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Resúmenes IV Coloquio Internacional Sociedad Chilena De Filosofía Analítica (SCFA) Resúmenes IV Coloquio Internacional Sociedad Chilena de Filosofía Analítica (SCFA) Departamento de Filosofía, Universidad Alberto Hurtado Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Santiago, 25 al 28 de marzo de 2014 Representacionalismo, disyuntivismo y el problema de la alucinación Francisco Pereira Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile [email protected] Hay dos clases de teorías que protagonizan el debate contemporáneo sobre la estructura metafísica de la experiencia perceptual. Por una parte, tenemos las teorías representacionalistas que aspiran a dar una caracterización homogénea a todas nuestras experiencias perceptuales, sean estas percepciones, ilusiones o alucinaciones en virtud de la instanciación de propiedades representacionales primitivas que conforman un estructura metafísica común. Por otra parte, están las teorías relacionales (particularmente el “disyuntivismo”) que niegan por completo que exista un factor metafísico común a las percepciones, incluyendo las ilusiones, y a las alucinaciones que no podemos discriminar introspectivamente de ellas. En esta presentación me centraré en un problema específico que debe enfrentar el teórico relacional disyuntivista: “el problema de la alucinación”, es decir, el problema que tiene toda teoría disyuntiva para dar cuenta de aquellos aspectos que supuestamente las percepciones y sus contrapartes alucinatorias comparten a nivel fenomenológico y cognitivo, sin referir a la existencia de factores estructurales de orden metafísico en común. Abordaré esta temática en tres etapas diferentes: (i) Primero, especificaré los compromisos del disyuntivismo en relación al problema de la alucinación, (ii) Segundo, me detendré en las alucinaciones desde una perspectiva empírica y filosófica, (iii) Finalmente, argumentaré que el disyuntivismo es una tesis plausible si comprende la indiscriminabilidad como una propiedad epistémica negativa fundada, al menos en parte, en una confusión metacognitiva implícita que nos lleva a experimentar episodios no perceptuales como si fueran reales. Emotional Perception as Perception of Values. A Phenomenological Analysis Sarah Songhorian y Francesca Forle PERSONA Research Centre in Phenomenology and Sciences of the Person – CNC Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, San Raffaele University, Italia [email protected] In contemporary debate there are several different theories of emotions. There are feeling theories (James 1884; Lange 1885), conative theories (Frijda 1988) and cognitive ones. Within the latter kind both conceptualist perspectives (Solomon 1976) and non-conceptualist ones (Deonna, Teroni 2012; Helm 2009) can be found. Our aim in this paper is that of understanding Max Scheler’s work within a non-conceptualist cognitive theory of emotions and trying to propose the idea that emotions can be described as perceptions of values. In order to do so, we will start giving the schelerian account of a particular kind of emotion, that is vicarious emotions (Scheler 1923). This example will prove particularly relevant because vicarious emotions are one of the clearest cases in which we can identify the object as valuable, specifically because they involve other people – commonly considered as 1 valuable – and their affective states. The same account that will be provided here can also be applied to the other emotional experiences. We just chose the one we felt was the clearest. We will focus therefore on the careful analysis of fellow-feelings conducted by Scheler. We will propose a three variables model that will help us explain the elements of vicarious emotions, focusing, in particularly, on the object of those phenomena. We will also provide an account of the difference between the nature of those phenomena and the level of consciousness that the subject of them can experience in any given case. In particular, we will see that fellow-feelings in general have as their object valuable features, either another person or – there is often no disjunction here, but a conjunction – a specific affective state of that person. The level of consciousness of the subject sharing the emotion is not at issue here, since it does not change the nature of the experience itself or its objective source. As we will see, even in the case of emotional infection, for instance, where Anne doesn’t know why her mood changed entering a cheerful party, it is still true that that emotion comes from somewhere – another person or a group of people. The nature of the experience is not at all different because of the fact that she cannot identify such an origin. Then, having shown that the object of fellow-feelings in general are value-qualities, we will investigate which specific act is able to present them in propria persona (Husserl 1901, 1913). We will show that we can describe this act as a kind of perception, in particular affective perception. So, if fellow-feelings, as vicarious emotions, have value-qualities as their objects, and if value-qualities are presented in propria persona in the act of affective perception, then we can describe emotions as fellow- feelings as a particular kind of value perception. Fellow-feelings, as a specific kind of emotion, can then be considered in parallel with other forms of perceptions, so that our account can be described as a partially non-conceptualist view on emotions as acts of presentation of value-qualities. References Darwall S. (1998), “Empathy, Sympathy, Care”, Philosophical Studies, 89, pp. 261–282. Deonna J. A., Teroni F. (2012), The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction, London/New York: Routledge. De Monticelli R. (2008), L’ordine del cuore. Etica e teoria del sentire, Garzanti, Milano. De Monticelli R. (2009), La novità di ognuno. Persona e libertà, Garzanti, Milano. De Monticelli, R., Conni, C. (2008), Ontologia del nuovo. La rivoluzione fenomenologica e la ricerca oggi. Bruno Mondadori, Milano. Eisenberg N., Strayer J. (1987), Empathy and Its Development, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Frijda N.H. (1988), “The Laws of Emotion”, American Psychologist, 43, pp. 349-358. Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2008). The Phenomenological Mind. An Introduction toPhilosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Routledge, London & New York. Helm B. W. (2009), “Emotions as Evaluative Feelings”, Emotion Review, 1/3, pp. 248-255. Husserl, E. (1901). Logical Investigations, Trans. J. N. Findlay, Routledge, London 2001. Husserl, E. (1913). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological Philosophy, Kluwer Academic Publisher, Boston 1989. James W. (1884), “What is an Emotion?”, Mind, 9/34, pp. 188-205. Lange C. G. (1885), “Ueber Gemüthsbewegungen. Eine psycho-physiologische Studie”, trans. Eng. Haupt I. A., “The Emotions. A Psychophysiological Study”, in Dunlap K. (Ed.)(1922), The Emotions. Volume I. Psychology Classics, Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins Company, pp. 33-90. Scheler M. (1913), Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt Toward a Foundation of An Ethical Personalism, transl. M. S. Frings and R. L. Funk, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, 1973. Scheler M. (1923), The Nature of Sympathy, transl. P. Heath, Routledge & Keegan Paul, London, 1973. Scheler M. (1933), Selected Philosophical Essays, transl. John Wild et al., Northwestern University Press, Northwestern, 1973. Solomon R. C. (1976), The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, re-edited (1993) Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Stein E. (1917), On the Problem of Empathy, ICS Publications, Washington, D.C. 1989. Stern D. N. (1977), The First Relationship: Infant and Mother, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Steuber K. R. (2006), Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology and the Human Sciences, Cambridge, MIT Press. 2 Whiting D. (2011), “The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions”, European Journal of Philosophy, 19/2, pp. 281-303. Zahavi D. (2001), "Beyond Empathy. Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity", Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8/5-7, pp. 151–167. Zahavi D. (2007), "Expression and Empathy", In D. Hutto, M. Ratcliffe (editors), Folk Psychology Reassessed, Springer, pp. 25–40. Zahavi D. (2010), “Max Scheler”, In A. Schrift (editor), History of Continental Philosophy III, Acumen Press, Edinburgh, pp. 171186. Zahavi D. (2012), “Basic Empathy and Complex Empathy”, Emotion Review, 4/1, pp. 81-82. Second-Order Knowledge and Indexicality Yves Bouchard Université de Sherbrooke, Canada [email protected] The KK-thesis stipulates that Ka ⊃ KaKa, in other words, that if an agent a knows a proposition ' then she knows that she knows that . This is an epistemic counterpart of the modal axiom 4, i.e., ⊃ . In a standard modal system like KT, the inclusion of 4 allows the addition or the reduction of homogeneous iterated modalities (iterated necessity operators or iterated possibility operators can be homogeneously augmented or homogeneously reduced to one single operator). This behavior of the system, which is S4, corresponds to one particular interpretation of the notion of necessity, according to which necessity is understood through a reflexive and transitive accessibility relation. In the same fashion, the epistemic operator obeys a certain understanding of the notion of knowledge when it exhibits the properties of S4. Whereas in alethic logic there is no a priori difficulty with the perspective of several notions of necessity (depending on ontological considerations, for instance), in epistemic logic it seems
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