Baku Dialoguesbaku Dialogues Policy Perspectives on the Silk Road Region

BAKU DIALOGUESBAKU DIALOGUES POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE SILK ROAD REGION

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 The Second Karabakh War: Initial Thoughts & Reflections A Most Significant Geopolitical Development Reassessing U.S.-Azerbaijani Relations Matthew Bryza Robert F. Cekuta W h i l e Yo u W e r e S l e e p i n g Special, Exceptional, and Privileged Alper Coşkun Ayça Ergun Understanding Armenian Narratives Three Decades of Missed Opportunities Rovshan Ibrahimov & Murad Muradov Lala Jumayeva The Caspian Sea as Battleground James M. Dorsey Appraising the Present, Forecasting the Future Eurasia 2040 S. Enders Wimbush Right or Left Economic Recovery? Farid Shafiyev Universal Dead-end in a Global Wormhole Andrey Bystritskiy Between Russia & China: Perspectives on the Silk Road Region Grand Strategy Along the Silk Road Central Asia and the Belt and Road Initiative Gregory Gleason Djoomart Otorbaev Russia and China’s Digital Silk Road Navigating the Great Powers Jeff Schubert Rachael M. Rudolph

Profile in Leadership Shev’s Way and the History of Europe Tedo Japaridze Baku Dialogues Interview A Higher Level of Openness and Engagement: Uzbekistan’s New Foreign Policy Abdulaziz Kamilov

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ISSN Print: 2709-1848 ISSN Online: 2709-1856 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUESBAKU DIALOGUES POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE SILK ROAD REGION

Profile in Leadership Shev’s Way and the History of Europe Tedo Japaridze Baku Dialogues Interview A Higher Level of Openness and Engagement: Uzbekistan’s New Foreign Policy Abdulaziz Kamilov

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Baku Dialogues is an independent policy journal. The content of each issue of the journal (e.g. essays, interviews, profiles, etc.) thus does not represent any institutional viewpoint. The analyses provided and viewpoints expressed by the authors featured in Baku Dialogues do not necessarily reflect those of its publisher, editors, consultants, Editorial Advisory Council members, and anyone else affiliated with ADA University orBaku Dialogues. Our sole acceptance of Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 4 responsibility is the provision of a forum dedicated5 to intellectualVol. discussion 4 | No. 2 |and Winter debate. 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES Table of ContentsBAKU DIALOGUES Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 Essays 8 A Most Significant Geopolitical Development Matthew Bryza 22 Reassessing U.S.-Azerbaijani Relations Robert F. Cekuta 40 While You Were Sleeping Alper Coşkun 52 Special, Exceptional, and Privileged Ayça Ergun 66 Understanding Armenian Narratives Rovshan Ibrahimov and Murad Muradov 82 Three Decades of Missed Opportunities Lala Jumayeva 102 The Caspian Sea as Battleground James M. Dorsey 112 Eurasia 2040 S. Enders Wimbush 124 Right or Left Economic Recovery? Farid Shafiyev 132 Universal Dead-end in a Global Wormhole Andrey Bystritskiy 144 Grand Strategy Along the Silk Road Gregory Gleason 162 Central Asia and the Belt and Road Initiative Djoomart Otorbaev 174 Russia and China’s Digital Silk Road Jeff Schubert 186 Navigating the Great Powers Rachael M. Rudolph

Profile in Leadership 204 Shev’s Way and the History of Europe Tedo Japaridze

Interview 224 A Higher Level of Openness and Engagement: Uzbekistan’s New Foreign Policy Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 6 Abdulaziz Kamilov 7 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES

Nagorno-Karabakh and occupied Karabakh is left to be determined A Most Significant by Armenia to Azerbaijan’s control; in the future, with Armenians im- an interim status for Nagorno-Kara- mediately able to claim the region bakh providing guarantees for secu- is no longer part of Azerbaijan and Geopolitical Development rity and self-governance; a corridor Azerbaijanis able to claim the oppo- linking Armenia to Nagorno-Kara- site. In this way, constructive ambi- Strategic Benefits and Strategic Focus bakh; future determination of the guity is used to enable agreement final legal status of Nagorno-Kara- on the above important elements bakh through a legally binding vote despite irreconcilable differences Matthew Bryza of Nagorno-Karabakh’s residents; between the two sides on final legal the right of all internally displaced status. persons and refugees to return to he November 10th, 2020, The trilateral agreement defines their former places of residence; Though not initially embraced by trilateral agreement signed a peace settlement in line with and international either Azerbaijan by Azerbaijani President the framework unofficially agreed security guarantees or Armenia, this IlhamT Aliyev, Armenian Prime Min- by the leaders of Armenia and that would include The trilateral agreement general approach ister Nikol Pashinyan, and Russian Azerbaijan over a decade ago, a peacekeeping op- could become the most was unofficially President Vladimir Putin could be- and thus stands a good chance to eration. significant geopoliticalaccepted by the come the most significant geopolit- hold. The so-called “Basic Princi- development in the South then-President ical development in the South Cau- ples” or “Madrid Principles” were The underlying of Armenia Serge casus since the collapse of the Soviet originally tabled by the American bargain was that Caucasus since the col- Sargsian and Pres- Union—perhaps even more than Russian, and French Co-chairs of Azerbaijan regains lapse of the Soviet Union. ident of Azerbaijan the establishment of the Baku-Tbili- the Minsk Group in November its seven occu- But it is not yet clear that Ilham Aliyev in si-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Tbilisi- 2007 at a meeting of OSCE foreign pied districts in key actors in the Trans- January 2009, fol- Erzurum natural gas pipelines. But it ministers in Madrid. exchange for se- atlantic community ap- lowing a year of is not yet clear that key actors in the curity guarantees fine-tuning by the Transatlantic community appreciate for the Armenian preciate this opportunity. Minsk Group Co- this opportunity, especially Wash- Land for Peace residents of Na- chairs. I personally ington and Paris, who along with gorno-Karabakh and a temporary witnessed their oral agreement in Moscow, comprise the Co-chairs of he Madrid Document con- legal status for Nagorno-Karabakh my capacity as the U.S. Co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the sup- Tsists, inter alia, of the fol- other than being unambiguously the Minsk Group at the time. posedly impartial mediating body of lowing elements: the return of the part of Azerbaijan. The Madrid the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijani territories surrounding Document thus strikes a balance This “land for peace” formula among three key principles of remained the framework for ne- Matthew Bryza currently resides in Istanbul, where he runs a Turkish-Finnish en- the 1975 OSCE Helsinki Final gotiations in subsequent years, as vironmental solutions joint venture, serves on the Boards of energy companies based Act: territorial integrity of states; the Minsk Group strove to help the in Turkey and the UK, and is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He is a former U.S. Co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, Director for Europe and Eurasia on the non-use and non-threat of force; leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan National Security Council Staff at the White House, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for and self-determination of peoples. resolve their differences on several Europe and Eurasia, and Ambassador to Azerbaijan. The final legal status of Nagorno- details, which were not serious.

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Those specific issues were never Aliyev was willing to stop, with is situated on the commanding war and could consolidate its vic- fully worked out, however, be- Azerbaijan’s forces remaining out- heights above Nagorno-Karabakh’s tory at the negotiating table with no cause the leaders of Azerbaijan and side Nagorno-Karabakh itself, capital, Khankendi (or Stepanakert, further loss of life. Armenia realized they were willing as long as internally displaced for Armenians). By regaining to accept compromises that their Azerbaijanis could return to their Shusha, Azerbaijan would cut off The trilateral agreement followed general publics were not yet pre- former homes inside Nagorno- the road connecting Armenia to two days later. It incorporated most pared to embrace. The Minsk Karabakh, especially to the town of Nagorno-Karabakh, enabling Baku of the Basic Principles, including Group nevertheless came close to Shusha, which is of great cultural to end the military phase of the war the return of Azerbaijan’s occu- finalizing modified versions of the importance to both Azerbaijanis from a position of extreme negoti- pied districts to Baku’s control, as Basic Principles during meetings and Armenians. Putin said he was ating strength. well as the right of return of all dis- with the presidents of Azerbaijan surprised when Pashinyan said he placed persons and refugees, but and Armenia in Prague in June 2009 perceived the return of displaced And this is exactly what happened. with three significant changes to and Kazan in June 2011; Putin then Azerbaijanis as a threat, explaining, Armenia’s severe disadvantage: offered a promising refinement fol- I do not quite understand the first, the omission of any mention lowing a resurgence of fighting in essence of this hypothetical Drifting Back to War of a possible change in Nagorno- threat, I mean, it was about April 2016. the return of civilians to their Karabakh’s legal status; second, a homes, while the Armenian ollowing four days of intense new transit corridor connecting t is therefore not surprising side was to have retained con- Ffighting in the forested hills Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan that throughout the Second trol over this section of Na- surrounding Shusha—often -in with the rest of Azerbaijan via I gorno-Karabakh, including Karabakh war, both Aliyev and Shusha, and meaning that our volving hand-to-hand combat— Armenian territory; and third, the Putin repeatedly called for negoti- peacekeepers were there, which Azerbaijani special forces scaled return of Shusha to Azerbaijan’s ations to resume according to the we have agreed upon both with the cliffs beneath control. framework of the Basic Principles. Armenia and Azerbaijan. At the city and re- Indeed, Aliyev and Putin compelled that point, the prime minister gained control of it he No- told me that his country could Despite popular senti- Pashinyan to recommit to the Basic not agree to this, and that it on November 8th. ment for the Azerbaijani Tvember 10th Principles in their October 10th would struggle and fight. Despite popular military to carry the trilateral agree- ceasefire agreement, though that sentiment for the ment has been met fighting into Khankendi truce lasted only a few hours. Pashinyan’s refusal to accept Azerbaijani mil- with violent pro- this deal proved to be extremely itary to carry the and beyond to liberate tests in Yerevan. In a remarkable November 17th costly for Armenia. Azerbaijan im- fighting into Khan- all of Nagorno-Karabakh In one instance, a interview with the Rossiya 24 televi- mediately resumed its offensive, kendi/Stepanakert by force, Aliyev exercised mob stormed the sion channel, Putin recounted how regaining control of its districts and then beyond strategic restraint, realiz- Armenian parlia- on October 19th and 20th—in the of Qubadli and Zengilan, then to liberate all of ing that Azerbaijan had ment and severely wake of Azerbaijan’s dramatic mil- moving into Lachin District and Nagorno-Kara- beat its Speaker. itary breakthrough along the Ira- onward to Nagorno-Karabakh itself. bakh by force, won the war and could Days later, the nian border—he tried to convince Azerbaijan’s main goal was to regain Aliyev exercised consolidate its victory at country’s secu- Aliyev and Pashinyan to end hos- Shusha, whose population before strategic restraint, the negotiating table with rity services an- tilities in accordance with the Basic the First Karabakh War was over- realizing that Azer- no further loss of life. nounced they had Principles. According to Putin, whelmingly Azerbaijani and which baijan had won the foiled an alleged

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 10 11 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES plot to assassinate Pashinyan. And And this appeared to be hap- by granting Armenia up front the Pashinyan’s drift away from the President Armen Sarkissian has pening in late 2018 and early 2019, primary concession it sought from Basic Principles accelerated in the called for snap elections. thanks to three constructive meet- Azerbaijan—namely a changed spring and summer of 2019. In ings between Pashinyan and Aliyev. legal status for Nagorno-Karabakh May, he and his minster of defense, At the time of writing (early De- These discussions produced a new equivalent to that of Azerbaijan and David Tonoyan, declared that the cember 2020), thousands of dem- communications channel and Armenia—but without giving any- Madrid Principles’ approach of onstrators continue to gather daily an unprecedented joint commit- thing in return to Azerbaijan. “land for peace” had been replaced in Yerevan, blocking streets and ment “to prepare the populations by a new doctrine of “new wars for demanding that for peace.” This Pashinyan’s shift seemed to result new territories.” That same month, Pashinyan resign. latter point was from political weakness. Lacking Pashinyan publicly repudiated the Whether Pash- Pashinyan’s reckless ap- particularly sig- a strong political organization of Basic Principles. Finally, in August inyan is able to proach precipitated a war nificant, given the his own, the new prime minister 2019, Pashinyan traveled to Stepa- survive politically aforementioned struggled to consolidate his polit- nakert/Khankendi and announced, is unclear. What is that produced Armenia’s reluctance of ical authority and implement his “Nagorno-Karabakh is Armenia. certain, however, is greatest strategic defeat Pashinyan’s pre- promised reforms. He faced se- Period,” leading public chants that his reckless ap- in over a century. decessor, Serge vere opposition from the previous calling for Nagorno-Karabakh’s proach to relations Sarkissian, as well political elite, comprised of the unification with Armenia. with Azerbaijan— as that of Aliyev, former “Karabakh Clan” and busi- including his abandonment of the to confront public opposition to ness oligarchs based in Yerevan Basic Principles—precipitated almost any compromise in their re- and Moscow, supported by vocal Clearly Not A Peacemaker a war that produced Armenia’s spective countries. and wealthy diasporas in Russia, greatest strategic defeat in over a France, and the United States. fter the Armenian leader century. uring the first half of 2019, Armenian nationalists—espe- Awalked away from the long- Dhowever, Armenia’s pop- cially the Armenian Revolutionary standing framework for a Na- ashinyan’s premiership ular prime minister began to shift Federation (or Dashnak- gorno-Karabakh settlement, the Pdid not begin this way. his approach. In March 2019, sutyun)—rejected the “Basic Minsk Group process was effec- His rise to power via Arme- Pashinyan declared that Nagorno- Principles” and the notion tively dead. During the first half nia’s “velvet revolution” in May Karabakh’s ethnic-Armenian au- of surrendering any land to of 2020, however, the COVID-19 2018 initially generated wide- thorities must participate in nego- Azerbaijan, dreaming instead of pandemic froze the deterioration spread hope that he might rein- tiations. Couching this demand in recreating antiquity’s “Greater of Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, as vigorate the Nagorno-Karabakh conciliatory language, he claimed Armenia” by carving out terri- both countries struggled to contain peace process. This was true to seek a fresh approach in pursuit tory from present-day Turkey, the new coronavirus. even among my interlocutors at of a settlement that was accept- Syria, Iraq, Iran, Georgia, and the highest governmental level able to the peoples of Armenia, Azerbaijan. Thus, in January 2019, As the rate of COVID-19 infec- in Baku. After all, Pashinyan Nagorno-Karabakh (the unrecog- Dahnaksutyun’s U.S. chapter, the tions flattened in summer, - ten had ousted Armenia’s old polit- nized “Republic of Artsakh”), and Armenian National Committee of sions between Armenia and Azer- ical regime, which had been led Azerbaijan. In reality, however, America (ANCA), urged Yerevan to baijan heated up again. In July, the for 20 years by former leaders of this demand would undermine repudiate the Madrid Principles as two countries exchanged heavy Nagorno-Karabakh. the logic of the Madrid Principles an empty formula of “land for paper.” artillery fire along the Armenia-

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Azerbaijan border, relatively far Russian troops stationed at Rus- with Pashinyan, “You came to innovative, battle-tested Turkish from Nagorno-Karabakh but close sia’s 102nd army base in Gyumri, power talking about finding a path military tactics, to decimate to the hydrocarbon pipelines, Armenia; Ankara reciprocated with to peace but [...] your nationalist Armenia’s army and bypass its heavy rail and road links, and fiber- joint Turkish and Azerbaijani mili- position on Nagorno-Karabakh [...] fortifications. By mid-October, optic cables that are essential to tary exercises in Azerbaijan. As ten- doesn’t seem to have a meaningful Azerbaijan’s battlefield victories were Azerbaijan’s independence, eco- sions rose, many observers feared peace element.” Sackur further noted so dramatic and so rapid as to sur- nomic vitality, and strategic signif- Turkey and Russia could be drawn that Pashinyan’s visit to Stepankert/ prise even the country’s top leaders. icance. Because part of the fighting into a regional war on opposing Khankendi one year earlier, coupled spilled from Azerbaijan onto Arme- sides. with his abandonment of the Basic nian territory, Pashinyan eyed an Principles, led him to conclude, What Went Wrong opportunity to invoke the Russian- Rather than seeking to calm ten- “you clearly are not a peacemaker.” led Collective Security Treaty Or- sions, Pashinyan instead reopened ooking back at my own ex- ganization (CSTO) pledge that an a deep historical wound in Turkey. Pashinyan nevertheless con- Lperience working with his attack on one member state is an On August 10th, he publicly com- tinued barreling toward armed predecessors, Pashinyan’s approach attack on all. memorated the centennial of the confrontation with Azerbaijan. In to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Treaty of Sèvres—the agreement late August 2020, the prime minis- was disturbing. Though conven- Yerevan therefore requested an between the Allied Powers of World ter’s wife, Anna Hakobyan, partic- tional wisdom held that previous emergency session of the CSTO, War I and the Ottoman Empire that ipated in a military training course Armenian presidents Robert which it then quickly withdrew in signaled the start of the Ottoman in Nagorno-Karabakh with 15 fe- Kocharian and Serge Sarkissian response to an evenhanded CSTO Empire’s dismemberment. That male residents of the region. This were hardline leaders of the statement, issued on July 14th, accord called for the transfer of occurred just after their son, Ashot, “Karabakh Clan,” in practice they that criticized the “violation of the several regions of eastern Anatolia had completed his two-year mili- and their foreign ministers were ceasefire agreed by the leaderships to the new, independent state of tary service in Nagorno-Karabakh constructive and creative. For ex- of [both] Armenia and Azerbaijan.” Armenia. Though never fully im- ample, during my first visit to This failure to elicit a statement plemented and eventually sup- Finally, on September 19th, Yerevan as the U.S. Co-chair of of support from Armenia’s mili- planted by the Treaty of Lausanne the de-facto leader of Nagorno- the Minsk Group in June 2006, tary allies should have served as a in 1923, any mention of the Treaty Karabakh, Arayik Haratunyan, an- then-Foreign Minister Vartan warning to Pashinyan that Putin of Sèvres stirs nationalist emotions nounced plans to relocate the leg- Oskanian proposed a tradeoff would not allow Russia to be drawn and fears of irredentism in Turkey islature of Nagorno-Karabakh to involving Nagorno-Karabakh’s into fighting on the territory of to this day. Ankara thus viewed Shusha. At this point, Baku con- legal status and the return of the Azerbaijan. Yet the Armenian leader Pashinyan’s move as reckless and cluded that any chance to recover Azerbaijani territories surrounding continued to ratchet up tension hostile, and raised its political and its occupied territories via negotia- Nagorno-Karabakh, which I had in- with Azerbaijan. military support to Baku to unprec- tions had evaporated. dependently been thinking about edented levels. in Washington and believed Baku ussia and Turkey filled the he Second Karabakh War might accept. Rdiplomatic vacuum left by the This string of provocations led Tbegan eight days later. U.S. and France following the July Steven Sackur, the host of the BBC’s Azerbaijan relied heavily on During the next three and a half clashes: Moscow called a snap mili- “Hardtalk” program, to observe Turkish (and Israeli) unmanned years, my fellow Minsk Group Co- tary drill with Armenian forces and during his August 14th interview aerial vehicles, coupled with chairs—Russia’s Yuriy Merzlyakov

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 14 15 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES and France’s Bernard Fassier— nario that represents Putin’s worst op French officials have been that France recognize the inde- and I built on this constructive political nightmare. In response to Teven more vocal in sup- pendence of the “Republic of Art- Armenian proposal. Oskanian’s Pashinyan’s repeated pleadings for porting Armenia at Azerbaijan’s sakh.” Although riddled with fac- successor, Eduard Nalban- direct Russian military support, expense, rather than remaining tual errors and having prompted a dian, and his Azerbaijani coun- Putin thus made clear that Mos- impartial as required of a Minsk clarification from the French For- terpart Elmar Mammadyarov, cow’s CSTO obligation to defend Group Co-chair. Just after the trilat- eign Ministry’s Secretary of State, worked with us in a collabora- Armenia was valid only if Armenia’s eral agreement was signed, French Jean-Baptiste Lemoyne, that the tive albeit competitive spirit. territory was attacked, whereas the Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Government of France had no inten- We also enjoyed active support Nagorno-Karabakh war was being Drian issued a one-sided statement tion to recognize the independence of from Russian Foreign Min- fought on the territory of Azerbaijan. in which he noted, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Senate res- ister Sergey Lavrov and then- France reaffirms its whole- olution accurately reflects deep bias Russian President Dmitriy Washington and Paris, in con- hearted friendship with the among many French authorities Armenian people in light of Medvedev. During a lunch for trast, did not share Moscow’s ap- our close human, cultural, and against both Turkey and Azerbaijan. the Minsk Group Co-chairs preciation of the threat to peace historic ties with Armenia. In The document thus “Condemns hosted by Lavrov in September posed by Pashinyan’s provocations these tragic circumstances, we Azerbaijan’s military aggression, 2008—a month after Russia in- and his stated policy of “new wars stand alongside it. In particu- carried out with the support of vaded Georgia—I observed for new territories.” Pashinyan’s lar, we will work to lend it all Turkish authorities” and declares the humanitarian support it that, as misaligned as Wash- dire warnings that Turkey and needs, especially for those Ar- “the expansionist policy led by ington and Moscow were on Azerbaijan aimed to “continue the menians who were displaced by Turkey is a major factor of desta- Georgia, we were equally aligned Armenian genocide” proved to be the fighting. bilization in the Eastern Mediter- with regard to the Nagorno- false but nevertheless resonated ranean, the Near and Middle East, Karabakh conflict. among many U.S. and European Le Drian failed to mention, how- and now in the South Caucasus.” analysts. ever, that the November 10th agree- Our joint efforts culminated in ment clears the way for Azerbaijanis the unofficial agreement to the -Ma Some prominent U.S. experts to return to their former places of Four Strategic Benefits drid Principles by Aliyev and Koch- continue to argue that Azerbaijan residence from which they were arian’s successor, Serge Sarkissian, and Turkey will conduct ethnic displaced during the First Karabakh hile such biases can be ex- in January 2009. cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh War. Instead, he warned Baku, “We Wplained by the influence of in the future, even if not yet. Se- expect Azerbaijan to strictly uphold France’s Armenian diaspora in do- een in this context, Moscow nior U.S. officials seem to share this the commitments that it has made mestic politics, it is more difficult Swas understandably unim- disdain for Turkish and Azerbai- and to put an immediate end to its to understand how Paris, as well pressed by Pashinyan’s rejection jani actions. For example, during offensive,” adding, “In this context, as Washington, fail to see four stra- of the Madrid Principles. Compli- a December 2nd video conference we call on Turkey not to do anything tegic benefits to the Transatlantic cating matters further was the fact of NATO’s foreign ministers, out- that goes against this key priority.” Community from the November that he had come to power via popular going U.S. Secretary of State Mike 10th trilateral agreement. protests and, having overthrown an Pompeo reportedly denounced The French Senate went ever entrenched regime, made promises to Turkey for what he viewed as ag- further than Le Drian in tilting First, the agreement settles the fun- undertake sweeping democratic and gressive behavior with regard to the toward Armenia, issuing a resolu- damental elements of the Nagorno- anti-corruption reforms—a sce- Second Karabakh War. tion on November 25th suggesting Karabakh conflict according to a

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 16 17 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES general framework that was pre- and investment flows and joint on the battlefield and enable the residents can safely return), shelter, viously agreed by both Armenia infrastructure projects—as well ceasefire to take hold. Addition- longer-term housing, and the and Azerbaijan, albeit unofficially, as new forms of political coopera- ally, given Russia’s historical role full range of physical infrastruc- which means it is essentially just. tion—that would benefit Armenia, as a protector of Armenia against ture (including electricity, natural The trilateral agreement is there- Azerbaijan, and Turkey. its Turkic neighbors, only Rus- gas, water, sanitation, and roads). fore likely to endure, and thereby sian peacekeepers could provide Azerbaijan will need to rely heavily eliminate a regional flashpoint for Third, the trilateral agreement Armenian residents of Nagorno- on help from the international the foreseeable future. While the mandates a new transportation Karabakh a sufficient sense of secu- community to meet these needs. Armenian side may eventually in- link between Azerbaijan’s exclave of rity to allow them to return to their International goodwill and exper- sist on a new round of negotiations Nakhchivan and the rest of homes, and indeed, thousands of tise will also be crucial to reducing on the legal status of the portion of Azerbaijan via Armenian territory. Armenians now appear to be re- enmity and restoring a sense of Nagorno-Karabakh over which it This new road will significantly returning to Stepanakert/Khankendi. trust required to rebuild communi- retains control, the conflict has now duce Nakhchivan’s dependence on ties psychologically, as Armenians been transformed into a nettlesome Iran for the transport of energy and Azerbaijan, meanwhile, seems and Azerbaijanis eventually be- political and legal dispute—one in other vital goods. committed to encouraging as many come neighbors again in Nagorno- which military force is unlikely to Armenians as possible to return Karabakh. play a role. The Nagorno-Karabakh Fourth, the November 10th to and remain in their homes. As conflict has therefore become more agreement provides NATO a mil- Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Azerbaijan can increase its akin to the Cyprus Question than itary presence in Azerbaijan by Jayhun Bayramov stated on chances of achieving such interna- to “a frozen conflict.” virtue of Turkey’s participation in November 27th, “We are entering a tional support if it maintains the peacekeeping operations. From new stage, a stage of reconstruction moral high ground. Baku’s recent Second, by mandating the re- agreement to allow ten extra days Moscow’s perspective, Turkish and rehabilitation, a stage of resto- opening of all transit links in the peacekeepers mean NATO troops, for Armenians to depart Kelbajar ration and coexistence.” region, the November 10th agree- which can now open new geostra- District and the announcement by ment clears the way for the eventual tegic opportunities for the Atlantic Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor General normalization of Armenia-Turkey alliance. Moreover, Turkey’s peace- Maintaining Strategic of investigations into alleged war relations. Having actively partic- keepers balance those of Russia, crimes by both Azerbaijani and ipated in negotiations of the pre- constraining the extent of destabi- Focus Armenian troops should help at- vious normalization agreement be- lizing actions Russian peacekeepers tract such assistance. tween the two countries in 2009, it can undertake, as they have often s the Government of was clear to me then that Turkey’s done in Georgia and Moldova. AAzerbaijan now formulates For now, however, Azerbaijan parliament would ratify the so- its reconstruction plan for its re- should expect continued mis- called Zurich Protocols only if there hile the presence of Rus- gained territories, its estimate of understanding from Paris and was a breakthrough in settling the Wsian peacekeepers is the damage caused by recent mili- Washington, given that time will Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. That a geostrategic setback for both tary operations and destruction by be needed for a positive post- breakthrough is now a reality. New Azerbaijan and NATO, as a prac- former Armenian residents is over conflict track record by Baku to be and positive vectors of coopera- tical matter, these troops fulfilled $100 billion. Rebuilding tasks in- recognized. Meanwhile, Armenians tion could therefore soon emerge, an urgent requirement to separate clude demining (with three years and members of Armenian dias- potentially catalyzing new trade Azerbaijani and Armenian troops required before the region’s former poras will endure a painful period

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 18 19 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES of soul-searching Karabakh by force, as they struggle to The trilateral agreement this show of stra- come to terms with transformed the great- tegic restraint re- their shocking de- est military victory in flected the wisdom feat. Some of these of the great nine- CASPIAN CENTER FOR will be thoughtful, Azerbaijan’s history into teenth century as those of Jirair Li- its greatest diplomatic Prussian military baridian, the wise victory. strategist Karl von ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT former Nagorno- Clausewitz, who Karabakh advisor to Armenia’s first taught the world that “war is the post-Soviet president. Others will continuation of politics by other be provocative and disturbing, means.” In other words, wars are such as the recent call in a prom- fought to achieve political goals, inent Armenian-American news with victory ultimately won at the outlet for Armenia to harvest the negotiating table. Military force is radioactive materials from its Met- a diplomatic tool used to reshape samor nuclear power plant for a the political space of a peace agree- “dirty bomb” to be dropped on ment, rather than as an end in itself. Baku. The November 10th trilateral hroughout this turmoil, agreement transformed the greatest TAzerbaijan should main- military victory in Azerbaijan’s tain its strategic focus, as when it history into its greatest diplomatic stopped its offensive after capturing victory. It is now the responsibility Shusha, having realized it had of all Azerbaijanis to consolidate won the military phase of the war these national triumphs into a pros- and could now spare hundreds of perous and peaceful future, with Azerbaijani and Armenian lives. Azerbaijan recognized interna- While unpopular among Azer- tionally as restoring the chance for baijanis who wished to see their Armenians and Azerbaijanis once army regain all of Nagorno- again to live side-by-side. BD The Caspian Center for Energy and Environment (CCEE), a core institution of ADA University, provides policy relevant and academic research, teaching, and training, as well as a variety of outreach activities in the sphere of energy and environment in the wider Caspian region.

Held annually in July, the Baku Summer Energy School (BSES) is our flagship certificate program. It brings together world-renowned scholars, academics, and bakudialogues.ada.edu.az policymakers to examine and gain a better understanding of global energy and environment issues and their practical application.

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portunity to build up ties that can and other resources have been key Reassessing U.S.-Azerbaijani become both more mutually bene- additional factors. ficial and effective. Geography makes Azerbaijan, Relations together with Georgia, the bridge Thirty Years of Partnership that connects Western and A Shared Imperative to Look Ahead Central Europe with Central Asia ashington has long char- and further onwards to East and Wacterized its relationship South Asia. This reality makes Robert F. Cekuta with Azerbaijan as a triangle based Azerbaijan essential to the on three specific points or vectors: Northern Distribution Network, he U.S.-Azerbaijan re- ramifications of the COVID-19 security issues, energy and other the pathway from the Black Sea, lationship remains im- pandemic or the realities of climate economic interests, and support across the Caucasus, Caspian, and portant to both countries, change—make the need for reval- for good governance and the rule Central Asia, which provides essen- butT it is time to reevaluate and up- uation, dialogue, and mapping out of law. At the same time, Azer- tial, timely access to and from Af- date how they engage with each new directions in the two countries’ baijan has sought and valued a stra- ghanistan for the United States and other. The Second Karabakh War is relations even more apparent. tegic relationship with the United NATO. Likewise, the Georgian- the most visible of the reasons for States, leveraging it to strengthen Azerbaijani trans-Caucasus route such a reassessment, given Azer- Basic, long-standing factors in its independence and well- has been important for U.S. allies’ baijan’s military successes, Russia’s the two countries’ engagement cer- being. The overriding interest for and other partners’ commercial headline role in securing the No- tainly remain valid, but that does Azerbaijanis—officials as well as links with Central Asia and coun- vember 2020 agreement that halted not obviate the need for tough, crit- citizens—has been to build Amer- tries both further south and east, the fighting, and the need to under- ical analysis of where their dealings ican understanding and support providing them with the only path take the extremely difficult work of stand and for recalibrating how to for its position vis-à-vis Armenia in that avoids transiting through avoiding a new war and building a engage in the time ahead. Sticking the protracted, painful conflict over Russia or Iran. peace. But China’s high profile eco- to how Baku and Washington Nagorno-Karabakh. nomic, diplomatic, and security have worked together or talked to his geographic reality means activities across Eurasia, coupled each other in the past serves nei- For U.S. policymakers—and for TU.S. policymakers should with the results of the November ther country, given changing re- those in other capitals as well— factor Azerbaijan—along with the 2020 election in the United States, gional and global pictures. While Azerbaijan’s unique geographic Greater Caspian Region of which have also significantly altered the conducting such an analysis pres- position is a critical consideration. it is an essential component—into diplomatic environment. Lastly, ents challenges, developing new Azerbaijan is the only country in a range of foreign policy consid- multinational challenges—such patterns in the two countries’ re- the world that borders both Russia erations. The Trump Administra- as the economic, social, and other lationship presents a strategic op- and Iran. It occupies a central place tion, for example, identified five in a dynamic part of the world overriding concerns in its 2017 where global and regional powers’ National Security Strategy: compe- Robert F. Cekuta is a member of the Advisory Board of the Washington, DC-based interests can collide and where con- tition from Russia and China; the Caspian Policy Center and a former U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan (2015-2018) and, in addition to other positions in the State Department, Principal Deputy Assistant flict and instability are frequently dangers posed by Iran and North Secretary for Energy (2011-2014). possible. The region’s hydrocarbon Korea; and threats of terrorism and

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 22 23 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES violent extremism, international and bring to an end the decades reserves and the transport of those 6 billion cubic meters (BCM) of criminal activity, narcotics, and of violence there. Moreover, Azer- resources to parts of Europe and be- natural gas annually to Turkey, 1 human trafficking. Azerbaijan is an baijan is an essential piece of the yond, which significantly boosted BCM to Greece, another 1 BCM essential component in America’s Lapis Lazuli corridor linking regional and global energy secu- to Bulgaria, 500,000 cubic me- efforts to deal with every one of the Afghanistan with the West, and rity. Azerbaijan’s energy resources, ters annually to Albania, and up concerns listed in this strategy, with providing a way to develop legiti- whether as exports of crude oil to to 18 BCM to Italy. Moreover, the the possible exception of North mate trade and foster Afghans’ eco- Israel or natural gas to Europe, have Southern Gas Corridor project Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Indica- nomic well-being. been factors in helping countries can be expanded, which would en- tions are these issues will be among stand up to those who would use able the trans-Caucasus and trans- those of deep concern to the in- Also within the security dimen- energy supplies for coercion. Anatolian portions to carry perhaps coming Biden Administration. sion, Azerbaijan has been a valued as much as 31 BCM of gas from partner in ongoing efforts to combat The United States was a visible, the Caspian region annually while Coming back to the triangle of terrorism and violent extremism. active partner with Azerbaijan the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline could strategic interests characterizing In addition to direct cooperation in realizing the “Contract of the be expanded to carry 20 BCM. U.S. relations with Azerbaijan, it is in international anti-terrorism ef- Century.” Signed in 1994, that Even in its current configuration, critical to stress that while each is forts, Azerbaijan’s example as a historic agreement directly led a link could be made across the important in and of itself, each of majority Shia Muslim state where to development of the Azeri- Caspian to enable gas supplies from the three vectors are inter-related religious and inter-ethnic tolera- Chirag-Gunashli oilfields in the Turkmenistan to reach markets in and mutually re-enforcing. Success tion is a long-established norm is Caspian as well as the construction the West. in one is needed for success in the also important. Azerbaijan’s strong, of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) other two. From an American point positive relations with Israel are oil pipeline. Such expansions would further of view, success in these areas also very much noted and appreciated enhance energy security in the benefits Azerbaijan, strengthening in the United States as well. On top The 2006 completion of BTC Balkans and elsewhere in Europe. its own independence, stability, of benefiting Israel, these relations was followed by the Southern Gas For the United States, the European prosperity, and well-being in a dif- may have provided something of an Corridor project. That project cost Union, and other European coun- ficult part of the world. example as the Trump Administra- about $40 billion to build and in- tries, seeing the realization of the tion sought to build diplomatic re- cluded the development of the Southern Gas Corridor and the ear- n the security point, for lations between Israel and a greater giant Shah Deniz II gas field in lier oil-related projects were stra- Oexample, Azerbaijan’s sup- number of Muslim countries in the the Caspian, the construction of tegic keys to diversifying sources port on the ground in Afghanistan Arab world. one of the largest gas processing of energy and safeguarding against as part of the international coali- facilities outside the Middle East potential disruptions of needed oil tion has been important, as was its zerbaijan’s geostrategic po- in Sangachal just south of Baku, and natural gas. earlier support in providing peace- Asition has been especially and the building of a 3,500 km set keepers in Kosovo. Azerbaijan’s pertinent in what may be the most of gas pipelines from Baku across he third vector—the impor- role in the Northern Distribution widely known example of bilat- the South Caucasus, Anatolia, and Ttance of building good gover- Network remains key, but Baku has eral cooperation with the United the southern Balkans to Italy. This nance and the rule of law—has been also provided valuable, direct bilat- States: the further development of project, which will be almost cer- an area of contention as well as ben- eral support to Kabul in its fight to Azerbaijan’s and the Caspian Ba- tainly fully operational by the time eficial cooperation. Rule of law is stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan sin’s crude oil and natural gas this issue goes to press, will deliver essential to attracting and keeping

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 24 25 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES foreign business and investment, to along with France and the Russian Eurasia, and in- expected costs making a country more competi- Federation, the United States was cludes new trans- By the end of 2020 and with terms tive internationally, and to helping charged with helping the parties portation infra- changes in the regional that translate into keep capital at home and encour- find a way forward. Frankly,- pa structure together Chinese control and broader internation- aging private enterprises’ establish- tience increasingly wore thin—both with other com- and ownership. ment and growth. Efforts against within the Azerbaijani public as well mercial and eco- al fabric underline the There have also corruption and having courts and as among figures in the country’s nomic activities, need for American and been instances a legal system where companies— leadership—over the years due to a often financed by Azerbaijani policymak- of heavy-handed foreign or domestic—can be as- lack of progress. Moreover, factors China and pri- ers to examine and re- Chinese political sured of fair recourse in a dispute such as Section 907 of the Freedom marily involving direct aspects of relations. engagement ac- are essential factors in business Support Act passed in 1992, which Chinese compa- companying BRI managers’ decisions on whether, sought to constrain U.S. assistance nies. For Beijing, projects. Moreover, and to what extent, to invest in a to Azerbaijan, raised questions of BRI represents a strategic means China has injected a military se- country. However, while there have Washington’s impartiality even for strengthening China’s influence curity dimension into how it has been positive exchanges on these though successive U.S. administra- and security by, for example, cir- engaged some countries in Central topics, matters of political prisoners tions used a subsequent amend- cumventing potential chokepoints Asia within the framework of BRI. and other pieces of Azerbaijan’s ment to waive its restrictions. such as the Strait of Malacca. The United States and other gov- democratic development have been ernments have become particularly contentious and colored the overall In some ways, BRI parallels and concerned and outspoken on the relationship on many occasions. Changes Are Necessary complements initiatives cham- dangers of such predatory lending pioned by the United States and and business practices, and there For Azerbaijanis, a strategic re- y the end of 2020 changes others to build a New Silk Road are instances in which countries’ lationship with the United States Bin the regional and broader for the purpose of reestablishing politicians and domestic popu- has been important in helping the international fabric—some were trans-Eurasian transportation and lations have opposed or demon- country navigate the region’s com- gradual, others appeared to be trade routes and with the intent strated against deals reached with plicated geopolitics, especially the sudden, tectonic shifts—under- to boost the economic activity Chinese entities. threats posed by some of Azerbai- line the need for American and and stability of, in particular, the jan’s neighbors. They have deeply Azerbaijani policymakers to ex- greater Caspian region. The new zerbaijan’s own successful valued cooperation on energy secu- amine and redirect aspects of road and rail links, for example, Afocus on developing its own rity matters and greater economic relations. can cut travel time for surface transport and communications in- and business ties. transport from Shanghai to western frastructure and furthering connec- One especially important change European commercial centers from tions with the rest of the Caspian However, what Azerbaijanis is China’s broadened, more active six weeks to a fortnight. region and beyond is a second im- wanted most from the United States engagement across Eurasia. China’s portant development. Connected was its understanding and support Belt and Road Initiative is the pri- However, as BRI moved forward with, yet separate from, China’s in the protracted conflict with Ar- mary, overarching framework for concerns arose that arrangements BRI, Azerbaijani efforts over the menia over Nagorno-Karabakh and increasing the network of con- for obtaining Chinese investment past decade have also yielded pos- the seven surrounding regions. As nections between China and East funds and other support could itive results in its relations with the one of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, Asia with the western portions of come with hidden or higher than United States.

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Especially noteworthy in this given the country’s growing popula- Azerbaijan. Then National Security if the U.S. strategy were to be fully regard has been the new port of tion and youth bulge, with perhaps Advisor John Bolton’s visit to the successful. The geographic realities Alat and its associated free trade two-thirds of the population born region in October 2018 underlined of the South Caucasus as the bridge industrial zone located about 75 in 1990 or the following years—a this point. The Trump Administra- to the region were not appropri- km south of Baku on the Caspian situation Azerbaijan shares with tion also continued American en- ately addressed. At the same time, Sea, as well as the construction of many others in the Caspian basin— gagement on energy matters, sup- Trump’s focus on drawing down in the new Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and the fact the hydrocarbon sector porting completion of the Southern Afghanistan and a general pullback that was inaugurated in October is highly capital intensive and em- Gas Corridor and seeing it as a of America’s international commit- 2017. Their realization, along de- ploys comparatively few workers. means to provide a broader range ments raised concerns over where velopments on the eastern side of Seeking to create around 200,000 of countries in the Balkans with the United States might be heading. the Caspian in Kazakhstan and jobs annually means encouraging needed natural gas and thus in- Human rights dropped off the Turkmenistan, advance the vision the fostering of new enterprises and creased energy and national se- agenda, except where the overall of a modern Silk Road and signifi- the growth of existing ones. curity. Moreover, the Trump context of bilateral relations was cantly help overcome the Caspian Administration strongly sup- worsening or difficult, e.g., in the region’s poor interconnectivity. To By completing these infrastruc- ported the project to build a Trans- case of statements over the treat- date, the Caspian region has been ture projects, Azerbaijan is shaping Caspian pipeline, which would ment of China’s Uighurs or abuses one of the least interconnected an environment that can create enable Turkmenistan to develop in Iran. Empty chairs in federal areas of the world, a factor holding and grow new productive activi- and sell its immense natural gas re- agencies made high-level contacts back its economic growth and ties as well as strengthen regional sources to Western consumers while more difficult and disrupted formu- prosperity. connectivity. These infrastructure also diversifying its slate of customers. lating policies and messaging. projects; the associated efforts to The Alat and related transpor- digitalize operations, eliminate reg- To its credit, the Trump tation infrastructure works are ulatory, and processing barriers; Administration developed and Recent Game-changers also key to the country’s efforts and the region’s economic expan- published a policy on Central to diversify its economy and to sion also mean opportunities for Asia—one of very few such policy wo especially important create industries and jobs. Another American manufacturers and s statements it produced. The doc- Tgame-changing develop- Azerbaijani-led project to boost re- ervices providers. ument focused on the five former ments in 2020 further altered regional connectivity is the laying of Soviet states east of the Caspian plus alities in the region as well as the a new fiber optic cable across the third factor changing the Afghanistan, with an eye on the framework of U.S.-Azerbaijan re- Caspian and the Caucasus that will Acontext of U.S.-Azerbaijan roles of Russia and China there lations. The first was the outbreak increase and strengthen Internet relations has been the overall tenor as well as having in mind the im- of the COVID-19 pandemic and and international telecommunica- of American foreign policy under portance of reaffirming American its social—and especially its eco- tions capacity across Eurasia. President Donald Trump. Although support for the independence, sov- nomic—impacts. The second was much less engaged in many as- ereignty, and territorial integrity of the renewed warfare between Reducing dependence on hydro- pects of international relations the countries of the region. Armenia and Azerbaijan that began carbon exports is a longstanding, than its predecessors, the Trump with a limited conflict in July 2020 necessary goal for Azerbaijan. Es- Administration’s focus on Iran and The document, however, failed and culminated in early November tablishing new companies and busi- its maximum pressure campaign to spell out the necessity for the with Azerbaijan retaking Shusha ness sectors are even more critical drew attention to the need to engage South Caucasus to be factored in and other territories Armenia had

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 28 29 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES occupied since the early 1990s, return to pre-coronavirus levels suggest global recovery from the ministers repeatedly engaged which resulted in a Moscow- at different times and at different virus remains some months out, Armenian and Azerbaijani coun- brokered armistice agreement with speeds. For Azerbaijan this situa- while its harmful social, economic, terparts, it was Russia—with Pres- Yerevan. tion may mean challenges resulting and health effects continue. Like ident Vladimir Putin’s direct in- from, say, Turkey recovering at other countries, Azerbaijan will volvement—that brokered the Moving across countries with one point and Russia at another. need to navigate this situation and November 10th statement that differing intensity and returning at Different countries recovering at make conscious policy decisions ending the fighting. different times, the COVID-19 pan- different paces will also have - im on how best to shape and rebuild demic has forced shutdowns and pacts on oil and natural gas mar- systems; post-coronavirus realities The November statement disrupted travel, trade, and supply kets—again with potential impacts will not simply snap back to what halted the kinetic conflict; left chains. The resulting global eco- for Azerbaijan and other hydro- they were before the onset of the Azerbaijan’s government in control nomic slowdown—which came on carbon exporters. Moreover, while COVID-19 pandemic. of the areas it had recaptured; and top of a fight between major oil ex- advanced industrialized economies provided for Armenia to vacate K porters Russia and Saudi Arabia— can draw on reserves or incur na- he final and most dramatic elbajar, Aghdam, and Lachin. How- produced substantial global sur- tional debt increases to institute Tfactor necessitating new ever, it also included provisions for pluses of crude oil as well as severe large fiscal stimulus programs to thinking regarding U.S.-Azerbaijan 1,960 Russian peacekeepers to be drops in oil prices for other pro- help their citizens and business relations is Azerbaijan’s successful present in the region for five years, ducers, including Azerbaijan. sectors, emerging and developing military campaign with a provision Countries instituted strict restric- country economies generally to regain con- In less than two months for them to remain tions on entry to control the virus’ lack such capacity. Furthermore, trol over most of for an additional spread. Trade and distribution emerging economies and devel- Nagorno-Kara- Azerbaijan achieved five years provided systems were disrupted worldwide oping countries may be hit with bakh and the sur- militarily much of what neither Armenia, and citizens working abroad found the need to repay or reschedule rounding terri- it had long sought diplo- Azerbaijan, nor themselves either unable to return international loan commitments tories Armenia matically for more than Russia oppose ex- home or to their jobs. At the same even as their economies remain occupied since the two decades. tension. In addi- time, health systems were severely in recession. A further reality is early 1990s. tion, Russia will strained, education was disrupted, that economic recovery will follow monitor the Lachin tourism dried up, and families suf- vaccines and medical advances in In less than two months corridor between Armenia and a fered income losses and other pres- treatment, enabling individuals Azerbaijan achieved militarily much portion of Nagorno-Karabakh that sures as necessary lockdowns were safely to resume their activities. of what it had long sought diplomat- falls within the Russian security instituted. At this writing, many of the vac- ically for more than two decades. It zone and previously occupied by cines that show promise require ul- pushed the Armenian forces out of Armenian troops. While almost every country extra-cold storage measures and two most of the territories surrounding pects to end 2020 with negative injections to be effective. Nagorno-Karabakh and regained The surface route between GDP growth numbers, the uneven control of much of Nagorno- Azerbaijan’s mainland and its nature of the pandemic’s impacts These factors, which in addition Karabakh itself. Although each of Nakhchivan exclave will also be re- and the differences in impact mean to costs and the logistics of pro- the heads of state of the three Minsk opened for the first time since 1992, countries will emerge from the duction and delivery to hundreds Group co-chair countries called but with Russian FSB personnel pandemic and their economies will of millions of people worldwide, for a ceasefire, and their foreign monitoring the four crossing points.

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United Nations agencies were are on Azerbaijani territory as changes in the region, the ma- irst, actively engage with charged with overseeing the return peacekeeping monitors while also turing and growing self-confidence FAzerbaijan in addressing of refugees and the internally dis- looking to be seen as guarantors of of Azerbaijan and other states that Russian, Chinese, and Iranian ambi- placed. Turkey, which sent F-16s Armenian security. emerged (or re-emerged) out of the tions. Azerbaijan’s geostrategic im- to Ganja following Armenia’s mis- Soviet Union thirty years ago, and portance remains great as does the sile attacks on the city and strongly Russian troops, as General Ben the range of contemporary issues country’s need to navigate the com- supported Azerbaijan diplomati- Hodges recently wrote, are now the world faces all require Wash- plications arising from bordering cally, was recognized as having a in all three countries of the South ington and Baku to reappraise how Russia and Iran, along with China’s presence in the headquarters of the Caucasus. For Armenia, the sit- they approach each other and es- push for trans-Eurasian transport, Russian monitoring mission. uation represents an unforeseen tablish a different tone in their bi- economic, and political linkages. defeat on the battlefield. Yerevan lateral dialogue. President Putin has frequently said The impacts of this Second will need not only to reappraise he sees Russia as having a privi- Karabakh War and the Russian- its situation but also to determine Given the nature of the U.S. pol- leged position or a special sphere brokered ceasefire are still emerging how best to ensure its long-term icymaking apparatus, these reap- of influence over the former Soviet and various necessary follow-up security. Finally, Turkey showed praisals on the Washington end in space, a claim the United States has arrangements are being worked both a willingness and the ability the context of the incoming Biden continued to reject as it fosters the out. However, some points have al- to advance its own interests in the Administration will most likely take independence, sovereignty, territo- ready become apparent. One is that South Caucasus, strengthening its place within the interagency frame- rial integrity, and prosperity of the Azerbaijan showed effective mil- image as a rising regional power to work of broader strategic analyses states of the Caspian region and itary planning and warfare capa- be taken into account. of, say, Russia or Asia, although elsewhere that were once part of bilities. Azerbaijanis were also able some bilateral recalibration may the Soviet Union. Contemporary to reassert sovereignty and control take place in specific Azerbaijan- or Russian ambitions on this front, over portions of its territory that Five Points of Reappraisal Caucasus-focused discussions. however, include utilizing pro- Armenia-backed forces had occu- tracted and other conflicts to ad- pied since the early 1990s. Another iven these changes as well A reappraised bilateral relation- vance its stature and influence. is that once again Russia showed Gas their long-term interests, ship should—at least from a U.S. China, which is challenging it is not afraid to capitalize on op- Azerbaijani and American officials point of view—include at least the freedom of navigation and other portunities to take an assertive role need to reevaluate and recalibrate following five points: actively -en long-standing U.S. interests in the and to show itself an influential both what they say to each other gage with Azerbaijan in addressing Pacific, is pursuing an ambitious actor on the global and how they say Russian, Chinese, and Iranian agenda to its west that aims at stage. Azerbaijan it. Again, each ambitions; build peace between boosting its prosperity and global was long proud Azerbaijani and Amer- country has long- Armenia and Azerbaijan; harness stature. Iran’s nuclear program, of the fact that, standing interests Azerbaijan’s capacity to serve as support for terrorism, and his- unlike others in ican officials need to -re that remain valid a key to greater regional connec- tory of meddling in Syria, Yemen, the former Soviet evaluate and recalibrate and sit at the core tivity; build on years of coopera- Iraq, and elsewhere mean it will space, there were both what they say to of their respective tion on energy matters; and address be a continued challenge to inter- no foreign troops each other and how they national security governance concerns through more national stability and security. As on its soil; now say it. and foreign pol- effective dialogue. Each will be ex- we have seen, Azerbaijan’s location Russian troops icies. However, amined in turn. and interactions with each of these

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 32 33 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES players makes it a key piece in a calls, congratulatory messages, and will want to utilize and benefit from the investment and other economic broader puzzle for constructively high-level visits between Moscow further animosity between Armenia engagement that will be needed. dealing with these geopolitical re- and Baku—and between Moscow and Azerbaijan, as it has with other The incoming Biden Administra- alities. and other capitals—pay off in terms protracted conflicts. tion should assume a substantial of increased influence. Washington role, engaging Armenians and Besides appreciating Azerbaijan’s has been comparatively stingy in It is important that the United Azerbaijanis to solicit their input stability as an important asset in terms of such contacts. However, States and other countries ac- and buy-in in moving forward to advancing U.S. interests in the COVID-19 has shown effective tively engage both Armenia and realize an effective, and greatly Caucasus and Central Asia and also conversations can take place elec- Azerbaijan to help them build real needed peace-building process. to keep the region from becoming tronically. Yes, there are security peace. Emotions are high on both an arc of crisis, the United States concerns, but 2020 proved offi- sides, but for the good of both coun- hird, focus on Azerbaijan should continue to help Azerbaijan cials can engage comfortably and tries Yerevan and Baku will need to Tas a key to greater regional act as a needed partner in fighting with needed effect using electronic find ways to live together in peace, connectivity. America’s Central international drug trafficking, traf- media. These conversations should security, and prosperity. It will not Asia strategy document restates ficking in persons, and other mul- not just focus on bilateral issues, be easy, but it can be done. After all, U.S. interests in the region’s devel- tilateral threats. This cooperation but should also look at informa- there was no guarantee in 1945 that opment and prosperity, which in- must include combatting the prolif- tion-sharing and advancing en- there would not be another Fran- cludes encouraging connectivity in eration of weapons of mass destruc- gagement on broader regional and co-German war and it is well worth Central Asia and between Central tion, a program which has been multilateral issues for a number of noting that any list of close, strong Asia and Afghanistan. The United highly successful. While there may good reasons, including the fact U.S. allies includes countries like States has also supported the Three be calls at home to cut back on U.S. that Azerbaijan currently chairs the the United Kingdom, Germany, Seas Initiative to facilitate inter- security cooperation—which has Non-Aligned Movement. For ex- Italy, and Japan—each of which connectivity on energy, infrastruc- long included America’s refusal to ample, Azerbaijan could be useful fought bloody, vicious wars against ture, and digitalization projects in supply military support that could in developing a new relationship the United States in the past. Central and Eastern Europe, seeing be used in a war with Armenia— with America’s key NATO ally and it as a way to reduce these coun- pulling back on security cooper- growing regional player Turkey. The United States has consider- tries’ dependence on Russian and ation in areas where Azerbaijan able experience, capabilities, and Chinese economic overtures. More- is a needed partner would be a econd, build peace between expertise in peace-building around over, the United States has long en- mistake. SArmenia and Azerbaijan. The the world. Americans should bring couraged the Lapis Lazuli corridor November statement halting the ki- these resources to bear in working to expand Afghanistan’s trade and The incoming Biden Administra- netic conflict between Armenia and with both Armenia and Azerbaijan other links with the west as well as tion should also boost direct con- Azerbaijan is silent on the future of in finding ways to rebuild under- construction of a Trans-Caspian tacts between Washington officials Nagorno-Karabakh. Although the standing, live together peacefully, pipeline to enable Turkmenistan and Azerbaijani partners at all rel- armistice ends the fighting, it does and shape a future that benefits to expand the range of customers evant levels. Russia and others have not establish peace. Moreover, in both peoples. Moreover, America for its natural gas and also to boost often bested American diplomacy addition to concerns that Arme- has the capacity to convoke inter- further European energy security. in the frequency, intensity, and ef- nian anger over its defeat will lead national meetings to engage other A land bridge across the South fectiveness of direct contacts be- to revanchism and future conflict, countries in the peace-building ef- Caucasus is crucial for the success tween capitals. The frequent phone there is also the sense that Russia fort, including to help encourage of each of these projects.

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The United States should en- reasons, the United States should needed, cleaner energy source. The and examples of predatory business gage Azerbaijan more vigorously be sitting down with Azerbaijan latter, in particular, is seen as a tran- practices, in the past few years the in boosting such interconnectivity. and discussing efforts to boost sition fuel for electricity generation United States reenergized agencies In addition to the realities resulting interconnectivity. as well as feedstock for needed such as the Export-Import Bank from Azerbaijan’s geographic po- chemical products. (EXIM) and created the new De- sition, there is also the fact that ourth, build on years of co- velopment Finance Agency (DFC). Azerbaijan takes the initiative in Foperation of energy matters, In other words, a transition will These agencies should keep a focus on building such interconnections. including to foster stronger U.S.- take place, but not overnight. The Azerbaijan and others in the region. The further expansion of the new Azerbaijan business and economic United States will almost certainly port at Alat is one example. An- ties. Strong U.S.-Azerbaijan com- continue to look to Azerbaijan as A further area for bilateral en- other is Azerbaijan’s engagement munication and cooperation in the a source for diversified, secure engagement is supporting economic with Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, energy sector—and the important ergy for Italy, Turkey, the Balkans, reforms. Reforms in Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan in building the contributions to energy and re- and others, even if this topic is not based on sound free-market prin- needed infrastructure and systems gional security they have pro- the headliner it was in previous ciples, remain essential for diver- that are key to boosting the inter- duced—should be broadened into years. Moreover, another Russian sifying the country’s economy; connection the United States ad- a more vibrant and mutually bene- move to cut off Ukraine or others fostering innovation and the estab- vocates and that the region’s pros- ficial set of economic and business could quickly catapult European lishment and growth of new busi- perity and stability need. relationships. Strong business ties energy diversification and security nesses; and enabling Azerbaijani not only promote prosperity, they back into the forefront of regional businesses to attract capital in an Moreover, the focus on intercon- also produce constituencies in each and global diplomatic and security increasingly competitive global fi- nectivity includes digitalization country interested in and looking discussions. nancial environment and market- and expanding communications to further build stronger bilateral place. American and other poten- and internet links. Azerbaijan has relations. The growing populations of the tial foreign business partners will worked with Kazakhstan and seeks Caucasus and Central Asia, these be watching Azerbaijan’s efforts to to work with Georgia to realize a Even as much of the discussions countries’ mineral and other re- fight corruption, strengthen the Trans-Caspian fiberoptic cable that in international fora, government sources, and the development of integrity and fairness of its courts would connect to Germany as well agencies, and various think tanks the region’s economies all mean and legal environment, and how as China. This would improve con- focus on climate change and the commercial and other economic it looks to reshape and strengthen nectivity globally as well as within need to reduce greenhouse gas opportunities. Washington has had its economy as it emerges from the the region. The fact that Azerbaijan emissions, Azerbaijan’s oil and nat- a history of good bilateral discus- COVID-19 pandemic with the eco- used its hydrocarbon dividends ural gas reserves will remain im- sions with Azerbaijan on economic nomic contraction it has induced, rather than turning to China for portant to Israel, much of Europe, and business matters, including on and brings into motion plans to re- financing—as others in the region and other regions home to U.S. al- what is needed to build a stronger, build its newly-liberated territories. have done—is also noteworthy. lies and partners. Action to address more attractive commercial envi- climate change is crucial, but at ronment. Those talks should con- inally, address governance Each of the aforementioned proj- the same time, the world will continue, but with heightened direct Fconcerns through more ef- ects present commercial opportu- tinue to depend on oil and oil-de- input from the business community fective dialogue. It is premature to nities for U.S. firms. Thus, for com- rived products in the coming years and other stakeholders. Sparked by speculate in much detail on the mercial as well as foreign policy as well as look to natural gas as a concerns over Chinese intentions new administration’s foreign policy,

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 36 37 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES but U.S. experts generally agree that COVID-19 pandemic, the Second the Biden Administration will again Karabakh War, and the need to ad- have a strong focus on human rights dress the new situation in the South and democratic development. The Caucasus—make this a time ripe President-elect, for example, has for both re-evaluation and deliber- already talked about a democracy ation on new ways for the United summit, with more initiatives likely States and Azerbaijan to engage. to follow. For the United States, this re- The human rights component of view will probably take place in the bilateral relationship does not the course of examination of the have to be handled as it was in the numerous broad challenges the past; rather, both Baku and Wash- Biden Administration will need to ington should learn from that ex- address. However, even without a perience. Each side knows where specific U.S.-Azerbaijan policy re- the problems lie. As in other areas view, U.S. officials should step back, of effective bilateral engagement, look at where relations stand, and quiet and reasoned discussions, consider how we can better engage ADA UNIVERSITY in which each side shows respect one another. for the other, have had—and will have—greater beneficial impacts Baku, too, should use this mo- PROGRAMS than “naming and shaming” or ment to revise how it engages with “billboard diplomacy.” the United States, including in light of recent developments and extant challenges in its region. Better Engagement UNDERGRADUATE PROGRAMS GRADUATE PROGRAMS Both sides could also use this • Business Administration • Business Administration, MBA • Economics • Business Administration, MBA in Finance or the United States, a presi- moment to identify some long- • Finance (dual degree with MGIMO University, Russian Federation) Fdential transition traditionally standing matters of little strategic • Computer Engineering • Computer Science & Data Analytics, represents an opportunity to re-ex- importance and sweep them out of • Computer Science Master of Science (dual degree with GW University, USA) • Information Technology amine issues, review priorities, and the way. Doing so would allow each • Diplomacy and International Affairs • International Studies design new approaches. Events— to concentrate on matters where • Public Administration • Communication and Digital Media • Education Management ranging from the challenges to the cooperation can considerably ad- • Public Affairs • Teaching and Learning rules-based international system vance both countries’ interests in • Law and the revived competition among ensuring stability, prosperity, and a some key global actors to the peaceful, secure region. BD Undergraduate students wishing to pursue a second career track may do so by taking a set of courses predefined by programs across the university.

of frustration not only among the subsequent General Assembly While You Were Sleeping Azerbaijani leadership, but also for resolution (62/243) calling for ordinary citizens in the country. Armenian forces to withdraw were I personally bore witness to these relegated to nothing more than Winds of Change in the South rising emotions while serving as empty words on paper. the Turkish Ambassador in Baku Caucasus for four years, between 2012-2016. This stark contrast cast a shadow Regrettably, this understandable on what should have been the uni- resentment never caught enough form application of international Alper Coşkun attention in international eyes. law, and, by extension, undermined confidence in the notion of a just he flaring up of active focused mostly on the timing of the In practice, all efforts, including international order. Moreover, this combat in the Southern events and the broader geopolitical those of the OSCE Minsk Group suboptimal situation did not sit Caucasus in late Sep- dynamics, they failed to notice that Co-chairs, mostly comfortably for an temberT 2020 between Azerbaijan the crux of the matter lay elsewhere. prioritized the increasingly aspi- and Armenia initially seemed to “management” of The clock in Nagorno- rant and self-con- catch many by surprise. An im- The clock in Nagorno-Karabakh the conflict, and fident Azerbaijan, mediate upside of this turn of had, in essence, been ticking in- thus fell far short of Karabakh had, in essence, justifiably yearning events was seen in the rekindled creasingly loudly for some time, and facilitating a just, been ticking increasingly to liberate its occu- interest it generated in the three for good reason. This unfortunately durable solution. loudly for some time, and pied lands. Mean- decade-old conflict in and around went unnoticed. The convenience This greatly un- for good reason. while, challenges Nagorno-Karabakh, which was of a mistakenly reassuring assump- dermined trust in emanating from often misleadingly labeled as being tion that this was a “conflict on ice” the mediation pro- the Armenian side “frozen.” It also acted as a crude re- was consequently shaken up as a cess which, as was often stated by in the context of this dispute were minder of the need for consistency new reality dawned on those who President Ilham Aliyev, “had led to left unaddressed. It was clear that, in advocating respect for a rules- were not paying sufficient atten- nowhere.” as things stood, Yerevan believed it based international order. tion, in the form of active combat held the initiative and did not feel between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In fact, the perpetual lack of prog- the urge to work constructively to- Numerous analysts and experts ress through negotiations bolstered ward a peaceful and lasting solution old and new scrambled to explain he continuing occupation of the perception that the opportu- on the basis of established norms the reasons behind the military TAzerbaijani territories and nistic use of force by Armenia in and principles of international law. escalation, seemingly driven by a the consequential plight of one mil- the early 1990s that resulted in its quest to identify the culprit or the lion displaced civilians has been occupation not only of Nagorno- his stalemate had been tradi- perceived instigators. While they a longstanding simmering sense Karabakh, but also of adjoining Ttionally further burdened by Azerbaijani territories, had yielded the fact that Armenia is beholden concrete results for Yerevan. As a to a self-inflicted entrapment, - so Alper Coşkun is a career Turkish diplomat who served as Ambassador to Azerbai- corollary to this argument, four lidified through a strict national- jan (2012-2016) prior to becoming Director General for International Security at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016-2019). The opinions expressed in this essay UN Security Council resolutions istic narrative both on this issue are those of the author and are not of official nature. (822, 853, 874, and 884), as well as a and more broadly in relation to

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Azerbaijan and Turkey. The into Azerbaijan. Among other ad- he reasons behind Pashin- Rules-based International Armenian mindset, prevailing po- venturist implications, this was Tyan’s hardening stance are litical discourse, and the defining a clear rejection of the Madrid probably multifold and can be at- Order? sentiments of its influential dias- Principles developed under the aus- tributed, among other things, to his pora are all heavily tainted in this pices of the OSCE Minsk Group, reading of political realities within theme of growing interest for regard and as time has shown, and mirrored Pashinyan’s attitude Armenia, as well as to overbearing Ascholars of international re- Prime Minister Nicol Pashinyan is on the matter. pressure from the Armenian dias- lations has for some time now been no exception. pora. For an unorthodox political related to the notion of a rules- The increasingly radical mes- actor like Pashinyan, lacking a tra- based order, both with respect to its Despite the fact that when he first saging from Pashinyan (and his ditional, hardcore base to confi- nature and the perceived challenges assumed office on a popular tide team) came to exceed even those dently rely on, it is quite possible affecting it. Pashinyan was heralded as a po- of his hardline predecessors and that the obligation to revert to a na- tential breath of fresh air in com- was ultimately seen in Baku as tionalistic and unrelenting rhetoric A Hobbesian international secu- parison to the traditionally intran- a clear sign that Armenia had was the only path to political sur- rity landscape is certainly not some- sigent “Karabakh clan,” he too did crossed the Rubicon. This tar- vival—or so, Pashinyan thought. thing to which one should aspire, not tarry in joining nished what were given the risks and challenges that rule-less competition and a poten- the same national- The armistice was noth- at best modest Irrespective of the reasons, istic bandwagon. expectations in though, as time has shown, his in- tial state of endless confrontation He manifested this ing less than a decisive Azerbaijan that flammatory discourse accompanied could inflict upon even the stron- vividly through ir- capitulation of Armenia Pashinyan could by occasional acts of military esca- gest of state actors. Therefore, while redentist rhetoric that marked the begin- in fact turn out lation proved to be a fateful miscal- its contours may vary, the premise toward Turkey, as ning of a new geostrate- to be a respon- culation. It eventually created the of the need for a rules-based order, well as by advo- gic chapter in the South sible partner on conditions under which Azerbaijan as well as the logic of defending it, are sound and clear. cating the recogni- Caucasus the road to peace. was able to take the initiative and tion of Nagorno- It severely under- level the playing field for the first Karabakh as an mined any hope time in the history of the Karabakh But the sustainability of any such independent entity. He went even that the conflict could be- re conflict. In a matter of six weeks, endeavor hinges first and foremost further during a visit to Khankendi solved through negotiations. Azerbaijan was able to reclaim most on the uniform application of its (Stepanakert) in August 2019, Azerbaijani indignation was evident of its occupied territories and oblige basic principles. It is incumbent where he notoriously declared, in the words again of President Armenia to agree to a cessation of upon responsible state actors to ad- “Nagorno Karabakh is Armenian. Aliyev during the first days of the hostilities, mostly on Baku’s terms. vocate and uphold these principles Period.” Meanwhile, his equally Second Karabakh War, when in an The ensuing armistice that the par- without exception, and to do so in unconscionable (now former) de- address to the nation, he reminded ties signed together with Russia was each specific context, in a standard fense minister outlined the updated listeners of Pashinyan’s provoc- nothing less than a decisive capitu- and balanced manner. Armenian strategic doctrine as ative declaration in Khankendi lation of Armenia that marked the “new war, for new territories,” os- and after citing the territories lib- beginning of a new geostrategic The steadfast support that the tensibly aimed at ridding Armenia erated by Azerbaijani forces at the chapter in the South Caucasus, and international community over- of a constant state of defense and time, went on to meaningfully ask, one in which Armenia seems to be whelmingly provides to Georgia projecting military action further “Where is Pashinyan now?” lacking in leverage. and Ukraine, for example, by

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 42 43 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES unequivocally standing up for their and the ensuing need to restore at NATO Headquarters with Indeed, experience has shown territorial integrity and sovereignty its territorial integrity by ending Secretary General Jens Stolten- that in the absence of a strong po- has been consistent, correct, and the ongoing occupation. This con- berg at the height of the conflict. litical dynamic guided by the re- meaningful. It serves as a perfect tinued to be the case in the run up In his assessment of the situation, quirements of international law example of how the international to the outbreak of hostilities in late Sarkissian squarely blamed Turkey and aimed at achieving a just and community at large can and should September 2020. and then went on to enthusiasti- lasting solution, fragile cease-fire stand united in the face of egregious cally endorse the idea that there attempts between Azerbaijan and violations of international law. f course, as experts often could be no military solution to Armenia have at best deferred the Turkey has been at the forefront Orightfully point out, finding the problem. This was quite an act, problem. They have in most cases of these efforts in both cases and a mutually acceptable solution to given the fact that been short-lived, as has energetically displayed its sol- this complex issue through negoti- Armenia itself is we witnessed again idarity with both Tbilisi and Kyiv, ations has proven to be easier said the recognized cul- The need to end the oc- during this latest including through enhanced bi- than done. This objective reality prit for the occupa- cupation of Azerbaijani phase of the con- lateral cooperation and unwavering has plagued the Minsk Process, as tion of Azerbaijani territories and to restore flict, where three support for their Euro-Atlantic in- a result of which the conflict passed territories through such futile ceasefire tegration aspirations. the thirty-year mark with no visible the unlawful use its internationally rec- attempts were all inertia toward a solution. of force in the first ognized territorial in- promptly broken Azerbaijan, on the other hand, place. The same el- tegrity has always been by Armenia and has faced a different reality as far It is against such a backdrop that ement of irony was paramount immediately ren- as the degree of international sup- the Second Karabakh War began evident in asser- dered meaningless. port to its territorial integrity is and where Turkey, traditionally an tions that Turkey concerned, with Turkey’s unwav- outspoken advocate for Azerbaijan, is biased due to its kinship with It has always been clear in ering position being the exception. was seen to be even more vocal in its Azerbaijan, that at the same time Ankara’s view that if any peace- And this despite four UN Security support for Azerbaijan’s legitimate conveniently overlooked the special oriented attempt is to be durable Council resolutions dating back aspiration to end the occupation interests and affinity that Russia, and successful, it cannot afford the to the early 1990s wherein, among without further delay. The nature France, and the United States enjoy luxury of complacency in calling other things, the occupation of and degree of Turkey’s support was with Armenia. for the enforcement of relevant UN Azerbaijani territories had been immediately put under intense scru- Security Council resolutions. In identified as a source of - con tiny, accompanied by a clear effort on hat said, even if, for argu- other words, the need to end the oc- cern and calls had been made the part of Armenia and some other Tment’s sake, one were to cupation of Azerbaijani territories for the immediate evacuation of actors to depict a concocted version single Turkey out and debate its and to restore its internationally Armenian forces, with responsi- of Turkey’s involvement. Ironically, eligibility as an honest broker, it recognized territorial integrity has bility attributed to Armenia, and these targeted efforts at times inad- has always been difficult to chal- always been paramount. The inter- open support voiced for the territo- vertently unveiled flagrant inconsis- lenge Ankara’s longstanding insis- national community, and most no- rial integrity of Azerbaijan. The fact tencies in other quarters. tence on the need for meaningful tably the Co-chairs (and members) of the matter is that it has mostly action to end the occupation of of the OSCE Minsk Group, carried fallen upon Azerbaijan to remind A clear case in point was Azerbaijani territories on the basis the moral and practical burden the international community of Armenian President Armen of relevant UN Security Council of taking a clear stance on the this historically important legacy, Sarkissian’s press conference resolutions. matter. It was up to them to make

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 44 45 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES it known beyond any doubt that the Having been directly involved choice but is rather the outcome of In their joint effort to develop forceful and illegal occupation of in the diversification and overall natural and mutually felt grassroot their engagement in all fields, Azerbaijani lands could not stand, deepening of bilateral relations be- sentiments. Bilateral cooperation Ankara and Baku have also focused much in the same way that the in- tween the two countries, I found between the two countries have on enhancing their military and de- ternational community had over- this to be a belated revelation, and steadily been improving on the fense industry cooperation, as re- whelmingly done in the cases of one that I could only attribute to basis of such a unique foundation cent events have promptly brought Georgia and Ukraine. In the absence a lack of attention to critically im- ever since Turkey became the first under the limelight. With its strong of such international push-back, portant historical realities, as well country to recognize modern-day credentials as a capable NATO ally, Armenia grew comfortable with the as to prevailing trends in Turkish- Azerbaijan in 1991. Turkey has from the outset volun- prevailing circumstances, whereby Azerbaijani relations. teered its support to Azerbaijan’s it believed to hold an advantage. uring Azerbaijan’s fledgling military modernization efforts This false sense of achievement, One must remember first Dfirst years of independence and to its participation in NATO’s which has always been nurtured that Azerbaijan is the eternal in the early 1990s, partnership activ- by the Armenian leadership, cap- resting place for more than 1100 Turkey naturally ities. This coop- tivated the Armenian population Turkish servicemen. These sol- pulled most of the The sense of unqualified eration has been at large. The utter sense of dis- diers made the ultimate sacrifice weight in terms of and absolute solidarity comprehensive, belief and anger that was seen while helping their kinsmen in investments and between Azerbaijan and ranging from facil- in the streets of Yerevan after their quest for independence in initiatives geared Turkey is not the simple itating Azerbaijan’s Armenia conceded to the armi- 1918. Their cemeteries, scattered to developing these function of a political contributions to stice and agreed to withdraw all over the country, including relations. But this NATO operations from the remaining occupied in Nakhchivan, serve as a testa- changed over time choice but is rather the and missions to Azerbaijani territories was in ment to the eternal bond that tie as Azerbaijan con- outcome of natural and enhancing the in- many ways a function of this Azerbaijan and Turkey together, solidated its inde- mutually felt grassroot teroperability of its mindset. Pashinyan, it seems, had as reflected in the often-quoted pendence, accu- sentiments. forces with those of also been swept away by this al- dictum, “two nations, but one mulated wealth, Allied nations. ternative reality that led him into people.” And this legacy goes both and grew in eco- grave miscalculations. ways, in view of similar sacrifices nomic strength. So much so that An important dimension has and displays of support made by today Azerbaijan stands among had to do with enhanced training Azerbaijanis during Turkey’s de- the top ten leading sources of for- and exercise activities that have Two States, One Nation fense of the Dardanelles in 1915 eign direct investments in Turkey. served to create a new and more as well as its war of liberation in For its part, Turkey is the leading capable defense and warfighting he Second Karabakh War the aftermath of World War I that foreign investor in Azerbaijan. culture within the Azerbaijani Ttriggered a great amount of led to the birth of the modern day armed forces. Joint exercises in dif- interest, accompanied by a near Republic of Turkey. Meanwhile, transborder trans- ferent formations and locations in sense of surprise in some circles portation and energy schemes, both countries have arguably con- about the enhanced degree of bilat- The sense of unqualified and which also involve Georgia, have stituted the most salient aspect of eral military and defense industry absolute solidarity between successfully been implemented and Turkish-Azerbaijani engagement, cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan and Turkey is not are operational with potential for attracting attention in Yerevan Azerbaijan. the simple function of a political future growth. and beyond. The spread of the

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COVID-19 virus has posed a chal- time now, and to be prepared for authorities in Baku and Ankara are Karabakh, Turkey has been sensitive lenge to the intensity of these ac- a worst case scenario. The active equally satisfied with the mutually to their potential implications for tivities but has not prevented them combat operations that took place rewarding nature of their coopera- Nakhchivan. This was again ev- from being continued. in 2016, as well as the more recent tion and can be expected to further ident in the prompt reaction clashes in July 2020, were in many deepen it in the years ahead. Ankara showed to an Armenian at- Meanwhile, concurrent advance- ways manifestations of the slippery tack on the settlement of Ordubad in ments in Turkey’s indigenous de- slope this so-called “frozen con- Nakhchivan in mid-October 2020. fense industry capabilities came at flict” rested on, and, in hindsight, Nakhchivan an opportune time for Azerbaijan were clear precursors of what was As an autonomous republic in helping meet its growing appetite to come. aps say a lot when it comes that is an integral part of, to procure state-of-the-art military Mto geostrategic realities and yet geographically separated hardware. While among numerous The nature and depth of the mil- a quick glance at Nakhchivan’s lo- from, the rest of Azerbaijan, procurers, Israel itary and defense cation clearly shows its importance Nakhchivan constitutes the only has been credited industry coop- for Turkey as well as, obviously, for land border between Turkey with the highest Experiences in the opera- eration between Azerbaijan. It also displays the ad- and Azerbaijan. This makes volume of military tional domain during the Azerbaijan and ditional challenge it most probably it politically and strategically sales to Azerbaijan Second Karabakh War Turkey, which is constitutes for Yerevan in terms of important for both sides. in recent years, suggest that Azerbaijan being scrutinized military planning and strategy. even surpassing has been able to capital- with intensity Under the terms of the armi- those from Russia, ize on its quest to mod- today, is neither Nakhchivan has historically been stice, Armenia has committed Turkey has steadily a new paradigm, referred to as “the path to the Turkic to enabling transport links be- matured into a ernize its military capa- nor is it a sudden world,” which is why the rupture of tween Nakhchivan and the rest of competitive and bilities, including through outcome. It can be continuity between this autonomous Azerbaijan. This is a milestone de- maybe most im- intensified collaboration better explained republic and the rest of Azerbaijan velopment that will serve not only portantly, reliable with Turkey. and understood during Soviet times has always been the interests of Azerbaijan and supply source. in the context of a the source of considerable debate Turkey, but also bears the real po- long-term strategic among strategists and scholars. tential of contributing to regional xperiences in the opera- vision shared by Baku and Ankara prosperity and well-being by Etional domain during the that represents linear growth in Another reason that makes stimulating economic and com- Second Karabakh War suggest that collaboration. A striking charac- Nakhchivan unique is the fact that in mercial activity. Azerbaijan has been able to cap- terization of its current state of the past Turkey has been associated italize on its quest to modernize play has been made by military with the status of the autonomous re- its military capabilities, including analyst and expert Can Kasapoglu, public, by virtue of various interna- Time for Sustainable Peace through intensified collaboration who aptly recoined the traditional tional instruments which have also with Turkey. The absence of in- dictum defining the relationship defined the eastern borders of Turkey. he November 2020 armi- ertia in the mediation process, cou- between Azerbaijan and Turkey in Tstice marks the end of an pled with escalatory trends with this context as “two states, but one It is against this background anomaly: the illegal occupation of Armenia, seem to have been driving smart power.” It is clear from state- that ever since the onset of hos- Azerbaijani territories is fast be- Baku to plan for the worst for some ments coming from both sides that tilities in and around Nagorno- coming a thing of the past.

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While the way ahead is fraught well. He went on to highlight the im- with numerous challenges, the focus portance of the opening of transport now needs to be on consolidating corridors which would be of rele- the opportunity for a peaceful and vance for all countries of the region, stable future for all. This process will including Armenia. need to be consistent with the requirements of international law and negotiated, peaceful, and be guided by a proper mindset that Alasting solution is the right aspires for a new and mutually bene- way to end the prevailing history of ficial state of affairs in the region. conflict and humanitarian suffering in the region. This prospect, along The South Caucasus holds an with the need to uphold universally untapped potential for regional co- recognized norms and rules, re- operation schemes. These could in quires energetic action on the part turn enhance interconnectivity and of the international community. catalyze a shared sense of interest in continued stability in the region. The basic parameters of such a sus- Azerbaijan and Georgia have made tainable solution will have to meet the great strides in this regard through requirements of international law, as cooperation involving Turkey. Under reflected in the relevant UN Security the right conditions, the same can Council resolutions and further elabo- hold true for Armenia, which could rated within the context of the negoti- in turn help its embattled leader- ation process under the auspices of the ship address the many challenges Co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. burdening the country’s economic Now is the time to seize the moment livelihood. and find an honorable and mutually-acceptable solution. Importantly, this is a prospect that has not been ruled out by Baku or Such an occurrence could po- Ankara. During a press conference in tentially set in motion a broader Baku a few days after the signing of positive momentum in the South the armistice, Turkish foreign min- Caucasus. This is not destined to ister Mevlüt Çavuşoglu stated that remain a lofty dream that is- be the process that had been put in mo- yond reach. All difficulties notwith- tion for lasting peace on the basis of standing, the fact is that seemingly un- Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity attainable goals can only be reached under international law will help re- through visionary persistence, and by store peace and stability in the region, aspiring towards them with a sense and benefit the people of Armenia as of realistic determination. BD

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vis-à-vis the Second Karabakh War Economic cooperation supports Special, Exceptional, and and show how it exemplifies the ex- significantly the foreign policy ceptional and still deepening level priorities of both countries. They of strategic cooperation between should therefore not be understood Privileged Ankara and Baku. as a mere trade and investment relations, but as a constituent part of Azerbaijani-Turkish Relations he Azerbaijan-Turkey bi- a common, forward-looking vision Tlateral relationship is im- to connect future generations. portant, perhaps crucial, for se- Ayça Ergun curing stability and security in the Thus, their emotional and histor- South Caucasus. It is based on mu- ical bonds correspond seamlessly to tual trust and relies their shared secu- he bilateral relationship described minutes later as having on mutual inter- rity and economic between Azerbaijan and “reached the level of alliance.” dependence. The A strong pattern of interests. This in Turkey is special, excep- mutuality in both friendship, fraternity, fact goes beyond tional,T and privileged. Both coun- In this essay I will analyze the support and soli- interests: Turkey brotherhood, and unity tries assign the highest value and nature of the multifaceted bilateral darity that the two and Azerbaijan importance to their relationship at relationship between Azerbaijan countries extend to characterizes the bilateral have common de- both the state and non-state level. and Turkey while focusing on the one another is un- relationship velopment and se- The motto “one nation, two states” content, quality, and meaning at- conditional. curity agendas. has been used quite frequently in tributed to this special partner- this context, and it rings true. First ship. I will start by identifying the This strategic relationship also or Azerbaijan, the image of pronounced by Heydar Aliyev, it is sources of the bilateral relationship has a significant economic dimen- FTurkey is well-rooted in his- frequently used by the political and and continue with a discussion of its sion, particularly in the field of torical memory. Atatürk famously intellectual elites of both countries political contours. I will then follow energy and transportation, which said, “Azerbaijan’s joy is our joy; and strongly supported by the public up with an examination of the state continues to provide both coun- its sorrow is our sorrow.” And in in both nations. A strong pattern of of inter-societal dialogue and level tries with opportunities to get the immediate post-Soviet period, friendship, fraternity, brotherhood, of cooperation in culture and edu- well-integrated into wider networks two cornerstone decisions taken and unity characterizes the bilat- cation. Next, I will turn to an ex- of economic relations through by Ankara at the time continue eral relationship, which presidents amination of the only period of tur- projects such as the Baku-Tbili- to resonate particularly well in Recep Tayyip Erdogan defined in bulence in the relationship, which si-Ceyhan pipeline and the Trans- Baku, at both elite and popular September 2010 as that between was caused by Turkey’s ultimately Anatolian gas pipeline as well as the levels: first, Turkey was the first “two fraternal countries bound to- unsuccessful outreach to Armenia Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line. In- country to recognize the mod- gether by bonds unseen elsewhere more than a decade ago. Finally, vestments in both directions have ern-day independence of Azer- in the world” and Ilham Aliyev I will explore Turkey’s position also been strong and are growing. baijan; second, Ankara’s refusal This creates a mutual dependence to build-up diplomatic relations in both countries for the represen- with Yerevan until the Karabakh Ayça Ergun is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Middle East Technical University tation of economic interests and conflict is resolved to Baku’s sat- (METU) and Vice-chairperson of the Center For Black Sea and Central Asia (KORA). profit maximization. isfaction. This was soon followed

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 52 53 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES by Turkey’s support to Azerbaijan through official visits, the signing Although one cannot deny the ve- from the latter’s perspective. Turks, in both regional and international of agreements, and the provision racity of shared cultural patterns on the other hand, without nec- fora and organizations. of continuous mutual support in and the mutual intelligibility of the essarily having substantial infor- all contexts: bilateral, regional, or dialects spoken by the two peo- mation, consider language as the For Turkey, the collapse of the multilateral; political, security, or ples, the underlying factors high- main proof of common ancestry. Soviet Union opened up the way socio-economic. lighting these commonalities are to In this respect, both countries’ to determine new foreign policy some extent constructed (but not perceptions are at once authentic priorities, formulate new policies, Patterns of cooperation coupled imagined). and constructed—although loaded and develop new tools vis-à-vis the with large doses of strategic good- with meaning—in the aftermath Turkic world to its east. Through will dominated the immediate Both communities did not in- of the collapse of the Soviet Union. the rediscovery of commonali- post-Soviet period. By the time teract at all during the Soviet period Memory is there, preserved and ties—particularly Azerbaijan was (from the early 1920s to the late revived, and has resulted in shared in culture and lan- For Turkey, the collapse of able to consolidate 1980s). As a consequence, both the feelings, real bonds, and strategic guage—between its statehood and perception and the image each has depth. two close nations the Soviet Union opened sovereignty, this of the other is not the product of an that had been al- up the way to determine largely emotional organic, uninterrupted evolution. Second, both countries share most entirely new foreign policy prior- basis was replaced This is not to imply artificiality but a common enemy. Armenians cut off from one ities, formulate new pol- by a more goal- rather a certain idealization. historically constitute the main another for de- icies, and develop new oriented approach Other for both societies. Histor- cades, Azerbaijan that deepened the The national memory of the ical grievances that could not been quickly came to tools vis-à-vis the Turkic two countries’ stra- Azerbaijanis thus glorifies the image overcome have been revived by be seen by Turkey world to its east. tegic alliance and of Turkey as savior, at least with re- the Karabakh conflict. In other as its closest partnerships. As of gards to events that took place in words, the fact of a common ally in the former Soviet space. late 2020, both countries view the the first decades of the twentieth enemy helped to bring Azerbai- Azerbaijan also became, in many relationship as being one between century. Generally, the shared past janis and Turks closer together. ways, a jumping-off point for equals in which both sides benefit is infused solely with positive con- Turkey’s unconditional support Turkey to seek opportunities to from their mutual interdependence. notations. There is much to be said for Azerbaijan in the Karabakh develop new economic relations in for this narrative. For instance, the conflict also has been tied to the other Silk Road region emerging interaction between Azerbaijani issue of sharing a common threat. markets, including those centered Sources of Commonality and Turkish intellectuals during Although the level of threat per- on energy projects. the fin-de-siècle period into the ception is not the same both coun- he origin of, and basis for, early 1920s, and the fact that they tries, it has constituted one of the hile the relationship Tthe “one nation, two states” shared almost the same vision of main challenges in shaping Tur- Wbetween Azerbaijan and motto that perfectly describes the a would-be state—with particular key’s relations with the West (both Turkey was and continues to be Turkey-Azerbaijan relationship emphasis on Turkism and mod- Europe and the United States) and enthused in emotional motives, lie in four commonalities. First, ernization—underlines the intel- Azerbaijan’s conception of terri- grounded in historical ties, and rooted Azerbaijan and Turkey share lectual and ideological basis of torial integrity and sovereignty, in both ethnic and cultural affini- common historical, cultural, re- the special relationship between as well as both nation- and ties, it has become institutionalized ligious, and linguistic attributes. Turkey and Azerbaijan, especially state-building.

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In this respect one could even constituent part of a common, buttressed by increased inter- to endure well into the future. The argue that “shared memory” is less forward-looking vision. societal dialogue and achieved level of mutual awareness is also un- important than “shared enemy” through an increase in both the commonly high. This is exceptional with respect to forging and deep- Fourth (and finally), the Turkey- depth and breadth of educa- for a number of reasons, not the least ening commonalities. The fact Azerbaijan bilateral relationship tional exchanges, media linkages, of which is the fact that it developed that hostilities (or hostile intent) goes beyond elite visions, initia- growing trade, expanding tourism, and blossomed largely without gov- have continued provides the sense tives, choices, and policies. Rather, and other tools of cooperation. ernmental incentivization. of “shared enemy” with a certain it has a strong societal basis, as evi- permanence with respect to both denced by the fact that the political The Second Karabakh War has The reasons informing this ex- Turkey and Azerbaijan. The ac- elite’s preferences are supported both accelerated and deepened ex- ceptionalism for Azerbaijanis and tual conflict—un- by both publics, isting trends in this most privileged Turks are different. For instance, derstood to refer which in turn guar- of bilateral relationships, thanks to the level of knowledge of, and particularly to the The Second Karabakh antees its preser- the unwavering moral and political first-hand experience in, Turkey or Second Karabakh War has both accelerat- vation, deepening, support extended to Azerbaijan by anything Turkish is much higher War—has further and consolidation. Turkey. The continuous dialogue among Azerbaijanis than vice versa. contributed to the ed and deepened exist- This implies that between Ilham Aliyev and Recep Azerbaijanis follow domestic and revitalization of ing trends in this most both countries’ so- Tayyip Erdogan, as well as their re- foreign policy issues in Turkey, a sense of shared privileged of bilateral cieties would react spective foreign and defense minis- watch Turkish news and television memory, albeit con- relationships, thanks to in the event that ters, represents strong evidence of programs, support Turkish foot- verted into a sort of the unwavering moral one or both na- this new deepening. Turkey’s pres- ball teams, and travel to Turkey collective identity and political support ex- tions’ elites were ence in Azerbaijan will definitely quite frequently either for busi- or collective con- to exhibit reluc- increase through participation in ness or touristic purposes. In this sciousness among tended to Azerbaijan by tance in pursuing what the November 10th armistice respect, societal literacy about Azerbaijanis and Turkey. common ground. agreement called a “peacemaking Turkey is Azerbaijan in not com- Turks. The importance of center to oversee the ceasefire” parable with that of Turks about the human dimen- as well as the likely role Turkey Azerbaijan. Third, Azerbaijan and Turkey sion is such that it is likely to remain will play in helping to rebuild share a common profit-making a driving force behind the choices of Azerbaijan’s liberated territories. In contrast, Turkish attachment to interest that manifests itself pri- both elites in the time to come. Azerbaijan is more emotional and, marily in the economic field. The one could even say, intuitive. Turks initiation of energy and trans- hese four sources constitute Societal Dialogue are neither very aware nor follow portation projects, along with Tthe basis for the bilateral re- Azerbaijani domestic politics. Their increased investment opportu- lationship, which later evolved into he backbone of the bilat- strong sensitivity and support for nities, have created a source of a more privileged partnership that Teral relationship between Azerbaijan’s position regarding economic interdependence be- served to deepen the unity between Azerbaijan and Turkey is the so- Nagorno-Karabakh is likely due tween the two countries, which Azerbaijan and Turkey and, more cietal dimension. The perceptions to perceptions of Armenia and has reinforced their respective recently, has been transformed into and feelings among both coun- Armenians. In opinion polls, foreign policy priorities, as noted a strategic partnership with com- tries’ publics are extremely positive, the Turkish public considers above, and thus represent a monly developed security priorities which is why they are most likely Azerbaijan its closest and most

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 56 57 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES reliable ally, year in and year out. societies but also consolidate the the opportunity to form a realistic Historical hatred fueled by the Although most Turks have neither societal dimension of the bilat- picture of what Turkey was truly absence of bilateral relations con- first-hand knowledge of, or experi- eral relationship. The Yunus Emre about, which allowed them to elab- stitute a hurtle for Turkish foreign ence in, Azerbaijan, notions of col- Institute and the Atatürk Center orate an informed perception of its policy to deal with internation- lective memory, cultural affinities, of Turkey can play critical roles in culture, society, politics, and much ally. The attempt at rapproche- and linguistic proximity condition this process. else besides. ment (or even reconciliation, as these perceptions. Thus, Azerbai- some thought possible) between jani and Turkish public opinions Ankara also worked hard to the Armenia and Turkey began with share both joy and sorrow—to Educational and Cultural building up of a pro-Turkey polit- football diplomacy. In September refer back to Atatürk’s famous Cooperation ical, intellectual, and business elite 2008, Turkish president Abdullah formulation. in Azerbaijan. This soft power inte- Gül visited Yerevan to watch a foot- he field of education is one gration model has helped to foster ball World Cup qualifier match at further increase in soci- Tof the liveliest domains illus- a sense of commonality by estab- the invitation of Armenian presi- Aetal literacy on Turkey in trating both the political and soci- lishing a shared social background dent Serzh Sargsyan. The Armenian Azerbaijan would open even greater etal aspects of the patterns of co- in which trust, sympathy, and affin- head of state was later invited to the potential for further collaboration. operation between Azerbaijan and ities are considered as given. The Turkish city of Bursa to watch the But improving the other side of the Turkey. In 1992, Turkey initiated very presence of a large Turkish sequel match. ledger is more pressing: increasing the Great Student Project, which university alumni community in Turkish societal literacy with re- provided young people from the Azerbaijan is a critical niche for the t the time, the symbolism spect to Azerbaijan. Turkish public Turkic world of the former Soviet further consolidation of the bilat- Awas rather exaggerated, al- opinion’s sympathy with Azerbaijan Union with the chance to study in eral relationship. though it later came to be viewed originates in the notion of shared Turkey at the undergraduate level. as the first step in the attempt memory, largely constructed with This visionary project aimed to to normalize relations between reference to a common enemy. Thus, provide an opportunity for the first A Period of Turbulence Ankara and Yerevan: the outcome it is highly responsive to emergency post-Soviet generation to receive a of these face-to-face presidential situations and becomes highly quality education in a time of polit- he exceptional ties between meetings opened the way to the visible and vocalized when the ical uncertainty, societal transition, TAzerbaijan and Turkey were signing up of the Zurich Protocols need arises. During the Second and economic turmoil that largely challenged, for a time, by Turkey’s in October 2009 between the coun- Karabakh War, media coverage in characterized the early years of in- attempt to normalize diplomatic tries’ foreign ministers. Of the two Turkey was comprehensive. How- dependence. relations with Armenia in 2008- documents signed, one concerned ever, Turkish encounters with 2009. Although Turkey’s relations the establishment of diplomatic Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan remain In the first decade of the Great with Armenia have been (and con- relations between Armenia and limited, since its South Caucasus Student Project program, more tinue to be) conditioned to the full Turkey whilst the other focused neighbor is not a popular tourist than 17,500 scholarships were restoration of the territorial in- on the development of bilateral destination. offered to students from Turkic tegrity of Azerbaijan, the issue of relations. Although these Proto- countries, including to more than Turkish-Armenian relations has cols were not been ratified by the Increased cultural interaction will 3,650 Azerbaijanis. These students become occasionally a topic legislatures of either country, they not only contribute to an increase represented a core cultural link be- for pressuring Turkey in had a considerable impact on the in familiarity between the two tween the two societies, having had international fora. Azerbaijan-Turkey relationship.

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It did not help domestic grass- the latter mechanism in October Between July and September Ankara’s case in The exceptional ties be- roots opposition 2011). This can be interpreted as 2020, the two countries conducted Baku that the tween Azerbaijan and to the Zurich symbol of the quick restoration joint military exercises that were Zurich Protocols Turkey were challenged, Protocols as well of disturbed relations as well as qualitatively more serious in com- made no men- as the extent to a further institutionalization of parison to those that had taken tion of Nagorno- for a time, by Turkey’s which these could the Ankara-Baku alliance. What place in the past, which made their Karabakh; prior attempt to normalize potentially disturb is also remarkable is that this new unconditional relationship more to their signing, diplomatic relations with both Azerbaijan’s mechanism formally incorpo- visible. This can also be interpreted Erdogan appeared Armenia in 2008-2009. elite and public rated a security dimension. Both yet another example of overlapping to indicate other- opinion. Ankara countries pledged to support each political, economic, security, and wise. In April did not do itself any other “using all possibilities” in strategic interests. 2009, for example, he had favors by opting not to consult with the event of a military attack or announced that “unless Baku prior to initiating the normal- “aggression” against either of zerbaijan’s military opera- Azerbaijan and Armenia sign a pro- ization process. All this produced a them. The Joint Declaration that Ations on its own territory tocol on Nagorno-Karabakh, we will real rupture between Turkey and established the aforementioned were unequivocally supported not sign any final agreement with Azerbaijan. Council also contained provi- by a very high-level declarations. Armenia on ties. We are doing sions to upgrade hardware for Erdogan stated that the Turkish preliminary work but this defi- Although constructive dialogue joint military operations, coop- nation stands by its Azerbaijani nitely depends on resolution of the at high levels resumed—as did re- eration in “military-technical” brothers “as always and with all Nagorno-Karabakh problem.” Four ciprocal official visits along with a areas, and joint military exercises its resources.” Foreign Minister weeks later, during an official visit resurgence of popular support in and training sessions. Mevlüt Çavuşoglu declared that to Azerbaijan, he said that “there each country for the other—the “Azerbaijan will, of course, use its is a relation of cause and effect damage had been done: the crisis right to legitimate defense to protect here. The occupation of Nagorno- was overcome, but not forgotten. The Karabakh Conflict its people and territorial integrity. Karabakh is the cause, and the For some period of time there- In this process, Turkey’s full sup- closure of the border is the effect. after, the Azerbaijani government urkey’s refusal to establish port for Azerbaijan is complete and Without the occupation ending, the embraced a more cautious stance Tdiplomatic relations with its solidarity is unwavering. We will gates will not be opened.” And yet, towards Turkey: the restoration of Armenia until the return of the oc- stand with Azerbaijan in any way for a time it seemed as though they trust was hardly instantaneous. cupied territories of Azerbaijan is it wants.” Çavuşoglu again: “We would—assurances to the contrary considered by Baku to be of funda- stand with Azerbaijan in the field notwithstanding. The breakthrough came about mental importance. One can argue and on the table.” Turkey’s defense a year later with the signing that although Turkish moral and minister, Hulusi Akar, added the t bottom, the exceptional of the Agreement on Strategic political support during the Second following, for good measure: “we Atype of relationship enjoyed Partnership and Mutual Support Karabakh War is a natural con- will stand with our Azerbaijani by Turkey and Azerbaijan is based between Turkey and Azerbaijan tinuum of the discourse, the latest Turkic brothers and sisters until on trust. Turkey obviously miscal- and the establishment of the developments provided yet an- the end with all our means in the culated the potential gains of the Azerbaijan-Turkey High-level other opportunity for the bilat- struggle to protect the integrity of nascent normalization process. Strategic Cooperation Council (and eral relationship to intensify and their land.” During one of his war- It also underestimated its own the holding of the first meeting of deepen. time visits to Baku, Çavuşoglu said

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 60 61 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES that Turkey and Azerbaijan can nothing new in this. But by the start Russia and Turkey that has aptly knowhow through jointly-created even be “counted as one state when of the Second Karabakh War, Tur- been defined as a competitive initiatives. This can be very in- necessary.” key’s stance had become more proac- partnership. spiring for Azerbaijani civil society, tive, assertive, and involved. Ankara given the considerable experience The Turkish public was glued in effect made a total commitment of of Turkish NGOs in voluntary to their screens, watching the support for the war effort (Azerbaijan Further Consolidation activism. news coverage of the war that was reportedly drew the line regarding more extensive of Azerbaijan in Turkey’s offer of direct military - in he bilateral relationship be- Second, developing and strength- comparison to any other period volvement on the battlefield). Ttween Azerbaijan and Turkey ening relationships between univer- since Azerbaijan’s independence. remains exceptional and has been sities and research centers. Almost Even a cursory examination of It should be noted, however, further deepened all the first- and Azerbaijani social media ac- that the Turkish army and its mil- as a result of the even many sec- counts lead to the realization that itary academies have been pro- Second Karabakh The balance of power in ond-tier universi- Azerbaijanis frequently use the viding training to their Azerbaijani War. The will and the South Caucasus will ties in Azerbaijan Turkish flag emoji alongside their comrades in arms for a couple of policies of the and Turkey—both own. The number of Turkish decades. This has obviously con- ruling elites are largely be determined by public and pri- flags hanging side by side with tributed to the formation of a well- fully supported the nature of the rela- vate—signed coop- Azerbaijani ones equipped and strong Azerbaijani by the publics of tionship between Russia eration agreements in cities and town across the military, which has vastly improved both states. With and Turkey that has aptly with each other country would be impossible to in comparison with the 1990s. And respect to the ques- been defined as a compet- years ago, but rela- count, so great generations of the tion of further itive partnership. tively few have sat- is the number. military elites of consolidation and isfactorily fulfilled Public celebrations During one of his war- the two countries enhanced institu- their stated aims in after the armistice time visits to Baku, have trained side tionalization, important initiatives practice. Faculty, student, and staff was signed on Çavuşoglu said that Tur- by side. can be considered—particularly in exchanges, along with joint research November 10th key and Azerbaijan can non-political fields. The diversifi- initiatives and the organizations of were held with even be “counted as one The postwar pe- cation of policies and tools would workshops and conferences, would both Azerbaijani state when necessary.” riod represents a eventually contribute to the further significantly contribute to the- de and Turkish flags. test for Turkey— strengthening of a unique set of bi- velopment of an interactive aca- And Erdogan was especially in the lateral ties. Three will here be men- demic milieu. The establishment of the guest of honor for the Victory context of its immediate neigh- tioned briefly. Turkish and Azerbaijani studies cen- parade that took place on De- borhood. Ankara has what may ters and academic departments, op- cember 10th in Baku. be a truly historic opportunity to First, civil society dialogue, which erating under relevant institutional strengthen its role in the region is one of the least developed dimen- frameworks, would not only con- urkey has already been sup- while becoming a more promi- sions of the bilateral relationship. tribute to knowledge production but Tportive of Azerbaijan in all re- nent security actor. The balance Although Turkish civil society or- also to heightened scientific analysis gional and international fora, in ac- of power in the South Caucasus ganizations are neither donors nor of the multiple dimensions of the cordance with the strategic nature of will largely be determined by the fund-generating entities, they still bilateral relationship. Supporting the bilateral relationship. There was nature of the relationship between have the capacity to transfer their such new academic initiatives would

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 62 63 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES necessitate an investment on the ahead, its contours will remain the part of both governments. same whilst the substance will continue to grow and deepen. One can Third, alumni organizations should therefore easily expect more insti- also be supported. States can support tutionalization, a diversification of their activities when doing so would joint initiatives, and stronger com- make sense, certain in the knowledge mitments by both sides. Based on EXECUTIVE EDUCATION AT that university graduates are the best historical ties and cultural prox- potential representatives of each na- imity, and inspired by common tion in terms of entrenching the con- interests and benefits, the bilateral ADA UNIVERSITY tinuity of an exceptional and deep- relationship will continue to be ening bilateral relationship. supported and preserved at the societal level in both countries. This he Second Karabakh War rare asset—this true alliance— Tbrought the relationship be- should be not taken for granted Launched in 2007, Executive Education at ADA University is an tween Turkey and Azerbaijan to so that its true potential may be important tool for government and businesses to nurture junior, an even higher level. In the time revealed. BD midcareer, and top leadership talent.

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special zone guarded by a 1,960- need to start doing more of each Understanding Armenian strong Russian peacekeeping force for lasting peace to take hold. This for a period of at least five years. essay, which is far from perfect, Narratives Both Azerbaijani and Armenian represents our initial thoughts and refugees and IDPs are to be re- reflections on this critically - im turned to the conflict zone under portant subject for both nations. An Azerbaijani Perspective on A the supervision of the UNHCR, and all transport communications Shared Post-conflict Future between the countries are supposed Politics and History to be re-opened. Rovshan Ibrahimov and Murad Muradov he First Karabakh War was The armistice agreement is the Tfought in the shadow of the first step, not the end of the journey: break-up of the Soviet Union. It n September 27th, 2020, as well as the southern part of the the deep conflict around Nagorno- started from an appeal by activists a fierce new war be- former Nagorno-Karabakh Auton- Karabakh still remains unresolved. of the “Karabakh committee”—a tween Azerbaijan and omous Oblast (NKAO) that had The Second Karabakh War may have proto-democratic nationalistic or- ArmeniaO erupted over the region existed during the Soviet period, come to an end, but a lasting, sustain- ganization that had just emerged— of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven including its symbolic and strategic able peace still remains to be secured. to the Soviet leadership to conduct adjacent districts that constitute heartland—the city of Shusha. “reunification” of the NKAO— the internationally recognized ter- his essay aims to understand an autonomous region of Soviet ritory of Azerbaijan but had long The tripartite agreement stip- TArmenian claims over Azerbaijan predominantly popu- been under Armenian occupation. ulated the complete withdrawal Nagorno-Karabakh in light of both lated by ethnic Armenians—with A period of 44 days of uncompro- of Armenian forces from the re- history and international law. It Armenia. mised fighting ended with the Rus- maining three occupied districts also aims to con- From the very sian-negotiated tripartite ceasefire (Kalbajar, Lachin, and Aghdam), sider possible tra- beginning, the his- statement signed on November while the remaining part of the jectories of the The armistice agreement toric aspect played 10th, 2020, by which time Azer- former NKAO, together with the negotiation pro- is the first step, not the a crucial role in baijan had already restored its sov- narrow corridor around Lachin cess to come and the narrative the ereignty over the Fizuli, Jabrayil, that connects the former NKAO lays out proposals end of the journey: the Armenian side was Zangilan, and Qubadly districts to Armenia, were to constitute a for building an deep conflict around carefully building alternative, non- Nagorno-Karabakh still and using to justify Rovshan Ibrahimov is an Associate Professor in the College of Oriental Studies of conflict vision for remains unresolved. The its claims over terri- Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in South Korea, and a former Head of the the future of both Second Karabakh War tories belonging de Foreign Policy Analysis Department of the Baku-based Center for Strategic Studies. peoples and coun- jure to Azerbaijan. Murad Muradov is Senior Economist at the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) tries. Engagement may have come to an end, This narrative and Co-founder and Deputy Director of The Topchubashov Center, a non-profit is hard, objectivity but a lasting, sustainable rested on the three think tank for analysis and discussion of international politics in the South Caucasus and beyond. The views expressed and the position adopted in this essay are entire- harder, introspec- peace still remains to be major arguments: ly those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the organizations or tion harder still. secured. the ancient history institutions with which they are affiliated. But both sides and ethnography

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 66 67 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES of Nagorno- Caucasian Alba- Armenian one, led to a creeping joint fact-finding commission of Karabakh; the Engagement is hard, ob- nian people that Armenisation of the Christian historians as unacceptable. The trauma of the jectivity harder, intro- inhabited a con- population of Nagorno-Karabakh, "genocide" issue is a “sacred cow” 1915 Armenian spection harder still. But tinuous stretch which was finalized after Russia of contemporary Armenian state- “genocide” that both sides need to start of territory that consolidated its conquest of the hood, which has defined its strategy took place on the included other region. Afterwards, Caucasian and political orientation since its territory of the doing more of each for parts of northern Albanian heritage was mostly onset. The cultivated memory of Ottoman Empire; lasting peace to take hold. Azerbaijan. The erased and forgotten, which paved the "genocide" has also instilled and the allegedly peculiar and some- the way for the general acceptance a semi-official Turkophobia unfair inclusion of the region into what isolated development of of the Armenian narrative as rein Armenia, which is most viv- the borders of the Azerbaijan SSR Karabakh from the eighth century gards local history. idly expressed in Armenia’s un- by the Soviet government. onwards is related to the fact that concealed hostility to Azerbaijan its mountainous parts remained owever, since claims based and Azerbaijanis, who are often he first argument stipu- mostly Christian for many cen- Hon ancient history are referred to derogatively as “Turks.” Tlates that Karabakh—or turies afterwards, while the -sur hardly enough to justify ethnic sep- “Artsakh,” as the Armenian side rounding regions underwent deep aratism in the twenty-first century, Thus, prior to and especially would start to call it later (ironi- Islamization. the proponents of Armenian irre- during the Second Karabakh War, cally, this very name is most prob- dentist claims (it has a special term, Armenian state propagandists ably not of Armenian origin but is However—and this is a cru- miatzum, in the Armenian lan- constantly referred not only to the aberration of the initial name cial moment for dispelling the guage) also eagerly pointed to the 1915 but also engaged in baseless “Orkhistena”)—is the historic cradle Armenian narrative — the Christians traumatic events of the twentieth and unfounded speculation about of the Armenian nation and the only of Karabakh were predominantly century that, as they believe, consti- the imminent launch of an ethnic place in which Armenian statehood of Caucasian Albanian origin. As tute irrefutable evidence about the cleansing campaign against Arme- flourished virtually uninterrupted. a matter of historical record, the primordial and intractable char- nians living in Azerbaijan-proper These claims are predominantly Caucasian Albanian (or Aghvank) acter of the Armenian-Turkish/ as well as in Nagorno-Karabakh. based on the strong concentration of Church preserved its ecclesiastical Azerbaijani conflict. The point, of course, was to claim medieval Christian monuments in distinctiveness from the Echmiadzin that the independence of “Artsakh” Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as on sev- Catholicosate until 1836—that is to This narrative is based, first, on represented the sine qua non for eral written sources (many of which say, decades into imperial Russian the 1915 events in the Ottoman the security of Armenians. turn out to be rather dubious after rule over the Caucasus; for some Empire that are recognized as being closely scrutinized). time, the two churches even had the "genocide" of Armenians by t the same time, in separate seats within the territory of the parliaments of several dozen Aorder to delegitimize the This argument has been in- the Gandzasar monastery—the best countries around the world. It Soviet period in the history of strumentalized by Armenians evidence that they had been clearly must be noted that the "genocide" Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian in order to claim “moral rights” distinct from each other. However, issue is viewed by official Yerevan side has claimed that Moscow— over this land. For most of its an- growing theological similarity as largely through a political, not through a 1920 decision of the cient history, however, Karabakh well as the gradual displacement historical lens—one reason why Caucasian Bureau of the Commu- was populated by various tribes of the original Caucasian Albanian Armenia has consistently referred nist Party—handed over this re- that trace their origins back to the script by the more widely used to Turkey’s offer to establish a gion to Azerbaijan. However, the

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Russian original of the text Armenian politicians have Legality have the right to achieve indepen- unequivocally states, “Nagorno- consistently insisted that the se- dent statehood through a process Karabakh shall be retained within curity of Armenians is predicated he Armenian-Azerbaijani of what the UN Charter called the borders of the Azerbaijan SSR,” on the grant of self-determi- Tconflict has been historically “self-determination.” To avoid any which reinforced the unbreakable nation—understood in its ex- so laden with bitter inter-ethnic possible ambiguity, the UN even political but also socio-economic treme form as independence— and personal hostilities that its in- issued a list of territories that were ties between this region and the for the “people of Karabakh,” ternational law aspect has been in- supposed to enjoy this right, many rest of Azerbaijan. defined exclusively as ethnic evitable pushed to the back burner. of whom have since become inde- Armenians from Karabakh, thus Since it was the Armenian side that, pendent states. Nagorno-Karabakh Based on this narrative, the ir- excluding the Azerbaijani popu- beginning in 1988, committed an was not on that list, or any similar redentism advocates claim that lation from the narrative, which actual aggression against the legally one. Thus, from the point of view Karabakh has never been part of is consistent with the awful fact recognized status quo, this omission of this cornerstone document of an officially recognized indepen- that they were ethnically cleansed served to create the false impres- international law—namely the UN dent state named Azerbaijan and down to zero in the First Karabakh sion of “equating” both sides—the Charter—Nagorno-Karabakh does hence had no obligation to respect War by Armenian forces. aggressor and the victim—which not have the right to independence, the latter’s territorial integrity. suited Yerevan very well. since it was not listed by the UN as This view, while disguised in the The issue of the cultural own- ever having been a colony. parlance of international law, is in ership and heritage of Nagorno- The new rules of interstate be- fact purely political—ideological, Karabakh and the seven sur- havior that were elaborated during, Moreover, international law does really—and simply tries to paint rounding territories is today sub- and entered into force after, World not provide for any other legal op- over a “moral right” claim that has ject to widespread debate—but not War II prohibited the “use of force tion for the emergence of new states. no credence in the liberal interna- widespread appreciation of the his- against the territorial integrity In present times, the emergence of tional order. torical facts. It cannot be disputed or political independence of any new states can be possible only if that both Azerbaijani and Armenian, state”—to quote from Article 2 of such a possibility is provided by the his historical-political nar- Christian and Muslim, history and the UN Charter—and excluded state itself (within the framework of Trative in favor of Armenian culture have run deep across this war-making as a legitimate instru- domestic law), as has been the case irredentism has had recourse to region for a millennia and a half. ment of international politics. At the of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia randomly-selected and sometimes Naturally, the farther back we delve same time, in order to prevent pos- with respect to their constituent re- false or misrepresented chunks of into history, the more likely that it sible future aggression against any publics, or on the basis of a state’s history to establish an artificial se- becomes subject to mythmaking. member state, the “inherent right of consent to self-disintegration, as curity dilemma that precludes the individual or collective self-defense was the case with Czechoslovakia peaceful existence of an Armenian Unfortunately, unbiased scholar- if an armed attack occurs against a and Sudan (with respect to South community within Azerbaijan (the ship and thinking have fallen prey to Member of the United Nations” was Sudan but not, notably, Darfur). fact that more than 30,000 ethnic the politicians’ desire to heavily load clearly spelled out in Article 51. Armenians live in Azerbaijan— the discourse of Armenian nation- s this essay concerns itself or, for that matter, more than alism with a narrative of a historic On this basis, various UN organs, Awith the topic of the possible 100,000 ethnic Armenians still injustice and conspiracy, helping to including the General Assembly legality of the self-determination of live in Turkey—is conveniently ig- radicalize and mobilize Armenians and the Trusteeship Council, made the former NKAO, the legal frame- nored). With very few exceptions, against numerous “enemies.” it clear that only former colonies work of the Soviet Union must be

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 70 71 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES considered. According to Article 72 of SSR Azerbaijan. Thus, the April structure” (there are corresponding There is, therefore, only one legal of the USSR Constitution, the right 1990 Law was unconstitutional, articles in the Constitution of the route by which Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination was given to and on more than one ground. Azerbaijan SSR, as well). Thus, could become as an independent the 15 Union Republics, including For instance, Article 3 of the Law even if one (a dubious proposi- state, and that is by securing the Azerbaijan SSR and Armenia SSR. grants the right of autonomous tion, at best) interprets the April consent of Azerbaijan. Given the Using this right, Azerbaijan and entities within Union Republics to 1990 Law to be compatible with the bloody history of Armenian occu- Armenia ultimately became inde- hold a referendum separately on USSR Constitution, no referendum pation over the past thirty years, pendent and sovereign subjects of “remaining [...] within the USSR could have been legally held on the it is hard to imagine a situation international law. They were rec- or within the seceding Union territory of NKAO on December in which that consent could be ognized as independent states by Republic, and also to raise the 10th, 1991, for the simple reason forthcoming. the international community and question of their own state-legal that NKAO had ceased to exist le- became UN member states. It is status.” This directly contradicts gally a fortnight prior to that date. a simple matter of legal fact that Article 78 of the USSR Constitu- Post-conflict Trajectories Nagorno-Karabakh, which was tion, which states that the “territory fter Azerbaijan and Armenia nothing more than an autonomous of a Union Republic may not be al- Aboth regained their inde- he November 10th Russia- region (oblast) within Azerbaijan, tered without its consent” and thus pendence, each was recognized Tbrokered trilateral armistice did not enjoy such a right under the made Article 3 of the aforemen- by the international community agreement managed to effectively USSR Constitution. tioned Law unconstitutional. If an within the borders in which the put a stop to the armed hostilities. appeal had been made to the Soviet countries existed as part of the So- While Azerbaijanis celebrated The Armenian position runs Constitutional Court (Committee viet Union on the basis of the in- their military and diplomatic tri- contrary to this. According to this for Constitutional Supervision of ternational law principle of uti pos- umph, the mood in Armenia was narrative, the acquisition of inde- the USSR), then it would have de- sidetis juris, which provides that understandably dour. Armenians pendence by Nagorno-Karabakh termined the unconstitutionality of emerging sovereign states should were initially shocked by what was in fact achieved in accordance this Law. But no such appear was retain the borders that their pre- they felt was a national humili- with the Law on Procedure for made, the Armenians point out. ceding dependent area had before ation, but seem to be gradually Resolving Questions Connected their independence. That is why— coming to terms with the new sit- with a Union Republic’s Secession Fine. But two weeks before the notwithstanding the former uation. from the USSR, which was adopted referendum in NKAO was to be NKAO’s unilateral by the Supreme Soviet on April held, Azerbaijan’s Supreme Council declaration of in- The armistice 3rd, 1990. On the basis of this Law, passed a law abolishing the NKAO dependence and The armistice agreement agreement is nei- NKAO’s ethnic Armenian authori- as an administrative-territorial the result of its il- is neither a peace treaty ther a peace treaty ties announced that a referendum unit. This legislative act was made legal referendum— nor a blueprint for rec- nor a blueprint on independence would be held on in accordance with Article 79 of the Nagorno-Kara- for reconciliation. December 10th, 1991. USSR Constitution, which states bakh has not been onciliation. It leaves open It leaves open the that a Union Republic “shall de- recognized by a the major issue of peace- major issue of However, the holding of such a termine its divisions into territo- single UN mem- building and normal- peacebuilding and referendum at the oblast level was ries, regions, areas, and districts, ber-state, including ization between the two normalization be- not envisaged either in the USSR and decide other matter relating its sponsor and de- rival states. tween the two rival Constitution or the Constitution to its administrative and territorial fender Armenia. states.

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What could be the further devel- Administration began constructing guarantee for Azer- restraint and made a opment of events in the Karabakh along its border with Mexico or baijan in future. The contrast between conscious choice conflict? Various hypotheticals rise Israel did with its security barrier. He has also under- the actual conduct of the to abstain from to the mind. Enormous costs aside, total isola- scored the point Azerbaijani military and pursuing military tion would be impossible anyway that Azerbaijan operations beyond ne option for maintaining a because of the Lachin corridor concentrated its the public messaging of those that involved Oversion of stability would be issue. This strip of Azerbaijani land, fighting on the the country’s leadership, the liberation of the continuation of the “renouncing located in the narrowest place be- battlefield, nei- on the one hand, and the symbolic city relations with the other” policy, tween Armenia and the former ther intentionally the baseless and often of Shusha. Un- which has been the prevailing re- NKAO territory, has always been striking Armenian quite feverish predictions like the hundreds ality since the 1994 ceasefire. Given a key issue in all the peace-resolu- civilian targets nor of thousands of both societies’ deep trauma and tion plans and today is within the retaliating against by some international Azerbaijanis who mutual mistrust—and the fact they Russian peacekeeping zone. The population centers media outlets and expert remained refugees see each other al- corridor’s long- in the wake of re- analysts of the “inevita- or IDPs as a result most exclusively as term status will in- peated shelling by bility of ethnic cleansing” of the First Should relations re- sworn enemies— evitably be one of Armenian forces of of Karabakh Armenians, Karabakh War for main in deep freeze, this solution does the major topics in Azerbaijani cities on the other hand, is nearly 30 years, appear attractive Azerbaijan and Armenia future talks. So, the like Ganja and the Armenians quite striking. at first glance. It would each feel compelled option of burning Barda, located far from Karabakh would enable both to fortify their thousand all the bridges is from the combat who left their Yerevan and Baku hardly viable. Sim- theater of operations. Aliyev homes during the Second to remain within kilometer long border, ilar arguments also stressed that ethnic- Karabakh War are already returning their comfort zones which mostly runs across could be made with Armenian citizens of Azerbaijan without impediment. All this pro- whilst abstaining high, mountainous, and respect to the other should be able to peacefully to live vides hope that a full-fledged peace from hard peace- difficult terrain. corridor—the in their places of residence, like all process will be possible in the fore- building work. one envisioned to other citizens of the country. seeable future. link Nakhichevan However, objective circumstances and the rest of Azerbaijan across The contrast between the actual f course, mutual material in- make this scenario hardly plausible. Armenian territory along the Aras conduct of the Azerbaijani mili- Oterest is most often the best Should relations remain in deep river, just north of Iran. tary and the public messaging of element that helps to surpass deep freeze, Azerbaijan and Armenia the country’s leadership, on the enmities and guarantees the rejec- would each feel compelled to fortify o what is the alternative? one hand, and the baseless and tion of violence. The November their thousand kilometer long border, SSince signing the November often quite feverish predictions 10th agreement thus contains an im- which mostly runs across high, 10th agreement, Azerbaijan’s Pres- by some international media out- portant clause about the unblocking mountainous, and difficult terrain. ident Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly lets and expert analysts of the “in- of all the regional communica- stressed in interviews and public evitability of ethnic cleansing” of tions, including the aforementioned In some places, one side or the statements that sustainable peace Karabakh Armenians, on the other overland corridor between main- other could even opt to build with Armenia is both a desirable hand, is quite striking. Baku con- land Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan a wall like the one the Trump outcome and the best security sistently demonstrated strategic through the territory of Armenia.

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This is without doubt a very sig- The resolution of the conflict the independence of the former of Armenia, which is administra- nificant declaration of intent that can thus become the basis for NKAO in any negotiating context, tively divided into two sparsely- will need to be followed up with a opening two critical borders of but so has the guarantor of the inhabited provinces (Syunik and detailed roadmap on restoring co- Armenia: the one with Azerbaijan November 10th agreement, Vayots Dzor) that together sep- operation. For example, Armenia and the one with Turkey (Ankara Russian president Vladimir arate mainland Azerbaijan and could finally become a part of lu- closed borders with Armenia in Putin: “Karabakh is the interna- Nakhichevan. This would accord crative regional energy and trans- April 1993, after the occupation tionally recognized territory of with one of the November 10th port projects, or purchase natural of Kalbajar, falling just short of an Azerbaijan,” he stated in an inter- agreement’s principles guaran- gas from an alternative source at agreement in 2009). view in the wake of the armistice. teeing the right of return of IDPs more affordable prices. This eco- Moreover, it would be absurd now and refugees, and is also consistent nomic integration argument was n order to develop peaceful for Armenia to continue insisting with the Madrid Principles. extensively made by President Ineighborly relations, it will be on old solutions, since it was the Heydar Aliyev during his negoti- necessary to conclude a long-term Armenian foreign minister who, Consider in this context the fate ations with Yerevan in the 1990s agreement. The agenda forming in April 2020, had refuted Russia’s of Azerbaijanis who were forc- when the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan the basis of such an agreement will Sergey Lavrov by confessing that ibly removed from Armenia in pipeline project was still under need to be determined, as the pre- there was no real conflict-resolu- 1988 and thus became refugees discussion, but back then Arme- vious one—centered on the Madrid tion plan on the table back then; at the very start of the conflict nian society was too overwhelmed Principles established by the Co- or, to go back a little further, given (this includes the aforementioned with its military victory in the First chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group— that Pashinyan had explicitly re- Zangezur region). Throughout Karabakh War to agree on has been largely overtaken by events jected the “land for peace” for- the Minsk Group-led talks, their compromises. and is thus no longer relevant. mula by publicly proclaiming that status was not considered in detail. “Karabakh is Armenia. Period.” Yet, until that year, 182,000 ethnic It seems that the Armenian lead- In other words, the outcome of the Azerbaijanis, 18,000 ethnic Kurds, ership has begun to understand Second Karabakh War is such that owever, should the ques- and 1,000 ethnic Russians lived in the opportunities opening up by the Madrid Principles have either al- Htion of status for Karabakh a territory of about 8,000 square the end of the Second Karabakh ready been implemented—whether again arise in the negotiations to kilometers in 261 settlements, of War. It is encouraging that a re- through gains on the battlefield or by come, Armenia will need to de- which 172 were exclusively popu- cent speech by Prime Minister the terms of the trilateral agreement— velop new proposals that may be lated by ethnic Azerbaijanis. The Nikol Pashinyan emphasized or are no longer applicable. Thus, a attractive to Azerbaijan. There- number of Azerbaijani refugees that the opening of communica- new basis for negotiations will need fore, if Yerevan insists on cham- from Armenia was, by the most tion will activate the route from to be conceived and a new roadmap pioning enhanced political au- conservative figure, 250,000. By Armenia to Iran via Nakhichevan. to peace will need to be established. tonomy for the ethnic Armenian 2015, that number, according to Equally encouraging is the fact This time, it will be impossible for citizens of Azerbaijan, what can the same source, had grown to that the newly-appointed Minister Armenia to continue challenging the Armenia offer in return? 350,000 (taking into account de- of Economy, Vahan Kerobyan, territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. mographic growth). To this day, has begun to hint at an opportu- A substantive proposal could in- many settlements in Zangezur are nity to export Armenian goods to Not only has the Azerbaijani clude, for example, the offer of a virtually empty, since Armenia Azerbaijan and Turkey in the side repeatedly continued to stress symmetric status for Azerbaijani does not have sufficient human re- (near) future. the inadmissibility of discussing refugees from the Zangezur region sources to populate these lands.

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Thus, Azerbaijan could make Azerbaijani territories. The presumably most of them Muslims, firmed our conclusions and did it clear that a discussion on the Armenian side left virtually no from Nagorno-Karabakh and the not challenge our assumptions and logic. Our problem is our status and level of autonomy for stone undisturbed in the occupied surrounding territories, and their political culture that relies on Armenians in Karabakh can be territories. A demonstration of inability to return to these territo- dreams rather than hard facts; considered only in the context of peacemaking goodwill in the form ries.” Naturally, the European Court the way we strategize, the way the return of Azerbaijani refugees to of extending an offer to compensate of Rights thus ordered Armenia to we easily set aside what the Zangezur (coupled, perhaps, with a Azerbaijan for damages incurred pay pecuniary and non-pecuniary outside world and our an- tagonists say and do if these consideration of their status). Such during thirty years of occupation damages to cover legal costs and disturb any of our prejudices a solution could stimulate the for- would go a long way towards indi- expenses to each plaintiff involved and predetermined beliefs. mation of vested interests in both cating Yerevan’s true intentions of in the case. We adjust political strategy to countries for peaceful coexistence. goodwill and contribute to broader our wishes, to what will make It would also meet the interests of reconciliation efforts. us feel good about ourselves inally, for a conflict resolution rather than take into consid- Armenia itself, as Fprocess to succeed and rec- eration the simple facts that Azerbaijan would The issue of rep- onciliation to take hold, a change collectively make up the reality surely be ready Azerbaijan could make arations and com- of narrative must be pursued. In around us. Our problem is the to underwrite the it clear that a discus- pensation must this essay we have engaged with way we allow our judgment to restoration of the also be considered be obscured by the highest, no- sion on the status and the major arguments to which the blest and ideal solutions of our settlements where level of autonomy for both within the Armenian side has appealed in problems, our illusions. Our Azerbaijanis lived Armenians in Karabakh framework of inter- order to defend its claim over the problem is the way we insist on compactly before national common territories of Azerbaijan, which overestimating our capabilities can be considered only in so that we would not question the conflict and law, at the interstate built heavily on an allegedly pe- the context of the return of our strategy and compromise decrease infra- level, and through rennial security dilemma, as we our dreams. We thought that structure costs by Azerbaijani refugees to international pri- have seen. For a long time, Ye- our strategy “not give an inch creating shared Zangezur (coupled, per- vate law: in the revan has been caught in a trap back” was the right one because our cause was just. And facilities, and haps, with a consider- latter category, ref- of a self-centered, maximalist so on. Finally, erence is made to we believed we could bend the ation of their status). view of its position and interests will of the enemy and of the should such a self- the judgment of the in its neighborhood. As recently international community and reinforcing pos- European Court stated by the reputable histo- have them think and feel the itive feedback cycle be estab- of Human Rights in Chiragov and rian and former senior adviser to way we do. lished, the return to Azerbaijan of Others v. Armenia (2015). The Armenia’s then-President Levon Armenian refugees could be guar- case involved the forced eviction Ter-Petrosyan, Gerard Jirair anteed at a later stage. of Azerbaijani Kurds from their Libaridian: n order to overcome the sort of places of residence, with the Stras- Our problem is the way we Iharmful ways of thinking identi- nother important item on bourg Court holding that Armenia looked at the Karabakh con- fied by Libaridian, new regional ar- Athe agenda for peace is the “exercises effective control over flict and the way we framed rangements must be fixed in such a issue of compensation and repara- Nagorno-Karabakh and the sur- the questions related to its way that would bind the countries of resolution: we started by the tions from Armenia for the cities, rounding territories” and is thus conclusion that corresponded South Caucasus to the existing secu- towns, and villages that were de- responsible for the “flight of prac- to our dreams, and then asked rity order and promote the inclusive stroyed during the occupation of tically all Azerbaijani citizens, only those questions that con- vision of their history and identity.

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At the dawn of the independence Armenian history like Hovhannes of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Katchaznouni, the first prime Georgia in the early twentieth cen- minister of the first Republic of tury, each state was fortunate to Armenia who, in his memoirs, have produced visionary leaders warned his nation against waging like Alimardan Topchubashov— conflicts with neighbors and he served as ambassador to underscored how this mistake Armenia and Georgia, then foreign had already cost the young na- minister, and then speaker of the tions of the South Caucasus their Azerbaijan Democratic Republic’s independence. parliament—who championed the idea of a united Caucasus Although conditions on the as the guarantee of its indepen- ground are obviously very dif- dent and successful development. ferent after more than thirty years of hostility—and much time will We could draw on positive ex- be needed to heal the wounds amples in the two nations’ his- caused by conflict—the latest tory as well: stress the legacy of events in the region demonstrate Armenian-Azerbaijani co-exis- convincingly that Armenia’s ag- tence in Karabakh in the eigh- gressive nationalism has only teenth and nineteenth centuries; brought war and destruction, ul- emphasize the intensive cultural timately failing to deliver on the exchanges and intellectual en- promises made in a time no longer richment that took place in Tbilisi suited to present realities and fu- (the traditional cultural capital of ture possibilities. Truly, it is time the Caucasus); and champion the to start writing a new chapter in thinking of prominent figures in our common history. BD

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perpetuated the unresolved state contact and ended military hostili- Three Decades of Missed of the conflict and ultimately led ties; on the other hand, during this to the resumption of large-scale period Armenian forces not only military operations that resulted occupied Nagorno-Karabakh but Opportunities in significant military gains by also seven adjacent territories in Azerbaijan and the onset of a Azerbaijan-proper and successfully Was the Second Karabakh War Russian-brokered armistice. Widely ethnically cleansed those territo- labeled a “frozen conflict,” it sud- ries of their Azerbaijani popula- Inevitable? denly but not unexpected became a tion. This was the only period when “hot zone” on the map of the world both Armenia and Azerbaijan felt a Lala Jumayeva before settling back into a state of sense of urgency to end the violence affairs that all would agree did not and, in order to avoid further ca- result in the end of the conflict. tastrophe, signed a ceasefire agree- he conclusion of the in the peace process with the aim of ment that was supposed to pave Second Karabakh War helping the parties to draft a mutu- the way for the conflict issues to be provides an opportunity ally-acceptable formula to reach a Inevitable? discussed at the negotiation table. toT reflect upon the question, at least final settlement. Nevertheless, this period laid the in a preliminary way, of whether e can begin by asking foundation for the indeterminate three decades of missed peace op- Taking into account both the Wwhether the Second future of the conflict’s destiny and portunities were necessary prole- political chaos and the economic Karabakh War was inevitable. In set the negotiation process into a gomena to the armistice signed by burden that the First Karabakh order to answer this question, we deadlock. the parties in early November 2020. War put on the shoulders of the need first briefly to shed light on After all, the conflict parties to the parties involved, signing a cease- those failed moments of poten- Another round of missed op- Nagorno-Karabakh disputes had fire appeared to be the best possible tial breakthrough and analyze a portunities is traceable back to the been engaging in peace talks trade-off for both Armenia and number of content and context 1997-1998 period, when the Minsk for nearly 30 years, with medi- Azerbaijan at that time. factors that served as destabilizing Group came up with several pro- ation roles initiated in the early elements in the negotiation process. posals for a stable peace settlement 1990s prior to the end of the First During the decades-long peace to the conflict. To be precise, the Karabakh War. process, there were a number To start with, for the whole pe- Co-chairs of the Group (Russia, of times when Armenia and riod of the Minsk Group-led pro- France, and the United States), At the time, a number of actors Azerbaijan came close to a break- cess, a number of negotiation operating under the institutional has volunteered to assume the through. However, each time a final rounds that can objectively be la- framework of the OSCE, offered function of potential peace-broker: peace settlement remained just out beled as missed peace opportuni- three proposals: the “package” Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Turkey, of reach, despite the existence of a ties. The first round of the nego- plan, the “step-by-step” or “phased” and finally, the Co-chairs of the potential rapprochement between tiations, which took place in the plan, and, finally, the “common OSCE Minsk Group, which in 1992 the disputants. Consequently, 1992-1994 period, was, on the one state” proposal. None of these were initiated and later became engaged each failed negotiation attempt hand, the most successful since the seen as mutually-satisfactory or parties ended up signing a ceasefire mutually-acceptable by the parties Lala Jumayeva is Assistant Professor of International Affairs at ADA University. agreement that established a line of to the conflict. The main factor that

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 82 83 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES prevented a breakthrough in the negotiation. It seemed that this new Virtually from the moment the substantive progress, the parties peace process during this phase was model might lead to some progress Madrid Principles were put for- continued to negotiate, meeting at the expressed concern of the parties within the Minsk Process. Even ward by the Co-chairs, both sides the heads of state level in Sochi in with respect to the final status of though the parties failed to reach (and both foreign ministries, in March 2011 and again in Kazan Nagorno-Karabakh and the Lachin any positive outcome during this particular) engaged in rounds of in June 2011 under the leader- corridor. Consequently, the parties period of negotiations, the Prague destructive condemnation, blaming ship of Russian president Dmitry chose to compromise and refused Process nevertheless laid a founda- each other for wanting to unilat- Medvedev, and with active engage- all three settlement proposals. tion for the development of what erally revise various parts of the ment of the presidents of the other came to be known as the Madrid document. By the end of 2008, the two Minsk Group Co-chairs. But it The Key West talks that took place Principles. momentum had waned and it once came to naught once more. in 2001 under the leadership of the again became clear that a resolution George W. Bush Administration he year 2006 was viewed as to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict After the Kazan meeting, the represented another opportunity Ta golden year for the negoti- remained out of reach. The stan- Nagorno-Karabakh peace pro- to break the deadlock. Expectations ations due to the absence of elec- dard line that began to be heard cess entered a phase of turbulence. were high in the run-up to the start tions in both countries, with many from both Baku and Yerevan was Armenia, in particular, projected of these talks. The proposal put policymakers suggesting that the that they accepted the Madrid doc- confidence that its wartime gains forward in this round was largely right time for an agreement was ument “in principle” without ever were being consolidated by a lack based on the Goble Plan that had at hand. The Co-chairs formally clarifying what “in principle” actu- of progress at the negotiating been initially offered back in 1999 presented a set of Basic Principles ally meant in practice. table. For instance, the country’s and contained provisions for terri- for the Peaceful Settlement of the 2012 and 2017 parliamentary torial swaps between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict only In 2010, high-level representa- elections demonstrated how the Azerbaijan. This idea was initially in 2007, however. These Madrid tives from both sides anchored their Nagorno-Karabakh factor has lost considered by the leaders of both Principles combined elements of hopes on the talks that took place its place in domestic discourse. sides, but, due in part to internal both “step-by-step” and “package” on the margins of the OSCE As- disapproval of the respective elites methodologies, which helps to ex- tana Summit under the aegis of the A further attempt by the Minsk of Armenia and Azerbaijan, ended plain, in part, why they attracted Kazakh Chairmanship-in-office, -al Group to get the conflict sides to up being rejected by both sides. significantly more attention than though this too came to be seen as renew dialogue in 2013-2014 also previous proposals. The Madrid a “vivid example of the fiasco of the failed to bring any development to The face-to-face meetings be- formula initially fostered a hope peace talks,” in the words of Fariz the peace process. Despite the con- tween senior officials from Armenia that the proposal would be mini- Ismailzade, now ADA University’s tinued lack of progress, the Madrid and Azerbaijan that started in 1999 mally acceptable to both Armenia Executive Vice Rector. The Astana Principles remained on the table as did not achieve expected results. and Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, al- Summit talks brought to the surface the basis for a comprehensive set- The Prague Process that took though initially supported by both the incompatibility of visions re- tlement and showed that the par- place in 2003-2004 involved a new conflict parties, the proposal was garding the conflict, the unwilling- ties continued to be interested in methodology whereby Armenia, later ignored by the Armenian ness of the parties to compromise, arriving at a peaceful settlement to Azerbaijan, and the Minsk Group side, which refused to provide a and the absence of a catalytic mo- the conflict. Thus, various attempts Co-chairs agreed to engage in a free concrete response to it and ulti- ment that could have resulted in a to reach an agreement based on the discussion on any issue without mately failed to formally respond breakthrough. Notwithstanding the Madrid Principles continued in any preset agenda, commitment, or to peace proposal. Astana Summit’s failure to achieve the following years, albeit without

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 84 85 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES much diplomatic achievement. a number of positive improve- of both countries as well as their generating momentum for the re- During this period, the negotiation ments between the conflict sides respective political elites. Ironi- newal of serious negotiations. But process was limited to a number of were registered. In 2018, Baku and cally, this expectation was main- it didn’t. Instead, the results of the meetings between the heads of state Yerevan launched a military ho- tained notwithstanding the increas- Second Karabakh War are such that and foreign ministers of Armenia tline to manage more effectively ingly bellicose rhetoric emanating they dictate a new set of geopolit- and Azerbaijan that ended, predict- ceasefire arrangements on the line from both Baku and Yerevan. ical realities that have come about ably, with expressions of disappoint- of contact. Furthermore, Armenia Azerbaijan’s leadership, in par- since the signing of the armistice. ment with regards to the failure to and Azerbaijan managed to issue ticular, quite transparently overcome the diplomatic logjam. a joint statement in 2019 whereby stated that in case mediation ef- This brings us to being able to the parties agreed to prepare their forts remained ineffective, the shed light on the substantial rea- ne consequence of the respective populations for peace. Azerbaijani side would consider sons that account for the failure Ofour-day war that took And in the wake of a colored rev- the military option for settling the of diplomatic efforts over the past place in April 2016, which re- olution in Armenia that brought dispute, thus taking upon itself thirty years. Once the peace talks sulted in limited territorial gains by Nikol Pashinyan to power in the the task of implement the four UN resume, it will be important to en- Azerbaijan, was that it again drew country, Azerbaijan seemed to ex- Security Council resolutions that sure the mistakes made in the past high-level attention—by the in- hibit high hopes that the deadlock had called for the withdrawal of are avoided by all concerned. ternational community in general could be broken—in part because Armenian troops from the area. and the great powers in partic- the newly-elected prime minister ular—to the unresolved nature of did not belong to the country’s Bearing in mind all of the afore- Intra- or Inter-state the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. “Karabakh Clan” and was thus seen mentioned instances of ineffec- Conflict? Still, little momentum was gained as a potentially more constructive tive mediation and the demon- and substantive talks did not mate- leader in the quest to attain peace. strably provocative attitude of fter Armenia’s occupation rialize. In fact, as an International Yet, the situation started to dete- Armenia, for Azerbaijan the Second Aof Azerbaijani territory in Crisis Group report argued, the riorate in 2019 when a number of Karabakh War was consequen- the early 1990s, the UN Secu- April 2016 war showed that both provocative statements and actions tial. However, it could have been rity Council adopted four resolu- Armenia and Azerbaijan seemed taken by the Armenian leadership avoided by a more tions—822, 853, ready to have recourse to arms for led to the resumption of not only a constructive ap- 874, and 884—that the first time since the 1990s—that, new military operation in July 2020 proach of the The results of the Second demanded the im- in other words, both countries were but also the onset of a full-scale war parties to the dis- Karabakh War are such mediate and unwilling to consider the military op- in September 2020. pute as well as by that they dictate a new conditional with- tion as a way forward to break free a demonstration drawal of Armenian from the status quo. After the 2016 ight up until the start of the of greater impar- set of geopolitical reali- armed forces escalation, tension in the region RSecond Karabakh War, the tiality and prob- ties that have come about from Azerbaijan constantly increased even though expectation that the conflict parties lem-solving atti- since the signing of the as well as the re- there was no clear sign of an ap- would remain committed to the on- tude on the part of armistice turn of refugees proaching full-scale war. going peace process was high—not the Minsk Group and internally dis- only among representatives of what Co-chairs. The placed persons to Despite the lack of momentum some call the international com- post-April 2016 war period could their homes. Notwithstanding the to negotiate a peace deal in 2016, munity but also among the publics have served as a catalyst for binding nature of these resolutions

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 86 87 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES on the conflicting parties, the Even though Armenia denied its di- under the sovereign control of the no sense, notwithstanding the fact Armenian side consistently ig- rect involvement into the Nagorno- authorities in Baku as it was under- that Yerevan itself had not extended nored them (with the tacit ap- Karabakh conflict, in the wake stood prior to the end of the Second recognition to it. proval of the Co- of the November Karabakh War. chairs), which 1989 abolishment However that may be, the fun- ensured that Today, not a single eth- of Soviet direct n the early 1990s, Armenia’s eco- damental point is that the pe- none of the de- nic-Azerbaijani is to be command, the Inomic instability was a result of riod between the end of the First mands they con- found on the territory of Armenian Supreme its direct humanitarian and finan- Karabakh War in 1994 and the end tained were able Armenia, and prior to the Soviet took what cial support to secessionist entity. of the Second Karabakh War in to be fulfilled. Svante Cornell Through the occupied Lachin cor- 2020, no one had come up with a Until the onset November 2020 armi- called the “his- ridor, Armenia not only sent mas- winning compromise formula for of the Second stice not a single ethnic- torical decision sive shipments of food and other peace through diplomacy. This rep- Karabakh War, al- Azerbaijani was to be to promulgate the materials, but also covered virtu- resented a main aspect hindering a most 20 percent of found on the territory incorporation of ally all of what came to be known potential rapprochement between Azerbaijani sov- controlled by the self- Nagorno-Karabakh as the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh the parties. ereign territory into the Armenian Republic’s budget deficits. During remained under proclaimed “Nagorno- Republic.” It was the Second Karabakh War, notwith- Armenian occu- Karabakh Republic.” thus Armenian irre- standing the fact that the de-facto Apple of Discord pation, with ap- dentist “Karabakh” “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” had proximately 1 million Azerbaijanis forces that occupied the whole ter- its own army, troops from Armenia s a result of a population ex- remaining the victims of ethnic ritory of Nagorno-Karabakh as well were the ones that were largely Achange carried out by the Rus- cleansing and officially classified as the seven surrounding territo- fighting the Azerbaijani military in sian empire in the nineteenth cen- as internally displaced persons or ries of Azerbaijan-proper. And it the occupied lands. To this we can tury, a huge number of Armenians refugees. was Armenia that had engaged in a add, at a minimum, the shelling that had lived in the Persian and campaign to fully ethnically cleanse of Azerbaijani areas outside of Ottoman empires were settled Armenia escaped the implemen- the Azerbaijani population. the conflict zone from positions in Russia’s newly-conquered tation of the Security Council’s four within Armenia during the Second Caucasian territories, especially in resolutions on the basis of a legal Today, not a single ethnic- Karabakh War. the western territories of what is argument that it did not recognize Azerbaijani is to be found on now known as the South Caucasus. itself as a party to the Nagorno- the territory of Armenia, and Hence, the untenability of According to Russian census data Karabakh conflict. Armenia, in prior to the November 2020 Armenia’s position of neither as researched by Svante Cornell, other words, viewed the dispute armistice not a single ethnic- being a conflict party nor of before the onset of St. Peters- as an intra-state conflict—that Azerbaijani was to be found on taking responsibility for decades burg’s population exchange policy is to say, as an internal affair of the territory controlled by the self- of violations of the sovereignty in 1823, 9 percent of Nagorno- Azerbaijan and a secessionist en- proclaimed “Nagorno-Karabakh and territorial integrity of Azer- Karabakh’s population was tity. Azerbaijan, of course, held the Republic.” This stands in stark con- baijan. Otherwise, Armenia’s pre- Armenian whilst the remaining oppositive view, maintaining since trast to the fate of ethnic-Armenians in Second Karabakh War demand to 91 percent was registered as Muslim. the onset of hostilities that it had Azerbaijan, where, as of today, at Azerbaijan to recognize the so- By 1932, the Armenian population been in a state of war with Armenia. least 30,000 of them live in areas called Republic of Karabakh made had increased to 32 percent and by

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1880 it had reached a majority of rom the onset, Azerbaijan has parties was presented within the the concept of what Italian legal 53 percent. By 1987, Armenians Funderstood the conflict to be framework of the two basic princi- scholar Salvatore Senese and others in Nagorno-Karabakh made up about the occupation of its interna- ples of the UN Charter, namely the called “external self-determination.” 74 percent of Nagorno-Karabakh’s tionally recognized sovereign terri- principle of self-determination and Senese defined this as the “recogni- population. tory—Nagorno-Karabakh and the the principle of territorial integrity. tion that each people has the right to seven surrounding regions—by Ar- Consequently, the determination constitute itself as a nation-state or This demographic argument menian military forces. According of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, to integrate into, or federate with, was emphasized by the commu- to Baku, Armenian support for the which has been the most defining an existing state.” Thus, Senese ar- nist authorities in Yerevan in 1989 establishment of a second Arme- part of the peace talks between gues, any case of a claim to external when they attempted to illegally nian state (or its annexation and Armenia and Azerbaijan, can be self-determination involves a si- annex Nagorno-Karabakh to the subsequent incorporation into Ar- solved either based on the principle multaneous claim to territory. Armenian Soviet Socialist menia) at the expense of the violation of self-determination understood as Republic, as it was then known. of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan being equivalent to an avowed right o guide us in understanding After this failure, their strategy is against the norms of international of secession, or the principle of ter- Tthese two principles we can changed. In the early 1990s, law and can never be supported by ritorial integrity. turn to UN General Assembly their main argument shifted any lawful political regime. Indeed, resolution 1514 from 1960 enti- to extending support to Na- if this would not have been the case, n general, the aim of all uni- tled “Declaration on the Granting gorno-Karabakh’s ethnic-Arme- many UN member states would have Iversal principles is to maintain of Independence to Colonial nian population in their struggle felt free to recognize the existing peace and security in the world; Countries and Peoples.” While it for self-determination on terri- regime of the so-called “Nagorno- however, the degree of prevailing does stipulate that “all peoples have tory that Armenia itself, together Karabakh Republic.” importance of the aforementioned the right of self-determination” it with the rest of the world, recog- principles has been subject to ex- also indicates that “any attempt at nized as belonging to Azerbaijan Hence, the conflict issue for tensive debate. The principle of the partial or total disruption of the from the point of view of interna- Armenia does not seem to be territorial integrity is an important national unity and the territorial in- tional law. centered on the self-determina- objective of international law that tegrity of a country is incompatible tion of the ethnic-Armenians of has played a tremendous role in with the purposes and principles of The beginnings of a shift in po- Nagorno-Karabakh because the maintaining stability and security the Charter of the United Nations.” sition came to be seen in August Azerbaijani leadership has always at the global level. Meanwhile, the 2019 when Armenian prime min- emphasized its readiness to grant principle of self-determination has The unambiguous conclusion to ister Nikol Pashinyan called for the highest degree of autonomy to come to be seen in some quarters as be drawn from this seminal text of the unification of Nagorno-Kara- Nagorno-Karabakh. Rather, it is constituting a fundamental collec- international law is that the prin- bakh with Armenia. It is important about claiming the sovereign ter- tive human right. ciple of territorial integrity denotes to note here that this represented ritories of Azerbaijan and an insis- that no claim to secession can be a fundamental shift in Yerevan’s tence on recognition of the so-called Now, since Armenian support justified by referring to the prin- position in a number of senses, “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.” for the establishment and recog- ciple of self-determination. Fur- including the fact this implied an nition of the so-called “Nagorno- thermore, we know from the prac- Armenian admission that it now Prior to the armistice that ended Karabakh Republic” represents a tice of international relations that, was, in fact, a direct party to the the Second Karabakh War, the apple clear claim on sovereign Azerbai- as a general rule, neither states nor conflict. of discord between the conflict jani territory, this brings to light international organizations favor

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 90 91 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES the establishment in the Republic of up with a winning compromise for- the Lachin corridor, which is lo- of new states from Armenia’s real goal was Armenia. mula for peace through diplomacy. cated in Azerbaijan-proper and territories of al- not to secure the self-de- provides the only road link between ready existing sov- termination of Nagorno- Azerbaijan’s po- the territory and Armenia. ereign entities. The sition, which it Wither the Madrid Karabakh’s ethnic-Arme- key point here is had maintained Principles? Another was the failure to over- that the doctrine nians but rather to legiti- throughout the come the longstanding disagree- of classical self- mize Nagorno-Karabakh period of Minsk rom 2007 up until the start of ment between the Armenian and determination, as a territory and thus Group-led peace Fthe Second Karabakh War, the Azerbaijani sides on the sequence which is misinter- to establish a second Ar- talks, was centered negotiations had been based on the of the implementation of pro- formula contained in the Madrid preted today by menian state carved out on a recognition of posed principles, notwithstanding partisans of seces- the Armenians of Principles, according to which the the fact that the parties had ini- sion, was extremely from the sovereign ter- Nagorno-Karabakh sides agreed to solve the dispute tially accepted it. Up until the narrow: namely, ritory of Azerbaijan, in as citizens of based on their implementation. start of the Second Karabakh War, to allow for the es- violation of international Azerbaijan en- Ironically, as Thomas De Waal has Armenia was reticent to acknowl- tablishment of new norms. joying equal rights pointed out, this formula was, in its edge the need to withdraw in the sovereign entities and obligations as essence, an updated version of the first stage from five of the seven within the context any other citizens peace plan that Armenia’s founding occupied territories surrounding of decolonization. (The UN even of the country, and had responded president Levon Ter-Petrosyan Nagorno-Karabakh as it would have made a list of colonial possessions to irredentist Armenian claims by had supported in 1997—principles meant relinquishing its main bar- that were understood to quality indicating a readiness to grant the that had led to his ouster. As po- gain point, notwithstanding that it for independence on the basis of highest level of autonomy to Na- litical scientist Thomas Ambrosio would not have had to immediately self-determination. It goes without gorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan. has pointed out, this explains why relinquish the northwest territory saying that Nagorno-Karabakh Ter-Petrosyan’s successors were “far of Kelbajar or the western terri- was not on it.) Thus, a sovereign From this we can conclude the less enthusiastic [about the Madrid tory of Lachin—two buffer lands state may consider the principle following: Armenia’s real goal was Principles], largely because these sandwiched between Armenia and of self-determination of a people not to secure the self-determination principles reportedly envisage the Nagorno-Karabakh. One reason to supersede the cornerstone prin- of Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic-Ar- province [Nagorno-Karabakh] for this is that had negotia- ciple of territorial integrity only if menians but rather to legitimize remaining at least de jure within tions on the basis of the Madrid the term “people” means the entire Nagorno-Karabakh as a territory Azerbaijan.” Principles failed at a later stage, population of that state. This is ev- and thus to establish a second Ar- Armenia would have been unable idently not the case in the context menian state carved out from the One main problem with the Ma- to reclaim these same five territo- of Nagorno-Karabakh, for the le- sovereign territory of Azerbaijan, in drid Principles, as indeed with ries, having returned them initially gitimization through recognition of violation of international norms. other possible deals that had been to Azerbaijan. Thus, a later-stage the so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh put on the table prior to the Second failure of talks would have been Republic” would in fact constitute These diametrically opposite Karabakh War, were the mutual- interpreted as a defeat by Yerevan. the establishment of a second na- views go a long way towards ex- ly-incompatible perceptions by the The risk, in other words, was too tion-state of the Armenian people, plaining why for close to 30 years conflict sides regarding the final high, from the Armenian perspec- which already has a sovereign home no mediator had been able to come status of Nagorno-Karabakh and tive, for the immediate return of

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 92 93 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES the five territories would have This is now the new status quo, And fifth, Azerbaijan has emerged interested in peace in the region or granted Azerbaijan a great tac- and it seems to have changed the as the victor of a three decades’ old of being interested in a particular tical advantage in the sense that it rules of the game. The political dispute whilst demonstrating its type of settlement. Obviously, such would have received direct access setting in the South Caucasus has strong commitment to interna- accusations did not represent the to Nagorno-Karabakh itself, which been updated. In a nutshell, this tional norms, which brought about sole obstacle to peace, yet they did would have, in turn, made it easier translates into the following. the restoration of just claims for play a significant role in what had to retake the rest of the occupied both its nationhood and statehood. been observed in the region for the territories by force. First, Russia proved that it still re- past three decades. mains the host of the region. nd yet the outcome of the Russia’s Trump Card The environment in which the ASecond Karabakh War has Second, Turkey proved that re- Karabakh conflict was embedded rendered many of the Madrid gardless of existing deep contradic- homas De Waal’s description for the last three decades had not Principles moot. The seven sur- tions between itself and Russia on Tof the Nagorno-Karabakh only determined the state of the rounding areas are now firmly many political issues, Ankara and conflict as “nobody’s front yard, but problem but also set the condi- under the control of Azer- Moscow can still bargain and act everybody’s backyard” perfectly de- tions under which this problem baijan again. Some were liber- together when needed. picted the attitude got to be addressed ated by military means, others of the mediators during the Second without a shot being fired. Third, both the European Union towards the peace Thomas De Waal’s de- Karabakh War. Russian peacekeeping troops, and the United States have lost process. Although scription of the Nagorno- These factors were under the terms of the armistice, much of their substantial political the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict as mainly a product provide a perimeter around parts influence in the region. Karabakh conflict “nobody’s front yard, but of dynamics partic- of Nagorno-Karabakh and ensure has been inten- everybody’s backyard” ular to the region a 5-kilometer wide corridor linking Fourth, Armenia has lost the game. sively meditated itself: the geopo- Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh At least three important points de- since 1992, the perfectly depicted the at- litical and strategic via Lachin. The same armistice rive from this point. One, it seems self-oriented char- titude of the mediators to- interests of the provides for the establishment of that neither internal nor external acter of each of the wards the peace process. major powers with a land corridor across Armenia— conditions are likely to serve its po- go-betweens rep- interests and am- also guaranteed by Russia— litical or economic recovery for the resented a hurdle to the achieve- bitions in the South Caucasus: along its border with Iran, which foreseeable future. Two, the trauma ment of a breakthrough in the Russia, the United States, the EU, will provide for a link between of the Armenian nation caused by peace process. The composition of Turkey, and Iran. Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan its defeat on the battlefield in the the Minsk Group has always been exclave. Azerbaijan also managed Second Karabakh War and en- a topic for debate in the disputing he ignorant attitude of the to return to its control a number shrined in the armistice agreement countries, since it was believed that Tmediators along with the of villages located in the Tovuz drafted by Russia will take a long the U.S., the EU, and Russia had constraints imposed by Russia, in district—located far away from the time to heal, if this ever happens. chosen to enter into in the pro- particular, set the rules of the peace Karabakh region, along the Arme- Three, having in mind the collective cess for the sake of advancing their talks game. Russia has undoubtedly nian-Azerbaijani border—that were historical memory of the Armenian own (mainly geostrategic and ener- been playing the main role in the also occupied by Armenian forces nation, its destructive stance towards gy-related) interests. The mediators region of the South Caucasus: by in the early 1990s. “Turks” will deepen even further. were accused either of not being keeping Armenia under its control,

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Moscow could use the Karabakh Second Karabakh War allowed to form of free armaments deliv- domestic and foreign policy cost conflict as a leverage towards both continue until one of the parties to eries, loans, and free training of the Armenian nation thousands of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The ex- the dispute wins the war. A number Armenia’s military. For instance, in lives and resulted in its military and istence of the Karabakh conflict in of international events—along 1997, Russia delivered to Armenia diplomatic defeat. the region has always managed to with the internal developments in $1 billion worth of weapons, in- benefit Russia. Moscow managed both Armenia and Azerbaijan— cluding tanks and missiles; at the Once a new war erupted, Russia to preserve its regional oversight may have influenced the timing of beginning of the 2000s, Russia was made it clear that it would only function while benefitting from the Azerbaijan’s successful launch of de- openly allocating loans to Armenia, intervene on the side of Armenia sale of military equipment to both fensive military operations on Sep- which made up against Azerbaijan parties to the conflict. tember 27th, but not decisively so. more than 60 per- on the basis of cent of Armenia’s Russia’s uncondition- its commitments For instance, according to the ussia’s stance towards the budget. Russia al support to Armenia under the terms Stockholm International Peace RSecond Karabakh War— still has two mil- since the collapse of the of the Collective Research Institute (SIPRI), during which is regarded, rightly or itary bases in Security Treaty the period of 2010-2015, 85 percent wrongly, as support in Azerbaijan Armenia and Rus- Soviet Union was un- Organization un- of Azerbaijan’s arms purchase were and betrayal in Armenia—served sia’s military troops derstood—wrongly, as it less Azerbaijan at- imported from Russia. It is also foremost to protect and promote its guard Armenia’s turned out—by the cur- tacked Armenia. a fact that since national interests. borders with rent Armenian leadership Armenia attempted the early 1990s, One of the provi- Turkey and Iran. as a constant instead of a to bait Azerbaijan military supplies sions of the peace Consequently, in a number of times Russia wants all three variable. of Russian arms South Caucasus states agreement drafted the past Yerevan during the war, to and equipment to personally by Vlad- perceived such no avail, by indis- to acknowledge it as the Armenia facilitated imir Putin—the support by the Kremlin as a guar- criminately shelling a number of military action be- region’s power-broker deployment of antee of its security against Turkey Azerbaijani cities located outside tween the parties and, hence, accept its Russian peace- and Azerbaijan in case war with the the conflict zone—as a result of to a large extent. supremacy. keepers in the lib- latter resumes. which around 100 Azerbaijani civil- Russia wants all erated territories— ians were killed, including women, three South Cau- was of a particular ussia’s unconditional support children, and elderly people. casus states to acknowledge it as concern for Azerbaijani public, an Rto Armenia since the collapse the region’s power-broker and, example of less than full trust in the of the Soviet Union was under- Even though Armenia lacked hence, accept its supremacy. War Kremlin’s intentions. stood—wrongly, as it turned out— Russia’s support in the Second in the region is only possible if by the current Armenian leadership Karabakh War, it nevertheless wel- Russia does not object to it. Only It is worth noting that it was with as a constant instead of a variable. comed the deployment of Russian because of Russia’s green light did Russian support that the Armenians The stance Russia took during peacekeepers to the region in its af- the April 2016 war broke out; and were able at first to settle and then the Second Karabakh War disap- termath—regarding it as a security only because of Russia’s rejection of to claim for the Nagorno-Kara- pointed Armenia and was regarded guarantee for the Armenians willing Armenia’s leadership and its con- bakh region. And it was Russia that by the Armenian public as its stra- to return to the region. Taken into sequent non-interference in the has been consistently supporting tegic partner’s betrayal. Pashinyan’s account the role of Kremlin in resumption of hostilities was the Armenia since the 1990s in the strategically irrational steps in both drafting the armistice and the terms

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 96 97 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES that were agreed (particularly those solution that did not presuppose development for both publics. To people of Azerbaijan as well as to its authorizing the presence of Rus- Azerbaijan’s recognition of the in- this should be added that the pop- government. sian peacekeepers), even a resolved dependence of the so-called “Nagorno- ularity of the military option had Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could Karabakh Republic.” been growing steadily for the past To this can be added the start of still remain one of Russia’s trump few years, among both the political construction of a new highway con- cards in the region. As for Azerbaijan, it used the elite and the public in Azerbaijan. necting Armenia and the occupied post-First Karabakh War period to Both the “urgency” factor and the lands, but also the resettlement of improve its smart power, without “military option” factor can be ex- Lebanese Armenians that began in Why it Became Possible? which it would not have been pos- plained by recourse to a number August 2020. Both were strongly sible to make strides in achieving a of developments manifested by condemned by Azerbaijan and less n addition to the Russia variable just outcome to an unjust situation Armenia such as Pashinyan’s un- forcefully by the international com- Ithat made this large-scale mili- characterized by the occupation of precedentedly aggressive rhetoric munity, although there seemed to tary operation possible in the first 20 percent of its territory and the and various recent decisions taken be a general agreement that these place, one other important variable presence of one million refugees by the Armenian leadership. constituted violations of interna- needs to be taken into account in and IDPs within its free borders. tional law. order to explain how Baku turned The urge was naturally created Pashinyan’s call for unification this possibility into a long-awaited for Azerbaijan when, after three of Karabakh with Armenia in 2019 hese developments, when put victory: the strengthening presence decades of ineffective mediation during his visit to the occupied Talongside stagnation or even of a popular urge in Azerbaijan to efforts, the Armenian leadership territory caused a huge discontent reversal with regards to the peace settle the Karabakh conflict started openly demonstrating a in Azerbaijan. The inauguration process, as well as the apathetic at- provocative attitude regarding the of the president of the so-called titude of the international commu- Until recently, the absence of an Karabakh conflict and disregarded “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” in nity to violations of international urge to settle the conflict in both Azerbaijan’s political willingness Shusha as well as norms all served Armenia and Azerbaijan had also and ability to force the issue by mil- the announcement as triggers for the contributed to the failure to achieve itary means. Russia’s non-interfer- of the transfer of Azerbaijan regarded its start of the Second a breakthrough in peace process. ence policy coupled with a Turkish its parliament to military counter-attack Karabakh War. For decades, the status quo seemed commitment to unconditionally the same city were This was not all. to have benefitted both sides. support Azerbaijan in its liberation met with anger in to take back its own terri- Presidential elec- effort contributed to an already ripe Azerbaijan, for it tories as a peace enforce- tions in the United Armenia, as the winner of the moment for Azerbaijan. represented a uni- ment operation through States, a growing First Karabakh War, had man- lateral change in which it was fulfilling discontent directed aged to occupy not only Nagorno t is still not clear which side the status quo per- four Security Council res- at Russia’s foreign Karabakh itself but also the seven Istruck first in both July and petuated by the olutions that have been policy, and the pos- adjacent territories. It was sitting September 2020: each side blames Minsk Progress, sibility of Moscow- pretty: its strategic posture was not the other. It does not much matter. which did not react ignored by both Armenia Ankara coopera- predicated on the imperative for What is more important is that— in any serious way and the international tion in the South compromise. Prior to the Second notwithstanding the predictions of to any of this. Nat- community for almost Caucasus made the Karabakh War, Armenia was not a few analysts—the resumption of urally, this was dis- three decades. Second Karabakh much interested in pursuing a hostilities was quite an unexpected appointing to the War feasible.

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Azerbaijan regarded its military For Armenia, this peace agree- such conditions it would be exceed- Russia seemed to make a conscious counter-attack to take back its own ment is a complete capitulation ingly naïve to hope for a quick rec- choice not to try to eliminate territories as a peace enforcement that seemed to be unexpected for onciliation of the two nations. Turkey’s role in the theater of op- operation through which it was the Armenian public, having been erations either during the war or fulfilling four Security Council fed with false information and For Azerbaijan, this was a long- since the armistice statement was resolutions that have been ignored spurious updates from the battle- awaited glorious victory that over- signed. Hence, the influence of by both Armenia and the interna- field. The political situation in the turned a fundamental injustice, Turkey in the region has relatively tional community for almost three country still remains tense and is restored the nation’s territorial in- strengthened, which is likely to decades. For its part, the Armenian likely to spiral downwards until tegrity, and provided an opportu- benefit Azerbaijan to a great ex- leadership rejected Pashinyan leaves nity for the return of about 750,000 tent. It remains to be seen whether to return to the ne- office—voluntarily IDPs to their homes. Under cur- Russia will ever make room for gotiation table and The means by which this or not. Of course, rent conditions, there could not Turkey to fully stand alongside implement those conflict has been resolved this will change have been a better peace deal for Russia in determining the geo- same resolutions, will deepen the existing nothing with re- Azerbaijan. On the one hand, the political rules of the game in the thereby leaving animosity between the gards to the war’s public looks askance at the deploy- South Caucasus. Azerbaijan with outcome. Quite the ment of Russian peacekeepers to no other reason- two nations. opposite, in fact: a the region; on the other hand, the It seems most likely that the able choice but to new government presence of Turkish peacekeepers postwar developments in the re- continue its peace enforcement op- will have to take on all the bur- on the ground seeds hope in the gion will be primarily controlled eration until Yerevan was ready to dens the defeat put on Armenia. fairness and balanced approach of by Russia only. This fact, automat- accept full defeat. Had a settlement to The means by which this conflict the present peacekeeping operation. ically, abolishes the involvement this conflict been achieved by different has been resolved will deepen the Azerbaijan also managed to secure a of any other interested party in means, it would have been easier to existing animosity between the corridor uniting its mainland with determining the region’s post-con- imagine a moment in time in which two nations. In particular, in the the Nakhichevan exclave, which flict destiny. It seems likely, there- reconciliation between Armenians Armenian collective memory shares a land border with Turkey. fore, that the Minsk Group will no and Azerbaijanis would be at hand. there exists a historic animosity longer be a factor and may even be that creates a hostile attitude on s a result of the Second disbanded by the OSCE. For it has the part of Armenians towards AKarabakh War, Turkey has clearly proven its ineffectiveness What is next? Azerbaijanis, who are equated with managed to claim its soft influence in times of both peace and war for and disparagingly called Turks. This in the region. More importantly, nearly long thirty years. BD fter 30 years of ineffective racist attitude points to two things: Apeace talks and a number of that both the support provided to missed opportunities to settle the Azerbaijan by Turkey in the Second conflict without having recourse to Karabakh War and the participation arms, Armenia and Azerbaijan once of Turkish soldiers in the activities of again signed a Russian-brokered the peacekeeping center established bakudialogues.ada.edu.az document that this time not only as part of the armistice agreement put to an end military operations underpin Armenians’ already deep- but also settled the dispute itself. ly-rooted mistrust of “Turks.” Under

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Jerusalem, held by Israeli since Turkey, which has opportunistic The Caspian Sea as 1967’s Six Day War, the Palestinian partnerships with Russia and Iran, question, Iran, political Islam, and both littoral Caspian states that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s pushed for a ceasefire but were Battleground touting of implicitly antisemitic seen as empathetic to Armenia, and conspiracy theories. Israel, with its close ties to Moscow, Second Karabakh War as Cause or rank among Azerbaijan’s top arms hat has not changed is suppliers. (A top aide to President Consequence? WIsrael’s close ties to Ilham Aliyev confirmed that the Azerbaijan that puts it on the Azerbaijani military was using same side as Turkey in renewed Israeli and Turkish-made killer James M. Dorsey animosity between Armenia and drones in the Second Karabakh Azerbaijan following the former’s War that began in late September.) opulated at the time by fluent that Israel is interested in: Muslims, defeat in the Second Karabakh Hebrew speakers, the Israel oil, and several thousand Jews. All War. This is a reflection of the desk of Armenia’s foreign Armenia has to offer is at best sev- Caspian basin’s inextricable links Straddling Divides ministryP waited back in 1991—in the eral hundred Jews,” said an Israeli to the greater Middle East’s myriad immediate wake of the collapse of official at the time. conflicts and the fluid and fragile f Israel and Turkey seem the Soviet Union—for a phone call nature of regional alliances, Istrange bedfellows, Saudi that never came. The ministry was Azerbaijan had one more asset: partnerships, and animosities Arabia and the United Arab convinced that Israel, with whom close political, security, and energy across the Eurasian landmass. Emirates appear to be in a bind. Armenia "shared an experience ties to Turkey, which was supporting Writing in the previous issue of The two Gulf states have invested of genocide", were natural allies. it in its hostilities with Armenia. As Baku Dialogues, in Azerbaijan to The ministry waited in vain. Israel a result, the pro-Israel lobby and Svante Cornell counter Iranian never made the call. That shared ex- American Jewish organizations with emphasized this What has not changed influence in the perience could not compete with longstanding ties to Turkey for years important point, is Israel’s close ties to Caspian but seem Armenia’s Turkic nemesis, helped Ankara defeat proposals in noting the “gra- Azerbaijan that puts inclined to favor Azerbaijan, with which it was at the U.S. Congress to commemorate dual merger of the it on the same side as Armenia because war over Nagorno-Karabakh, a ma- the 1915 mass murder of Armenians. geopolitics of the of their animosity jority ethnic-Armenian enclave on South Caucasus Turkey in renewed ani- towards Turkey, Azerbaijani territory. That has changed in recent years and the Middle mosity between Armenia which they accuse with strains between Turkey and East” and going and Azerbaijan following of interfering in “The calculation was simple. Israel becoming more strident over so far as to say the former’s defeat in the internal Arab af- Azerbaijan has three strategic assets issues such as the status of East that Azerbaijan, Second Karabakh War. fairs. Saudi Arabia in particular, is signaled where it “more closely con- stood by backing James M. Dorsey is Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International nected to Middle Eastern dy- Armenian calls for a ceasefire Studies of Nanyang Technological University, Senior Research Fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute, and Co-director of the University of namics than it has been in two within the first two days of the re- Würzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture in Germany. centuries.” newal of hostilities and giving voice

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 102 103 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES to Armenia rather than Azerbaijan’s the country’s power structure, sanctions-busting military cooper- Caspian coast where a destroyer is side of the story in state-controlled Tehran, often perceived as empa- ation between Moscow and Tehran being repaired and modernized. media. thetic to Armenia, walked a fine line in the Caspian and beyond. The officials, including Iranian calling for a ceasefire in the Second navy commander Rear Admiral By the same token, Israeli ties to Karabakh War and offering to me- These and other analysts—in Hossein Khanzadi, his deputy, Azerbaijan, which has worked hard diate an end to the fighting. Supreme what appeared to be a repeat of Admiral Habibullah Sayari, and to deepen its ties to Iran, potentially Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei unconfirmed reports of closer Admiral Amir Rastegari (who re- put it at opposite ends with the UAE is of ethnic-Azerbaijani decent. Chinese-Iranian cooperation that portedly oversees naval construc- and Bahrain with which it recently Iranians in nearby border areas stretched credulity but circulated tion), stressed the importance to established diplomatic relations in stood on hilltops to watch the for an extended period and were Iranian national security of the Cas- order to strengthen their alliance fighting in the distance. Security discussed widely in policy circles— pian on tours of facilities on the coast. against Iran and Turkey. Nonethe- forces clashed with demonstrators suggested that Russia and Iran were less, this may be one instance in in various cities chanting “Karabakh planning extended military collab- They also urged closer coopera- which finding Gulf states and Israel is ours. It will remain ours.” Iran, oration, including naval exercises tion and joint naval exercises with on different sides of a divide may in line with international law, has in the Caspian as well as in the Gulf other littoral states like Azerbaijan work in the Jewish State’s favor. Is- long recognized Nagorno-Kara- and the Strait of Hormuz. and Turkmenistan. “The Caspian raeli sources suggest that the Second bakh as being a part of Azerbaijan. Sea is the sea of peace and friend- Karabakh War potentially creates Yet, the demonstrations serve as a The analysts, including the afore- ship and we can share our military an opportunity for backchannelling reminder of environmental pro- mentioned Dushenov, who was tactics with our neighbors in this in which Israel could try to drive a tests in the Iranian province of East reportedly jailed a decade ago on region. We are fully ready to expand wedge between Turkey and Iran. Azerbaijan at the time of the 2011 charges of antisemitic incitement, ties with neighboring and friendly popular Arab revolts that often claimed further that Iran had of- countries,” Khanzadi said. “The arms shipments to turned into manifestations of ethnic- fered Russia naval facilities at three Azerbaijan and the flare-up in Azerbaijani nationalism. ports—Chabahar, Bander-Abbas, The Iranian moves are about Nagorno-Karabakh is a reminder and Bander-Busher—on the Is- more than only strengthening the that the periphery alliance may not lamic Republic’s Gulf coast, a move country’s military presence in a be entirely dead,” said prominent Naval Posturing that would violate its foundational basin that it shares with Russia, Israeli commentator Anshel Pfeffer principle of no foreign presence Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and in early October 2020. Pfeffer was ven before the hostilities on its soil. It would also contra- Kazakhstan. A 2018 agreement referring to the Israeli policy prior Ebetween Armenia and dict Iran’s proposal for a regional among the littoral states, made nec- to the opening of relations with Azerbaijan erupted on the north- Middle Eastern security architec- essary by the collapse of the Soviet Arab states to maintain close rela- western inlands of the Caspian, ture that would exclude involve- Union, barred entry to the basin by tions with its neighbors’ non-Arab Iran had stepped up its naval pos- ment of non-regional powers. military vessels of non-littoral states neighbors in the absence of official turing on the basin’s southern coast. but failed to regulate the divvying Israeli ties to its Arab neighbors. Analysts like Jamestown’s Paul evertheless, raising the up of the sea’s abundant resources. Goble and Russian conservative Nspecter of a more asser- With ethnic-Azerbaijanis, who writer Konstantin Dushenov, as tive attitude, senior Iranian com- Closer naval ties with Caspian Sea account for up to a quarter of Iran’s well as Iranian naval commanders, manders stepped up visits to naval states would allow Iran to leverage population and are influential in raised the specter of enhanced U.S. facilities and a shipyard on Iran’s its position at a time that Central

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Asians worry about to explain an ar- Organization of Islamic Cooperation erhaps Iran’s strongest trump greater Chinese se- Closer naval ties with ticle published on conference in the kingdom and visit Pcard is that by linking the curity engagement Caspian Sea states would a Chinese website Iran instead. Caspian to the Arabian Sea it in their part of the that asserted that can provide what the Gulf states world. The engage- allow Iran to leverage its the Central Asian Iran has since agreed to in- cannot: cheap and short access to ment threatens position at a time that country wanted to vest $4 billion in the completion the Indo-Pacific. Already, Iran is a tacit under- Central Asians worry return to Chinese of a five-kilometer-long tunnel written all over Uzbek President standing in which about greater Chinese rule. Kazakh media that will link the Tajik capital of Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s transporta- Russia shouldered security engagement in called for China Dushanbe with the country’s section infrastructure plans. A decree responsibility for their part of the world. and the United ond-largest city, Khujand. That, issued in late 2017 identified var- regional security States to leave however, has not put a halt to ious corridors as key to his plans, while China fo- Kazakhstan alone recurring strains. In September including the extension of a rail line cused on economic development. after the Chinese foreign ministry 2020, Iran summoned the Tajik that connects Uzbekistan’s Termez Increased Chinese engagement claimed that the coronavirus had ambassador in Tehran in protest to Afghanistan’s Mazar-i-Sharif raises the specter of the export of originated in U.S.-funded laborato- against the broadcast of an an- to the Afghan city of Herat from aspects of the People’s Republic’s ries in the country. ti-Iranian documentary on the where it would branch out to Iran’s vision of the twenty-first century: Central Asian’s state’s state televi- Bandar Abbas port, Chabahar; and an Orwellian surveillance state ranian efforts, boosted by the sion channel. Bazargan on the Iranian-Turkish amid widespread anti-Chinese IIndian-funded deep sea port border. sentiment in countries like Kyrgyz- of Chabahar that serves as a con- Saudi Arabia and the UAE stan and Kazakhstan as a result of duit for Indian exports to Central have fared somewhat better in “As Tashkent seeks to diversify China’s brutal crackdown on Turkic Asia, benefit in the margin from Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. its economic relations, Iran con- Muslims in the troubled north- big Asian power rivalry, has opened Saudi utility developer ACWA tinues to loom large in these calcu- western province of Xinjiang. the region, including the Caspian Power, in which China’s state- lations. For Uzbekistan, not only do basin, to greater competition with owned Silk Road Fund has Iranian ports offer the shortest and Hard hit by the economic fallout the Islamic Republic’s chief Gulf a 49 percent stake, and the cheapest route to the sea, but sev- of the coronavirus pandemic, Cen- opponents, Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s Masdar or Abu Dhabi eral future rail projects cannot be tral Asians are torn between wanting United Arab Emirates. Future Energy Company agreed accomplished without Tehran’s ac- to benefit from Chinese willingness to invest in tive participation,” to reinvigorate projects related to Iran hopes that geography and Azerbaijani re- wrote Central Asia the Belt and Road Initiative and Central Asian distrust of past newable energy Perhaps Iran’s strongest analyst Umida their concerns about the way that Saudi promotion of its ultra- projects. ACWA trump card is that by Hashimova in Jan- enhanced Chinese influence could conservative strand of Islam will Power also signed linking the Caspian to the uary 2020. impact their lives. Popular senti- work to its advantage. That hope may agreements in Uz- ment forced Kyrgyzstan early on not be in vain. Tajik foreign minister bekistan worth $ Arabian Sea it can pro- Iran, together in the pandemic to cancel a $275 Sirodjidin Muhriddin, despite past 2.5 billion for the vide what the Gulf states with Russia and million Chinese logistics project. troubled relations with the Islamic construction of a cannot: cheap and short India, has been The Kazakh foreign ministry sum- Republic, opted a year ago to ig- power plant and a access to the Indo-Pacific. touting a sea moned the Chinese ambassador nore a Saudi invitation to attend an wind farm. and rail hook-up

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 106 107 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES involving Iranian, Russian, and agreement with the EAEU while Anzali to Russia’s we take sixteenth Indian ports that would link South the grouping is discussing an ac- Caspian harbor of Armenia’s humiliating place in Azerbaijan, Asia to northern Europe as a vi- cord with ASEAN, which, as it hap- Astrakhan at the defeat at the hands of while Erdogan is mouth of the Volga number one; then able alternative to Egypt’s Suez pens, has just signed a Regional an emboldened, Ankara- Canal and constitute an addition to Comprehensive Economic Part- and onwards by what is our posi- China’s Belt and Road Initiative. nership with China, Japan, South rail to Europe. backed Azerbaijan is tion in Kazakhstan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. The Iranian push likely to turn the Caspian in Central Asia, in In July 2020, Iranian and Indian was boosted in by basin into one more bat- [...] Ukraine (con- officials suggested the route would If successful, the Iranian push, an agreement in tlefield in multiple power sidering Crimean significantly cut shipping time and backed by Russia and India, would March 2020 be- struggles across the great- Tatars and mil- tween Russia and itary supplies)? costs from India to Europe. About anchor attempts by Iran to project er Middle East aimed at a month earlier, Senior Indian itself—as opposed to Saudi Arabia India that would And what will Commerce Ministry official B.B. and the United Arab Emirates— enable the ship- shaping a new regional our position be in Swain said the hook up would re- as the key Middle Eastern player ment of goods order. Tatarstan, in duce travel distance by 40 percent in Russian and Chinese ploys for through the cor- Bashkiria, in and costs by 30 percent. regional dominance. Leveraging ridor on a single invoice, a requisite Yakutia and Altai, where Turks also geography and Central Asian dis- for shippers to persuade banks to live? This is not theory, it is reality,” he Iranian-Indian-Russian trust of past Saudi promotion issue letters of credit. said in October 2020 prominent Tpush is based on a two- of its ultra-conservative strand Russian commentator and head decades old agreement with of Islam, Iran expects that kick- of the Moscow-based Middle East Russia and India to establish an starting INSTC will give it a signif- History Repeats Itself Institute Yevgeny Satanovsky. International North-Sout- icant boost in its competition with Transport Corridor (INSTC) as Saudi Arabia and the UAE for the nvoices and letters of credits hat is a question being posed well as more recent free trade region’s hearts and minds. INSTC Imay not make the difference Tnot only in Moscow but also agreements concluded by the would also strengthen Iran’s po- as long as Iran asserts itself, and Yerevan. As in the early 1990s, Russia-dominated Eurasian sition as a key node in BRI on the Russia seeks to fend off a Turkish Armenia waited in vain during Economic Union (EAEU) with Iran back of a two-year old rail link be- challenge in the South Caucasus, Second Karabakh War for a cru- and Singapore. tween western China and Tehran its Chechen Muslim soft -un cial phone call—this time from that runs across Kazakhstan, derbelly, and potentially among Moscow rather than Tel Aviv In The agreements have fueled Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Russia’s Turkic Muslim minorities, contrast to three decades ago, Central, South, and Southeast Asian as well as Central Asia’s former So- Russia’s failure to make the call interest in the corridor even if the The INSTC would link viet republics, territories Moscow has had fatal consequences for EAEU itself groups only a handful Jawaharlal Nehru Port, India’s largest has long considered as its preserve. Armenia, even if Yerevan was on of countries: Russia, Belarus, container port east of Mumbai, the wrong side of international Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and through the Iranian deep-sea port “If it turns out that [...] we just law. Armenia’s humiliating defeat Kazakhstan, another Caspian of Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman, hum and dither and do not force at the hands of an emboldened, Sea state. Exploiting the mo- which is funded by India to bypass our southern neighbor to swallow Ankara-backed Azerbaijan is likely mentum, Russia has been nudging Pakistan, and the Islamic Repub- his insolence along with his own to turn the Caspian basin into one India to sign its own free trade lic’s Caspian Sea port of Bandar-e- teeth [...]; and if [it turns out that] more battlefield in multiple power

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 108 109 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES struggles across the greater Middle on Azerbaijan’s success to increase For now, Erdogan has strength- veillance of the Islamic republic. East aimed at shaping a new re- its influence in Central Asia, a- re ened his position in what will “The message sent from Tel Aviv gional order. gion of former Soviet republics lead inevitably to a rejiggering to Tehran is very clear: ‘Syria is with ethnic, cultural, and linguistic of the balance of power in the my backyard, and I will be in The Azerbaijani and Turkish links to Turkey. Caucasus between not only Russia Azerbaijan, your backyard,’” said sense of moral and military victory, and Turkey, but also Iran, at a time Sadik Öncü, a Turkey-based in- coupled with Erdogan’s assertive re- The pan-Turkic daily Türkiye—a that the trade-off for Israeli support of ternational relations analyst, refer- gional policies, bodes ill for the need newspaper with the fourth largest Azerbaijan is believed to be the ring to Iranian support for Syrian for Azerbaijan to balance its success circulation in Turkey—urged Jewish state’s ability to operate sur- President Bashar al-Assad. BD with gestures and magnanimity the government to leverage the that will rebuild confidence in Azerbaijani victory to create a Azerbaijani assurances that the military alliance of Turkic states: safety, security, and rights of “The success in Karabakh has the Armenian population in brought once again to the agenda Nagorno-Karabakh will be safe- one of the West’s greatest fears: guarded amid their fears of re- the Turan Army. Azerbaijan, newed displacement or even ethnic which has become stronger with cleansing. It also throws into doubt the military training, joint drills, longer-term relations between and support with armed drones Russia and Armenia, where many that Turkey has provided, has feel betrayed by Moscow’s refusal broken Armenia’s back. This pic- to come to Armenia’s aid under a ture of success that has appeared defense pact between the two coun- has once again brought to life the tries. (Russia maintains a couple of hopes concerning a Turan Army, military bases in Armenia under that would be the joint mili- bakudialogues.ada.edu.az the pact.) tary power of the Turkic states,” Türkiye said. (“Turan” is the term Turkey’s inevitable role in any ne- used by pan-Turkists to describe gotiations to resolve the Armenian- Turkic Central Asia.) Azerbaijani conflict adds to the balancing act that Russia and Turkey So far, Turkey’s bet that history are performing to ensure that their would repeat itself appears to be alliance is not undermined by mul- paying off. The South Caucasus tiple regional conflicts in which the is the latest former Soviet region, two countries back opposing sides. after political crises in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan and the electoral defeat Russia is likely to worry about of pro-Russian forces in Moldova, pan-Turkish and nationalist voices in which Moscow’s ability to main- demanding that Turkey capitalize tain stability is being challenged.

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own strategies the consequences of other powerful actors. To the con- Eurasia 2040 Russia’s undisguised decline. trary, its legacy of creating resent- ments from temporary partners it When the Soviet Union collapsed, has sought for advantage, or more S. Enders Wimbush a Russian state remained among open hostility from states on its the many new states of the former periphery that have experienced empire. That state was incon- Russia’s imperial designs, is lasting. an we imagine the geopol- Middle East is, well, the Middle gruous, at best. It stretched across The economic and political institu- itics of Eurasia in 2040 to East. From all this churning, a Eur- more territory than its authorities tions Russia created or supported be radically different from asia that is likely to be startlingly could control. It contained large to harness its former borderlands— today’s?C How could it be otherwise? different will emerge by 2040. blocks of non-Russians, whose de- for example, the Collective Treaty Change will be rapid, the result of mographic growth often outpaced Security Organization or the dynamics already visible but fur- that of ethnic Russians by orders Eurasian Economic Union—have ther accelerated and deformed by Russia of magnitude, while these peoples done little to advance Russia’s brand radical changes in different parts of entertained visions of indepen- or secure its geopolitical foothold. Eurasia. Change will also be highly number of powerful geo- dence from Russia that were barely Russia has fought a relentless battle interactive; new, permanent, and Apolitical forces will drive this suppressible under to immunize itself transactional realignments will change. Of these, Russia’s decline the thin blanket of against Chinese occur among Eurasia’s actors, who will prove to be the most conse- Moscow’s remit. From all this churning, a influence by -un will each frame new objectives and quential. What was once specula- Rural Russia was Eurasia that is likely to be dermining orga- strategies for achieving these same tion of a few prescient strategists disappearing from startlingly different will nizations like the objectives. Unpredictable outcomes is now solid analysis built into the neglect, depopu- emerge by 2040. Shanghai Coopera- will flow from unprecedented risk- strategic planning of virtually all of lation, and envi- tion Organization, taking that can no longer be con- Eurasia’s important states, and in- ronmental break- composed of most strained. deed many states beyond Eurasia. downs. Its economy could not of the region’s key players, often at The evidence is now so overpow- overcome dependence on dwin- the expense of Russia’s longer-term The distinct outlines of all of this ering that it cannot be wished away dling hydrocarbon revenues, while interests. Looking back from 2040, geopolitical movement are already or denied. The question is not how its military could not develop or one will see that from Europe to evident, though far from predict- long the Russia we know will last, adapt next generation technologies China, and from the Arctic to India, able or even forecastable. Russia is but rather what a Russia suffering and capabilities without those reve- Russia had no permanent friends. failing. Europe is breaking. America from multiple pathologies will look nues. Its best and brightest human is withdrawing. China is stretching like in various stages of failure and capital fled in droves to more- at Experts tell us the Soviet Union assertively. India is rising. Japan is collapse, how deftly it will seek to tractive and imaginable futures in collapsed for many reasons, in- arming. Iran is pre-revolutionary prevent its own demise, and how the West and elsewhere. cluding the country’s lousy (again). Turkey is in therapy. The other actors will factor into their economy, over-extended political ussia cannot now align itself control, and the population’s re- Rout of these dilemmas. It has jection of KGB excesses. All true, S. Enders Wimbush is President of StrateVarious Inc. and a Distinguished Senior no strong history of sustainable but these pathologies had existed Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. alignments with any of Eurasia’s for decades prior to 1991, and

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Russia’s Soviet empire had still held Russians, not non-Russians, whose from independence movements have removed a memorial to con- together. Only when the borderland identity is associated more closely that flourished before Lenin’s Bol- quering tsarist forces in Sochi, peoples called it quits did the USSR with their region than their ethnic sheviks could extinguish them. which both copies and provokes ef- come apart, much to the astonish- roots. Their call to re-establish the They are doubling down on their forts of others along the periphery ment of political scientists, intelli- Far Eastern Republic, a nominally respective claims of sovereignty to rid themselves of Russia’s impe- gence analysts, and think tank re- independent region established within the Russian Federation in rial imprint. “North Caucasians, gional specialists who had insisted in that part of the country after the face of Moscow’s efforts to walk Siberians, and others view ad nauseum that so many “stake- Russia’s civil war in 1920-1922, un- back power sharing arrangements Moscovite conquerors as Africans holders” in Soviet rule precluded derlines both this regional identity with both that were agreed in the and Asians do their colonizers,” such an outcome. and its distance from Moscow’s wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. trumpeted the editors of a leading version of what Russia is, which is Tatarstan asked for UN recogni- Russian newspaper recently. istory is repeating itself. The punctuated by flying a regional flag. tion of its independence in 2008, HSoviet Union is gone, but And third, expect to hear echoes and this desire has intensified, not Even Kaliningrad, a small exclave the turmoil along Russia’s periphery among Russia’s Slavic Siberians, abated. These are also among the between Lithuania and Poland that extending some 11 time zones is in- who have a long history on the Russian Federation’s most econom- has been part of Russia since only tensifying and accelerating. Russia fringes of, but distinct from, main- ically important regions, whose loss World War II but has no land at- is again coming apart at its edges, stream Russian culture; the history would be grievously felt. tachment to it, is the object of forces but with another twist. In the of their separatist instincts is, in- seeking to reattach it to Germany 1980s, ethnic issues and regional is- deed, just about as long. The infec- The North Caucasus run- or achieve outright independence sues often conflated. Today’s Russia tion potential is powerful, with mil- ning along an important part of from both countries. still has divisive ethnic issues, but lions of Russians following events Russia’s southern boundary has its regional challenges in places in Khabarovsk on the internet. been steadily, often violently, dis- he former Soviet border- dominated by ethnic Russians may tancing itself from Moscow’s rule Tlands, now mostly indepen- matter as much or more. The com- Further west, tensions in Buryatia for several decades. Chechnya is dent states, have put more distance bination of ethnic and regional on Russia’s border with Mongolia ruled by a nominally Moscow-af- between themselves and Russia, resistance to Russian rule makes a have risen dramatically because of filiated strongman, but this is little despite Russia’s efforts to stop the post-Russia world both imaginable Russian slights of Buryats’ distinct more than a fig leaf for allowing consequences of a fractured Soviet and increasingly probable. culture and politics. “How long will Chechens to exercise unfettered Union through interventions, in- Buryatia remain a colonial republic authority over their own affairs in timidations, and coercion. Georgia The recent massive demonstra- fed with crumbs from the Czar’s exchange for not drawing Russia is gone from Russia’s sphere of in- tions against Moscow’s rule in table?” a resident asked recently on back into another devastating fluence, and basing Russian troops Khabarovsk on Russia’s Pacific rim Facebook. war. The neighboring Ingush are in territories it captured from may be 5500 kilometers away from intensifying their opposition to Georgia in 2008 will not reverse the capital, but this highlights three Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, Moscow’s efforts to control their this dynamic; rather, it has inten- important features of the unrest. Muslim nations associated eth- politics, rights, and concerns, and sified it. Ukraine, too, has lost a First, Moscow’s authority stops well nically and religiously with the some have called for independent substantial part of its territory to short of its claim to embrace these new states of Central Asia and sit- statehood. Circassians, who seek to vengeful Russia, but it appears to far-flung territories. Second, the uated close to now-independent prevent their territory being amal- be increasingly more distant from protests are fueled largely by ethnic Kazakhstan, are resurrecting heroes gamated with Russian territories, any reconciliation that gives Russia

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 114 115 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES hegemonic influence over Ukraine’s orbit or Azerbaijan’s realignment China strong in the South Caucasus, as Western-looking population. with Turkey—let alone reverse well. Georgia is a particular target Georgia’s strong commitment to ussia’s decline is already of Chinese interest. The two have At this writing, Belarusians are a transatlantic future. To the con- Rcreating a vacuum at the signed a free trade agreement, and threatening to evict their Soviet- trary, they will accelerate these center of Eurasia, and China has China has undertaken a number of era leader —a move Russia may yet dynamics because Russia cannot moved steadily into it. An increas- infrastructure projects in Georgia. attempt to prevent, but without any provide a solution to Karabakh’s ingly popular scenario for post- It would be unsurprising if China hope of convincing that state’s citi- densely insoluble geopolitical co- Russia Eurasia features China were to make a play for the stalled zens that unification with Russia is nundrum. While it is popular to chalking up gain after gain through Anaklia deepwater port project, desirable. And Central Asia’s new assume that Russia’s new role has its economic diplomacy. In the after- which would bid an essential part states have watched Russia’s influence improved its strategic position, math of the COVID-19 crisis, this in its larger national security am- decline in the face of China’s more re- this is far from clear, especially scenario will likely have even more bitions. This would add another lentless economic diplomacy. now that Turkey is a key player in traction, as states whose economies piece to China’s “string of pearls”— the dispute. Russia’s options are were devastated by port facilities it Armenians tossed out their tradi- now more limited and its risks en- the pandemic seek owns or controls— tionally Russia-first governments in hanced, with little evidence that its economic assis- At the nexus of so many stretching from the 2018, while Azerbaijan has aligned intervention can slow its decline. tance from China’s powerful intersecting South China Sea itself heavily with Russia-wary apparently robust fault lines, it is hard to to Europe, and it Turkey. Russia’s seemingly adroit t the nexus of so many checkbook. Some imagine Russia success- would add another move to offer its troops to separate powerful intersecting fault layer of economic A inland economies fully reclaiming its lost Armenian and Azerbaijani combat- lines, it is hard to imagine Russia of Eurasia that integration to in- ants following the latter’s striking successfully reclaiming its lost seek to strengthen former hegemony across vestments related to victory in the Second Karabakh former hegemony across much of logistic supply much of Eurasia through the Belt and Road War is seen by some as a successful Eurasia through any planned res- chains also will any planned restoration Initiative across the Russian gambit to reinsert its in- toration of its imperial project. seek China’s help of its imperial project. region. For its part, fluence along Russia’s vulnerable To the contrary, it is easily imag- as the solution. Georgia might in southern frontier, but on closer ex- inable—easily, because we have (But not everyone. this way secure amination it has a scent more of des- already seen the broad outlines Uzbekistan has agreed to use some immunity against an aggres- peration than strategic opportunity. of Russia’s geopolitical neurosis— Pakistan’s major sea ports for its sive Russia, which might consider If Russia cannot control the South that Russia will lurch this way and trade, a clear hedge to China’s oman intervention that endangers Caucasus, its security perimeter is that as its window of opportunity nipresence.) China’s investment to be a risk it is the volatile North Caucasus, a vision to assert itself closes. The danger unwilling to take. Moscow cannot welcome: reason is not Russian imperial overreach, China is either the first or enough to seek stability in the region. which it cannot sustain. Rather second largest importer for most hina’s investment is not it is Russia miscalculating risks Central Asian states (Turkmenistan Cwelcomed everywhere in But Russian troops in it feels it must take to remain is an exception), and the first or Central Asia, and the security forces Karabakh will not enhance competitive against other forces second export destination for most China often imports to protect its the Kremlin’s inability to deter seeking their own opportunities (Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and investment are deeply resented. A Armenia’s slow slide out of Russia’s in the context of Russian decline. Azerbaijan are exceptions.) It is short time ago, China faced former

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Soviet republics the driving forces 2016, this alignment was recently development of Iran’s 5G telecommu- struggling to find What if China fails? And of futures that ul- codified in a 25-year pact begin- nications network also falls to China. sovereign traction what if China’s failure timately emerge. A ning in 2020. It will harness the two across the border, and Russia’s decline co- China-dominated powers economically, militarily, The injection of Chinese “se- but today it faces Central Asia could and politically. In many ways, this curity personnel” into Iran—at fully independent incide, and their inter- be wrong-headed connection, if successful, could least 5000 strong, with still others states with defined action intensifies the dy- for a number of be one of the more permanent to guarantee shipment of en- political, economic, namics of both? reasons. A growing building blocks of 2040’s potential ergy to China overland or via the and security inter- body of research geopolitics and serve as one of the Persian Gulf—are a central part ests. Most exercise argues that China most powerful drivers of other ac- of the agreement, which logically developed foreign policies and dip- will become more fragile than ro- tors’ strategies. points to China linking to and sup- lomatic relations around the globe bust in the next few decades, as its plying weapons and technology— that have broken the Central Asians’ economy struggles, human capital The linkup could be a lifesaver for and perhaps nuclear capability—to isolation. These Central Asians view deteriorates, technological aptitude Iran, which otherwise is trending Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and China’s campaign to “re-educate” sputters, and ability to innovate once again toward military. Payment its own Uighur population by con- founders. The China we know al- internal revolu- in soft currencies fining them to prison camps as ev- ready is characterized by powerful tion resulting from If the China-Iran strate- will allow the par- idence of China’s weakness, not of tensions that intersect across its po- an economy col- gic partnership—hinged ties to avoid using its strength. The Chinese campaign litical, economic, regional, ethnic, lapsing from state to China’s existing stra- American dol- clearly is not intended to woo the demographic, social, and cultural mismanagement, tegic relationship with lars, thus hedging confidence and affection of the eth- fault lines. So it is appropriate to low energy prices, Pakistan—works as its against sanctions. A nically and religiously related citi- ask: What if China fails? And what and Western sanc- new Silk Road con- zens of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyr- if China’s failure and Russia’s de- tions. At no time partners envision... necting Urumqi gyzstan, and the other Central Asian cline coincide, and their interaction in recent history to Tabriz via states. To the contrary, it reveals China’s intensifies the dynamics of both? has Iran been willing to sacrifice Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, fear that the winds of change blowing so much of its sovereignty to avoid and Turkmenistan is envisioned, across the border, have the potential to No part of Eurasia would be un- this outcome, an indication of how probably with, yet perhaps without infect Xinjiang and beyond, deep affected by such a scenario. One serious the Iranian regime assesses Russia’s acquiescence, which will into China. does not have to assign probability its situation to be. As reported, the become less necessary as Russia de- to it to agree that it is plausible and, agreement tethers Iran’s energy in- clines, in any case. If one were simply to project to- hence, possible. dustry to China, as the latter invests day’s visible trends into the future, $280 billion in developing Iran’s hina’s embrace of Iran brings a China-dominated Central Asia gas, oil, and petrochemicals, while CBeijing closer to many cher- would loom large. China would— Iran offering Chinese energy companies ished objectives. It will empower little by little, deal by deal, loan by first right of refusal in developing China to weave Central Asian states loan—take over Russia’s role as Cen- f more immediate geopolit- them. Another $120 billion of Chi- more deeply into its geoeconomics tral Asia’s acknowledged hegemon. Oical significance is China’s nese investment will go into Iran’s web, increase its flanking of India But this kind of trend following budding alliance with Iran. Dis- transport and manufacturing sec- in the north and west, create a and linear projection often misses cussed between the parties since tors with similar concessions, while largely proprietary energy supply at

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 118 119 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES highly favorable prices from Iranian military to enforce one even if it significant expansion of Turkey’s a potential game changer for any fields whose output is boosted by could manage to pound one out, regional influence; a reconsider- scenario of Eurasia in 2040. Chinese investment and compa- would likely deepen its accommo- ation—and perhaps a reordering— nies, successfully transport and dation of China while supporting of Turkey’s relationship to Europe But what do we know about how store Iran’s energy in the face of Iran against the United States. and the United States; and a re- Turks think about their future? American sanctions and prohibi- source base to build Turkey’s mili- What is their national vision of tions, and plant China’s military in And lastly, with a powerful China- tary to support these objectives. If themselves? Can they be simultane- the pivot of Eurasia. Iran combination threatening to the Turks conclude that China will ously oriented to the West; neo-Ot- dominate its neighborhood, Turkey or might contribute to Iran’s nu- toman; a Central Asian, Cauca- A deep and sustainable China- might finally solve its national iden- clear weapons ambitions, a nuclear sian, and Balkan power; a modern Iran alignment should be a pow- tity crisis: East or West or Ottoman. Turkey will not be far behind. Muslim democracy; a member of erful driver of scenarios for Eurasia’s Its efforts to balance this challenge, NATO and (sometimes) of Europe; future. If the China-Iran strategic or bandwagon with it, would un- In Syria, Libya, the Eastern or any number of other things? Is partnership—hinged to China’s doubtedly influence Eurasia’s stra- Mediterranean, and even in the the Hagia Sophia a mosque, a cathe- existing strategic relationship with tegic dynamics decisively. Karabakh theater, dral, or a historical Pakistan—works as its partners Turkey showed monument? Per- envision, it is hard to imagine an- yet another instru- In almost every imagin- haps Turkey is all other coalition of powers with Turkey ment that it is no able scenario, Turkey is a of these things and equal potential for radically trans- longer reluctant to critical uncertainty. It has that its seemingly forming not just Eurasia’s geopoli- urkey’s aspirations and use beyond its bor- flirted at one time or an- fractured strategic tics but arguably the geopolitics of Tgrowing capabilities will add ders: its powerful other with all of Eurasia’s profile can never be the Middle East, South Asia, and an additional layer to any complex modern military. fit together in any Europe, too. Arab states would scenario of Eurasia’s geopolitical Russia, in partic- key players, sometimes as coherent pattern. likely move more rapidly to ally horizons. In almost every imagin- ular, can no longer friend and sometimes as Perhaps the Turks with each other—and even with able scenario, Turkey is a critical harbor illusions adversary. themselves don’t Israel—to thwart Iran’s new uncertainty. It has flirted at one that the Turks can know. Perhaps Tur- swagger. India might overcome its time or another with all of Eurasia’s be bluffed and coerced to abandon key’s central geography, with direct strategic reluctance to go full into key players, sometimes as friend their interests or ambitions to pla- borders with seven countries and a security alliance with the United and sometimes as adversary. By cate Moscow. Among Russian strategic proximity to many more States, Japan, Australia, and others 2040, we may plausibly assume that military planners, who struggle via long coastlines on the Black Sea in Asia to offset China’s extended it will benefit substantially from to develop the next generation of and the Eastern Mediterranean, Eurasian footprint. Central Asian recent energy discoveries in the weapons for their own military, the makes it impossible to pin down states that have employed Russia’s Black Sea, including energy inde- specter of Turkey’s drones defining the mix of Turkey’s historical ex- influence to balance China will find pendence from Russia. This may the battle spaces in which they op- perience, vital interests, shared as- this gambit less effective as Russia or may not allow Turkey to put its erate must be a powerful attention pirations—that is, what Turks see declines and the China-Iran con- financial house in order and rescue grabber. Turkey is now capable— as their destiny—more concretely. nection solidifies. The European its troubled banking system. But it and apparently willing—to call Perhaps, perhaps, perhaps. Clearly Union, with no coherent policy will certainly whet the appetite of Russia’s bluff. A Turkey capable of unraveling the critical uncertainty towards change in Eurasia and no Turkish strategists who envision a projecting power credibly becomes of “whither Turkey?” logically

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 120 121 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES should begin by understanding to think of itself as a great power for example? In this sense, does to reveal dynamics that portend what Turkey sees itself to be, but but has neither the cohesion, the great power competition come to futures about which we currently also what it sees itself becoming. aspiration, or the capability to be Eurasia’s heartland as a result of give little thought. Great Power But is anyone doing this work? one continues its naval gazing in outsiders combining their capabil- competition is a familiar analyt- search of its transcendent “values.” ities to get inside? ical paradigm, but because it is China is likely to be the only large familiar, embracing it uncritically 2040 power of any heft with a vision of Scenarios that feature lesser but risks intellectual laziness. Eurasia- its dominance in Eurasia in con- capable powers within the Eur- in-2040’s dynamics will not be so cenarios that attempt to cert with its vital interests. That is, asian space aligning and realigning easy to characterize, and the range Simagine Eurasia in the next unless China fails. to increase their strategic trac- of alternative futures arising from 20 years should be heavily in- tion—even if China’s heavy weight surprises is likely much wider than formed by the following kind of f this surmise has value, it is hanging over them—are likely we now imagine. BD research and thinking: who are the Ishould be to focus scenarios players, to what do they attribute in a somewhat different direction, the sources of power in their na- namely toward competition below tionhood, and where, as nations, the “great power” threshold. How do they see themselves located will Iran deal with its growing amongst other players whose own economic and military subordi- sense of national power and des- nation to China? Will this be a tiny might collide or converge with comfortable relationship, and for their own? how long? How might China’s sway over much of Eurasia’s stra- Yet today’s most common dis- tegic space affect Turkey’s own cussion of geopolitical scenarios expanding Eurasian vision—and is about the return of competition its growing military capability to between great powers, almost to pursue it? Where will Russia seek the point of cliché. It is hard to support against the strong prob- bakudialogues.ada.edu.az imagine where great power com- ability that it will be reduced in petition could take place in the potential, power, and, especially, Eurasian heartland if one for- geographic size? Who else might merly powerful state—Russia—has come into this competition? India been reduced to a regional power is a Eurasian state with growing at best; while the United States, global ambitions and military a true great power, remains con- power, and, lest it be forgotten, a fused or ambiguous about its own strong resistance to China’s inces- national interests in Eurasia, has sant efforts to flank it. How does no strategy for Eurasia, and in- New Delhi play its hand, and can it vests its efforts further east; and attract other outside powers to as- the European Union, which likes sist it—Japan or the United States,

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Here we are facing the already economies in the most efficient way Right or Left Economic quite old dilemma between a laissez- possible. Pre-industrial agricultural faire approach or a Keynesian-style societies were believed to have had intrusion into the national economy. limited market interactions and the Recovery? role of government authorities, op- I argue that this perennial ques- erating within mostly monarchical The Wrong Question to Ask tion is fundamentally the wrong regimes, was limited to collecting one to ask. Left or right, so- taxes and ordering some public ac- cial-democratic versus conservative tivities, such as building palaces, Farid Shafiyev policy—these are both outdated religious sites, or roads. concepts for the simple reason that humanity has already entered into With more sophisticated market t is high time to begin looking the COVID-19 pandemic and the a new post-industrial world. The relationships and the arrival of in earnest around the corner, economic crisis has gained consid- Fourth Industrial Revolution that large production chains, the need past the present disrup- erable prominence in the current we are experiencing has already for better regulation to provide tion—evenI devastation—caused discourse on the subject. Public altered the way we live, work, and governmental supervision over the by the COVID-19 pandemic to health concerns raise the ques- earn. It is also affecting national national economy led to the emer- the all-important question of eco- tion of larger state policy with re- authorities. Our discussion should gence of two basic concepts. The nomic recovery. From its onset, gard to the economic and social go beyond the nature of production first was a redistributive model nearly a year ago, many policy- dimensions of the crisis. While it and consumption and focus on hu- based on an interventionist vision makers in the Silk Road region and is clear that governments should, man-to-human and human-to-gov- of the role of government, or a leftist around the world have reflected on in many cases, help businesses ernment interactions. policy. On the right side of the spec- the ways in which their respec- to recover, and they are doing so trum we had the protagonists of tive governments should address on a global scale from the United limited governmental interference the health and ensuing economic States to China, a heated debate Some History in the market. This is, of course, a crises. Some scholars point to about post-pandemic “rightist” rather simplistic description but, the success of China, Singapore, or “leftist” policy preferences is t this point, we need to make for the time being, we will stick to Vietnam, and other countries with raging on political podiums in Aa short excursion into the these two models to advance the controlled political systems; other many countries. Outgoing Amer- history of relations between state discourse in this article. experts highlight the achievements ican president Donald Trump has authorities and the market to deter- of New Zealand, Germany, South vowed to save the country from mine the future of policy choices. The advocates of conservative Korea, and similar states. “leftist radicals,” whereas in more Since the birth of modern political political thought have relied upon social-democratic Europe many economics in the nineteenth cen- the ideas of Adam Smith, who be- The effectiveness of national parties are demanding more vig- tury, the focus of classical econo- lieved in the “invisible hand” of governments in their responses to orous state involvement. mists has been on the relationship the market, which regulates itself between the market and the au- in the best possible way based on thorities. Hence, a goal of the disci- human self-interest. His concept Farid Shafiyev, a former Azerbaijani ambassador to Canada and the Czech Repub- lic, is Chairman of the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIRCenter) and pline of economics was to tune gov- evolved over time into laissez-faire Adjunct Lecturer at ADA University. ernment policies to govern national capitalism—an economic system

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 124 125 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES that protected the operations of the market as their foundation, but and competitive foundation for the The End of History and the individuals and businesses from with redistribution of wealth at the political edifice of the state, while government intervention and in- top. The terror that characterized Hayek wrote about the economic Pandemic volved only the minimum level of the 1917 October Revolution and fundamentals of democracy. Hayek taxes, regulations, and subsidies. the Soviet system thereafter ap- believed that the guarantee of per- uphoria regarding the free Extending Adam Smith’s theories, palled many social democrats and sonal freedom is based on private Emarket economy lasted until another British economist, David turned them away from a radical property and “small” government, 2008, when a deep financial crisis Ricardo, advanced the labor theory egalitarian vision of society. The which limits its interference into the broke out. The expert community of value and the idea of free trade. foundation of modern European market, and argued that there was a voiced its collective concern over social democracy came to rest on threat of totalitarianism emanating unregulated market forces. Even ountering the trend in favor the vision of the welfare state, first from central economic planning. before this, the Asian crisis of 1998 Cof laissez-faire capitalism, developed in the 1920, which pro- and many instances of corporate Karl Marx asserted that an unfet- motes liberal democracy and wealth In the 1970s, when many Western fraud should have raised concerns tered market privileges those with redistribution through taxation and capitalist countries were faced about weak and inadequate regula- wealth and facilitates the exploita- other instruments. with economic stagnation, polit- tion. tion of the poor, which causes class ical leaders such as Ronald Reagan struggle. To resolve this problem, The Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States and Margaret Neoliberal scholars had blinded Marx recommended removing further shook the edifice of the free Thatcher in Great Britain ushered in themselves with their own narrative wealth from the relatively small market. In response, yet another a new era of laissez-faire economics, of scientific progress and the “end number of owners and distributing British economist, John Keynes, labeled as neo-liberalism. American of history.” On paper, the funda- it among all people. His theory had developed a theory for measured economist Milton Friedman crit- mentals of the prevailing economic a tremendous impact on global de- and appropriate state interference icized Keynesianism and offered theory, with its elegant supply and velopments, but a political result in a market economy. Keynes advo- monetary policy as an alternative demand curves, rules of competi- of his doctrine was the totalitarian cated the use of various monetary for the regulation of the economy. tion, comparative advantage, free command economy, which, moral instruments and employment poli- Friedman favored minimalist inter- trade, and so on, appeared ideal. and political consequences to one cies to mitigate the negative effects ventions by the state and large-scale However, in reality neo-liberalism’s side, ultimately reached a dead end of a depression. He advocated more privatization. For him, a certain level idealistic picture was shattered by in terms of economic theory—as robust government interference in of unemployment was healthier for the crisis, high unemployment, manifested in the collapse of the market relations, and this was in society and the economy compared and income inequality. This led to Soviet system. Hence its abandon- time adopted by many capitalist with the zero level that was targeted the formation inter alia of the Oc- ment by most political economists. governments. by Keynes. The end of the Cold War, cupy movement as well as helped the collapse of the Soviet Union, precipitate the rise various types of At the beginning of the twentieth uring the 1930s and 1940s, and the apparent victory of the free populist forces across the political century, political activists devel- Dat the height of Soviet re- market, gave an additional impetus spectrum. oped the concept of social democ- pression and Nazi ideology, two to the principle of unfettered com- racy that abandoned Marxist po- Austrian-born British philosophers, petition. International trade agree- Moreover, the success of the litical radicalism but developed a Karl Popper and Friedrich Hayek, ments such as NAFTA and the Eu- Chinese model over the past two theory of social justice combined came to the defense of liberal de- ropean common market followed decades has reinvigorated the de- with mixed economies that had mocracy. Popper laid the electoral the trend. bate on the choice between political

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 126 127 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES control and economic interven- American “alt-right” assault on lib- the UK, and South Korea are also many other European countries in tionism, on the one hand, and liberal democracy. close to the top of the list, and excel the 1970s. Leaving market forces eral democracy and the laissez-faire in technology, science, and higher unregulated, however, led to the economics, on the other. This short and simplistic excur- education. crises of 1932-1933, 1997-1998, and sion into the history of political 2008-2009. In past and current discourses economy manifests that there is no The question of the relationship about leftist or conservative -pol single “right” or “left” policy that between government and market icies, the political and economic could address all the complexi- remains at the core of the current Contemporary Trends choices (democracy vs. authorities of the development of modern debate. In the eighteenth century, tarianism; market vs. command states and markets. with the rise of manufacturing and eople’s self-interest dictates economy) were sometimes mixed. machines, the market, capital ac- Pthat they compete for re- For example, Chile’s Augusto Pi- he COVID-19 pandemic cumulation, and production devel- sources and income, and, if they nochet advanced both dictatorship Tonce again reivigorated the oped without much government can, they make every effort to en- and market reforms. Scandina- debate about the role of government intervention except for limited regu- hance control over desirable re- vian countries, in general, opted control, protectionism, income relation through taxes. The state appa- sources and diminish competition. for political liberalism and heavy distribution, and various state in- ratus was rudimentary and revolved Unregulated, both companies and state regulation. The economic ad- struments in regulating the market. around the power of the monarch. In individuals tend to remove com- vancement of politically centralized the twentieth century, unregulated petitors and create monopolies and China is based on the move from a Thus far, countries with liberal market forces and the exploitation of bubbles, whereas too much inter- planned to a market economy. democratic forms of government labor caused a chain of revolutions vention destroys incentives to work have manifested much better per- and uprisings. The administration and develop. Today, most countries The fathers of laissez-faire formance in the advancement of of the state became a new scientific adhere to more or less centrist policies. economy such as Adam Smith and economic and social welfare than discipline. National governments Friedrich Hayek also envisaged authoritarian ones. However, in the realized the necessity of rendering This generally centrist approach certain obligations of the state to economic domain, the choice be- essential public services, such as should be continued as we enter render essential public services to tween a conservative laissez-faire education, health, and unemploy- a new era of production and con- the population. Much more moot model and a social-democratic re- ment and retirement benefits, in sumption. There are several trends is the question of distributive and in- order to avoid revolutions. In part, that are radically modifying the the effectiveness of terventionist policy this development rested on more centuries-old structure of market a politically con- The COVID-19 pandem- is not backed by sophisticated modes of production. relations. As a result, current state trolled society. ic once again reivigorated definitive statistics Meanwhile, democracy empowered instruments, developed from the Here, the debate the debate about the role for success either the voices of ordinary citizens by mid-nineteenth century up to the became compli- of government control, way. Scandina- expanding the franchise in response beginning of the twenty-first cen- cated by new po- vian countries can to demands for more public services tury, will be insufficient to address litical trends: the protectionism, income re- boast about their and benefits from governments. future challenges. Russian “sovereign distribution, and various ratings in the UN democracy” narra- state instruments in regu- Human Develop- Too much government interven- First, the robotization of productive, the European lating the market. ment Index, but tion into the market caused stag- tion means that millions of jobs will far-right, and the the United States, nation, as witnessed in the UK and be, and are already being, lost. The

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 128 129 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES future of production with minimum creating a threat to human rights. barter to coins, and from coins to protectionism, which has become human labor is no longer science fic- Famous Israeli historian Yuval paper money. The use of credit cards especially acute during the tion. This revolution puts pressure Harari writes about this in apoca- and wire transfers is still pegged to COVID-19 pandemic. The specter of on governments to provide a basic lyptic tones. However, the problem currencies issued by national gov- technological bifurcation due to the income to large segments of their of a “superstate spy” already exists, ernments. However, the time when growing rivalry between America populations. Thus, we come to inter- regardless of outbreaks of corona- money issue was the exclusive priv- and China is something Friedman ventionist and redistributive policies. virus or other infections. Famous ilege of national authorities has al- did not see coming. Nonetheless, French philosopher Michel Foucault ready gone. With the volatility of some of his arguments remain valid. Furthermore, with the rise of artifi- wrote about the threat of general many currencies and the question of cial intelligence, automatization, and surveillance back in the middle of the sustainability of the world’s largest After all, no country can survive other related digital technologies, the the last century, using the concept economy, namely the United States, by shutting down borders in the cost of production will become min- of “panoptism,” the roots of which and its currency, namely the U.S. long term. From an economic point imal from the current standpoint. go even deeper into history (recall, dollar, many are now talking about of view, global production and trade Demand for low-skilled workers is for instance, the famous project of the growing power of digital curren- is unstoppable, and it has its own ef- diminishing, while the search for an ideal prison, the “panopticon” of cies. Bitcoin has already become pop- fect on the movement of people and highly skilled specialists is on the rise. eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ular in many countries where people ideas. Similarly, in the political do- This will highlight the importance British philosopher Jeremy Ben- do not trust the local government. main, with all its surveillance mecha- of education and talent over cap- tham). Supervision is a characteristic We have yet to fully comprehended nisms, the digital space also provides ital. Thus, the duty of governments feature of all modern states, including the implications of digital currencies opportunities for various non-gov- to provide, at a minimum, a strong both democratic and authoritarian outside the control of national governmental actors to operate—both enabling environment for contem- ones, both of which make use of ernments. It is quite likely that digital legitimate businesses and NGOs, and porary educational opportunities so constantly-evolving technologies. currencies will become more widely illegal crime syndicates and terrorists. as to better prepare their respective The market economy, with its credit circulated and that governments The battle between government sur- populations for the job market of to- cards, mobile phones, applications, will not be able to contain this phe- veillance mechanisms and personal morrow will undoubtedly become an and social networks, which billions nomenon, although the arguments freedoms and people’s free move- increasingly important factor in en- of people use completely voluntarily, of economist like Nouriel Roubini ment is still ongoing, but the “flat suring the success of national econo- is constantly pushing the envelope in against their mainstreaming poten- world” is likely to remain preferable mies in transformational times. this regard. tial will need to be factored into the over closed societies. equation as well. In the meantime, many pundits he aforementioned trends will aking into account all these have raised concerns over the over- Tundoubtedly increase the role In 2005, Thomas Friedman pub- Tdevelopments, I tend to be- whelming power of national gov- of government. At the same time, lished The World is Flat, in which he lieve that, in the economic domain, ernments to surveil and control however, opposing trends are also ap- argued that the forces of globaliza- policymakers across the Silk Road their populations through the de- pearing around the corner. tion make borders increasingly irrel- region and beyond should gear their velopment of digital technologies. It evant and that global supply chain recovery measures somewhere to- is believed that the COVID-19 out- One such revolutionary change dictates national policies. Despite ward the center—fostering market break may lead to the introduction is related to the system of payment. the fact that, since the publication of development through carefully of systems by which citizens may be Human civilization has witnessed this seminal book, globalization has chosen distributive and regulatory totally monitored by the state, thus several previous revolutions—from been threatened by nationalism and instruments. BD

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iceberg. With respect to information the communications sphere, to a Universal Dead-end in a and communication, the current situ- large extent, at the international ation in the world resembles the one level. Otherwise, it would seem Global Wormhole in which humanity found itself when that the greatest achievement of our nuclear weapons first appeared. The time—the amazing world of new power and destructiveness of new communications—could turn out The Need to Regulate Modern communications are comparable to to be a path to the self-destruction Communications the power of nuclear energy. of civilization. Oddly enough, nuclear weapons, The evidence of this threat is which are able to destroy humanity, endless. The recent elections in the Andrey Bystritskiy have become a kind of guarantee of United States, the Second Kara- human survival. The fear of total anni- bakh War, trade disputes, and hilation has played an important role much else are all immersed in a t seems to me useful to under- man is practically deprived of the in keeping the peace. New commu- new information and communi- line, at the very onset, that this opportunity to consume more nications and the rapidly emerging cation space. Back in Soviet times, text is not directly devoted to or less reliable information. This new world of information technolo- there was a joke about how var- theI problems of the South Caucasus modern man is an object of manip- gies has turned out to be a fantastic ious historical figures would stand or Central Asia. But at the same ulation in the interests of one or an- weapon of power. on the platform of Lenin’s mauso- time, everything that it discusses other political or social force. And leum on Red Square, the traditional certainly applies to those parts of the the impact of this situation is being More than 70 years ago, man- vantage-point of the head of the world. Moreover, it is especially ap- felt far and wide. And this same im- kind needed to regulate the use of Soviet Union, during the annual plicable there due to their rapid de- pact could represent a grave and nuclear weapons; November 7th velopment. Perhaps what I describe growing danger to the future of this this system of regu- parade: Genghis and suggest will be interesting for same modern man. lation gradually led With respect to informa- Khan, Alexander people specializing in the problems to the prohibition tion and communication, the Great, and of what some call Eurasia and others ndeed, we face what is perhaps the of ground-based the current situation in Napoleon. Genghis call the Silk Road region. Imain challenge of our time: our nuclear tests and Khan admires the inability to use information. We talk of the deployment the world resembles the armored personnel A summary of my thesis—its lead about fake news, informational con- of nuclear weapons one in which humanity carriers, saying paragraph, as it were—could be un- fusion, and the cognitive dissonance in space as well as found itself when nuclear that if he’d had derstood thusly: today, those who experienced by a large segment of the to the limitation of weapons first appeared. them, he would must deliver accurate and unbiased population due to the inability to dis- the proliferation The power and destruc- have been able to information often claim to be mas- tinguish truth from lies; but this, for of such weapons. take all of Europe. ters of minds. As a result, modern all its significance, is just the tip of the Today we are faced tiveness of new commu- The conqueror with a new, albeit nications are comparable from Macedon is Andrey Bystritskiy is Chairman of the Board of the Foundation for Development and somewhat similar to the power of nuclear delighted with the Support of the Valdai Discussion Club and Dean of the Faculty of Communications, challenge: there is energy. missiles: if he’d had Media, and Design at Russia’s National Research University–Higher School of Economics. a need to regulate them, he’d have

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 132 133 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES taken the whole of epidemiologists, help us deal with this and related and not an end in itself. Later in the Eurasia. Napoleon, there is a need to regu- politicians, and issues—by providing us with the text we will have cause to return to for his part, reads late the communications public figures were information we need to make the what is happening with the modern Pravda and notes sphere, to a large extent, saying. It is diffi- right decisions—but rather to con- media. But for now, let us turn to that with such a at the international level. cult to find any re- fuse us, to compromise any positive COVID-19, which clearly revealed, media outlet, no liable information, expectations. As soon as some en- in my opinion, a much more im- one would have Otherwise, it would seem for example, about couraging information appears, we portant, even fundamental thing. known about his that the greatest achieve- the effectiveness of hear irritating cries that everyone The world has not only changed, defeat at Waterloo. ment of our time—the masks or gloves, to is being deceived, that nothing it has bifurcated, as it were, if not Napoleon really amazing world of new mention nothing of can be trusted, that dangers are ev- multiplied in a more complex way. understood the communications—could vaccines. er-present, and that honest media role of the press warn about them. and actively used turn out to be a path to The stories about Double Reality it. But today, the the self-destruction of the methods of las, this often leads to com- most daring de- civilization. treatment are remi- Apletely monstrous conse- o what had to happen, hap- sires of the great niscent of the eight- quences, like the killing of millions Spened. Humanity has moved Corsican have been surpassed dra- volume collection of the Arabian of innocent minks. To be honest, I to a new world. More precisely, matically. The world is completely Nights fairy tales, in which a new feel sorry for the minks. But still, I it turned out that now we live in confused about what is truth and Scheherazade appears on every wonder what kind of fraud did the two worlds at the same time: a what is falsehood. And this is com- page, knowing nothing about the minks fall victim to? Inaccuracies real, physical one in which we act bined with modern technologies, previous one. Recently, the British in information? Or is there a con- through our corporeal bodies; and including military ones, which magazine The Spectator noted that spiracy of manufacturers who deftly a cyber or virtual one in which our bring us all to the edge of survival. the number of allegedly scientific manipulate public opinion in favor physical presence is minimal—re- New threats can turn the existing in- publications on the coronavirus has of certain fur entrepreneurs? Lord duced to the effort necessary for formation chaos into general chaos. grown 60 times since last year, but knows; but it is certain that we’re the manipulation of an electronic only three of them attempted to un- facing either irresponsibility or cal- device. Something like wiggling a derstand the effectiveness of masks; lousness, which only benefits certain finger or giving a voice command. Arabian Nights and there was still no clear answer. traders in pelts and the like. Prices There are, of course, prerequisites However, I will make a reservation have quadruppled as of this writing. for integrating a computer directly he most striking example, right now: masks definitely need into the human brain, but this is still Thowever, is not the afore- to be worn, if only because there Actually, I am not against—and I the stuff of gimmickry. In theory, mentioned election or various is little harm from this whilst there am even “for”—an approach rooted this is possible, but still doubtful, if wars, but the COVID-19 pan- can be a lot of benefits. in this sort of criticality, for this only because, so far, we have been demic. It was hard to imagine that is, after all, one of the roles of the unable to cope with the pandemic, all of us—from ordinary citizens to The situation with vaccines is media. But it is worth remembering not to mention cancer, strokes, and the most influential people in the even more striking. It seems that that such criticality is a tool for heart attacks—despite all the en- world—would be forced to wander in the media, especially the more finding out a more or less reliable thusiasm regarding the possibilities practically in the dark, unable even popular outlets, all kinds of blog- picture of the world—that, in other of extending life. Biology is still an to understand what certain doctors, gers are trying not so much to words, this criticality is a means elusive area of regulation.

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My point is that In general, the each other, for no one is anony- In the Virtual World... COVID-19 ignited It turned out that now emergence of the mous in world-1. In world-2, rel- what can be called we live in two worlds at virtual world has ative anonymity is fairly common. f we proceed from the model of the emergence of the same time: a real, become a fact. Of course, with some effort, identi- Iparallelism and the alignment the virtual world. And this means ties can be easily exposed. But still, of virtuality with reality, we need Of course, a clear physical one in which we that we need to re- efforts need to be made, which not to reproduce in the virtual world border between act through our corpo- produce a certain everyone can do. World-1 has a something like internet citizen- these worlds will real bodies; and a cyber set of institutions huge number of in- ship and internet not appear in the or virtual one in which regarding human stitutions—police, taxes in order, for foreseeable future, our physical presence is communication in courts, national How do we compare reg- example, to fund but it is already ob- minimal—reduced to the the virtual world. jurisdictions, and ulation in the “real” world from the public vious that virtual However, every- so on. At present, purse the mainte- reality has shifted effort necessary for the thing is already there is nothing (let’s call it world-1) with nance and avail- from being a “des- manipulation of an elec- there—shops, cin- like this in world-2. regulation in the virtu- ability of what is sert” to a proper tronic device. emas, factories, And although the- al world (let’s call this in the public do- communication and so on. The oretically the sub- world-2)? main—reference system, becoming something quite “experience economy,” as it is being jects of world-2 and educational comparable to the world of rela- increasingly called, is only a part (whether they are sites, libraries, and tively “real” communications. of this virtual world; it makes no people or institutions) are reach- so on. And we also need to figure sense to consider it outside the able with the help of the institu- out how to organize and finance Virtual space today plays the same new double reality or new glo- tions of world-1, this is achieved something like an emergency alert role that physical territory used to bality. The success and despair of with significantly greater difficul- system. And all this without even play in the past. the Internet of Things is a perfect ties and obstacles. And in some getting into questions regarding ju- illustration of this duality. cases, the institutions of world-1 diciary and executive power in the olumbus discovered new are not at all able to cope with the virtual world. Clands in the Americas. f we assume that the idea of the new challenges as, for example, in Then, centuries ago, it did not Iemergence of a parallel virtual the field of copyright, defamation, Moreover, in the virtual world, we matter fundamentally whether world is correct, then a lot of ques- and so on. also need an information hierarchy. one grew bananas or tobacco. tions arise. First, how can we regu- In conditions Land was a universal commodity, late those relations—those subjects The point is that where fake news “flexible” and adaptable to what- that arise in the virtual world? At we need new in- we need new institutions predominates, and ever was in demand. Frequencies the same time, how do we compare stitutions in a new in a new world; more- amidst the simple play that role today. It doesn’t regulation in the “real” world (let’s world; moreover, lack of reliable in- matter which ones, by the way. call it world-1) with regulation in the these new insti- over, these new institu- formation, we need The digital solution is univer- virtual world (let’s call this world-2)? tutions should be tions should be somehow to maintain trust- sally applicable to everything that somehow associ- associated with the insti- worthy informa- people use for communication, In the “real” world, for example, ated with the institutions of our familiar, tion institutions. no matter whether they exchange it is not quite so easy or devoid of tutions of our fa- “real” world. At one time, when real goods or services. consequence for people to insult miliar, “real” world. the first electronic

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 136 137 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES media appeared, about a century distinction between what is called are turning into a separate social processes, elections, and so on have ago, for example, they did so in the media and what is called, for group, a kind of mediocracy. And their roots precisely in the contra- the form of “public service broad- example, a community, a party, a this rather large group claims its dictions between the ways people casting,” with the BBC playing corporation, and so on. The gen- own role in society. This is some- behave in these two worlds. a vanguard role. The goal, then, eral mediatization that has taken what reminiscent of the partocracy was extremely simple—to create a place in which any supermarket is in the Soviet Union. In that time, There has been a lot of talk about source of information controlled a media that releases news about people who were supposedly called the rules of such mutual inter- by society, independent of adver- sausage and cheese has led to a sit- upon to serve society turned into ference, which boils down to the tising and other private interests, a uation whereby the media—whose its masters. Today, those who must fundamental problem of the re- source whose task was to broadcast purpose is to provide the public deliver accurate and unbiased in- lationship between the “old” and the most reliable information to the with accurate information—is formation often claim to be masters “new” spaces. In the very near fu- whole of society. drowning in a sea of pseudo-media of minds. As a result, modern man ture, this state of affairs will only get with the goal of is practically deprived of the oppor- worse thanks to a combination of It is clear that in promoting their tunity to consume more or less reli- things like the emergence of global the virtual world the various communities views or products, able information. He is an object of broadband internet (Elon Musk’s this kind of media of people involved in the which, in a sense, manipulation in the interests of one Starlink), automatic linguistic cannot be repro- creation and distribution are the same thing. or another political or social force. translation that makes use of ele- duced. But one ments of artificial intelligence, and might think about of content are turning into Evidently, a mu- the strengthening of the Internet how to do some- a separate social group, a tation has begun Getting Worse and Worse of Things. All told, such develop- thing similar. For kind of mediocracy. And within the seem- ments will be able to change signifi- example, a kind of this rather large group ingly professional n general, it should be noted cantly the balance of forces in the news aggregator claims its own role in so- media. Huge Ithat the problem of the relation- man-society-state system. Things controlled by so- human markets for ship between virtuality and reality won’t end there. This will affect ciety and main- ciety. This is somewhat the consumption of is completely non-trivial. Already many aspects of life and the global tained at the ex- reminiscent of the parto- all kinds of infor- now, the conflict of the coexistence economy, which by construction pense of internet cracy in the Soviet Union. mation, as well as between reality and virtuality is will affect all our national econo- users, for example, political competi- obvious. For example, problems of mies as well. paid for with an tion, have resulted borders and sovereignty arise. The imposed general tax on each user. in many media outlets becoming a formal limitlessness of virtuality is n addition, since it will never The management of these taxes, kind of political party or branches unequivocally contradictory to na- Ibe possible to separate world-1 incidentally, would be completely of parties. There can be no talk of tion-states and jurisdictions. and world-2—at least unless or transparent. any impartiality; CNN, for example, until artificial intelligence destroys is the mouthpiece of the Democratic I want to emphasize that we are humanity—it will be necessary n my opinion, the problem of Party in the United States. not talking about what is better or to understand and then manage Ireliable information is espe- worse: virtuality or reality. Rather, the changes that the “new” world cially important, because under Moreover, the various communi- the question is about interaction brings to the “old” one. Much has the influence of “virtuality” and ties of people involved in the cre- and coexistence. Endless talk about already been mentioned, but the new competition, we have lost the ation and distribution of content interference in internal political impact will go much deeper.

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For example, problems arise with censorship, not to mention ordinary 100 water pipe systems at once. this is especially noticeable. Leo respect to applying laws in the vir- individuals, or certain points of view. Therefore, this issue is not a matter Tolstoy or Charles Dickens or tual world. A person lives and dies, of pure competition. Rabindranath Tagore are at the top eats and drinks, sleeps and does It turns out that this is very char- of the cultural hierarchy. Columbus’ sports physically, in the real world. acteristic: virtual spaces that seem In one way or another, the largest merits are significant. But today, as Consequently, the virtual world to have been created for free com- modern social networks, which are many times in the past, an attempt becomes a tool for influencing the munication have suddenly turned sometimes called the Big Five, have is being made at a global revision of real world. The transformation into information ghettos; any become a very serious and dan- hierarchies. Incidentally, we see this of the media into political parties attempt to escape from them is gerous tool for the rule of the mi- taking place in the United States. and communities has already been punishable by ostracism—an old, nority over the majority, a way of But in contrast to past years, those mentioned above. But there is also even ancient way of getting rid of imposing new hier- who are seeking a the opposite. For example, NEX- those with whom one disagrees. It archies and crudely place under the sun TA—a Belarusian public organiza- seems to me that the sphere of so- manipulating con- Physics uses the concept have a new, previ- tion based in Poland—is trying to cial media should be civilized and sumers in favor of ously undeveloped present itself as a media outlet, al- transformed from wild information often-unknown of quantum wormholes: instrument. Vir- though it is in truth a fully-fledged prairies with the rule of a strong patrons. At one something that connects tuality allows for mechanism of manipulation, con- moderator who for all intents and time, the inhab- different universes togeth- both the construc- trolling the behavior of the masses purposes, serves the owner of said itants of a still- er in a nonlinear way. In tion of new hierar- in favor of certain political forces. social media, into some sort of so- young Soviet Union this sense, the virtual and chies and for them cially regulated space. By the way, I could witness with real worlds in which we to be implemented In other words, the subjects of the would like to note that, in general, their own eyes how through the impact virtual world are trying to change the obvious arbitrariness of the a cultural, anti-hi- now live are also connect- of virtuality on re- the real world. And since these owners of social media should be erarchical revo- ed by what could be lik- ality. same subjects live in that same regulated not only by laws in rela- lution was taking ened to wormholes. real world, it becomes possible or tion to social media themselves, but place, the end of Physics uses tempting to change the hierarchies also by the equipment manufac- which turned out the concept of of world-1 according to their own turers with the help of which these to be so bloody that it absorbed quantum wormholes: something ideas. social media are operated. most of those who were involved in that connects different universes the anti-hierarchical coup itself. together in a nonlinear way. In this f course, social media met- ociety and private citizens sense, the virtual and real worlds Oworks are champions at re- Sshould have the right to both in which we now live are also con- building the modern world. There create any virtual community they Hierarchies and nected by what could be likened is no need to draw attention to the wish and have access to networks Wormholes to wormholes. In essence, these gross manipulation by Twitter, controlled by society as such. One wormholes are people and their Facebook, and less mainstream could say that we need antitrust umanity lives in a world of associations; they connect human players. The recent American elec- laws for the internet. In some re- Hhierarchies. Often they are civilization into a kind of complex, tions are replete with examples of spects, it is not a bad idea to re- probably not entirely fair. But this is intricate structure solely by laying manipulation. Even the President call the example of plumbing. One what makes the existence of people the aforementioned wormholes. of the United States is subject to apartment building cannot have sustainable. In culture, by the way, And this makes the current situation

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 140 141 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES extremely interesting, but at the actual, physical wars. It is obvious At the beginning of this essay, I is so evident that there is no need same time terribly dangerous. Hun- that a part of all this has success- compared the power of modern to talk anymore about it in detail. dreds of millions of sites, aggressive fully moved into the virtual world, communications with the en- But everything in the world is du- and manipulative social networks, and that from there strikes out at ergy of nuclear weapons. And the al-natured and ambivalent. If we attempts at establishing mediocracy real, living people and turns them threat of nuclear weapons, for all miss the moment, especially given carried out by numerous suppos- into corpses. There is also a terrible its reality and riskiness, ultimately the aggressive and contradictory edly journalistic communities, and challenge to private life, the conse- turned out to be a means of pre- nature of human beings, we could new technologized and ideologized quences of which are not yet fully serving global peace. New com- engender a destructive evil instead communities striving for power understood. For example, what will munications are, of course, a great of harnessing great good. (and much more) all make the vir- happen to sexual relations in the blessing too. They can and are tual world a competitor and a threat near future? How much will they already providing incredible ben- The peaceful coexistence of all to the real world. But in essence, be mediated by virtuality? And efits. The truth of this statement worlds is necessary. BD this is a fratricidal struggle—the what will constitute violence in the most dangerous amongst all pos- virtual world? sible types of war. n general, I repeat, there are a lot n some general sense, this has Iof questions. But the most im- Ihappened before, for we are portant challenge we face, from my facing an extremely alarming chal- point of view, is the disintegration of lenge: the chal- information hierar- lenge of a global The most important chal- chies, the chaos of conflict, a kind of the space in which global civil war. It lenge we face is the disin- humanity lives. This would be impos- tegration of information can lead to terrible sible in a direct hierarchies, the chaos of shocks, to wild vio- form without a new the space in which hu- lence and, in the fu- virtual world—a manity lives. ture, to the degrada- bakudialogues.ada.edu.az world in which tion of civilization. there are no rules yet, no boundaries, no established In my opinion, there is an ur- hierarchies, not even a single lan- gent need for the most decisive ap- guage. But the development is rapid, proach to establishing principles of and we may not be able to keep up regulation of this already-existing with it; and this will lead to chaos. virtual world. Otherwise, we will in fact become like moles, and blindly, There are a lot of challenges. Here chaotically make holes in the world you find the political state of coun- in which we live. And this can easily tries and the world, and mutual come to be done so badly that ev- influence. Here you find war: real, erything collapses.

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grows ever more intricately con- Often those states that do not Grand Strategy Along the nected and interdependent. To the seem to be determining the out- extent that security was indivisible comes of interactions merely be- in the past, in today’s era of glo- cause there are not the states that Silk Road balized connections, digitally em- announce outcomes of grand-scale powered mechanized warfare, and negotiations are thought of as The Pivotal Role of Keystone States widespread mutual vulnerabilities to being secondary, derivative, and phenomena such as pandemics and essentially reactive in their foreign global environmental disarray, secu- policies. Often analysts tend to at- Gregory Gleason rity is less divisible than ever before. tribute highly constrained preroga- tives to lesser powers, arguing that he concept of “great power the product of a combination of the The indivisibility of security in the second order powers behave competition” is a focal power and volition of the leading the present era implies that the great either as vassals of a great power point of all thinking about states. Textbooks told the history of powers—measured by their eco- (the “bandwagoners”) or exercise grandT strategy in international pol- diplomacy in terms of the outcome nomic standing and their force and a swing influence by shifting their itics. Throughout history, the rise of the competition of great powers influence in the world of advanced allegiances to in a way that alters a and fall of nations, victories and de- but, significantly, also tended weaponry—wield the capacity to in- balance of power (the “balancers”). feats in the great internal contests, to represent the history of great flict enormous damage. But, asym- and the praise and rebuke garnered power competition as though those metrically and strangely, the great hat this mainstream by great leaders has always been powers were acting alone. From powers do not appear to exercise Wapproach to international the product of what is called power the eras of Cyrus the Great and proportional capacity to generate politics fails to appreciate is that in competition. Great power compe- Alexander of Macedon in antiquity equal measures of consensus and critical points in history, key states tition is the jockeying for position, to the days of strategic competition deliver equal measures of benefit. among the lesser powers have made influence, advantage, and control in the modern Westphalian na- This is particularly important for the all the difference in the outcome of by those states that rank high in the tion-state system, the popular view many countries that fully participate great power competitions. Writing lists of economic, political, and mil- sees history as shaped exclusively in international processes but do not in the previous issue of Baku itary standing. by the deeds of the leaders of the rank high on the list of measures of Dialogues, Nikolas Gvosdev accu- most powerful and celebrated na- power and influence. Textbooks of rately and succinctly drew attention Because great power competition tion-states—the great powers. international relations spend a great to Azerbaijan’s pivotal position in has always been the focal point of deal of time measuring the power the current situation by pointing major shifts in global politics, it has his popular view of and might of great nations and tend out that “the Silk Road region— also always been natural to think Tinternational politics was to glide over or entirely ignore the with Azerbaijan at its geopolitical in terms of the shifts in standing never entirely accurate and is prob- influence of those countries which center—is located at the seams of the among the leading powers to be ably growing less so as the world are not represented at the table in global system and is positioned to the negotiating conventions of the serve as a critical mediator between great powers. Textbooks rarely even different major powers, acting as Gregory Gleason is Professor Emeritus at the University of New Mexico and Professor of Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, have a name for those other than the gateways between different blocs a partnership between the German Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Department of great powers. “Small states”? “Lesser of states, regional associations, and Defense. The views expressed in this article are those of the author. Powers”? “Middle Powers”? civilizational groupings.”

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As Gvosdev rightly argued, the exercised by keystone states will in recent decades, reemerging only rise” to the elaboration of a new, role of keystone states is not only increase as discussion involves an recently as a central focal point in extended prosperity sphere, driven the function of “balancing or increasingly large community of thinking and discussion about by financial investment and gain. band-wagoning” in the calculations scholars, analysts, and diplomats. international relations. The U.S. The Belt and Road Initiative is rhe- of the great powers; it is also a role National Security Strategy an- torically presented as a policy plat- the includes essentially shaping the From my perspective, the role of nounced in December 2017 and form designed to advance mutual outcome of diplomatic interactions. Azerbaijan as a keystone state in in- soon followed by the U.S. National economic interests and but also Gvosdev draws attention to the fluencing the international commu- Defense Strategy in 2018 explic- features a grand geostrategic pro- proposition that at critical points nity is amplified by three important itly articulated the competition gram designed to fuse the economic in history, it is often the lesser factors. First, the current climate among the world’s contending great interests with the political ones states that play the of political change powers, namely China, Russia, and of a network of states across East most significant and the search the United States. Asia, Southeast Asia, the Silk Road role in orienting In critical points in his- for new forms region (Eurasia), East-Central the direction of tory, key states among of political equi- The recalibration of America’s Europe, and the Middle East. diplomatic rela- the lesser powers have libria—meaning a foreign policy posture is a re- tions and shaping made all the difference “new world order.” sponse above all to two recent he stakes are high in great the changes in Second, new trade trends. First, it represents a re- Tpower competition. In the the character of in the outcome of great and transport in- sponse to Moscow’s invasion midst of today’s disputatious dis- world order. The power competitions. tegration efforts (Georgia), annexation (Crimea), cussions of international politics, present set of cir- One such pivotal state is such as Beijing’s and clandestine occupation one of the few things that seem to cumstances is just Azerbaijan. Belt and Road Ini- (east Ukraine) of neighboring unite everyone is the recognition such a moment in tiative—meaning countries. Moscow’s revisionist that the prevailing world order history. Azerbaijan is just one such a “grand inversion.” And third, the policies toward the prevailing lacks the consensus support it has a state in a pivotal position that impact of the transition to fixed- European security order pro- enjoyed for the last seven decades. makes its policies crucial in influ- system infrastructures for transport voked a reassessment of the east- We may not all agree on the ratio- encing changes in the contempo- and communication particularly west balance of power. Moreover, nale, grounds, or justification of rary world order. in the period of the information Moscow’s efforts to use increased the international disagreements in stage of the industrial revolution— economic integration throughout which we find ourselves, but we The concept of a “keystone state” meaning something very different the former Soviet space to provide can at least all agree that the level of has been analyzed in the pages of than the ancient Silk Road. Each a justification for the re-creation of disagreement is unprecedented in Baku Dialogues from a variety of will be examined in turn. a politico-military bloc called into recent decades. methodological and policy vantage question the assumption that the points. This discussion has begun resolution of Cold War ideological What, then, explains the failure to influence the way that others, New Equilibria competition would be followed by of security institutions, multilateral scholars, analysts, and practitioners an enduring peace and stability. economic institutions, and the for- comprehend the present dynamic he concept of “great power eign policy postures of the world’s period of global order. It can be Tcompetition” had been ab- Second, the change of American great powers to forge and sustain expected that the influence of this sent in much of the literature and foreign policy is a result in Beijing’s a stabilizing and forward-oriented concept and the strategic leverage dialogue of international discussion shift from the principle of “peaceful consensus on a global level?

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The spectrum of views is broad. are no longer capable of ensuring swept into this role by the con- cholars and diplomats in tra- Similar to many historical periods stability and promoting peace and sequences of the actions of other Sditional schools of thought of power transitions, there are status prosperity? If indeed structural states. tend to look to the lessons of his- quo powers and revisionists. There adjustment is a necessity, why has tory in coming to terms with the are those who favor strengthening world order not simply reestab- The liberal international order challenges of the future. To the ex- existing international institutions, lished itself? based on the nation-state system tent that a unipolar moment existed and those who favor completely and market-oriented commercial at all, it was fleeting. Natural eco- abandoning those same institutions ne school of modern relations was challenged by the nomic, social, and political changes or replacing them with entirely new Othought maintains that communist system based on the make unipolar moments unlikely institutions. There are proponents the so-called liberal international elimination of the Westphalian and not long-lasting. The globe is of enhanced hegemonic stability order that crystallized at the end of nation-state and relied upon Com- by nature spherical and the world’s and binding international agree- World War II and was buttressed munist Party-directed interna- politics are by nature multifaceted. ments, and proponents of multi- for the past 75 years by the major tional commerce. The great bulk of A multipolar system of politics of lateral balances of power, multipo- Western states under the de facto the globe’s population—what came the global community is inevitable. larism, and self-reliance. And there leadership of the United States is to be known as the developing This has brought many people to are proponents of the introduction best understood in historical con- countries or the Third World—was argue that we should look back into of new competing or even context and a broad, global perspec- not explicitly counted as belonging history to find examples of suc- testing leading institutions with the tive. This school of thought runs either to the “first world” of the ad- cessful formulas. idea of shifting the focus of interna- roughly along the following lines. vanced Western industrial coun- tional negotiation to new forms of In the pivotal period of 1945-1949, tries or the “second world” of the Can we expect that a multipolar activism on subjects ranging from the United States took steps which communist countries. When the balance of power is the most stable distributive politics to global envi- led it to assume an international Soviet Union fell in 1991, the bi- and equitable formula for the new ronmental issues. role of guarantor-of-last-resort for polar system came to an end and international order? Can we not international stability. The United the “first world” (increasingly simply return to the noble agree- All of these debates over security, Nations and the family of eco- termed the “developed world”), ments of the balance of power pe- equity, representation, the envi- nomic, political, and cultural with the United States as its de riod that established a “concert of ronment, and now, given the most institutions associated with the facto leader, gained a new posi- nations” with stability and equity to pressing immediate challenges of UN became the basic structural tion of prominence. The idea of the states which adopted them? the modern era—responding to foundation for the postwar order. the “unipolar moment” drew at- pandemic disease—raise questions The United States was not acting tention to the unusual historical Some strategists argue that we about why the institutions of the alone, but America did bear most circumstances. Now, three decades will mislead ourselves if we exag- past have lost the ability to resolve of the direct cost burden for this later, the international situation is gerate romanticized versions of the the problems of the present. role for decades. To the extent that very different. If the United States stability of the past. In his compact the United States grew into the is no longer willing or able to pro- and yet encyclopedic one-volume Have the major institutions of in- role of supplying hegemonic sta- vide that stabilizing role of a guar- analysis of international politics ternational cooperation of the past bility, this was seen as being less a antor, should not some other in- entitled World Order (2014), Henry become merely fatigued, or has the product of an international design strument or mechanism of world Kissinger offers a wealth of infor- contemporary world itself changed of America’s political system than order simply be substituted to re- mation and insight on the idea in such a way that these institutions the fact that the United States was establish world order? of global order in the past. Two

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 148 149 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES positions stand out in the book that more of a series of temporary fixes ulated, not all societies around the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, the are crucial in helping us to com- than the creation of a concert of globe shared these same assumptions, IAEA, and countless other regional prehend today’s world. One simple great powers. or at least did not interpret them security institutions—derive their but particularly important thesis of in the same way. The Westphalian legitimacy from the basic legalistic the book concerns the very idea of Kissinger argues that what passes system worked to the extent that it did principles set forth by Dutch ju- world order. Kissinger notes that for world order today day is derived in Europe. But at the opposite end of rist and philosopher Hugo Grotius scholars and practitioners speak from an arrangement devised in the Eurasian landmass from Europe, that serve as the “axioms” of the comfortably about the structure of Western Europe nearly four cen- China was the center of its own hier- post-Westphalian system. The ur- the global community as referring turies ago at a peace conference in archical and theoretically universal gent problems of world order today, to a set of rules and responsibilities the German region of Westphalia concept of order. This system had op- if one follows this realistic inter- that created a stable relationship and conducted without the involve- erated for millennia—it had been in pretation of international politics, among countries that we regard as ment or even awareness of most place when the Roman Empire gov- are related to challenges that arise “world order.” other continents or civilizations. erned Europe as a unity—and based from competing visions of how the The Peace of Westphalia reflected a itself not on the sovereign equality of world can and should be governed Kissinger sees this as an over- practical accommodation to reality, states but on the presumed bound- and how disputes can be resolved. simplification of the past, pointing not a unique moral insight. The lessness of the emperor’s reach. In In the logic of the situation of to- out that, in reality, “there never has stability of the system relied on a this Eastern concept, national sover- day’s world, the states and regions been a real world order.” Kissinger network of independent states mu- eignty in the European sense did not that are situated territorially or con- asserts that what was often con- tually agreeing to refrain from in- exist, because the emperor held sway ceptually between the competing strued as the vaunted architec- terference in each other’s domestic over “all under Heaven.” Moreover, visions of world order are of pivotal ture of enduring stability was in affairs and checking each other’s in much of the geography between significance. Keystones states are little more than a de facto patch- ambitions through a general equi- Europe and China, Islam’s different significant for this reason. work of limited agreements. Those librium of power. The Westphalian universal concept of world order held agreements might have promised system endured, despite its many sway, with its own vision of a single Valhalla, but in fact offered only flaws, to become the foundation for divinely sanctioned sphere of gov- The Grand Inversion limited, practical, and specific solu- many of the assumptions of the in- ernance uniting and pacifying the tions to a concrete set of urgent ternational system that were exem- world. Meanwhile, the emergence of n the days before the Peace of problems. To the extent that such plified by the principles of the UN the New World in the eighteenth cen- IWestphalia—from the point of institutional arrangements were Charter, institutions of global gov- tury added a new set of civilizational view of the necessities of trade and effective, they succeeded by- re ernance, and in general the idea of principles in which the American vi- movement from place to place— straining overweening powers and a liberal international order. sion rested not on an embrace of the the world did appear to be flat for propping up the defense of basically European balance-of-power system most people. Long-distance enter- defenseless societies. These de facto second important thesis that but on the achievement of peace prises involving cooperation and arrangements served general goals AKissinger puts forward is that through the spread of democratic conflict were conducted on what even if they did not derive from world order was never well-fitted principles. appeared in those day to be essen- the universal acknowledgement of to the political expectations of the tially a plane. In antiquity, the Silk natural law. Kissinger’s argument is Westphalian logic—not then, and The leading institutions of the Road gained its name from the that the “balance of power” among even less now. At the time the West- international security architec- trade of silk from China to points the European great powers was phalian principles were first artic- ture in present circumstances—the west, north, and south. As early as

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 150 151 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES the days of Han dynasty in China as well. Land traffic was easily con- goals. Great powers have sought t present, all three of these (approximately 200 BCE) long- tested by brigands and local com- to exert dominance over portions Afactors are changing sig- distance commercial trade was peting political forces. Maritime of the sea by encouraging priva- nificantly and rapidly. Economic based on silk but also included passage was less easily contested teers and even pirates to corner growth in China has lowered the many other scarce and valuable and became the domain of major or block trade markets. Innocent difference in labor costs between commodities such as paper, gun- European powers. The principle of passage through highly congested China and other countries and, powder, and spices. The Silk Road freedom of the seas was based on and contested chokepoints such as even more importantly, the labor grew to become a channel of cul- the idea that national sovereignty the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait component is diminishing in rela- tural, political, and military expan- only applies to a geographical ter- of Malacca or the so-called South tion to other components in produc- sion as well. With its publication in ritory located on the land surface China Sea grew to be more con- tion costs. Technological changes 1300, Marco Polo’s book Marvels of and the bodies of water which are tested as the shift from land to sea are increasing energy efficiency the World brought cross-land trade within the bounds of the territory. routes became more significant. and the digitization of manufac- routes to the attention of the Med- The concept of the freedom of the turing is reducing iterranean basin. The growth of seas, or Mare Liberum, was first ar- For a little more the advantage of east-west trade along the Silk Road ticulated by Grotius in 1609. This than four decades, For a little more than four large, centralized greatly spurred economic and po- remarkable Dutchman argued that a historically un- decades, a historically production facil- litical development along various the use of the seas as a matter of first paralleled transi- unparalleled transition in ities. At the same east-west corridors leading through principles was a common space tion in global trade time, advances Central Asia and the Caucasus— which could be enjoyed by all. patterns has been global trade patterns has in transportation what is now termed by some as taking place in the been taking place in the are reducing the Eurasia and others as the Silk Road or the past four centuries context of the emer- context of the emergence cost-advantage of region. Fcountries have interpreted gence of China as a of China as a major and maritime freight the principle of freedom of the major and rapidly rapidly climbing power. over land freight. The shift to maritime traffic, seas in various ways, often coming climbing power. In These factors— which started the “Age of into disagreement regarding the a little more than a in combination Discovery,” disproportionately re- use of waterways adjoining sov- generation, China has transformed with great power efforts to nation- duced dependence upon cross-land ereign land, the right to the use of itself from a backward economy alize maritime trade routes—are trade routes. A “great transition” resources, the use of fisheries and into one of the world’s largest, combing to have the effect of re- took place with the advent of mar- minerals, the use of underground most competitive, and most for- ducing the advantages of the maritime traffic for commercial devel- watercourse traversing sovereign ward-looking industrial economies. itime trade routes first established opment and imperialist expansion. land, and the right to innocent pas- China’s initial advantage in east- in the Age of Discovery over older, Bartolomeu Dias’ travel to the sage for commercial or other pur- west trade was based largely on the more traditional land trade routes. Indian Ocean in 1488 was followed poses through physically restricted cost advantages of Chinese imports by Ferdinand Magellan’s circum- and heavily used passageways such made possible by three factors: first, China’s turn to economic reform navigation of the world in 1522. as the Bosporus. Since its inception, extensive state-financed support for began in 1978 under the leadership As the cost advantage of maritime the principle of freedom of the seas export-oriented industrial goods; of Deng Xiaoping. A recalibration trade over cross-land trade grew, has led to contestation among great second, the cost-advantage of mar- of China’s foreign policy soon after the incentive for military extension powers, which have sought to use itime freight over land freight; and the turn of the century was exem- of power proportionally increased sea lanes for military and strategic third, significantly lower labor costs. plified by the concept of China’s

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“peaceful rise.” Policies predicated rail, energy systems, and communi- Europe, Russia and its former- the principle of the freedom of the on this concept became the driving cation infrastructure were financed Soviet periphery, the Middle East, seas and more willing to accept force behind the rising tide of the through China’s government con- and Africa to China and much of Chinese overtures to privatize stra- “Asian Century,” with China be- trolled financial institutions such as the rest of Asia into a massive single, tegic bodies of water like straits or coming once again the engine of the China Development Bank and coordinated Eurasia-centered sup- whole portions of various seas and development for much of Asia. the China EXIM Bank. The agree- ply-chain network—hence the re- oceans. In referring to a “grand in- China’s economic change brought ments behind these investment vival of the term Silk Road region. version,” Michta has argued that hundreds of millions of people out mechanisms was almost exclusively Once the new trade network is in Beijing is calculating on replacing of dire poverty in a single genera- framed in terms of China’s bilateral place, its planners envision that the maritime supremacy in favor tion. During the early stages of this agreements with partner countries. the Chinese national currency, the of the land domain that for four economic transformation, immense RMB, will rise in importance to be- centuries favored the interests of infrastructure development trans- Since 2013, China’s leadership come a major reserve currency in the Western world. In such a sce- formed transportation, energy, and under Xi Jinping has greatly wid- international trade. nario, Michta states, the European communication systems in China ened and deepened the foreign eco- Rimland would cease to be the and across Asia. The world’s leading nomic influence of China through RI implies a set of economic transatlantic gateway to Eurasia, public international financial insti- multilateral foreign projects. Bactivities that also suggest a becoming instead the terminal end- tutions—the World Bank, the Inter- China’s leading role in establishing geostrategic importance in terms point of a China-dominated Eur- national Monetary Fund, the Asian the Asian Infrastructure Invest- of recalibrating relations among asian empire. Development Bank, and others— ment Bank (AIIB) signaled a new the great powers. As Dean of the have sought to mobilize capital for era in this dynamic transformation. George C. Marshall European he geostrategic significance development throughout the Asian China’s proposal to extend its in- Center for Security Studies Andrew Tof BRI is already illustrated region and, at the same time, estab- fluence through an unprecedented Michta has argued, BRI is essen- in terms of its effects. China’s as- lish a virtuous circle of economic and massive foreign development tially drafting a new set of policies sertion of sovereign control over change promoting good governance, framework, initially referred to as and practices that amounts to a maritime trade routes in the South fiscal accountability, environmental One Belt, One Road, was unveiled “grand inversion.” Just as the shift China Sea—a major trade channel protection, human rights, and social to finance and politically endorse to maritime trade routes in the Age between East and West—created equity. Despite progress, the leading development projects to recreate a of Discovery transformed the land great consternation in government international institutions were modern form of east-west commerce trade routes shifting from land to chancelleries throughout Southeast criticized for not working boldly along what was often described of as sea, BRI is envisioned to result in Asia. After China seized a strategic and swiftly enough to meet Asia’s the ancient Silk Road trading routes an “inverted” transformation to a reef off its coast, the government mounting development challenges. between China and Europe. new framework that amounts to a of the Philippines appealed for restoration of the significance of the remedy to the Permanent Court of nder the leadership of Jiang This strategic infrastructure ini- Eurasian land bridge and a reduc- Arbitration in The Hague. In April UZemin and Hu Jintao, tiative—later renamed the Belt tion in the importance of maritime 2016 the court found in favor of the China’s infrastructure develop- and Road Initiative—sought to ex- traffic and sea-based trade flows. Philippines. But its ruling came at ment projects extended throughout pand to include a large number of roughly the same time that presi- the Asian region and beyond. “special economic zones” and stra- If fewer countries are directly dential elections in the Philippines China’s rapidly growing foreign tegic cooperation agreements in reliant on maritime traffic, they brought in new political leader- infrastructure projects in highways, an effort to link the economies of may grow less concerned about ship under Rodrigo Duterte. The

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 154 155 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES new Philippine administration the idea of maintaining a “common between national sovereignty and zone also result in a parallel secu- recalibrated, indicating its accep- economic space” throughout their trans-national cooperation. rity sphere? tance of the terms of China’s claims geography. To all of those present over sovereign control of the South at the first post-Soviet negotiations, any large BRI infrastruc- ixed physical distribution sys- China Sea. the perpetuation of cooperation in Mture projects are now in Ftems such as roads, railways, economic and commercial relations their first stages of implementation oil and gas pipelines, water distri- A principal goal of the Belt and was uniformly desired because ex- throughout the Silk Road region. bution systems, irrigation systems, Road Initiative is certainly to bring isting economic relationships were The coordination of the “software” electrical distribution grids, and about the restoration of the cross- seen to be practical and the idea of government policies with the fixed telecommunication networks land transit corridors. To the ex- of maintaining a “single economic “hardware” of a fixed systems—e.g. often come with the features of a tent that technology, finance, and space” was expected to be easily the interconnections of rail, road, natural monopoly. Commodity international politics all trend in achievable. But, in fact, the collapse port facilities; power grids and markets are economically most ef- that direction, the states located of the Soviet Union was not fol- airspace control; fixed electronic ficient where there are many - pro at the seams of shifts in the global lowed by the emergence of graceful communication systems including ducers and many consumers, and system are positioned to serve as economic cooperation. Instead, the transmitters, relay towers, and re- when competitive pricing prin- critical mediators between dif- period was characterized by a great ceivers—are projected for devel- ciples determine the terms of ex- ferent major powers. These states deal of economic one-upmanship opment throughout the entire Silk change. These features describe the are of increasing importance, and and protectionism driven by narrow Road region, overcoming geog- standard market model. Natural Azerbaijan is just such a state. interpretations of self-interest. raphy and drawing East and West monopolies do not share all these together in an intricate network of market features. Fixed distribution In the immediate years following linkages. systems tend to fail in conforming Road and Regimes the Soviet collapse, dedicated ef- to efficient market conditions, par- forts by the negotiators repre- These projects raise two ques- ticularly if there is low diversity of ogic—no matter how clear senting post-Soviet countries to co- tions. Can the construction of the producers and consumers. Land how compelling—does ordinate currency, customs, trade, new BRI “hardware” of infrastruc- not always guide politics. In pol- and investment policies produced ture projects in transportation, en- The case of a single oil pipe- itics, sometimes matters of prin- far more cooperation on paper than ergy, and telecommunication create line between the producer and the ciple and logic are important, but in practice; an enduring diversity a new framework for cooperation consumer illustrates the problem calculations of self-interest get in and incompatibility of standards, in the greater Silk Road region? of a natural monopoly. If the con- the way. The early stages of devel- policies, and practices slowed in- Will the “software” of government sumer side is offered only a limited opment in the post-Soviet space tegration and harmed trade within policies and practices sync with number of suppliers—as is usually after the disintegration of the Soviet the entire Eurasian region. Suc- this “hardware,” or will government the case with pipelines—the price Union provides a good example. cessful agreements to negotiate policies lead to inefficiencies and of the commodity will tend to be When the founding meeting of even limited cooperative economic even conflicts? To the extent that determined not by a market equi- the Commonwealth of Indepen- relationships among the post- these fixed infrastructure projects librium but by the supplier’s de- dent States took place in Alma-Ata, Soviet states took more than a de- can offer greater operational - effi termination of what constitutes a Kazakhstan, in December 1991, cade. These economic integration ciencies, will these also introduce “fair” price. Oil and gas consumers one of the few things that all the po- efforts in Eurasia should draw- at inflexible geostrategic implica- served by transport pipelines with litical leaders could agree upon was tention to the dialectical tension tions? Will an enlarged prosperity a limited number of alternative

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 156 157 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES sources or substitute energy fuels terms of supply and demand but the routes of the Silk Road ages ago linkages, implying a new level of are familiar with the problems of rather organized in terms of the but were displaced by the Age of coordination and a new format of energy dependence and the results engineering aspects of the facilities Discovery and were lost to animos- political deliberation, consultation, of price gouging, shortages, and dis- for production, transmission, and ities which swept over the Silk Road and decisionmaking. This is fast be- ruption. The energy dependence of distribution. region hundreds of years ago. coming a Silk Road of a type vastly consumers is a common complaint. different than the transportation Consumer energy dependence fre- The inflexibilities of fixed trans- The contemporary quest to restore routes of antiquity. quently is drawn to people’s atten- portation, energy, and communi- the ancient Silk Road is inaccurate tion because it is often a public con- cation systems require, for all these and even distorting when under- Today’s Silk Road is immeasur- cern. Producer energy dependence, reasons, a high level of regulation. A stood out of its historical context and ably more efficient and effective in contrast, is less often discussed. high level of regulation, in turn, re- without proper attention being paid than the desert trails of the past. It But producer dependence is also quires a high level of political over- to the differences inherent in our con- is also subject to control and ma- a major factor in shaping the na- sight and the political control that temporary situation. The Silk Road nipulation for political objectives tional policies of energy producers this implies. Fixed infrastructure fa- that linked east and in a way that the and the governments that rely or cilities create a framework that may west in the days of ancient Silk Road even depend upon them as a major be seen as the “hardware” of inter- Marco Polo was not All along today’s Silk Road never was and source of state revenue. national affairs. For the hardware a road at all. Trade region signs of significant could never be. to work effectively, it requires the routes throughout change are on the hori- The Silk Road of Electrical power transmission pro- “software” of government regulatory Central Asia the the past was suc- vides another important example of policies. Large public infrastructure Caucasus and what zon. This is nowhere more cessful to the extent the distorting effects of natural mo- projects are designed to improve is today called the apparent than in Baku. that it constituted a nopolies on prices. One of the tradi- the prosperity and stability of all ac- Middle East were rationale for local tional constraints of electric power tors, but those that are located in the not roads in any modern sense of the political leaders to cooperate so systems is that production needed nexus points in the physical infra- word. There were mountain passes; as provide protection against me- to be closely linked to consumption. structure network are likely to play a there were fertile oases; and there dieval brigands and highwaymen New electric storage capabilities are pivotal role in the functioning of the was busy maritime traffic along the who sought to plunder trade and rapidly expanding with technolog- systems. Again, Azerbaijan is located Caspian to be sure. But the area be- transportation corridors. ical changes and large-scale electric in just such a nexus point. tween the many stopping points storage costs are coming down rap- along the Silk Road typically involved In other words, the ancient Silk idly. Traditionally, however, elec- a great expanse of desert and difficult Road only functioned effectively tricity has not been storable in large Competition Along the Silk natural terrain, not fixed by any fac- because it was supported by what volumes. Consequently, production Road tors other than the shifting fortunes we would today call a collective needed to be flexibly scaled in order of the natural elements. security community. The classical to meet fluctuation in demand. This he idea of the restoration of Silk Road was not a road: it was, has been a source of great difficulties Tthe ancient Silk Road in the omorrow’s fixed infrastruc- rather, what political economists for large regional electric transmis- present set of circumstances is in- Tture systems of highways, today would call a “regime.” More sion projects. Due to these market deed a beguiling idea. It seems to railways, electric grids, and tele- precisely, it was a set of political features, electricity distribution sys- champion the great advances in civ- communication relay facilities arrangements among local leaders tems tended not to be organized in ilization that were prominent along constitute a new level of intricate that created a mutual protection

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 158 159 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES community, freeing commerce first-century Silk Road, linking East from manipulation by brigandage and West and North and South. and plunder. Baku, in other words, is a strategic hub by virtue of being situated at a Today’s Silk Road is a fixed in- critical geographical fulcrum point frastructure network that requires of rapidly expanding transport and a complex system of state-to-state communication infrastructure. political relationships to prevent natural monopoly features from Competition, as sages tell us, cre- overwhelming the technical and ates dynamics that lead to oppor- operational efficiencies of modern tunities and threats. Opportunities technology. All along today’s Silk and threats are two aspects of the Road region signs of significant same thing; which of these two change are on the horizon. This aspects prevails depends above all is nowhere more apparent than in else on how diplomats negotiate Baku. Baku is located at the geo- and maneuver the dynamic factors Center of Excellence graphical center of the twenty- inherent in all competition. BD in EU Studies

ADA University’s Center of Excellence in EU Studies (CEEUS) was established in 2014 as part of an agreement between the European Commission and the Government of Azerbaijan to support civil service training in the country with a focus on EU affairs.

CEEUS serves as a focal point for studying the EU in Azerbaijani higher education.

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First, quite prominent emphasis Chinese politics. What was new was Central Asia and the Belt and is given to the inclusiveness of the the fact that diverse areas of political initiative and the chance to create activity (domestic, foreign, regional, Road Initiative win-win cooperation that is benefi- etc.) were combined under a single hat cial to all participating entities. The and set within the overarching frame- major goal is to strengthen trust work of a single flagship initiative. Djoomart Otorbaev and connectivity between the cooperating partners. Prospects, Challenges, or us Central Asians, it is geography. All the maps that have Second, the recommendations Achievements especially important to un- been published only present in- refer to many recently announced derstand what is happening terpretations of official statements multilateral investment banks or ithout any doubt, the Belt sevenF years after the Belt and Road or documents. Most maps do not funds like Asian Infrastructure Wand Road Initiative will be- Initiative was first announced. even show national borders, but Investment Bank (AIIB), the New come the global phenomenon of the During an official visit to Astana, rather various corridors, regions, Development Bank (formerly modern world. Its very scale shows the capital of Kazakhstan, in early and cities. Some are puzzled and known as BRICS Development that this still-new, China-led frame- September 2013, China’s president keep asking when such a map will Bank), and the Silk Road Fund. work for economic and political co- Xi Jinping proposed that China and appear. But I believe the absence of Support is also organized through operation will be truly geopolitical, Central Asian countries build an any geographical allocation or asso- China’s own financial institutions for BRI will form a huge network “economic belt along the Silk Road,” ciation with any territory was and like the Export-Import Bank and of highways, railways, airways, thus sowing the seed of a trans-Eur- remains the right approach. the China Development Bank. oil and gas pipelines, power grids, asian project designed to deepen co- transmission, and communication operation and expand development hina is moving fast. Since Xi’s Third, BRI has a prominent do- networks. It is clear that along with across the Silk Road region. Cannouncement, thousands mestic socio-economic dimen- all this connectivity infrastructure, of BRI events have been organized sion, with increasing focus being various types of industrial clusters This essay will attempt answer a all over China and several BRI-spe- placed on China’s and services net- number of questions in this regard, cific research institutes have been landlocked and works will also be including: How has it been received established all over the country. In borderland re- This unprecedented, developed. BRI’s by the Central Asian countries? March 2015, the government set up gions like Xinjiang, China-led free trade co- ambition is clear: What has been the reaction of the “special leading group” under the Fujian, Guangxi, operation framework will to form an inte- external world to this initiative? National Development and Reform and Yunnan, which certainly have an enor- grated land area What is happening in Central Asia Commission (NDRC) to oversee should strengthen mous impact on global stretching from in the context of BRI? the coordination and implemen- cooperation with economic development, the Pacific to the tation of different projects under their neighbors. Atlantic and thus It is important, even funda- the BRI framework. To my mind, forming the foundation to establish a direct mental, that no one has ever of- there are three main elements of Even when they for a new and more pre- land link between ficially defined the scope of BRI’s this Initiative. were announced, dictable political and two major global none of the three el- economic order. economic powers: Djoomart Otorbaev is a former Prime Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic (2014-2015). ements were new to China and Europe.

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The construction of this inter- popularized by BRI advocates will Chinese response to the growing participating countries. This con- continental infrastructure system is soon be transformed into a “triple complexity of our world. In the cept is truly a grand invitation; it is being designed to serve as the basis win” formula. positive scenario, this response neither pressure nor enforcement. for the creation of strong regional has the potential to turn into a new economic integration and enhance The Initiative is likely to en- concept of how international order Third, the main task remains the the free flow of goods, labor, and counter significant challenges along could be organized in the future. building up of a comprehensive capital. All of this will create, in the the way, not the least due to its vir- Three points rise to the mind. economic and political network to long run, a single Eurasian market. tually global scale. The biggest risk promote the various connections This unprecedented, China-led for the Silk Road region countries First, BRI is mainly about building between the countries involved free trade cooperation framework will not only be in figuring out how up and strengthening cooperation in BRI, including those in the Silk will certainly have to deal with the among participating countries. It Road region. In this regard, BRI an enormous im- enormous differ- should be understood as a joint comprises all sorts of actors both pact on global The biggest risk for the ences in the eco- “road to prosperity, and a belt of within China and well outside its economic devel- Silk Road region coun- nomic, political, peace.” Its goal is to create networks frontiers: central, provincial, and opment, forming tries will not only be in cultural, social, of cooperation in many areas and city governments, certainly, but the foundation for and legal systems on many different political levels. also private sector players, NGOs, a new and more figuring out how to deal found amongst the think tanks, and universities—to predictable polit- with the enormous dif- countries along its Second, BRI is likely to continue name the most obvious. ical and economic ferences in the economic, routes. There also being flexible, inclusive, and open. order. political, cultural, social, will be, as Alexis Its geographic scope remains to be ecurity considerations also and legal systems found de Tocqueville put determined. Those who are willing Sinform China’s decision to ini- urrently, 90 it, the “interests of to join are joining; those who are tiate BRI. In this essay we can focus amongst the countries Cpercent of the big.” With re- not ready still have some time to on just one example: energy security. world industrial along its routes. There gards to the Eur- think through their options. The production is also will be, as Alexis de asian land route, fact that the Chinese leadership At present, China imports from concentrated in Tocqueville put it, the China must deal still has not published an “official” abroad about half of the crude oil it three geographic “interests of the big.” with Russian in- BRI map further underscores its requires. Of this amount, more than regions: North terests, due to the global openness and inclusiveness. a half is delivered from the Middle America, Europe, latter’s historically And this is the right concept. Every East by sea. Just from these two sen- and Southeast Asia. Pragmatic con- strong links with Central Asia and country that has an interest in one tences, it becomes obvious that a siderations have driven Beijing’s the South Caucasus. The Initiative of the institutions related to BRI can key Chinese national security issue approach to the design of BRI: will face an additional challenge become part of it. And “invitation” centers on being sure to have safe connect by land two centers of the from the United States, the current really is the right word. The success and reliable maritime transporta- world economy: China and Europe. global leader. of the establishment of the AIIB was tion routes between its seacoast and An unavoidable consequence of this related to the same flexible method one of the world’s most unstable re- logic is that the countries of the Silk RI should not be viewed as of inclusiveness. In addition to this gions. In the best of times, the risks Road region will themselves reap BChina’s “grand strategy.” On inclusive orientation, the success are high; in the event of a regional benefits from the Initiative. Thus the contrary, the Initiative should of BRI and its related institutions or global conflict, they are likely to the “win-win” slogan heretofore be interpreted as a proactive also relies on the diversity of the rise significantly. For example, the

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 164 165 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES great maritime powers can simply underline is that the struc- duties that were introduced in the knowledge, technology, and cap- block the delivery of hydrocarbons ture of Chinese investment to Eurasian Economic Union coun- ital. And it did so successfully. Now by sea to China. Kazakhstan and the rest of Central tries, as well as to the economic the reverse is happening: it is China Asia has been changed for a better. transformation of the region. that is delivering knowledge, tech- Thus, China needs to diversify Chinese businesses started to in- nology, and capital beyond its own oil imports with an obvious alter- vest not only in the energy sector borders to foreign soils near and native—namely Eurasia: the Silk but in technology, processing, and Demand-driven Approach far. And this is proving to be much Road countries. Chinese growth manufacturing. As of July 2019, more complicated. Successful out- rates may not be what they were, China had invested $2.16 billion in RI has been clearly explained wards investment requires not only but they are still quite impressive. Kazakhstan’s industrial sector, Bin official documents as well money, knowledge of foreign laws, And the nature of all that growth whereas in 2013 the number was as and numerous unofficial books, regulations, and business practices; is likely to be such that energy con- literally zero. Uzbekistan is also pri- papers, and commentaries. One it also requires understanding and sumption will increase at a higher oritizing Chinese investments in its must admit that the main part of re- recognition of diversities, appre- rate than growth. This gap could be industrial development. Most of the search regarding BRI has been con- ciation of differences in cultures, partly but not insignificantly cov- 46 projects agreed in 2018 between ducted and published by Chinese ethics, habits, customs, and so on. ered by additional imports from the two countries—worth a total of and Western scholars. Due to a lack Central Asia and Russia. By 2030, $6.8 billion—are focused on proof capacity and fewer resources, ne of the “must-do” charac- these countries could supply an ad- cessing and manufacturing. much less analysis and fewer pub- Oteristics of BRI as it is coming ditional 30 percent of China’s addi- lications have been produced by to be understood is going to have to tional energy requirements. Exports from the Central Asia scholars from Eastern Europe, the be a thoughtful acknowledgment countries to China have also in- Silk Road region, and Russia. One of those differences. The Chinese ow have economic relations creased: they totaled $14.64 bil- point of agree- way of thinking Hbetween China and Central lion in 2013; in 2019, they totaled ment within the and doing busi- Asian countries changed over $18.83 billion. China’s share of total scholarly commu- Until very recently, China ness differs from, the few years of BRI’s existence? exports from Central Asia grew nity—irrespective needed to import knowl- for example, the According to data provided by from 17 percent to an impressive 23 of nationality—is edge, technology, and Western or Islamic China’s Ministry of Commerce, percent in the same period. that BRI is not a way. One should in 2018 FDI flows from China one-way road but capital. And it did so suc- not automatically consisted of $3.8 billion to The growing Chinese market has rather a multi-ways cessfully. Now the reverse bring or apply any Kazakhstan, $1.98 billion to Turk- become increasingly important one. This is a reflec- is happening: it is China preconceptions menistan, $412 million to Uzbeki- for the Central Asia economies, as tion of the fact that that is delivering knowl- while acting in a stan, $316 million to Tajikistan, well. That being said, over the past live in a multipolar edge, technology, and new political and and $47 million to Kyrgyzstan. few years, imports from China to world, wherein the economic envi- There have also been what appear Central Asia have slightly declined, Initiative rose from capital beyond its own ronment. And one at first blush as dips: for instance, going from $15.42 billion in 2013 one of the poles. borders to foreign soils should never auto- total Chinese investments in to $14.35 billion in 2019. China’s near and far. And this is matically insist on Kazakhstan fell from $19.7 billion share in the region’s imports fell Until very re- proving to be much more the application of in 2013 to $14.5 billion in 2019. from 28 percent to 21 percent. This cently, China complicated. previously known But what is critically important to might be related to new tariffs and needed to import norms, rules, or

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 166 167 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES principles. Practical steps must be This will not be an easy task. For wellbeing continues to improve— a mine operated by a Chinese com- adjustable and made to be compat- example, the Soviet Union tried to the anti-BRI lobbying groups will pany and fought with its Chinese ible with different environments. harmonize its multicultural and find it more difficult to influence workers. The source of a conflict All actions should lead to deep- multiethnic societies within its own the population; this will threaten was minor and artificial. But it did ening trust, building bridges, and boundaries for three-quarters of a the basics principles of not only take place and it caused significant constructing a sense of joint own- century. In some cases, there were their support but also their exis- damage to the investment climate ership. BRI should not divide but successes, but in others, there were tence. With the success of BRI, their in the country. Another source of unite people and nations. failures. China also knows that this social influence will decline. conflict? The frequent speculation is not an easy process. that Chinese workers are marrying How will the Initiative be re- Thus, upon working in foreign Kyrgyz women in large numbers. ceived by others—China’s neigh- One must be prepared for the fact soils one must avoid any careless How large are those numbers? Only boring Central Asian countries, for that in many BRI countries there step that could potentially ignite 60 such marriages were recorded example? is a more than even chance that nationalistic, ethnic, or environ- from 2010 to 2018. “resistance groups” will pop up— mental hysterics under the expected The key question to be answered is factions whose interests are in common slogan “Chinese invasion.” Many critics of China speculate the following: what to do and what contradiction with those of global- on a large influx of Chinese immi- not to do while ization and BRI’s grants to Kazakhstan, although the planning, acting, ideas and goals. Artificial Tensions actual numbers in this example are and communi- BRI should be considered Among them will also quite low. According to offi- cating between be nationalist, pop- he apparent lack of readi- cial data, between 1995 and 2014 by the countries and their potential partners ulist, ethnic, envi- Tly-available, reliable informa- Kazakhstani citizenship was during the im- communities as a respon- ronment, and var- tion about China’s real plans and granted to 73,800 individuals from plementation of a sible and demand-driven ious other lobbyist intentions in Central Asia has cre- China in total. Of these, only 13 given project. The process, which would build forces. Such groups ated a favorable ground for specu- percent were Han Chinese, which key advice here is a profound sense of owner- are political or eco- lation and provocations among var- make up 92 percent of China’s that BRI should ship at the local level. nomic beneficiaries ious interest groups. overall population. be considered by of status quo poli- the countries and cies and rhetoric. I will cite several cases of unrest in nother example from their communities as a responsible Central Asia, caused by completely AKazakhstan. At the end of and demand-driven process, which Only openness, inclusiveness, artificial and far-fetched reasons. May 2016, the country experienced would build a profound sense of and efficient communication will Pure speculations and the falsifica- unexpected protests sparked by ownership at the local level. improve exchanges and mutual un- tions of facts produced by contro- proposed amendments to the Land derstanding between peoples and versial nationalist groups were the Code that was originally adopted in uilding trust between new ethnic groups, which will in turn main reasons for each of the cases 2014. The amendment was about to Bpartners should come first lead to a lowering of the tempera- elaborated below. enter into force in June 2016 when and become the highest priority. As ture of historical, economic, envi- the tumults started. The proposed Confucius famously said: “I wouldn’t ronmental, and political disputes. I begin with an example from the changes would have allowed for- know what to do with someone As BRI drives countries towards Kyrgyz Republic. Not so long ago, eigners to rent agricultural land for whose word cannot be trusted.” prosperity—and ordinary people’s Kyrgyz villagers entered the site of 25 years, instead of the previous

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 168 169 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES ten. Following protests, the Kazakh A conclusion to be drawn from cases: disregard of problems, lack and its economy; to consult with government postponed the amend- this case is the following. Amend- of transparency, and ignorance of society on the kind of potential ben- ment’s introduction. But how large ments to the national law that were key details creates an atmosphere of efits and challenges each particular was the size of this great peril? Ac- made in the interest of the country mistrust and suspicion. project could bring to the country cording to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of were artificially and opportunisti- or region in question. And third, Regional Development, at the time cally used by unscrupulous interest In all the examples outlined only upon reaching full public only 32 Chinese citizens had rented groups and political forces to build above, the public did not get the consensus on a particular matter a total of 4,750 hectares—that resistance to a valuable initiative. sense of real ownership. In each should the government in question comes out to 0.0002 percent of the case, it was as if someone was in- place an open request on a specific country’s agricultural area. nother example, also from sisting on making it happen. The and targeted investment. That way, AKazakhstan. A few years ago, whole approach was not designed to these “artificial problems” can be To stay on this last example: there people began to read in the local be a demand-driven process. Good outflanked. was some misunderstanding as press about inter-governmental intentions led to the opposite result, well with regards to the false pro- consultations on the transfer of and, at the end of the day, public paganda of interest groups over the factories from China to Central opinion turned against perfectly Avoiding Various Traps assumption that the amendments Asia—a way to deal part of the healthy investment opportunities. would allow foreigners to own excess capacity that exists in the These examples also show how easy erhaps it would be a good idea land, which the officials did not Chinese manufacturing sector. The it is to capitalize on “anti-Chinese Pto create a special educational explain properly. Then the protests press published this news without sentiment” in some places. This is institution that would teach and erupted. Everyone understood that any description of what it would dangerous and could lead to a po- train businessmen on how to work these proposed changes weren’t the all mean, and without informing tentially destructive output that in foreign countries with different real cause of the protests. They in- the public which sort of enterprises may, sometimes, destroy not only political and economic environ- stead reflected underlying discon- were expected to be transferred. the particular project in question ments. That is what already hap- tent with the state of the national but even cause harm to the entirety pening in China on a large scale. economy, income and social benefit Immediately after that announce- of a bilateral relationship. reductions, and a sort of popular, ment, some lobbying groups and “Think globally but act locally” is general fear of growing Chinese media outlets started to spread an such artificially-created a business slogan that is fully valid economic influence in the country. misinformation about “environ- Ctensions be avoided? Surely in such cases. Local people and so- mentally dirty, dangerous, and un- yes, but only by applying seriously, cieties must be fully included and Naturally, the main blame for a healthy” industries. Finally, thanks and in advance, full and trans- involved in all processes—from case like this is to be placed at the to the government’s idleness and parent public consultations. Three initial planning to final practical feet of those in the central and local ignorance, public opinion turned ideas spring to mind. realization. Each phase and every governments—as well as the intel- against that initiative. action should be well-planned with ligence services—who had been First, a government should weighted tactics, precise strategies, unable to explain to the public the any such examples harmed launch transparent public debates and well-executed implementation real ideas behind the proposal. It Mthe status and image of on each subject. Second, a govern- steps. Of course, these must be ac- was not done properly, and the Chinese companies—both in ment should organize tailor-made companied by transparent commu- “opposition” used these cases quite Central Asia and around the world. public-private dialogues on what nication, with full inclusiveness and skillfully. The short conclusion from those is required by the relevant country connectivity. The real goal of these

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 170 171 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES steps is to build a sense of local on connections between funda- to focus on the details of the Politicians and policymakers are ownership. Again, a fully respon- mental and applied research and practical implementation of similar everywhere. For instance, sible demand—not supply-driven development. such recommendations—and of as a rule, they do not read pa- actions—is what is required. course, as always, the “devil will pers—even brilliant ones. But they As a professor of physics, I was be in the details.” An expert com- sometimes listen. Let us get them In other words, we all must work an active scientist in the former munity should be prepared so that to listen. More multicultural de- more closely with each other on Soviet Union. At that time, the this process can become more bates between expert communities “what to do and what not to do” country was strong in fundamental than just general, mainly theoret- and policymakers—with the direct matters. In official research. The ical research. Not only in gener- involvement of Eurasian, Chinese, BRI documents, it country had sur- ating papers, but practical, prag- and European scholars, thinkers, is clearly stated that The real goal of these steps vived the arms race matic, and “straight-to-the-point” and politicians—should target the China will pro- is to build a sense of local with the United policy recommendations, which creation of very specific “road- mote cultural, ac- ownership. Again, a fully States even though will be actively used by both pol- maps” from the initial planning ademic, and indi- responsible demand—not its military budget iticians and practitioners in their of various projects to their final vidual cooperation supply-driven actions—is was vastly lower. daily work. This must be the goal. implementation. and exchanges, However, everyone The time is now to focus on over - which would make what is required. knows that the coming challenges for the execu- Surely, this can help all of us in the its contribution to Soviet Union could tion of the idea of better coopera- Silk Road region grasp the meaning building the public trust and mu- not compete economically with the tion and greater connectivity. of the Belt and Road Initiative. BD tual understanding and would re- West, partly because of a poor ca- duce the risks of public discontent. pacity to implement the results of fundamental research onto prac- It is also clearly stated that China tical and commercial applications. will work not only at the official levels but also on the “experts to Though our subject belongs not experts” (E2E) level. The aim? To to natural but to social science, we offer not only scientific advice but all must first acknowledge that the also deliver straight-to-the-point problem I have discussed exists, recommendations to policymakers. and, secondly, we all must work in Such an approach is required to concert on figuring out how to avoid bakudialogues.ada.edu.az build trust and avoid sometimes the various traps that may be laid. costly mistakes and errors, which can lead to opposite results. We have—both here, in Cen- tral Asia, and in the outside ach policy discussion should world—an enormous amount Ehave inputs from both re- of fundamental studies, which searches and practitioners. That is creates great foundations for why in the final part of this essay practical follow-up projects. it would be important to comment Now it is critically important

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n mid-2020, two U.S. innovation cooperation is “neg- Russia and China’s Digital Ianalysts, Samuel Bendett and atively affected by circumstances Elsa Kania, compiled an extensive common to all areas of cooperation Silk Road and impressive looking list of pub- between Russia and China. At the licly known technology projects technical level, there is a shortage of and agreements between Russia competent specialists with sufficient Jeff Schubert and China. It may not be well- foreign language skills, a lack of ac- known that we are now, in offi- cessible information about markets cial terms, in the Year of Russian- and opportunities in both coun- he focus of this essay is on strategic partner. Russo-Chinese Chinese Scientific, Technical, and tries, and similar issues.” Moreover, Russia-China technology relations rest on a formula: never Innovation Cooperation, and that “according to Chinese experts, the relations and the Digital against each other; not necessarily the particular focus is on the dig- investment climate in Russia is not SilkT Road part of China’s Belt and always with each other. This com- ital and aerospace spheres. We can favorable enough. In particular, Road Initiative (BRI) as it applies to bines reassurance with freedom of put this together with the findings the country’s foreign investment the central Eurasian land mass, or maneuver.” of a recent Russia-China Dialogue protection and dispute resolution to what some have taken to calling report published by the Russian mechanisms seem to be ineffective.” the Silk Road region. However, this situation is not International Affairs Council The report also finds that “Chinese without risks for Russia. Mos- (RIAC) that says the present pe- partners are wary of the problems As the relationship of both Russia cow-based researcher Vasily riod is “intended to serve as an in- of Russian scientific and business and China with a number of other Kashin has noted that “Russia centive to strengthen ties between counterparties that arise from the major powers—most notably the doesn’t feel threatened itself, be- representatives of the scientific and specifics of local business culture and United States—has deteriorated, cause right now China can ill-af- technical circles of the two states, government regulation. Some of the their own bilateral relationship at ford to alienate a neighbor that’s exchange skilled personnel, and most annoying factors noted by the the leadership level has strength- an important military and re- deepen pragmatic project-based co- Chinese side are the focus on quick ened. But over the past two years source power in its own right. operation.” Targeted areas include results instead of long-term partner- or so, the biggest change has been Still, Russia’s government and “all key areas of the bilateral sci- ships, overpricing (often also a conse- in the attitude of China, which has experts have of course noticed ence, technology, and innovation quence of the short-term focus), and found itself and some of its own a significant change in Chinese dialogue: basic research, artificial the use of ‘grey’ schemes.” The report political policies and economic sec- diplomacy and behavior, which intelligence, big data, new energy also points out that, as it says, “at the tors under attack. sped up during the last several resources, new materials, ICT and same time, the focus of interactions is months and especially during the internet, biotechnology, aero- often shifted to the simple purchase According to Carnegie Moscow’s the COVID-19 crisis,” noting po- space, nuclear energy, agriculture, and sale of products or, in rare cases, Dmitri Trenin, “Russia has ‘piv- tential for greater risk-taking to and environmental protection.” to a one-time transfer of technologies oted’ itself, as a major indepen- create problems in Russia’s rela- instead of conducting joint work in dent player, with China its key tions with third countries. In reality, the situation is less pos- strategically important areas.” itive than suggested by Bendett and Kania. The RIAC Russia-China The RIAC report continues: “for Jeff Schubert is Professor of International Business at the Baikal School of BRICS of the Dialogue report says that the devel- Russian companies, traditional con- Irkutsk National Research Technical University (INRTU) in Russia opment of science, technology, and straints include the limited access of

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 174 175 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES foreign companies various research in technology issues that they feel that But how real are these “opportu- to a number of im- However, the most signif- cooperation with their “superiority” is becoming clear. nities”—particularly in relation to portant segments icant and widely-touted Russian research the Digital Silk Road? of the Chinese entities and univer- In September 2020, Russia’s high-tech cooperation market, the leak or sities. My own uni- Minister of Industry and Trade re- The Digital Economy section transfer of valuable project between Russia versity (INRTU) portedly alleged that the “Chinese of Russia’s own official domestic intellectual prop- and China is mired in is working with were bent on snooping on Russian National Projects documentation erty to local com- difficulties. the Alibaba Cloud experts and getting hold of core, indicates a 2021 goal of an “in- panies, difficulties Venture Fund to proprietary technology and solu- tegrated information system for for foreigners with search for prom- tions while refusing to open up handling the common processes of no business experience in China in ising technological start-ups. their domestic market,” and that the governments of EAEU member establishing business relations and there were “counter-accusations countries.” However, it makes no complying with a set of national owever, the most significant from some COMAC employees mention of China’s Digital Silk Road. and regional regulations, and the Hand widely-touted high- who took to the social media and hiring of personnel.” Lastly, the re- tech cooperation project between forums popular among technicians In 2016-2017, the EAEU offi- port also indicates that “the prob- Russia and China is mired in dif- to say Russia was only interested in cially emphasized “digital transfor- lems of legal support and project ficulties. The CR929 wide-bodied selling parts to China without the mation” as a “key factor of devel- management remain: many agree- aircraft project between Russia’s goodwill to swap and share vital opment” and partnered with the ments, both at the government and United Aircraft Corporation and technology.” World Bank to “conduct a joint corporate level, are not sufficiently China’s COMAC, with a price tag study to research the international thought out, which leads to many of between $13 billion and $20 bil- Finally, it is worth mentioning experience, and develop recom- arrangements staying unfulfilled.” lion, continues to face delays. One that over the last year or so a mendations to maximize the eco- senior Russian manager in July number of Russian scientists, gen- nomic impact of the development As it happens, this list of prob- 2020 attributed this to “difficulties erally retired, have been charged of the digital space and the imple- lems is almost identical to those I in working together with Chinese with spying for China. mentation of the Digital Agenda wrote about in my 2017 report enti- partners.” of the EAEU.” Not unexpectedly, it tled New Eurasian Age: China’s Silk “concluded that it was important Road and the EAEU in SCO Space. My own interactions within Russia-China Technology to develop a common coordinated Russia, as well as the findings of Cooperation? approach to the framework of dig- In terms of particular sectors previously-published reports, ital development at the national and companies, there have been have suggested that such “difficul- ccording to the RIAC and union levels.” The report some recent successes. There is ties” are not new. The Russian side ARussia-China Dialogue report, also makes no mention of China’s an agreement between Alibaba has suspected that China would “experts point to the opportunities that Digital Silk Road ambitions. Group, Mail.ru Group, MegaFon not open-up its domestic market Russia-China cooperation will develop and the Russian Direct Investment to jointly manufactured aircraft through the alignment of the Eurasian The RIAC China-Russia Dialogue Fund to create AliExpress Russia, despite Russia equally sharing Economic Union (EAEU) and report concluded that “scientific as well as agreements of MTS and development costs, while the China’s Belt and Road Initiative and technical cooperation could VimpelCom with Huawei on 5G in Chinese have been annoyed and the creation of the Greater also contribute to the co-develop- Russia. Huawei is also undertaking by Russian “arrogance” on Eurasian Partnership.” ment” of the EAEU and BRI, but

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 176 177 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES then adds that “no significant re- were said to be done by promoting aroslav Lissovolik, writing should be noted that the inclusion sults have been achieved in this and lending money for essen- Yfor the Valdai Discussion of “all Asian and European coun- area so far.” There is no mention of tially economically unsustainable Club in September 2020, said tries” is really the broader Putin the Digital Silk Road in this report projects. A thorough examination that “this year Russia celebrates PR version of the Eurasia to which and, in my view, no “significant re- of two projects in Sri Lanka and the one hundredth anniversary of Lissovolik refers. sults” can be expected in the future. Malaysia (even though not on the Eurasianism, a school of thought SREB part of BRI) by political that emphasized the uniqueness The reality is somewhat different s far as BRI is concerned, scientists Lee Jones and Shahar of Eurasia as a continent charac- to what Lissovolik and Putin would Athere have been changes in Hameiri highlighted the extent terized among other features by like to see. Andrey Kortunov the way it is being both presented which recipient countries have extreme distances of its inland re- of RIAC says that, “sadly, the and seen. sought funding from Chinese en- gions from coastal lines and trade Eurasian continent continues to tities for their own—often vain or routes.” He wrote that “from today’s be disjointed or, rather, split into a From the beginning, various corrupt—purposes. The reality is vantage point Eurasia’s geography host of large and small fragments. Chinese businesses, organizations, that China is not essentially en- of unique continental expanses This applies to Eurasian secu- as well as regions and regional of- gaged in debt-trap lending. and the prevalence of landlocked rity, the Eurasian political space, ficials have sought countries rather the Eurasian to brand as many Essentially, BRI than being a hin- economy, and projects as possible The reality is that China remains what it drance to develop- The idea of Eurasia or science and cul- as BRI-related. is not essentially engaged always has essen- ment may harbor Greater Eurasia as an en- ture. Right now, As well as adding in debt-trap lending. tially been: a PR tremendous eco- tity beats in the heart of the concept of credibility to proj- idea that sparked nomic potential a considerable number ‘Eurasian iden- ects along the land the imagination of related to connec- of Russian thinkers and tity’ does not even Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) others who then worked for var- tivity projects.” exist, and the nu- leaders. part of BRI, it also often ensured ious reasons to more exactly define He then went on merous attempts that funding was available. Part of it and give it real form—and with to detail how he to construct one the result was much corruption and some success! thought Eurasia can be brought have not brought anything par- resentment within SREB countries, to fruition as some sort of unique ticularly promising.” Kortunov which forced Beijing to ensure that Russian pride means that it entity. continues: “Even though the idea the BRI brand is not used by anyone does not want to be seen as a of the ‘Greater Eurasian Partner- who wanted to, and to begin pub- SREB country, and certainly not In his pre-recorded video ad- ship’ was first put forward about lishing official BRI-related project as a “bridge” between China and dress to the seventy-fifth session five years ago, we are still in the lists. Europe. Moreover, it only wants the of the UN General Assembly in very beginning of a lengthy his- SREB to succeed if it is in partner- September 2020, Vladimir Putin torical project. At the moment, The Western view of the essence ship with its own EAEU. extolled “Russia’s initiative to we can only talk about some very of BRI has also been changing. Ac- form a Greater Eurasian Partner- preliminary pencil sketches of the cusations were initially levied that The idea of Eurasia or Greater ship involving all Asian and Euro- very complex Eurasian structure of China was attempting to entrap Eurasia as an entity beats in the pean countries without exception” the future. These sketches contain various countries in debt to China heart of a considerable number of as contributing to solving some more questions about the future of on a large, organized scale. These Russian thinkers and leaders. of the world’s problems. Here it our continent than they do answers.”

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ussia has seen a role for close to the peak of their influence with increased emphasis on the education; and policy means digital Rthe Shanghai Cooperation and relevance.” I concluded that Digital Silk Road. governance. Organization (SCO) to contribute “significant cooperation between to the security and political— the EAEU, BRI and the SCO—or The concept of a Digital i Jinping is a more ideological but not economic—aspects of its even between any two of these—is Silk Road was contained in a Xleader than his recent prede- Eurasian vision. Prior to BRI, China highly unlikely” and that “the idea Chinese white paper released in 2015, cessors and has increasingly sought had wanted the SCO to be more of Greater Eurasia is a fantasy.” which built on work done at Fudan to ensure that private businesses and greatly involved in economic issues University. It initially did not garner its leaders are working in the interest but Russia had resisted this—pre- much attention because at the time of the Communist Party of China ferring to try to develop the EAEU Digital Silk Road Concept the major focus of BRI projects and (CPC). In September new instruc- as the main Eurasian supranational discussion related to major infra- tions were given by the CPC Central economic organization working as hina has several programs to structure projects. Moreover, as Committee that reinforced this ten- a “partner” with China. Cpromote its technology de- with the wider BRI idea, the Digital dency. Business was reassured that it velopment and influence. Made in Silk Road is best understood as an could continue to exist and prosper if China’s confidence in BRI eventu- China 2025 aimed at making China “umbrella branding effort and nar- it aligned its overall goals with those ally reduced its interest in the SCO an international leader in manufac- rative.” It is, in other words, a way of the CPC to achieve “socialism with as a vehicle for economic issues, turing various types of advanced for China to promote its global vi- Chinese characteristics.” This is inev- and the admission of India and Pa- technology. Internet Plus aims to sion and standards across a range of itably going to flow through to a con- kistan to the SCO greatly increased promote the use of cloud com- technology areas. tinued tightening of what it is permis- its diversity of thinking and inter- puting, big data, and the Internet sible for Chinese entities to do under ests. The SCO is now little more of Things (IoT) in order to ad- A March 2015 article in China’s the official BRI umbrella—including than a leader’s discussion club. vance other sectors of the economy. official state press Xinhua News the Digital Silk Road. China Standards 2035 will aim at Agency defined Digital Silk Road as In summary, not much has re- promoting Chinese technology “five connectivities and three com- As with the wider-BRI, ally changed since I wrote my re- standards to the world in areas munities”: connectivity in infra- Chinese entities attempt to curry port entitled, New Eurasian Age: such as telecommunications, AI, structure, trade, finance, ‘people’s political favor and receive funding China’s Silk Road IoT, blockchain, hearts’ and policy; and the com- by claiming numerous technolo- and the EAEU in and the use of these munity of interest, destiny, and re- gies as part Digital Silk Road. While SCO Space in 2017. China’s confidence in BRI in such things as sponsibility. It thus remains a rather large state-backed Chinese finan- Therein I stated eventually reduced its in- “smart cities” and abstract idea in many ways, and has cial organizations such as the China that “the SREB, terest in the SCO as a ve- telemedicine. even been described as a “mindset.” Development Bank and the In- the EAEU, and hicle for economic issues, dustrial and Commercial Bank the SCO are very BRI’s initial focus In practical terms, infrastructure of China have played major roles different things in and the admission of was very much on essentially means cross-border in the wider BRI because of the any institutional India and Pakistan to the transport infra- optical cables and telecommu- huge funding requirements, the or organization SCO greatly increased its structure and trade nications, and Beidou satellite Digital Silk Road requires a dif- sense” and that diversity of thinking and networks, but tech- navigation; trade means supply ferent approach because much “the EAEU and interests. nology has become chains and e-commerce; people’s Chinese technology ability and the SCO are each more prominent heart’s means media and on-line capacity is held by its private

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 180 181 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES tech-giants such as Baidu, Alibaba, Harvard Business School’s Meg 5G networks are expensive to any one country is likely to be of Tencent, and Huawei. Rithmire, “the Chinese govern- deploy, especially in less popu- little use in another situation. Nev- ment’s heavier hand in the economy lated areas—as in much of central ertheless, some countries seem to The more influence China and in recent years does not mean that Eurasia—because the radio wave fear that apps such as TikTok can its tech-giants have on setting its intentions always translate into signals travel a comparatively short be used to collect user data in their such international technical stan- reality.” Big-tech companies such distance compared to earlier gener- country and consequently be used dards, the greater will be interna- as Alibaba and Tencent compete ations of telecommunications. This to facilitate unwanted influence of tional compatibility with domestic fiercely within China, and it should means that many more cell boxes their citizens. Chinese systems and the greater the not be expected that they will easily need to be deployed in an area in extent of Chinese economic power, cooperate in achieving govern- order to connect to the network. Outside of China, verbal-hype as well as social and political influ- ment aims when working outside of about the Digital Silk Road is likely ence in the world. It is the interests China. 5G is now being rolled out in to run ahead of reality for quite a of both China and its technology many areas of China, but even there few years. For example, according companies that these companies some questions are to the Reconstruc- seek to build influence in such or- Digital Silk Road being asked about tion and Develop- ganizations as the International Technologies its present use- the Digital Silk Road ment of Agency of Telecommunications Union, which fulness because broadly reflects China’s Armenia (AD- inally, it worth reflecting on leads in setting standards for 5G. of the absence of efforts to expand its tech- KARS) Chinese In addition to telecommunication Fwhether the “road” word in other technologies entities will fi- product producers such as Huawei the term “digital silk road” has any such as autono- nology sphere of influence nance the construc- and ZTE, Chinese state-backed similar meaning to the “road” or mous vehicles to across BRI participating tion of a “Smart mobile carriers such as China “belt” terms in the One Belt, One take advantage of countries by going from Science City” in Mobile, China Telecom, and China Road terminology used before it be- it. For example, a standards-taker to a Armenia costing Union can only benefit from such came the Belt and Road Initiative. a former Chinese standard-maker. about $10-15 bil- influence. This, I should add, is not merely finance minister lion over 15 years linguistic tinkering, for it points to recently warned beginning in 2021. In essence, the Digital Silk Road something more substantial. of over-investment in 5G: “We are ADKARS says that “after signing, we broadly reflects China’s efforts to getting ahead of ourselves. The 5G must create a group that will consider expand its technology sphere of This is only likely to be the case technology isn’t ready, but tens of what joint projects are interesting to influence across BRI participating if technology competition be- billions have already been invested, develop, in what areas, and in parallel countries by going from a stan- tween the U.S. and China results in raising costs for users and debt for with the construction of the city, these dards-taker to a standard-maker. non-Indian Eurasia having separate public institutions.” projects will be carried out.” However, 5G telecommunications standards it expects “the main directions are ar- Despite the general desire to ad- to that of much of the remainder In addition to a clear and well-de- tificial intelligence, medical neural vance the interests of China, its of the world, because 5G is a basis fined task, AI systems need large networks, the production of new ma- technology companies are not for much of what is proposed in accurate databases from which to terials, new drugs, machine learning, easy to manage in any centralized the new digitally-orientated world. search for patterns and thus make the Internet of smart things (a com- coordinated manner to achieve But even if this is ultimately the decisions and recommendations. pletely new direction in science and such government aims. As noted by case, it will not happen quickly. One set of data on any issue and in technology) and much more.”

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It is difficult to know how - seri interest in these multilateral formats ously to take this agreement, but it and ideas favored by Russia. Russia would be very surprising if it came will continue to try to figure out what to much given the huge amount of it can do to hold its position in cen- money compared to the size of the tral Eurasia and—unrealistically— Armenian population and the fact engage in EAEU and Greater Eurasia that it is basically a project looking dreams about how it can enhance it. for a reason to exist rather than a reason existing for a project. BRI (including the land SREB part) has been exposed as a nice PR stunt China has been working on a that has consumed large amounts of Central Bank Digital Currency in the money and brought China little eco- form of a e-Renminbi. Unlike crypto- nomic benefit. The Digital Silk Road currencies such as Bitcoin, it will be has emerged as the most discussed controlled by a state and not decen- part of BRI, in no small part due to tralized. Such a digital yuan, with the the increasing technology competi- help of China’s tech-giants and big tion and antagonism between China state-owned banks, could replace the and America, as well as some other U.S. dollar in international transac- Western countries. tions along the SREB that occur with Chinese entities. This could be con- 5G and AI are very impressive tech- sidered a Digital Silk Road project, nologies, and they offer the potential DURATION but is certainly not dependent on it. for significant changes in ways that 2 YEARS societies operate and are managed; thus, they are the two technologies of FORMAT ST Little Significant Change most significance for the Digital Silk 1 YEAR: EVENING / WEEKEND COURSES 2ND YEAR: MODULES / FINAL PROJECT Road. However, the ways in which ittle has significantly changed this will occur will ultimately depend over the last three years in on human decisionmakers. There L LEARN MORE terms of Russia-China technology is an element of mystery to both relations, the EAEU, the SCO or the technologies that causes some fear. idea of “Eurasia.” The reality is that neither is the over-powering technology that some China will work hard on main- imagine. How this will come to affect taining a good general bilateral re- the Silk Road region in strategic terms ada.edu.az/mbaf lationship with Russia, but has little thus remains an open question. BD Ahmadbey Aghaoghlu str. 61, Baku, Azerbaijan, AZ1008 [email protected] | ada.edu.az (+994 12) 437 32 35

ADAUniversity ADA University

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and European major powers) and he South Caucasus region, Navigating the Great Powers rivals (e.g. between America and Tas will be highlighted in the western European powers and first part of this essay, is no stranger Russia); and, U.S.-China compe- to the aforementioned compe- China's Entry in the South tition and the Trump Administra- tition and confrontation. Since tion’s shift from a more cooper- gaining (or regaining) indepen- Caucasus ative engagement approach with dence thirty years ago, each South Beijing toward one combining Caucasus state has had to navigate Rachael M. Rudolph competition, confrontation, and a geopolitical jungle comprised of cooperation on key regional powers— economic and po- Russia, Turkey and To undertake a journey on a road never before traveled requires litical issues. Great Both statesmen and Iran, the United character and courage: character because the choice is not obvious; stateswomen are ponder- courage because the road will be lonely at first. And the statesman power competition States, and major must then inspire his people to persist in the endeavor. with China will ing the past, looking at western European – Henry Kissinger continue under the present, and explor- powers—all of the Biden Ad- ing new courses of action whom have com- or ages power has been the policymakers and the global ministration, but peted for influence topic of countless articles, public today because of the shift there is likely to for ways to wisely and and confronted books, and newspaper col- in the international system from be a greater em- safely navigate their state one another either umns.F Analysts, practitioners, spe- a quasi-unilateral order domi- phasis placed on and people toward an un- directly or indi- cialists, and theoreticians alike have nated by a single major power multilateral en- defined, unknown future. rectly since the end thoroughly discussed its different (the United States) to a multi- gagement and less of the Cold War. types (hard, soft, smart); the nature polar order that is in the process on executive-level of its distribution at the global and of being reconstituted by major, confrontation. Confrontation is Armenia, Azerbaijan, and regional levels; and how large, me- rising and reemergent powers; the more likely to be led by U.S. con- Georgia have formed alliances with dium, and small states behave (e.g. relative decline of America’s ability gressional foreign policy entrepre- key regional powers, established a accommodate, balance, remain to project her power as a result neurs on foreign policy issues such web of economic, political, and se- neutral) when there are both shifts of that shift; new types of geo- as trade, technology, and invest- curity relations with both regional in power and changes in interna- economic and geopolitical compe- ments in the time ahead. and major powers, and advanced tional order. tition among powers in key stra- their own foreign policy agendas to tegic regions and countries across Needless to say, the current pe- promote growth, development, and These age-old discussions are the globe, including among tradi- riod facing nation-states is filled security. When China entered this ever-present in the minds of tional allies (e.g. between America with uncertainty. Both statesmen jungle and showed individual atten- and stateswomen are pondering the tion to each state it was welcomed past, looking at the present, and with open arms. Not even the Rachael M. Rudolph is an Assistant Professor of Social Science for a joint program exploring new courses of action for major Western powers expressed between Bryant University and the Beijing Institute of Technology-Zhuhai based in Zhuhai, Guangdong, China. The views expressed and the position adopted are those of ways to wisely and safely navigate concern at the time. A review of her own and do not per se reflect those of the organization or institutions with which their state and people toward an transcripts and other news material she is affiliated. undefined, unknown future. including speeches, congressional

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 186 187 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES hearings, interviews, and news arti- acquainted with such geostra- in which they are engaged. Russia, As will become evident later in cles published by government offi- tegic games, experts on the South Turkey, and Iran vie for influence this essay, these experts are correct, cials in States News Service and U.S. Caucasus are divided as to whether not only in the South Caucasus but but only to a degree. China’s rela- Federal News, which provide cov- they will have a significant impact also in the Middle East—a region tions are insignificant at the present erage to American news media out- on the region and each country’s that has been the exclusive opera- time to either compete with or pose lets and are picked up by the Asso- relations with China. tional ground for America up until a challenge to the regional coun- ciated Press International, find that the last few years. Russia, an actor tries’ relations with either Russia, Sino-South Caucasus relations in This essay explores Sino-South that strives to rekindle its great the United States, or the major EU general and China’s relations with Caucasus relations, focusing more power status, competes with both countries. However, restrictions the specific South Caucasus coun- specifically on China’s trade rela- America and the EU for influence imposed by the EU on the re-ex- tries were not major concerns for tions, investments, and military in the European geography and port of goods and products sold in Western policymakers. From the relations (or the lack thereof) with other regions. The United States its market and the oversight of in- period of the announcement of the Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. and the EU—two traditional al- vestment projects could potentially Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 In doing so, it draws on the larger lies in promoting and maintaining have an impact on and limit future to the present, the majority of the debates to discuss potential ways a Euro-Atlantic dominated inter- Sino-South Caucasus economic re- references to Sino-South Caucasus forward for the region in this period national order—compete for eco- lations. The actual impact will also relations were made within the con- of geopolitical uncertainty. Although nomic and political influence in depend to some degree on how EU- text of Russia’s role in the region. the nature of relations between China certain countries and regions de- China relations evolve. References to China’s relations with and the region’s countries have grown, spite their coordination to counter specific South Caucasus countries, they are still insignificant to pose a the perceived threats to instability egional powers Russia, on the other hand, simply men- challenge to either the aims and inter- within the Atlantic Alliance and the RTurkey, and Iran have the tioned them within a larger focus ests of regional or other major powers growing regional and global influ- greatest stake in the region’s po- on issues of concern to lawmakers at this time. And, as Yu Hongjun ence of Russia and China. litical and economic develop- including democracy (or the lack wrote in the previous edition of Baku ment, given two factors: their geo- thereof), the Nagorno-Karabakh Dialogues, there is much potential for China, a relatively new actor to graphical proximity to Armenia, conflict, energy developments, and cooperation between China and the the geopolitical game, is a com- Azerbaijan, and Georgia, and how economic security concerns. countries in the region, but they must petitor for the United States and instability in the region impacts be pursued in the spirit of persever- a geo-economic competitor for on their national security. Russia Despite the lack of specific con- ance given the many challenges facing Russia and the EU despite its stated is considered by scholars to be the cern expressed by Western policy- the region and the global community. desire not to be considered as such. most important regional actor, makers, they have raised concerns Experts suggest Beijing’s growth in while Turkey is considered to be the about China’s growing global influ- the South Caucasus will depend second most important actor. Iran ence and the impact of that on both The Geopolitical Jungle not only on Moscow’s but also the rounds off the list. U.S. and Western interests. Some Euro-Atlantic bloc’s acceptance of have even called for economic and ithin the geopolitical jungle its role. They also suggest the West All the South Caucasus countries political pressure to be applied to- Wof the South Caucasus, has the potential to block or contain depend to some degree on Moscow wards smaller states to counter the geopolitical codes of the major China’s growth, given the South for communications, transportation, Beijing’s growing influence. Though and long-term stakeholders have Caucasus countries’ dependence on supply-chain, and other networks the South Caucasus region is well been oriented toward the level(s) the European market. that either pass through Russian

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 188 189 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES territory or are primacy and re- Karabakh War solidifies Moscow’s to the Iranian border and the fact under full Russian Baku has pursued a com- duce its economic military and security primacy and that both actors have ties to com- control. As will be pletely independent for- and energy de- effectively contains western rela- peting non-state actors operating in highlighted below, eign policy, seeking to bal- pendencies. Azer- tions to the economic realm. That the larger Central Asia and MENA China’s economic baijan is Turkey’s may be. More interestingly, it opens regions. relations neither ance both regional and traditional ally— the door to Moscow serving as compete with nor other major power actors. and increasingly meditator in any future tensions be- However, Moscow is unlikely to challenge Russia’s Armenia and Georgia do so, as it turns out. tween Ankara and Tehran. allow any sort of tension between economic relations not have the same luxury, However, Baku has the two to develop in the short-to- in the region. Some given the nature of their pursued a com- Turkey and Iran have long com- medium term because of the impact experts suggest that pletely indepen- peted for soft power influence it would have on the new balance of dependencies. China has they, in fact, com- dent foreign policy, in both Azerbaijan and Georgia. power Russia had a primary hand plement them; thus neither given preference seeking to balance Ankara’s aims in the region include in establishing at the conclusion raising the concern to nor does it have a spe- both regional and promoting soft integration through of the Second Karabakh War. Al- by some analysts cial relationship with any other major power economic, energy, and infrastruc- though relations between Russia, and Western pol- specific country in the actors. Armenia ture projects; finding alternative Turkey, and Iran affect stability, it icymakers of a region, as do Russia and and Georgia do energy sources and market oppor- is Turkey-Russia relations that have potential China- not have the same tunities; developing civil society, the most significant impact on the Russia-Iran axis Turkey. luxury, given the sociocultural, and commercial distribution of power in the region. that could chal- nature of their relations, including tourism pro- The U.S., NATO, and the EU— lenge or replace American and dependencies. China has neither motion; and enhancing its secu- coupled with their tensions with EU influence in the region. Such given preference to nor does it have rity cooperation with Georgia and both Ankara and Moscow—factor an axis, however, is unlikely given a special relationship with any spe- Azerbaijan (given the importance into these dynamics as well. the shift in the regional power dy- cific country in the region, as do of their economic and energy coop- namics following the conclusion of Russia and Turkey. eration and the need for stability in merican interests in the the Second Karabakh War. the region). Aregion have evolved. Initially, oscow’s aims in the region the United States was concerned Beijing’s relations similarly com- Minclude minimizing U.S. Tehran seeks to bolster its eco- with supporting and strengthening pliment Turkey’s aims and interests and NATO military encroachment nomic, political, and cultural ties each South Caucasus country’s eco- in the South Caucasus. Armenia is and EU influence, maintaining with each of the countries, and nomic and political independence Moscow’s traditional ally, and the military and security primacy, has long sought to maintain the and territorial sovereignty. Then, country that is most dependent on and minimizing instability by ex- status quo in the Nagorno-Kara- in the mid-1990s, energy security Russia for its economic, political, panding good neighborly relations bakh conflict. Experts on Iran- became the driving force. The U.S. and security relationships. It has for the purpose of reestablishing South Caucasus relations say that sought to deny any one country been a traditional Iranian ally as itself as a major global player. the conclusion of the war reduces from having a monopoly on the well. Georgia, on the other hand, Some experts suggest the signing Tehran’s regional influence, while transportation of Caspian natural has turned to Turkey, NATO, the of the armistice agreement between others suggest it opens the door to resources, facilitate energy diver- U.S., and the EU to counterbalance Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia a different type of regional tension sification for Europe, and reduce Moscow’s military and security that marked the end of the Second due to it bringing Ankara closer the region’s economic and energy

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 190 191 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES dependence on Russia. The U.S. the other hand, offers the region a education, and training due to Economic and political develop- shifted its main focus from con- stake in Beijing’s vision and room divisions within NATO itself and ment, energy security, and the pro- taining Russia in the post-9/11 pe- for the countries to create their a lack of will among the South tracted conflicts are the three key riod in order to balance its global own visions for economic growth Caucasus countries for the Alliance areas of concern for EU member security objectives with other con- and development. The afore- to play a greater role in the region. states in the context of the South cerns by seeking support for the mentioned review in States News Caucasus. Georgia is the only global war on terrorism and lo- Service and U.S. Federal News finds None of them want to see in- country that has openly declared gistical assistance for operations that Western policymakers recog- creased Europe-Russia tensions, its intent to become an EU member in Afghanistan. Military and se- nize this issue in the nature of U.S.- which would definitely result from (an unlikely prospect in any reason- curity cooperation with Armenia, South Caucasus relations and why a change in the present role NATO able time horizon); both Armenia Azerbaijan, and Georgia—and their BRI has been well-received. Experts plays. Georgia is the only country and Azerbaijan seek only a closer participation in NATO’s Partner- and lobbyists have highlighted a with an expressed interest in, and connection to, rather than mem- ship for Peace program—increased need for the United States to pro- a declared intention to, become bership in, the European Union. during this period, commensu- vide countries with economic alter- a NATO member. Armenia and Experts suggest that the EU is likely rate with the aforementioned shift. natives to those which are provided Azerbaijan have limited their en- to continue playing a minimal American economic assistance through Sino-South Caucasus eco- gagement to participation without role, deferring instead to the U.S., and infrastructure investments nomic relations. membership. This is viewed by NATO, and the engagement of the also have been important compo- each, for different reasons, as the EU-3 (France, Germany, and Italy) nents of U.S.-Caucasus relations. All three South Caucasus coun- best way to counterbalance Rus- in a non-EU capacity in promoting The Overseas Private Investment tries have provided valuable sup- sian military and security primacy relations and advancing both Euro- Corporation (OPIC) has invested port to NATO-led operations by and transform regional security dy- pean and transatlantic agendas. around $1 billion in the South Cau- contributing forces to NATO-led namics. Similarly, as will be high- casus. As will be highlighted in the missions in Kosovo and Afghan- lighted later in the essay, limited EU-Russian relations shape following sections, China’s relations istan and the U.S.-led coalition in military relations with China are the EU’s engagement (or the lack neither compete with nor challenge Iraq. Terrorism, WMD prolifer- seen as simply an attempt to diver- thereof) as well as member states’ American economic relations in the ation, energy security, and pro- sify their military partners. divisions on the EU’s approach to region. The only area where some tracted regional conflicts are the EU-Russian relations. Sino-South sort of competition exists is in con- traditional security agenda items he EU’s relations are con- Caucasus relations, as will become sistency. corresponding to each country’s Tducted via its Eastern evident in the next section, are security agenda, while border Partnership program (EaP) and complimentary to both the EaP A lack of American consistency security, cyber security, and di- European Neighborhood Policy and ENP, and they neither compete in its foreign policy approach to- saster preparedness and response (ENP). The EaP seeks to provide with nor challenge the EU-3’s bilat- ward the region has been a long- are non-traditional security issues support in the countries’ transfor- eral relations with countries in the held complaint among the South where cooperation with NATO mation process and to bring them region. Nonetheless, it should be Caucasus countries. Experts high- is welcomed. The Atlantic Alli- economically and politically closer kept in mind that there are Euro- light the fact that the U.S. has a well- ance’s engagement with the region to the EU, while the ENP seeks to pean actors who have been working developed strategy for Central Asia is limited to these areas as well as promote prosperity, stability, and in concert with some U.S. policy- but is lacking one for the South to working with each country on security in the countries and to the makers to counter China’s growing Caucasus region. China’s BRI, on defense sector reform, military European geography as a whole. global influence, and this could

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 192 193 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES have a later impact on Sino-South are examined, these concerns just their domestic affairs or using them primarily takes the form of trade Caucasus relations. simply appear to be (at least at to influence or alter regional or and investment. this time and within this context) global power dynamics; a potential hina is a relatively new comer nothing more than hyperbole. economic and political counter- According to Yu Hongjun, Cto the geopolitical jungle of weight to both Russia and the West; China is Azerbaijan’s fourth largest the South Caucasus. Beijing has ex- China’s relations with each South and an actor that has demonstrated trading partner, third largest ex- pressly stated it has no geopolitical Caucasus country have grown since its willingness to invest in proj- port partner; and Georgia’s third or geo-economic objectives despite the introduction of the Belt and ects in other countries and regions largest trading partner. Although claims made by some Western poli- Road Initiative in 2013. BRI aims to where the conditions are not ideal its trade with Armenia has stag- cymakers. Some suggest Beijing in- promote connectivity, establish and (i.e. where there are higher levels nated over the past couple of years, tends to challenge U.S. primacy in strengthen partnerships with coun- of instability). Each country also China is still among the top five of global politics; alter the rules-based tries along the various land and sea seeks to diversify its economy and Yerevan’s trade partners. An anal- transatlantic order that has defined routes, and facilitate sustainable sources of foreign direct investment ysis of the 2018-2019 Import- and managed relations between development at the domestic, rein order to reduce their economic Export data available from the states since World War II; and use gional, and global levels by building dependency on some of the major Global Trade Database finds that its economic power on and advancing actors, while both Armenia and China’s trade relations with the to influence coun- existing economic, Azerbaijan seek to diversify their South Caucasus countries consists tries’ behavior in The South Caucasus energy, and trans- military and security cooperation primarily of trade in manufac- domestic, regional, countries each view Chi- port infrastructure beyond their traditional partners. turing (62.95 percent), industrial and global politics na as a distant, alterna- initiatives. As will be highlighted toward the (20.43 percent), consumer (17.58 for the purpose end of this section, regional mili- percent), and agricultural goods of advancing its tive major power that has Armenia, tary and security relations have not (.04 percent). And of that trade, 55 own foreign policy no interest in interfering Azerbaijan, and yet been a major focus for Beijing percent is with Azerbaijan while the agenda. A few of in their domestic affairs Georgia have each in its relations with Baku, Tbilisi, remainder is split almost equally them even go so or using them to influence welcomed BRI and Yerevan. between Armenia (22 percent) and far as to posit that or alter regional or global and increased eco- Georgia (23 percent). Beijing’s economic nomic cooperation and military or se- power dynamics; a poten- with Beijing, with Sino-South Caucasus There is, of course, variation curity relations in tial economic and politi- both Chinese state- Economic Relations across the countries in the goods certain regions and cal counterweight to both backed and private traded. For example, in manufac- with specific coun- Russia and the West; and investments taking n his aforementioned Baku turing goods, 60 percent is traded tries are a national an actor that has demon- place in these coun- IDialogues essay, Yu Hongjun with Azerbaijan, 20 percent with security challenge strated its willingness to tries. The South writes that there is much poten- Armenia, and 19 percent with and/or a potential Caucasus countries tial for economic and develop- Georgia. For industrial goods, future threat to re- invest in projects in oth- each view China as ment cooperation between China 47 percent of the trade is with gional and global er countries and regions a distant, alterna- and the South Caucasus countries Azerbaijan, 22 percent with security. However, where the conditions are tive major power and for them to combine existing Armenia, and 31 percent with when Sino-South not ideal that has no interest cooperation into a wider frame- Georgia. In consumer goods, trade Caucasus relations in interfering in work. Their existing cooperation with Azerbaijan consists of 43

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 194 195 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES percent while the remainder is alike in trade, China’s invest- Armenia, Chinese investors have development by targeting business most equally split between Georgia Lments in the South Caucasus targeted thermal nuclear energy opportunities involved in the con- (29 percent) and Armenia (28 per- have increased since 2013. An exam- production capabilities and dis- struction of bypass tunnels and cent). Finally, in agricultural goods, ination of available open source data cussed the development of hydro- railway goods, market and com- 60 percent is traded with Georgia on Chinese investments finds that electric and solar capabilities. A mercial facilities, and residential and 31 percent with Armenia. they have specifically targeted proj- focus for Chinese investment in districts. These have included in- There was no reported agricul- ects in manufacturing and energy Azerbaijan have been renewable vestments in the industrial zones, tural trade with Azerbaijan. The in Azerbaijan and Armenia; trans- energy including mobile energy container cranes, and other heavy Chinese leadership has consistently portation infrastructure in Armenia stations for Nakhichevan, the dis- equipment needed for construc- expressed its readiness to both ex- and Georgia; finance and real estate patching of installation specialists, tion, management, and operations. pand the import of high-quality ag- in Georgia; and agriculture in Azer- and the building of greenhouse In Azerbaijan, Chinese railroad ricultural products from Armenia baijan. These investments neither complexes. Experts suggest the re- workers contributed to the de- and help Azerbaijan with its agri- pose a real or perceived threat to gion’s energy imbalance poses fu- velopment and expansion of the cultural renovations. Western interests in the region nor ture difficulties for ensuring the sta- Trans-Caspian International Trans- do they have the potential to alter bility of energy transport. port route. As Taleh Ziyadov pointed Manufacturing goods comprise regional power dynamics or policy out in the previous issue of Baku the majority of the region’s exports behavior. Nonetheless, Chinese in- Transportation infrastruc- Dialogues, China also transferred to China; and, of the total amount, vestments in energy and transpor- ture is another area of interest for the technology needed to enhance 37.47 percent consists of natural re- tation infrastructure are two areas Chinese investors because of its cargo capacity at the Port of Baku sources and raw materials. The ma- where Western policymakers have impact on economic growth. Ac- and to strengthen the country’s jority of these exports come from expressed concern in their public cording to Yu Qin of the National overall role in regional trade and Azerbaijan (68 percent); they consist remarks with respect to China’s University of Singapore, infrastruc- logistics. In Armenia, Chinese in- of mineral, fuels, distillation prod- growing global influence. ture investments bring economic vestors enabled the construction of a ucts, lac, gums and resins, inorganic prosperity, affect the distribution of portion of the North-South corridor chemicals, precious metals and iso- Energy has been a major target economic activities, reduce poverty, connecting Gyumri to the Georgian topes, and copper. Ores slag and ash for Chinese investment in the BRI and promote economic integration border. All the countries seek FDI are also exported to China from Ar- countries, including in Armenia in the targeted country. Chinese in- in transportation infrastructure. menia and Georgia. These natural and Azerbaijan. A 2018 study con- vestment in the region’s transporta- As the Azerbaijan government has resources and raw materials are im- ducted by Zhongsu Li, Kevin P. tion infrastructure has been limited highlighted, interconnectivity will portant for Beijing’s economic devel- Gallagher, and Denise Mauzerall even though Beijing has encouraged boost development and economic opment and are much needed for its from the Global Development investors to play an active role in cooperation in the region and en- continued economic growth. Though Policy Center in the United States the construction of BRI transit cor- hance the global economy by cre- the total amount of its imports from found that countries falling within ridors. Investors have instead con- ating more economic opportunities the region are relatively small in com- the scope of BRI’s geography com- centrated on indirect opportunities around the world. parison to what it receives from Asia prise 48 percent of the Chinese surrounding each country’s planned or Africa, they should be interpreted energy investment portfolio cov- and actual transport infrastructure hina’s economic relations as part of Beijing’s strategy to diver- ering various technologies in- projects. For example, in Georgia, Cwith the South Caucasus sify and strengthen its trade relations cluding coal, gas, oil, hydro power, they indirectly aided the coun- countries pose no immediate chal- across BRI’s geography. wind, solar, and biomass power. In try’s transportation infrastructure lenge or threat to major powers or

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 196 197 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES regional power dynamics, and it is with or challenge each of the major mentioned, they do not appear, at and human assets to highlight its unlikely that growth in them will stakeholders’ interests. this time, to be a major concern growing global security footprint. result in a power realignment or ac- among policymakers who are con- commodating behavior on their part. A lack of direct investment in cerned about both the rise and Recognition of this and reflection Azerbaijan’s transport infrastruc- economic and political influence on its potential implications has led Four reasons rise to the mind. ture projects is a case in point. Di- of China across the globe. As was some Western policymakers to raise First, Sino-South Caucasus eco- rect investment by China or a mo- highlighted above, Western policy- concern over whether its growing nomic relations (at least at this nopoly held by other non-Western makers have raised concerns about military and security roles in spe- time) are relatively insignificant entities could have triggered a Chinese investments in energy and cific countries and regions across when taking into consideration fear that has been raised before by transport infrastructure, but the the globe will challenge and/or re- the region’s economic relations Western policymakers, namely of nature of those investments in the place U.S. military and security pri- with Russia, France, Germany, and the potential blocking of key trans- South Caucasus do not seem to be macy. Some have even questioned the United States. port routes and an issue at this time. whether it could potentially chal- Second, the nature critical infrastruc- lenge Russian military and security of China’s trade China’s economic rela- ture (e.g. ports) in primacy in its own area of influence relations and in- tions with the South Cau- the future, which, Military and Security like the South Caucasus; and, if so, vestments comple- casus countries pose no in turn, could Relations whether it would create a degree ment rather than immediate challenge or hinder oil and food of regional instability that would compete with or supplies to core hina has a growing stake in necessitate U.S. or NATO inter- challenge major threat to major powers or areas in Eurasia Csecuring its overseas eco- vention. Others experts, including powers. Third, re- regional power dynam- and Japan where nomic and energy interests and those from the Rand Corporation, gional connectivity ics, and it is unlikely that there is a heavy U.S. protecting its growing diaspora argue that because of Beijing’s own through transport growth in them will result military presence. community, particularly given that “renouncement of military aggres- infrastructure, in a power realignment or This fear, coupled the security environments where sion, lack of international allies, the nature of Eu- with the perceived they are located are often plagued and limited power projection ca- ro-Atlantic and accommodating behavior security threat of by a combination of traditional and pabilities,” it presents neither a di- Euro-Asian trade on their part. a dominant power non-traditional security threats. Ex- rect nor an indirect military and linkages, and the in either Europe or perts highlight Beijing’s armament security challenge or threat at this complex webs comprising the Asia setting conditions for Amer- sales, military-technology and se- time. As will be highlighted below, South Caucasus countries’ bilat- ican access to vital natural re- curity agreements, and both its mil- Beijing also poses no threat to eral economic relations promote sources, have long provoked strong itary presence in Africa and actions major power stakeholders in the economic and political develop- resistance to Eurasian connectivity in the South China Sea as signs of South Caucasus region. ment and regional stability. Fourth, from some Western policymakers. its growing military footprint. They China has thus far recognized and also underscore intelligence and China’s military and security respected the complex nature of the Finally, the aforementioned ex- satellite communications networks, footprints in the South Caucasus region’s power dynamics and Chi- amination of material in States dual-use ports and infrastruc- is relatively light, with its relations nese investors have been selective News Service and U.S. Federal News ture projects, and the use of pri- being limited to Armenia and Azer- in their investments so that they indicates that although Sino-South vate or host-nation security forces baijan. In Armenia, military rela- complement rather than compete Caucasus economic relations are to protect strategic commercial tions consist primarily of high-level

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 198 199 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES military-to-military Beijing as a poten- policymakers and experts of a po- partners to meet their economic, personnel meet- Beijing has little to gain tial alternative mil- tential China-Russia-Iran axis that development, and security needs. ings and limited by entering the geostra- itary supplier and could compete with and challenge weapons sales and tegic security game, and security assistance Western interests and influence in As has been highlighted in non-lethal techno- provider. Beijing, the South Caucasus. And the latter this essay, Armenia, Azerbaijan, logical assistance. doing so would only re- however, remains itself, as will be recalled, runs con- and Georgia look to China—an Some experts have inforce the fears and reticent to ex- trary to the interests and aims of emerging global power but not a proposed the ex- concerns expressed by pand its military- the region’s countries that do want rising power in the South Caucasus pansion of Sino- some policymakers and security cooper- limited military and security coop- region per se—as an alternative Armenian military- experts of a potential ation with either eration with the West. source for their economic and de- technological as- country because velopment needs. Only Armenia sistance to include China-Russia-Iran axis of the nature of its To that end, the limited Sino- and Azerbaijan have expressed a the creation of that could compete with economic relations South Caucasus military and se- desire to explore and enhance their a joint military- and challenge Western with both coun- curity relations should be seen military and security relations with industrial center interests and influence in tries, the military within the larger context of BRI Beijing. The level and nature of for the production the South Caucasus. and security role and as part of Beijing’s intention Beijing’s economic, military, and of military robots, played by Russia, to offer incentives for participating security relations do not in any way drones, and other Turkey, the United countries and to simply diversify pose a challenge to or threaten to military technology. However, States, and NATO in the region, the nature of its relations with alter the distribution of power in Beijing has not overtly expressed and its own relations with these them rather than as an intent to the South Caucasus region. As was an interest in such an expansion powers. compete with or challenge the estab- highlighted in the first part of the of their relations. Sino-Armenian lished major power stakeholders in essay, Russia and Turkey are major security relations consist of secu- hus, Sino-South Caucasus the region. regional powers and have greater in- rity cooperation agreements on Tmilitary and security re- fluence on the exercise of economic anti-terrorism, cyber security, and lations at this time present no and military power in the region, BRI security. In Azerbaijan, rela- military or security challenge to Navigating the Way and both the United States and the tions consist primarily of military either the United States (and by Forward European Union play (lesser) roles armament sales. Baku has pur- extension NATO) or Russia. As in that dynamic. Also, for America chased Chinese-licensed tactical was highlighted in the previous he relative decline of and and the EU, Russia rather than China weapons from Turkey and a multiple section, the nature of the security Tthe role played by America, remains the larger security concern rocket-launch system that was jointly environment in the region is al- the ongoing shift from a unipolar for the transatlantic bloc, although designed by China and Belarus. ready quite complex, given the na- to a multipolar system, and the Turkey appears to be running a close ture of relations between the major emerging (yet to be defined) new second in some circles (e.g. France). Like Yerevan, Baku has also ex- power stakeholders and each international order resulting from pressed an interest in expanding country in the region. Beijing has the rise of new and reemerging All this means that as long as military, military-technolog- little to gain by entering the geo- powers at the regional and global Beijing’s relations continue to en- ical, and military-educational strategic security game, and doing levels have each contributed to hance the aims and interests of the cooperation with Beijing. Both so would only reinforce the fears small and mid-size states making region’s major stakeholders and the Armenia and Azerbaijan see and concerns expressed by some choices to search for alternative nature of their relations with the

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South Caucasus countries, then it between Russia and Turkey in state or a coalition of states that can leaders and policymakers of the is unlikely there would be any ex- North Africa, which has implica- best provide for their security. Each South Caucasus have proven them- ternal coalition formed in the short- tions for the two competitors in the country’s behavior will continue to selves to be adept in navigating great term for the purpose of targeting South Caucasus region, as Svante be situationally determined. power competition at both the re- Sino-South Caucasus relations. Cornell discussed in an essay that gional and global levels; so even if appeared in the previous edition of he bottom line is that the some aspects of their relations with lso, the fact that Beijing is not Baku Dialogues. Teconomic, development, China—such as those that have Aa rising power in the region and security needs of Armenia, been raised as a concern by some per se is an extremely important This implies that there is unlikely Azerbaijan, and Georgia will almost Western policymakers—are targeted point to keep in mind, given that to be any change in the behavior of certainly continue to be defined in the future, they are likely to nav- much of scholarship examining Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and dictated by the nature of their igate the conflictual currents with small and mid-size state behavior toward their relations with China relations with the region’s major expertise and sophistication. None- in periods of great and major power under present circumstances. stakeholders. Looking ahead, this theless, they should be cognizant competition finds that it is there Rather, each are more likely to re- will certainly include China. of, and plan for, ways to overcome gional rather than the global distri- main inclined to keep enhancing any points of tensions in the future. bution of power that matters more. their respective economic relations Each South Caucasus country The shifting world order itself and with Beijing, given the existing views its participation in BRI—as the uncertainty that it brings will Small and mid-size states are competition between the major well as its bilateral relations with require both character and courage; more conscious of the distribu- stakeholders in different regions. China—as an opportunity to bring for the future of the South Cau- tion of power within their vicinity Even if Beijing were to increase greater development to themselves, casus will be determined by how its (i.e. the South Caucasus) rather its economic relations with these prosperity to their own people, and statesmen and stateswomen weather than the larger region (i.e. Europe, countries, research by experts finds enhance the strategic role of their the storms of global, regional, and broadly under- that economic ca- region to the global economy. The domestic uncertainty. BD stood) or global pabilities of a rising competition (i.e. Each South Caucasus power (should U.S.-China global country views its par- Beijing reach that competition). level in the South Beijing has also ticipation in BRI—as Caucasus in the demonstrated its well as its bilateral re- future) are not reticence to get in- lations with China—as alone sufficient to volved in regional an opportunity to bring generate a change disputes, as was greater development to in small and mid- bakudialogues.ada.edu.az demonstrated both themselves, prosperity to size state behavior. by the July four-day Rather, it is only a flare-up in and their own people, and en- threat to their se- around Nagorno- hance the strategic role of curity that is likely Karabakh and the their region to the global to induce such a Second Karabakh economy. change, whereby War; and tensions they turn to the

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they were able to provide not just a foundation but a substantive context Profile in Leadership for the value-based principles, standards, and practices that continue to inform the world of today. Shev’s Way and the History o no, this portrait will not be comprehensive. I hope, rather, and in Ssincere humility, that what follows will come to be considered as a reflection and reminiscence on some episodes in the life of this unique of Europe individual—concrete events and developments that I either personally witnessed or in which I participated by virtue of the positions I held at the time.

Tedo Japaridze As a consequence of all this, in the profile that follows my biases ought to be made clear at the onset: I liked and admired the man; Shevardnadze was my mentor, a person who introduced me to the art of diplomacy can think of no more fitting introduction to this profile in leadership and the quintessence of foreign policymaking of a sovereign Georgia on Eduard Shevardnadze than to share how I felt at that moment in and, in general, of how to properly and realistically harness Georgia’s between the end of the recollection and note-taking phase and before capacity, potential, and resources. And he did all this—I learnt all this, theI onset of the phase in which one begins to actually write. I intuited right or at least as much as I could—in a fully away that I could not hope to draft a full-on, comprehensive portrait of Shevardnadze was my men- confused and misbalanced world order Georgia’s “Babu” (Grandfather) or, as Westerners called him, the “Silver tor, a person who introduced that emerged after the collapse of the Fox.” He remains too grand of a figure—an exalted member of the pantheon me to the art of diploma- Soviet Union; and he was able to do all of great statesmen: architects of world affairs, people who made an out- cy and the quintessence of this because he understood he could not standing impact on international relations. Such people are titans of world foreign policymaking of a change (much less oppose) those new politics, true leaders one and all. sovereign Georgia and, in realities and perspectives, but only work from them as givens in order to find an People like Eduard Shevardnadze—or Shev, as those of us who were general, of how to proper- appropriate and applicable niche so as fortunate enough to work closely with him called him between our - ly and realistically harness to make Georgia’s capability—and its selves—helped launch the world into that complex, comprehensive, and Georgia’s capacity, potential, institutional or collective memory— yes, frequently tumultuous process of coming to grips with the end of and resources. valuable, useful, and convenient for the Cold War and the beginning of something new and better. Unsur - partners and allies alike. prisingly, in doing all this, people like Shevardnadze never overlooked the strategic interests of their own countries and of their respective po - hevardnadze conveyed meticulously to his counterparts and asso- litical and ideological systems, clashing and harshly debating over them Sciates that Georgia could not survive alone—that regional security with each other but still trying to keep an essential balance. In so doing, and stability are indivisible, interconnected, intertwined, and interdependent. Shevardnadze was always reminding those of us who worked closely Tedo Japaridze is Vice Chairman for International Relations of the Ankalia under him to stay realistic, rational, and pragmatic—to never lose our Development Consortium and a former Chairperson of the Foreign Relations sensitivity to the geopolitical circumstances in which we found ourselves. Committee of the Parliament of Georgia, Secretary-General of the Organization of In other words, Shevardnadze continuously insisted that we keep our wits the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Foreign Minister of Georgia, National Security Adviser to the President of Georgia, Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime about us and look into Georgia’s future with a clear sense of our own Minister of Georgia, and Ambassador of Georgia to the United States. legacy combined with a Realpolitik assessment of our perspectives.

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Once, in an address to the UN General Assembly, Shevardnadze described fountain of his local power to build a new narrative as a national leader—a Georgia as a country “crucified at its geopolitical crest.” The reasoning that co-author of Georgia’s rediscovered independence. had gone into that description led him to urge us unceasingly to keep in mind Georgia’s “special geography,” as he put it: our own neighborhood Shevardnadze left Moscow for Georgia to lead a country that was very and its vicinity, as well as our centuries-old own collective and institutional much taking toddler’s steps in a new world. I remember how, at the time— memory—deeply-imbued in our genetic code—that had preserved, even at the beginning—most of us walked around pretending that we knew what saved, the Georgian people in its dealings with the outside world. we were doing; and I also remember there were a few who actually had the conviction that they did, in fact, actually know what they were doing. However, Shevardnadze—who continuously instructed us in how to think Obviously, Shevardnadze fell into the latter category: he had the audacity, through the consequences of our history and heritage—always endeavored the courage, the experience, and perhaps the cheek to act as if he was actu- to steer his countrymen in a direction that looked to the future. He spoke ally competent. Georgia needed such confidence and, frankly, all of us who of the importance of materializing our national legacy—of leveraging and worked around him needed it too. building on it—while always paying heed to resist the temptation to drag Georgia back into a modern-day pursuit of what he once called “glorious first met Shevardnadze on April 1st, 1992. On that very day he asked historical triumphs” that appear here and there throughout our unbridled I me whether I was willing to move from the position of First Deputy history. Instead, the accent was always on applying that legacy to navigate Foreign Minister to become his foreign policy adviser. Georgia ahead—towards the future—and to do so by way of well-calculated steps and decisions. I guess the expression on my face betrayed how stunned I felt at the proposal, that had (to my mind, at least) come out of nowhere. “I hope you historical review of Shevardnadze’s legacy—a profile of his lead - didn’t take my offer as an April fool’s joke,” he said. I never looked back. A ership—is never a purely academic, disinterested endeavor. She - vardnadze has been different things to different people. For the Soviets, Shevardnadze chose his new team—myself included—not because we were for instance, he was a Caucasian making it through the ranks of the similar but because we were not. He knew the world was changing, he was party nomenklatura, punching a bit above his weight to strengthen his too confident to be afraid, and he filled his cabinet with people who would grip on his personal power, like Georgians (and not only them) often help him learn, accommodate, and shape the future for the benefit of Georgia. did in those times. will never forget Shevardnadze’s first “instruction”—a pronouncement, Shevardnadze rose to be the First Secretary of the Central Committee of Ireally—that he shot out spontaneously to us right at the start: “Don’t the Communist Party of Georgia and was, as observers admit, a more ca- worry, we’ll work together, for we have a big strategic agenda. Yes, it will not pable economic steward and a more liberal autocrat (as far as Soviet repub- be an easy time—too many challenges, too many risks. So, I will need fresh lic-level secretaries went) than those who preceded or succeeded him. For ideas and concepts to navigate Georgia safely from its disastrous situation! example, he served as a skillful interlocutor between the Soviet leadership Therefore, try to find young and knowledgeable people, engage them into and Georgian protesters in 1978, who demanded that Georgian remain the different brainstorming sessions, and introduce them to me.” sole language within Georgia, with Shevardnadze succeeding to outma- neuver and persuade the Kremlin leadership. I call to mind one other “instruction” that Shevardnadze gave us soon thereafter: “Georgia will never be safe, stable, prosperous, and, in the end, Then, in 1985, he rose to become the Foreign Minister of the Soviet sovereign and independent if, for example, Azerbaijan and Ukraine are Union, resigning abruptly in December 1990 before briefly taking the post not either. That’s why Georgia will need to take delicate care to nurture its up again in late 1991. A few months later, in March 1992, he returned to the relations, specifically with Azerbaijan,” he continued.: We need to do this

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 206 207 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES in more than the usual nuanced way. We need to help and support each had developed over nearly three decades as the Soviet Union’s foreign min- other, and we need to recognize that if Georgia succeeds, this will represent ister. Shevardnadze stood by Mikhail Gorbachev as he disengaged from a a triumph for Azerbaijan as well, and vice versa,” Shevardnadze concluded. bloody and costly war in Afghanistan, which paved the way towards the instauration of change in East-Central Europe, then Germany, then the One way this “instruction” was carried over into our diplomatic work was Soviet Union itself, and then, inevitably, his Georgian homeland. in writing letters. Heads of state write untold letters to their fellow world leaders. Some administrations take this more seriously than others (the He continuously went where no Soviet foreign minister had gone be- same can be said about composing speeches). For our part, we always made fore. And he made it look easy—charmingly so—even effortless. He had a sure the letters that went out with President Shevardnadze’s signature were crushing sense of humor and, even when travelling abroad, he somehow never pro forma. At his insistence, each letter went through multiple revi- was able to create an atmosphere that sions until we were all satisfied it was ready to be sent out. Almost without No one can comment on made it seem as if he was the natural host fail—and in particular with respect to the letters we sent to U.S. presidents Europe’s present, especially of every conversation. and leaders of other major Western powers—we included a well-crafted with regards to the inde- paragraph or two about Azerbaijan and Ukraine, emphasizing the impor- Invariably, Shev left in his wake more pendent states that emerged tance of assisting those states and noting the latest Georgian initiatives in enemies than he made friends—especially doing the same, but also what they were doing to help us. from behind the Iron in Moscow, and concretely among the Curtain, without referring to military and intelligence communities. As The letter writing example helps to illustrate how Shevardnadze identi- Shevardnadze. it turned out, this was not forgotten. fied and communicated Georgia’s strategic foreign policy agenda that has remained valid into the present—an agenda that from the moment he took or 30 years now, I have become accustomed to disagreeing with people over the reins of the country looked squarely to the future. Fover Babu’s true nature with people who confuse knowledge (or opinion) of what happened with the courage it took to make it happen. But there is one hevardnadze was ambitious, and then some. I remember a joke that point of consensus: no one can comment on Europe’s present—especially Swent around in the 1970s in Tbilisi: two men are dragging a statue of with regards to the independent states that emerged from behind the Iron Shevardnadze up a steep hill. “Why do you bother?,” a passerby asked. “Just Curtain—without referring to Shevardnadze. leave him down below, and he’ll climb up himself.” Another preliminary point: by virtue of having been a Soviet statesman, But ambition is the stuff of which consequential people are made. Shev’s Shevardnadze became a global leader. And this carried over to his time as well-developed ambition was not simply about engendering a personal drive President of Georgia. And no one has come close since. Shevardnadze is to acquire and hold power. For him, personal success was never an end in itself. literally the last Georgian who was endowed with the capacity for global It was a means to an end. And that end—that goal—was always about the bet- outreach, possessed a global network, and who was capable of expending terment of others. No one who ever worked for him failed to feel an enormous cultural and political capital on behalf of his small country on a global scale. sense of responsibility. This feeling, which comes to inform everything you do and all the duties you perform, cannot take hold if the end is merely power. s Foreign Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, AShevardnadze played a pivotal role in the reunification of Germany s the foreign minister of a superpower, Shevardnadze made his mark and, therefore, of Europe. In part due to the fact that Vladimir Putin keeps Aby the execution of what came to be known in some circles as the evoking the “Great Patriotic War” in his nationalist rhetoric, the West has “Sinatra Doctrine”—the art of doing things “His Way,” which meant leaving become desensitized to the 27 million people who were lost in the war with behind Andrei Gromyko’s “executive-style” of foreign policymaking that he Nazi Germany. But in 1985, when Shevardnadze rose to head the Soviet

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Foreign Ministry, he was a minister of a people that still had vivid mem- assumed (or hoped), Russia could be brought into the fold, perhaps even ories of that war. Indeed, the memory of the Second World War was fun- assimilated (instead of being kept out in the cold). damental to why citizens of the Soviet Union referred to themselves as “a people,” if they did at all. To get the Soviet people to accept German re - Now, of course, we can play the “who was right” game in which historians unification was difficult enough, given this fact. But it should be recalled like to dabble. Much depends on the passage of time and one’s perspective. that Shevardnadze did much more than make this historic concession. What appeared right in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War can be He went much further: he championed it. I remember in 1993 he visited reviewed and reassessed three decades later. But one should always keep Germany as the Head of State of Georgia, and during a fully packed gala in mind that the benefit of hindsight is the prerogative of the scholar rather reception in Berlin he exclaimed: “What a life! One Georgian dismem- than the diplomat; for the diplomat, “being right” in the long term is less of bered Germany and another one has unified it. It sure looks like nothing a concern. The point for the diplomat is to play a role in driving his side’s in this world happens without the meddling of Georgians!” foreign policy narrative: “there was no other logic,” Shevardnadze went on to write in his memoirs, with regards to the question of reunification. I think the reason why his West German counterpart, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, referred to Shevardnadze as “one of the significant and -out To come back to the Iron Lady for a moment more. Thatcher and standing statesmen of the twentieth century” was that he actually made a Shevardnadze had very different roles to play and operated in the context two positive case for a united Germany. After all, it was not the Soviet Union but different narratives. The Silver Fox stood by Gorbachev as he was trying to Great Britain that most fiercely resisted its former enemy’s reunification, disengage the Soviet Union from the captive half of Europe in order to pave with British prime minister Margaret Thatcher—known to supporters and the way towards a new and hopefully united Europe. That would have been a detractors alike as the Iron Lady—going so far as to visit Moscow to try Europe with no victors and no vanquished—a Europe in which the Soviet to convince Gorbachev and Shevardnadze to reverse their position. This Union would become an integral part of a new order rather than a defeated was a classic “balance-of-power” move that was more reminiscent of Lon- adversary. don’s thinking when it had been hard at work in building a coalition against Napoleon than the actions expected of a Euro-Atlantic partner and ally in More than almost any other factor, it was the August 1991 attempted coup the waning years of the Cold War. in Moscow that set in motion events that put an end to that vision.

hat is not to compare the qualities of Shevardnadze with those of hevardnadze understood that making friends in the West (and with TMargaret Thatcher. The kneejerk reaction of that quintessentially Sthe West) was Realpolitik. Thatcher saw things differently. She viewed Conservative politician was in line with her nation’s traditions. For the herself as the latest in a string of British leaders who stood on the right side British, the Americans were, systemically, the perfect missing piece in an of history, claiming her rightful seat at the table around which the future of elaborate game of alliances that had remained imbalanced for decades, Europe was to be discussed and decided. perhaps for centuries. After all, who can forget the classic formulation of Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, that the Alliance was all She understood this claim as the third great vindication of Britain and about keeping “America in, Russia out, and Germany down.” The reuni- British grand strategy in less than a century—of course, not Britain alone, fication of Germany meant it was no longer down and that the Russians but Britain acting in concert with the same small, core group of allies. And were not quite out. At least Thatcher and Shevardnadze agreed—in the to her credit, she did seem to have based her position not just on a halcyon context of negotiating the terms of the post-Cold War settlement—that glance back at history but also on a look towards the future—to twenty the complex question of German reunification was not of “red line” im- or thirty years hence and the systemic challenge that could be posed by portance so long as the Americans stayed in, for this meant that even a a resurgent and powerful Germany standing tall at the center of a new unified Germany could be held in check (if not held down), and, it was European state system.

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Sure, the idea of a United States of Europe encompassing Germany and Many still remember the moment when Shevardnadze—who had spent two Great Britain was the takeaway line from a famous speech Thatcher’s hero weeks in Abkhazia’s capital, Sukhumi, which had been shelled and encircled by Winston Churchill had delivered in Zurich in 1946; but that speech is one separatists forces and units of the Russian army—exclaimed that he wished to of the few spoken by the great Englishman that was quoted far more on the die rather than witness the surrender of Georgian lands to the adversary. Continent than in Albion. And as we know today, the idea never quite resonated with Lady Thatcher. But for Shevardnadze, the modern-day version And so Shevardnadze began to reach out to Western capitals—to his per- of Churchill’s vision made strategic sense. sonal friends with whom he had worked hand-in-hand in the attempt to build a new world. I remember how he traveled to Germany to remind the Shevardnadze bought into Gorbachev’s Shevardnadze bought into leadership of very recent facts and even more momentous decisions that idea that it was possible to dissolve an Gorbachev’s idea that it was could have gone the other way. And I remember how deftly, seamlessly, empire of unequals and join a common possible to dissolve an em- he segued to asking for concrete support, which included a request for the project as an equal. Shevardnadze was provision of immediate material assistance. willing to entertain a rather romantic vi- pire of unequals and join a sion (a German vision, one could even common project as an equal. I attended that meeting in Bonn with a stunned Helmut Kohl. Was this say) of a Europe ruled on the basis of gambit of Shevardnadze’s a bit inflexible? Perhaps it was. But Tbilisi was values and principles rather than naked power. In such a Europe, “blood not Moscow, and Georgia was falling apart: breadlines stretching for a ki- and iron” would take a back seat and the Soviet Union would not be de- lometer or more, electricity cuts, no running water, looting, and civil war. feated and dissected but rather re-conceptualized and re-integrated in what Having chosen to run a bottomless ship in a stormy sea—to trade in his role Gorbachev called a “common European home.” of global leader for that of national leader in a country that was struggling to become a state in more than name alone—Shevardnadze was going to give That is why the question of “who was right—Thatcher or Shev?” is imma- it his all. He was ruthless in meeting the requirements of his role, every role. terial. Without the benefit of an oracle, the best a leader can do is act with And he would do what it took. Survival is a dirty business. Kohl yielded. clarity, conviction, openness of heart, and strength of mind. In the world Germany delivered. And Georgia lived on to fight another day. Shevardnadze imagined, it was possible for country like Georgia to exist with Russia but not in Russia. That dream defined Shevardnadze’s successor hevardnadze’s evocation of the past was in truth a comment on the generation, my own. Spresent. He had brought with him from Moscow three very important resources. First, a Soviet dowry in the form of Western contacts: the cultural fter the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Shevardnadze was reborn. and political capital of the man who helped reunify Germany and prevented ABut this re-birth was of his own choosing. He chose not to remain bloodshed in East-Central Europe. Second, the moral authority of the So- in Moscow, but rather to become the president of a war-torn, dilapidated, viet Union’s last foreign minister—the one who allowed the Berlin Wall to and dismembered country. And this choice, as I’ve already mentioned, had come crumbling down without falling on the head of a single European, its consequences: some of Shevardnadze’s foreign policy successes as the especially those who came from the former Warsaw Pact countries. And Soviet foreign minister ricocheted back to him when he returned home: the third, his little black book of jottings and his little black box of favors—the old Soviet military and security apparatus—having made a seamless turn sorts of things one invariably gains as the foreign minister of a superpower. to serve a “democratic Russia”—retaliated against the Silver Fox without hesitation: their choice was to carve out the Tskinvali region and Abkhazia, Shevardnadze was determined to carve out a role for a small state on the two historical Georgian territories. It should be noted that this carving rep- periphery of Europe—a state that most people in the West could not locate resented the first Moscow-backed military operation in a former Soviet re- on a map. Georgia could easily have become one of those countries that was public after the collapse of the USSR. small and poor and irrelevant enough to be stepped on by its giant neighbor

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 212 213 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES with impunity and without commanding even an hour’s worth of prime- Georgia’s geopolitical situation that still remains fully valid to this very day. time television in the United States. That it did not was almost entirely Shev’s doing. He could command attention, he could demand and receive “I would like you to deliver this message back to my friends in Wash- an audience. He could speak persuasively and firmly enough to make heads ington,” Shevardnadze said—again, this was back in 1992. “We’ll do our turn. Sure, he used his “Soviet stool,” but it was one that had been built of best to make Georgia a functioning and resilient democracy in this part hard Georgian oak, and it was one on which he stood tall—seen and heard of the world. I know it won’t be easy, just the opposite in fact: it will be by all. His critics in Georgia would throw all that back into his face, as if his an uphill and tumultuous journey, and there will be mistakes and zig- Soviet past was a liability. zags. But Georgia will plough through all its difficulties, and we’ll become a normal, institutional, and functioning democracy one day. This But that was balderdash. In my ambassadorial capacity, I was ever-grateful we will do for ourselves, and we will also consider it our reimbursement for his charisma, sure, but no less for his Rolodex and the favors he could to our American friends: a democratic and successful Georgia; an island call in at a moment’s notice. This was due to his Soviet past. So fine, it was of democracy in this part of the world,” Shev continued. “But,” he added, Soviet. But it was past. And that Soviet past was put to new uses to help build “Georgia will also become a regional actor and a facilitator, because Geor- a Georgian future. Period. gia’s security and stability will be strongly contingent on the stability and security of its immediate neighbors, first of all Azerbaijan and Ukraine,” f the many meetings with foreign he exclaimed. Oleaders and conversations Shevard- Georgia could easily have nadze had over the course of our years become one of those coun- And then, the Silver Fox came to his last point: “Always keep Russia on your working together, three rise to the mind as tries that was small and mind. Even a ‘democratic Russia,’ which, as I understand, is currently one useful to convey in this essay. I recall, first, poor and irrelevant enough of America’s strategic priorities, and which will keep unbroken her imperial an episode punctured by gunfire. agenda, especially in her immediate neighborhood; and Russia will continue to be stepped on by its giant to attempt to keep our area weak and dependent on the Kremlin; to dominate The first senior American official who neighbor with impunity and and control that region, and thus promote their own interests.” How prophetic. visited Shevardnadze in his office soon after without commanding even he returned to Georgia in March 1992 was an hour’s worth of prime- come to the second conversation, which took place a little over a year Richard Armitage, who had been sent by time television in the United Iafter the first. Shevardnadze traveled to Kyiv for a state visit to Ukraine President George H.W. Bush to arrange the States. That it did not was that was very successful. I remember an informal lunch hosted by President delivery of tons of grain to feed a famished almost entirely Shev’s doing. Leonid Kravchuk at which he and Shevardnadze had the opportunity to nation. Shevardnadze thanked Armitage engage in casual conversation about various international issues as well as and promised that this was an investment and that, one day, the American discuss their respective domestic challenges. taxpayer would be reimbursed. At that very moment, a shooting volley from the nearby street disturbed the conversation. “Mr. President,” Armitage noted Babu calmly said, as if he were thinking aloud, “Naturally, we all need to with a semi-sarcastic smile on his face, “It appears that you have more friends have a peaceful and stable Russia as our neighbor, and we also need to take in Washington than here, in Tbilisi.” However, that was not quite true: even into account the interests of Russia in our part of the world; but only if Russia those shooting towards Shevardnadze would not have known what to do in also would admit that Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Moldova, the Central a world without him. Asian states—every former Soviet republic—are now independent and sovereign. The problem is that the Russians still confuse the notion of ‘interest’ with I still remember distinctly another part of that conversation with the meaning of ‘influence,’ and so they still want to control and dominate the Armitage—a conversation that turned into a friendly disquisition on neighborhood.”

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“I know, dear Leonid Makarovich,” Shevardnadze continued, “that you Shevardnadze had the real- one day either to Tbilisi or Baku, and sub- are knotted up with Westerners and Russians over very complex and painful ism to be utopian. He had a stitute Havel’s problems for just one day negotiations”—a reference to what eventually became the famous (or infa- Hegelian (or Marxist) convic- with mine or Aliyev’s. Your friend would mous) Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances on Ukraine, signed tion in the inescapability of a forget his allegories instantly. Russia’s on the margins of the OSCE Summit in December 1994. “And I know that better future that impressed policy toward Georgia has been the same these are very rough and hand-wriggling negotiations. And I know how since the days of Ivan the Terrible, when much pressure the Westerners are putting on you. I have seen, as a member Americans and inspired Russia started assembling its empire. Peter of Politburo, thousands of memoranda and reports regarding nasty plans enough Georgians to keep us the Great, Stalin, Yeltsin—in their essence, that detail how and by what means the Kremlin prearranged to keep control going when times were really they’ve all pursue the same policy towards over the republics, including by provoking direct conflicts among different tough. We needed to believe us: create chaos and weaken us to the point ethnic entities on the territory of the USSR. We must remember,” he added, in order to get on with it. And that their troops are called in on some pre- “that great powers— especially imperial ones—appreciate strength as an we needed the Americans text or another to ‘keep the peace.’” instrument of deterrence. I know that from my own experience at the Soviet and Europeans to believe in Foreign Ministry,” he continued. us and to give us a hand. And I then reminded Shevardnadze of Paul we would have gotten neither Goble’s famous crack regarding Russia’s “So I have been thinking: what if Ukraine is able keep just one nuclear without the Silver Fox lead- “peacekeeping” capacity—a play on words missile in its military arsenal—naturally, just for deterrence! I understand ing us on, sometimes by the that works perfectly in English: “piece- that it’s no more than wishful thinking, but were it possible, it would sheer force of his spirit. keeping,” Goble called it: by which he strengthen Ukraine’s capacity to defend its independence and sovereignty. meant keeping or grabbing one or another A strong and capable Ukraine is so vital for Georgia’s independence and piece of land here and there. Shevard- sovereignty,” Shevardnadze concluded. nadze laughed passionately. “Indeed, Russian habits die hard,” he remarked.

he third conversation involving Shevardnadze begins in Prague. n recalling these and many other conversations, it struck me that it was not so TDuring an April 1992 visit to that wonderful Central European city, I Imuch what Shevardnadze did that made him irreplaceable. It was his ability had the privilege of meeting Luboš Dobrovský, who at the time was serving to be completely realistic and down to earth, and yet, at the same time, to believe as the Head of Václav Havel’s Presidential Administration. We were talking in and articulate a future that had no material foundation. about the then new and now notorious Russian concept of the “near abroad.” Shevardnadze had the realism to be utopian. He had a Hegelian (or Dobrovský calmly admitted to me, “Tedo, if the West had not immediately Marxist) conviction in the inescapability of a better future that impressed countered and discouraged Russia on what nowadays they call their ‘near Americans and inspired enough Georgians to keep us going when times abroad’ concept, tomorrow we would have become the ‘middle abroad,’ were really tough. We needed to believe in order to get on with it. And we and, eventually, we might have become the ‘faraway abroad.’ I do not mean needed the Americans and Europeans to believe in us and to give us a hand. to declare a war on Russia but rather to stay steadfastly with her, protecting And we would have gotten neither without the Silver Fox leading us on, our own independence and sovereignty,” added Dobrovský. sometimes by the sheer force of his spirit.

I remember how upon my arrival back to Tbilisi, I had related the ex- t seemed to me at the time that Europe and America had more of change to Shevardnadze. He smiled back at me in that particular way of his Ia post-Soviet mindset than Shevardnadze ever did. When the Dem- and said, “it’s easy to equivocate with these kinds of metaphors when you ocrats won the White House in November 1992, Eduard Shevardnadze sit in Prague, Warsaw, Berlin, or Paris. Bring your friend Dobrovský just for dispatched me and my colleague (and good friend) Gela Charkviani to

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Washington to meet the new foreign policy team of the incoming Clinton the early 1990s—or, come to think of it, in the early 1890s, or even the early Administration. 1790s. But in the West, the dominant idea at the time was that it was possible to build on a clean slate—think back to how even serious people took At the State Department we met with a transitional interagency foreign seriously the “end of history” hypothesis and the “unipolar era” paradigm— policy and security group, and later that day we met with Strobe Talbott, and that Europe would no longer works on the “blood and iron” principle. who had been nominated but not yet confirmed as Ambassador-at-Large for the Newly Independent States. We met Strobe in the cafeteria, located But that’s not what happened. certainly not in our world. We knew we somewhere on the ground floor of the State Department, if memory serves. were racing against the clock, and that the objectives of building a country Strobe greeted us, his hands full of unpacked boxes and files. and finding a role for ourselves in the world were intrinsically linked. While Shevardnadze has been accused by some at home of being too much of a Strobe and I were old friends, having met when he was a journalist and “post-Soviet” leader, he was the first to realize that if Georgia was to build a I was an analyst at the USA and Canada Studies Institute in Moscow. So state that was substantively independent, we would have to build a narrative the unsettled and informal nature of the meeting suited us fine, and it also of relevance from the ground up. allowed for an agenda that was broader than usual—more “reflective,” in a sense. The three of us talked about the “Newly Independent States” or We wanted in on the redesign of the European energy map; we wanted in NIS—the term used in the West for all the post-Soviet republics before we on the redefinition of trade routes. And we wanted in with regards to joining grouped together to became the Commonwealth of Independent States, or the EU and NATO. Georgia had to make CIS. One acronym replaced another, but the reality stayed the same. Europe today is quite a differ- the case for its instrumentality. Of course, ent place from what we imag- Shevardnadze understood that Georgia’s Naturally, the discussion gravitated towards Russia and its “democratic ined it would become: Russia journey to NATO would take a long time. perspectives.” Of course, we had no idea that the incoming Clinton Admin- is not quite out, the Americans But he did not want us to stand forever istration had been quietly developing a new paradigm towards our part of are not quite in, and the Ger- under the arch that held NATO’s “open the world that later came to known as the “Russia First” policy. I remember mans are not quite down. But door.” It reminded him too much of re- suggesting to Strobe that rather than focusing on Russian democratization, volving doors: you’re kind of in and then it would be better to help the NIS countries establish themselves as demo- Georgia is now more like the you’re instantly out. When he read that cratic regimes in their own right. “Why not focus on creating a ‘democratic country Shevardnadze imag- NATO Secretary General Javier Solana had belt’ around Russia?,” I asked. “That would make it easier to build democ- ined than the country he ruled. once again delivered his almost ritualistic racy in Russia,” I suggested. pronouncements on the Atlantic Alliance’s Open-Door policy, Shevardnadze cracked in his usual way: “If one stays too That’s when Strobe muttered into his coffee that “they wouldn’t like the long in an open door, one might catch a nasty cold and die from exposure.” idea of a ‘belt’ around them.” urope today is quite a different place from what we imagined it would ndeed, anything resembling the idea of encirclement seemed quite be- Ebecome: Russia is not quite out, the Americans are not quite in, and Iyond the spirit of the day, week, month, year, and even century—from the Germans are not quite down. But Georgia is now more like the country the Russian perspective (from ours, too, I might add). For a country that Shevardnadze imagined than the country he ruled. stretches from Europe to the Far East, Russia’s intolerance of interference in its “near abroad” is problematic. Half the world’s landmass is near Russia, Shevardnadze was ruthless enough to remain relevant and amiable lest we forget. Another other issue is that Russia favors exclusive relation- enough to make a difference. People like Shevardnadze do not work on ships. That was quite clear to a Georgian, a Lithuanian, or an Estonian in the assumption of clarity. They create the clarity we take for granted. From

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Babu and Thatcher, to Genscher and Baker, we judge leaders as if they act out date. That was how Georgia acquired choices it may not have otherwise had a script. But the truth is that they don’t: they improvise. If we notice they’re and came to build up its strategic posture. improvising, then they’re doing something really wrong; if we don’t, then they don’t get the credit. Yet Shevardnadze managed to get enough credit to hold t the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul, Russia and Georgia released onto power when the stakes were really high and use it to make a difference. Aa joint statement that Russia would withdraw from its military bases in Georgia. This was right around the time a certain Vladimir Putin s a senior non-Russian member of the Soviet nomenklatura, Shevard- was coming into office. And I recall that the Clinton Administration was Anadze competed with Heydar Aliyev, the founding father of mod- trying to manage the bruised ego of an economically stagnating Russia, ern-day Azerbaijan, for decades during the last decades of the Soviet Union. and that some American policymakers and analysts made suggestions to But in paving the way for their respective Shevardnadze that now President Putin would object to Georgia’s countries to emerge from the Cold War Shevardnadze competed Western trajectory. into the brave new world of independence with Heydar Aliyev for de- and sovereignty—liberating their nations cades during the last decades For instance, I remember Shevardnadze’s meeting with U.S. Secretary of from the shackles of the USSR—the two of the Soviet Union. But State Madeleine Albright in the suite of rooms on the top floor of New York’s leaders stretched their hands out to one in paving the way for their Waldorf-Astoria Hotel that served, until a few years ago, as the Official another other, got their nations to do the countries to emerge from the Residence of the United States Permanent Representative to the United same, and in the process dragged Berlin, Cold War into the brave new Nations. Albright posed a question that was very typical of the sorts of in- Brussels, and Washington into the region, world of independence and quiries Shevardnadze was asked to address at the time: “Eduard, tell me, pretty much for the first time in history. sovereignty, the two leaders who’s Putin?” stretched their hands out to Under Shevardnadze’s steward- one another other, got their Shevardnadze looked straight into her eyes and said, “Who’s Putin? I ship, Georgia worked with Turkey and don’t know, dear Madeleine. I’ve never met him. But what I can tell you is Azerbaijan to implement the Baku-Tbilisi nations to do the same, and that there are many ‘Putins’ in Russia; but Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan— Ceyhan oil pipeline and its natural gas equiv- in the process dragged Berlin, all the former Soviet republics—should follow their own way.” His state- alent, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline. Brussels, and Washington ment was not an exercise in senseless bravado. Shevardnadze saw Georgia into the region, pretty much as part of what he called “South-Eastern Europe,” defining it as a region I clearly remember those long and tu- for the first time in history. stretching from Vienna to the Urals, the Balkans to the Caspian. And he was multuous negotiations, the Kremlin’s fierce determined to make history, not change it. reaction, and the direct, brutal, and physical danger to which Shevardnadze and Aliyev were constantly subjected, hevardnadze never overperformed his roles. He did not pretend to be including assassination attempts on their lives. Despite all the brutalities Sa world leader as he sat at the helm of a small country somewhere on a and the immense political pressure they felt, Shevardnadze and Aliyev, to- peripheral crossroads between East and West. He was a diehard realist and gether with Turkey’s Süleyman Demirel, succeeded in realizing those truly a doer, but he was also a politician who—as any politician, anywhere in the strategic projects. “Shevardnadze and Aliyev are unique leaders who place world—cared about state power but also about his personal standing as well their own national interests over realizing the interests of the entire region,” as his ability to exercise power. admitted Richard Morningstar, the Special Envoy of the U.S. Secretary of State for Eurasian Energy. Georgia and Azerbaijan also started building On the other hand, it was Shevardnadze who propelled a younger gener- the Transportation Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA). And to- ation of Georgian politicians into the political arena, those same who—due gether we articulated a narrative of strategic relevance that resonates to this to certain objective reasons and factors—stirred up the 2003 Revolution of

Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 220 221 Vol. 4 | No. 2 | Winter 2020-2021 BAKU DIALOGUES BAKU DIALOGUES the Roses against corruption and rigged elections. Reflecting back on the events that led to his resignation, Shevardnadze later said, “I was promoting the new generation [...]. They were my pupils. This generational change could have happened in a much more violent way—with bloodshed—but I would not let this happen! The transfer of the power [...] did not impede the ADA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION trajectory of development and the democracy-building process.”

he transformation of Georgia launched by Shevardnadze has never Tbeen a linear process—there were mistakes, blunders, drawbacks, and zigzags. But Georgia has never deviated from that way set by Shevardnadze. The country has kept on moving steadily onward, firmly and resolutely.

In literally creating a new democratic Georgia—predicated on the belief that doing so was the best option for Georgia’s future—Shevardnadze had to teach himself, and the country, the ABCs of democracy. He sometimes simplified its vibrant context. At other times, he maneuvered or sought compromise within his diverse team composed of “old-timers” and reformers, while Shevardnadze was a little bit at the same time trying not to lose his per- of everything: a Communist, sonal grip on power. But at the end of the an Atlanticist, a Soviet, a day, he never wavered from navigating European, an international- Georgia forward. And that remains She- ist; maybe a little bit of a fox, vardnadze’s main national accomplish- but never a chicken. He was ment—his legacy for future generations. all Georgian, and always a Perhaps that is why American journalist patriot. Susan Glasser—while acknowledging the contributions of Mihkeil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania, and Nino Burjanadze during the Revolution of the Roses— admitted that the hidden hero of the Revolution was Eduard Shevardnadze, The ADA University Foundation is a non-profit charity organization that supports who rejected the use of force and chose to transfer his power peacefully. the university’s educational activities. We recently established a permanent People with a tenth of his achievements have done the same since. endowment fund, an innovative concept in in the country’s education sector that ADA University has pioneered. The ADA University Foundation also operates a branch in Washington, DC, known as ADA International, that I can end with this: Shevardnadze never rested until there was no doubt has become in short order a significant extension of ADA University and its who was the main protagonist in the room. If he could not be the center of educational activities in the United States. attention, he did not play; and one needs to admit that he was a brilliant po- Giving to ADA University impacts positively not only on the quality of education litical actor. He was a little bit of everything: a Communist, an Atlanticist, a we can offer but also provides support that can tangibly impact the lives of the ADA students, faculty, and staff by developing their education and research Soviet, a European, an internationalist; maybe a little bit of a fox, but never activities whilst enhancing academic excellence. a chicken. He was all Georgian, and always a patriot. Whatever he did, he ADA University Foundation has partnered with around one hundred local and did it “his way” or no way at all. BD foreign companies in Azerbaijan and abroad.

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to taken a number of effective counter measures, so to speak. The first Interview question is a stock-taking one with respect to Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, of asking you to discuss how you have implemented a “balanced, mutually beneficial, and constructive foreign policy”—to quote from the document that lays out a national five-year development strategy, slated for comple- A Higher Level of Openness tion in 2021. and Engagement Kamilov: Uzbekistan’s New Foreign Policy Due to a number of historical, geopolitical, demographic and economic factors, Uzbekistan is one of the backbone regional Abdulaziz Kamilov states that play a key role in maintaining stability and security, as well as in the sustainable socio-economic development of its region. Baku Dialogues: The importance of Central Asia has indeed always been his- Mr. Minister, we would like to begin with the obvious, namely that most torically important as a region of the Silk Road, the crossroads great powers look at Central Asia and conclude that they have intrinsic of world civilizations, active trade and economic interaction, national security and economic interests. And yet there is tension between scientific and cultural relationships. The contribution of those same great powers in terms of how they each define their respective Central Asia, including the states that existed on the territory interests in your part of the world. of Uzbekistan, to the world heritage is colossal.

And irrespective of the fact that—if we may put it this way—the regional Today we are standing witness the revival of this historical meta-narrative is that Central Asia is no longer a mere object of interna- role of our region. And one of the decisive factors of this, in tional relations, the great powers still can’t help looking at it through a our opinion, is the strengthening of the Central Asian states Great Game lens. From such a perspective, Uzbekistan is seen as a par- as independent, self-determined, full-fledged international ticularly important geopolitical object: your country has the largest pop- entities with a unique Central Asian identity and a vision ulation in the region and a truly storied history; it’s the only country to of the development of their region as a single civilizational border with all the other Central Asian states, including Afghanistan; and space. just a few years ago it launched a spectacular string of reform initiatives. An important factor for the realization of the huge economic Uzbekistan’s leadership is obviously aware of this sort great power pos- and human potential that the region possesses is also pro- ture and the risks associated with this. Uzbekistan’s foreign policy appears found reforms and transformations in Uzbekistan. The ongoing processes of political and economic liberalization, structural renewal of the economy, public administration, Abdulaziz Kamilov is Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan. The interview was conducted in writing in mid-November 2020 through the good offices of the scientific and educational sphere, lay the foundation for a Embassy of Uzbekistan in Baku. The provided answers, reproduced verbatim below, have new era—the “Third Renaissance,” as President Shavkat undergone no editorial intervention by Baku Dialogues, as requested. Mirziyoyev has called this historical period.

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In the conditions of hard-to-predict processes taking place in conditions, we will not be able to achieve our goals without a the modern world, Uzbekistan realizes its special responsibility strong foreign policy.” for maintaining the comprehensive and dynamic development of Central Asia. This is achieved by pursuing a sound, prag- The Strategy of Action for the five priority areas of develop- matic and constructive foreign policy strategy that developed ment of the Republic of Uzbekistan for 2017-2021, developed in order to best meet the goals of minimizing risks and threats on the initiative of the President, includes modernization of to regional and international security, creating a conducive en- the public administration, the judicial and legal system, eco- vironment for maintaining peace, stability, friendly relations nomic liberalization, reforms in the social sector, as well as between peoples, and ensuring their prosperity. the principles of foreign policy and security policy. This is a program of real renewal, the foundation of which is the prin- Speaking about the difficult external conditions in which -do ciple of “Human interests are paramount,” and it is already mestic reforms and the new foreign policy of Uzbekistan are being actively implemented. being carried out, I have in mind, first of all, that the instability of the world economy, the growth of international competi- The strategy provides for a balanced, mutually beneficial and tion, as well as the difficulty of adapting both developing and constructive foreign policy aimed at strengthening the inde- developed countries to global climatic, technological, infor- pendence and sovereignty of the state, creating a belt of se- mational, social and other changes. Many of these processes curity, stability and good-neighborliness around Uzbekistan, have manifested themselves most tangibly during the current and strengthening the country’s international image. pandemic, which entails long-term consequences that can change, and are already changing various aspects of the in- Through the implementation of this course, fundamental ternal and international development of states, and, in general, positive changes have been taking place in Central Asia the development of mankind. since 2017. An atmosphere of mutual trust, friendship and respect has been created in relations among the states of The Government of Uzbekistan, when shaping the domestic the region, as well as open cooperation in the implemen - and foreign policy of the state, deeply analyzes and takes into tation of regional and international initiatives that are in account all the mentioned trends. More to the point, that the the interest of all the countries of Central Asia. The regular President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev Consultative meetings of the Heads of State of Central Asia from the outset of his presidency foresaw many of those world initiated by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev were a common events that today directly affect the interests and the state of achievement in the region to jointly seek solutions to re - both our region and most countries of the world. gion-wide issues.

Speaking in January 2018 at the meeting on the country’s di- In the last four years, Uzbekistan’s mutual trade with Central plomacy, the President of Uzbekistan drew particular attention Asian countries has increased fivefold. The current pandemic to the need to develop and conduct an active foreign policy crisis has not been able to break the new trend towards the aimed at effectively achieving national interests and strength- mutually beneficial trade, economic, investment and hu- ening the state’s ability to adequately respond to emerging manitarian links between our countries. On the contrary, challenges and risks: “We are aware that the current difficult good-neighborly relations between our countries are being times present us with more and more rigid conditions,” said the strengthened continuously through solidarity and mutual Head of the country. “In such extremely difficult and alarming support.

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Uzbekistan’s new foreign policy includes active assistance common interests in this part of the world. Such interests in overcoming crises and establishing stability, including in are to support the state sovereignty and independence of the neighboring Afghanistan, which is part of our region. The Central Asian states, continue their multi-dimensional foreign high-level Tashkent conference on Afghanistan, held in March policy and the path of civilized democratic development, and 2018, marked a new stage in mobilizing the international com- integrate consistently into the global economy. The interest of munity’s efforts to resolve the Afghan problem peacefully and each of the world’s powers is in strengthening the capacity of involve the country in regional economic cooperation. the Central Asian countries to confront new threats and prevent conflicts and crises that have a broad destabilizing effect As the President of Uzbekistan emphasized during the seven- beyond one region. ty-fifth session of the UN General Assembly, “today Central Asia has a major policy challenge which is to ensure deep integration of our region into global economic, transport and Baku Dialogues: transit corridors.” These and other important international initiatives of Uzbekistan mark our country’s entry into a new Let’s start with a discussion of the United States—a country you know level of foreign policy openness, encourage foreign invest- well—in view of the recent presidential elections. You served there ments, technologies and interregional interconnection to the as the ambassador of Uzbekistan for about seven years, arriving at the region. height of the War on Terror when Uzbekistan played a unique role in the fight against violent extremism. Since then, the bilateral relationship As you have justly noted, the major world powers have interests has evolved—we can say that neither country is now as it was when you in Central Asia, including in Uzbekistan, which necessitates served in Washington—but so has America’s relationship with the entire a high level of foreign policy competition. However, today, I Silk Road region, in light of the January 2020 release of its formal strategy think it is clear that the time of the “Great Game” is over, it is in document on Central Asia. In the context of its promotion, America’s the past of our region and empires fought for influence in this Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central strategically important part of the world. Nowadays, attempts Affairs Alice Wells referred to both “historical openings” and “enduring to revive the zero-sum geopolitical game could lead to great opportunities” while emphasizing that America sees Central Asia as a losses for all parties and must be well aware. “geostrategic region of importance in its own right.”

The processes we are witnessing today in the region demon- So how do you assess, Mr. Minister, Uzbekistan’s bilateral relationship strated the contrary: each of the world’s major forces, in- with the United States evolving in the time to come? And, more broadly, cluding, of course, Russia, China, the United States, the Euro- what sort of contribution do you think America can make to Central Asia’s pean Union, as well as regional powers—India, Pakistan, Iran, development? Saudi Arabia, Turkey, are interested in increasing the region’s participation in global economic and political processes. Kamilov: The open policy of Uzbekistan has allowed to strengthen and deepen the relations of the strategic partnership with all the Cooperation with the United States is one of the priorities above-mentioned states, active international actors. This is of the foreign policy of Uzbekistan. This is reflected in the one of the evidence that, in addition to the well-known con- Concept of Foreign Policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan and tradictions that exist among them, these states certainly have the Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation

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Framework with the United States of 2002. During President preferences between our countries, which was recently an - Mirziyoyev’s visit to the U.S. in May 2018, a Joint Statement nounced by the U.S. administration, will help expand trade of the two heads of states “The United States and Uzbeki- turnover. stan: Launching a New Era of Strategic Partnership” was adopted. I would like to underline that the relations between We are planning to establish another campus of the Webster Uzbekistan and the United States are comprehensive, long- University in the city of Fergana in the near future. We will term and multifaceted. actively expand the sister city relationships between cities and maintain close contacts with our compatriots residing in the U.S. Uzbekistan stands ready to continue developing cooperation with the United States on the principles of mutual respect and Uzbekistan intends to continue active dialogue with the United consideration of each other’s interests. We are interested in States within the “C5+1” framework (five Central Asian coun- strengthening partnership in all areas of the bilateral agenda. tries and the United States), which was launched in November In the political arena, this can be achieved through further 2015 in Samarkand. This platform has proved to be an effec- intensification of mutual high-level visits. The visits of tive mechanism for discussing important issues of the region, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of contributing to the alignment of positions in the spheres of Commerce Wilbur Ross, members of the Congress and economy, infrastructure and environmental protection. other high-ranking representatives of the U.S. administration to Uzbekistan over the past years have been very suc - Peace in Afghanistan largely depends on the United States. In cessful. We hope that this positive trend will continue. this context, it is important to continue the dialogue within the “Uzbekistan-U.S.-Afghanistan” format. The work carried out One of the important objectives for the near future is revi - in its framework contributes to strengthening of cooperation talization of the “Congressional Uzbekistan Caucus” in the in the development of practical proposals aimed at promoting House of Representatives, which was established at the end the peace process and reviving the Afghan economy. of 2018. In our view, the intensification of the dialogue with the U.S. Congress representatives and senators is very im - Uzbekistan is interested in the involvement of the U.S. private portant for strengthening the understanding in the United and public investments in the implementation of strategically States of the comprehensive reforms carried out by our important projects—such as the construction of the Surkhan- Government. Puli-Khumri power transmission line and the railway routes from Mazar-i-Sharif to the seaports of Pakistan. We intend to continue Cooperation with the U.S. in the fields of trade, economic developing a dialogue with the United States in this direction. and investment is a priority direction of our partnership. The coronavirus pandemic has affected the bilateral trade, Interaction within the Trade and Investment Framework which previously showed rapid growth and almost doubled Agreement (TIFA) facilitates the development of economic in 2019. In this regard, the primary goal, in our opinion, cooperation between Uzbekistan and the United States and should be to restore the dynamics of trade and economic re - the countries of Central Asia. Uzbekistan also maintains part- lations. Today, Uzbekistan has created favorable conditions nership with the United States in the framework of regional for attracting foreign investments, including the American infrastructure initiatives designed to stimulate the flow of long- investments, into the infrastructure development, agri- term foreign investments into projects that meet international culture, energy and other sectors. Maintaining the trade development standards.

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Baku Dialogues: The reforms being implemented in our country are supported by Russia since they are opening up the new prospects for intensifying bilateral ties and implementing mutually beneficial Let us now turn to China and Russia. As it happens, Uzbekistan is projects in trade, energy, infrastructure, transport, technology, one of only three countries in the Silk Road region—the others are science and education—in all areas of mutual interest. Armenia and Turkmenistan—that does not share a land border with either Russia or China, or both. And yet Moscow and Beijing figure most prom- We closely cooperate in the field of education, information, as inently in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy posture. So how does the view from well as the development of the Russian language in Uzbekistan. Tashkent look like, Mr. Minister, with regards to relations with China and There are branches of the Moscow State Institute (University) Russia? Or to re-phrase the question this way: both in terms of bilateral of International Relations (MGIMO), Lomonosov Moscow relations and regional affairs, what do Moscow and Beijing each bring to State University, Plekhanov Russian Economic University and the Central Asian table? other authoritative Russian universities in Tashkent, which we consider as an important investment in youth development. Kamilov: Both Uzbekistan and Russia confirmed their commitment at the highest level to deepening strategic relations in political The relations with Russia take an important place in the pri- and diplomatic, trade and economic, humanitarian and other orities of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. The Russian Federation areas, where, as we see concrete results have already been is our traditional, reliable partner, cooperation with which is achieved. actively and productively developing in all areas on the basis of the Treaty on Strategic Partnership in 2004 and the Treaty Along with this, our relations with China are developing dy- on Allied Relations of 2005. namically and characterized as a comprehensive strategic partnership. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is our In recent years, thanks to the friendly, trusting dialogue time-honored partner, which invariably supports the way of between the presidents of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev independent development and the reforms being carried out and Russia Vladimir Putin, as well as regular exchanges of in Uzbekistan. high-level delegations, inter-parliamentary ties, the Uzbek- Russian relations are developing dynamically. In recent years, the Uzbek-Chinese cooperation, which covers various areas, has been filled with new practical con- Russia is one of the leading foreign economic partners of tent. A solid foundation for this was created through a trust- Uzbekistan with an almost 16 percent share in the foreign worthy dialogue between the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat trade turnover of our country. Due to the “green corridor” Mirziyoyev and the President of the PRC Xi Jinping, close in- system, a special order of phytosanitary control, and a reduc- teraction between foreign policy and foreign economic institution in VAT, conducive conditions have been created for in- tions, contacts between parliamentarians, business, academic creasing the export of agricultural products from Uzbekistan and expert communities. to the Russian market. Today, China is the leading trade, economic and investment The Russian Federation is also a leading investor in the coun- partner of Uzbekistan and acts as a participant in the programs try’s economy with over $10 billion in investments. for structural modernization of economy.

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Tashkent and Beijing are actively cooperating within the be—aims to reconnect three continents, cover a population of 4,4 billion framework of the United Nations, Shanghai Cooperation people, and provide a total investment output in the neighborhood of $20 Organization (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and trillion, by some estimates. Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), constructively interact on the issues of regional and global security, imple- BRI’s economic attractiveness is evident for a country like Uzbekistan. If mentation of sustainable development goals. implemented properly, BRI could fundamentally transform the economic destiny of not just your nation but that of the entire Silk Road region. On The vision of further development of relations with China was the other hand, China’s flagship development initiative has not exactly been clearly unveiled in the recent speech of the President Shavkat greeted with unconditional enthusiasm by some of the other great powers. Mirziyoyev at the opening ceremony of the third China This does not seem to have discouraged Uzbekistan, and much of your neigh- International Import Expo. The head of Uzbekistan has pro- borhood, from engaging actively within the framework provided by BRI. So posed five key directions for the development of cooperation with this in mind, Mr. Minister, what role do you see Uzbekistan playing in between the two countries, in particular, the liberalization of the development of the Belt and Road Initiative in the time to come? foreign trade relations, including investments in projects for organization the production of high-demand goods in our markets; development of transport and transit potential, for- Kamilov: mation of an effective system of the land communications in the region; industrial development—the adoption of a pro- Uzbekistan supported the initiative of the President of China gram of industrial cooperation and the stimulation of the Xi Jinping “One Belt One Road” (OBOR). President Shavkat implementation of specific projects using the instruments of Mirziyoyev took part twice in the OBOR forums in Beijing. joint investment funds; digitalization of the economy, as well as strengthening cooperation in the fight against pandemic. In its approaches of cooperation within the framework of the OBOR, Uzbekistan proceeds from its own national interests. Particular importance is attached to the high-quality develop- Baku Dialogues: ment of joint investment and infrastructure projects within the framework of this initiative ensuring their financial stability Interconnectivity, in the broadest sense, is critical to fostering trade in and economic efficiency. the twenty-first century. We all speak now of financing and building transportation and communications infrastructure of all sorts—from road and The Leadership of Uzbekistan pays a great attention to the proj- rail networks to internet cabling—and we all have discussions about reg- ects on the creation of new multimodal international transport ulatory compatibility and standard setting. And of course there is the stra- corridors, including those connecting the railway systems of tegic issue of energy security, one aspects of which is the implementation Central and South Asia. The implementation of proposals put of regional pipeline projects throughout the Silk Road region, pointing forward by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in this area at the outward in all directions. OBOR and UN forums will contribute to the development of the “One Belt One Road” initiative in accordance with the in- Over the past two decades, both the EU and the United States has put terests of the countries of our and neighboring regions. forward various initiatives, proposals, and plans in this regard; but by far the most ambitious is the Belt and Road Initiative. Launched in 2013 by The formation of promising interregional transport routes, China, BRI’s grand economic strategy—whatever else it may or may not in particular the implementation of the project for the

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construction of the “Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China” railway, In general, Uzbekistan supports the search for optimal models as well as the creation of new economic corridors, such as of joining various regional initiatives and national strategies “China-Central Asia-Western Asia,” will ensure the intercon- for economic development, which would allow opening up nection of the land transport system of the Eurasian continent new opportunities for the enhancing of trade, attracting in- and economies of the participating countries to a new level of vestment, facilitating business activity, cooperation, and the development. implementation of large-scale transcontinental projects.

It would be economically feasible to establish the pass-through tariff for rail transportation along the OBOR routes passing Baku Dialogues: through the Central Asian region. Mr. Minister, Central Asia—which in your reckoning includes The projects for the development of transport and logistics Afghanistan, as you mentioned—has been, is, and will evidently remain a potential, modernization of the agro-industrial sector, energy, priority for Uzbekistan. Perhaps the key to secure prosperity for the region tourism, “green economy,” introduction of new technologies lies in figuring out how to maintain equilibrium but not equidistance be- and innovations are on the focus of our attention. tween China and Russia. And in the view of one member of the Editorial Advisory Council of Baku Dialogues—who is widely seen as one of the In this, we see the basis not only for cooperation with China, world’s foremost experts on the Silk Road region—an even more im- but also for expanding the international cooperation with portant piece of the puzzle that’s missing is the lack of a regional frame- other interested states. work comparable in scope to ASEAN or the Nordic Council. And it’s no secret that some important steps have already been taken in the direction In this regard, it is worth noting the prospects for linking the of establishing structures for regional cooperation. Now, in the consid- OBOR with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which ered view of our Editorial Advisory Council member, Uzbekistan is par- can stimulate the processes of regional trade, economic and ticularly well-positioned to credibly take the lead in spearheading what transport connectivity with the participation of Russia, other would surely amount to a generational endeavor—a truly game-changing, EAEU and SCO member states. Although Uzbekistan is not ambitious enterprise to anchor the region’s five countries more closely a member of the EAEU, our country is developing a close together. So the question is this: can you envision Central Asia heading in mutually beneficial cooperation with the member states of that sort of institutional direction? Is a Central Asian version of ASEAN this union. or the Nordic Council on the horizon?

Uzbekistan also supports the European Union Strategy for Central Asia adopted in 2019, which is based on the European Kamilov: notion of regional connectivity. The Strategy includes harmo- niously bounded transport, digital, communication, energy The President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev has clearly and humanitarian links, as well as the certain rules and stan- defined that the country’s main foreign policy priority is to dards. We are looking forward to signing the draft Extended pursue an open and constructive policy towards its neighbors, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, which tackle the Central Asian problems on the basis of equality, mu- will allow us to expand our political, trade, economic and in- tual consideration of interests and search for reasonable com- vestment cooperation, and will contribute to strengthening promises. The goal of this strategy is to transform Central Asia ties between Central Asia and Europe. into a region of stability, security and prosperity.

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Achieving these tasks, as well as ensuring sustainable and dy- enormous economic potential of the region, continue active namic development of our entire region, largely depends on cooperation in creating a regional system of efficient economic how close and harmonious the interaction between the states and transport corridors. of Central Asia will be. In addition, Tashkent became a platform for a thorough ex- Strengthening political trust and good-neighborly relations change of views on regional cooperation in the field of joint between Uzbekistan and the countries of Central Asia in re- water use, mitigating the effects of climate change and coun- cent years represents a positive milestone in the modern his- tering environmental challenges, including in the Aral Sea re- tory of the region. gion, attracting innovative technologies to the region, intro- ducing a “green economy,” and preventing desertification. The initiative of the President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to organize regular Consultative Meetings of Heads of State represents Presidents have agreed to maintain active interregional con- great importance for the continuation of these positive trends. tacts, the programs to promote common values and traditions This initiative for the first time was put forward on November that unite the peoples of the region. 10, 2017 in Samarkand during the international conference “Central Asia: Shared Past and Common Future, Cooperation Today, the process is underway to form broad opportunities for Sustainable Development and Mutual Prosperity.” for deepening and building up interregional cooperation, bringing it to a qualitatively new level. The Central Asian states Uzbekistan understands that there is a real need today for a have opened up a new page in the centuries-old chronicle of joint search for ways to solve regional problems. It is necessary friendship, good neighborliness and mutual support. to unite the efforts of the countries of the region on the basis of the principle of shared responsibility. Thus, we can say that in the near future the countries of the region will interact with each other on the basis of regular con- As the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan has empha- tacts within the framework of the Consultative meeting, taking sized, “we are not talking about the creation of a new interna- into account mutual interests and reasonable compromises. tional organization in Central Asia or any integration structure with its own charter and supranational bodies. The activities Along with this, the analysts in the region and beyond are of the regional platform for dialogue will be aimed exclu- talking about the prospects for the emergence of a structure for sively at “synchronizing watches” on the key issues of regional a new format of regionalism in Central Asia. In our opinion, it development.” is too early to talk about the creation of such a structure.

The initiative of Uzbekistan was fully supported by the Undoubtedly, the experience of ASEAN and the Nordic leaders of the Central Asian countries, who stressed that the Council, which demonstrate the sustainable regionalism in Consultative meetings will be a dialogue platform for open difficult geopolitical conditions, is being studied in Central and trustworthy discussion of relevant issues of regional Asia. Some of their aspects can be applied to promote regional cooperation. cooperation and future integration processes.

At the meeting in Tashkent, the heads of state have agreed to However, it is necessary to understand that each of the existing develop a dialogue and partnership in priority areas, using regional organizations like ASEAN was formed on the basis

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of already established interstate relations, with specific Despite the consequences of the pandemic, in the current dif- conditions and in a certain historical period. For Central ficult period, the Council manifests itself as a dynamic inter- Asian states, the experience of such structures is valuable state structure. The Turkic Council was one of the first among not as a “tracing paper,” but in terms of studying the pos - international structures to respond to the pandemic crisis: on sibilities of deepening the political, trade and economic April 10 this year on the initiative of Azerbaijan, as Chair of the interaction of countries with different levels of develop - organization, the Summit was held in the video-conferencing ment, forming their relations with world powers and other format. As a result, the leaders of our countries, unanimously regional structures. showing solidarity in the fight against the pandemic and its negative consequences, have agreed to develop and implement practical measures for cooperation in the context of a Baku Dialogues: pandemic – from interaction in the healthcare sector to facilitating transport links. Let us stay on the topic of regional affairs. Uzbekistan joined the Turkic Council as a full member in 2019. And for those of us based in Uzbekistan is an active participant in the process of deepening Azerbaijan, it was a fortuitous sign that this happened at the organization’s cooperation between the countries of the Turkic Council. Baku summit, which, as it happened, coincided with the tenth anniver - Therefore, during the video summit held on April 10 this year, sary of the adoption of the landmark Nakhichevan Agreement. Joining the President Shavkat Mirziyoyev put forward a number of initia- Turkic Council is obviously an issue of identity and a sense of belonging tives in the areas of healthcare, trade, investment and trans- that touches upon history, language, culture, and so much else. And it is port. They are already under practical implementation. Thus, also about practical cooperation, as we have seen in the way the Turkic the Coordination Committee for Combating the Pandemic world came together to combat the coronavirus pandemic in the wake of was created within the CCTS, which plays an important role the extraordinary summit meeting that was held in April. The question in expanding cooperation between the healthcare institutions has two parts, Mr. Minister. First, can you speak to the concrete bene - sharing experience in the treatment and prevention of corona- fits for Uzbekistan that membership in the Turkic Council has accrued virus and developing vaccines. since your country joined? And second, can you say something about Uzbekistan’s strategic vision for the future of the Turkic Council—looking Another important initiative voiced by Tashkent was the ahead to the twentieth anniversary of the Nakhichevan Agreement? signing on September 11, 2020 of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Turkic Council and the World Health Organization (WHO). Kamilov: Also, on the initiative of the Uzbek side, a Working Group of Uzbekistan’s accession to the Cooperation Council of Transport Ministers was created within the Organization and Turkic-Speaking States (CCTS) last year was a logical contin- its first meeting was held. This mechanism makes it possible uation of the country’s new foreign policy course. The coop- to promptly agree on the schemes for the delivery of humani- eration of the member states in this organization is based on tarian goods and the uninterrupted transportation of essential the common history, language, culture and traditions of the goods during a pandemic among the CCTS member states. fraternal peoples. Considering that our country was one of the cradles of the civilizations of the Turkic-speaking peoples, its The Turkic Council is a young regional organization with good participation in the Turkic Council is an objective process. development prospects. Modern international and regional

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processes necessitate the strengthening interconnectedness in UN resolutions, recommendations of the World Health the field of economy and transport. The member states of the Organization and universal multilateral instruments. Council have enormous potential for economic, transport and transit, scientific, technological and human development. To- The pandemic poses a serious risk for the world community gether we have to realize these great opportunities. in achieving the goals and objectives of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In this regard, the Code will consolidate voluntary obligations of states to support the health Baku Dialogues: system, raise awareness and sanitary and hygienic culture of the population, and ensure social protection, maintaining In his address to the UN General Assembly in September, President food security and supply chains, and strengthening interna- Mirziyoyev advocated expanding the competencies of the World Health tional cooperation and mutual assistance in the fight against Organization and proposed the development, under UN auspices, of pandemics. an “international code of voluntary commitments of states during pandemics.” Mr. Minister, can you say something more about this—how, in The endorsement and adoption of such a Code by the interna- your view, this proposal could play an important role in restoring much- tional community will contribute to the elaboration of frame- needed trust, without which multilateral diplomacy and international co- work and reasonable approaches. Such approaches mean: operation is much harder to engender? First, determination of the temporary nature of restrictive measures with mandatory guarantees of observance of citi- Kamilov: zens’ rights and freedoms. Such measures should be propor- tionate to the risks, should not impede international trade and The global crisis caused by COVID-19 has affected all spheres efforts to support socially vulnerable groups of population; of public life and economic development of states and revealed Second, development of systemic, timely and effective mea- a number of global problems in the pandemic response system. sures of prevention, forecasting, containment at early stages, By and large, it showed the absence of a global action plan for counteraction to epidemics and their consequences; Third, such emergencies. ensuring labor safety, especially in the healthcare system.

Based on the need to enhance the principles of common re- We are convinced that the implementation of this initiative sponsibility, close international coordination in countering will be a step towards the formation of a fair global system global threats to human health and security, the President of that will facilitate an effective and coordinated response of the Uzbekistan speaking at the seventy-fifth session of the UN world community to common challenges. General Assembly has initiated the adoption of the Interna- tional Code of Voluntary Commitments of States during Pan- demics under the UN auspices. Baku Dialogues:

The aim of this initiative is to consolidate the minimum vol- The UN’s flagship multilateral initiative is the 2030 Agenda for untary obligations of states, both to their citizens and to in- Sustainable Development. The SDGs are unprecedented in their scope ternational partners, in the political, social, economic, hu- and ambition for human progress—a declaration of, and a pathway to- manitarian and human rights spheres based on the relevant wards, the comprehensive transformation of humanity, predicated on the

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As you know, Mr. Minister, achieving the SDGs worldwide is predicated The Government of Uzbekistan has taken a number of major on the assumption of increasing international cooperation; it is also pred- anti-crisis measures, including financial, economic and regu- icated on enough resources being dedicated to achieving the SDGs. We’ve latory, to support entrepreneurs, vulnerable groups of popula- seen how both of these assumptions have been set back in 2020—the first tion and workers in social institutions in order to mitigate the because of how the world has handled the coronavirus pandemic and the impact of the pandemic on the SDGs. An anti-crisis fund of $1 second because of how countries are prioritizing the allocation of funds billion has been created. to quickly get out of the global recession it has caused, sometimes to the detriment of SDG implementation. Uzbekistan’s leadership has set tasks to further reduce pov - erty and inequality; improve the quality and equal access Mr. Minister, how has Uzbekistan integrated sustainable development to social services, in particular in healthcare and educa - in its domestic policies and the conduct of external relations, and how has tion with a focus on remote regions and vulnerable groups the pandemic affected your approach to fulfilling the SDGs? of population; secure sustainable employment, especially among youth and women; achieve a more rational use of water, energy, land and other natural resources. Further Kamilov: strengthening the rule of law, freedom of speech and mass media, increasing transparency and quality of public ser - The Sustainable Development Goals adopted in 2015 are of vices, reducing corruption and ensuring gender equality on crucial importance for Uzbekistan. The idea behind the SDGs the principle of “leaving no one behind” are among the im - is that economic development must go hand in hand with portant tasks. improved social protection and the inclusion of vulnerable groups in development. Consistent implementation of the ongoing reforms in Uzbeki- stan, as well as active cooperation with the United Nations and The presentation of Uzbekistan’s first Voluntary National other international partners will contribute to the successful Review on progress in implementation of the SDGs was held at achievement of the sustainable development goals. the High-level Political Forum under the auspices of ECOSOC on July 15, 2020. The delegation headed by Madame Tanzila Narbayeva, the Chairman of the Oliy Majlis Senate, empha- Baku Dialogues: sized the country’s strong commitment to the implementation of the 2030 Global Agenda and the promotion of large-scale Uzbekistan has a longstanding relationship with NATO—your country reform within the Uzbekistan’s Development Strategy that are joined Partnership for Peace in July 1994, right around the time you were fully consistent with the SDGs. appointed foreign minister the first time around. You have joined, twice, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, but in 2012 Uzbekistan sus- The work is underway to integrate the National SDGs into pended its membership, although it engages with many of the CSTO national, sectoral and regional development strategies and countries through the CIS. And since the turn of the century, Uzbekistan programs, including the Concept of Comprehensive Socio- has been a full and active member of the Shanghai Cooperation Orga- Economic Development of the Republic of Uzbekistan and nization: after all, the SCC’s Secretary-General is from Uzbekistan—in

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For its part, the CIS is an important regional mechanism for us Kamilov: to develop mutually acceptable approaches and conformed practical measures to unite the potential of countries ensuring secu- In the context of globalization the bilateral and multilateral co- rity in the Commonwealth space, including in the field of actions operation in the military and military-technical sphere, as well against terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, illegal migration as in the field of security is an important component of stability and human trafficking, organized crime groups and cybercrime. and ensuring sustainable peace. Uzbekistan actively interacts with partner states, as well as international and regional orga- Along with this, according to the Concept of Foreign Policy nizations in these areas based on the national interests. Along Activities of Uzbekistan, the armed forces of our country do with this, Uzbekistan firmly adheres to the principle of secu- not participate in peacekeeping missions and operations rity indivisibility since the state of national security and the abroad. Uzbekistan does not place foreign military bases and level of sustainability of the situation of any country, certainly, facilities on its territory. These principles remain unchanged. has an impact on stability at the regional and global levels.

After gaining independence, our country consistently and Baku Dialogues: based on the national interests participates in the NATO Partnership for Peace Program within the annually approved Our final question. Mr. Minister, is about Uzbekistan’s relationship with individual programs. Participation in this Program is essential Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus. Since late September, a central issue in terms of exchange of experience and advanced knowledge for the Silk Road region and beyond has been the reheating of the conflict in the military and military-technical fields. Uzbek military between Azerbaijan and Armenia. personnel regularly participate in Alliance’s activities related to military education, training of staff officers, improving -lan So our question. Mr. Minister, is not just about Tashkent’s position on guage skills, conducting trainings and exercises to combat ter- the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, although that’s obviously a central issue, rorism and other threats. but also, more broadly, about the bilateral ties between Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. How do you assess this relationship? And do you see a role At the same time, Uzbekistan develops close cooperation in for Uzbekistan in bringing Armenia ‘back into the regional fold,’ so to the military and military-technical sphere at the bilateral level speak, in the aftermath of the end of the war? with leading foreign policy partner states based on the interests of national security. Much attention is paid to the development of multilateral cooperation to ensure regional security Kamilov: within the SCO and the CIS. The relations between Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan are charac- In particular, Uzbekistan participates in interaction on the is- terized by a high level of trust and lack of disagreements, they sues of combating terrorism in the SCO and in December 2018 have clearly defined strategic priorities and guidelines. We re- ratified the Agreement on the procedure for organizing and gard Azerbaijan as a brotherly country and a key state in the conducting joint anti-terrorist exercises by the SCO Member South Caucasus.

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Tashkent and Baku maintain close contacts at the highest In Uzbekistan, people are especially proud of the fact that and high levels, as well as within regional and international in the center of the capitals of our countries—Baku and structures. Since 2016, 11 meetings have been held between Tashkent—the monuments to the outstanding Uzbek poet, the leaders of the two countries Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Ilham educator and statesman Alisher Navoi and the world-famous, Aliyev within the framework of international events of the greatest Azerbaijani poet and thinker Nizami Ganjavi have CIS, SCO and CCTSS. been erected. One of the central streets of Baku is named after the great Uzbek scientist Mirzo Ulugbek. Let me remind you that it was at the Baku summit of the Turkic Council on October 15, 2019 that President Shavkat I would also like to note that in 2010 the Azerbaijan cultural Mirziyoyev first introduced Uzbekistan as a full member in center named after Heydar Aliyev was opened in Tashkent, this organization. The high-level talks held during this visit and one of the streets in the capital was named after the na- between the leaders of Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan opened up tional leader of brotherly Azerbaijan. a new page in the traditionally friendly relations between the two countries, confirmed the commitment of the parties to in- All this serves as a clear evidence that strong friendship, crease cooperation in trade, economic, investment, transport cultural and spiritual closeness between the Uzbek and and communication and other spheres. Azerbaijani peoples have been and remain the foundation for further strengthening the close and fruitful interstate relations At present, over 130 documents have been signed between between Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, and the mutual support Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. Among them the 1996 Treaty of in the international arena. Friendship and Cooperation, as well as the 2004 Declaration on the Further Strengthening of Strategic Partnership. Tashkent and Baku definitely and firmly support each other’s positions on various issues and problems. Over the past three years, more than 40 high-level visits have taken place between the parties, including the visit of the Prime In this context, I want to emphasize that Uzbekistan has per- Minister of Uzbekistan Abdulla Aripov to Baku to participate manently advocated and continues to advocate a peaceful, in the opening ceremony of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway (in political solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and 2017). considers ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan to be the main condition for its The inter-parliamentary friendship groups actively interact. settlement. The Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan inter-parliamentary group has been functioning in the Milli Majlis of Azerbaijan since 1995. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that in its official In 2018, an inter-parliamentary group on cooperation with the statement of September 27 this year the Ministry of Foreign Milli Majlis of Azerbaijan was established in the Oliy Majlis of Affairs of Uzbekistan called on the parties of the conflict to Uzbekistan. begin diplomatic negotiations with a view to a peaceful settlement of the conflict in compliance with the above princi- An important mechanism for promoting bilateral coopera- ples of sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition, the tion in trade, economic, investment and other spheres is the Uzbek side, as the chairperson of the CIS, has confirmed “the Intergovernmental Commission on Cooperation, through importance of strengthening relations of friendship, good which 10 meetings were held. neighborliness and mutual trust, the peaceful resolution of

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controversial issues in the Commonwealth space strictly in accordance with international law.”

We fully support the readiness of Azerbaijan to sit down at the negotiating table with Armenia and discuss the conditions for peaceful coexistence of the population on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

We wish the people and the leadership of Azerbaijan the ear- liest possible achievement of peace and prosperity, the implementation of all creative plans and initiatives.

Baku Dialogues:

Thank you, Mr. Minister, for the interview. BD

bakudialogues.ada.edu.az

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BAKU DIALOGUES POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON THE SILK ROAD REGION

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