IAI Working Papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI Ukraine European Union |EasternPartnership (EaP)|South Caucasus | | differentiated policy isrequired. that aone sizefits all approach does not work andamore to choose.Developments intheregion have demonstrated 2015. Meanwhile has the luxury of choosing not Armenia joined theRussian-led Eurasian Union inJanuary trajectories. While Georgia hasstuck totheEuro-Atlantic track, Armenia, Azerbaijan andGeorgia have different geostrategic Caucasus countries could genuinely rely on the West. Today, as it raisedconcerns over theextent towhich theSouth war againstUkrainehasfurtherexacerbated thesituation today more fragmented thanit wasfive years ago. Russia’s Rather theEaPhasproduced limited results, with theregion security andregional cooperation, thishasnothappened. act asatransformative tooltostrengthendemocracy, stability, region. Despite hopes that theEasternPartnership (EaP)would The South Caucasus isafragmented andsecurity challenged Abstract by Amanda Paul and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus the Russia-Ukraine War, The EasternPartnership, keywords IAI Working papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI 2 eastern/index_en.htm. * 1 integration on thebasisof EUvalues, norms, andstandards. to bring partner countries closer to the EU through deepened cooperation and The goal of theEU’s EasternPartnership (EaP), which waslaunched in2009,was Introduction by Amanda Paul* and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, . and theEU, wereweakand indecline.Thus, Ukrainehasbecome atestfor theEU serious mistake, asit reinforced Russia’s belief that theWest, inparticular NATO In 2008, Russia paid no price for its invasions of Georgia. In hindsight, this wasa of support theycould expect. aimed at strengtheningties with theEU(andWest more broadly), and what sort Georgia), over what impact theRussia-Ukraine warcould have on theirpolicies states, including thethreeSouth Caucasus states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and The mounting tension over Ukrainehasheightened concerns from otherEaP neighbourhood. has also challenged theEUasaforeign andsecurity policy actor inits immediate established world order andtheagreement nottoredraw theborders of Europe. It proxy waragainstUkraineintheeastof thecountry, hasnotonly challenged the Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimeaalmost one year ago, aswell asits ongoing repercussions have beenmuch wider–andthesituation isstill farfrom settled. a geostrategic choice. Ukrainehasbeenboththecatalyst andtheepicentre, but the efforts of a number of EaPstates todeepenties with theEU, makingEUintegration has beenturned upside down asaconsequence of Russia pushing backagainst the the EUhasdeepenedties with all theEaPcountries, regional stability andsecurity Partnership?”, Rome, 8 October 2014. 8October Rome, Partnership?”, Eastern for the Next What Caucasus: South the and on “EU conference at the presented of apaper version Revised Cooperation?”. EU: Close the Towards and Caucasus “Azerbaijan, Paper prepared for the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) within the framework of the project the project of framework the within (IAI) Internazionali Affari Istituto for the prepared Paper Amanda Paul is Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre (EPC). Centre Policy European at the Analyst Policy Paul is Amanda

Eastern Partnership Eastern (EEAS), Service Action Union External European , http://eeas.europa.eu/ , 1 Five years on, while IAI Working papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI 3 periphery. was little interest for aregion that wasbroadly viewed ason theobscureanddistant unfolding inits Easternneighbourhood following thefall of theIron Curtain,there figured on theEU’s radar.Preoccupied with theBalkan wars andthenewrealities is still thenewboy on thebloc. Duringthe1990s,South Caucasus hardly Despite having now beenactive intheSouth Caucasus for two decades,theEU empires. shaped bytheexternal policies andinterests of theRussian, Ottoman, andPersian centuries, thedestiny of thepeople of theSouth Caucasus hasbeensignificantly the region hasbeenthesite of geostrategic competition andconfrontation. For Central Asia andEurope, it hasbeenaparticularly coveted region. Consequently, of theformer Soviet Union. However, because of its geographical location between The South Caucasus isone of themostcomplex andsecurity-challenged regions 1. TheEUandtheSouth Caucasus the South Caucasus aswell ason theirforeign policy choices. outcome will have asignificant impact on thefuture development andsecurity of in termsof its commitment toEaPpartnersandits ability todeal with Russia. The and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, 2 publications/publication/did/the-european-union-and-the-south-caucasus. 2009/01), http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/ Dialogue in (Europe 49-89 p. 2009, Stiftung, Perspectives on the Future of the European Project from the Caucasus from of the Project European on the Future Perspectives Union European Three and The the South Caucasus: Gogolashvili, Kakha and Huseynov (Georgia) andNagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan andArmenia), respectively. as aconsequence of unresolved conflicts betweenSouth Ossetia and Abkhazia gave it anadditional reason tofeel concerned about thefragile security situation flagship Southern GasCorridor project. TheEU’s newenergyinterests intheregion households andbusinessesinEasternEurope without gasfor days –led totheEU’s a political tool–namely theRussian-Ukraine gaswarof 2009,which left numerous opportunity todiversify energysources androutes. Russia’s tendencytousegasas Russian gas,theCaspianregion, with Azerbaijan asthe“gateway,” represented an the 2008Russia-Georgia war.Lastly isEUenergysecurity. Overly dependent on priority. Furthermore, theEU becamethemainsecurity actor inGeorgia following to power aPresident who madeEuro-Atlantic integration akey foreign policy South Caucasus geographically. Second, Georgia’s Rose Revolution brought of reasons for this.First, through its enlargements theEUmoved closer tothe The EUhasslowly awakened tothe importance of theregion. Thereareanumber states notonly experienced asplit with Russia, but also with eachother. cooperation andintegration but rather theopposite. After independence,thethree of one empire with multiple ties andinterdependencies didnotlead todeeper survive, beingconsumed with interstate warandeconomic collapse. Beingpart

Tabib Huseynov, “The EU and Azerbaijan: Destination Unclear”, in Tigran Mkrtchyan, Tabib Mkrtchyan, Unclear”, Tigran in Destination Azerbaijan: and EU Tabib “The Huseynov, 2 At thesametime,three South Caucasus states werebusytryingto , Gütersloh, B , Gütersloh, ertelsmann ertelsmann IAI Working papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI 4 2003, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 2003, cultural cooperation. cultural and legislative, economic, and investment, trade, dialogue, of political areas the EU, including the with countries three of the of each bilateral relation of the basis the formed They 1999. force in 3 neighbouring region.” in theproblems of theSouthern Caucasus, which will indue coursealso bea political problems there.We should now take astronger andmore active interest economic andpolitical cooperation toourneighbours intheEastwhile tackling the problems of theSouth Caucasus,” stating, “weneedtoextendthebenefits of lines inEurope, calling on theEUto“take astronger andmore active interest in The December2003Security Strategy underlinedtheneedtoavoid newdividing and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, 5 4 partnership andcooperation agreement (PCA)frameworks. the EU’s willingness toengageindeeperrelations andmove beyond existing states intheENPwasaqualitatively newstageinbilateral relations andindicated (ENP) aswell astheBlackSeaSynergy (BSS).Theinclusion of theSouth Caucasus In 2004, the South Caucasus became part of the European Neighbourhood Policy Representative for theregion, Heikki Talvitie. territories” asthenumber one threat toGeorgia’s national security. Federation andterrorist actsorganized bytheRussian Federation from theoccupied Security Concept identifies “occupation of Georgian territories bythe Russian including assuringpermanent independencefrom Russia. Georgia’s National considers that Euro-Atlantic integration istheonly way toguarantee its security, EU membership. Along with the states of Central andEasternEurope, Georgia Georgia’s foreign policy priority remains Euro-Atlantic integration, including full with thethreestates moving invery different directions. cohesive region. Rather, theregion ismore fragmented thanit wasfive years ago, a strengtheningof security andstability intheregion or the creation of amore different degrees,deepened ties with theEU. However, thishasnotresulted in The EUhasbecome thelargesttrading partnerof all threestates, which have, to foreign andeconomic policies principally aimedat reducing therole of Russia. political cooperation represented anopportunity towork towards more balanced The EU’s increasedinterest intheregion waswelcomed. Deeper economic and Forum andtheCivil Society Forum. three South Caucasus states tomeetandfoster ties, including viatheBusiness that themultilateral trackcould beauseful framework for representatives of the put on thetable. Having bothabilateral andmultilateral dimension, it washoped Comprehensive Free Trade (DCFTA), aswell asvisafacilitation/liberalisation were a “more andmore” approach. Association Agreements (AA),including Deepand 2009, opening thedoor for much closer political andeconomic cooperation using Georgia, Georgia,

A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy World. in Security European Europe aBetter ASecure Council, European The PCAs were signed with all three countries of the South Caucasus in 1996 and entered into entered and 1996 in Caucasus South of the countries all three with signed were PCAs The National Security Concept of Georgia Concept Security National 3 Thiswasfollowed bytheappointment of thefirstEU Special , 2012, p. 7, p. , 2012, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/ 4 EaPwasborn in 5 , 12 December December , 12 IAI Working papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI 5 security it is impossible and ineffective to isolate yourself from a corresponding the national interests of Armenia […]when you arepartof one systemof military of negotiations. According to Sargsyanit was“a rational decision stemming from Armenia abandoned planstosign anAA/DCFTA with theEUaftersome four years Eurasian Economic Union (EEU),which it didon 1January 2015.With thisdecision, on 3September2013.He announced that Armenia would join theRussian-led has over Yerevan led toPresident SerzhSargsyanmaking ageostrategic U-turn Armenia haschosen a different direction. The extensive influence that Russia Georgia’s territorial integrity, which isof little comfort. concerns meansthat theEU could do nothingmore thanrepeat its support for integrating with the West. The fact that the EaP does not address Georgia’s security towards the EU. They are a message to other former Soviet states about the price of their defactosovereignty. Thesetreaties areRussia’s response toGeorgia moving Russia. TheAbkhaz re-draftedtheirtreaty inorder tomaintain several elements of upon foreign policy” andhandingover full control of theirsecurity andborders to in granting Russia full control over that Georgian territory, conducting an“agreed- before. Abkhazia toRussia politically, military, economically, andsocially more thanever the Treaty on Alliance andStrategic Partnership with Abkhazia. Thistreaty binds difficult waters. Shortly afterGeorgia ratified theAA/DCFTA, Russia introduced remains on theEU trajectory it seems set to be volatile and heading into increasingly While stepshave beentaken tonormalise relations with Russia, aslong asGeorgia door toGeorgia. European country inits AArepresents noguarantee that theEUwill ever open its clear membership perspective. Thefactthat Georgia isrecognisedasanEastern the and expensive reforms. Georgia isbeingasked toswallow asignificant chunk of support will notbe easy, asimplementing the AA/DCFTA will require many painful justice, Georgia hasremainedon track.However, maintaining thecurrent level of Despite some negative domestic developments, including accusations of selective change. consensus, broad public support from society, andastrong desirefor democratic committed partner. This canbe put down toanumber of reasons including political and theopposition United National Movement (UNM),overall Tbilisi hasbeena Despite theoften turbulent politics betweentheruling Georgian Dreamcoalition 27 June 2014.The agreement wasratified intheGeorgian Parliament on 18 July. Georgia, along with Ukraineand Moldova, signed an AA/DCFTA with theEU on and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, 6 Publications/Detail/?id=156940&lng=en. Ebert Stiftung, December 2014, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/11092-20141217.pdf. 2014, December Stiftung, Ebert

Dieter B Dieter acquis communautaire without receiving sufficient economic support ora 6 Furthermore, thenewly tabled treaty with South Ossetiagoes astepfurther The Russian-Abkhaz Treaty: New Tensions New in the South Caucasus Treaty: Russian-Abkhaz The oden, , B erlin, Friedrich Friedrich erlin, IAI Working papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI 6 ECFR Commentaries ECFR eurasian_economic_union_the_view_from_yerevan387. 2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia-customs-union/25094560.html. 2013, commonspace.eu/eng/news/6/id2754. Commonspace.eu in Kocharyan, Shavarsh Minister Foreign Deputy http://aje.io/zpj5. 10 9 8 7 military-security choice; theDCFTA isoureconomic choice.” 2013, Armenian Deputy Foreign MinisterShavarsh Kocharyan stated, “Russia isour to initial theagreements at theNovember 2013Vilnius EaPsummit. On5August a few weeksearlier Armenia’s leadership hadreassured theEUthat it wason course Sargsyan’s U-turn, not so much over the decision but rather how it was taken. Only There wassignificant bitterness among EUpoliticians andbureaucrats over role asa“bridge” betweenthe EEUandtheEU. seeking topre-empt any Russian pressurebyhighlighting (andexaggerating) its Yerevan hasbeencautious inhow it haspresented its re-engagement with theEU, it seemsunlikely that anything will besigned inthenearfuture. Furthermore, in theregion. Armenia still aspirestohave anewagreement with theEU, although against EUengagement intheformer Soviet space,sendingamessagetoothers Armenia’s U-turn also underlinedMoscow’s newassertive policy of pushingback on Russia anymore.” relations; asArmenian expertRichard Giragosian concludes, “Armenia can’t count base at GyumriinArmenia has prompted anewchallenge toArmenian-Russian of anArmenian family byaRussian soldier basedat theRussian 102ndmilitary to Azerbaijan, playing thetwo states off eachother. Moreover, therecent slaying fact that Russia claimstobeArmenia’s security ally, Moscow continues to sell arms allowing Moscow toproject its power across theregion. Furthermore, despite the Russia’s significant military presence isfirst and foremost for Russia’s benefit, Armenia hasfurtherunderminedits own security with thischoice tojoin theEEU. economic space.” and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, 11 relations andtheclosed border with Turkey. Karabakh conflict andis only exacerbated bytheabsence of “normal” diplomatic virtual state of warwith neighbouring Azerbaijan, which isrooted intheNagorno- security andsovereignty. Armenia’s security relianceon Russia isdriven bya This development deepened Armenia’s dependenceon Russia, threatening national relations with theEuro-Atlantic institutions. vector foreign policy – having a strong relationship with Russia but also deepening lingering suspicion that Sargsyan wasnever negotiating ingood faith. Presently

Ibid.

“Armenia to Join Russian-led Customs Union”, Liberty Europe/Radio Customs Free Radio in to Join Russian-led “Armenia Richard Giragosian, “Armenia can’t count on Russia anymore”, in Al-Jazeera anymore”, in on count Russia can’t “Armenia Giragosian, Richard Joseph d’Urso, “Russia is our military-security choice; DCFTA is our economic choice, Armenian Armenian choice, economic our is DCFTA choice; military-security our is “Russia d’Urso, Joseph Richard Giragosian, “Armenia and the Eurasian Economic Union: The View from Yerevan”, View from Union: Economic The in Eurasian the and “Armenia Giragosian, Richard , 8 January 2015, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_armenia_and_the_ 2015, January 8 , 7 Thedecision put anendtotheArmenian narrative of amulti- 9 8 10 , 11 August 2013, http:// 2013, August , 11 11 Hence, thereisa , 20 January 2015, 2015, January , 20 , 3 September , 3September IAI Working papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI 7 EU andUSpolicy. weaken Russia’s ability to use energy as a political weapon – a stated aim of both in 2019,it will contribute firstly tothepricing competition in Europe, andsecondly then carrythegastoAlbania, finally ending in Italy. Scheduled tobeginpumping the Greekborder, where it will hook up totheTrans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). TAP will transport gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz II field across Georgia and Turkey to which is seen as the “enabler” of the Southern Corridor. The Southern Corridor will core of Azerbaijan’s relations with theEUremainstied toenergywith Azerbaijan, for Modernisation” (SPM), although adate for finalising andsigning isnotclear. The negotiations for an AA but is recently engaged in talks for a “Strategic Partnership Ukraine), which Azerbaijan considers adouble standardapproach. Bakuhasfrozen in theEaPthat have territorial disputes (Moldova, Georgia, andmore recently Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity inthesame way it does with theothercountries A significant thorn inrelations hasbeentheEU’s failure toexplicitly recognise objectives inwhich interests aremore narrowly defined. activists), Azerbaijan wants astrategic relationship basedon mutual interests and to theimprisonment of numerous representatives of Azerbaijani civil society and greater progress related to human rights and democracy (most recently in relation approach, on theneedfor comprehensive reforms across arangeof sectors and poor communication. While theEUfocuses, inlinewith its “more-for-more” free but rather arehobbled bymismatched objectives andambitions andoften that relations have agreat potential inthefuture, relations arefarfrom problem- to beasclose aspossible toEurope,” While Azerbaijan’s President, , has declared that he wants “Azerbaijan which many inAzerbaijani fear seekstoexport its Islamic state model. Russia, with its growing aspirations todominate its nearneighbourhood, andIran, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy agenda.Azerbaijan also finds itself sandwiched between it faces.Theongoing conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh dominates “balanced foreign policy” isdictated byits geography andthesecurity challenges a policy of “choosing nottochoose.” Many inAzerbaijan argue that thecountry’s Azerbaijan hasnoaspirations tojoin theEUor theEEU. Bakucontinues topursue roadmap, recognisingof thelimits of Armenia asapartner. May EaPRiga Summit. Whatever thefinal agreement, it should take theshape of a member states toannounce thestartof negotiations on afuture agreement at the legal andpolitical cooperation, with thepossibility of obtainingamandate from EU the EUis engaged inaso-called scoping exercise about thefuture of EU-Armenia and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, 12 en.president.az/articles/8499. http:// June 2013, 21 Van Rompuy, Herman Council Brussels, European of the President the

Statement by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev after his meeting with with meeting his after Aliyev Ilham of Azerbaijan Republic of the President by Statement 12 that it isamatter of strategic importance; IAI Working papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI 8 alternative options. Unfortunately, the integration treaties signed betweenRussia case, thestatus quo hasbecome comfortable, with little thinkingover possible any significant progress interms of resolution of thetwo conflicts. Asis oftenthe Meanwhile theGenevaPeace Process islittle more than“palliative,” without making still controlled byTbilisi), which furtherincreasestensions andinstability. (erecting fences betweentheareasof Abkhazia, South Ossetia,andterritory that’s two breakaway regions while also takingprovocative stepssuch as“borderization” to tackle Moscow on theseissues. Rather, Russia hasconsolidated its hold on the remains only partially implemented byMoscow, andtherehasalso beenlittle effort a solution totheprotracted conflicts. Unfortunately, thesix-point peaceplan while also beingaco-chairof theGenevaProcess peacetalks aimedat finding actor intheregion, deploying theEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) In theaftermath of the2008Georgia-Russia war,the EUbecamethemainsecurity little appetite todo so. greater role inthe“resolution” of theprotracted conflicts, inreality therehasbeen one of theprincipal goals of the2003Security Strategy wasfor theEUtoplay a The region’s unresolved conflicts remainasignificant security challenge. While 2. TheEUandconflict resolution visa-free regimethisyear, bothArmenia andAzerbaijan arelaggingbehind. and thefight againstcorruption. While it ispossible that Georgia may receive a as it incorporates important reforms inkey areassuch asmigration management All threecountries hope toobtain visa liberalisation, although theprocess is noteasy time. rather acaseof having little otherchoice basedon thegeopolitical realities of the military, sinceindependence.Though Azerbaijan didjoin theCISin1993,thiswas Azerbaijan hasnotpursued any form of integration with Moscow, either tradeor given that Moscow haslittle togainfrom asolution totheconflict. Furthermore, because thereisnoguarantee that Russia would follow through on its promises However, thisargument isonly backed byaminority inAzerbaijan, notleast some progress inAzerbaijan’s favour inreturnfor ’s EEUmembership. leverage over Azerbaijan isthe Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, interms of offering projects, like theTrans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). Thestrongest cardMoscow hasas a monopoly over thegassupply totheEU, asaccession would impact future energy sector significantly influences foreign policy, joining theEEU would offer Moscow Baku’s independent foreign policy would bedamaged.Moreover, sincetheenergy not favour membership of theEEU. Thereisastrong belief that byjoining theEEU, the EEU. However, themajority of Azerbaijan’s political elites andpopulation do to courtBaku.Moscow would like Azerbaijan inits orbit, inparticular its joining has been visible in the numerous visits of Russian delegations over the past year Russia has tried to capitalise on Azerbaijan’s disappointment with the West. This and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, IAI Working papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI 9 New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 104. York, p. New Routledge, 2011, context of EUrelations notonly with Azerbaijan, but also with Armenia. understanding of EUpolicy on Nagorno-Karabakh cannotbetaken out of the with theEU. Thiscreated greater pressureon theEUfor neutrality. Thus, any recognised states, Armenia andAzerbaijan, eachwith theirown partnerships over Nagorno-Karabakh was in many ways an inter-state conflict between two in Baku,underliningthechallenges theEUfacesindealing with thisconflict. negotiation processes, it hasnevertheless served tounderminetheEU’s credibility Even though theEUmay explainthesedivergences as aconsequence of thebilateral determination, theENPEU-Azerbaijan Action Planinsistson territorial integrity. Hence, whereas theENPEU-Armenia Action Planrecalls theprinciple of self- movement.” determination, which isacentral principle of theNagorno-Karabakh’s secessionist integrity while theotherfaceof theEUrecognized region’s right toself- ‘personality split’, where one face of the EUrecognizedAzerbaijan’s territorial for neutrality, theEUhasmoved from anon-policy on Nagorno-Karabakh, toa position” betweenArmenia andAzerbaijan. As Nicu Popescu writes, “In its quest has something of anambiguous position, asit endeavours tomaintain a“balanced Furthermore, unlike intheconflicts inGeorgia and Moldova (Transnistria), theEU also pledged totake a key role inaneventual post-conflict settlement process. partners intheSouth Caucasus on awiderangeof peace-building activities. It has measures (CBMs).EPNKisaEuropean civil society initiative that works with local the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK)andsupport for confidence building contribution hasbeenviatheEuropean Partnership for thePeaceful Settlement of in andaround the“Line of Contact” continuing toflare up. Sofar,theEU’s main “Basic Principles” that have beengoing on for several years arestalled, with tensions continue tosupport theefforts of theOSCEMinskGroup. Negotiations on aset of the EUhasanalmost non-existent role inthepeaceprocess. Rather it issatisfied to – Russia, Turkey, andeven Iran –ifrenewedwarfareweretobreakout. However, arms race between the two states and hasthe potential todraginotherregion players security, keeps Azerbaijan andArmenia inastate of dejurewar.It hascreated an The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which represents thegreatest threat toregional between Russia andGeorgia andexacerbate theexistinginstability. and South Ossetiaand Abkhazia, respectively, furtherstrainthealready fragile ties and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, 15 14 13

Ibid., p. 99. p. Ibid., Dieter B Dieter EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts. Stealth and Policy Foreign Post-SovietIntervention Conflicts. EU Nicu Popescu, The Russian-Abkhaz Treaty Russian-Abkhaz The oden, 14 Unlike theintra-state conflicts in Moldova andGeorgia, theconflict , cit. , 13 , London and and , London 15 10 IAI Working papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI Russia hadnow beenrescued.” portrays theYeltsin years as aperiod of disgraceful weaknessandchaosfrom which new approach tothepastthat glorifies theSoviet Union, denigrates the West and historical reconciliation. According toEduard Lucas thisremark “spearhead[ed] a marked thebeginningof anewera,with Putin abandoning Yeltsin’s policy of December 2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6355. 132 (September 2014), http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/CP_132.pdf. (September 132 B 17 16 we will make ourplacehereeven stronger.” declared, “Russia will never leave this region [Trans-Caucasus]. On the contrary, During avisit toArmenia on Putin 2December2013,Russian President Vladimir to complain about it.” it, “Russia hastheright todetermineits neighbours’ future. And theyhave noright Russia views this region asits sphereof influence andbelieves that, as Lucas puts considering EaP a tool to erode Russian influence and interests in its near “abroad.” As thethreestates have strengthenedties with theEU, Russia haspushedback, Union wasamajor geopolitical disasterof the[twentieth] century.” In Putin 2005, Russian famously President said, “thecollapse Vladimir of the Soviet 3. EaPandRussia and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, 20 19 18 http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml. and ASEAN. influence ina multipolar world, putting theEEU on parwith theEU, NAFTA, APEC, former Soviet republics from the USSR, he would make Russia a distinctive pole of he would “bringRussia up from its knees.” Byreversing the“civilised divorce” of The EEUisfuelled bygeopolitical aspirations andwastobetheinstrument bywhich Russia’s military presenceenables Moscow toproject power andinstability. policy of divide andrule bybeingpartof theconflicts andthesolutions, while Caucasus areparticularly important for Russia astheyallow Moscow topursue a in aneffort toderail EUprocesses. Thethreeprotracted conflicts intheSouth with theRussian church, Russian-financed NGOs, andethnic Russian minorities leverage it hasinareassuch assecurity, labourmigration, energy, andtradealong loomsbury, 2008, p. 141. p. 2008, loomsbury,

The New Cold War. Cold New The and the West Lucas, How the Russia Kremlin Both Edward Menaces Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of the Russian to Annual the Assembly Federal Address Putin, Vladimir Chaillot Papers Chaillot in likely”, the and imaginary the real, Union: the “Eurasian Nicu Popescu, Ibid., p. 147. p. Ibid., Speech at meeting of the Russian-Armenian Interregional Forum of the at Russian-Armenian meeting Interregional Speech Putin, Vladimir 19 18 Hence, Russia created its own integration project, theEEU. 17 20 Russia hasexerted theconsiderable 16 Thiscomment , Gyumri, 2 , Gyumri, , 25 April 2005, 2005, April , 25 , London, , London, , No. 11 IAI Working papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI and theirnational security. Azerbaijan, andGeorgia searching for ways tosafeguard theirstate sovereignty South Caucasus today resembles theturmoil of thepost-Soviet era,with Armenia, According tothe academic ElkhanNuriyev, much of what ishappening inthe 4. Impact of Russia’s waragainstUkraine and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, 22 21 lose more than10bndollars in2015because of theweakRussian currency. on cashsent home from Russia for theireconomic buoyancy could collectively remittances. According to World depreciation of theArmenian dram. It has also brought about asteepdecline in a blow asaresult of Western sanctions imposed on Russia. Thisisevident inthe Armenia’s economy –now closely linked to that of Russia intheEEU– has suffered dependent on Russia and,toalesser extent, on Iran. security cooperation. As aconsequence Armenia hasbecome furtherisolated and and Georgia have taken stepstofurther strengthenpolitical, economic, and It hasalso sparked efforts to form stronger regional alliances. Azerbaijan, Turkey, rather thanwork towards acomprehensive solution. to holdout for independence,deeperintegration, or even annexation toRussia, Furthermore, theannexation hasstrengthened the resolve of thebreakaway states withdrawal of Armenia from Azerbaijani territory will ever beimplemented. less likely that the four UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions demanding the territories it occupies. Moreover, afterRussia’s annexation of Crimea,it iseven that Armenia would acceptsimilar guarantees for returningtheAzerbaijani The blatant violation of the1994 Budapest Memorandum makes it even less likely power andinfluence inthe South Caucasus. allowing Russia totake lead role, theWest, including theEU, isacceptingRussian the status quo andhelp bringabout “state building” inbreakaway regions. By Caucasus. Yet Russia’s peace-makingandpeace-keeping only serve toconsolidate Russian leverage ininfluencing andpromoting Russia’s geostrategic aimsinthe that only Russia hasinfluence over Armenia andAzerbaijan. Karabakhserves as Sochi with President Aliyev andPresident Sargsyanwasaimedat demonstrating and autumn of 2014waslinked totheRussia-Ukraine crisis.Putin’s meetingin The serious violation of theNagorno-Karabakh ceasefire during thesummer is unable toplay arole of guaranteeing security. Russia’s ongoing proxy war inEasternUkraine,it hasalso underlinedthat theEU undermining the presenceof the EU intheregion byfurtherfragmenting it. Given of uncertainty, exacerbating thealready fragile security situation aswell as the European Union”, European DGAPkompakt the in getFullPDF/26317.

Elkhan Nuriyev, “Facing Difficult Choices. The South Caucasus between Russia and Russia between Caucasus South The Choices. Nuriyev, Difficult “Facing Elkhan Shaun Walker and Alberto Nardelli, “Russia’s rouble crisis poses threat to nine countries relying relying countries to nine threat poses rouble crisis “Russia’s Nardelli, Walker Alberto and Shaun 21 TheRussia-Ukraine warhascreated aclimate , No. 1 (January 2015), https://dgap.org/de/article/ 2015), , No. 1(January Bank figures, nine countries that rely heavily 22 21 12 IAI Working papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI April 2014, http://news.az/articles/politics/87642. 2014, April an opportunity for theEUtodemonstrate how adopting key reforms andvalues transformative power alive. Georgia canbearole modelfor theregion, representing transforming theprocess into one of integration –which iskey tokeeping theEU’s table at theRiga EaPSummit aclear roadmap that goes beyond association, support for Georgia byquickly delivering avisafreeregime andputting on the Azerbaijan andArmenia, theEUshould strengthenits political andeconomic While it isimportant tomaintain strong engagement with clear benchmarks for and proxy warinEasternUkraine. fact that Russia isthemainthreat, aswitnessed byits illegal annexation of Crimea the “shared neighbourhood.” Hence, any revisedEaPneedstotake into account the relations sothat it may beable tocontrol thegeopolitical path of thecountries in As isthecasewith NATO, Russia wants tobeaninformal “veto” player inEU-EaP society. roadmaps for eachof thethreecountries that should also include theinput of civil maintained, theEUshould adopt apredominantly bilateral approach, tailoring misinformation war. While certain elements of themultilateral trackshould be realities intheregion andtakinginto account newchallenges such asRussia’s to thedrawing boardtodevise a“PlanB.” Thisshould bedone basedon thenew devised noalternative for theAA/DCFTA, it hasfound itself needingtogo back does not work and a more differentiated approach is required.Because the EU Developments intheregion have demonstrated that aone-size-fits-all approach the geopolitical consequences of the policy intermsof thereaction from Moscow. EU presented holistic policies but thenfailed to follow through and that it ignored of agenuine will from some of thepartner states for real change;thefactthat the to increasefinance for it); thefactthat thereis nomembership perspective; thelack EU memberstates have notviewed thepolicy asapriority andhave beenreluctant the EaPhaving inadequate political andeconomic support (it isnosecretthat many power witnessed intheCEEregion. Thiscanbeput down toanumber of reasons: The EaPhasproduced only limited results, failing toreplicate thetransformative 5. What does thismeanfor theEasternPartnership? Russia while Azerbaijani landsremainoccupied, with little interest from theEU. having double standards:the EU condemns Russian occupation of Crimea by It hasfurtherruptured Azerbaijan-EU relations, with BakuaccusingtheEUof the Azerbaijani rely on remittances from Russia. percent of theArmenian economy, 12percent of theGeorgian, and2.5percent of and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, 23 Guardian The in on remittances”,

“Samad Seyidov accuses organization of pursuing policy of double standards”, in News.AZ in of double standards”, policy of pursuing organization accuses Seyidov “Samad , 18 January 2015, http://gu.com/p/45xjh/stw. 2015, January , 18 , 10 23 13 IAI Working papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI involved intheregion. The EUshould also aimtodeepencooperation with Turkey, which isincreasingly in security sector reform andtakingamore proactive role inconflict resolution. a needtobemore engagedinregional security, including strengtheningits role EaP. It isintheEU’s interest tohave astable andsecureregion. Hence, thereis The warinUkrainedemonstrates theexistenceof aserious security deficit inthe can improve thequality of life of thepopulation. and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, Updated 25February 2015 14 IAI Working papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI CP_132.pdf Papers, No. 132(September2014), http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ Nicu Popescu, “Eurasian Union: the real, the imaginary and the likely”, in London andNew York, Routledge, 2011 Nicu Popescu, EUForeign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts. Stealth Intervention, de/article/getFullPDF/26317 and the European Union”, in Elkhan Nuriyev, “Facing Difficult Choices. TheSouth Caucasus between Russia West, London, Bloomsbury, 2008 Edward Lucas, TheNew Cold War. How theKremlin Menaces BothRussia and the the-european-union-and-the-south-caucasus 2009/01), http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/publications/publication/did/ the Caucasus, Gütersloh, BertelsmannStiftung,2009,p.49-89(Europe inDialogue South Caucasus: Three Perspectives on theFuture of theEuropean Project from Mkrtchyan, Tabib Huseynov andKakhaGogolashvili, TheEuropean Union and the Tabib Huseynov, “The EU and Azerbaijan: Destination Unclear”, in Tigran yerevan387 commentary_armenia_and_the_eurasian_economic_union_the_view_from_ Yerevan”, inECFR Commentaries, 8January 2015,http://www.ecfr.eu/article/ Richard Giragosian, “Armenia andtheEurasian Economic Union: TheView from Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=156940&lng=en Georgia, pdf 12 December2003,http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367. European Council, ASecure Europe in aBetterWorld. European Security Strategy , moe/11092-20141217.pdf Berlin, Friedrich EbertStiftung,December2014,http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id- Dieter Boden,TheRussian-Abkhaz Treaty: New Tensions in theSouth Caucasus , References and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, National Security Concept of Georgia, 2012, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/ DGAPkompakt, No. 1 (January 2015), https://dgap.org/ Chaillot 15 IAI Working papers 15 | 06 - February 2015 ISSN 2280-4341 | ISBN 978-88-98650-30-9 © 2015 IAI Latest IAIW and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus The EasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, www.iai.it [email protected] F +39 T +39 Via Angelo B and otherpapers’ series related toIAIresearch projects. (AffarInternazionali), two series of research papers (QuaderniIAIand Research Papers) publishes anEnglish-language quarterly (TheInternational Spectator), anonline webzine and theMiddle East;defence economy andpolicy; andtransatlantic relations. TheIAI in the global economy and internationalisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean research sectors are:European institutions andpolicies; Italian foreign policy; trends and abroad andisamemberof various international networks. More specifically, themain that end,it cooperates with otherresearch institutes, universities andfoundations inItaly and disseminate knowledge through research studies, conferences andpublications. To economy andinternational security. Anon-profit organisation, theIAIaimstofurther Founded byAltiero Spinelli in1965,does research inthefields of foreign policy, political Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) 14 |18 14 |19 15 |01 15 |02 15 |03 15 |04 15 |05 15 |06 14 |16 14 |17 06 3224360 06 3224363 the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: ACall for an EU Initiative Daniela Huber andLorenzo Kamel,TheMultilateralisation of Global Energy Trends:Old Wine in New Bottles? Marie-Claire Aoun, European Energy Security Challenges and Sphere Azzurra Meringolo, TheStruggle over theEgyptian Public Achievements and Potential Tayeb Amegroud, Morocco’s Power Sector Transition: and theImpact on theSouth Caucasus Amanda Paul, TheEasternPartnership, theRussia-Ukraine War, for European Foreign Policy Along its Arc of Instability? Nathalie Tocci, TheNeighbourhood Policy isDead.What’s Next a Supply for theEU? Elif Burcu Günaydın, Can South-Eastern Mediterranean Gasbe Framework Governance Challenges of theEU’s 2030Energy and Climate Sirja-Leena Penttinen, Nicolò Sartori andKimTalus, and Grasping Opportunities Marco Sanfilippo, Chinese Investments in Italy: Facing Risks Kosovo Supranational Divide in EUForeign Policy: Insights from Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, Beyond theIntergovernmental- runetti, 9-I-00186 Rome, Italy orking P apers