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Index of Names INDEX OF NAMES A Austin, John L., 53-54, 286-287 Abelard, Peter, 11, 13,325 Auvergne, Wilhelm of, 13 Abraham, Max, 945 A verroes, 11 Achinstein, Peter, 215, 218 219 Avicenna, 11, 13 220 ' , Aquinas, Thomas, 11-12, 13,20, Ackennann, Wilhelm, 592 337,456 Adams, Ernest, 902 Ayer, Alfred, 51, 52, 283, 379, Adams, J. K., 868 405,820 Adams, P. A., 868 Adams, John Couch, 926 B Adler, Jonathan, 158-160,880-881 Bachelard, Gaston, 611 Aeschylus, 639 Bacon, Francis, 14, 18, 24, 197, Agassi, Joseph, 219 198, 206-208, 210-211, 228, Agassiz, Alexander, 931, 932 244,524,987 Ajdukiewicz, Kazimier, 5, 48, 790, Bacon, J. B., 798 793,795,805,824,829,830 Bacon, Roger, 12-13, 18 AI-Farabi, Abu Nasr, 11 Baire, R. L., 586 Albert the Great, 11, 13 Baker, John A., 293 A1chourron, Carlos, 255, 263 Baker, L. R., 511 D' Alembert, Jean Ie Rond, 27 Baldwin, T., 400, 402 Almeder, Robert, 551 Balzac, Honore, 634 Alston, William, 349, 366, 467, Bambrough, Renford, 625 470,483,487,665,687,696, Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua, 521-522 698-4, 702, 862 791,827 ' Amabile, Teresa 858 Barnes, Barry, 758-765, 770, 926, Anaxagoras, 6 931-3,937,954-956 Anderson, C. A. 831 Barthes, Roland, 634, 639 Anscombe, Elizabeth, 955 Bartlett, F. C., 956 Anselm of Canterbury, St., 11 Bartley, W. W., 742 Archimedes, 575 Batens, Diderik, 232-34 Aristotle, 7-8, 9, 11 20 206 228 Baudrillard, Jean, 989, 1006-1007 337-1,341,348: 385,398-2, ' Bayes, Thomas, 216-3, 225, 226, 405,456,506-507,522-523, 683 526, 573-575, 580-582, 608, Bealer, George, 782, 831 612,751,811 Beardsley, Monroe C., 632, 634- Annstrong, David, 341, 399, 417, 635,641,990 652,985-986,996-998 Belnap, Noel D., 236, 245, 382- Aron, Raymond, 635 383 Arthur, Brian, 957 Bencivenga, E., 797 Audi, Robert, 490, 873 Bender, J. W., 891, 991, 993 Augustine of Hippo, 10,986 Beneke, Friedrich Eduard, 41 Aune, Bruce, 828 Bennett, Jonathan, 794,828 Austen, Jane, 655, 1003 1027 1028 INDEX OF NAMES Benussi, Vittorio, 41 Bradley, Francis Herbert, 34, 49, Berg, Jan, 827 351,362,402,621 Bergmann, Gustav, 793 Bradwardine, Thomas, 13 Bergson, Henri, 47-48 Braine, M. D. S., 888 Berkeley, George, 3, 5, 21-23,81, Braithwaite, Richard B., 228 404,417,555,652,694,926 Brandom, Robert, 384, 403, 405 Berlin, Isaiah, 612 Brannigan, Augustine, 236, 239- Bernays, Paul, 38, 446, 593, 599 241,243 Berry, G. D., 594 Brentano, Franz, 43-45, 403, 440, Bernoulli, Jacob, 527 452-453,610,614,617,628, Bernstein, Richard J., 622 819 Berwick, R. C., 726 Brewer, Bill, 670 Beth, Evert, 229 Brigdman, William P., 47 Bhaskar, Roy, 428 Brisson, Christine, 726 Billman, Dorrit 858-859 Broad, C. D., 820 Black, Max, 525-526,997 Broadbent, Donald, 938, 956 Blackburn, Simon, 9 Bromberger, Sylvain, 230 Blake, William, 1004 Brooks, P. G., 887 Blanshard, Brand, 34, 364-8, 401- Brouwer, Luitzen Egbertus Jan, 5 445,586-587,588,922 Block, Ned, 720, 728 Brown, Jessica, 668 Bloor, David 758-765, 770 Brueckner, A., 667 Blum, L., 190 Buchanan, B. G., 900 Blum, M., 190 BUchner, Ludwig, 40 Boden, Margaret, 238, 995 Bunge, Mario, 796 Boghossian, Paul, 566, 668, 670, Burali-Forti, Cesare, 594 782, 804-805, 828 Burge, Tyler, 510-511, 518, 657- Boh, I., 963 659,662,665,667,669,721 Bohr, Niels, 218 Burian, Richard, 223 Bolayi, Janos, 594 Buridan, John, 13, 337, 963 Bolzano, Bernard, 3, 41-42, 325, Burleigh, Walter, 963 442-443, 445, 453-454, 458, Butrick, R., 828 585 Byrne, R. M. J., 888 Bonaventure, St. see Fidanza, Jan Bonjour, Laurence, 363, 367, 476, C 477,478-479,481-482,484, Cain, J. A., 740 487-488,490,831,859,873, Campbell, Donald, 221, 222, 736- 891 738,740-742,810,934,956 Boole, George, 532, 581, 594 Camp, J. C., 382, 383 Borkowski, L., 795, 806-807 Candlish, S., 402 Borel, Emile, 527, 586 Cantor, Georg, 575, 581, 584, 586, Born, Max, 948 590,594 Bosanquet, Bernard, 34 Cardano, Girolamo, 14 Bourbaki, Nicholas, 599 Cargile, James, 566 Bradie, Michael, 736 INDEX OF NAMES 1029 Carnap, Rudolf, 38, 51, 52-53, 188, Cohen, L. J., 514, 515, 536, 860- 213,219,227,402,418,420- 861,900 421,521-522,526,531,533- Cohen, Paul, 595 534,534-535,550,553,556, Cohen, Stewart, 484 566,610-611,618,788,791- Cole, Stephen, 939, 941, 944, 949- 792,799,801,803-804,812, 950,952,957 818-819,828,830,932-934, Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, 993- 940, 951-952, 963 994 Carneades, 9 Collingwood, R. G., 228, 618 Carnot, Sadi, 233 Collins, Allan, 900 Carroll, Noel, 990 Collins, Harry, 236, 954, 956, 957 Cartwright, Nancy, 611 Comte, Auguste, 38-39, 418 Cartwright, R. L., 400 Conant, James, 925 Case, J., 191 Condillac, Etienne Bonnot de, 27 Cassirer, Ernst, 35, 36, 631, 633 Conee, Earl, 485, 486 Castonguay, Charles, 822, 828, Copernicus, Nicolaus, 14, 566, 830 921,921 Casullo, A., 831 Copi, Irwing, 790, 821, 830 Cauchy, Auguste, 594 Cosmides, Leda, 142, 146-148, Chaitin, Gregory, 602 152-153,888 Chalmers, David J., 615 Cournot, A. A., 529 Changeaux, J.-P., 740 Couturat, Louis, 578 Charron, Pierre, 14 Chun, Carl, 931, 932 Cheng, P. W., 888-889 Church, Alonzo, 790, 809, 830 Cherniack, Christopher, 169,219 Cirera, Ramon, 828 Chihara, Charles, 597 Cowper, E. A., 709, 726 Chisholm, Roderick, 284, 351, 349, Craig, Edward, 491, 872 485-486,618,694,796,819, Creath, Richard, 828 828,831,862-863,873,876, Crimmins, M., 502-504, 510, 726 963 Culicover, P. W., 192, 709 Chomsky, Noam, 17, 138-140, Curd, Martin, 214, 143,396,614,629,709,710, Currie, Gregory, 990, 996 712-714,718,727,818,860, Curry, Haskell B., 446, 455, 603 992 Cziko, Gary, 736, 738-739 Church, Alonzo, 423, 446, 458, 528,592,595 D Churchland, Paul, 416, 551, 607, Dalton, John, 218 615,627,629,873,875 Dante Alighieri, 12 Chwistek, Leon, 446, 585 Danto, Arthur C., 639 Clarke, D. S. Jr., 286-289 Darden, Lindlay, 237, 740 Clasius, Rudolf, 233 Darwin, Charles, 46, 219-222, 230, Clement of Alexandria, 9 240,244,558,736,738-739, Clifford, W. K., 689-690 819 Code, Lorraine 859, 993, 1003 David, Marian, 828 Cohen, Hermann, 35-36 1030 INDEX OF NAMES Davidson, Donald, 318, 341, 389, Dretske, Fred, 509-511, 610, 614, 398-399,402,404,420,422, 741,869 481,518,609-610,615,620- Dubislav, Walter, 789, 827 621,626-627,632,635-636, Duhem, Pierre, 48, 234, 242, 921- 656,660,662,667,715,719, 924,926-928,930,932,955 721, 742, 756, 768 Dummett, Michael, 357, 369-403, Davies, Martin, 670, 709, 711, 712, 421-422,437,445-446,637, 717,990-991 641, 709, 714,719,720-725, Davis, Ph. J., 601 727,827 Dear, Peter, 208 Duncan, S. C., 239 de Finetti, Bruno, 530, 566 Duns Scotus, John, 12,423,456, de Morgan, Augustus, 581, 594 963 Dedekind, Richard, 583, 594, 599 Dvorak, Max, 38 Delius, H., 822, 829 DeLong, H., 830-831 E Democritus, 6, 20 Eccles, John, 417 Dennett, Daniel C., 615, 659, 726, von Eckhardt, Barbara 842 742,842 Eckhart, Master, 12 De Pieris, G., 829 Edelman, G. M., 740 Derrida, Jacques, 988 Edge, David, 956 Descartes, Rene, 3, 4, 5, lO, 14-18, Ehrenfe1s, Christian von, 41 20,24,32,95,100,206-208, Einstein, Albert, 221, 238, 829, 210-211,228,288,337,355- 925,944-945,947 356,357-358,360,404,469, Elman, J., 717 576-577,607-608,614,617, Ess1er, R 829-830 627,647-651,659,669,688- Ellis, Brian, 220 689,691,694,703,770,811, Ellis, R. L., 528 815,818-819,829-830,843, Empedocles, 5 987,992 Engels, Friedrich, 40 Desmond, Adrian, 954 Enriques, F., 582 Detlefsen, Michael, 798 Ericsson, K. A., 868 Devitt, Michael, 399, 608, 616, Eriugena, John Scot, 13 625-626, 636 Etchemendy,John,389 Dewey, John, 351, 401, 419,735, Euclid, 7, 574-576, 582 742,841 Evans, Gareth, 712-7l3, 716-717, Diderot, Denis, 27 726 Diller, Justus, 447 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 34, 38, 607, 609, F 623,642,954 Dionysius the Pseudo Aeropagite, Fagin, R., 963 10 Faraday, Michael, 221, 238 Dorling, Jon, 210, 223 Faucher, Luc, 219 Downes, S., 235-236 Feagin, S., 990 Doyle, Jon, 258 Feldman, Richard, 290, 485-486, Dreben, Burton, 828 841 INDEX OF NAMES 1031 Fetzer, James H., 562 Galileo Galilei, 13-14, 220, 559, Feyerabend, Paul, 416, 623, 640, 751-753 923-924, 1016 Galison, Peter, 551 Feynman, Richard, 218 Gfu"denfors, Peter, 255, 263, 265, Fichte, Johann G., 3, 32-33, 35, 505,534,963 439-440, 993 Gauss, C. F., 594 Fidanza, Jan, 12 Geach, Peter, 384, 613 Field, Hartry, 333, 393-394, 399, Geffner, H., 902 405-407,423,596-597,831 Geirsson, H., 83 1 Fine, Arthur, 424, 623, 952, 973 George, A., 707, 708,711, 716, Finetti, Bruno de, 966 724, 726, 728 Firth, Roderick, 287 Gentzen, Gerhard Karl Erich, 353, Fischhoff, Baruch, 142, 868 593 Fisher, R. A., 532 Gettier, Edmund, 286, 290, 356, Fleck, Ludwik, 239, 611 357, 467-468 Flew, Anthony, 679-680 Gewirth, A., 799, 827-828 Floyd, Julieth, 828 Gibson, E., 713 Fodor, Jerry, 144,333,509,511, Gibson, J. J., 416 610,614,627,629,632,710- Giere, Ronald, 213, 532 712,718,727,864-865,874- Gigerenzer, Gerd, 142, 146, 150, 877 152,157-158,160-163, 172, Foley, Richard, 500, 504-505, 507, 550 859 Gilligan, Carol, 1013 Foucault, Michel, 607, 609, 612, Ginet, Carl, 291, 488,862 616-617,642,988-989,993 Glymour, Clark, 223, 227, 536, Fox Keller, Evelyn, 1015 566 Franklin, Allan, 566 GOdel, Kurt, 455, 458, 572, 582, Frege, Gottlob, 41-43, 213, 325, 585,592-593,595-597,602 346-347,349,351,379,398, Gochet, Paul, 803, 828 404-405,437-438, 442-443, Goethe, John Wolfgang, 212 445-446,501-503,511,581- Gold, E.
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