Armenian prime ropean Union ex- to countries in the countries in the region. with the country in poor economic minister Nikol Pashinyan to reduce pressed clear sup- region. This vision health, and with Russia having Russia’s influence over the country, port for Azerbaijan’s was reinforced by heavy financial commitments in he has had little success so far and territorial integrity, rather than its the Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea eastern Ukraine and Syria, Moscow regularly finds himself pandering hitherto rather tight-lipped approach. and developments in the Black Sea hardly has money to throw at the to Vladimir Putin. Moscow has had whereby Russia shored up its military The mandate of the EUSR vis-à-vis South Caucasus. Nevertheless, a more accommodating and flex- presence. In short, when it comes to Russia remains a ible approach to Nagorno-Karabakh is limited to sup- security issues there has been no EU very influential Azerbaijan, which porting the official mediation efforts appetite to further challenge Russia player. While the The South Caucasus re- has consistently of the Minsk Group and its co-chairs. over its malign activities. Ultimately, region may not be mains more important followed a “bal- This includes having direct dialogue the EU lacks a clear vision of how to Russia’s top foreign ancing” foreign with the leaders of Azerbaijan and contribute to the region’s security: so to Russia than for any policy priority, the policy between the Armenia and supporting confidence far, Brussels has been unwilling to in- other external player. South Caucasus West and Russia. building measures (CBMs). The EU vest the political and diplomatic cap- remains more im- So far, the Kremlin is not ready to take on a role in the ital necessary to significantly advance portant to Russia has not countered conflict that goes beyond its tradi- regional peace. tional soft power, bottom-up ap- than for any other external player. Baku on this score whilst ensuring proach (promoting people-to-people Russia Moscow thus concerns itself with that Azerbaijan does not cross Rus- reducing the influence of other sia’s interests. contacts and similar peacebuilding ussia has increasingly come initiatives). Only in the event that a Rto see the South Caucasus re- powers, including the EU, which To a large extent, Russia has political agreement is reached would gion as a pivot through which it can Russia continues to consider a nor- played a key role in the stalemate the EU be ready to do more. present itself as a key player in the mative-civilizational competitor in the three states currently have with Yet because the EU does not ade- Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, the shared neighborhood. the EU. Russia uses it military bases quately address the main problems Red Sea, and Caspian Sea regions. Albeit in different ways, Russia in Georgia’s occupied territories to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia Therefore, the South Caucasus is remains deeply embedded in all project power across the region.

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It is also able to manipulate both rapprochement would clearly im- The American withdrawal from to one side as the three states have Azerbaijan and Armenia over the pact the calculus in the foreign pol- the region began under the Obama strengthened cooperation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in icies of the three South Caucasus administration in the context of its economic, political, and defense which Moscow plays a deft game states as it would carry a risk of reset policy with Russia and has spheres. This has effectively culmi- of “good cop, bad cop” whereby it increasing the Kremlin’s influence further gathered speed under the nated in a trilateral alliance, paying simultaneously presents itself as in the region. However, given that Trump administration. Washing- economic dividends to all three peacemaker whilst selling arms to many EU member states continue ton’s attention is countries whilst both Yerevan and Baku, playing the to view Russia as a threat to their se- far more focused deepening Tur- two countries off each other. curity, not only from the Kremlin’s on the Indo-Pa- Aside from the EU and key’s regional foot- Russia, there are four he future shape of Russia’s hard power projection but also due cific region and print. It has also other powers with in- Tties with the West will also to Russia’s interference in elections, countering China. deepened Azerbai- have a significant impact on the rapprochement is still seen as a far- There is no reason terests in the South jan’s influence in South Caucasus. Russia has long fetched scenario. to believe that this Caucasus: the United both Turkey and called for a “Yalta 2”-type confer- Reducing Russia’s influence re- would change in States, Turkey, Iran, Georgia. Although ence to work out a new European mains a priority of all three South the event Joe Biden and China. projects like the security architecture. French presi- Caucasus countries and efforts to is elected presi- Baku-Tbilisi-Kars dent Emmanuel Macron has been a deepen political and economic ties dent. The fact that (BTK) railway leading voice calling for rapproche- with other partners countries con- the United States is no longer so have transformed Azerbaijan and ment with Russia. He opened the tinues apace. interested in the region is crucial in Georgia into a connectivity hub door for Russia’s recent return to the calculus of the three South Cau- between Europe and Asia, they the Parliamentary Assembly of the Other Players casus states in terms of managing have still to deliver real economic their ties with other partners. Council of Europe and the resto- side from the EU and Russia, benefits. ration of military cooperation be- Athere are four other powers hile economic coopera- ran has significant interests in tween France and Russia. He also with interests in the South Caucasus: Wtion with the EU remains Ithe region and views it as part insists that pushing Russia away the United States, Turkey, Iran, and crucially important for all three of a common Iranian cultural area. from the EU is a profound strategic China. Each will be addressed in countries, efforts to strengthen Like Russia, it has not welcomed re- error that will result in an isolated turn, beginning with America. Ar- ties with other neighbors and ex- gional activities by external powers, Russia, increasing tensions with the menia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia ternal powers has been a priority. in particular the United States. As a West or deepening alliances with in would each welcome renewed in- In this sense, Eurasian connec- Shia nation and with some 30 mil- particular, China. In short, Macron terest and engagement from Wash- tivity through the employment of lion ethnic-Azerbaijanis in Iran, claims that Russia could eventually ington. While America remains a various formats has been boosted. Baku has often had a challenging be lost to Beijing’s economic, mili- key partner for Georgia in terms For instance, cooperation between relationship with Iran. Efforts by tary, and technological superiority. of defense cooperation, the sort of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia Tehran to export its brand of Islam While the EU remains committed political engagement that existed in has been particularly successful. have created tensions over the years. to its current sanctions policy vis- the 1990s is missing. However, re- Over the past two decades there Furthermore, the fact that Iran is à-vis Russia at present, Macron’s newed engagement goes against the has been a surge in ties between the viewed as a key partner of Armenia message has gained traction with retrenchment trend that is currently three states. Differences in foreign is also an irritant. Incidents like other EU member states. Such a in vogue in official Washington. and security policies have been put Iran delivering oil to the occupied

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 72 73 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES region of Nagorno-Karabakh are Beijing as an important part of its to face increasing pressure from should be more strategic and less very testing. BRI and investment strategy. This the United States to abstain from patronizing. Its actions must re- Still, the South Caucasus is not importance was reflected in the using the Chinese version. Further- flect its words. Furthermore, there Iran’s top foreign policy priority: May 2019 visit of Chinese foreign more, it remains to seen how the has been a tendency to view de- the Middle East, and to a lesser minister Wang Yi to all three coun- COVID-19 pandemic will impact velopments in the South Caucasus degree Afghanistan, ranks higher. tries. As China aims to diversify its on China’s BRI and consequently through liberal democratic lenses, Nevertheless, Iran is engaged in trade routes, the South Caucasus far-flung regions such as the South failing to take into account the a number of different strategic offers an alternative and shorter Caucasus where Chinese influence bigger picture, particularly related projects, particularly in the en- route to conduct part of its trade. is still rather nascent. to the security environment and ergy sector, with both Azerbaijan In May 2017, Tbilisi concluded the influence of other actors when and Armenia. However, since the a free trade agreement with Bei- The EU’s Bottom Line designing policy instruments. This United States pulled out of the Iran jing, which made Georgia the only he South Caucasus has has sometimes led to ruling elites nuclear deal, launched its “max- post-Soviet country to have such a Tgained more prominence having to pacify Russia. imum pressure” campaign against deal with both the EU and China. in EU foreign policy over the last However, when compared to Tehran, and re-imposed sanctions Meanwhile, the South Caucasus three decades. New bilateral and other external actors, the EU is on the country, many of the Islamic states—particularly Azerbaijan and multilateral framework agree- broadly viewed positively, particu- Republic’s economic projects have Georgia—see China’s BRI and the ments established with Armenia, larly among young people. Efforts been floored. The sanctions bar EU’s connectivity strategy as being Azerbaijan, and Georgia have by EU Delegations to promote the American companies from trading congruent with their respective for- strengthened political and eco- EU throughout the South Cau- with Iran, but also with foreign eign policy agendas, which aim to nomic ties. Nevertheless, today casus via different tools, ranging firms or countries that are dealing transform their countries into re- the South Caucasus is not a pri- from conferences and workshops with Iran. gional connectivity hubs. ority for the EU or for any of its to cultural events, have been suc- astly, China. The three During the COVID-19 pan- member states. Because there is cessful. These activities have played LSouth Caucasus states have demic, China targeted the leaders no direct border with the EU, the a key role in increasing the EU’s vis- been eager to strengthen ties with and the general publics of the three countries are broadly viewed ibility. One of the results has been Beijing. Despite Russia and Iran op- South Caucasus, including using as being less important than, an increase in young people from posing foreign actors engaging with the Shanghai Cooperation Orga- say, Ukraine, which is a direct the South Caucasus studying in uni- the South Caucasus, the fact that nization to promote its narrative neighbor. Relations between the versities in some EU member states, China’s integration projects exclude about its response to the pandemic. EU and all three South Caucasus or taking part in EU educational the United States are supported as In its effort to make inroads, China countries have reached a stale- programs. they are viewed as undermining sent high-profile humanitarian mate, which needs to be overcome. As a consequence of the America’s presence in the region and medical aid missions and pro- Furthermore, despite its increased COVID-19 pandemic, Azerbaijan, While the South Caucasus cannot moted its digital technologies, in- regional footprint, the EU has be- Armenia, and Georgia are facing an be described as priority area in cluding 5G, as the means to keep come less central to the dynamics unprecedented challenge. The pan- China’s foreign policy, there has the virus from spreading. While in the region compared to regional demic will exacerbate many pre- nevertheless been an increase in the there is an obvious interest in powers Russia, Turkey, and Iran. existing conditions like poverty and Middle Kingdom’s presence in the adopting 5G technology, the three The EU lacks a clear strategic mistrust in political elites. While region. The region is of interest to South Caucasus states are likely vision and coherent policy. It the EU is also suffering from the

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 74 75 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES same crisis, it is important that the Here too Brussels should be more When it comes to Nagorno- structures, coupled with a lack of EU continues to support the South strategic and its actions must re- Karabakh, more focus should be U.S. interest in the region, the geo- Caucasus: the risk of the region’s flect its words. In a speech earlier placed on efforts to help bring about political chess board in the South problems affecting the EU should this year, German foreign minister a solution including continuing sup- Caucasus is in flux. The EU needs not be overlooked. With Russia and Heiko Maas claimed that, regard- port for peacebuilding efforts. to double down on its engagement. Turkey having also less of the outcome Moreover, the EU needs to main- It should make a clearer geopo- been very badly hit of America’s presi- tain a united front when it comes litical commitment with a more by the COVID-19 The three South Cau- dential election in geostrategic and security-oriented casus states have been to Russia. A rapprochement with pandemic, neither November, the EU Russia which could lead to the lifting policy. eager to strengthen ties country can offer and its member of sanctions that were put in place If the EU fails to do this, it could with Beijing. the South Caucasus states “will have to following its annexation of Crimea have implications for all three coun- solutions to its eco- think about how to and the war in Donbas would be a tries. Most particularly, a decrease nomic and social better contain the very wrong move. The EU would of Western support for Georgia challenges. On the contrary, the conflicts in Europe’s vicinity, even be seen as rewarding Putin even risks sapping the country’s resolve Kremlin has a history of exploiting without the United States.” though he hasn’t moved an inch on to pursue pro-Western policies. As the internal and external fragility of There are a number of steps that anything. Macron has warned, Europe could all three countries. could be taken in this respect. ith increased engagement “disappear geopolitically” unless it here is an opportunity for First, the mandate of the EUSR Win the South Caucasus by begins to act as a strategic power. Tthe EU to demonstrate that it should be reviewed and revamped other regional actors and China, This sort of action should start in can become a “top-tier geostrategic to include a coordinating role in including via different alliance its own neighborhood. BD actor,” as EU foreign policy chief developing and delivering strategic Josep Borrell recently put it. When engagement with the region. At the considering ways to reduce the moment the EUSR is appointed by, risks of economic overdependence and reports to, EU member states. on China—not least because of This has its benefits, but in order to long supply chains—EU businesses increase coherence he and his team should look to the South Caucasus need to be better integrated in the as three countries that can provide EEAS’s structure. Second, given it a workforce that has the potential has been more than a decade since to produce goods at a high stan- the EUMM was first deployed, it bakudialogues.ada.edu.az dard of quality. This would not needs to be reviewed to ensure that only significantly shorten supply it continues to be fit for purpose. chains, but also strengthen EU- Third, the region’s unresolved con- compatible rules-based economic flicts will play a key role in how the and political systems. region will evolve in the future. The The EU also needs to sharpen high level of engagement that the its tools of engagement with the EU current has with the conflicts region when it comes to security. in Georgia should be maintained.

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iruni’s legacy helps remind us impacted profoundly on the advance Five-Star Hubs Bthat for a millennia or more, of human civilization. Ulugh Beg’s the very name and scope of the Silk Star Catalogue (1437), for example, Conceptual Key to Innovation and Road region (otherwise known was drafted in Samarkand and listed as the Greater Caspian Region, more than one thousand stars; Prosperity Central Eurasia, or several other centuries later it guided western names) invokes the memory of a European sailors on their many long-dormant economic legacy that world-opening voyages of dis- Taleh Ziyadov brought great benefits to a vast and covery. Similarly, Avicenna’s Canon multi-civilizational region for cen- of Medicine, written on the basis of turies. Invoking Biruni today allows consultations of books in promi- ne thousand years ago human history could be compared us also to recall how the cities and nent Silk Road region libraries at two fundamental human chronologically side by side. Isfahan and Hamadan, remained a concepts, namely his- ports of this immensely diverse re- In his book Lost Enlightenment principal manual for European med- toryO and time, were united for the gion were home to one of the most (2013), a preeminent Western significant endeavors of economic, icine over the next 500 years. first time by a great figure of the scholar of the Silk Road region, S. intellectual, and cultural exchange Along with the exchange of goods Silk Road region. Serving at the Frederick Starr, did much to shed in human history. Commercial went the exchange of new ideas court of Qabus ibn Wushmagir light on this largely forgotten figure trade in goods, services, people, and technologies, enriching and (a great scion of the Ziyarid dy- of the golden age of this part of the arts, technology, and ideas flowed advancing the development of so- nasty that ruled over the Southern world. One of the most interesting unhindered between Europe and cieties along the ancient Silk Road. Caspian basin in present-day Iran), episodes in the life of this great man Asia across thousands of kilome- Great cities like Xian, Bukhara, a young man of around thirty by of inquiry is a fascinating and vir- ters by land and sea. In notable Samarkand, Merv, Balkh, Tabriz, the name of Abu Rayhan Mu- tually unprecedented correspon- ways, the ancient Silk Road was a Isfahan, Baghdad, Aleppo, and hammad al-Biruni was provided dence he maintained for two years precursor of the modern concept of with the wherewithal to engage in with Avicenna (Ibn Sina), including Istanbul emerged or grew and acted globalization. a lifelong, systematic quest to try to an enlightening epistolary ex- as strategic commercial hubs, con- understand nations and societies— change on the interpretation of the Biruni’s intellectual output also necting and nourishing continents irrespective of geographic or cul- Aristotelian corpus that touched reminds us how the network of and civilizations. The thriving trade tural provenance—as they under- upon various aspects of philosophy, ancient Silk Roads brought wealth between these and other hubs re- stood themselves. Surpassing even mathematics, astronomy, and the and prosperity to the region’s in- mained the backbone of the region’s Herodotus and Thucydides in in- like. Although its details fall beyond habitants; but also that this wealth economic prosperity for centuries. vestigative open-mindedness, Biruni the scope of this essay, it is sufficient served as a catalyst for creativity that he Silk Road region began also went on to become the first to to say, for present purposes, that drove human development far into Tto fade in importance for a standardize a single, objective time- Biruni stressed time and again that the future. Coeval with the great number of reasons, including the scale measuring system or matrix “evidence, not authority, is what ancient Silk Road network were Crusades, waves of pestilence, and within which all of the particulars of counted,” as Starr put it. major breakthrough discoveries in Mongol conquest. Then, around mathematics, astronomy, geometry, the dawn of the European Industrial Taleh Ziyadov is Director-General of the Baku International Sea Trade Port (Port of medicine, and other areas of theo- Revolution and the entrenchment of Baku) in Azerbaijan. He holds a PhD from the University of Cambridge. retical and practical knowledge that colonialism, significant parts of the

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Silk Road region entered into a deep in 2004 fell under the umbrella of motivation. Does BRI constitute he European Union’s newest period of economic hibernation. the Baku Initiative and aimed to China’s support for global devel- Tstrategy paper on Central As the geography of capital flows foster cooperation in transporta- opment and infrastructure; or is Asia, which came out in May 2019, was reoriented, investment dried tion infrastructure in the context Beijing seeking long-term global also prioritizes connectivity whilst up, and the ties that bound the Silk of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy. domination through BRI? Xi Jin- placing greater emphasis on the Road region together began to fall Then, in 2007, the EU adopted its ping has consistently emphasized importance of establishing part- apart. As other parts of the world initial Strategy for a New Partner- economic interdependence, un- nerships in regulatory and stan- prospered, much of the region fell ship with the countries of Central derscoring that BRI aims to recon- dard setting. behind. Inventions like steamboats, Asia. Just like with various ini- nect three continents covering a However, it was a 2018 document ocean-going vessels, and shipping tiatives with regards to the South population of 4,4 billion people, that truly systematized the EU’s containers further changed the for- Caucasus (e.g. the Eastern Part- and some have estimated its total approach to the Silk Road region, tunes of the once-affluent, land-based nership program, sundry Associ- investment output to be in the officially called the Connecting ation Agreements, and free trade Silk Road across Central Eurasia. neighborhood of $20 trillion by Europe and Asia: Building Blocks deals), it too prioritized upgrading Today, most Euro-Asian trade its anticipated completion in the for an EU Strategy. This document transport, energy, and digital bypasses the region, and so do the middle of the century. Xi has also came to be adopted in the wake of infrastructure. attendant benefits. Large ships spoken of BRI’s ultimate aim to an important European Bank for carrying thousands of containers The United States also had the establish an “open and peaceful Reconstruction and Development have replaced the ancient camel idea to strategically revive the an- community of shared interests, re- (EBRD) study that calculated the caravans. They now carry most cient Silk Road. In 2011, Secretary sponsibilities, and commitments total cost of the region’s infrastruc- of the trade between Europe and of State Hillary Clinton unveiled to freer trade, integrated economic ture requirements in the transpor- Asia via the Suez Canal; this con- a vision of regional economic in- growth, and cultural enrichment.” tation, energy, ICT, and water areas stitutes more than 90 percent of tegration and infrastructure con- to be €1.2 trillion over a five year all cargo exchanged between the nectivity under the New Silk Road To that end, China has reached period (2018-2022). out to a number of regions, of- two continents. moniker, as part of a plan to en- The 2018 document defined, for fering soft loans, building roads hance the political stability of Af- the first time, the EU’s “vision for a Revival Initiatives and railways, funding and/or ghanistan. This later become sub- new and comprehensive strategy to n September 2013, during a visit sumed as one aspect of the Obama buying key infrastructure projects, better connect Europe and Asia.” It Iby Chinese president Xi Jin- Administration’s “pivot to Asia.” including ports. So far, the Chi- thus represents the bloc’s intention ping to Kazakhstan, he and his host eanwhile, One Belt, One nese have spent some $200 billion for full-on engagement with the Silk Nursultan Nazarbayev breathed MRoad became officially on BRI-related projects, and total Road region as a whole. This flag- new life into the idea of reviving the known as the Belt and Road investment could reach $1.3 tril- ship EU communication contains once prosperous ancient Silk Road Initiative (BRI) and was sub- lion by 2027. In providing finan- “concrete policy proposals and ini- through the unveiling of the One sequently declared by the Chi- cial and development assistance to tiatives to improve connections be- Belt, One Road initiative. nese government to constitute its neighbors and BRI participating tween Europe and Asia, including Conceptual predecessors from global development strategy. Such states, China aims to connect its through interoperable transport, the 1990s include the EU’s Trans- a declaration provoked politi- internal hard infrastructure and energy, and digital networks.” It port Corridor Europe Caucasus cians and specialists from around diversify its sources of imports— also defines the “European way” Asia (TRACECA) program, which the world into questioning its energy-related and otherwise. of approaching investments in

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 80 81 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES connectivity: these In other words, nature of the emerging twenty-first In other words, the core eco- need to be “sus- The core economic logic the EU stresses century version. Unlike today’s great nomic logic of the ancient Silk tainable, compre- of the ancient Silk Road that connectivity maritime ports, the leading com- Road was not about connecting hensive, and rules- was not about connect- is as much about, mercial cities of the Silk Road region roads and building infrastructure. based,” it says—or ing roads and building to emphasize were land-based hubs. They served It was about hubs and their contri- as the EU’s then-for- infrastructure. It was Mogherini’s words, as critical logistics and distribution butions to the social and economic eign policy chief about hubs and their “physical” infra- centers for merchants caravanning prosperity of their host societies. Federica Mogherini structure (e.g. rail- on journeys lasting In my view, the defined it, con- contributions to the ways, roads, pipe- months and even twenty-first cen- nectivity is under- social and economic lines) as it is about years spanning Cooperation between tury version of the stood to be the sum prosperity of their host its “non-physical” three continents. neighboring countries Silk Road will de- total of both “the societies. aspects (e.g. cus- These hubs all as well as with the pend on getting all physical and non- toms procedures, hosted caravanse- world’s major econo- the relevant stake- physical infrastruc- legal frameworks, rais, where goods mies is vital to the suc- holders to work in ture through which goods, ser- technical standards). This holistic and ideas were common cause to cess of the region as a build and connect vices, ideas, and people can flow approach—the “European way,” exchanged, and whole twenty-first cen- unhindered.” as the strategy puts it—is meant people and cultures tury hubs that to- According to the EU’s 2018 to be contrasted to the perceived met and mixed. gether contribute strategy, sustainability refers not ways of others. hese trading centers varied to regional social and economic only to high environmental stan- Ancient Hubs, not Roads in function as much as they prosperity. dards, but also to social, economic, variedT in their respective con- or the countries of the Silk and fiscal dimensions. The docu- tributions to economic growth: Three Phases Road region, the fundamental ment’s reference to a comprehen- F some were just small and modest any will continue to question is this: how will all these sive approach indicates a desire to stopover places, others were great speculate about the true plans, strategies, and initiatives im- M promote the EU internal market’s cities acting as hives of commerce nature and potential impact of pact on their economies? How will free movement of people, goods, and innovation. Think of a vast not only BRI but also its alterna- they help growth and prosperity? and services as a model to emulate, number of one-star, three-star, and tive models whilst seeking clarity For us in Azerbaijan, there is an including lessening the regulatory five-star hotels scattered across on the important question of additional question—the answer to burden on trade. Thus, the EU Eurasia, connected by a network of whether they are ultimately com- which we believe could have a posi- seeks to promote regional integra- continental routes and corridors. plementary. Yet the prevailing view tive impact on the geography of the tion within the Silk Road geography While one-star stopovers offered amongst policymakers in the Silk entire region: how can Azerbaijan’s through its 2018 strategy. Lastly, just food and accommodation, Road region is that a way can be the emphasis on a rules-based ap- hub strategy contribute to building five-star trading megacities were found to ensure each contributes proach is meant to assure a level the twenty-first-century Silk Road? the ancient equivalent of Silicon positively to the emergence and playing field for economic opera- We can begin with a basic ques- Valley: places in which vibrant development of new hubs across tors competing in a well-regulated tion: what was the economic basis commercial activity also engen- our geography. That is certainly market, including transparency in of the ancient Silk Road? Under- dered science, technology, ideas, in- the Chinese view, and it also seems procurement procedures. standing this will help explain the novation, and enlightenment. to be that of the EU.

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This last speaks, in my opinion, major economies is vital to the suc- The critical question here is how Over the past thirty years, to the necessity of adopting a hub cess of the region as a whole. much will these developments ben- Azerbaijan has used its vast oil strategy for the region; this, in turn, efit the economies and peoples of and gas resources to modernize its necessitates a three-phase path of Third, over the next decade or the Silk Road region itself? The an- transport and logistics infrastruc- development. First, each country two, the Belt and Road Initiative swer will depend in large part on ture, including road, rail, ports, in the Silk Road geography must will bring about major transfor- the policies and strategies adopted and airports. Its strategic “hub vi- ensure its infrastructure is up to mations across the Silk Road ge- by their respective governments, sion” for economic diversification international standards. Without ography—all the more so when working closely with the major has stimulated thinking about a good roads, railways, ports, and put alongside the plans, strategies, powers and other partners. common vision for this part of the airports, no state can hope to and initiatives of others. A robust world: the restoration of the Silk achieve economic network of inno- Azerbaijan’s Hub Strategy Road region as one of the world’s development and vative twenty-first- oday, we are on the threshold great geographies of commerce. will surely lose out century intercon- There will be open com- of emerging twenty-first cen- ort of Baku is the oldest and in the competition necting hubs is T petition between the tury hubs that will reactivate the amongst the largest ports for key hub status poised to emerge as P hubs that emerge, but underused potential for land-based in the Caspian Sea, close to huge along the twen- the economic back- only a few will achieve trade between Europe and Asia. markets in the EU, Turkey, Iran, ty-first century bone of Euro-Asian five-star hub status. Giving new life to the ancient land- Russia, and China. For centuries a Silk Road. The task commerce, linking based Silk Road can only raise the key maritime gateway between East for governments regional and global profiles of Azerbaijan and its new and West, today’s port is already a across the region is markets in new Port of Baku. The country’s stra- transit bridge between Europe and clear: build the core infrastructure ways. There will be open competi- tegic location at the crossroads of Asia. It aims to become something that will match the ambitions of the tion between the hubs that emerge, major Eurasian land and air trans- more, however: a keystone five-star twenty-first century. but only a few will achieve five-star port corridors is entrenching its hub of the Silk Road region—a dy- Second, once the internal infra- hub status. status as a vital Silk Road region namic center of distribution and structure is made fit for purpose, his means that we are likely trade and logistics hub. added value in the heart of Eurasia. connectivity becomes the crit- to witness soon the creation In Beijing in April 2019, the T Due to the limited expansion ical issue. Most countries in the of the aforementioned hub net- second Belt and Road Forum capacity of the old port located Silk Road region are landlocked work and the selection of strategic heard Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham in downtown Baku, in 2007 the and depend on each other for im- hubs across the Silk Road region Aliyev, state that port/export and transit activity. and beyond. We know the Chinese Azerbaijani government decided the creation of modern transpor- Consequently, mechanisms of government is already planning to tation infrastructure is one of the to move the port to a new location smooth connectivity need to be put develop more than 200 domestic priorities of Azerbaijan. Using near Alat, a township 70 km south in place between the region’s roads hubs; they are likely to be linked our geographical location, we in- of the city, at the junction of flag- vest in building bridges between ship east-west and north-south and railways, on the one hand, and to global hub networks across the Asia and Europe [...]. The Belt major markets like those repre- world. The European Union is and Road Initiative not only cre- connectivity corridors. Its 400 sented by the European Union and also upping its game, as is Russia, ates opportunities in transporta- hectares are in the midst of rapid, China, on the other hand. Clearly, which makes it likely that the tion but enhances trade, tourism, phased development. With the people-to-people contacts, [and] cooperation between neighboring United States, India, Pakistan, and serves the cause of stability and first phase having been completed countries as well as with the world’s Turkey will not be far behind. security and peace in Eurasia. in May 2018, the port became the

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 84 85 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES region’s largest transshipment and for future businesses operating in workshops run under the auspices as an ISO 9001:2015 Quality multi-purpose port, with an an- the free economic zone (FEZ) in of the Technical Assistance and Management System Standard nual throughput capacity of 15 and around Port of Baku. In the Information Exchange (TAIEX) in- certificate in January 2019. This million tons of freight and 100,000 same year, the president signed a strument of the European Commis- policy went hand in hand with a TEU. Its operational capacity decree that addressed the establish- sion. It has also been the recipient strategy to help implement the UN is expected to reach 25 million ment of the FEZ’s authorized body of several EuropeAID-funded proj- Sustainable Development Goals— tons and 500,000 TEU, based on and its operational frames and re- ects that supported the enhance- in particular SDG7 (Affordable future expansion plans. sponsibilities. All this was done to ment of the new port’s operational and Clean Energy), SDG9 Port of Baku is also the launch stimulate growth in Azerbaijan’s and human resources capabilities. (Industry, Innovation, and pad for the new Baku-Tbilisi- non-oil economy and create a lu- Moreover, the port has been active Infrastructure), and SDG17 (Global Kars (BTK) railway, which crative, stable, and protected cli- in securing agreements with major Partnerships). The conscious links Azerbaijan, Georgia, and mate for new sources of foreign di- European interests to strengthen choice to adopt cutting-edge Turkey with the geography rect investment. and expand freight traffic from technologies—particularly with re- of Europe. In operation since To respond to those strategic Europe to the Silk Road regards to energy use, waste manage- October 2017, it connects China and developments, Port of Baku itself gion and beyond via the Trans- ment, air quality, digitalization, and Central Asia with Turkey, the initiated large-scale reforms. By Caspian International Transport automation—has been supported European Union, and the 2025, the port plans to become a Route. Its partnership with and recognized at the European Mediterranean (via Mersin Port). mainly landlord port. It will work Austria’s ÖBB Rail Cargo Group level. As result of these efforts, in In fact, Port of Baku and BTK are with leading multinationals to de- and the Dutch Cabooter Group— October 2019, Port of Baku became effectively indispensable compo- velop fertilizer and grain termi- formalized in November 2019— the first port in the Caspian basin to nents of anyone’s strategy to de- nals, develop its holistic digital Port is but the latest example of stra- be recognized as a “Green Port” by the velop a transportation corridor Community System, and build tegic efforts to expand a critical European Sea Ports Organization. connecting Asia with Europe. news terminals to accommodate East-West transport corridor from Lastly, Port of Baku has been Like the Silk Road region’s meg- container, intermodal, and bulk Europe’s busiest logistics hubs in The working with the OSCE to launch acities of old, Port of Baku will add liquid traffic, as well as other fa- Netherlands and Germany to a forward-looking project entitled value to cargo shipments between cilities required for a twenty- Turkey, Azerbaijan, Central Asia, “Promoting Green Ports and Europe and Asia and become a first-century port to thrive. and ultimately China. Connectivity in the Caspian Sea major destination for international ort of Baku will also continue At the same time, Port of Baku has Region.” Implementation began business seeking a regional head- Pto develop cross-border co- become a pioneer in implementing in June 2019 and this first-of-its- quarters in Eurasia. Some 130 operation with various parties, best practices related to health, safety, kind regional endeavor has already million people live within 1,000 including the EU, to enhance the and environmental standards. In begun exploring ways in which op- km of Port of Baku—all poten- operational effectiveness of its new September 2017, it was awarded timal use of renewable energy, dig- tial customers of companies and facility. The EU, for instance, has OHSAS 18001:2007 Occupational italization, and trade and transport businesses that would set up shop provided technical assistance that Health and Safety Management facilitation can be made to promote in Azerbaijan. To facilitate this, in has enabled the port to compete Certification. This was followed in sustainable connectivity. May 2018 the Milli Majlis (par- in a very competitive international December 2018 by the acquisition of In short, anticipated develop- liament) adopted a law providing and regional environment through an ISO 14001:2015 Environmental ments will make Azerbaijan an special tax and customs incentives various expert missions and Management Certificate as well ideal place for cargo traffic between

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Europe and Asia, and the develop- ture: highways, railways, ports, ment model offered by Azerbaijan and airports. Since 2015, the and Port of Baku echoes the five- focus has been on integrating star hubs of the ancient Silk Road: the country’s infrastructure the goal being not to just buy and with neighbors like Georgia, sell, but to add value, innovate, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, and develop the local economy Russia, and Iran. By 2030, Azer- and society. baijan will fully become five-star hub, thus renewing its historical New Synergies position as a keystone commercial he countries of the Silk Road center of the Silk Road region. Tregion are building new syn- The legacy of the era personified ergies to secure their respective by the example of Biruni both re- places in the globalized economic minds us of the golden age of the and political arenas of the future Silk Road region and can presently by renewing and reworking the an- serve as a signpost of the strategic cient Silk Road that once connected opportunities on offer in our cur- Europe and Asia. Azerbaijan will rent era. In the past, hubs served as continue to be a key regional actor the backbone of a robust and inter- in shaping the region’s transforma- connected network promoting con- tive vision. nectivity, open-mindedness, and The country’s hub strategy envis- innovation. Global trends indicate ages an integrated, cohesive, and ef- a similar set of circumstances are ficient multimodal project of supply now ripe again: working in tandem chain and logistics hubs within its with partners, the Silk Road region borders and abroad. This vision can accomplish in the time ahead a is likely to be emulated elsewhere hoped-for restoration of wealth and in the Silk Road geography as the prosperity to a geography emerging transformational changes initiated once again onto the world stage. by the various connectivity plans, Port of Baku and other potential strategies, and initiatives of the re- one-, three-, and five-star hubs will gion’s partners begin to be seen and need to play supporting roles in the felt on the ground. modern-day endeavor to bring back The first two phases of the economic, intellectual, and cultural country’s hub strategy have been flourishing to this part of the world, already completed. Between predicated on the unimpeded flow 2007 and 2015, Azerbaijan built of goods, services, people, arts, and renewed major infrastruc- technology, and ideas. BD

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revolution that is reconceptualizing possible emergence of a new para- Eurasia, the Hegemon, and the understanding of sovereignty. digm; and the overall reconfigura- So it is with this introduction tion of the international system. the Three Sovereigns that I would ask readers to imagine A useful starting point may be to this admitedly unorthodox head- explore some of the ideas contained line: “Michel Foucault to the in the book Necropolitics (2019) by Pepe Escobar rescue: where shall Achille Mbembe, we find the real a Sorbonne-edu- Sovereign, now?” Against all odds, the Silk cated Cameroo- t is my contention that there subsidiary—and these three inde- To unpack this Road region has man- nian philosopher are essentially four truly sover- pendent Eurasian powers. It is im- mysterious phrase aged to become, notwith- and political the- eign states in the world today, perative therefore for the core states we will need to standing the few obvious orist. The book atI least amongst the major powers: that make up the Silk Road region turn to a number theorizes the gene- exceptions, a bastion of the United States, the Russian Fed- to grasp the strategic conceptual of other contempo- alogy of the con- eration, the People’s Republic of trends that stand behind the geo- rary thinkers and stability in an increas- temporary world, China, and the Islamic Republic of political interplay taking place concepts, many ingly vacillating and un- a world plagued by Iran. These four sovereigns—I call in a part of the world people like of which may be predictable world. ever-increasing in- them the Hegemon and the Three Zbigniew Brzezinski rightly called unfamiliar. Please equality, militariza- Sovereigns—stand at the vanguard the “world’s axial supercontinent.” bear with me. tion, and enmity, as of the ultra-postmodern world, Against all odds, the Silk Road he most influential phi- by a resurgence of retrograde forces characterized by the supremacy of region has managed to become, Tlosopher currently writing determined to exclude and subju- data algorithms and techno-finan- notwithstanding the few obvious in the German language— gate progressive attempts to build cialization ruling over politics. exceptions, a bastion of stability in who happens to be a South a more equitable and just world. It so happens that these Three an increasingly vacillating and un- Korean by birth—is Byung- One of the main trusts of the book Sovereigns constitute the three key predictable world. In the coming Chul Han. He has recently been is Mbembe’s attempt to pierce far nodes of Eurasian integration and period, regional leaders will need making the argument that the ef- beyond sovereignty as interpreted the top three existential “threats” to figure out how to build upon this fects of the COVID-19 pandemic in conventional political science to the Hegemon, according to the foundation of stability to create a may very well lead to a redefinition and predominant international re- U.S. National Security Strategy. region defined by the sort of dyna- of the concept of sovereignty (in his lations narratives. The story of the young twenty-first mism that reinforced the stability words: “the sovereign is the one who Mbembe revisits Michel Fou- century will continue to revolve that serves as the basis of the entire resorts to data”). cault’s famous lectures delivered around the clash between the construction. They will have to do With this in mind, let us attempt at the College de France in 1975- United States—joined by its NATO so in the context of an ongoing data to mix this insight with what may 1976, in which he conceptualized constitute the three major inter- biopower as the domain of life over locking issues further on down the which power has absolute control. Pepe Escobar is Editor-at-Large at Asia Times in Hong Kong and a columnist for rocky road of twenty-first-century Foucault himself defined biopower Washington, DC-based Consortium News as well as for Strategic Culture, based in Moscow. A foreign correspondent since 1985, he is working on his next book geopolitics: the appalling manage- as “an explosion of numerous and provisionally titled The New Silk Roads and Eurasian Integration. ment of the COVID-19 crisis; the diverse techniques for achieving the

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 90 91 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES subjugation of bodies and the con- sovereignty is about society’s ca- ow, Mbembe stresses how terror in slow motion—needs to trol of populations.” On this basis, pacity for self-creation with re- N“racial thinking more than address the legacy of slavery, one Mbembe develops the relation course to institutions inspired class thinking (where class is an of the first instances of biopolit- of biopower with sovereignty— by specific social and imagi- operator defining history as an eco- ical experimentation. As Mbembe Imperium—and the state of excep- nary significations, as Cornelius nomic struggle between classes) stresses, the structure of the plan- tion, as conceptualized by Giorgio Castoriadis reminded us in The has been the ever-present shadow tation system—and its dire conse- Agamben. Mbembe tells us that, Imaginary Institution of Society hovering over Western political quences—express the paradoxical “the ultimate expression of sover- (1975). But, in fact, sovereignty thought and practice, especially figure of the state of exception. eignty is the production of general is above all defined as the right to when the point was to contrive the The slave condition includes loss norms by a body (the demos) com- kill in defiance of international law. inhumanity of foreign peoples and of home, loss of rights over his/ prising free and equal individuals.” This has become a characteristic of the sort of domination to be ex- her body, and loss of political Then these individuals are con- the various expeditionary adven- ercised over them.” For Foucault, status. Think of Nagorno-Karabakh sidered as full subjects capable of tures conducted around the world racism is above all a technology (“Artsakh is Armenia, and that’s self-understanding, self-conscious- for decades by the Hegemon. allowing the exercise of biopower. it”) or Palestine, for that matter ness, and self-representation. Foucault’s notion of biopower In the economy of biopower, the (“there are no Palestinians”). Loss Thus politics is defined as a must be freshly examined in the function of racism is to regulate the is equal to absolute domination, project of autonomy and as the myriad declinations of the state of distribution of death and to enable alienation and social death—as in process of reaching an agreement exception and the state of siege. the state’s killing machine. It goes de facto expulsion from humanity. within a collective, through com- Biopower in Foucault divides without saying that this biopower The colony—and the apartheid munication and recognition. The people into those allowed to live mechanism is inbuilt in the func- system—operates a synthesis be- problem is that in ultra-postmo- and those who must die. Now bio- tioning of all modern states. tween massacre and bureaucracy, dernity, this whole project has power is applied in much more Mbembe reminds us how the that “incarnation of Western ratio- been shattered. Relations have been subtle ways—especially through material premise of Nazi extermi- nality” as noted by Hannah Arendt debased to a permanent state of economic sanctions capable of pro- nation is to be found in colonial in The Origins of Totalitarianism Hybrid War. voking slow death. imperialism and in the serializa- (1951). ate modernity revolved Control presupposes a distribution of technical mechanisms for he point is that the technol- Laround a paradigm whereby tion of human species into groups, outing people to death, developed Togies that produced Nazism reason is the truth of the subject a subdivision of the population into between the industrial revolution— have a strong affinity to those that and politics is the exercise of reason subgroups, and the establishment as shown, for instance, in Priya resulted in the plantation and the in the public sphere. And that ex- of a biological divide between these Satia’s Empire of Guns (2018)—and colony. And as Foucault showed, ercise of reason corresponds to the subgroups. Foucault used to relate the First World War. That’s how Nazism and Stalinism only am- exercise of freedom—a key element the whole process to racism—a the working classes and the “stateless plified a series of already existing for individual autonomy. concept that was not simply based people” of the industrial world found mechanisms of Western European Mbembe wistfully evokes the “ro- on the color of one’s skin, as in the their equivalent in the “savages” or social and political formation: sub- mance of sovereignty” that rests black/white dichotomy, but one “barbarians” of the colonial world. jugation of the body, health regula- on the belief that the subject is that took into account all sorts of There is no question that an ad- tions, social Darwinism, eugenics, both master and controlling author racial and ethnic gradations pre- equate historical narrative of the medico-legal theories on heredity, of his own meaning. Exercising supposing Western hegemony. rise of modern terror—and modern degeneration, and race.

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The colony thus represents a stresses they are, “ideally, hit- yung Chul-Han takes the production taking place under place in which sovereignty funda- and-run affairs,” manifestations of Bconceptual consequences of relentless pressure. mentally consists in exercising a which have been seen recently in Mbembe’s analysis one step be- Algorithms are capable of nu- power outside the law and in which parts of the Silk Road region. yond. Necropower is the least of merization yet are incapable of “peace” assumes the face of End- What is emerging alongside our problems when the whole Kan- producing a narrative. To think less War. Not by accident did the conventional armies—NATO in tian world—predicated on a faith is way more substantive than to Pentagon reinvented the concept— Afghanistan surrounded by a maze that humanity, as a free and au- merely calculate. In other words, the terminology used was “the long of contractors, for instance—are tonomous subject, shapes the for- there is an erotic aspect to thinking, war”—immediately after 9/11. This “war machines,” as in a corporate mative and legislative instance of which traces its roots back to clas- ties in with the definition of sover- bastardization of the concept elabo- knowledge—is dead. sical Greek philosophy: remember eignty by Carl Schmitt in the early rated in the 1980 book A Thousand The new emerging paradigm is “Eros, the most ancient God ac- twentieth century: the “power Plateaus by Gilles Deleuze and Félix the product of a Copernican an- cording to Parmenides,” to quote to decide the state of exception.” Guattari. This metamorphosis de- thropological turn. Data is the New Martin Heidegger. Deep down, to Think of the Hegemon’s hot wars fines, for instance, the mini-galaxy Sovereign. Man has abdicated the exercise free thinking is to play, as (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya) and of “moderate rebels” in Syria. They role of producer of knowledge to Georges Bataille used to say. “We proxy wars (Syria, Yemen). borrow from regular armies and the profit of data. Data-ism thus are all players,” Baudrillard stressed, Late modern colonial occupa- incorporate new elements adapted finishes off whatever lineaments “in ardent wait for those occasion- tion is a disciplinary, biopolitical, to the principle of segmentation of idealism and humanism had ally rational chains to dissipate.” and necropolitical mix. Mbembe and deterritorialization—a mix be- characterized the Enlightenment. To think is essentially subversive. concludes that the “most accom- tween a political organization and Knowledge is now produced by a Calculus is erotic and rectilinear; plished form of necropower” is the a mercantile enterprise, operating binary (war) ma- thinking implies a neo-colonial occupation of Pales- through capture and depredation. chine—and that, sinuous trajectory: tine, featuring no continuity be- of course, applies Data is the New Sover- Homo ludens. Thus Mbembe shows how necropol- eign. Man has abdicat- tween ground and the sky; drones itics is reconfiguring the relations to Necropower as Byung Chul-Han’s ed the role of produc- crammed with sensors; aerial re- between resistance (think the Axis well. Man himself formulation: from connaissance jets; early warning of Resistance: Iran, Iraq, Syria, has been reduced er of knowledge to the Myth to Data, real, Hawkeye procedures; assault heli- Hezbollah), sacrifice (as in fighting to a mere and cal- profit of data. critical, creative copters; satellites; techniques of ho- ISIS/Daesh jihadi fanaticism), and culable accumula- thinking totally lost logrammatization; medieval siege terror (as applied by strands of tion of data. its playful element. warfare adapted to the networked “moderate rebels”). The Hegemon, The consequence is inevitable: nd so we come to the sprawl of urban refugee camps and for its part, continues to practice total communication coincides ACOVID-19 pandemic. Here systematic bulldozing. Necropower—as in deploying with total vigilance. We have en- it would be helpful to refer to the Obviously, there are other necro- weapons in the interest of maximally tered the realm of what may be writings of Giorgio Agamben, who power examples, as well. Zygmunt destroying people’s living conditions called “Discipline and Punish did in fact square the circle: it’s not Bauman noted already in the 2000s and creating what Mbembe defines as 2.0.” Our whole reality—or, to that citizens across the West have that the wars of globalization are “death-worlds,” namely unique forms evoke the late Jean Baudrillard, the right to health safety, he has not about conquest, acquisition, of social existence in which vast pop- our whole simulacra—is subjected written, it’s the fact that now they and takeover of territory. Mbembe ulations have the status of living dead. to the logic of non-stop for-profit have been juridically forced to be

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 94 95 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES healthy. And that, in a nutshell, is Nassim Taleb’s concept of “anti- from Black Swans and almost never organized. But the key point is not what biosecurity—a data process— fragile,” elaborated in a 2012 book get any benefit.” The central point that Asian disciplinary society might is all about. of the same name, might be helpful of the Black Swan problem, Taleb be seen as a model for the West. Obviously, there are conven- here. “Antifragility is beyond resil- says, “is that the odds of rare events We already live in a digital global tional advantages to biosecurity. ience or robustness. The resilient are simply not computable.” Panopticum—a sort of Foucault- Nonetheless—and equally obvi- resists shocks and stays the same; et COVID-19 was a Black on-steroids situation. Social network ously—we cannot escape the fact the antifragile gets better,” he writes. YSwan, but only of a sort: after vigilance—and censorship—deployed that biosecurity is an ultra-efficient “This property is behind every- all, deciding elites knew for quite by the Silicon Valley behemoths has governance paradigm. Citizens thing that has changed with time: some time that something like it already been internalized. All our have had it imposed with virtually evolution, culture, ideas, revolu- was inevitably coming—even as data as citizens is trafficked and inno political debate whatsoever. tions, political systems, technolog- mediocre Western politicians were stantly marketized for private profit. The enforcement, as Agamben has ical innovation, cultural and eco- caught totally unprepared. So digital neo-feudalism was already in effect even before the onset of the noted, killed “any political activity nomic success, corporate survival, Antifragile might lead, optimisti- COVID-19 pandemic. and any social relation as the max- [...] even our own existence as a cally, to a reduction in fragility and imum example of civic participa- species on this planet.” The classic greater robustness. Yet there is no n previous writings I had called tion [in the West].” example of something antifragile evidence, so far, that a “reduction Iit “surveillance turbo-neoliber- That is how the West came to is Hydra, the Greek mythological in fragility” within the framework alism” in which there is no inbuilt experience social distancing as creature that has numerous heads. of the current international system, “freedom” in the Western sense and an entirely new, unprecedented When one is cut off, two grow back such as it is, will invariably lead to- everything is accomplished by vol- political model—with a (flawed) in its place. wards “greater robustness.” In fact, untary servitude. Biopolitical sur- digital matrix replacing human As he explains, “Antifragile is the international veillance is just a interaction, which by definition the antidote to Black Swans.” The system has never further layer in the from now on will be regarded as modern world may increase tech- been so fragile as it We are witnessing the whole process— fundamentally suspicious and po- nical knowledge, but it will also is presently. What onset of data as the New the final frontier, litically “contagious.” make things more fragile. “Black we do have is plenty Sovereign. so to speak—because now, as Fou- Agamben had to be appalled by this Swans hijack our brains, making of indications that cault taught us, this “concept for the destiny of human so- us feel we ‘sort of’ or ‘almost’ pre- the system col- paradigm controls our own bodies. ciety that in many aspects seems to dicted them, because they are ret- lapse is being refitted, at breakneck “Liberalism” has been reduced to road have borrowed from religions in de- rospectively explainable. We don’t speed, as digital neo-feudalism. To kill a long time ago. The point is not cline the apocalyptic idea of the end realize the role of these Swans in life repeat: we are witnessing the onset that China may eventually become the of the world.” In ultra-postmodernity, because of this illusion of predict- of data as the New Sovereign. model for the West but rather that the economics had already replaced poli- ability.” The potency of randomness Asian-wide collectivist spirit tics—as in everything subjected to the is underestimated: “when we see it, and discipline in the fight against West may have been set up for an end- diktats of financial capitalism. Now we fear it and overreact. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic— less biopolitical quarantine without the economy is being absorbed by this fear and thirst for order, some especially in Confucianist-influenced people even noticing it. “the new biosecurity paradigm to human systems, by disrupting the societies—has worked irrespec- In realpolitik terms, the post- which every other imperative must invisible or not so visible logic of tive of the political system within lockdown turbo-capitalist frame- be sacrificed.” things, tend to be exposed to harm which the countries in question are work points to a calcification of the

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 96 97 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES sort of illiberalism privileged by the So the planet may rest in peace: security system,” made it clear that national security law in Hong one percent in the West, coupled Davos Man will push the button, the Western neoliberal system is Kong. According to the official with naked turbo-financialization and a Brave New World will en- facing the worst financial meltdown Chinese readout of the call, Xi re- boosted by the reinforced exploita- lighten us all. in recorded history. He underscored ferred explicitly to “external sab- tion of an exhausted and now in- ut let us come back to the the point that a new international otage and intervention” in his dis- creasingly unemployed workforce. Breal world. Apart from the system will, by necessity, have to cussion with Putin. Throughout the pandemic, the Hegemon, arguably there are only be brought online. Otherwise, he As much as “external sabotage plutocrats at the helm of hegemonic three real Sovereigns left in ultra- noted, the world will be facing the and intervention” is bound to reach capital interests—well-equipped to postmodernity: Russia, China and imposition of a de facto hybrid neo- fever pitch, the Belt and Road Ini- coopt and even sabotage anything Iran. NATO members are not more fascist “solution.” tiative (BRI), complete with all its that threatens their standing—have than unevenly glorified vassals, as Russia, China, various branches not stood on the sides. Consider U.S. President Donald Trump has and Iran are not in- and derivations— the long planned ironically made tended to become The story of the young polar, space, World Economic rather evident in constitutive ele- twenty-first century will health, informa- Forum’s initia- The planet may rest in various public ments of the Davos tion, and so on— statements. continue to revolve tive, scheduled to peace: Davos Man will “Great Reset.” As around the clash be- will continue to take place in Jan- it stands, Moscow be deployed as the push the button, and a To repeat: these tween the Hegemon and uary 2021, called Three Sovereigns and Beijing are Chinese roadmap Brave New World will Eurasia’s three indepen- The Great Reset. enlighten us all. happen to consti- more like playing for the twenty-first According to the tute, simultane- “dragon in the dent major powers. century, which has World Economic ously, the three fog”—a delightful seen partnerships Forum, it is defined key nodes of Chinese concept established with vir- as a “commitment to jointly and ur- Eurasia integration and are defined evoked by former Kremlin adviser tually all the countries of the Silk Road gently build the foundations of our as constituting the top three exis- Alexey Chesnakov according to region, as well as many, many more. economic and social system for a tential “threats” to the Hegemon, which a strong player, in a complex In parallel with BRI, Russia is more fair, sustainable and resilient according to the U.S. National space, is able to strike at his com- advancing the Eurasia Economic future.” Security Strategy. The story of the petitors at any moment from an un- Union (EAEU) as well as its own This “reset” is meant to elaborate young twenty-first century will expected angle. New Silk Road vectors focused on a “new social contract centered on continue to revolve around the clash This is the key takeaway from Arctic development, space explo- human dignity, social justice and between the Hegemon and Eurasia’s the lengthy telephone conversation ration, biospheric engineering, where societal progress does not fall three independent major powers. held between Putin and Xi Jinping and fusion power. BRI and EAEU behind economic development” by At his June 2020 Moscow Parade in mid-July in which they discussed are in a process of congruence and “connecting key global governmental speech celebrating the seventy-fifth virtually all aspects of the evolving achieving, slowly but surely, some and business leaders in Davos with anniversary of the allied victory in Russo-Chinese strategic partner- sort of merger. For instance, the a global multistakeholder network Second World War, Vladimir Putin, ship—a conversation that took development of the Russian Far in 400 cities around the world for a while stressing “friendship and trust place against the background of East is one of the great projects forward-oriented dialogue driven by between nations” and the neces- Russia’s constitutional referendum of the twenty-first century, which the younger generation.” sity to achieve a “common reliable and the announcement of the new is conceived to be achieved in

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 98 99 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES partnership with China, Japan, with the intention of atrophying it terms of trade and investment— The case of Iran is extremely South Korea, and India. geopolitically to a level, in the wild was one of them. complex—not least because of the The interpolation of BRI and dreams of some Western policy- But since Xi’s 2013 announce- delicate political balancing inbuilt EAEU is an open system, based on makers, comparable to the “century ment establishing the vision of in a unique Shia theo-democracy. a set of principles, with a special of humiliation.” BRI as a matchless roadmap for Even facing the Hegemon’s relent- place for “win-win” partnerships Yan Xuetong, Dean of the globalization 2.0—in fact, as the less “maximum pressure,” Supreme in trade, economics, and politics. Institute of International Relations only credible game in town—the Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei The Western equivalent would be at Tsinghua University, recently ar- process of decoupling became all has managed to regiment society the Westphalian system that es- gued that Cold War 2.0, unlike the but inevitable. by drawing on the formidable Shia ethic of resistance. As a priceless tablished modern nation-states original Cold War, will be essen- BRI is the embryo of a transfor- geostrategic prize, and confronted in 1648. The Peace of Westphalia tially a technological competition. mation of the international sys- not only by the Hegemon but also is in fact an open system that en- As a direct hot war is unthinkable, tem—a soft reinvention of capi- Israel and assorted Arab regimes, shrined the concept of state sover- considering the inevitability of nu- talism. What Putin had proposed eignty into international law, and clear escalation, myriad forms of at the Munich Security Confer- Iran has at least managed to im- that centuries later was set in stone Hybrid War, some already in effect, ence in the 2000s (unsuccessfully, prove relations with key neighbors by the United Nations Charter. It will proliferate. it turned out) was re-packaged and (and important New Silk Road ac- is a “win-win” partnership in the That, in itself, will be already re-proposed by Xi in the 2010s. tors) Turkey and Pakistan. sense that every state, whatever its crystallizing the onset of a “post- This time, what was on offer Yet the game-changers are re- size and economic importance, has Westphalian” scenario, with scores quickly found an audience in vast ally Russia and China. The Three an equal right to sovereignty. So of nation states dragged into a de- parts of not only Sovereigns, slowly any rumblings by Western oligar- coupling scenario and forced to the Silk Road re- but surely, are on chies hinting at a post-Westphalian take sides. Reference models will gion but also BRI is the embryo of a their way to har- system—something that was some- vanish. Xenophobia and hyper-na- amongst the mem- transformation of the monize their dif- what advanced in the past several tionalism with fascistic traits will bers of the Non- international system— ferent payment decades by humanitarian imperi- prevail. International law—already aligned Movement a soft reinvention of systems; the pos- alist interventions of the Kosovo thrown in the dustbin of history and other parts of capitalism. sibility is open for and Libya kind—in fact constitute with the onset, ironically, of the the Global South these to eventually a threat to what until recently was doctrine of the end of history by the (not to mention merge in the near established as a moderate, best-of- Hegemon around the time of the member states of future, bypassing the U.S. dollar. possible-worlds level playing field. fall of the Berlin Wall—will be ren- the European Union), as it empha- After the end of the Iran nuclear On the “external sabotage and in- dered meaningless. sized China’s civilizational disci- deal-related UN sanctions this tervention” front, China seems to or at least a few decades the pline and ability to independently year, Iran may be admitted as be overtaking Russia as a primary FHegemon, based on its global innovate. a full member of the Shanghai focus of American (and to a much military reach, was able to offer It is as if in a post-Planet Lock- Cooperation Organization (SCO). lesser extend European) oppro- a geopolitical and geoeconomic down environment, the world may The recently announced 25-year brium. Virtually every move seems framework in which at least some need to keep pace with China or risk strategic partnership with China, to be converging towards pro- selected players enjoyed political getting left in the dust. With this we which covers multiple fields, solid- voking a fragmentation of China, and economic benefits. China—in may turn for a moment to Iran. ifies Iran as a key New Silk Road

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 100 101 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES node and enhances China’s na- sia is now one step beyond served to accelerate the logical flow “unipolar moment” has come tional security in the context of Aconceptualizing and em- of history—which is the progressive and gone. In this lies the heart of securing yet another reliable en- barking on a full-on implementation integration of the “heartland,” in Cold War 2.0. of economic uplift for the whole of ergy provider. H.J. Mackinder’s formulation. Mbembe concisely encapsulated Eurasia, with an African extension. What should lie ahead is an It was the Hegemon that in fact the drama of the young twenty-first enhanced Turkey-Iran-Pakistan As the Silk Road region, in acted as an illiberal power—when century as the “extreme fragility of partnership, interlinked with the particular, invests in its in- we observe how all. And of the All.” SCO agenda, advancing the inte- tegration, the EU fragments. trade wars and With necropower gration of West Asia with South Germany, even if not a Sovereign sanctions are now What should lie ahead and data-as-sover- Asia in which Iran plays the but a de facto NATO vassal, may configured as the is an enhanced Turkey- eign tightening its double role of energy provider eventually assert its regional hege- new normal, di- Iran-Pakistan partner- grip, what passes and key transit route. As much as mony by crushing even more the rected at entire ship in which Iran plays now for “democ- investing in connectivity with the illusions of the mini-sovereigns—as populations of the double role of energy racy” in the West is Arab world—the Iran-Iraq-Syria- in the eurozone, where the minis nations arbitrarily provider and key transit being reduced to a Lebanon road and rail axis— are absolutely impotent to deter- deemed as ene- route. hollowed out shell, Tehran should also advance mine economic policies in accor- mies (e.g. Iran, unpredictable, par- dance with their national interest. the same connectivity role Syria, Venezuela, anoid, corroded with Central Asia, via the Cas- In the event that Europe, crip- Yemen). Necropower is inbuilt in by the marriage of manufactured pian Sea and also overland to pled by north-south and east-west the era of Total Economic War. consent and political correctness, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. internal corrosion, is prevented A not entirely unimportant corol- devoid of substantive meaning and All of this should be conducted in from profiting from its status as lary to this is the fact that there is no increasingly lacking in justifica- strictly pragmatic terms, which im- the largest economic block in the evidence that UN Security Council tion: a mere (and increasingly out- plies toning down what remains of world, it will be inexorably re- reform will be allowed by the five dated) ornament. As the countries Islamic revolutionary rhetoric. duced to no more than an incon- permanent members. Yet the real of the Silk Road region continue sequent Far Western Asia. Revenge Largely self-sufficient, even gap is not between the UN nu- to invest in various integration of History redux, one could say. under harsh sanctions, with a clear club and the rest, considering strategies to ensure the heartland well-educated young popula- As it stands, the mostly Amer- the nuclear capabilities of India, become a geopolitical player in tion and profiting from excel- ican playbook has featured sanc- Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. its own right, they would be wise lent technical knowledge, Iran tions and trade wars—especially The real gap is between the Three to keep in mind the rebalancing is ideally positioned to revive against the Three Sovereigns. It Sovereigns—Russia, China, and taking place between the Hegemon the role it played along the Silk is misguided to qualify it as the Iran—and a Hegemon still con- and the Three Sovereigns in the Road in ancient times. A po- advent of a new illiberal order. ditioned by the logic of perpetual context of the construction of our litical, economic, diplomatic, Russia and China—and to a cer- war and the refusal to admit the ultra-postmodern world. BD military, and connectivity alli- tain extent Iran—were asking for ance of the Three Sovereigns is a rethink of the post-1945 (and the essential building block of post-1989) international system, Eurasia integration. Build it, and alongside others like Turkey. They they will come. were flatly rebuked. That only

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has involved both the greatest and mutual influences among the Silk Road Pathways number of countries and the most three countries that cannot be over- complex projects. The South Cau- looked. As a result of the region’s casus has since ancient times been location between the Black and The China–Central Asia–West Asia an important node on the Silk Caspian Seas, the South Caucasus Economic Corridor Road, connecting various regions. has broad links with Central Asia, China has immense potential Western Asia, and even the Medi- for cooperation with Azerbaijan, terranean, and complicated rela- Yu Hongjun Georgia, and Armenia, and we have tions with Russia, which makes it much to offer in partnership. Every very geopolitically important and party should improve dialogue and sensitive. ince the outbreak of 2008 globally influential Belt and Road cooperation, and together endeavor world financial crisis, issues Initiative (BRI). to finish work on this corridor. The South Caucasus currently has a total of around 14 million such as lackluster economic Since this proposal was made in growthS around the world and lack The China–Central Asia–West people; thus, the scale of the re- autumn 2013, the international com- gional market there is not very of progress in regional cooperation munity’s broad participation in the Asia Economic Corridor aligns large. All three countries have, since have not been resolved. Conserva- Belt and Road Initiative has demon- with the developmental interests of regaining independence, experi- tism, isolationism, racism, popu- strated that BRI is more than just a all parties and has a broad future enced various degrees of civil strife lism, and unilateralism are on the new measure for China to develop prospect. The corridor spans much and warfare, leading to a significant march; political and social move- domestic and international markets, of the Silk Road region. It starts issue of lagging economic devel- ments based on opposition to eco- or even a signpost for how to grow in from China, directly connecting nomic globalization are in vogue; concert with the world. BRI is also with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and opment. They all need to renovate and policymakers as much as ordi- a new model for promoting interna- Tajikistan, then continues through aging infrastructure, modernize Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to nary people are expressing concern tional cooperation beyond political, public services, and improve wel- connect with the fare systems. This about the future of the world. Based social, and geopolitical differences, rest of West Asia, provides a rare on his observations and thoughts aiming to achieve deeper congru- which naturally The China–Central historical opportu- with regards to modern interna- ence of development pathways. includes the South nity for China to tional relations, as well as his com- Asia–West Asia Eco- Caucasus. combine existing mitment towards a common destiny BRI and the South nomic Corridor aligns cooperation with for mankind, Chinese President Caucasus There are major with the developmental differences in the the three states Xi Jinping proposed the launch of o far, within the broader interests of all parties history, religion, into the wider the Silk Road Economic Belt and framework of the Belt and and has a broad future S level of develop- framework of cre- Twenty-first Century Maritime Road Initiative, the China–Central prospect. ment, political ating the China– Silk Road, which together form the Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor system, and es- Central Asia–West pecially interna- Asia Economic Yu Hongjun is Senior Expert at the China Forum of the Center for International tional relations postures among Corridor. Fully utilizing the op- Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, having formerly served as Vice Minister of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee and China’s Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. portunity on offer is not only in ambassador to Uzbekistan. However, there are also many ties the present interest of the South

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Caucasus countries, but will also, in Economic Belt. Since then, he ue to the high level of im- As a keystone transportation the long term, promote peace and has made numerous constructive Dportance placed on the issue link between Europe and Asia, stability in the region. An examina- comments on increasing Sino- by the heads of state of both coun- Azerbaijan places great importance tion of the ties linking each of the Azerbaijani cooperation within the tries, Sino-Azerbaijani relations on its regional advantage, trying three countries to China in general framework of the Belt and Road have now moved into practical co- to create a transportation cor- and BRI in particular is thus war- Initiative. operation on many different sec- ridor that spans multiple regions, ranted and will be presented below. In August 2016, during a meeting tors, achieving rapid high-quality with both east-west and north- with the new Chinese ambassador growth. Azerbaijan’s diplomats in south links. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Azerbaijan to Baku, Azerbaijan’s president China have participated in many ex- railroad that was inaugurated in positions across China and worked October 2017 has great significance ithin the South Caucasus, reaffirmed the great importance hard to help firms in both countries for the full implementation of the Azerbaijan is the most his country places on relations W find opportunities for cooperation. Belt and Road Initiative in the re- populous, and generally the stron- with China, indicating his desire In November gion. It can greatly gest country: it has significant eco- to actively promote comprehen- 2018, at the first expedite travel times nomic vitality and is an important sive cooperation between the two International Im- Fully utilizing the oppor- for Chinese goods member of the Organization of countries under the Belt and Road port Expo held tunity on offer is not only reaching Azerbaijan Islamic Cooperation. As Presi- Initiative framework. In January in Shanghai, 32 in the present interest through Central Asia dent Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan 2019, Aliyev agreed to an interview firms from Azer- of the South Caucasus to make its way onto had conceptually proposed a res- with Chinese media while at the baijan partici- countries, but will also, Europe, and reduced toration of the historic Great Silk World Economic Forum in Davos. pated, bringing transportation costs Road as early as September 1998, He again emphasized that BRI is in the long term, pro- over 200 prod- mote peace and stability will benefit all. China’s concrete very important ucts. According proposal of the Belt for Azerbaijan, to Azerbaijan’s in the region. A new international and Road Initiative Azerbaijan has always that his country State Customs port under construc- in 2013 has been had high praise and ex- fully supports this Committee, tion 70 kilometers warmly welcomed tended a warm welcome Chinese initiative, in the first half of 2019, from Baku will be a very modern- by Azerbaijan. Its for Chinese firms that in- and that it will do Sino-Azerbaijani trade reached ized transportation hub that can status as a founding vest in the country. everything it can to $1.27 billion. China has become annually handle 25 million tons of member of the become an active Azerbaijan’s fourth largest trading Caspian Sea trade. A 120-acre free Asian Infrastruc- participant in BRI. partner, third largest export partner, trade zone is also under construc- ture Investment In April of the same and fourth largest import partner. tion in the port, providing tax-free Bank, which actively promotes year, he actively participated in the While deepening commercial ties, commerce, streamlined approval BRI, is clear evidence for this. second Belt and Road Forum for both sides are also promoting processes, and other measures to at- In December 2015, when International Cooperation held in cultural exchanges: for instance, tract international investors. So far President Ilham Aliyev traveled to Beijing, and held high level talks with Azerbaijan has further simplified this port has signed memoranda of China on a state visit, the leaders Chinese President Xi Jinping. its electronic visa procedures, and understanding with China’s Jiangsu of the two countries signed a China and Azerbaijan signed more launched direct flights to Beijing. Lianyungang Port Corporation Memorandum of Understanding than ten important documents, on Chinese tourism to Azerbaijan is and China Cosco Container Lines on Joint Promotion of the Silk Road top of many signed previously. growing steadily. Corporation. We believe that more

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 106 107 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES and more international firms, es- ment, business, and legal environ- a desire to revive the ancient Silk egation of Chinese media covering pecially Chinese firms, will make ment continues to improve, Sino- Road in order to develop interna- the Silk Road region visited Tbilisi, investments in this new port. Azerbaijani cooperation under the tional ties and promote economic Georgia’s then President Giorgi zerbaijan has always had high framework of the Belt and Road development since Georgia re- Margvelashvili and Prime Minister praise and extended a warm Initiative will grow even further. newed its independence. Former Irakli Garibashvili gave interviews A President Eduard Shevardnadze to Chinese journalists. They both welcome for Chinese firms that Georgia invest in the country, recognizing had proposed a “new Silk Road” expressed support for BRI and the their participation in many indus- eorgia has a population of multiple times. He believed that hope that it would lead to increased tries and facilitating the completion Garound 4 million, with an this idea was not just a fancy catch- ties with China. In October of that of projects in accordance with con- area of some 70,000 square kilo- phrase but that it could instead year, Garibashvili spoke at an inter- tracts. In September 2019, during a meters, is an Eastern Orthodox become a multilateral coordinated national investment forum in Baku meeting with the visiting Chairman country in possession of a unique effort based on mutual respect and on the importance of reviving the of the Standing Committee of the historical tradition, development equality—and that its actualization Silk Road, and said that Georgia National People’s Congress Li pathway, governance system, and would contribute to Georgia’s secu- would be willing to make contribu- Zhanshu, Aliyev said that both political and economic relation- rity and prosperity. tions to this endeavor. sides have achieved good results in ships internationally. However, this One of Shevardnadze’s succes- In December 2015, China’s first the advancement of cooperation in country has suffered through ex- sors, Mikheil Saakashvili, also said Silk Road-branded cross-border the energy, transportation, and cul- tended periods of warfare and civil that Georgia should continue to train from Lianyungang arrived in tural sectors. Both sides also con- strife since regaining its indepen- attach great importance to the re- Tbilisi, where Garibashvili person- firmed that Azerbaijan’s success in dence, with the regions of South vival of the Silk Road. Because var- ally participated in the welcoming completing modern infrastructure Ossetia and Abkhazia remaining in ious Georgian leaders have shown ceremony, commenting that the re- capable of transporting Chinese a de facto state of separation. The great enthusiasm in developing ties vival of this ancient transportation goods to international markets is a state of conflict between Russia and with China, Sino-Georgian ties in route also signaled the return of successful example of cooperation Georgia has still not been resolved, various sectors had already begun Georgia’s historic mission. He pre- in the field of transportation. while challenges in the realm of in- to grow before the initiation of the dicted that Georgia would soon be- frastructure and economic develop- The World Economic Forum’s Belt and Road Initiative. Both sides’ come the regional hub connecting ment also remain salient. Experts 2019 Global Competitiveness Re- cooperation in infrastructure proj- Europe, East Asia, India, China, port ranked Azerbaijan 31st in have pointed out that, perhaps as ects have stepped up in the cur- and the Middle East. Prior to this, transportation infrastructure, 11th a result of its situation, Tbilisi had rent century. For instance, China’s in February 2015, the arrival to in efficiency of train services,th 12 not initially paid special attention Sichuan Electric Power Import Tbilisi of a cargo train from Xin- in airport connectivity, 25th in ef- to the strategic potential of the Belt & Export Corporation built the jiang, Georgia’s then deputy prime ficiency of seaport services, and and Road Initiative, while Beijing Khadori hydro power plant, which minister had led officials from rel- 27th in quality of road infrastruc- had likewise failed to notice the was inaugurated in 2004. evant departments in hosting a ture. These impressive results show unique role Georgia could play in Since China proposed the Belt welcoming ceremony. Georgia’s that Azerbaijan’s business environ- the China–Central Asia–West Asia and Road Initiative in autumn 2013, enthusiasm for the Belt and Road ment and international coopera- Economic Corridor. new opportunities for cooperation Initiative and great expectations tion is constantly improving. We On the other hand, the country’s between China and Georgia have from bilateral cooperation is believe that, as Azerbaijan’s invest- leaders have consistently expressed arisen. In August 2014, when a del- evident.

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he year 2015 represents Georgia also signed a bilateral local performance, projects where Hualing railways network. China Tianchen Tan important milestone in currency swap agreement, enabling has had responsibilities have been Engineering Corporation also re- Sino-Georgian cooperation under the companies of both countries to rated by Georgia as the best. cently completed a 230-megawatt conduct business using local cur- the framework of the Belt and n January 2018, the Sino- capacity combined cycle power rency in order to ease trade and in- Road Initiative. Things kicked Georgian free trade agreement plant—the largest electricity gener- vestment. I off in March 2015, when the two formally went into effect. This trade ation plant in Georgia’s history. sides signed a Memorandum of Admittedly, Georgia’s market has deal is the first that China signed Due to these and other mile- Understanding on Joint Promotion a limited size, thus Sino-Georgian with another country in the con- stones, some predict that as mu- of the Silk Road Economic Belt, as trade volume is not large. However, text of the Belt and Road Initiative. tual trust between China and well as a joint declaration on begin- China is Georgia’s third largest Reactions have been positive across Georgia continues to rise, the ning work on feasibility studies for trading partner and fourth largest the Silk Road region, not just in the trading partnership continues to a trade deal, shortly followed by a wine importer, as well as a major South Caucasus. According to this tighten, and cooperation in every memorandum of understanding investor in Georgia. So far, we do treaty, Georgia will not apply any field keeps growing in scope and launching negotiations for free trade not have the full data for Chinese tariffs to 96.5 percent of Chinese depth, Georgia could become the agreement. In September 2015, investment in Georgia, but we imports, while China will recipro- Black Sea base of the Belt and Road when Garibashvili attended the know that from 2007 to 2018, the cate by not applying any tariffs to Initiative. World Economic Forum’s Annual investment total in Georgia of just 93.9 percent of Georgian imports. Meeting of the New Champions one Chinese company, Xinjiang Partly as a result of this good news, Armenia in Dalian (the so-called “Summer Hualing Corporation, exceeded when Hualing Corporation’s new- Davos”), he and Chinese Premier $600 million. he smallest of the South ly-completed industrial park begun Li Keqiang held talks. While dis- Caucasus countries, Armenia its process of attracting businesses T cussing various sectors of Chinese Xinjiang Hualing Corporation has a population of 3 million and is globally, over 70 businesses ex- society, he said that Georgia is the entered Georgia more than a decade a completely landlocked country. pressed interest in the first round country that is most welcoming of ago and today remains the largest Due to a very complicated history of inquiry. Georgia had also signed Chinese investment, firms, people, foreign firm in Georgia. Its invest- between the two, Armenia and a comprehensive free trade agree- and culture in the region, and ex- ments in Georgia include timber, Turkey hold deep grudges against ment with the European Union. pressed his view mining, real estate each other, while Armenia and Therefore, many experts believe that Georgia will development, in- Azerbaijan are involved in a thus-far that Georgia could indeed become unresolved territorial dispute. become an out- Georgia could become dustrial parks, and standing partner international eco- a transit hub between China and Today, Armenia has yet to establish for China. In Oc- the Black Sea base of the nomic zones—to the European Union, as long as normal diplomatic relations with tober 2015, he fur- Belt and Road Initiative. name but a few. In China and Georgia both work hard Turkey and Azerbaijan, causing this ther stated at the 2012, Hualing suc- towards actualizing this goal. country, which is starved of natural Tbilisi Silk Road cessfully purchased Sino-Georgian cooperation is resources, to remain relatively poor International Forum that Georgia Georgia’s Basisbank, taking an im- not just limited to trade, but also in terms of economic self-reliance. connects the East with the West, portant step forward in developing extends to infrastructure. In 2016, In 2013, when China proposed the North with the South, adding that financial ties in Georgia by Chi- China Railway Bureau Group 23 Belt and Road Initiative, Arme- it hopes to become the regional nese private enterprises. Because successfully completed the T8 nia’s GDP was only $11.1 billion, center node. In 2015, China and of good cooperation and business tunnel along Georgia’s modern with a GDP per capita ranked 113th

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 110 111 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES globally and fixed capital formation mostly partake in equipment sales Belt and Road Initiative. In 2016, ding process for the third section of growing negatively at -7.75 percent. and project contracting. Other than Armenia became a dialogue partner Armenia’s “North-South” Highway However, one area of opportunity Huawei and ZTE—two Chinese in the Shanghai Cooperation Orga- and a transformer station, and lies in its large diaspora in Europe firms which provide telecommu- nization. In March 2017, the Asian are also conducting feasibility and the Americas, which is mostly nications products and services to Infrastructure Investment Bank studies on a planned Armenia-Iran relatively wealthy. The role of this Armenia—most other projects are approved Armenia’s membership. Railways project. China and Ar- diaspora and associated remit- currently in the planning stage. China and Armenia further ex- menia are also expanding coop- tances in helping Armenia develop Fortune Oil from Hong Kong SAR tended bilateral dialogue, and have eration opportunities in copper international economic ties and had successfully obtained mining deepened ties in various sectors. mining, cement, glass manufac- trade is quite clear. rights in Armenia, but due to the Sarkissian has personally ex- turing, and other sectors. China has had many interactions persistently low international price pressed a clear, positive stance on We hope that China and Armenia with Armenia throughout history. of iron ore, was forced to tempo- Armenia’s participation in the “Belt can continue to achieve new mile- Since 1991, when Armenia regained rarily close its Armenia office in and Road Initiative.” In April 2019, stone in cooperation under the independence, Beijing and Yerevan 2018. while attending framework of the have maintained a positive posture lthough the trading volume the second Belt Belt and Road Ini- for developing ties in the political, Abetween the two countries and Road Forum Sarkissian has personal- tiative, and that economic, cultural, and other sec- has remained stagnant for a number for International ly expressed a clear, pos- both sides can con- tors, as well as gaining a high level of years and the volume of invest- Cooperation held itive stance on Armenia’s tinue to explore of bilateral and multilateral co- ment remain negligible, China has in China, he said participation in the “Belt new opportunities operation in international affairs. maintained for many years the po- that Armenia’s and Road Initiative.” for cooperation as According to Armenia, from 2010 sition of Armenia’s second-largest participation in part of the China– to 2013, trade between China and trading partner. Armenia con- the Belt and Road Central Asia–West Armenia has been around $400 mil- tinues to consider China an im- Initiative not Asia Economic lion annually, growing to $588 mil- portant trading partner. Therefore, only consists in cooperation with Corridor, and thus create more tan- lion in 2014, backsliding to below Armenia participates in the Belt Chinese firms on developing infra- gible results. $500 million in 2015 and 2016. and Road Initiative with great en- structure but can also be expanded In March 2015, the two countries thusiasm. to the data world, where the sides Spirit of Perseverance signed a three-year local currency In March 2015, while on a state can create a digital BRI to help uilding the China–Central swap agreement of 1 billion ren- visit to China, Armenian President make Armenia a digital port to the BAsia–West Asia Economic minbi (or 77 billion dram) in order Armen Sarkissian signed a decla- world. Corridor is a very complex en- to further encourage bilateral trade, ration on further developing bi- In recent years, Armenia’s em- deavor, requiring continuous work commerce, and direct investment. lateral relations. Building on this, bassy in Beijing has worked hard from all parties. As outlined above, According to China’s Ministry of both sides later signed a Memo- to build on positive signs in Sino- the three South Caucasus coun- Commerce, as of the end of 2015, randum of Understanding on Joint Armenian cooperation, encour- tries all need to renovate aging the total volume of China’s direct Promotion of the Silk Road Eco- aging Chinese firms and people infrastructure, modernize public investment in Armenia is $7.51 mil- nomic Belt. In this document, Ar- to find business opportunities in services, and improve welfare sys- lion. Few Chinese firms are present menia expressed its clear stance Armenia. So far, Chinese firms are tems. This provides a rare historical in Armenia: those that are there of wanting to participate in the actively participating in the bid- opportunity for China to combine

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 112 113 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES existing cooperation with the three Given this situation, the China– nations into the wider framework of Central Asia–West Asia Economic creating the aforementioned corridor. Corridor may not be able to form At the same time, we must also a comprehensive regional net- recognize that, due to the many work for some time. China and challenges to economic develop- the South Caucasus countries ment, complicated intra-regional should not rush to complete the relations, and inadequate connec- construction of the Belt and Road tions with the wider world, there is Initiative. Instead, all parties are much work to do for China and the expected to work more steadily South Caucasus countries in cre- and maintain a detail-oriented ating the China–Central Asia–West mindset. Ensuring that coopera- Asia Economic Corridor. In the first tion leads to win-win situations, quarter of 2020, due to COVID-19, as well as maintaining a spirit of bilateral trade between China and perseverance, represents the best Armenia fell to $198 million, a clear path for moving forward coop- drop from the same time last year. eration between China and the China’s trading relationships with South Caucasus countries under both Azerbaijan and Georgia were Belt and Road Initiative, together similarly affected. Cooperation in making progress on creating the other sectors, especially in infra- China–Central Asia–West Asia structure, were hit even harder. Economic Corridor. BD

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WTI crude going negative for the The Southern Gas Completing the Southern first time in history. Moreover, consumption of coal and natural gas Corridor Gas Corridor for 2020 is projected to fall by 8 The Southern Gas Corridor is the percent and 4 percent, respectively, term used to describe a planned SGC in a Post-pandemic World according to the IEA. chain of infrastructure projects In addition to falling demand, designed to bring natural gas many anticipated energy projects from the wider Caspian region to Akhmed Gumbatov are being canceled or postponed. European markets. The initiative Global investment in the oil and was proposed by the European gas sector is projected to drop by Commission in 2008 to diversify he global spread of the 2020), the global economy will almost one third in 2020. Such the EU’s natural gas supply routes latest zoonotic virus, com- shrink by 4.9 percent this year, which gloomy developments in the energy and decrease its dependency on monly known as COVID- represents the worst downturn since sector have provoked discussions supplies from Russia, a country that 19,T has become an unprecedented the Great Depression of the 1930s. about the potential challenges to accounted for more that 40 percent calamity for all humankind. By the he energy sector has been hit the on-time completion of one of of the EU’s total imports of natural time this publication goes to press, Tparticularly hard. Limitations the world’s largest and most expen- gas in 2019. it is likely that worldwide around on transport, trade, and economic sive energy infrastructure projects: The strategic importance of 25 million people will have been activities have led to a staggering the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), finding a steady and reliable al- infected and the number of lives drop in energy demand worldwide. a $40 billion 3,500 km-long chain ternative source of natural gas is lost will approach the one million In its latest Global Energy Review, of pipelines aimed at bringing nat- strengthened by the fact that the mark. the International Energy Agency ural gas to Europe EU’s indigenous This tragedy has been com- (IEA) forecasted a 6 percent drop from Azerbaijan production of nat- pounded by another one: the coro- in global energy consumption. and the wider Cas- The Southern Gas Cor- ural gas is in steady navirus pandemic has dramatically The organization anticipates a pian region for the ridor is the term used to decline. According demobilized the global economy. In decline in demand for all types of first time ever. describe a planned chain to the IEA, the an attempt to curb the further trans- energy sources (except for renew- This essay will of infrastructure projects EU’s domestic pro- mission of the virus, many affected ables). For instance, the oil industry investigate the im- designed to bring natural duction of natural countries around the world imposed expects a drop in consumption of pact of COVID-19 gas from the wider Cas- gas will decrease complete lockdowns of their respec- 9.3 million barrels a day this year. on the on-time pian region to European from a total of 128 tive populations, which resulted The collapse in demand for crude completion of markets. billion cubic me- in severe and extraordinary eco- has already sparked turmoil in the the Southern Gas ters (bcm) in 2018 nomic disruption. According to the global oil market, with prices for Corridor, which to 65 bcm in 2025. IMF’s most recently updated World Brent crude in April dropping to appears to remain on track for the In addition, around 100 bcm of Economic Outlook forecast (June their lowest level in 18 years and end of 2020. It will also consider long-term contracts are expected to potential developments regarding expire by 2025, thus creating favor- Akhmed Gumbatov is Director of the Caspian Center for Energy and Environment at the Southern Gas Corridor in a able conditions for additional im- ADA University. post-COVID-19 world. ports from new sources.

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t the initial stage, natural company (TPAO), with 19 percent; 2 natural gas field to Europe Bulgaria (IGB). The IGB project, Agas for the SGC project Petronas, with 15.5 percent; Lu- via the SCPX pipeline on the which also experienced delays in will be supplied from Azerbaijan’s koil, with 10 percent; and Naftiran Georgia-Turkey border and the past, is also set to be completed Shah Deniz Stage 2 field. Discov- Intertrade Company (NICO), with the TAP pipeline on the by the end of 2020. ered in 1999, Shah Deniz is one of 10 percent. Turkey-Greece border. TANAP Once additional energy supplies the largest gas-condensates fields esides the development of can transport 16 bcm of natural are available in the future, TAP’s in the world. It is located on the Bthe second stage of the Shah gas annually, and similar to SCPX, transporting capacity can be dou- deep-water shelf of the Caspian Deniz field, other major elements of its capacity can be expanded up to bled to more than 20 bcm. The Sea, approximately 70 km south- SGC are the South Caucasus Pipe- 31 bcm. TANAP’s shareholders realization of the TAP project will east of Baku. Shah Deniz Stage 1 line Expansion (SCPX) in Azer- are the Southern Gas Corridor not only improve Italy’s energy se- started operations in 2006 and has baijan and Georgia, the Trans-Ana- CJSC, with 51 percent ownership; curity, but will also promote the the capacity to produce around 10 tolian Pipeline (TANAP) in Turkey, Turkey’s BOTAS, with 30 percent; country’s aspirations of becoming bcm of natural gas per year. Since and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline BP with 12 percent; and SOCAR Southern Europe’s gas hub. TAP’s then, the field has become an im- (TAP) in Greece, Albania, and Turkey, with 7 percent. ownership is held by six companies: portant source of natural gas sup- Italy. The South Caucasus Pipeline The final leg of SGC is the TAP BP, SOCAR, and Italy’s Snam, each plies not only for domestic con- (SCP) was commissioned in 2006 to pipeline. Connecting with TANAP with 20 percent; Belgium’s Fluxys, sumption in Azerbaijan, but also supply around 7 bcm of natural gas on the Turkey-Greece border, TAP with 19 percent; Spain’s Enagás, for exports to Georgia and Turkey per year from Shah Deniz Stage 1 to crosses Greece, Albania, and the with 16 percent; and Swiss-head- quartered Axpo, with 5 percent. via the newly-built South Caucasus Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Adriatic Sea before coming ashore Pipeline (SCP), also known as the The pipeline was expanded in 2019 in southern Italy to connect to the hen complete, the SGC Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Pipeline. to accommodate an additional 16 Italian natural gas network. The project will comprise Shah Deniz Stage 2, which began bcm of natural gas for the Southern TAP project, worth €4.5 billion, 3,500W km of pipelines, with the total to come online in 2018, will pro- Gas Corridor from Shah Deniz faced delays in the past, and cur- value of works for the whole project vide an additional 16 bcm of nat- Stage 2, thus increasing the pipe- rent plans are for it to be com- worth around $40 billion. As noted ural gas production per year, with line’s capacity to 23 bcm. It could be pleted in late 2020. above, the strategic 10 bcm allocated to Europe and 6 further expanded to 31 bcm should In other words, gas corridor is ex- bcm to Turkey. The cost of devel- more gas supplies become avail- TAP is the only SGC is considered as pected to come on- oping the second stage of the Shah able in the future. The shareholder component of the one of the most strategic line by the end of Deniz field is $28 billion, making it structure of the pipeline project is strategic energy projects for the European 2020, when TAP’s the most expensive component of identical to that of Shah Deniz. corridor that is still Union, helping to diver- construction works the Southern Gas Corridor. BP is The next major element of SGC under construc- sify the bloc’s natural gas are completed. the technical operator of the field is Turkey’s TANAP pipeline, tion. Once fin- supplies routes and im- The SGC project and its largest shareholder, with which was officially inaugurated in ished, it will begin prove its energy security. represents the first 28.8 percent ownership of the joint November 2019 and cost $6.5 carrying 10 bcm of -ever attempt to venture. Other participants include billion to build. The central and natural gas, with directly connect a division of Azerbaijan’s state oil also longest part of the corridor 8 bcm for Italy, 1 bcm for natural gas fields located in the company (SOCAR/SGC), with (1850 km), TANAP connects Greece, and 1 bcm for Bulgaria Caspian basin with European 16.7 percent; Turkey’s national oil Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz Stage via the Interconnector Greece- markets. In this regard, SGC is

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 118 119 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES considered as one of the most Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, oreover, while revenue is f particular concern is the strategic projects for the Euro- Croatia, Hungary, Montenegro, Mshrinking, costs associated Ofact that the pandemic has pean Union, helping to diver- and other countries have already with the development of SGC are imposed particularly significant sify the bloc’s natural gas sup- expressed their interest in partici- increasing. One reason is that in- hurdles on the on-time realization plies routes and improve its pating in an expanded version of the vestors have been forced to adopt of TAP—the corridor’s final leg energy security. The European Southern Gas Corridor in the future. costly safety measures to prevent and the only component which is Commission has officially rec- the spread of the virus in the com- still under construction. The past ognized both TANAP and TAP The COVID-19 Factor munities engaged in the construc- few months have seen significant as “projects of common interest” The coronavirus outbreak has had tion and operational activities of increases in spending caused by (PCI) under the EU’s Trans- a negative impact on demand for the corridor. Another is that these the introduction of strict epidemi- European energy infrastructure natural gas. In fact, the pandemic activities had to continue amid var- ological safety measures, including guidelines. has further exacerbated already ious lockdowns and quarantines, as limitations on commercial flights. Together with related factors, this The realization of SGC is great shrinking gas consumption caused well as closed borders. by historically mild temperatures has negatively affected the delivery news not only for the EU but also Despite such challenges, COVID-19 over the first months of 2020. of staff and materials, which has for Azerbaijan’s economy, which has not caused delays in commercial According to the IEA, the natural dramatically complicated the con- stands to benefit from increased ex- operations at any of the three com- gas sector will experience a 4 per- struction process. ports of natural gas, given that the pleted components of the corridor, oil and gas sector generates about cent decline in 2020—“the largest Nevertheless, the construction namely Shah Deniz Stage 2, SCPX, 40 percent of the country’s GDP recorded demand shock” in history. of TAP has not stopped, and the and TANAP. According to both and 75 percent of government rev- Global natural gas output is also set project is steadily progressing to- SOCAR and BP reports, all facili- enue. In addition, the successful by drop by 2.6 percent in 2020. wards delivering its first gas by the ties and operations have performed execution of a project of such scale, Prior to the pandemic, global end of 2020. In previous months, in line with established goals and which already involves seven coun- natural gas production in 2020 was significant advances on TAP’s right timeframes. In the first half of 2020, tries and more than a dozen major expected to be 4,233 bcm. Now the of way (ROW) were made: land energy companies, increases Azer- indicator has been revised down to TANAP transported 1.9 bcm of nat- was actively cleared and pipeline baijan’s geopolitical standing. Other 3,962 bcm for this year, rising to ural gas to Turkey, which accounts parts strung, welded, lowered into participating countries also benefit 4,015 bcm in 2021 and to 4,094 in for around 37 percent of Azerbai- the trenches, and backfilled. In from transit fees, investments, and 2022. Weak demand accompanied jan’s total exports to Turkey for short, TAP moved further into the new jobs created by the construc- with abundant supplies has led to a the reporting period (i.e. 5.2 bcm). project construction phase. tion and operational activities of the collapse in natural gas prices around Remarkably, thanks to the addi- In late May, TAP started to in- corridor. Should more supplies be- the world, with European natural tional export capacity provided by troduce natural gas into a 4 km come available from Azerbaijan and gas prices falling by almost 40 per- TANAP as well as a dramatic reduc- section of the pipeline in Albania other natural gas producing coun- cent since the start of 2020. This is tion in imports of natural gas from as a test (the first natural gas to tries in the region, the corridor’s not welcoming news for natural gas Russia, Azerbaijan has become the be introduced into the Greek sec- capacity can be doubled, thus fur- suppliers participating in the devel- largest supplier of natural gas to tion of TAP had taken place in ther increasing the economic and opment of the costly Southern Gas the Turkish market in the past few November 2019). Meanwhile, in geopolitical weight of the project. Corridor, as their revenues are also months, well ahead of Russia and June, TAP reached another im- Potential buyers from Albania, expected to decrease. Iran. portant milestone: the completion

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 120 121 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES of the 105 km offshore section of the TAP portion—the consortium espite the expected end of percent or more (against baseline the pipeline under the Adriatic Sea. requested a second prolongation Dthe pandemic and the ex- 1990 levels) in the decade ahead. Finally, TAP’s last weld was com- of what’s called a Third-Party pectation that this will be followed While the bloc seems to be divided pleted in mid-July, meaning that Access (TPA) exemption, pro- by some sort of gradual recovery over the target, most EU member all components of the 878 km-long viding the possibility of post- in 2021, the COVID-19 crisis will states acknowledge the need for a pipeline has been joined together. poning the first delivery of gas until almost certainly have a long-term further reduction in greenhouse As of mid-August 2020, the TAP December 2021. impact on natural gas markets. gas emissions, particularly in the project was more than 97 percent TPA, one of the key pillars of According to the IEA, the energy sector, which accounts for complete—a 7 percent increase EU internal market regulation, “repercussions of the 2020 crisis on 75 percent of the EU’s greenhouse since January 2020 and quite an entails a system whereby third growth are set to result in 75 bcm of gas emissions. impressive logistical feat, given the parties other than owners and op- lost annual demand by 2025, which In light of the aforementioned, difficulties caused by COVID-19. erators of the pipeline can have non- is the same size as the global annual there are concerns that the Southern imilar to TAP, IGB is also discriminatory access to pipeline increase in demand in 2019.” Gas Corridor might lose its pri- Sfacing significant challenges transportation services. However, Most of the post-COVID-19 ority status for the and support imposed by lockdown and quar- an exemption to this rule may be growth will happen in Asia, led from Brussels, which would thus antine measures. Nevertheless, granted by national regulators (sub- by China and India. Europe’s de- call into question the future expan- the project is also steadily project to approval by the European mand is expected to go through a sion of the corridor. The concerns, gressing, and its completion re- Commission) for a limited period of moderate recovery, thus keeping however, are misplaced, as current mains scheduled for the end of time to facilitate a major infrastruc- natural gas prices low on the Old projects—including SGC—will not 2020, in parallel to TAP. Once re- ture project and make it commer- Continent. All this also means low be affected by the European Green alized, the 182 km-long pipeline, cially more attractive by allowing revenues for the natural gas sup- Deal. worth €240 million, will trans- suppliers to fully book a pipeline’s pliers participating in the Southern At the most recent ministerial port Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz capacity without open competition. Gas Corridor. meeting of the SGC’s Advisory Stage 2 natural gas from TAP in Following the approval from the ndoubtedly, one of the key Council held in Baku in February Greece to the national gas trans- relevant regulatory authorities in Utrends that will increasingly 2020, Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, the mission system in Bulgaria. IGB is Italy, Greece, and Albania, in 2013 characterize the development of European Commission’s deputy a key part of the EU’s strategy for the European Commission for- energy infrastructure projects in director general in charge of coor- greater integration of its internal mally approved TAP’s application the near perspective is the transi- dinating energy policy, the Energy gas market, which also includes for a TPA exemption for the initial tion to clean energy. The trend will Union, and external energy policy, interconnection projects between capacity of 10 bcm for a period of be particularly acute in Europe. In underscored that the European Bulgaria and Greece, Bulgaria 25 years, which required the pipe- December 2019, the European Green Pact does not contradict and Romania, and Romania and line to come online within six years, Commission presented the the development or even expan- Hungary. by June 2019, for the exemption European Green Deal, a set of pol- sion of the Southern Gas Corridor. As of mid-August, SGC remains decision to be valid. In 2014, amid icies aimed at making the EU cli- Furthermore, by virtue of the fact on schedule. Nevertheless, as anticipated delays in the project’s mate neutral by 2050. As part of this that natural gas is the cleanest fossil COVID-19 still has a potential to completion, TAP obtained its first Deal, the Commission proposed to fuel, it is widely accepted as a tran- negatively impact on the develop- TPA extension for the project com- increase its 40 percent greenhouse sition fuel towards a low and ze- ment of the corridor—particularly pletion by December 2020. gas emission reduction target to 50 ro-carbon economy. In this respect,

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 122 123 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES the senior representative of the desired capacity exceeds the 20 alone might not be enough to fully in the wake of more than two de- European Commission noted that bcm maximum planned capacity book the maximum capacity of an cades of diplomatic efforts. While the transition to clean energy will of the pipeline, TAP might consider expanded SGC. the convention addresses the legal be realized with the inclusion of an expansion that would further The country’s peak production obstacles on the way to building the TCP, the project’s prospects natural gas. increase its maximum capacity to years of natural gas—namely, 50 remain unclear due to a number igh demand in the EU for around 24 bcm. bcm per year—were expected to be of commercial and also political natural gas, coupled with The second stage of the market 2023-2028, although the effects of H considerations. the bloc’s aspirations towards en- test is binding and was expected COVID-19 are likely to shift this to ergy supply diversification, indi- to start in the second quarter of the 2025-2030 period. This will in- Having said that, modest exports cates the likelihood that the expan- 2020 but was postponed to January clude around 10 bcm of non-com- of Turkmen gas to Azerbaijan, ei- sion format of the Southern Gas 2021. However, due to poor energy mercial associated gas from ther via a small Trans-Caspian link Corridor will remain a key issue market conditions and uncertain- Azerbaijan’s largest oil field, known or as swaps via Iran or even Russia, on the project’s agenda in the post- ties caused by COVID-19, TAP’s as Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG), are quite plausible in the near COVID-19 period. While the con- transmission system operators fur- thus leaving 40 bcm of natural perspective. struction of SGC ther postponed the gas for commercial use. In case of The Russia Question has not yet been binding bidding moderate domestic demand, For some time growing concerns completed, discus- The SGC expansion pro- phase to July 2021. around 30-35 bcm of natural gas sions on the expan- would be available for export. have been expressed in parts of the cess is unlikely to happen Based on the re- West that Russia’s Gazprom could sion of the corridor sults of the binding Azerbaijan’s commitment for ex- have long been before 2025. porting 24 bcm of natural gas per book capacity in an expanded ver- market test, a de- sion of TAP—the corridor’s final taking place. cision by TAP to year will leave only 5-10 bcm for an expanded SGC. leg located in the EU. As mentioned To determine the need for addi- expand the pipeline will be made. earlier, due to the Third-Party tional capacity, TAP is required to As actual construction time for any urkmenistan is another Access exemption granted by hold a market test in two stages. of the expansion works takes up Tpotential supplier of natural EU regulators, TAP’s initial ca- The first stage of the market test to three years, which suggests that gas to the EU. The world’s fourth pacity of 10 bcm per year is exclu- was non-binding and took place in the expansion process is unlikely to largest holder of proved natural gas sively reserved to suppliers from July 2019. Its purpose was to allow happen before 2025. reserves has long been welcomed by Azerbaijan for 25 years. Once ex- natural gas shippers to express their the EU and other partners to join the panded, however, the pipeline’s ad- initial interest in the future ex- Expansion Sources SGC project via the Trans-Caspian ditional capacity would be opened pansion of the pipeline’s capacity. While there are many potential Pipeline (TCP)—a proposed for third-party access, meaning that According to the results, which sources of natural gas that can be natural gas pipeline that would other potential suppliers, including were announced in October 2019, supplied for an expanded version run under the Caspian Sea from Russia’s Gazprom, could book TAP’s expressions of interest for using of the Southern Gas Corridor, Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan. capacity for delivering natural gas TAP exceeded 11 bcm, thus con- Azerbaijan currently seems to be one of Discussions on the realization of to the Italian market, as well as firming the need for conducting the most feasible options. However, the TCP project have been partic- other ones in the European Union. technical studies for the expansion depending on domestic production ularly active after the Convention Although Russia’s potential partic- of the pipeline from 10 bcm up to and consumption scenarios, on the Legal Status of the Caspian ipation in the project contradicts 20 bcm. Furthermore, as the total Azerbaijan’s natural gas supplies Sea was signed in August 2018, the EU’s aspirations to diversify

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 124 125 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES energy supplies and reduce its forced to re-route the project to delivery of staff and materials have While there are many potential dependency on Moscow, the in- Turkey and halve its capacity. put additional hurdles on the proj- sources of natural gas supplies for volvement of Gazprom in the TAP In announcing the results of the ect’s completion whilst increasing this expanded version of SGC, expansion under the current EU reg- first market test, TAP did not reveal its costs. However, the construction Azerbaijan currently seems to be ulations is legal and quite plausible. any information about the compa- of SGC has not stopped, and the one of the most feasible options. Technically, Moscow could also nies that had expressed interest in project seems to be steadily pro- However, depending on do- gressing towards delivering its first use the TurkStream pipeline, which booking the pipeline’s additional mestic production and consump- gas by the end of 2020, as planned. stretches from Russia to Turkey capacity, as such information is tion scenarios, Azerbaijan’s nat- across the Black Sea, to supply nat- confidential. Therefore, there is no Despite the anticipated end of the ural gas supplies alone might ural gas to TAP. The TurkStream way of knowing whether Russia’s pandemic and the expectation that not be enough to fully book the project, launched by Turkish presi- Gazprom expressed an interest this will be followed by some sort of maximum capacity of an ex- dent Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his in the TAP expansion. However, gradual recovery in 2021, low demand panded SGC. Amid the current Russian counter- amid the current and low prices for natural gas will re- uncertainties over the future of part Vladimir Putin uncertainties over main the likely predominant reality Nord Stream 2, proponents of in January 2020, Russia might use the SGC the future of Nord in the immediate post-COVID-19 European energy security are has a total capacity expansion as a medium Stream 2—an ad- period, thus further depressing the concerned that Russia might use of 31.5 bcm. The for delivering its own gas ditional 1,200 revenues of SGC shareholders. An- the SGC expansion as a medium first line, which has from TurkStream to Italy km-long offshore other important trend that will be for delivering its own gas from a capacity of 15.75 and beyond. pipeline being con- increasingly characterizing the de- TurkStream to Italy and be- bcm, envisages nat- structed to supply velopment of energy infrastructure yond. Lastly, the prospects of ural gas supplies natural gas from projects in the near perspective is building the Trans-Caspian to Turkey; the Russia to Europe across the Baltic the EU’s transition towards clean Pipeline to connect gas from second line, which has a similar Turkmenistan with an expanded Sea—it is quite possible that Russia energy. However, the shift will not capacity, is designed to transport SGC remain unclear due to may have expressed its interest in impact the development or even the Russian gas into the EU through a number of commercial and booking TAP’s addition capacity in possible expansion of the Southern member state Bulgaria. Gas Corridor. political considerations. BD order to hedge its bets. If warranted, Russia could easily build an additional line to supply Looking Ahead natural gas to TAP. In fact, its orig- The new coronavirus outbreak inal design—which was known as has substantially complicated the South Stream—envisaged the con- realization of the Southern Gas struction of four lines with a total Corridor. Its investors have been capacity of 63 bcm directly to Bul- forced to adopt numerous safety bakudialogues.ada.edu.az garia. However, the European Par- measures to prevent the spread of liament adopted a resolution in COVID-19 in the communities 2014 opposing the project on the grounds that it violated the EU’s engaged in the construction and energy rules. As a result, Russia was operation activities of the corridor. Limitations on flights and the

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the short-lived independent re- point of selling arms from their in- The Karabakh Peace Process publics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, ventories to sides in the many local and Georgia. That process, and the conflicts that erupted. Rebuilding Trust for demarcation of the borders of the Relations between Armenians and three states, happened in somewhat Azerbaijanis deteriorated as a wave International Engagement chaotic circumstances, leaving of nationalism swept over the entire many unresolved issues that con- South Caucasus. This resulted in tinue to haunt the region. Soviet many terrible stories of human suf- Dennis Sammut rule with an internationalist doc- fering as people were killed because trine at its core, and its nationalities of their ethnicity, whole populations policy within a single Soviet Union, he engagement of the were displaced, and in the case of mediation to the EU-supported by and large froze many of the is- international commu- track 2 peacebuilding initiatives— Nagorno-Karabakh, an ugly conflict sues for nearly seventy years, until nity in dealing with the need to step-up their efforts, fo- lasting nearly five years left 30,000 it emerged again once the Soviet Nagorno-KarabakhT conflict has cusing on a number of directions dead and many more suffering the Union started disintegrating and been somewhat erratic and the ef- including incremental peaceful and consequences of war. the hold of the Communist Party on forts to broker a peace deal largely negotiated changes to the situation An uneasy ceasefire has been in Moscow’s periphery started to ease. unsuccessful. Short outbursts of vi- on the ground in the conflict zone; place since 1994, and an interna- olence now regularly alternate with confidence-building measures be- The Soviet leadership under tional mediation effort under the even shorter moments of optimism tween Armenia and Azerbaijan; Mikhail Gorbachev is often ac- auspices of the Organisation for when peace appears within reach. and people-to-people contacts and cused of mishandling the Nagorno- Security and Co-operation in initiatives involving the populations Karabakh issue. Certainly, the Europe (OSCE) has been on- Since the ceasefire agreement of affected by the conflict. These need easing of a tight central control going since 1992. The ceasefire is 1994, geopolitical considerations to run in parallel with renewed, offered plenty of opportunities breached nearly every day with in- have contributed to the reinforce- meaningful, and substantial negoti- for individual power centers—the cidents for which both sides blame ment of deeply entrenched local ations on substance in a mutually re- KGB, the Ministry of Defense, and each other. On two occasions, in animosities, fears, and distrusts, all enforcing way. The next task of the others—to push their own agendas. April 2016 and more recently in July of which have reduced the ability of mediators is to convince the sides of Even within these institutions, ver- 2020, sharp escalation in violence the international community to act the expediency of this approach. tical power became weak or non- resulted in dozens of deaths and as an honest broker. A conflict that existent, and many a fear the region many believed could have been de- The Conflict in Brief officials deployed may once more fused and resolved 30 years ago now n the early twentieth century, in far flung corners So far the Karabakh me- become embroiled appears intractable and unsolvable. Ias the Russian and Ottoman of the once mighty diation process has failed in an all-out war. In the meantime, ongoing peace- empires collapsed, nationalism USSR found them- and people across the That this has not building efforts—from the track 1 emerged as a strong force in the selves left to their conflict divide have lost happened offers OSCE Minsk Group co-chair South Caucasus with the birth of own devices in the trust in it. Rebuilding absolutely no guar- absence of instruc- this trust will require an antee that it will Dennis Sammut is Director of LINKS Europe, and has worked and commented on the tions. Some ex- international effort. not happen in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and peace process for more than two decades. ploited this, to the future.

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Expectations from the efforts of Karabakh that had already been States and France started lobbying attention given provided a the international community to re- raging for several years. for the place, and diplomats in their glamour effect, in which respective solve the conflict have been high. But The CSCE Council meeting in wisdom decided to have three co- Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders so far the Nagorno-Karabakh medi- Helsinki in late March 1992 re- chairs, and so the trio emerged and thereupon basked. ation process has failed and people quested the CSCE Chairman- were formally installed in January On the other hand, the direct in- across the conflict divide have lost in-Office to convene a conference 1997. The activity of the Minsk volvement of the three big powers trust in it. Rebuilding this trust will on Nagorno-Karabakh as soon as Process and the activity of its three increased the suspicion amongst require an international effort. possible; provide an ongoing forum co-chair mediators since their ap- elites and populations, already for negotiations towards a peaceful pointment in paranoid under The OSCE Minsk Process settlement of the crisis on the basis January 1997 has the weight of the verwhelmed by euphoria of the principles, commitments, been chronicled Diplomats who were di- baggage of history, Oand chaos following the dis- and provisions of the CSCE; and many times, and rectly involved in this ear- that their respec- solution of the Soviet Union, the hold this conference in Minsk. A it is not necessary ly period are on record in tive leaders may be international community stumbled number of countries were desig- to repeat it here. saying they had no idea arm twisted into the indecisively to respond to ongoing nated as the Minsk Group to coor- However this long how they were going to wrong deal. This fighting between Armenians and dinate the process. The Swedes held life span enables deal with the issue. has led to an in- Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh the Chairmanship of the CSCE in an evaluation of creasing entrench- in the early 1990s. 1992 and provided one of the two its strengths and ment of maximalist Up to December 1991 the co-chairs. It was considered a sine weaknesses in order to shed light positions. As time passed, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was an qua non that the other one had to on why the Minsk Process has so glamour of hobnobbing with the internal matter of the Soviet Union. be Russia. Thus was born the Minsk far failed. great leaders of the world faded, but the entrenchment deepened. When the Union collapsed, the 15 Process. he involvement of France, constituent republics were recog- Diplomats who were directly in- TRussia, and the United States he following question there- nized as independent states and volved in this early period are on in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace Tfore arises: if the mediation applied to join the United Nations. record in saying they had no idea process upped the stakes for the had been done by, say, a Swedish In late January 1992, Armenia and how they were going to deal with sides in the conflict too, with mixed diplomat under a UN mandate in- Azerbaijan were admitted as full the issue. Veteran Russian ambas- results. On the one hand the instead of representatives of three big members of the Conference for sador Vladimir Kazimirov says that volvement of three UN Security powers, would the outcome have Security and Co-operation in Eu- the process was “somewhat cha- Council members in the resolution been different, or less, or more? rope (CSCE). Since at the time the otic.” The international commu- of their problems played to the ego The blunt answer is probably UN had its hands full with a number nity needed both to do something of the countries and their leaders. not. Finesse is not the strong point of other major issues, it was the and to be seen as doing something, After all, in 1997 Armenia and of either Armenian or Azerbaijani CSCE (renamed and re-organized but nearly all the cards were held Azerbaijan were, in the bigger foreign policy. Power is respected. in December 1994 as the OSCE)— by Russia. This conundrum has scheme of things, small, fragile, So initially the aura of the medi- the guardian of the Helsinki Final bedeviled the Minsk Process ever newly independent states with ators from three big powers kept Act and other key agreements be- since. little diplomatic exposure. The the sides focused. But in truth, tween East and West—that took the In 1996, when the post of co-chair invitations to meet the leaders of over the years the sides became lead on the conflict in Nagorno- became vacant, both the United the co-chair countries and the adept at massaging the ego of the

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 130 131 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES mediators, often resorting to brink- measure—ironically not in support he question needs to be more transparent in its intentions. manship but never letting the frus- of a Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Tasked if Russia’s role as a It should stop providing the sides tration of the mediators spill over. settlement, but in the management mediator—considered widely to with sophisticated armaments— So a Swedish diplomat may have of big power relations. be necessary—is perhaps declaring been able to achieve the same re- not in fact part initially a one year sults. On the other hand, a Swedish Russia of the problem. Russia’s not-so-hidden moratorium on diplomat would not have had to n the Caucasus, Russia is al- Russia often uses agenda on Karabakh is arms sales, which worry about his country’s bilateral Iways the elephant in the room. the “white man’s that it wants to be able can be extended relations with the conflict sides— Nowhere more so than in the burden” argu- to have a military force annually. And it not too much, anyway. France, Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, ment to justify its deployed in Azerbaijan should be one of Russia, and the United States all where Russia has played a double role in the South as part of a peacekeeping the countries that have interests in the region that game. On the one hand it is one Caucasus—and force. declares upfront they are keen to protect, and this of the three co-chairs of the inter- particularly its in- that it does not to some extent has also clouded the national mediation process, and volvement in the have the intention mediation work. Thus, having the it conducts itself in that context Nagorno-Karabakh conflict set- of participating in any future mil- process led by diplomats of three impeccably. On the other hand, tlement process. Yet it has simul- itary peacekeeping force in Na- big powers may have hindered its from day one and since, it has run taneously flooded the region with gorno-Karabakh. Such actions will overall chances of success, rather a parallel bilateral process, talking sophisticated military equipment contribute to restoring trust in the than helped it. to the sides separately and together, costing billions. For the sides to Minsk Process and in the efforts of the conflict therefore, Russia is its three co-chair mediators. The process has been bedeviled pushing its own ideas and visions, not primarily a mediator but an by a number of factors. However, and generally making sure ev- arms supplier. intriguingly, big power rivalry does eryone understands that it is that Ambivalent Roles not appear to have been one of parallel process that matters. Russia’s not-so-hidden agenda on part from the framework of them, at least until recently. Whilst Vladimir Putin has person- Nagorno-Karabakh is that it wants Athe OSCE Minsk Process, relations between the United States ally dedicated a lot of time to this to be able to have a military force and occasional UN engagement, and its allies and Russia have deteri- issue, as he has indeed done with deployed in Azerbaijan as part of a the other state actors to engage orated considerably, especially since a number of other issues related peacekeeping force. This Russian in any meaningful way with the the 2008 Georgia-Russia war and the to the Caucasus, because of the need has lurked in the background Nagorno-Karabakh conflict set- 2014 Ukraine crisis, and even rela- strategic importance Russia con- over the whole life span of the tlement process were the United tions between America and France tinues to attach to the region as its Minsk Process. Kingdom and the European Union, at some point appeared strained, soft underbelly. But it was his pre- The Kremlin’s intentions in its working separately long before the atmosphere of cooperation be- decessor, Dimitri Medvedev, who engagement with the Nagorno- Brexit. tween the three co-chair mediators during his time as president really Karabakh conflict-settlement pro- The UK had a historical link has, according to multiple sources, tried to pull the bull by the horns cess is constantly being questioned, with the South Caucasus through been extremely harmonious. and achieve a breakthrough. He especially in Azerbaijan, but more the short period of independence Indeed, ironically, the Minsk co- also failed. At Kazan in 2011 a deal recently also in Armenia. For the of the first Transcaucasian repub- chair mechanism appeared to take appeared within reach, but the two sake of the credibility of the peace lics in 1918-1920. By the time they the role of a confidence-building sides blinked. process, Russia should be much regained their independence in

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December 1991, London’s main to the new post of EU Special South Caucasus Parliamentary changed to EU Special Representa- interest was largely commer- Representative for the South Initiative (SCPI)—best considered tive for the South Caucasus and the cial: the energy resources of the Caucasus. The EU procrastinated as track 1.5 (it ran between 2003 Conflict in Georgia. Caspian and BP’s huge proposed and the British lost patience: and 2009). A number of inter-de- his change in designa- investment in Azerbaijan. The UK London appointed Sir Brian as the partmental disagreements on how Ttion was not just symbolic. swiftly opened an embassy in Baku first (and last) UK Special Repre- best to utilize the British govern- Given that the EU was now coin 1992—Tbilisi and Yerevan had sentative for the South Caucasus. ment’s funding mechanism (the chair of the Geneva International to wait until 1995 and 1996, respec- This was meant to send a signal “conflict management pool”) and Discussions on Georgia (together tively. Initially, the British approach of increased British interest in the another round of changed prior- with the UN and the OSCE), much was to try to avoid the politics region, and a big part of his remit ities meant that the Consortium of the EUSR’s time became devoted and the conflicts. The UK Foreign was to deal with the conflict issues. Initiative was left to elapse, on the to issues related to Abkhazia and Office in this period had its hands An EU Special Representative was understanding that most of the South Ossetia. The EUSR traveled full with events in the Balkans, and eventually appointed, and the two work could be picked up at an EU to the region two or three times a the general view in Whitehall was co-existed merrily. level through a similar tool working year to meet the leaders of Armenia that the Caucasus was a largely a hilst Britain adhered to with civil society. After much ado, and Azerbaijan, and kept in touch Russian matter. For this reason, Wthe mantra of support for in 2010 the EU launched EPNK— with the co-chairs, but the EU was, when the Minsk Group was con- the Minsk Process and rejection the European Partnership for the and remains, by and large a passive stituted in 1992, ostensibly to orga- of the idea of forum hoping, it was Support of the Peaceful Resolu- observer to the Nagorno-Karabakh nize the Minsk Conference, Britain not averse to engage in a little bit of tion of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. It was again left to stayed out—to the surprise of many. nudging of the process on the side. Conflict. It lasted until 2019, with the NGOs to maintain the most vis- Some blame this on incompetence The Foreign Office recognized that some breaks between phases 1 and ible, and tangible, EU engagement on the part of the officials in- whilst it was busy elsewhere, several 2 and phases 2 and 3. with the conflict issues. volved, others say it was perfidious British NGOs had engaged with After the 2008 Georgia-Russia Part of the reason is that Albion trying to avoid rubbing the the South Caucasus, including the war, the UK Ministry of Defence the EU understands that the Russians the wrong way. difficult conflict issues, and their started taking more of a leading role Nagorno-Karabakh peace process In any case, that this was not such work was starting to be noticed on British affairs in the South Cau- is a poisoned chalice. Tensions be- a smart decision became obvious and appreciated. Britain therefore casus. Sir Brian tween Armenia and soon thereafter, but given the usual launched what was at the time a Fall resigned as Azerbaijan have bureaucratic lethargy, it took about unique and ambitious program Special Repre- The EU was, and re- often resulted in a decade for London to start en- of civil society activity in support sentative in 2012 mains, by and large a unseemly and acri- gaging on the Nagorno-Karabakh of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace after a decade in passive observer to the monious exchanges conflict settlement issue meaning- process, involving three NGOs: the job, and it was Nagorno-Karabakh in the councils of fully. At the start of the new millen- International Alert, Conciliation decided not to peace process. the OSCE and the nium, the Foreign Office toyed with Resources and LINKS. replace him, but Council of Europe, the idea of having an experienced Operating under the brand to have a Trade and even the EU’s British diplomat, Sir Brian Fall, “Consortium Initiative,” they imple- Envoy instead. That war also im- own EURONEST Parliamentary who had served as UK Ambassador mented a range of track 2 initiatives, pacted the work of the EU Special Assembly and Eastern Partnership to Russia (1992-1995), appointed with at least one—the LINKS-led Representative, whose official title gatherings have not been immune

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 134 135 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES to this. It was often argued that there ered important at the point where Space for Track 1.5 and unjustified criticism. The situation was little to be gained from engaging an agreement is likely, but they can has gotten much worse since 2008, with the conflict resolution process, also contribute to the process now. Track 2 Initiatives? and continues to deteriorate. here is a whole body of lit- that it carried a lot of risk, and that Since becoming UN Secretary- he co-chair mediators have erature produced by think in any case the sides did not want General, António Gutteres has T not always appreciated the tanks and academics on the T EU involvement anyway. taken an interest in the Nagorno- contribution of think tanks and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and The EU is now toying with the Karabakh conflict and has sig- civil society in discussing the con- the conflict resolution process. idea of another civil society initia- naled a readiness to engage with flict and its resolution. This is There are also hundreds of exam- tive, EU4Peace. The fact that it al- the peace effort. It has always partly due to the obsession of the ples of activities of all sorts that aim lowed at least a gap of a year before been understood that the UN Armenian and Azerbaijani negoti- to promote a peaceful resolution the end of EPNK and the new ini- Security Council will have to be ators with secrecy, as well as their of the conflict through joint activ- tiative sent a neg- the ultimate guar- distrust of their respective civil ities, people-to-people contacts, ative signal about antor of a peace society organizations, which they and confidence-building measures the importance The UN Security Coun- agreement and implemented by local and interna- each suspect to be proxies of their cil will have to be the that it should prob- the EU attaches to tional NGOs of all sorts and sizes. domestic opposition. On this point, this work. There ultimate guarantor of ably be the one Armenia and Azerbaijan have had are some signs that a peace agreement and that authorizes the By its very nature, this work of perfect consensus, at least since the new EU High that it should probably deployment of a civil society is often uncoordinated 2008. Representative on peacekeeping force and often looks erratic. This is due be the one that autho- to a number of factors: funding Instead, the sides in the conflict Foreign and Secu- rizes the deployment of if it ever comes to have tried to manipulate civil so- rity Policy, Josep that. Whilst the UN for this work has not been steady a peacekeeping force if it and funders have been very fickle, ciety initiatives and actors to reflect Borrell, is taking a ever comes to that. should not replace their own positions and echo their more direct interest often asking for “something new” the OSCE as the own propaganda. For example, in the conflict. This without appreciating the need to lead in the media- the Armenians often insist on the is to be welcomed, consolidate that which had started tion efforts, there engagement of civil society initia- for the EU, apart of its experience is good reason why it should be in- to work, even if modestly. This partly explains why the turnover tives with the de facto authorities in and its resource, also has the poten- volved now, even if in a consultative of personnel is very high, which Nagorno-Karabakh, seeking in tial to play the role of honest broker. capacity. means that there is often lack of doing so to increase their legiti- ut beyond this, formal EU One can make the same argument continuity. A core of NGO activ- macy, international profile, and Bengagement within the track 1 for the European Union. It is often ists have remained committed to overall acceptance; on their side, peace process should now be ac- said that the EU will need to be the issue and have come to con- the Azerbaijanis demand that tively considered. brought in if ever a deal was reached stitute an informal institutional NGOs working on the conflict rec- The beleaguered Minsk Process because its money and expertise will memory collective of the last two ognize the territorial integrity of would benefit by a widening of be required for post-conflict recon- or three decades of events. Civil Azerbaijan, regardless of the norm the mediators’ circle to include, struction. There is a good case to be society initiatives have also been ei- that it is states that recognize states, even if only in a consultative made for it to be brought into the ther snubbed by the mediators and not NGOs. The working space for role, the United Nations and the process now, even if, initially at least, the sides to the conflict, or, worse, civil society has been shrinking European Union. Both are consid- in a consultative capacity. have been the target of often very over the years, at a time when it

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 136 137 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES should be widening and expanding. Towards Conflict renewed in the process by the sides have a duty to recognize this A new approach on this by the sides Settlement sides themselves, and more widely and facilitate their work. is much needed. by their respective elites and their In the meantime, on-going peace- t is possible that Armenia and populations. The extent to which building efforts—from the track 1 There are some examples of at- IAzerbaijan may at some point this trust has evaporated is not al- OSCE Minsk Group co-chair me- tempts by the co-chair mediators decide not to wait for the interna- ways appreciated, and hardly ever diation to the EU-supported track 2 to open a dialogue with local and tional community and together admitted. Involving the UN and peace-building initiatives—need to international civil society orga- muster the necessary courage to the EU in some way in the work step-up their efforts, focusing on nizations, a process usually in- work out a solution by themselves. may make the process a bit more a number of directions including stigated by the American repre- Indeed one can look at some rare unwieldy, but will add credibility. incremental peaceful and negoti- sentative on the trio. Some of the moments over the last three de- he border incidents between ated changes to the situation on the countries holding cades when this TArmenia and Azerbaijan ground in the conflict zone; confi- the rotating chair- appeared to be in July 2020 have left the atmo- dence-building measures between manship of the Given that the peace pro- happening, like sphere around the peace process Armenia and Azerbaijan; and peo- the talks between OSCE in recent cess now appears to be poisoned, and it is going to take a ple-to-people contacts and initia- Heydar Aliyev and years—notably the entering a period of re- lot of corrective work in the time tives involving the populations af- Robert Kocharyan Swiss and the Aus- flection, it would be ben- ahead to create the right atmo- fected by the conflict. These need trians—have also (1999) or between eficial if civil society en- sphere for substantive negotiations to run in parallel with renewed and used their prerog- Ilham Aliyev and gagement could become to take place. Local and interna- meaningful negotiations on sub- ative to push the Nikol Pashinyan more systematic. tional civil society organizations, stance in a mutually re-enforcing co-chair media- (2018-2019). Both together with the think tank com- way. The next task of the mediators tors in meetings of these initiatives munity, have a contribution to is to convince the sides of the expe- with small, select ended nowhere, make, and the mediators and the diency of this approach. BD groups of NGOs. The mediators’ but they did show that direct talks lack of enthusiasm on these occa- without mediation is possible, and sions was quite striking. that there was a common ground to Given that the peace process now be discovered. appears to be entering a period of But most likely, international reflection, it would be beneficial mediation is going to be required if civil society engagement could going forward, and the existing become more systematic through framework is also likely to remain, the involvement of experts from simply because replacing it will be bakudialogues.ada.edu.az the conflict sides and beyond hugely disruptive and may take working on particular issues; and a long time. This does not mean, by moving as quickly as possible however, that the present arrange- to the establishment of working ments under the auspices of the groups under the auspices of the three co-chair countries cannot mediators to support an invigo- be improved. Indeed the process rated peace process. is damaged. Trust needs to be

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STUDY IN FRANCE AND AZERBAIJAN EARN TWO DEGREES

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[e]specially in Azerbaijan and almost always puts pragmatic in- Turkmenistan republics, with terests above ideology in instances Iran’s Longstanding the ultimate objective of brewing discord among the Iranian where Islamic solidarity conflicts Cooperation with Armenia Azeris and Turkmen by insti- with primary geopolitical interests. gating ethnic and nationalistic In the specific case of the war be- sentiments. tween two of its northern neigh- Domestic Azerbaijani Opposition During the period of the Soviet bors, the clash between ideological collapse, all-out war emerged be- and pragmatic considerations was May be Rising tween two of Iran’s new neighbors: unmistakable: Christian-populated Armenia and Azerbaijan, which Armenia had invaded Shia majority Brenda Shaffer created a critical security and po- Azerbaijan (the only majority- litical challenge for Tehran. This Shia former Soviet republic), cap- was not some faraway conflict like tured close to 20 percent of its terri- hen the Soviet Union Union and the establishment those in the Gaza Strip or Lebanon; tory, and turned almost one million collapsed in De- of six new states populated by this war was taking place directly Azerbaijani Shia into refugees cember 1991, Iran’s Muslim-majorities in the Caspian on Iran’s borders, and at times cre- and Internally Displaced Persons stableW northern boundary suddenly region as an opportunity to expand ated refugee flows into Iran. Thus, (IDPs). became a shared border with five its influence and “export the revolu- Iran’s own national security and states: land borders with Armenia, tion.” Rather, Tehran’s position was domestic stability was seen to be However, the devastation created Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, and defensive: protecting against this directly threatened by the conflict. by the war and occupation in Azer- maritime borders with Kazakhstan new potential source of threats. The The danger was especially sensitive baijan in the early years of the con- and Russia. Tehran viewed this officially-sponsored Tehran Times, since over one third flict served a main momentous change as a source of wrote in late December 1991 that of the population of Iranian policy several new security challenges. the first ground for concern Iran is ethnic-Azer- Tehran almost always goal by dimming Among these were maritime de- from the point of view in Teh- baijani; the regions puts pragmatic inter- the new coun- ran is the lack of political sta- of northwest Iran try’s attraction to limitation in the Caspian Sea and bility in the newly independent ests above ideology in the establishment of Azerbaijan republics. The unstable condi- that are contig- instances where Islamic Iran’s Azerbaijani and Turkmenistan, two states that tions in those republics could uous to the con- solidarity conflicts with minority. Thus, be serious causes of insecuri- shared ethnic ties with large num- flict zone—East primary geopolitical Tehran adopted a ty along the lengthy borders Azerbaijan, West policy in support of bers of Iranian citizens. (over 2,000 kilometers) Iran interests. shares with those countries. Azerbaijan, and Yerevan in the war Consequently, Tehran did not Already foreign hands can be Ardebil—are pop- with Azerbaijan view the breakup of the Soviet felt at work in those republics, ulated primarily by and has continued ethnic-Azerbaijanis, many of whom to engage in close cooperation with share family ties with co-ethnics in Armenia until the present day. Brenda Shaffer is a faculty member of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Senior Advisor for Energy at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and a Senior Fellow the Republic of Azerbaijan. n January 2008, Mahmoud at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center who has provided testimony to both While the ruling regime in Iran for- Vaezi, Iran’s then-Deputy houses of the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament. She is the author of, most I notably, Energy Politics (2009), a standard textbook in over 200 university courses mally asserts that its foreign policy is Foreign Minister responsible for around the globe. based on Islamic solidarity, Tehran the former Soviet region (he now

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 142 143 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES serves as chief of staff to the coun- regime protests in Iran since late considerations as one of Iran’s first post-independence govern- try’s president) wrote the following 2017, have increased opposition major factors in its policy toward ments reinforced Tehran’s fears that about how Iran had approached to Iranian-Armenian cooperation the Karabakh conflict. According Baku would engage in irredentism. the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict among Iran’s ethnic-Azerbaijani to an Armenian official I inter- During the late 1980s and the initial during the early war period: community, both at grassroots and viewed in winter 2000, Tehran independence period, the Popular Iran was in the neighborhood elite levels. Iran’s tilt may thus be- put pressure on Front of Azerbaijan of the environment of the con- come domestically costly and diffi- Armenia to re- political move- flict. Karabakh is situated only cult to sustain. ject U.S.-initiated 40 km distance from its bor- While officially Tehran ment campaigned ders. At that time, this possibil- This essay will examine the ac- peace proposals remained neutral, Iran for language and ity raised that the boundaries of tivity and attitudes of Iran’s eth- (the “Goble Plan”) served as Armenia’s main cultural rights and conflict extended to the beyond that would have eventual reunifica- of Karabakh. Since then, Iran’s nic-Azerbaijani population as it supply route during most led Armenia to tion with ethnic- consideration was based on relates to Iranian cooperation of the war. security perceptions. [...] Iran with Armenia and Tehran’s tilt to- cede back to Azer- Azerbaijanis re- could not be indifferent to the ward Yerevan in its conflict with baijan control of siding in north- developments occurring along territory bordering its borders, security changes of Azerbaijan, beginning with a dis- eastern Iran, to the borders and their impact on cussion of Iranian policies toward Iran. The Islamic Republic pre- which they referred as “South Iran’s internal developments. the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. ferred to preserve a large de facto Azerbaijan.” Prior to the Soviet col- Tehran’s policy tilt toward border with Armenia to limit ties lapse, beginning in December 1989, Armenia—for reasons of security, Iran’s Policy between Azerbaijan and Iran’s eth- large-scale protests of Azerbaijanis nic-Azerbaijani population. Vaezi as Vaezi made clear—was predi- rom the beginning of the emerged in the border area between cated on the assumption that Iran’s Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, also stated Iran’s preference for a Iran and Soviet Azerbaijan, in the domestic Azerbaijani community theF main factor weighing on Iran’s border with Armenia (and opposi- region of Nakhchevan. Activists would not mount policy toward the tion to direct links between Turkey from Baku, together with local vil- significant op- war was the per- and Azerbaijan): lagers, held rallies in the border area, position to this Iran’s main concern ceived impact on Iran expressed its opposition to and attempted to communicate with was preventing identi- the change of political geogra- policy. For most its security. Tehran phy of the region. If this plan co-ethnics and family members in of the period since fication of its domestic held no special could have been somehow im- Iran. The protestors also destroyed the emergence Azerbaijani community sentiments for plemented it would have had some of the border posts. wide political, economic and of the Armenia- with the new Republic of Azerbaijanis as co- security effects on the region. After the renewal of Azerbaijan’s Azerbaijan con- Azerbaijan. religionists. Iran’s Linking Nakhchevan to Azer- independence, President Abulfez flict, Tehran’s bet main concern baijan would have reduced the Elchibey (1992-1993) elevated the had paid off. importance of Iran’s unique was preventing and distinctive position in campaign for language and cultural However, growing awareness of identification of its domestic the Caucasus and interrupted rights for ethnic-Azerbaijanis in Iran the extent of cooperation and ties Azerbaijani community with the Iran’s linkage with Armenia. to the level of state policy. For in- between Tehran and Yerevan, vi- new Republic of Azerbaijan. In 1992, The activities of the main po- stance, the new state’s new elementary olent flare-ups between Armenia Mahmoud Vaezi (the country’s litical actors in Azerbaijan during school textbooks’ covers displayed a and Azerbaijan that caused signifi- aforementioned then-deputy for- the Soviet collapse and the poli- map of historical Azerbaijan that in- cant casualties, and a wave of anti- eign minister), pointed to internal cies of the Republic of Azerbaijan’s cluded territories in present-day Iran.

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Tehran developed relations In April 1992, two cargo planes of continued to forge ahead with trade years. Iran’s official media shows and trade with Armenia during aid funded by ethnic-Armenians in and cooperation with Yerevan. no special feelings toward the ref- the height of the battles between Iran arrived in Yerevan. The planes Considering that the Armenians ugees and IDPs in Azerbaijan or Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1992- were dispatched to Armenia by sought to change existing borders Azerbaijan’s loss of control of its 1994. During the war period, the Iranian Red Crescent. Iranian between Armenia and Azerbaijan lands, nor special identification Armenian and Iranian officials con- Armenians also reportedly contrib- and occupied a significant amount or solidarity with Azerbaijan as ducted regular high-level visits and uted funds to the construction of a of Azerbaijan’s internationally Muslims or Shiites. However, a cordial exchanges. bridge linking Armenia and Iran, recognized territory, the lack of small shift in the official Iranian hile officially Tehran which was inaugurated in May Iranian criticism and the adoption messaging took place around 2012: Wremained neutral, Iran 1992. During the war, the sides in- of a “balanced” approach to the Iranian officials and official media served as Armenia’s main supply augurated direct flights between sides in actuality favored Armenia. began to add that Iran supports route during most of the war. In Tehran and Yerevan. Iranian official media often adopts “Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity,” 1992 and 1993, supply routes Armenian officials thanked Iran the Armenian official practice of re- which would imply return of the territories captured by Armenia. from all of Armenia’s neighbors a number of times for the supplies ferring to the occupied territories as except for Iran were closed or un- and for serving as a supply route. the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” ne of the best indications of reliable: for example, a civil war For instance, Armenian Prime despite the fact that the Iranian OIran’s conciliatory position in neighboring Georgia hindered Minister and Vice President Gagik government does not recognize toward Armenia is the fact that Russia from using land routes to Harutyunyan remarked in May the occupied territories as a state Armenian representatives in the supply Yerevan. Armenia was able 1992, in a ceremony opening a or recognize Armenia’s sovereignty 1990s repeatedly praised Iran’s to continue the war effort due to bridge over the Araz river that this over these territories. role in the negotiation process, ex- critical fuel and food supplies that would contribute to his country’s In regional fora with Mus- pressed their preference for Tehran reached it through Iran. For in- economic stability by providing lim-majority state membership, over many other foreign represen- stance, in April 1992, at one of the alternatives to transport routes such as the Economic Cooperation tatives, and called for the deploy- most critical points in the con- blocked as a result of the war. Organization, Tehran has refrained ment of Iranian observers along flict, Iran agreed to supply fuel to The bridge was opened just after from criticizing Armenia. Iranian the borders between Armenia and Armenia and improved transporta- Armenian forces had captured the representatives and Iranian of- Azerbaijan. Armenia’s first post- tion links with Armenia. Moreover, pivotal city of Shusha, the histor- ficial media reserved their criti- independence president, Levon Russian fuel was often delivered to ical capital of Azerbaijanis in the cisms in the early 1990s for “colo- Ter-Petrosyan, stated in May 1992 Armenia by way of Iran. Iranian Karabakh region. Shusha was cap- nial powers” and other external that “the Iranians have proved their fuel supplies critical for the war tured by Armenia’s forces while agents, such as Russia, Turkey, the complete impartiality in this issue, effort included oil for heavy vehi- Tehran was holding a peace summit United States, and occasionally the respecting the rights of both sides cles and coal for heat and cooking. of the leaders of Armenia and Azer- “Zionists,” and even blamed and striving for a just solution, and Hrant Melik-Shahnazaryan, an baijan. Despite the embarrassing Elchibey for the conflict with therefore the sides trust Iran.” Armenian specialist on Iran’s timing, Tehran offered no condem- Armenia, while refraining from During his September 2011 visit policies in the South Caucasus, nation of Yerevan: Iranian reac- pointing a finger at Yerevan. to Iran, Armenian foreign min- claimed in May 2011 that “Iran [had] tion was limited to an expression Tehran’s rhetoric toward the ister Eduard Nalbandyan praised provided Armenia’s food safety of “concern over the recent devel- Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict has Tehran’s position on the conflict during the war.” opments in Karabakh.” Tehran not changed significantly in recent with Azerbaijan, stating that he

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“appreciated the Islamic Republic On a visit to Yerevan in late its recognition of Azerbaijan’s sov- cooperation with Armenia, but of Iran for presenting proper and January 2015, Iranian foreign min- ereignty over the territory. Tehran the opposition was not sufficient balanced views on the Nagorno- ister Javad Zarif remarked that “Iran also agreed that the Armenian to impose a constraint on Iranian- Karabakh issue, and expressed is ready to cooperate with Armenia side could not display any national Armenian cooperation. the hope that Tehran would in different areas, including tele- symbols, such as flags, at the plant Since late 2017, as open public maintain the same stance and communications, railway, energy, and dam.) Moreover, products in opposition to the Iranian regime continue presenting such posi- gas, electricity and the cleaning of Iran are supplied directly to the has grown, so has open opposition tive views in future.” the Aras river.” occupied territories and Iranian to Iran’s cooperation with Armenia. In contrast, Azerbaijan’s repre- Iran and Armenia also continue companies and in- In parallel, Iran’s sentatives voiced critical statements to engage in energy trade: Iran dividuals conduct ethnic-Azerbaijani regarding Iran’s role in the negoti- supplies natural gas to Armenia, direct trade with Since late 2017, as open community has re- ations, illustrating their perception while Armenia supplies Iran with entities there. Iran public opposition to ceived through so- also supports a cial media a better that Tehran was not promoting electricity from its nuclear power the Iranian regime has their interests. As Elchibey re- plant. During Prime Minister radio station that picture of the ex- broadcasts in the grown, so has open op- tent of Iranian- marked in May 1992: Pashinyan’s February 2019 visit to position to Iran’s cooper- Unfortunately, there was no Iran, the sides expressed support Talysh language Armenian coop- benefit from the activity of for the establishment of an addi- (a Persian dialect) ation with Armenia. eration, including Iran’s peacemaking mission, tional electricity line between the from the occupied Iran’s direct aid for example. Khodzhaly fell af- city of Shusha, to the occupation ter their first visit to Karabagh, countries to expand Armenia’s elec- and Shusha fell after their sec- tricity exports to Iran. During the targeting the Talysh minority in forces in the Armenian-occupied ond visit, and the fall of Lachin same visit, Pashinyan expressed Azerbaijan. Iranian companies territories of Azerbaijan. Flare-ups is the sequel to this. support for Armenia serving as a have also conducted restoration in the conflict that resulted in sig- In 1994, Iranian officials also transit state for Iranian natural gas work on mosques in the occupied nificant Azerbaijani casualties stated that early in his term as pres- supplies to Europe. territories, such as the Govhar aga have also galvanized opposition in Shusha. among ethnic-Azerbaijanis in Iran. ident of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev Iran is even involved in infra- Since late 2017, several events had complained to Tehran about its structure projects located in the The Role of Ethnic- cooperation with Armenia. Azerbaijani territories occupied have sparked a significant ethnic- ran openly advocates for ex- by Armenia. For instance, in 2010 Azerbaijanis in Iran Azerbaijani response in Iran: the Ipanding its cooperation with Iranian and Armenian company ehran’s close cooperation visit of Armenia’s prime minister Armenia, including in infrastruc- officials inaugurated a hydroelec- Twith Armenia is grounded to Iran (February 2019), appear- ture projects that traverse the oc- tric dam on the Araz river near the on the assumption that Iran’s do- ance on social media of clips of cupied territories. Iranian president Khoda Afarin Bridge in an area mestic Azerbaijani community Iranian aid and trade convoys to the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remarked that straddles Iran and the occu- will neither actively nor strongly Armenian occupation forces during Nalbandyan’s September pied territories. (It should be noted, oppose this policy. For most of (spring 2020), and the recent reig- 2011 visit that “Tehran-Yerevan however, that in 2016 Iran and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, nition of the conflict (July 2020). ties could be enhanced promptly as Azerbaijan signed an agreement Iranian Azerbaijanis have ex- During the initial war period Iran considers no limits on its rela- allowing Iran to use the occupied pressed support for Azerbaijan and (1992-1994), Iranian ethnic- tions with Armenia.” territories, thus Iran reconfirmed some criticism of Tehran’s close Azerbaijani activists publicly

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In 1992-1993, much of Azerbaijani members of the Iranian 2010 interview for a news service ported that the demonstration was the humanitarian and refugee as- parliament condemned Armenia’s in Azerbaijan, Iran’s Vice-President held “despite the opposition of the sistance from Iran to the Republic occupation of Azerbaijan’s lands for Parliamentary Affairs, Sayyed authorities.” The next year, Tehran of Azerbaijan was organized di- and Tehran’s support for Armenia. Mohammad-Reza Mir-Tajeddini, University students held a demon- rectly from Iran’s majority ethnic- In addition, during the war pe- stated that stration in front of the Armenian Azerbaijani provinces. Beginning riod, Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Nagorno-Karabakh is Azer- embassy to show their support for in summer 1992, some of the baijani territory. We cannot Azerbaijanis wounded in the war Abdulkarim Mousavi Ardebeli, support an Armenian policy Azerbaijan in the conflict. During an ethnic-Azerbaijani cleric, often of aggression and occupation the demonstration, the embassy was with Armenia were treated in mentioned the Nagorno-Karabakh that aims to separate the region stoned, and subsequently the Ira- Tabriz hospitals. Throughout from Azerbaijan. [...] As part conflict in his Friday sermons and nian ambassador in Yerevan was 1992-1993, and initially organized of my activities as an MP from by ethnic-Azerbaijani representa- frequently expressed solidarity with Tabriz, I wrote an article about summoned by the Armenian foreign tives from the Iranian provinces, the Azerbaijani side. Iranian depu- the situation with the Agdam minister to explain the incident. ties from its majority ethnic-Azer- mosque and denounced this convoys of supplies and other aid fact. Several other members Iran allows the publication of a baijani provinces led campaigns were sent directly from these prov- joined me. Naturally, we con- limited number of literary jour- aimed at limiting Iranian relations demn any disrespect to Islam. inces to the needy and refugees in with Armenia, openly called for A mosque is a symbol of reli- nals in the languages of its ethnic Azerbaijan. For instance, a del- Tehran’s assistance to Azerbaijan, gion and faith. The mosques in minorities. Varliq is a bilingual egation from Urmia in June Karabakh are not an exception. Azerbaijani-Persian publication and participated in demonstra- Our theologians condemn the 1992 set up a refugee center in tions against Armenia. Ethnic- desecration of mosques. produced in Tehran, and it is the Nakhchevan and Iran’s East only Azerbaijani-language journal Azerbaijan Province opened a Azerbaijani parliament mem- In addition, in several pro- that has been published since refugee camp within the ter- bers distributed petitions. In April tests, Iranian ethnic-Azerbaijanis the revolution in 1979. It has fre- ritory of the Republic of 1993, Kamel Abedinzadeh, an eth- expressed their solidarity with nic-Azerbaijani deputy from Khoy, Azerbaijan and criticized the quently published articles on the Azerbaijan in September 1993. even spoke in the Azerbaijani lan- Iranian government’s support for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, often In May 2006, mass demonstra- guage in the Iranian Majles when Armenia in the conflict. In May expressing solidarity with Azer- tions broke out in Tabriz, Tehran, he condemned Armenian actions 1992, 200 students demonstrating baijan. In spring 1994, the journal’s and other cities in Iran with large against Azerbaijan. He also issued at Tabriz University chanted editor, Javad Heyat, addressed an ethnic-Azerbaijani populations in press releases for publication in “Death to Armenia” and, alluding article to then Turkish President Sü- response to a caricature in an offi- Hamshahri and other Iranian jour- to Tehran, described the “silence leyman Demirel, calling on Turkey cial Iranian newspaper that equated nals on this issue. of the Muslims,” in the face of the to come to Azerbaijan’s aid. Varliq Azerbaijanis to cockroaches. Ira- ranian officials of ethnic- Armenian “criminal activities” as has frequently carried articles about nian security forces killed dozens IAzerbaijani origin and parlia- “treason to the Quran.” According Azerbaijani victims of this conflict, of protestors and arrested hun- ment members from the ethnic- to the Iranian newspaper Salam, the as well as poems written in memory dreds and many were convicted of Azerbaijani populated regions ethnic-Azerbaijani demonstrators of fallen Azerbaijani soldiers. violations and sent for long prison

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 150 151 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES sentences. During the demon- Republic of Azerbaijan and chanted according to Supreme Leader Ali None of these events—taken in strations, support for Azerbaijan “Karabakh is and will be ours.” Khamenei, “Karabakh is an Islamic their own—have been significant regaining control of the occupied Reportedly, Iranian security forces ar- land. Now I ask, what is the difference enough to change Iran’s policy on territories was also expressed. rested 29 ethnic-Azerbaijani citizens between Palestine and Karabakh?” the conflict; but through the policy In mid-January 2008, the Iranian for participation in this activity during Hezretpur also read a nationalist of arrests, it is clear the regime fears government approved the opening the soccer match. poem in the Azerbaijani language further activity. Moreover, should of an Armenian consulate in Tabriz, ashinyan’s visit to Iran in and was booed by Majlis members. wider protests against the ruling re- a city in northern Iran populated PFebruary 2019 was a trigger ost recently, Azerbaijanis gime take place, Tehran’s policy of primarily by ethnic-Azerbaijanis. for ethnic-Azerbaijanis in the Min Iran reacted to the April cooperation with Armenia will in- This decision was reportedly pro- country. During his visit, in meet- 2020 open appearance of evidence crease the incentive of Iran’s domestic Azerbaijani population to protest. tested by a petition campaign among ings with Pashinyan, the Iranian of Iran’s aid to Armenia in the occu- Azerbaijanis in Armenian commu- pied territories of Azerbaijan. While Coming to an End? Iran. Nevertheless, nity hung banners Iranian trade and cooperation with Tehran continued stating that “Kara- the Armenian occupation forces has ran’s policy on the Armenia- Azerbaijanis in Iran re- Azerbaijan conflict strongly illus- to encourage Ar- bakh is Armenia,” been taking place since the war pe- I acted to the April 2020 trates the interconnection between menia to open the and the prime min- riod, the surfacing of clips and films open appearance of evi- Iran’s foreign policy and domestic consulate. ister posted pictures verifying this cooperation spurred issues. More than half of Iran’s citi- In the last two de- dence of Iran’s aid to Ar- with these banners, public complaints from ethnic-Azer- zens are of non-Persian origin, be- cades, Iranian soccer menians in the occupied all uninhibited by baijanis in Iran and in various media. longing to ethnic groups that share matches have also territories of Azerbaijan. Pashinyan’s Iranian Some suggested blowing up the gas ties with groups in bordering states: become a venue hosts. Ethnic-Azer- pipeline to Armenia or sabotaging the Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, for frequent ex- baijanis in Iran re- bridges between Armenia and Iran, all Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghani- pression of ethnic sentiments among sponded with protests in front of the which run through areas of Iran in- stan. These groups can put pressure on ethnic-Azerbaijani fans of Tabriz’s Armenian embassy in Tehran and habited by ethnic-Azerbaijanis. Tehran’s ties with neighboring states main soccer team, Traktor Azerbaijan stuck posters on the embassy’s walls Ethnic-Azerbaijanis also called for and some of those states pay close (formerly Traktor Sazi), and of eth- stating that “Karabakh is an integral protests against Armenia in front of attention to Tehran’s policies toward nic-Azerbaijanis in Tehran. Teams part of Azerbaijan.” the Armenian embassy in Tehran and co-ethnics in Iran. This creates not and their fans from Persian-majority In an Iranian parliament session many Azerbaijani populated cities so simple policy challenges for Iran. centers also often unfurl Armenian following Pashinyan’s visit, Ruhulla in Iran in response to a July 2020 To date, the ruling regime in Tehran flags at games in attempt to incite the Hezretpur, a deputy from the ma- flare-up of conflict between Armenia has been able to weather domestic ethnic-Azerbaijani players. jority ethnic-Azerbaijani city of and Azerbaijan that led to many ca- Azerbaijani opposition to its close co- In recent years, anti-Armenian Urmia, denounced the visit and sualties. Iranian security forces ar- operation with Armenia. Continued sentiment has been expressed reg- Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani rested dozens of ethnic-Azerbaijani flare-ups in the conflict between ularly at matches. A few days after lands. He also condemned the fact activists on the eve of the planned Armenia and Azerbaijan may lead Pashinyan’s February 2019 visit to that the visit had taken place during demonstrations to preempt them. to increased domestic pressure on Iran, for instance, Traktor fans burned the anniversary of the Khojaly mas- Consequently, only small numbers of Tehran to end its support for Armenia an Armenian flag during a match. sacre of Azerbaijanis in the hands of protestors managed to demonstrate. in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.BD They also waived the flag of the Armenians. He pointed out that

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protection of minority identities divided along ethnic, political, reli- The OSCE and Minorities in and rights is certainly a thread gious, historical, cultural, and lin- running through the HCNM’s guistic lines. These fault lines can the Silk Road Region work, minorities and the dynamics ignite crises and conflicts. In order between minority and majority to address them effectively, we have groups are approached from a con- found that traditional, short-term Fostering Social Cohesion and flict-prevention perspective: a clear conflict-prevention tools are often- Integration recognition that at a time when the times insufficient and in some cases degree of diversity in our societies plainly ineffective. has dramatically increased, the pro- Population movements, including Lamberto Zannier, with Eleonora Lotti motion of policies that facilitate in- through immigration, further di- tegration is one of the most effective versify the demographic compo- tools for preventing crises and con- sition of our societies, posing spe- t the beginning of the in a spirit of cooperation, decided flicts rooted in such diversity. 1990s new conflicts almost three decades ago to es- cific additional challenges to their erupted in Europe as tablish the function of a High s the degree of geopolitical cohesion. Against this backdrop, newA borders appeared on the map Commissioner on National Aconfrontation has steadily populistic or nationalistic policies following the dissolution of the Minorities (HCNM). The HCNM increased in recent years, interna- have found fertile ground in many Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and has a two-fold mandate: firstly, to tional cooperation in preventing OSCE participating States, further Czechoslovakia. As emerging states provide “early warning” at the first and resolving conflicts has become complicating the challenge of pro- were striving to assert new identi- sign of imminent conflict in the less straightfor- moting the pro- ties (or revive old ones), various OSCE area arising from tensions ward, including in gressive integration minorities found themselves living involving national minorities; sec- in the OSCE area. The OSCE participat- of societies in an within new national borders, which ondly, to provide “early action” in In fact, classic in- ing States, in a spirit of inclusive manner in a number of cases provoked in- regard to national minority issues ter-state conflict cooperation, decided al- through a broad stability and conflict, with geopol- that have the potential to develop has almost disap- most three decades ago and balanced itics complicating these dynamics into conflict. peared around the to establish the function range of policies. even further. As quickly became world. Acute crises Along with the in- This mandate takes the form of of a High Commissioner apparent, some of these divisions assisting OSCE participating States and conflicts have creasing appearance were so deep that a number of those become increas- on National Minorities of inflammatory to develop and implement poli- (HCNM). conflicts remain unresolved. cies that facilitate the integration ingly hybrid and language in main- It was against this background of diverse societies, which is key are often charac- stream political dis- that the OSCE participating States, to conflict prevention. While the terized by internal course, hate speech strife, sometimes in the context of and hate crimes are on the rise. These Lamberto Zannier holds the rank of ambassador in the Italian diplomatic service failed or dysfunctional states, or dynamics have the potential to fur- and recently completed his term as OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. violent separatism, in some cases ther marginalize the more vulnerable He previously served as OSCE Secretary General after having held the rank of UN accompanied by quasi-military communities in a given society and, Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General as Head of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Eleonora Lotti serves operations affecting civilian pop- in some cases, can pave the way to as Personal Adviser to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. ulations. Many societies remain radicalization and violent extremism.

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hese political trends also affect potential to be successfully adapted Central Asia was a strategic plank resettling populations, and em- Tnational minorities, which to different contexts. Therefore, of the ancient Silk Road that con- ploying other divide-and-rule tac- increasingly look for support and I did not simply engage with and nected East and West: it saw the tics. Nonetheless, the attempt to protection from states with whom visit a country because it might passage of many diverse peoples, create a common state identity, with they share ethnic, linguistic, or face or is facing an imminent risk which in turn created a mosaic of Russian as a lingua franca, together cultural affinity (the so-called “kin- of interethnic stability. A lot of my diversity that includes nomadic with socio-economic and infrastruc- states”). We see many situations in work involved engaging with spe- and settler populations, Turkic and tural development, helped make di- the OSCE where national minori- cific countries to become better ac- Persian-speakers, living side by side verse peoples feel part of a common ties resist integration, demanding quainted with existing regulatory in peace in the steppes and high Soviet destiny. frameworks to protect minority levels of autonomy that would ef- mountains in the heart of Asia. he breakup of the Soviet rights, to better understand and if fectively isolate them from the rest This entire area—which I under- Union resulted in a number necessary foster progress in rele- T of the society of the country where stand some have recently taken to of challenges in the Silk Road re- vant integration policies, and to they reside. The space within which calling the Silk Road region—also gion, which still have repercussions explore and share best practices in we can find common ground be- today. New states emerged or re- key policy areas. became an object of imperial ri- tween different parties has shrunk. valries during the “Great Game” gained their independence. Some States are increasingly urging the Regional Overview between Great Britain and Russia states, like Tajikistan, descended international community to take in the nineteenth century. Both the into civil war along regional, action against other states’ policies he eastern part of the OSCE space is an ethnically di- Caucasus and Central Asian regions ethnic, and ideological lines. Other that negatively affect “their” com- T were largely subsumed into the Central Asian countries experi- munities residing there, while, in verse region with strong traditions of peaceful interethnic coexistence Russian Empire and later into the enced flashes of interethnic violence, some cases, resisting requests to vet Soviet Union, such as in the Fer- their own policies affecting the na- and tolerance. The Caucasus region has a very rich and complex which led to the gana Valley in the tional minority groups residing on transformation of The breakup of the Soviet 1990s, which reig- their own territory. history as the strategic locus of important trade routes and civi- the constituent re- Union resulted in a num- nited in southern This, in short, is the geopolit- lizational exchanges between the publics during this ber of challenges in the Kyrgyzstan in 2010, ical landscape in which I operated Black Sea and Caspian Sea and period spanning Silk Road region, which claiming the lives throughout my three-year term across the Caucasus range. Early almost a century, still have repercussions of over 400 people as OSCE High Commissioner on Arab historiographers referred to with mixed lega- today. and causing dis- National Minorities, which re- the Caucasus as the “mountain of cies. On the one placement. In- cently came to an end. Within tongues” to describe its incredible hand, early Soviet ternal fissures em- the OSCE space, successive High linguistic variety. The region has policies encour- broiled Georgia Commissioners have priori- also been an area of geopolitical aged nation-building within the in civil strife and protracted se- tized their geographical engage- conflict, contested by various and USSR, promoting representatives cessionist wars in the 1990s. ment based on various factors, successive empires that have fre- of the so-called “titular” nation Nationalist and breakaway aspira- including conflict potential; the quently redefined its borders whilst into lower-administrative levels of tions were pitted against each other, level of access, dialogue, and contributing to further shaping its government. On the other hand, drawing in Russian military inter- leverage; and the availability ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and re- national aspirations were thwarted ventions, and exposing latent and of best practices that have the ligious diversity. by drawing complex borders, unresolved conflicts. These later

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 156 157 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES escalated into an armed conflict We often see the securitization of Abkhazia, South Ossetia (Tskhinvali) of my mandate. Emergency mea- between Georgia and the Russian national minority issues and the and Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia’s sures to prevent and contain the Federation in 2008, further es- favor of approaches that focus on proximity and historical ties to spread of the virus, as well as longer- tranging reconciliation pros- the containment of risks rather Central Asia translate into signif- term policies to minimize the ef- pects and leaving de facto than prevention. Unresolved ten- icant interests, including towards fects of the crisis, had exposed or minority populations stranded. The sions and conflicts, as well as out- sizable ethnic-Russian commu- further accentuated discrimination, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict started standing border demarcation and nities residing in many countries shortcomings in governance, and even before the collapse of the delimitation issues, further aggra- of the region, in particular in existing structural imbalances in Soviet Union, and regularly vate the tendency to securitize na- Kazakhstan. China’s flagship Belt diverse societies. re-escalates, as in April 2016 tional minority issues. As a result, and Road Initiative, which aims The economic impact of the crisis, and July 2020. we see local conflicts sporadically at expanding Beijing’s economic especially on border areas, which Added to the ever-present risk of emerging in border areas—namely and geopolitical clout in the Silk are often inhabited by minority latent conflicts reigniting, which is around enclaves or exclaves, which Road region, has led to the accel- communities, has been significant. further complicated by geopolitics, are often inhabited by national mi- eration of Chinese investment, I had been concerned by several we see that many countries in the nority communities—over access to along with influence, in some incidents of discrimination against Silk Road region also face the on- land and resources. Concerns about Central Asian countries, but specific social groups accused of going challenge of managing in- the potential spread of Islamist rad- also progressively in the South spreading the virus, including on creasing diversity in their societies. icalization, including in connection Caucasus. The proximity with social media. Frustration over the To varying degrees, these states are to conflicts in the Middle East, is China’s problematic Xinjiang re- impact of COVID-19—and the still undergoing identity and na- another factor contributing to real gion, as well as with war-torn perception that some governments tion-building processes, character- and perceived security risks. Afghanistan, which hosts signifi- may have been mismanaging the ized by an ongoing tension between eopolitics also play an im- cant ethnic Tajik, Turkmen, and crisis—coupled with long-standing civic values, of which minority Gportant role in interethnic Uzbek communities along border socio-economic grievances and dis- rights are a part, and ethno-centric relations. Rivalries between re- areas, also brings to the surface crimination against certain groups, narratives. As such, governments gional and global players—be they security issues in Central Asia. had, in some contexts, increased may find it difficult to reconcile on- Russia, the United States, the Euro- Similarly, the relative proximity of resentment against the author- going efforts to unify their diverse pean Union, Turkey, or Iran—play conflicts in the Middle East raises ities and gave rise to protests or societies through language, educa- out to varying degrees in the Silk concerns of potential security instability. tion, historical narratives, and sym- Road region. Navigating between spillover to the South Caucasus. Cognizant of the security risks bols with the need to protect the differing interests and positions, f the interplay of such factors that this crisis presents, at the multiple identities that have histor- countries may find it difficult to Iwere not complicated enough, onset of the pandemic I issued a ically coexisted there. achieve a balance in their respective the impact of COVID-19 in recent set of policy recommendations While integration policies that foreign policy orientations. months has added a new challenge under the title “Streamlining seek to achieve a balance between In the South Caucasus, for ex- to diverse societies in the region Diversity: COVID-19 Measures that these two imperatives are in some ample, while they play a media- and beyond, and constituted an Support Social Cohesion.” This cases being developed, such efforts tion role, regional players also en- additional dimension to my work advice, which was based on ex- are often partial and implemen- croach on the latent conflicts in as OSCE High Commissioner on isting guidance developed by the tation proves to be challenging. connection to breakaway entities like National Minorities at the tail end HCNM in a number of secto-

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 158 159 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES rial policy areas, called for non- historical legacies—just to name a on the experience of the successive and Guidelines in our interactions discrimination and inclusivity as the few policy areas on which I regularly High Commissioners in their work with participating States, and of- driving principles of any response to engaged with OSCE States. directly engaging on these issues. fered advice on how these could be the crisis. However, in my experience, even While these documents do not operationalized. In my experience, By the end of my term, many in instances where minority issues represent a consensual set of prin- this thematic approach was exem- countries had begun to move out are not the main cause of conflict, ciples agreed upon by the partici- plified through our programmatic of the emergency phase, with gov- how states choose to handle di- pating States, an overall respect for activities. Pilot projects provided ernments beginning to embark versity can determine how strong the institution—grounded in the practical examples of what can be on efforts to develop sustainable and resilient respective societies personal accountability of the High done in these thematic areas with policy solutions to mitigate the are to internal or external threats. Commissioner and designed in co- built-in exit strategies that aimed at impact of the crisis and build pre- This is why policies promoting a operation with renowned experts local ownership by national author- paredness for future possible re- balanced management of diversity and partners in the field—give these ities and minority groups, some- lapses of the virus. Finding ways are a powerful structural and long- Recommendations and Guidelines times augmented or reinforced to do that in an inclusive way that term conflict prevention tool, and authority and the ability to influence with support from donor partici- builds social cohesion, rather hence one of the main pillars that policies. I found that this technical pating States. than contributing to fragmenta- had guided my work in the Silk and thematic approach was an effec- The need to promote, contextu- tion, will remain a challenge for Road region and beyond. There tive way to address sensitive issues alize, and give practical examples years to come. remains an urgent need to build in a non-politicizing way, which of the principles enshrined in the resilient societies in order to pro- had proven to be fundamental in Guidelines and Recommendations Prevention tect ourselves from the risks that I building and maintaining trust—a guided much of my work in the he cumulative experience of have outlined above. cornerstone of the mandate of any South Caucasus and Central Asia. OSCE High Commissioner on successive High Commis- The main reference for this Below I present a few examples of T National Minorities. sioners demonstrates the centrality kind of policy support to par- how we engaged in the region. These of minority issues to international ticipating States is a series of he thematic Recommenda- should not be considered in isola- peace and security. Recommendations Ttions and Guidelines range tion; I had consistently advocated Indeed, present-day and Guidelines from an overview of the policies for comprehensive approaches that crises in the OSCE The experience of succes- that successive needed to promote the overall pro- link policies in different thematic space often emerge sive High Commissioners High Commis- cesses of integration (or the chal- areas, feeling that this represented over minority-re- demonstrates the cen- sioners have devel- lenges of looking at national mi- an effective way to build integration lated issues: legis- trality of minority issues oped in a number nority issues from the perspective and cohesion. This is why, along lation that is seen to international peace of specific secto- of inter-state relations), to others with supporting the development as infringing on and security. rial areas over the which address more specific angles, of specific sectorial policies, my of- rights, attempts by past three decades. such as education, language, partic- fice invested resources in assisting states to grant priv- Drawing inspira- ipation, media, policing in multi- countries in these regions to de- ileges and protection from interna- ethnic societies, or access to justice. velop and implement comprehen- tion to “their” minorities residing tional law and norms, these aim to In practical terms, my team and sive integration strategies, in line abroad, and questions related to lan- share best practices encountered in I often presented contextually rel- with The Ljubljana Guidelines on guage, education, citizenship, and OSCE participating States, based evant thematic Recommendations Integration of Diverse Societies.

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Education the school system. Over the years, instruction in Kyrgyzstan; and with the 1+4 Program, allowing mi- successive High Commissioners Uzbek language of instruction in nority students to improve their ducation is an extremely have refined the OSCE’s engage- some schools in Tajikistan. It pro- state language skills during a pre- effective sectorial policy that E ment in several participating States vides support at the policy and paratory year and then continue can promote balanced integration. in the sustainable promotion of practitioner levels to uphold the with regular bachelor studies at se- The Hague Recommendations Re- mother-tongue-based multilingual right to mother-tongue education lected universities. This helped mo- garding the Education Rights of and multicultural education. and improve state-language profi- tivate minority school graduates to National Minorities advise that ciency. The program also produces stay on in Georgia for their higher education policies should strive In Central Asia, support has been methodological publications posted education. to find an appropriate balance be- provided to education authorities’ on its educational resource website. tween respecting the right of per- efforts to elaborate legal frame- During my tenure as High sons belonging to minorities to be works and policies for multilingual This long-term engagement has Commissioner, we accompanied taught their culture and (in) their education; develop methodological had a positive impact. The pro- these processes by piloting mul- minority language. The idea is to materials for teacher training and gram has supported the creation of tilingual education in schools enable them to maintain their iden- train teaching staff at pilot schools a center for Uzbek-language text- with Armenian and Azerbaijani tity as well as address the need to and preschools; and bring educa- book development and publishing languages of instruction in the create a common educational space tion authorities and practitioners in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. The experience Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo with equal opportunities for all to together to foster regional cooper- of minority schools in Kazakhstan Kartli regions of Georgia, respec- receive quality education. ation on multilingual education in in piloting mother tongue based tively. While there was overall prog- regular summer schools and focal multilingual education has shown Many of the states comprising ress in state language acquisition how to implement trilingual edu- the Silk Road region share a point meetings. This unique ap- by minority students, several chal- cation reform (teaching in Kazakh, Soviet legacy of segregated minority proach has been embodied in the lenges in terms of teacher capacity Russian, and English) in minority schools. More recently, however, HCNM Central Asia Education and resources remain. Recently, many countries have increased Programme (CAEP), which has schools, while ensuring a continu- efforts were refocused to promote their respective investments in become a flagship program of the ation of subject teaching in the mi- mother tongue-based multilingual teaching the state language, which Institution. nority mother tongue. education in selected schools and is important to enable national urrently in its third phase, In Georgia, in the early 2000s we preschool institutions in these two minorities to pursue higher educa- Cthis program operates supported state language classes minority-populated areas, also sup- tion and, further, a career in their with in-service training centers for ethnic Armenians compactly porting the vision for minority ed- country. This is translating into an on the basis of Memoranda of settled in the Samtskhe-Javakheti ucation developed by the Georgian overall trend of reduced teaching in Co-operation signed with the region. The authorities eventu- Ministry of Education. and of minority languages, which Ministries of Education and Science ally took over this function via the some see as a threat to minority of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Ta- Zurab Zhvania School of Public Language identities. Education experts have jikistan. It supports mother-tongue- Administration, providing lan- he High Commissioner’s ap- identified multilingual education based multilingual education in guage classes to civil servants in Tproach to language follows as an elegant way out of this puzzle, schools and preschools with Uzbek, various minority-populated re- the same principles enshrined in the thus ensuring the promotion of Uyghur, and Tajik languages of gions. Inspired by policy dialogues promoted education policies. The state or official language(s) whilst instruction in Kazakhstan; with with successive High Commis- Oslo Recommendations regarding preserving minority languages in Uzbek and Russian languages of sioners, Georgia also established the Linguistic Rights of National

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Minorities posit that state policies There is, therefore, a need to con- elected assemblies, executive struc- measure progress, while respecting should balance the need for shared tinue promoting the state language tures, the public sector, the courts, the right to self-identification language(s) as a common basis for as a key tool for integration but and the civil service—is vital to and privacy. Members of my staff the integration and functioning of within a balanced approach that foster trust in the institutions of the also regularly took part in OSCE/ diverse societies—with the obligation also safeguards the linguistic and state. This helps ensure ownership ODIHR election observation mis- to safeguard and promote linguistic education rights of national mi- of decisionmaking processes by all sions, including in Central Asian diversity, including by protecting the norities. This approach to language members of society, which in turn countries and Georgia, to observe linguistic rights of minorities. had formed the basis of my policy positively affects social cohesion. I and assess the participation of na- This principle recognizes that dialogue with relevant authori- believe a balanced approach to edu- tional minorities in election pro- language is a key component of ties in the participating States of cation and language in diverse soci- cesses. Central Asia as well as Georgia. identity, which, if threatened, can eties is a prerequisite to and starting In Georgia, over the past five cause instability. At the same time, point in ensuring participation and years we promoted the political language, and, in this context, pro- Participation representation of all members of participation of national minorities ficiency in the language(s) of the society, with respect to their own by bringing them closer to main- he effective participation and specific identities. participating State where minorities Trepresentation of persons be- stream political parties. Activities live, is an essential vehicle towards longing to national minorities in As mentioned earlier, participa- included conducting research and their participation in the country’s public life was a main area of focus tion of minorities in public life—as writing policy papers; discussing economic, social, and public life. in my work as High Commissioner, a vehicle towards greater social co- participation at multiparty round- This is why it is a vital element of as it is indicative of their level of hesion—is indeed one of the end tables where minority represen- any integration policy. inclusion and integration in so- goals of the policy advice we pro- tatives engage with party leaders; In the South Caucasus and Cen- ciety as a whole. My core message vided in these specific fields as well. supporting visits by party repre- tral Asia after the dissolution of the was that minority participation The principles above are articulated sentatives to minority regions and Soviet Union, the lingua franca pro- in decisionmaking is an asset that in The Lund Guidelines on the Ef- visits by minority youth to the cap- gressively shifted from Russian to the generates substantive gains both fective Participation of National ital; engaging expert consultants language of the “tit- for the minorities Minorities in Public Life, which to help political parties develop ular” majority, which themselves and marked its twentieth anniversary agendas for integration; and orga- in some cases needed The effective participa- the state in ques- last November in Lund, Sweden. nizing minority youth internships to be revived. For nation and representation tion. As such, I he principles enshrined in in mainstream political parties. tional minorities, this of persons belonging to approached it not Tthe Lund Guidelines were at We also produced a video called often meant having to national minorities in only from a rights- the heart of my policy dialogues Everyone’s Voice Matters that high- learn a new language. public life was a main based perspective with relevant authorities in the var- lighted the impact of this internship This was sometimes area of focus in my work but also through ious OSCE participating States. For project on participants. also accompanied as High Commissioner. a conflict-preven- instance, on several occasions I in- In the months preceding the con- by a reduced attention lens. quired about the level of represen- clusion of my term, the COVID-19 tion to the preserva- A meaningful tation of persons belonging to na- pandemic had come to show more tion and development of minority level of representation and partici- tional minorities in public services starkly the importance of the par- languages by countries engaged in pation of minorities in all aspects of and parliaments and encouraged the ticipation of minority communi- nation-building. a country’s public life—such as in collection of disaggregated data to ties in economic life—an area that

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 164 165 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES had increasingly become a priority A police service that is seen to n Georgia, for example, we to justice, my staff had also hosted for me. Lockdown measures and incorporate sections of society that Iprovided assistance to drafting roundtables to present the Graz border closures put a strain on the are otherwise excluded or margin- the Law on Police. We focused on Recommendations in Central Asian South Caucasus and Central Asia alized, as well as one that invests in community policing, which has countries and Georgia. and particularly affected vulnerable enhancing communication with all come to be reflected in the curric- communities, including national communities, will be more likely to ulum of the Academy of the Min- Media minorities. The latter are often dis- secure the acceptance and coopera- istry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. he Guidelines on the Use of proportionately concentrated in tion of their members, which tends In Kyrgyzstan, between 2005 and TMinority Languages in the low-skilled labor and the informal to lead to sustainability. This not 2009, we carried out a project pro- Broadcast Media and the recent economy, or are located in cross- only strengthens interethnic rela- moting multi-ethnic policing in Tallinn Guidelines on National border areas with related economic tions, but also increases the oper- cooperation with the Ministry of Minorities and the Media in the activities. The absence of prior ational effectiveness of the police, Interior. My office later supported Digital Age advise that state poli- savings, combined with job losses, improves intelligence-led policing the Community Security Initia- cies should aim at building the capacity and awareness of the media a reduction in wages and working and crime reporting, and enhances tive (CSI), established in southern to reflect and respond to the diver- hours, limited access to social pro- trust with national minorities. Kyrgyzstan following the 2010 Osh events, through activities sity within societies, including by tection benefits, and a reduction The same applies to the judiciary. aimed at enhancing cooperation promoting intercultural exchange of remittances from abroad, were Lack of adequate representation of and trust between law enforce- and challenging negative stereo- all shown to be factors that nega- minority communities in the judi- ment and minority types and ethnici- tively affected already vulnerable ciary diminishes minorities’ con- populations. In ty-based hatred. communities. fidence in the justice system. In Kazakhstan, we We had engaged addition, factors such as the failure Another recurring issue Rule of law launched a capaci- that I observed through- with public broad- to adequately prosecute crimes ty-building project casters in Central he principles of participation out the OSCE region is that disproportionately affect mi- on policing in multi Asia and Georgia to also apply to the judiciary the damaging impact of T nority communities, such as hate ethnic societies and advocate for media and law-enforcement agencies. competing and confron- crimes committed against them by a series of training content in mi- Here my guiding document was members of the majority, further sessions on the Po- tational historical nar- nority languages, called the Recommendations on undermine trust. This also dimin- licing Recommen- ratives on interethnic which should not Policing in Multi-ethnic Societies. ishes the deterrent effect of the dations for senior relations. only be restricted Therein, the theory was developed system. In multi-ethnic societies, and mid-level po- to folkloric topics, that when the police and military the state should promote access lice officers at the but rather in- are representative of the compo- to justice for national minorities Ministry of Internal Affairs clude a range of topics of public sition of society and are respon- through positive measures, such Institute in Aktobe. During my last interest and reflect minority sive to the wishes and concerns of as removing disproportionate so- visit to Kazakhstan in September perspectives as much as pos- all ethnic communities, they have cio-economic barriers to accessing 2019, my office worked with part- sible. For example, we discussed the potential to promote stability legal advice. These are some of ners to organize a workshop to multilingual subtitling and lan- within the state and increase the the key elements of The Graz present the OSCE’s “community guage quotas in broadcasting state’s legitimacy in the eyes of so- Recommendations on Access to policing approach in multi-ethnic on television channels in ciety, including among minorities. Justice and National Minorities. societies.” Specifically on access Kazakhstan. We also supported

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 166 167 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES minority regional television sta- As a result, different groups often historical and contemporary com- flicts, but also to implement, in a tions in Georgia, as part of wider attribute different meanings to the munity relations. State policies comprehensive way, inclusive poli- efforts to support media outlets cre- same historical events, or simply should aim to foster intercultural cies that support social cohesion. I am ated by minorities themselves. end up focusing on different events. links and mutual recognition and proud to have had the opportunity to As we move further into the dig- Disparities in the way people see the accommodation of all groups in accompany them on this journey. ital age, I believe it will be important and remember history can divide society.” The work of the High Commis- for media content relevant to mi- societies for decades or even centu- A group of historians, experts, sioner, however, does not take norities also to be represented on ries after the events in question had and I had been exploring good place in a political vacuum and renew platforms. As the COVID-19 occurred, including along ethnic practices in this field. I was inspired, lies upon the continuous support pandemic has revealed, new media lines. This is what some call the in part, to focus on this after my and cooperation of the OSCE par- can easily become a vehicle for “mirror of pride and pain,” where visit to Petropavlovsk in northern ticipating States. In that sense, the spreading hate speech, which often the pride of one group corresponds Kazakhstan, where ethnic Russians institution’s Recommendations and to the pain of the other. targets specific groups in society. It make up the majority of the pop- Guidelines are only effective tools is therefore important to invest in ll over the Silk Road region, ulation. I remember being struck for conflict prevention if countries shared media spaces that promote Amemory and trauma related by the many concrete examples of are willing to integrate them into social cohesion and contribute to to the experience of conflict and powerful symbols of interethnic their policies and operationalize countering discrimination and eth- displacement continue to play a key unity that I found there, such as the them accordingly. The global geo- nicity-based hatred. role in shaping historical narratives, Abay-Pushkin monument, dedi- political climate sometimes fails to which may pit communities against cated to two of the most prominent facilitate these processes. Historical legacies each other—both within and across Kazakh and Russian poets. I remain convinced that there is borders. Sometimes the object of nother recurring issue that I ob- Geopolitical Realities a need to invest more in coopera- Aserved throughout the OSCE contention is a statue or a monu- tive platforms as a way to counter region, including most recently in ment, or a toponym; at other times, any of the countries in the trends towards geopolitical polar- connection with ongoing anti-racism the curriculum taught at school; or MSilk Road region have taken ization. Existing tools for common movements, is the damaging impact again the so-called “memory laws” significant strides in the direc- reflection, dialogue, and concerted of competing and confrontational through which governments may tion of devising integration strate- preventive action also need to be historical narratives on interethnic impose singular historical narra- gies that contribute to inclusive strengthened. The OSCE can and relations. The way people under- tives and prohibit alternative inter- societies. Challenges remain how- should remain a primary avenue stand, remember, and value history is pretations of the past. ever, not least to resolve latent con- for such cooperation. BD an important factor in the shaping of To overcome such issues, I called identity. When approaching the past, for inclusive approaches to history one can often observe that people and memory that have the ability may glorify and commemorate their to unify rather than divide different achievements, victories, and suffer- groups in society. This principle bakudialogues.ada.edu.az ings, while glossing over darker chap- is also enshrined in The Ljubljana ters revolving around the tragedies Guidelines on Integration of Diverse and suffering they may have endured Societies, which indicate that “States or inflicted on others. should take due account of both

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had a responsibility to advance this national endeavor throughout my Profile in Leadership Itenure as Azerbaijan’s inaugural ambassador to the United States (1992- 2006)—a period of service to the state that more or less coincided with what has been described as America’s unipolar era. It was truly a unique moment Zbigniew Brzezinski in history: the old diplomatic manuals were no longer of much use whilst the new ones had not yet been written. Most thoughtful, seasoned practitioners in America and across the globe were at a loss to predict with confi- (1928-2017) dence the course of events to come. Some celebrated, other mourned; many were hopeful, many more were confused or even frightened. My Friendship with America’s It is against this backdrop that I came to meet a truly extraordinary indi- Geopolitical Sage vidual: one of America’s elder statesmen and most renowned geopolitical strategists, Zbigniew Brzezinski (1928-2017). By the time I met him, Zbig (as his friends called him without exception) no longer held any formal Hafiz Pashayev position in American government. But his influence had hardly waned. He was, in short, the “American foreign policy sage,” as his most prominent biographer called him, alongside, one could say, Henry Kissinger, Brent istory is never at a stand-still for us in Azerbaijan. Over the past Scowcroft, James Baker, and perhaps one or two others. century or so—not to go back further in time—we have witnessed Zbig’s career in public service began more than thirty years before we multiple revolutions, coups, and regime changes in our neigh- met in Washington, DC: he served as an adviser to the presidential cam- borhood;H participated in two world wars; and experienced the travesties paigns of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Hubert H. Humphrey. and tragedies of successive foreign occupations of our lands. The renewal of He served on the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning Council from our independence coincided with the implosion of the Soviet Union—one 1966 to 1968. In the early 1970s, he co-founded the Trilateral Commission of the largest empires in human history; the entrenching of American pre- together with David Rockefeller, serving as its director from 1973 to 1976. eminence; the return of China and India as economic powerhouses; and He was presidential candidate Jimmy Carter’s principal foreign policy ad- the evolution of the European Community into the European Union. viser in 1976 and went on to serve as President Carter’s national security All these historical trends have been felt in modern Azerbaijan, a country adviser from 1977 to 1981. At various points in his career, he was a member that belongs to an overlapping set of regions and civilizations. We are, in a of the faculty of Harvard University, Columbia University, and the Paul H. sense, a quintessential “borderland country,” a formulation made famous by Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), a division of Johns prominent historian Tadeusz Swietochowski; but unlike quite a few other Hopkins University. When I met him, Zbig was a member of the Board borderlands, the political and economic emancipation of today’s Azerbaijan of Trustees and Advisory Board Co-chair of the Center for Strategic and has helped to complete the transformation of our country from an object of International Studies (CSIS), arguably Washington’s most influential think great power competition—a geography to be won and lost by others—into tank. He was a prolific writer, a sharp policy advocate, and an exceptionally a strong and independent actor in international affairs: a keystone state im- thoughtful geopolitical strategist who authored hundreds of books and es- bued with a strong and unified national identity in a part of the world that says over his career. His body of work was so large, in fact, that at the time remains a critical seam of world politics. of his death in 2017 there was no complete record of it. Zbig was also one of the most prominent foreign witnesses and American Hafiz Pashayevis founding Rector of ADA University and Deputy Foreign Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan, having previously served as the country’s first advocates of Azerbaijan’s national achievement—of our reemergence onto ambassador to the United States. what he called the “grand chessboard” of world politics—and our stratagem

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 170 171 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES to position ourselves in “axial Eurasia” (again, his words) most advanta- American national interests. For instance, this led him to publicly criti- geously within that geopolitical context. He was one of those interesting cize Section 907 (entitled “Restriction on Assistance to Azerbaijan”) of the and powerful people from whom I came to learn a great deal, but also Freedom Support Act (1992) and its ban on any kind of direct U.S. govern- someone who was willing to learn from me and my country’s experience ment-to-government aid to Azerbaijan. This section was incorporated into and history. Certainly, many of these people became good, lifelong friends; the bill as the result of a successful lobbying effort on the part of ethnic- yet Zbig continues to carry a special place in my heart and I deeply miss Armenian organizations and hurt the development of U.S.-Azerbaijan stra- him these days. tegic relations. s already mentioned, Zbig and I first met in the early 1990s, when For such views, he was often disliked by ethnic lobbies. But he didn’t care Athe Soviet Union had just collapsed in the wake of the fall of the because he always spoke his mind and acted in manner entirely consistent Berlin Wall. Just like other ambassadors of the newly independent states with his understanding of the principles and beliefs that constitute Amer- of the former Soviet Union, I was eager to promote my country’s interests ican patriotism. within the American political establishment, strengthen bilateral relations, and help secure state sovereignty. Zbig was, of course, quite a sophisticated For example, Zbig famously disagreed with the Bush administration’s de- expert on Russia and on our part of the world—and he was also someone cision to invade Iraq in 2003. When Barack Obama became president, Zbig who fully understood the geopolitical importance of supporting the newly was very hopeful about him. He thought that Obama, who had been elected independent states. He grasped the tectonic changes that were taking place with the help of millions of grassroots donations by ordinary Americans, in the world and possessed the ability to examine emerging trends and con- would be able to launch a new era in U.S. politics in which the role of cor- sider their likely consequences like few others. porate contributions and special-interest lobbying efforts would diminish. He was impressed by this young, dynamic, and promising leader. Yet after a For a grand strategist like Zbig, those were exciting times, indeed. His few years I could tell that his expectations had turned into disappointment. analyses of the events taking place in our region, together with his speeches and activities, were very helpful to us—both in order to draw attention to Zbig came to believe that Obama did not fully understand the impor- our region and to provide a better understanding of American policy. tance of continuing American leadership in the world, that he failed to Above all else, Zbigniew Brzezinski was put together the right team of foreign policy advisers, and that he lacked a great American patriot. In every one of Above all else, Zbigniew interest in the post-Soviet space. Notwithstanding breakthrough agree- his endeavors, his main priority was al- Brzezinski was a great ments with Iran and Cuba, Obama’s efforts to reset relations with Russia ways to defend the national interests of American patriot. did not produce good results—and during his presidency, the United the United States and, if at all possible, States effectively retreated from the Silk Road region, or broader Eurasia advance American relations with other countries. He also considered it im- as some still call it. proper to receive financial or other sorts of contributions from lobbying n the person of Zbigniew Brzezinski I had found someone who well groups, including those linked to promoting the narrow interests of ethnic Iunderstood Azerbaijan’s dream for full and secure independence, our minorities residing in his country. His main vision and goal was to do what strong national desire to protect our sovereignty, and our country’s chal- he thought best for the United States, at both strategic and tactical levels. lenges with governance issues. He saw the passion in our people and he n that context, Zbig was consistently sincere and frank in offering helped us to keep that fire alive. “There is a personal sense of satisfaction Ifriendly criticism of this or that aspect of American foreign policy- in having been a witness to your nation’s emancipation and to the con- making, including the process whereby particular financial considerations solidation of your independence in shaping your national destiny, which advanced by various groups unduly influenced that process. In our private is now fully in your hands. For all of you here, it is a time of national conversations as well as in public fora, he repeatedly expressed concern renaissance. There is an element of ecstatic emancipation in the sense of that special interests could deleteriously affect American democracy and having obtained—regained—one’s independence. It is now a destiny of

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 172 173 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES the future—fuller, more hopeful, more fulfilling,” Zbig would say in 2003 Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. Later, I read somewhere that the in Baku, on the occasion of the receipt of an honorary doctoral degree American president had said that the series of agreements that made BTC from Baku State University. possible constituted one of his administration’s “most important foreign Over the course of my ambassadorship and after I returned to policy achievements.” Azerbaijan, Zbig and I had many discussions and conversations about Azerbaijan eventually managed to build what ended up being a lengthy, the successes and mistakes of the coun- 1,340 km-long pipeline through Georgia and Turkey thanks to the strategic vision and strong political will of Heydar Aliyev, thus permanently try’s young democracy. Notably, he al- In the person of Zbigniew ways looked at the larger, more strategic linking Azerbaijan to its Western friends and strategic energy partners. The Brzezinski I had found some- picture rather than criticizing us for leadership skills and diplomatic wherewithal required to achieve such a one or another sort of concrete polit- one who well understood game-changing project were truly of exceptional caliber. My country and ical act. He knew well that democratic Azerbaijan’s dream for full our partners will all continue to reap the benefits of this grand endeavor, development is a long process and re- and secure independence, which for many decades to come will continue to affect the strategic map quires many years of hard work. “In our strong national desire to of the Silk Road region. BTC has gone on to serve as a magnet for other essence, every person knows that these protect our sovereignty, and regional connectivity projects, such as the South Caucasus gas pipeline three processes—consolidation of inde- our country’s challenges with (SCP) and its expansion (SCPX), the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline pendence, transformation of economy, governance issues. (TANAP), the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars and democratization of politics—do not (BTK) railway project. The communities straddling these strategic proj- happen overnight. They are difficult and slow processes. Some move ects—in fact, the populations of the region as a whole—have gained much ahead of others,” Zbig said during his Baku State University address. in terms of prosperity and development from the moment these began to see the light of day. In short, Zbigniew Brzezinski knew well that it was critically important for Azerbaijan to preserve its national freedom, and he supported our vision. nother way Zbig helped Azerbaijan was to provide guidance in Ahelping me and my embassy staff understand how to better position big also made concrete contributions to helping my country and our ourselves diplomatically in the American capital. At times, listening to his Zregion stand on its own two feet. For instance, it was precisely he who explanations was akin to attending a private master class in American for- delivered in 1996 an important letter from U.S. President Bill Clinton to eign policy decisionmaking. Zbig repeatedly stressed that the United States President Heydar Aliyev regarding the strategic potential of a new oil pipe- was too big to be able to focus on small, individual countries. A successful line that would carry Caspian oil to world markets whilst bypassing both strategy, he said, would require uniting with likeminded regional allies in Russia and Iran. At the time, this proposed pipeline was very much con- order to position ourselves in Washington as a larger grouping. The three tested by regional powerhouses, with major oil companies also questioning Baltic states, he told me in one of our early meetings, were quick to learn the wisdom of such an investment. this strategy and began acting as one in their lobbying efforts to gain sup- The delivery of Clinton’s missive reinforced Heydar Aliyev’s confidence port for acceding to NATO and, later, the European Union. Unfortunately, to boldly move ahead with this idea. In future meetings and negotiations, the three South Caucasus republics, despite early hopes and aspirations, our president would make reference to this letter: in many ways, Zbig’s spe- failed to repeat that same strategy and instead got bogged down in regional cial delivery came to be seen as a solid foundation for intense talks that hostilities. For example, Georgia openly aspired to NATO membership culminated in the landmark Istanbul Declaration in support of the Ba- whereas Armenia allied itself with Russia within the Collective Security ku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which was signed on the margins of Treaty Organization (CSTO). the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit in the presence of presidents Clinton, Azerbaijan later tried to create another regional grouping—the Aliyev, Süleyman Demirel of Turkey, Eduard Shevardnadze of Georgia, and Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM)—that

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 174 175 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES brought our country on the same page as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. sculptors, and writers. Now I understand why he wanted to speak to that This novel regional grouping soon became very popular in those American particular group. He wanted to see in their eyes the passion and thirst for decisionmaking circles that focused on our region, seeing some potential freedom and independence. And he saw it indeed: the tea-time discussion in this collaboration. When Uzbekistan joined GUAM a few years later, it lasted almost two and a half hours. “Azerbaijan is a country with profound further increased hopes for deeper cooperation and integration. Most im- intellectual potential, great cultural achievements, and a genuinely proud his- portantly, GUAM helped draw the attention of the American political estab- tory,” Zbig would later say in aforementioned speech at Baku State University. lishment to this part of the world. t is worth to note that Zbig always had in focus the values shared by It is hardly coincidental that Zbig’s influential book, The Grand IAzerbaijan and the Euro-Atlantic community, alongside his under- Chessboard (1997), focuses on three GUAM countries—Azerbaijan, standing of where Baku fit in the range of American national interests and Ukraine, and Uzbekistan—and called them linchpins of greater Eurasia: broader geopolitical considerations. He certainly felt our two nations shared Uzbekistan as a powerhouse and focal center of Central Asia, Azerbaijan the values of democracy, freedom, equality, and tolerance. as a hub of the South Caucasus and the Caspian region, and Ukraine as an It is those same shared values to which U.S. President Woodrow Wilson important republic southwest of Russia. “Without Ukraine, Russia can’t be has referred in May 1919 when he met with Alimardan bey Topchubashov, an empire,” he would famously write. chairman of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic’s parliament, during the In short, Brzezinski believed in the potential of the newly independent Paris Peace Conference. This august co-founder of the first secular republic states of the former Soviet Union. He saw their strategic importance and in the Muslim world had impressed the American president so much, that felt that the development and progress of these states might have a positive Wilson later remarked, in a speech he delivered in September of that year at impact on Russia itself. He was hopeful and optimistic about our region, San Francisco’s Commonwealth Club, that the delegation from Azerbaijan which helps to explain why he proposed to bring students, academics, and “talked the same language that I did in respect of ideas, in respect of con- civil society actors from our respective countries, as well as from Russia ceptions of liberty, in respect of conceptions of right and justice.” and others, to the United States to learn more about the American system of I think this legacy of shared values provided a historical foundation upon governance. He was very supportive of all such people-to-people contacts. which Zbig and I were able to build in order to bring our countries closer to as he afraid that Azerbaijan and other states in the Silk Road region one another in the present. Wwould lose their independence? Perhaps he was. He was rooting for ne particular “project” with Brzezinski rises to my mind with a spe- us and he didn’t want us to fail. I remember Zbig’s reaction to some negative Ocial joy of memory. In 1997, when we were planning a state visit remarks about Iran made by Abdulfaz Elchibey during the brief period in for Heydar Aliyev to the United States (the first official visit by this grand which he served as president of Azerbaijan (1992-1993). Zbig was quick to statesman to the capital of the superpower), I had sought Zbig’s advice on say that this was not the right move because troubled relations with Iran is how to enrich the program of the agenda. He told me that many American the last thing a war-torn Azerbaijan needed at that particular time (by 1993 policymakers would surely want to discuss the president’s past experience Azerbaijan was severely suffering from the occupation, refugee, and IDP as a non-voting and then full member of the Soviet Politburo (1976-1982, crisis, and was being threatened by further Armenian military incursions). 1982-1987) and First Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR (1982-1987). Zbig Speaking of IDPs and refugees, Zbig showed genuine compassion and con- then suggested we jointly organize a luncheon in Blair House (the official cern about their plight and sorrow. Azerbaijan’s humanitarian catastrophe upset guesthouse of the President of the United States) with senior American es- him so much that during a 2003 visit to a temporary IDP camp, Zbig refused to tablishment figures, who would surely enjoy conversing with President Aliyev. join the lavish dinner that the local mayor had unwisely arranged in his honor. The eleven-day visit in 1997 was a chance for Heydar Aliyev to show him- I remember how in planning for that trip, Zbig had asked me to orga- self to the American political elite in a new form: as the proud head of state nize a meeting with prominent Azerbaijani intellectuals: poets, painters, of an independent Azerbaijan who had parted with his Politburo past and

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 176 177 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES come to selflessly devote his life to the advancement of his nation’s interests. said America needed to “correct those elements in the American posture Together, Zbig and I developed a list of invited guests to the event, which which detract from that impartiality”—and that failure to do so would my friend had kindly agreed to moderate. Amongst those who accepted “hurt the promotion of American national interests.” This was a clear ref- our co-signed invitations were Richard Armitage, Dick Cheney, Alexander erence to the aforementioned Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, Haig, Anthony Lake, Jessica Matthews, Colin Powell, James Schlesinger, among other things. Zbig went on to conclude his remarks with his typi- and Brent Scowcroft. It was a fascinating discussion and constituted, in my cally scientific way of thinking about foreign policy matters. Resolving the view, the intellectual highlight of the state visit. Nagorno-Karabakh issue with enhanced participation by the United States, he said, I remember how during the luncheon, one of the American dignitaries The opportunity to observe is “in our interest, as well as in the interest had asked the president if the Soviet Union would still have collapsed had Heydar Aliyev and Zbig- of Azerbaijan. That, in my judgment, is a he, Heydar Aliyev, been in charge instead of Mikhail Gorbachev. The presi- niew Brzezinski up close strategic agenda that we confront in order dent replied “no,” showing strong confidence in his leadership and manage- was a special delight: two to advance that strategic relationship. To rial capabilities. A few minutes later, he came back to the subject: “it would great statesmen and grand advance a strategic agenda we have to have have collapsed later, because its economic system was not right,” he said, strategists deep in thoughtful genuine geostrategic cooperation with adding that he would have managed the collapse in a much more orderly conversation. Azerbaijan.” Until his passing, I know this fashion. Such excellent discussions also continued later on in Zbig’s own remained Zbig’s considered view. home, where the president had been invited to attend a private dinner as he opportunity to observe Heydar Aliyev and Zbigniew Brzezinski the guest of honor. Tup close during the president’s 1997 official visit to the United States, uring the historic visit, Zbig was also asked by Georgetown as well as in several subsequent meetings, was a special delight: two great DUniversity to introduce our president’s public lecture at a specially or- statesmen and grand strategists deep in thoughtful conversation. The topics ganized public symposium. Instead of offering merely perfunctory or cour- they touched upon included the Soviet Union, Iran, Russia, the Cold War, the teous remarks, Zbig seized the opportunity to make a substantive speech future of the region, and indeed the future of the international system. on what he called the “most strategically critical country” of the region. He I remember Zbig sharing with the president his vision for our part of recalled how a senior Clinton administration official had called the South the world: a region of open access, multiple participation, and the in- Caucasus a “second grey zone,” with Central Europe being considered the volvement of many nations in the development of future prosperity of the first such zone. Zbig interpreted that to mean the following: “a zone of some Caspian basin and beyond, including Central Asia. Zbig was against the strategic uncertainty, but a zone in which the United States has to be more idea of looking into our region from the perspective of Russia, advocating a actively engaged so that the area ceases to be a gray zone.” more balanced policy. I remember him saying in his speech that this “grey zone” terminology— Another time we met, Zbig had with him some words that Heydar Aliyev in public he did not name the person who used it—could turn out to be a had recently spoken and proceeded to signal agreement with them: very significant signal if there was policy follow-through at the top deci- I regard Azerbaijan’s policy over the last ten years and in the future as inde- sionmaking level, because it would mean that America was ready to shift pendent of anybody’s interests. It must be based on observing our own values. towards thinking about our region in terms of its strategic potential. Zbig [...] We have no specific orientations in foreign policy. Our orientation is based on promoting by means of foreign policy activity the attainment of set objec- went on to say this required deeper American engagement in resolving the tives, the strengthening of Azerbaijan’s place in the world, and also our economic Nagorno-Karabakh issue, which in turn required his country to exercise development via mutually advantageous cooperation. “impartiality.” This strategic framework has been further enhanced under President He was aware that the United States had just recently become a co-chair Ilham Aliyev, whom I have heard describe Azerbaijan’s approach to foreign of the OSCE Minsk Group, joining France and Russia. In light of this, Zbig relations in the following terms: “we pursue a balanced and independent

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 178 179 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES policy in the true sense of the word, uninfluenced by any external actor, and put my country on the radar of the American political establishment. Of based on national interests and justice.” special value were conversations I had with some of America’s most influ- I think Zbig would approve of the clarity and predictability of our for- ential journalists and editors who also regularly attended Zbig’s New Year’s eign policy, of our striving to maintain full reliability with the world’s great Day brunches. And on a more personal level, I was happy that our families powers and all our strategic partners, of our emphasis on economic self-em- quickly bonded and often exchanged visits to each other’s homes in DC. powerment, and of our principled adherence to the diplomatic golden rule t had been my dream of many years to return to academia after the com- of reciprocity. Because of the geopolitical importance he ascribed to our re- Ipletion of my diplomatic service. After my departure from the United gion, I am confident that Zbig would also encourage us to continue demon- States, I was honored to become the founding rector of the Azerbaijan strating a willingness to negotiate in good faith on the cardinal issue of lib- Diplomatic Academy. We all know how Azerbaijan’s strengthening erating our occupied lands whilst endorsing the importance we have placed economy provided the country with both on verifying the sincerity of the other side’s intentions. Zbig’s encouragement helped the need and the resources to open new embassies and diplomatic missions. Al- But I think most of all Zbig would salute Azerbaijan’s grandest achieve- us all to transform the though the first years of independence ment on the world stage, which I have already mentioned: namely, the Azerbaijan Diplomatic witnessed many ambassadors that came transformation of our country from a mere object—a plaything of others— Academy into ADA Univer- from other fields, such as history, Arab of international affairs, which had put our very existence in jeopardy in sity, the country’s flagship studies, and the hard sciences, the new era the early 1990s, into a strong, free, equal, proud, and active participant in English-speaking institution and the country’s expanding diplomatic the international system, which thanks to Ilham Aliyev’s leadership is fully of higher learning. administration brought forth the need for capable of charting its own destiny. a specialized training school. Many people big was also willing to help develop bilateral economic ties. Back in jokingly called Azerbaijan’s embassy in DC the country’s “original diplo- Z1995, a decision was made to set up the U.S.-Azerbaijan Chamber of matic academy,” because the diplomatic skills of seven or eight future am- Commerce (USACC) in Washington, DC. The aim of this non-profit or- bassadors were cultivated there during my tenure. ganization was to help foster economic and business ties between our two I had used the opportunity of my many meetings with my friend to discuss countries. Zbig was very supportive of this new and promising initiative my plans with him and he very much supported the idea of establishing a and attended our events on several occasions whilst serving on its Board full-scale university. Zbig’s encouragement helped us all to transform the of Trustees. For instance, in 2000 Zbig moderated a USACC gala event Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy into ADA University, the country’s flagship in honor of Heydar Aliyev, going on to host in 2007 First Lady Mehriban English-speaking institution of higher learning. Early on, I had invited Zbig Aliyeva at a USACC dinner as part of her tour of America in her capacity to join our Board of Trustees, and I was gratified by his kind acceptance. It as Chairwoman of Azerbaijan’s parliamentary friendship group with the had been my dream to show him in person how our “green” campus con- United States. tinued to grow, but unfortunately we were never able to schedule another Zbig was not only my guide—one could even say my mentor—for under- trip for him before he passed away. Although Zbig was not able to see our standing American politics; he was also my good friend. One of the high- new facilities, his son Mark visited us in 2017 and together we planted a tree lights of our friendship was the annual New Year’s Day brunch he held at in the center of the campus in my friend’s memory. his home, and I always felt honored to be included on his carefully curated Zbig very much valued Azerbaijan’s focus on development, our invest- guestlist. Prominent policymakers and politicians, such as U.S. Secretary of ment in education, our economic diversification plans, and the emphasis State Madeleine Albright, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, the aforementioned we put on building up our nation’s human potential. He knew well that the Brent Scowcroft, and others were among those invited. These brunches pro- future of Azerbaijan greatly depended on such matters and saw how my vi- vided me with invaluable opportunities to promote Azerbaijan and further sion for ADA University fit into that strategy. During his visit to our country

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 180 181 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES in 2003, he was awarded Honorary Doctorate degree at Azerbaijan’s oldest often jokingly referred to Zbig as a “mathematical political scientist,” and most reputable university, Baku State University. I only wish we could Ibut it had more than a ring of truth to it. Rare among thinkers special- have done him the same honor at ADA University. izing in any subject, Zbig had what Pascal had termed esprit de géométrie as much as esprit de finesse. The former impressed me more, to be honest, recall also how I would call on Zbig each time I went back to DC for a because of my own academic background. I continue to be struck by his rig- visit after my ambassadorial term had come to an end. I somehow felt I orously analytic, almost mathematical, approach to geopolitics to be found that on each occasion we were able to resume our wonderful and interesting in his writings, where he is incredibly precise and to the point without ever discussions as if hardly a day had passed since the last conversation. His failing to understand the big picture. clear, sharp, and concise arguments continued to mesmerize. I remember one visit coincided with his return from China—a country he had visited Some of his best works include the aforementioned The Grand Chessboard (1997), which I get the impression introduced him to a whole regularly since the late 1970s, when as U.S. National Security Adviser he new generation of readers and admirers—especially in our part of the world, had played a pivotal role in establishing full diplomatic relations between because of all his books it is the one most directly focused on the Silk Road the two countries, building on the foundation laid by Richard Nixon and region. Alongside a number of Zbig’s other volumes, that one holds pride of Henry Kissinger a few years earlier. Zbig’s eyes were full of spark and pos- place on my bookshelf at home. itive impressions about China’s economic progress. He saw something big I remember how on weekends in Washington I would sometimes go to was coming and he kept talking about China all day long. used bookstores, and I would always look for his earliest books—those that China was for him an opportunity more than a threat. Zbig understood were out of print at the time. One day, I there would be increasing policy differences between Washington and Rare among thinkers spe- found the one he had co-written with his Beijing but thought that prudential management of what he felt was turning cializing in any subject, Zbig lifelong friend Samuel Huntington in 1964 into the most important bilateral relationship of the twenty-first century called Political Power: USA/USSR. It was had what Pascal had termed could ensure things would not boil over. He had come across some articles at once a groundbreaking work of polit- esprit de géométrie as much that predicted a new cold war was looming on the horizon. I remember ical systems analysis (including examples him talking about two key differences this possibility held in comparison as esprit de finesse. of institutional decisionmaking in both to the actual Cold War. The first was political: China was not in the least domestic and foreign policy), geopolitics interested in trying to impose its system on the rest of the world, he said. and grand strategy, and comparative political history. I saw Zbig a few days The other was economic: America and the Soviet Union never competed after finding that book and showed it to him. He held it in his hands and I economically and were never interdependent economically. But China, he could tell he was thinking back to the time he wrote it. Zbig leafed through the pages until he got to one part of the book and pointed. Seeing it, he underscored, was growing in economic stature. said, reminded him about the argument he and Huntington had made that Avoiding a cold war with Beijing, in Zbig’s view, was in the American contrary to the conventional view, collectivization of Soviet agriculture did interest: increased tension would make no strategic sense for either side. not facilitate industrialization—a bold and provocative thesis, indeed. He He also understood that sooner or later China would look west across the decided to re-read the book, he told me, in order to see whether he still steppe towards the Caspian littoral and seize the investment opportuni- agreed with what he had written three decades ago. ties on offer. He thought it would help balance the Russian influence, but For me, this remains a quintessential Zbig story: he was always thinking he also felt this could be beneficial for both the region and Russia. At the and re-thinking his positions and views. He never rested on his laurels. The Georgetown University symposium held during Heydar Aliyev’s official most important thing was not whether he was right, but whether the ar- visit in 1997, Zbig put it this way: “prosperity and peace in the region can gument was correct. If that required revising his view, so be it. In other help Russia modernize itself, democratize itself, and Europeanize itself.” words, he had no problem with admitting he had been in error: he was the

Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 182 183 Vol. 4 | No. 1 | Fall 2020 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES opposite of a stubborn careerist or dogmatic defender of his own legacy; in addition to being a genuine American patriot, Zbig was a true intellectual whose primary locus remained the quest for truth until the end. Several of Zbig’s books are taught in various courses at ADA University and almost all the others can be found in our library. Irrespective of whether they are part of our formal curriculum, all his writings are to be recom- mended because in them one can see how much respect and dignity Zbig brought to the field of political science, which, I, as a former physicist, still have a hard time calling a real science. In any event, his books are must- reads for even the most advanced students of international relations and a number of other disciples. Learning to appreciate the sophistication and intricacy of his mind has been a lesson in humility for many diplomats and policymakers. It is a true pity that grand figures such as was Zbig are largely missing these days in the American capital, as can be seen by the fact that the expertise and institutional memory on Russia and other parts of the post-Soviet space is weakening. It is my impression that many think tanks and universities that used to focus on our region are losing their potential and that the United States is shifting its focus away from a strategic region that Zbig called, I repeat, “axial Eurasia.” But it should not be forgotten that we are located at the crossroads of many empires and civilizations. Our part of the world has been dominant in world politics for several millennia. There is no reason to think this will not continue—quite the contrary. And I believe the United States needs to stay actively involved throughout the Silk Road region for the sake of its own national interests, no doubt, but also for the purpose of supporting its regional allies—a position I have no doubt Zbig would strongly support today, as he did throughout the more than quarter of a century that we shared in friendship. BD

bakudialogues.ada.edu.az

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and Azerbaijan. But as a rule of thumb, no one power dominates, equi- Interview librium is maintained, and a general balance is kept. In other words, the meta-narrative is that the Silk Road region is no longer a mere object of international relations. From this we get to the first question, which is about Strategic Equilibrium statecraft. A former ambassador of a great power posted until recently in Baku described Azerbaijan’s foreign policy as akin to “strategic balancing on Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy a tightrope.” How did Azerbaijan learn to walk the geopolitical tightrope? Hajiyev: Hikmat Hajiyev We all know that today Azerbaijan has good relations with its neighbors—except one, for obvious reasons—and that the country plays a crucial role in the development of the re- Baku Dialogues: gion. The development of mutually beneficial relations with neighbors, based on understanding and respect, is the for- Good afternoon, Mr. Hajiyev. Thank you for receiving us today. Our in- eign policy priority of Azerbaijan as defined by the President tention is for each issue of the re-launched Baku Dialogues to feature a conversation with a prominent decisionmaker from what we are calling the Silk of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev. The realization Road region—this part of the world that looks west past Anatolia to the warm of economic projects and the increase of prosperity was the seas beyond; north across the Caspian towards the Great Plain and the Great result of the establishment of an atmosphere of partnership, Steppe; east to the peaks of the Altai and the arid sands of the Taklamakan; both with regional and other partners. And one can refer and south towards the Hindu Kush and the Indus valley, looping down to such a successful foreign policy with the academic term around in the direction of the Persian Gulf and across the Fertile Crescent. “strategic balancing.” But we can more properly classify it as an independent and pragmatic foreign policy based on the And we’re honored that you will be the first to be featured in our pages national interest. in this way. The editorial premise of Baku Dialogues is that one of the few strategic sempiternities in this tumultuous era of change—characterized by It should be emphasized that in our modern history, such centrifugal geopolitical trends hastened by the pandemic—is that this area, a foreign policy was formulated by the National Leader of this part of the world as we have sketched it out, will maintain its position as the Azerbaijani People, Heydar Aliyev, and that this policy is a critical seam of international relations, as one of our authors put it. now being effectively continued by President Ilham Aliyev. In taking a deeper look into such a policy, I think we can focus And what’s particularly interesting is that the Silk Road region does not on two aspects: first, the will—the desire—of having part- really have a “go-to” geopolitical hub that is an exclusive and integral part of nership relations with neighbors. In order to understand this the region. Here the predominant reality is something else: a combination aspect, we can look deeper into our own society: a society of formal treaties and informal understandings; and there’s also some ten- that has an enormous experience of tolerance and a society sion, obviously; and frozen conflicts that occasionally flare up into skir- that operates within an atmosphere—an environment—of mishes—like the one we’ve seen recently at the border between Armenia multiculturalism. So definitely, these factors have influenced the friendly foreign policy of Azerbaijan. Hikmat Hajiyev is Assistant to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Head The second aspect is the self-sufficiency of our country. of the Department of Foreign Policy Affairs of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The interview was conducted in early August 2020 by Fariz Today we do not need to be on someone’s side in order to Ismailzade and Damjan Krnjević Mišković. gain benefits. We just pursue our national interests in the

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conduct of our foreign policy and enjoy cooperation with our different geographies in this part of the world through various partners. We believe that only such a friendly and coopera- political and economic projects. tive environment can lead to international economic devel- And nothing could be more natural: Azerbaijan has multiple opment and prosperity. geopolitical identities. For instance, Azerbaijan is in the South I believe that today, thanks to such a successful foreign policy Caucasus and it is also both a Caspian and Black Sea basin as practiced by Azerbaijan, our country is a driving force of re- country. It is at the same time a far-eastern country of the West. gional development and a platform for international dialogue. And it is also a Central Asian and CIS country. Our multiple And even if you will conduct a comparative analysis of the geopolitical identities in a natural way stimulate our multi- respective foreign policies of the region’s countries, I think you regional and multi-vectoral policy. In other words, Azerbaijan will definitely come to the conclusion that the foreign policy of cannot confine itself to the boundaries of only one geopolitical Azerbaijan, based on self-sufficiency and good neighborhood framework. policy, is a formula of success. In practical terms, we can mention such multi-regional political formats as, for example, the recent meeting of the Baku Dialogues: presidents of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan. Or You have defined Azerbaijan’s international relations in conceptual terms let us look at the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and Trans- as the “Four Ms”: multi-vectoralism, multi-regionalism, multilateralism, Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) projects, which are linking to- and multiculturalism. Let’s go through the Four Ms two at a time, if you gether the Caspian, Mediterranean, and Adriatic basins. So agree, starting with multi-vectoralism and multi-regionalism. How do these today Azerbaijan is bridging several regions, be it in political two terms form the basis of Azerbaijan’s external engagement? or economic spheres, and this is our vision of multi-regional connectivity. Hajiyev: With regards to the multi-vectoralism—and I have already Baku Dialogues: touched on this in my previous answer—Azerbaijan is keen to One of these regions, in a political sense, is Europe—or more precisely, build good neighborly relations and ties of cooperation with the European Union. So let’s follow up on that. Last year, President Aliyev all its partners. The foreign policy concept of Azerbaijan is not expressed pessimism that an agreement would be reached with the EU on an exclusive but an inclusive one. We are open for all hori- a new trade deal by the June 2020 EU Eastern Partnership Summit. And he zons that bring economic prosperity and development to our was right. By and large, the parts of the text that had not been agreed when country. And I think it’s fair to say that today, Azerbaijan is he expressed pessimism still have not been agreed in the interim. How not just pursuing multi-vectoral initiatives, but that we have would you characterize the current negotiations with Brussels in terms of become a regional driving force of such a policy. Azerbaijan’s future course of relations with the European Union? With regards to multi-regionalism, Azerbaijan is evidently situated on the crossroads of civilizations. We are the biggest Hajiyev: economy in the South Caucasus and are the initiator of several We have always emphasized that we want to have close successful projects in this region. But we do not limit ourselves cooperation and partnership with the European Union, as to just this geography. We try to act wider afield. Such a wider the EU is very important, in political and economic terms, perception of our geographic presence and belonging is also at both regional and global levels. As President Aliyev an important part of our foreign and economic policy. What said during the Summit of Eastern Partnership countries, I mean is that Azerbaijan tries to serve as a bridge between which took place in mid-June 2020 in the format of a video

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conference, cooperation with the European Union is one of Baku Dialogues: the main priorities of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. What is President Aliyev has spoken of Azerbaijan’s “fraternal” relations with important to underline here is that we want to have cooper- Turkey. He has asserted that he knows of no two other countries in the ation as an equal partner. Indeed, the EU has great capabil- world that are as close to each other as Turkey and Azerbaijan. Would ities and resources, be it in financial, institutional, or other you say that Turkey is Azerbaijan’s closest strategic partner? How is this spheres. However, as a fully self-sufficient state Azerbaijan perceived by your other strategic partners? also has assets to offer to the EU, including in the spheres of energy security, transport, security, the fight against illegal Hajiyev: migration, trade, and others. As I mentioned earlier, Azerbaijan tries to have good rela- Now, as both sides clearly perceive the nature of their tions with all its partners and we are not aiming to differen- relations as one of equal partners, we are continuing to tiate among them. However, relations with Turkey deserve work on a new bilateral agreement—one that is expected to special attention. As National Leader Heydar Aliyev once said: cover several spheres of cooperation and constitute a legal “Azerbaijan and Turkey—one nation, two states.” These words basis for our relations. The finalization of this agreement is spring out of historic ties and a legacy of cooperation between high on the agenda of both sides, and I believe that we can our two countries, and now they set the framework for the achieve a good result with both sides making an effort. future of our bilateral relations. Today Azerbaijan is the EU’s main South Caucasus trade Today we are fully cooperating with Turkey on both bilateral partner. The largest part of the EU’s exports to the South and multilateral levels. Together we have become stronger and Caucasus are destined for Azerbaijan—and vice versa: more this is our rational choice based on the wills of our peoples than 50 percent of Azerbaijan’s exports are directed towards and our respective national interests. We provide each other EU markets. with reciprocal support in various multilateral institutions Another important aspect is the security dialogue be- where we are members, and I can give many examples where tween Azerbaijan and the EU. Last year we organized a se - Azerbaijan and Turkey fully supported each other in numerous curity dialogue here in Baku and discussed such important forums. So, the Baku-Ankara relationship is characterized as aspects of cooperation as the fight against terrorism, illegal a strategic partnership—and even further, I would say: our migration, radicalism, and so on. We are on the forefront of relationship is like one between brothers. this fight and we believe that there is an enormous area for Besides, the partnership between Azerbaijan and Turkey has cooperation between Azerbaijan and the EU in these secu- led to successful regional energy and transportation projects. rity dimensions. These have made great contributions to the development and Moreover, the EU has a new strategy regarding prosperity of the entire region. Central Asia, and Azerbaijan is ready to play a bridging I also want to stress that such close relations between role in building this connectivity between the EU and Azerbaijan and Turkey are not directed against any other one the Central Asian region. We enjoy good relations of our partners. We don’t think in terms of how one part- with both the EU and Central Asian countries, and we nership can harm another; on the contrary, we’re in favor of have made it clear that we are willing to offer our ca- synergies among such partnerships. As a practical example, pacities to help further link these two regions—both I can mention several trilateral regional formats involving politically and economically. Azerbaijan, Turkey, and a third country. These have now

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become almost institutionalized and thus contribute to regional to your question is for Armenia. They must be noticing how peace, security, and regional economic development. And we regional economic projects are providing better life conditions are very glad and proud that Azerbaijan is not just participating for the peoples of the participating states—how, for example, in these formats, but is one of their main driving forces. Azerbaijanis and Georgians are benefitting from such cooperation in their daily lives. And if Armenia carefully watches Baku Dialogues: this, maybe one day Armenians will understand that their ag- We propose to stay for a moment longer in Azerbaijan’s immediate gressive stance and occupation policy will lead them nowhere, neighborhood and ask you about Georgia. In many ways this relation- and even further isolate from all regional development initia- ship is a model for bilateral ties across the Silk Road region—espe- tives. And of course, this means more political and economic cially the way frictions and misunderstandings are managed. What are isolation for Armenia, and even further worsening of socio- the takeaways for others in the region in terms of emulating how the economic conditions for the population. So, Armenia can Baku-Tbilisi relationship works? easily change this negative tendency by learning from the takeaway of the successful cooperation model between Azerbaijan Hajiyev: and Georgia. I mentioned earlier how Azerbaijan, together with Turkey, is creating regional prosperity through economic projects. Some Baku Dialogues: of these projects are also realized in close partnership with We can come back to the Armenia-Azerbaijan question a little later. But Georgia. Our joint initiatives and projects have already proved let’s turn our focus to big-picture regional issues. One could say that the stra- to be successful. Besides, we enjoy fruitful historical relations. tegic anchors of the unique set of arrangements that make up the Silk Road And on the basis of the fact that we enjoy fruitful cooperation, region are its “middle powers.” And a few months ago you made reference on any issue that comes up between our countries is duly resolved Twitter to an essay making the case that Azerbaijan is one such middle power, in a brotherly manner. after being considered a failing or even failed state just 30 years ago. Today Azerbaijan is one of the main investors in Georgia Both the term middle power and the concept traces its origins back to and our main energy and transportation routes pass through at least Giovanni Botero, a late sixteenth-century political and economic this country. So, our cooperation is essential for regional de- thinker and diplomat, who published his most famous work The Reason velopment and prosperity. I believe our relations with Georgia of State in 1589. In that book, Botero makes a tripartite division between can be characterized as a model of historic and pragmatic great, middle, and small “dominions” or powers. A middle power, in his cooperation. Of course, not all are happy from such a model telling, has “sufficient force and authority to stand on its own without the of success, and as a result we see several destructive attempts need of help from others.” And Botero goes on to explain why: leaders of against it. But as I said, we are very clear on this matter: such middle powers tend to be acutely aware of the dexterity required to main- attempts can never be successful in the end. tain security and project influence in a prudential manner beyond their And coming to takeaways for others in the region, I think immediate borders; and because of that, middle powers are apt to have fa- this is very important matter. Thus, this aspect of your ques- cility in properly managing their finances and promoting trade with their tion perfectly fits into our argument about resolving the neighbors and their neighbors’ neighbors. So we can turn our focus to great Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Azerbaijan always states that power interests, which are not congruent—in the Silk Road region in gen- the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict will bring eral and Azerbaijan in particular. You have strong relations with the United not just peace, but also more economic prosperity to the re- States, Russia, and China. They each see themselves as having legitimate gion. And in this regard, the main takeaway with reference interests here, which tend not to be defined in the same way.

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Take the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which the United States has in- In our view, BRI is purely an economic project, and as we creasingly examined—critically—within a geopolitical framework of ri- all know, we now live in an interdependent and economically valry with China. It can be said that, regardless of its ultimate success, BRI connected world. So we don’t see any antagonism between our will inevitably transform the politics and economics of globalization in the possible participation in BRI and our bilateral relations with twenty-first century—starting with this part of the world. BRI envisions a other important partners. International trade is an important surge of interdependence across the Silk Road region, and massive invest- and useful element of our globalized world, where all partners ment to improve connectivity. This is an incredibly ambitious vision. Not to some extend benefit from its further development. surprisingly, BRI has been met with excitement, but also concern, in many parts of the world. Baku Dialogues: How would you qualify Azerbaijan’s reception of the BRI concept? How Your response helps us get further into the subject of middle powers. Just do you see the future of engagement—both nationally and more impor- as a bit of background: scholars like Carsten Holbraad, who wrote an en- tantly, regionally—within the framework of BRI? How will this positive— tire manual on middle powers in international relations and drew heavily let us call it a sonorous resonation—attitude toward BRI affect the strategic on the work of Botero, gave additional criteria for a country to achieve middle power status. All of this is certainly familiar to you: some degree course of relations with Russia and the United States? of national affluence; the exercise of a moderating or even pacifying influ- Hajiyev: ence in the international system, which can even go so far as to positively affect relations between great powers; and actively supporting multilater- As you know, Azerbaijan has its own historic role in the con- alism and the work of international organizations. Another scholar, Marijke text of the ancient Silk Road. By geographic default, you could Breuning, gave a name to that: “norm entrepreneurship.” By this she means say, it had influenced our history, culture, architecture, and, of that middle states, as norm entrepreneurs, “advocate for the adoption of course, our economy. And immediately after regaining our in- certain international standards and work diplomatically to persuade the dependence we started to project our economy with reference representatives of other states to also adopt these norms.” So would you rec- to all that. In other words, the aim was to revive the ancient ognize Azerbaijan in this definition? Is it prudent for a middle power to for- Silk Road based on new technologies. In practical terms, posi- mulate its grand strategy on such a basis? In other words, through what sort tioning ourselves as a transportation and energy hub has been of conceptual framework does Azerbaijan engage with the world, within a main component of this policy. Among others, I can mention the context of the last two of the Four Ms you mentioned earlier—namely such successful projects as the TRACECA corridor, the BTK multilateralism and multiculturalism—given present geopolitical realities railroad, the building of Alat Port, and so on. and constraints? So, the Silk Road concept, of course, is not a new concept or a new dimension for us. But certainly, the launch of BRI by Hajiyev: China—a country that is quite an influential part of the Silk We see multilateralism as an essential tool of international Road, both in terms of economic and political components— relations and in this regard and we highly appreciate the role gave a new spirit for the revitalization of the ancient Silk of the United Nations system, alongside other regional and Road. And because of our historical inheritance regarding international organizations. We consider them as platforms the Silk Road, we definitely have had a positive perception for dialogue and cooperation—as institutions providing of BRI; and we feel ready to contribute towards its wider re- support and expertise for those who are in need. In this realization. We also enjoy very fruitful political and economic gard, for us, their role in the system of international rela- relations with China—this was another impetus for us to join tions is crucial. I can provide many examples of how Azer- to this initiative. baijan is not just engaged within these organizations, but

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also how we actively promote their value among others in the So, the uniting factor of the Four Ms concept is the cognate international community. “multi.” Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is based on this approach: We are currently chairing the Non-aligned Movement we want cooperation with different partners, in different (NAM), which is the second largest international institution in regions, and in promoting tolerance among different cultures. the world—after the UN—with 120 member states. Our aim is Baku Dialogues: to develop even further the NAM platform—the NAM voice— within the UN by playing our part to ensure more coordina- Educational opportunities could be construed to be also a part of the tion and cooperation among its members. As an example, I “norm entrepreneurship” practiced by middle powers. After all, Azerbaijan want to emphasize the successful proposal made by President has been providing students from member-states of the Turkic Council Aliyev, in his capacity as NAM chair, to convene a special ses- and the Non-aligned Movement with generous scholarships for studies in sion of the UN General Assembly dedicated to COVID-19, higher educational institutions in the country. Some of these students have via videoconference. This is good example of how we see the chosen to study at ADA University, the institutional host of Baku Dialogues. role of multilateral institutions. Why? Well, we believe that the Welcoming students from abroad is part of the university’s strategic vision COVID-19 pandemic is a global threat and that we need to to become a world-class university in this country by 2025. What stands unite in the fight against it. And the most appropriate platform at the heart of Azerbaijan’s commitment to promote educational oppor- for such unity is the UN—the General Assembly has a unique tunities for students from abroad? How does this benefit not just Azerbaijan, convening power, and it needs to be better utilized. And we are but the entire Silk Road region? happy that this proposal was widely supported by most of the members of the international community. Hajiyev: Regarding multiculturalism, I want to mention that there We all know that quality education is a core driver for the are strong traditions of tolerance and multiculturalism in our development of any society. This is why education is high society: we have inherited these values from our history. And on Azerbaijan’s agenda. And today Azerbaijan has become a today multiculturalism is a state policy. We are not just ex- strong member of the international community, with its own ercising these values within our own society, but we are ac- great experiences to share. So our country does not just focus tively trying to promote them on international level as well. on itself—we do not just look inward—but we also offer oppor- For example, I want to mention the Baku Process initiated by tunities to other members of the international community. President Aliyev in 2008, which later grew into an institu- We are glad that our country has become a destination for tional platform for intercultural dialogue. As you know, every foreign students and I am strongly convinced that here they two years Azerbaijan hosts the World Forum on Intercultural can gain not just academic knowledge, which is at a very high Dialogue in partnership with such international organizations level, but also benefit from our rich tradition of tolerance and as the UN Alliance of Civilizations, UNESCO, and others. multiculturalism. So today, in our turbulent world full of hate and extremism, You know, we are receiving several students from the coun- Azerbaijan actively promotes multicultural values. tries of Silk Road region. And I find that quite symbolic. The Furthermore, I want to emphasize the visit of Pope Francis Silk Road is not just about trade, transportation, and the to Azerbaijan in 2016, when he praised the level of tolerance in economy; it is also about other forms of connectivity like our country and called Azerbaijan a bridge between cultures. cultural exchanges, sharing experiences, learning from each And in February of this year, President Aliyev had a very suc- other, and education. So the presence of foreign students from cessful visit to the Vatican where he again met with Pope Francis. Silk Road region countries here in Azerbaijan demonstrates

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the role of Azerbaijan in the Silk Road region as a whole, and it So today we contribute to international trade and the shows how the Silk Road is again becoming a living organism broader economy as a main hub in this region. Virtually no through the sharing of cultures, education, and experiences. regional economic projects are being implemented without the participation of Azerbaijan. This means that we have been Baku Dialogues: able to transform our geographic reality of being a land-locked We’ve already addressed the Belt and Road Initiative—the contemporary country into our economic success—into our economic reality Silk Road and the region that forms its core, which as you’ve noted places of having become a land-linked country. pride of place to connectivity. But Azerbaijan’s emphasis on connectivity predates BRI. Azerbaijan has gone from being a “land-locked country to Baku Dialogues: a land-linked country,” as you’ve said. Can you therefore share with us the Let’s next turn to energy. Along with geography, which you have just conceptual framework behind this logic? What is Azerbaijan’s comparative discussed, Azerbaijan’s other natural strategic advantage is hydrocarbon advantage? And if you could, leave the hydrocarbon aspect of it aside, for resources. One could say it forms the basis for everything else: it’s the cor- the moment. We will come to that in the next question. nerstone of prosperity. But hydrocarbons can often be a curse, not just in the sense that they can destroy a country’s economy if the resource is Hajiyev: mismanaged, but also in the sense that their presence sometimes attracts As I have already said, Azerbaijan is located on the crossroads undue and competing attention from great powers and ambitious aspi- of continents. This is a geopolitically complex region, but also rants. Azerbaijan has been able to avoid both of these dangers: the eco- a region of opportunities. With a successful economic and nomic and the geopolitical. It is a reliable producing country and a reliable foreign policy, Azerbaijan can reap the benefits of its lo- transit country. But it is more than that, as well. Befitting its middle power cation. Yes, we don’t have access to open seas and in geo- status, it continues to be a norm entrepreneur in the field of energy security graphical terms we are land-locked country. But we have been and energy cooperation. Could you briefly outline the regional challenges able to become a transport-logistic hub, which is a crucial el- Azerbaijan had to overcome and your vision of the future in the context of ement in modern international economics. Two important energy connectivity? transport corridors pass through Azerbaijan: the east-west and the north-south transversals. And of course we’re also Hajiyev: part of the Silk Road—of the Belt and Road Initiative—as I Energy projects continue to have an essential role to play already mentioned. within our economy. But we have to see not just the economic But one should consider that such a situation—of us moving but also the political importance of these projects. In the early beyond the traditional confinements of being land-locked— period of our independence, Azerbaijan faced a major threat cannot be perceived as a given. Rather, this is a result of the in the form of foreign occupation. And of course, this was a successful economic and foreign policy of the President of major challenge which we had to contain. And secondly, not Azerbaijan. Tremendous efforts and lots of resources were all regional states were supportive of these energy projects, as allocated for this to become a reality. To name a few achieve- there were several other views and interests in this regard. And ments in the economic and infrastructure fields: building in such a complex geopolitical situation, our National Leader highways, our international port, development of air carrier Heydar Aliyev successfully concluded the Contract of the infrastructure, and so on. And of course, I need to come back Century with major international oil companies. And in the to something I said earlier: all of this is integral to the policy of end this contract became the reason—the catalyst, even—of building cooperation with our foreign partners. regional cooperation and development.

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With regards to the future, I have to say that even though the the main international oil companies to invest in Azerbaijan. world’s hydrocarbon players are now investing in renewable en- Establishing stability within the country and building partner- ergy resources, still, for the moment, fossil fuels are maintaining ship relations with regional countries—these were two of the their tangible share in the world’s modern energy system. And main conditions for Azerbaijan to be able to attract strategic the world is becoming even more interconnected in terms of levels of foreign investment. And this all was successfully real- economy. So, energy connectivity is still actual and important, ized at that time. Azerbaijan was able to demonstrate that our and Azerbaijan is happy to have its own tangible role in this pro- energy projects will bring development and prosperity to our cess. Today we are not just exporting oil and gas, but we are also region, and that all participating sides will benefit from such becoming a transit hub for other exporters. We have developed cooperation. And of course, today we see the fruitful results of all the necessary infrastructure, which gives us an asset in negotia- these projects. tions with our partners on various energy transportation projects. Baku Dialogues: Baku Dialogues: We have discussed one dimension of security—namely energy. There are Remaining on questions having to do with energy. Let’s go back to the two more to go. Let’s start with hard security. Azerbaijan is institutionally beginning—to the Contract of the Century, which you’ve mentioned. We affiliated with NATO through Partnership for Peace, which it joined in May could say that it points to the diplomatic artistry at the heart of Azerbaijan’s 1994. Less than a year earlier, in September 1993, it joined the Collective energy policy. Heydar Aliyev came back to Baku and was elected chairman Security Treaty Organization, and then in 1999 a decision was taken not of Azerbaijan’s parliament in June 1993, and a few days later assumed the to renew membership in the CSTO. So for a period of time, Azerbaijan function of president. In October 1993, he was elected president. This was exclusively PfP-oriented. It modernized its military, deepened overall could be said to be the moment in which he consolidated power. And less defense cooperation with NATO, participated in NATO forward deploy- than a year later—in September 1994—the Contract of the Century was ments in places like Afghanistan, and so on. Then, in March 2016 Azerbaijan signed. Again, you alluded to this in your previous answer. The internal became a Dialogue Partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. But circumstances were dire and the geopolitical vultures, one could say, were all in all, Azerbaijan seems to enjoy a much deeper level of engagement and circling. He had to tread extremely carefully on the energy question. And cooperation in the security field with the Atlantic Alliance than with its he succeeded: he found a way to accommodate all stakeholders. To attract alternatives. So the question can be formulated in the following manner: the West through partnership and without alienating Moscow—actually by what lies behind Azerbaijan’s strategic decision, which was made in incorporating Russian interests into the deal. This approach, with requires 1994 and has been consistently maintained ever since, to favor security constant fine-tuning and a combination of prudential judgment and stra- cooperation with the West? tegic foresight, continues to form the basis of Azerbaijan’s energy policy. On the other hand, geopolitical circumstances have changed. At the very Hajiyev: beginning of our discussion, we referred to centrifugal geopolitical trends The reason Azerbaijan has a partnership with NATO is very quickened by the pandemic. With this in mind, can you lay out for us how simple. NATO is a strong regional political-military block with Azerbaijan has been able to maintain its strategic energy posture, vis-à-vis its own capabilities and institutional military experience. After the great powers in particular, in these challenging geopolitical times? gaining independence, Azerbaijan pursued a policy of building good relations with all international partners, and NATO was Hajiyev: one of them. We were keen to benefit from NATO’s military First of all, the historic role of Heydar Aliyev should be experience in building up our own national army and devel- emphasized, as you have done in your question. Thanks to his oping our own military capabilities. And the Partnership for vision and foreign policy concept we were able to convince Peace was an existing instrument that was offered by NATO.

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So, bearing this in mind, we joined this instrument. Today Baku Dialogues: we enjoy excellent relations with NATO; and sharing experi- Next, we’d like to ask you to address the recent escalation of tensions ences is one of the core components of this cooperation. And along the Azerbaijan-Armenia state border, which centers on an area of course, building partnership with NATO as an institution several hundred kilometers north of the line of contact. Azerbaijan says definitely contributed to the positive relations which we are Armenia started it, Armenia says Azerbaijan started it. And of course this having with our Western partners. took place in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. So what are your Baku Dialogues: thoughts on this? In your view, what were the reasons this happened? We now turn to the third and most fundamental aspect of security for Hajiyev: Azerbaijan—its number one national security threat. And because this is Let me start with the reasons. This was a new and well- the core issue, we have chosen to reserve a consideration of the conflict prepared act of aggression by Armenia against Azerbaijan. This between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and other act is a logical continuation of the statement of the Armenian occupied territories for the very end of our conversation—although you defense minister regarding a “new war for new territories.” The made reference to it earlier. We want to give you the opportunity to state the reasons are linked to both the domestic and foreign policy of official position of Azerbaijan on this fundamental question not just for this Armenia. First, through such acts Armenia is trying to distract country but in the context of the legitimacy of the principles upon which the attention of its population from the country’s existing socio- stands the international system as a whole. And then we can discuss further. economic problems. In addition, due to the government’s Hajiyev: mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic, Armenia is experiencing huge challenges in that regard. The position of Azerbaijan on this issue is very clear and was mentioned on several occasions by President Aliyev. This con- Secondly, the location of these deliberate attacks were not flict should be resolved within the territorial integrity of the accidental. Thus by launching an attack on the state border Republic of Azerbaijan, based on the norms and principles of with Azerbaijan, Armenia tried to do four things. One, international law, the four relevant UN Security Council reso- involve third parties in the conflict, namely the Collective lutions, the Helsinki Final Act, and of course, the Constitution Security Treaty Organization. However, this was both a failure and laws of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Security Council and miscalculation. The CSTO did not support Armenia, for resolutions demand the unconditional and full withdrawal of the simple reason that Azerbaijan enjoys fruitful relations with Armenian troops from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan. all its members, except Armenia. Two, distract the interna- Also, the Security Council resolutions condemn the occupational community’s attention from Armenia’s occupation of tion of Azerbaijan’s lands through the use of force and under- nearly 20 percent of the territories of Azerbaijan. Three, target line the inadmissibility of gaining territory by the use of force. Azerbaijan’s critical infrastructure, including oil and gas Thus, for the resolution of the conflict, the armed forces of pipelines. Four, cast a shadow over the successful initiative Armenia should be withdrawn from the occupied of the President of Azerbaijan concerning the UN General Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and the seven Assembly’s special session on COVID-19, which I have surrounding regions, and there should be a condition for already mentioned. Azerbaijani IDPs to return to their homes in dignity and se- The Armed Forces of Azerbaijan responded effectively curity. So, Nagorno-Karabakh is and will be as an integral and the attack was repulsed; Armenia achieved none of the part of Azerbaijan. As President Aliyev has said: “Nagorno- aims. Unfortunately—because of this act of aggression— Karabakh is Azerbaijan, and exclamation mark.” twelve Azerbaijani servicemen were killed. It should also be

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emphasized that Armenia deliberately attacked the civilians consistent with a plain reading of the relevant Security Council living alongside the state border, using heavy artillery. As a resolutions and OSCE core documents. result, one civilian died and some civilian infrastructure was There seem to be two ways to resolve the issue. One is military and the heavily damaged. This is a clear violation of international other concessionary. But the military approach is not something anyone humanitarian law, including the relevant Geneva wishes, so let us leave that discussion for another time. The second is Conventions. concessionary. What Azerbaijan has been offering is evidently not enough Of course, as always, Armenia tried to blame Azerbaijan for for Armenia to yield. And those who have a mandate to mediate so far these events. This is nonsense. Azerbaijan deploys the State appear unwilling or unable to trigger the implementation of a phased Border Service along the dominant part of the state border approach on that or any other basis. Otherwise there would be no with Armenia. This clearly demonstrates that Azerbaijan has ongoing stalemate. no interest in escalation at that destination. Perhaps it could be helpful to ask you to paint us a strategic picture of This was another destructive attempt to mislead both Azerbaijan’s vision for peace. Before you take up your answer, we would internal and external audiences. Again, to repeat: the result ask you to please consider what Heydar Aliyev said on the day the was failure. Armenia has to understand that sooner or later Contract of the Century was signed: “I want to say frankly, not all our Azerbaijan will restore its territorial integrity. The political- desires have found their expression in the contract, but we understand that military leadership of Armenia needs courage to accept this any contract must satisfy the interests of both sides.” The question is this: fact and act accordingly. what is the concessionary basis for peace—and it seems that both sides will Finally, I want to touch upon the issue of the global struggle need to make difficult concessions, and both sides are constrained by their against the COVID-19 pandemic, in the context of Armenia’s respective narratives; so, again, what is the concessionary basis for recent act of aggression. As you know, United Nations Secretary- achieving a breakthrough? General António Guterres declared a global ceasefire for the Hajiyev: world to be able to better concentrate on the fight against the pandemic. Armenia joined this initiative and widely publi- Concessions are important elements of conflict resolution, cized its decision. A little bit later, they started this deliberate but of course within certain reasonable frameworks. In our act of aggression. This is nothing but hypocrisy. It is important case we have to make it clear that the territorial integrity of that the international community reacts to such behavior in a the Republic of Azerbaijan cannot be questioned in any cir- very clear manner. cumstances. It is not a matter of discussion or negotiation. The basis for a resolution of the conflict is the restoration of Baku Dialogues: the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. As I mentioned earlier, But let us take a step back. Azerbaijan lives in “conditions of war,” as the armed forces of Armenia should withdraw and IDPs must President Aliyev has reminded audiences for a number of years. So return to their homelands. The basis for such arguments lies yes: there is a general ceasefire, there is a line of contact, and there is both within historical reality and international law. So, from a peace process. But peace remains elusive after more than 25 years of both historic and legal perspectives, this is the only founding mediation and direct talks: the war has not come to an end. The stalemate is ground for the resolution of the conflict. cementing. The one million refugees and IDPs have not returned home. Unfortunately, today we witness illegal activities realized The reality of the occupation has not changed. The status quo—the frozen by Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. In this conflict—favors Yerevan: its continues to hold what Baku claims by regard, I want to specially emphasize the policy of illegal recourse to law is its own—a position, as you have outlined, that is settlement, illegal extraction of mineral resources and their

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delivery to black markets, money laundering, and the promotion of illegal visits of foreigners to these territories. All these facts clearly demonstrate that Armenia is not sincere in the negotiation process and is not interested in achieving a resolution of this conflict at all. The current leadership of Armenia tries to undermine both the substance and format of the negotiations. The fact that Azerbaijan is still continuing to participate in this process of negotiations—what we call a policy of strategic patience—is already a great concession from our side. Because for the moment, doing so is our rational choice, derived from all the possible means enabling us to restore our territorial integrity. Azerbaijan is very clear in its position that we are ready to accommodate peacefully the Armenian inhabitants of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. We see them as our citizens and we believe that Azerbaijanis and Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan will be able to live together in peace. But of course, as I said earlier, first of all the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan should be restored. Today we live in the twenty-first century and changing internationally- recognized borders by force is totally inadmissible in our civilized world. The situation resulting from such an occupation cannot be imposed as a reality. The status quo of occupation must end. Azerbaijan retains all its rights to liberate its territories from occupation under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The responsibility for such development completely lies on the shoulders of the leadership of Armenia. Baku Dialogues:

Thank you, Mr. Hajiyev, for the interview. BD

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bakudialogues.ada.edu.az

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BAKU DIALOGUES POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE SILK ROAD REGION

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